Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market: Misusing Mobile Sensors
for Stealthy Data Exfiltration
author:Michalis Diamantaris and
Serafeim Moustakas and
Lichao Sun and
Sotiris Ioannidis and
Jason Polakis
This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market:
Misusing Mobile Sensors for Stealthy Data Exfiltration
Michalis Diamantaris
Serafeim Moustakas
Lichao Sun
FORTH
Heraklion, Crete, Greece
diamant@ics.forth.gr
FORTH
Heraklion, Crete, Greece
mustakas@ics.forth.gr
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, USA
james.lichao.sun@gmail.com
Sotiris Ioannidis
Technical University of Crete
Chania, Crete, Greece
sotiris@ece.tuc.gr
Jason Polakis
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois, USA
polakis@uic.edu
ABSTRACT
Mobile sensors have transformed how users interact with modern
smartphones and enhance their overall experience. However, the
absence of sufficient access control for protecting these sensors
enables a plethora of threats. As prior work has shown, malicious
apps and sites can deploy a wide range of attacks that use data
captured from sensors. Unfortunately, as we demonstrate, in the
modern app ecosystem where most apps fetch and render third-
party web content, attackers can use ads for delivering attacks.
In this paper, we introduce a novel attack vector that misuses
the advertising ecosystem for delivering sophisticated and stealthy
attacks that leverage mobile sensors. These attacks do not depend
on any special app permissions or specific user actions, and affect
all Android apps that contain in-app advertisements due to the
improper access control of sensor data in WebView. We outline
how motion sensor data can be used to infer users’ sensitive touch
input (e.g., credit card information) in two distinct attack scenarios,
namely intra-app and inter-app data exfiltration. While the former
targets the app displaying the ad, the latter affects every other
Android app running on the device. To make matters worse, we
have uncovered serious flaws i...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market: Misusing Mobile Sensors
for Stealthy Data Exfiltration
author:Michalis Diamantaris and
Serafeim Moustakas and
Lichao Sun and
Sotiris Ioannidis and
Jason Polakis
This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market:
Misusing Mobile Sensors for Stealthy Data Exfiltration
Michalis Diamantaris
Serafeim Moustakas
Lichao Sun
FORTH
Heraklion, Crete, Greece
diamant@ics.forth.gr
FORTH
Heraklion, Crete, Greece
mustakas@ics.forth.gr
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, USA
james.lichao.sun@gmail.com
Sotiris Ioannidis
Technical University of Crete
Chania, Crete, Greece
sotiris@ece.tuc.gr
Jason Polakis
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois, USA
polakis@uic.edu
ABSTRACT
Mobile sensors have transformed how users interact with modern
smartphones and enhance their overall experience. However, the
absence of sufficient access control for protecting these sensors
enables a plethora of threats. As prior work has shown, malicious
apps and sites can deploy a wide range of attacks that use data
captured from sensors. Unfortunately, as we demonstrate, in the
modern app ecosystem where most apps fetch and render third-
party web content, attackers can use ads for delivering attacks.
In this paper, we introduce a novel attack vector that misuses
the advertising ecosystem for delivering sophisticated and stealthy
attacks that leverage mobile sensors. These attacks do not depend
on any special app permissions or specific user actions, and affect
all Android apps that contain in-app advertisements due to the
improper access control of sensor data in WebView. We outline
how motion sensor data can be used to infer users’ sensitive touch
input (e.g., credit card information) in two distinct attack scenarios,
namely intra-app and inter-app data exfiltration. While the former
targets the app displaying the ad, the latter affects every other
Android app running on the device. To make matters worse, we
have uncovered serious flaws i...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Debugging the data plane with anteater
author:Haohui Mai and
Ahmed Khurshid and
Rachit Agarwal and
Matthew Caesar and
Brighten Godfrey and
Samuel Talmadge King
Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater
Haohui Mai
Matthew Caesar
Ahmed Khurshid
P. Brighten Godfrey
Rachit Agarwal
Samuel T. King
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
{mai4, khurshi1, agarwa16, caesar, pbg, kingst}@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Diagnosing problems in networks is a time-consuming and
error-prone process. Existing tools to assist operators pri-
marily focus on analyzing control plane conﬁguration. Con-
ﬁguration analysis is limited in that it cannot ﬁnd bugs in
router software, and is harder to generalize across protocols
since it must model complex conﬁguration languages and
dynamic protocol behavior.
This paper studies an alternate approach: diagnosing prob-
lems through static analysis of the data plane. This ap-
proach can catch bugs that are invisible at the level of con-
ﬁguration ﬁles, and simpliﬁes uniﬁed analysis of a network
across many protocols and implementations. We present
Anteater, a tool for checking invariants in the data plane.
Anteater translates high-level network invariants into in-
stances of boolean satisﬁability problems (SAT), checks them
against network state using a SAT solver, and reports coun-
terexamples if violations have been found. Applied to a large
university network, Anteater revealed 23 bugs, including for-
warding loops and stale ACL rules, with only ﬁve false posi-
tives. Nine of these faults are being ﬁxed by campus network
operators.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Operation; D.2.5 [Software Engineering]: Testing and
Debugging
General Terms
Algorithms, Reliability
Keywords
Data Plane Analysis, Network Troubleshooting, Boolean Sat-
isﬁability
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Debugging the data plane with anteater
author:Haohui Mai and
Ahmed Khurshid and
Rachit Agarwal and
Matthew Caesar and
Brighten Godfrey and
Samuel Talmadge King
Debugging the Data Plane with Anteater
Haohui Mai
Matthew Caesar
Ahmed Khurshid
P. Brighten Godfrey
Rachit Agarwal
Samuel T. King
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
{mai4, khurshi1, agarwa16, caesar, pbg, kingst}@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Diagnosing problems in networks is a time-consuming and
error-prone process. Existing tools to assist operators pri-
marily focus on analyzing control plane conﬁguration. Con-
ﬁguration analysis is limited in that it cannot ﬁnd bugs in
router software, and is harder to generalize across protocols
since it must model complex conﬁguration languages and
dynamic protocol behavior.
This paper studies an alternate approach: diagnosing prob-
lems through static analysis of the data plane. This ap-
proach can catch bugs that are invisible at the level of con-
ﬁguration ﬁles, and simpliﬁes uniﬁed analysis of a network
across many protocols and implementations. We present
Anteater, a tool for checking invariants in the data plane.
Anteater translates high-level network invariants into in-
stances of boolean satisﬁability problems (SAT), checks them
against network state using a SAT solver, and reports coun-
terexamples if violations have been found. Applied to a large
university network, Anteater revealed 23 bugs, including for-
warding loops and stale ACL rules, with only ﬁve false posi-
tives. Nine of these faults are being ﬁxed by campus network
operators.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Operation; D.2.5 [Software Engineering]: Testing and
Debugging
General Terms
Algorithms, Reliability
Keywords
Data Plane Analysis, Network Troubleshooting, Boolean Sat-
isﬁability
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Bird's Eye View of the World's Fastest Networks
author:Debopam Bhattacherjee and
Waqar Aqeel and
Gregory Laughlin and
Bruce M. Maggs and
Ankit Singla
A Bird’s Eye View of the World’s Fastest Networks
Debopam Bhattacherjee
ETH Zürich
Waqar Aqeel
Duke & M.I.T.
Gregory Laughlin
Yale
Bruce M. Maggs
Duke, Emerald Innovations, & M.I.T.
Ankit Singla
ETH Zürich
ABSTRACT
Low latency is of interest for a variety of applications. The most
stringent latency requirements arise in financial trading, where sub-
microsecond differences matter. As a result, firms in the financial
technology sector are pushing networking technology to its limits,
giving a peek into the future of consumer-grade terrestrial mi-
crowave networks. Here, we explore the world’s most competitive
network design race, which has played out over the past decade on
the Chicago-New Jersey trading corridor. We systematically recon-
struct licensed financial trading networks from publicly available
information, and examine their latency, path redundancy, wireless
link lengths, and operating frequencies.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement; Topology analysis and
generation; Physical topologies; Network design principles.
KEYWORDS
low latency, network design, high frequency trading
ACM Reference Format:
Debopam Bhattacherjee, Waqar Aqeel, Gregory Laughlin, Bruce M. Maggs,
and Ankit Singla. 2020. A Bird’s Eye View of the World’s Fastest Networks.
In ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27–29, 2020,
Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3419394.3423620
1 INTRODUCTION
Many Internet applications are highly sensitive to latency. For pop-
ular Web services, a few hundred milliseconds of latency translate
to significant changes in revenue [10, 15]. For gaming, tens of mil-
liseconds imply large differences in player competitiveness [47].
Augmented and virtual reality [26] have even tighter requirements.
Perhaps the most latency-sensitive application,...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Bird's Eye View of the World's Fastest Networks
author:Debopam Bhattacherjee and
Waqar Aqeel and
Gregory Laughlin and
Bruce M. Maggs and
Ankit Singla
A Bird’s Eye View of the World’s Fastest Networks
Debopam Bhattacherjee
ETH Zürich
Waqar Aqeel
Duke & M.I.T.
Gregory Laughlin
Yale
Bruce M. Maggs
Duke, Emerald Innovations, & M.I.T.
Ankit Singla
ETH Zürich
ABSTRACT
Low latency is of interest for a variety of applications. The most
stringent latency requirements arise in financial trading, where sub-
microsecond differences matter. As a result, firms in the financial
technology sector are pushing networking technology to its limits,
giving a peek into the future of consumer-grade terrestrial mi-
crowave networks. Here, we explore the world’s most competitive
network design race, which has played out over the past decade on
the Chicago-New Jersey trading corridor. We systematically recon-
struct licensed financial trading networks from publicly available
information, and examine their latency, path redundancy, wireless
link lengths, and operating frequencies.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement; Topology analysis and
generation; Physical topologies; Network design principles.
KEYWORDS
low latency, network design, high frequency trading
ACM Reference Format:
Debopam Bhattacherjee, Waqar Aqeel, Gregory Laughlin, Bruce M. Maggs,
and Ankit Singla. 2020. A Bird’s Eye View of the World’s Fastest Networks.
In ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27–29, 2020,
Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3419394.3423620
1 INTRODUCTION
Many Internet applications are highly sensitive to latency. For pop-
ular Web services, a few hundred milliseconds of latency translate
to significant changes in revenue [10, 15]. For gaming, tens of mil-
liseconds imply large differences in player competitiveness [47].
Augmented and virtual reality [26] have even tighter requirements.
Perhaps the most latency-sensitive application,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in AMD's Secure Encrypted
Virtualization
author:Mengyuan Li and
Yinqian Zhang and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Yan Solihin
Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University; Yan Solihin,
University of Central Florida
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/li-mengyuan
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Mengyuan Li
The Ohio State University
Yinqian Zhang
The Ohio State University
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
Yan Solihin
University of Central Florida
Abstract
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an emerg-
ing technology to secure virtual machines (VM) even in the
presence of malicious hypervisors. However, the lack of trust
in the privileged software also introduces an assortment of
new attack vectors to SEV-enabled VMs that were mostly
unexplored in the literature. This paper studies the insecurity
of SEV from the perspective of the unprotected I/O operations
in the SEV-enabled VMs. The results are alerting: not only
have we discovered attacks that breach the conﬁdentiality
and integrity of these I/O operations—which we ﬁnd very
difﬁcult to mitigate by existing approaches—but more signiﬁ-
cantly we demonstrate the construction of two attack primi-
tives against SEV’s memory encryption schemes, namely a
memory decryption oracle and a memory encryption oracle,
which enables an adversary to decrypt and encrypt arbitrary
messages using the memory encryption keys of the VMs. We
evaluate the proposed attacks and discuss potential solutions
to the underlying problems.
1 Introduction
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an em...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in AMD's Secure Encrypted
Virtualization
author:Mengyuan Li and
Yinqian Zhang and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Yan Solihin
Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin, The Ohio State University; Yan Solihin,
University of Central Florida
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/li-mengyuan
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Mengyuan Li
The Ohio State University
Yinqian Zhang
The Ohio State University
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
Yan Solihin
University of Central Florida
Abstract
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an emerg-
ing technology to secure virtual machines (VM) even in the
presence of malicious hypervisors. However, the lack of trust
in the privileged software also introduces an assortment of
new attack vectors to SEV-enabled VMs that were mostly
unexplored in the literature. This paper studies the insecurity
of SEV from the perspective of the unprotected I/O operations
in the SEV-enabled VMs. The results are alerting: not only
have we discovered attacks that breach the conﬁdentiality
and integrity of these I/O operations—which we ﬁnd very
difﬁcult to mitigate by existing approaches—but more signiﬁ-
cantly we demonstrate the construction of two attack primi-
tives against SEV’s memory encryption schemes, namely a
memory decryption oracle and a memory encryption oracle,
which enables an adversary to decrypt and encrypt arbitrary
messages using the memory encryption keys of the VMs. We
evaluate the proposed attacks and discuss potential solutions
to the underlying problems.
1 Introduction
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an em...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:DSN 2007 Tutorials
author:Lu'ıs E. T. Rodrigues
DSN 2007 Tutorials
Lu·(cid:17)s Rodrigues
Universidade de Lisboa
ler@di.fc.ul.pt
Message from the Tutorials Chair
Scienti(cid:2)c Panel
Tutorials are an important part of the DSN program.
They provide an opportunity for attendees to acquire a ba-
sic understanding of, and familiarity with, several state of
the art topics related to the dependability, security and re-
silience of systems and networks. Tutorial proposals pro-
viding guidance on how technology can be applied success-
fully in practical systems were particularly encouraged.
This year, nine tutorial proposals were submitted. From
these, (cid:2)ve tutorials were selected using a two-phase proce-
dure. In the (cid:2)rst phase, all proposals were carefully evalu-
ated by a scienti(cid:2)c panel composed of Anish Arora, Danny
Dolev, Shivakant Mishra, Michel Raynal, Neil Speirs and
myself. The panel prepared a recommendation that was dis-
cussed, in a second phase, by the DSN steering committee
in cooperation with the DSN organizers. The (cid:2)nal selection
considered many different issues such as, but not limited
to, the relevance to the DSN attendees of the subject ad-
dressed, the quality of the tutorial structure, the merit and
quali(cid:2)cation of the speakers, but also practical aspects such
as logistic constraints.
Due to the high quality of the submissions received, DSN
2007 is able to offer an excellent set of tutorials on very
timely and relevant topics. On behalf of the tutorial scien-
ti(cid:2)c panel, I wish to thank all of the authors that submitted
proposals and made it possible to assemble such a strong
tutorial program. I would also like to thank the members
of the scienti(cid:2)c panel for their insightful contribution to the
selection process. Finally, I would like to thank the DSN
2007 organization, and in particular Tom Anderson and Mo-
hamed Ka(cid:136)aniche, for all the support provided to our panel.
A. Arora Ohio State U., U...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:DSN 2007 Tutorials
author:Lu'ıs E. T. Rodrigues
DSN 2007 Tutorials
Lu·(cid:17)s Rodrigues
Universidade de Lisboa
ler@di.fc.ul.pt
Message from the Tutorials Chair
Scienti(cid:2)c Panel
Tutorials are an important part of the DSN program.
They provide an opportunity for attendees to acquire a ba-
sic understanding of, and familiarity with, several state of
the art topics related to the dependability, security and re-
silience of systems and networks. Tutorial proposals pro-
viding guidance on how technology can be applied success-
fully in practical systems were particularly encouraged.
This year, nine tutorial proposals were submitted. From
these, (cid:2)ve tutorials were selected using a two-phase proce-
dure. In the (cid:2)rst phase, all proposals were carefully evalu-
ated by a scienti(cid:2)c panel composed of Anish Arora, Danny
Dolev, Shivakant Mishra, Michel Raynal, Neil Speirs and
myself. The panel prepared a recommendation that was dis-
cussed, in a second phase, by the DSN steering committee
in cooperation with the DSN organizers. The (cid:2)nal selection
considered many different issues such as, but not limited
to, the relevance to the DSN attendees of the subject ad-
dressed, the quality of the tutorial structure, the merit and
quali(cid:2)cation of the speakers, but also practical aspects such
as logistic constraints.
Due to the high quality of the submissions received, DSN
2007 is able to offer an excellent set of tutorials on very
timely and relevant topics. On behalf of the tutorial scien-
ti(cid:2)c panel, I wish to thank all of the authors that submitted
proposals and made it possible to assemble such a strong
tutorial program. I would also like to thank the members
of the scienti(cid:2)c panel for their insightful contribution to the
selection process. Finally, I would like to thank the DSN
2007 organization, and in particular Tom Anderson and Mo-
hamed Ka(cid:136)aniche, for all the support provided to our panel.
A. Arora Ohio State U., U...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A11y Attacks: Exploiting Accessibility in Operating Systems
author:Yeongjin Jang and
Chengyu Song and
Simon P. Chung and
Tielei Wang and
Wenke Lee
A11y Attacks: Exploiting Accessibility in
Operating Systems
Yeongjin Jang, Chengyu Song, Simon P. Chung, Tielei Wang, and Wenke Lee
School of Computer Science, College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
{yeongjin.jang,csong84,pchung,tielei.wang,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
Driven in part by federal law, accessibility (a11y) support for dis-
abled users is becoming ubiquitous in commodity OSs. Some assis-
tive technologies such as natural language user interfaces in mobile
devices are welcomed by the general user population. Unfortunately,
adding new features in modern, complex OSs usually introduces
new security vulnerabilities. Accessibility support is no exception.
Assistive technologies can be deﬁned as computing subsystems
that either transform user input into interaction requests for other
applications and the underlying OS, or transform application and
OS output for display on alternative devices. Inadequate security
checks on these new I/O paths make it possible to launch attacks
from accessibility interfaces. In this paper, we present the ﬁrst secu-
rity evaluation of accessibility support for four of the most popular
computing platforms: Microsoft Windows, Ubuntu Linux, iOS, and
Android. We identify twelve attacks that can bypass state-of-the-art
defense mechanisms deployed on these OSs, including UAC, the
Yama security module, the iOS sandbox, and the Android sandbox.
Further analysis of the identiﬁed vulnerabilities shows that their
root cause is that the design and implementation of accessibility
support involves inevitable trade-oﬀs among compatibility, usability,
security, and (economic) cost. These trade-oﬀs make it diﬃcult to
secure a system against misuse of accessibility support. Based on
our ﬁndings, we propose a number of recommendations to either
make the implementat...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A11y Attacks: Exploiting Accessibility in Operating Systems
author:Yeongjin Jang and
Chengyu Song and
Simon P. Chung and
Tielei Wang and
Wenke Lee
A11y Attacks: Exploiting Accessibility in
Operating Systems
Yeongjin Jang, Chengyu Song, Simon P. Chung, Tielei Wang, and Wenke Lee
School of Computer Science, College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
{yeongjin.jang,csong84,pchung,tielei.wang,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
Driven in part by federal law, accessibility (a11y) support for dis-
abled users is becoming ubiquitous in commodity OSs. Some assis-
tive technologies such as natural language user interfaces in mobile
devices are welcomed by the general user population. Unfortunately,
adding new features in modern, complex OSs usually introduces
new security vulnerabilities. Accessibility support is no exception.
Assistive technologies can be deﬁned as computing subsystems
that either transform user input into interaction requests for other
applications and the underlying OS, or transform application and
OS output for display on alternative devices. Inadequate security
checks on these new I/O paths make it possible to launch attacks
from accessibility interfaces. In this paper, we present the ﬁrst secu-
rity evaluation of accessibility support for four of the most popular
computing platforms: Microsoft Windows, Ubuntu Linux, iOS, and
Android. We identify twelve attacks that can bypass state-of-the-art
defense mechanisms deployed on these OSs, including UAC, the
Yama security module, the iOS sandbox, and the Android sandbox.
Further analysis of the identiﬁed vulnerabilities shows that their
root cause is that the design and implementation of accessibility
support involves inevitable trade-oﬀs among compatibility, usability,
security, and (economic) cost. These trade-oﬀs make it diﬃcult to
secure a system against misuse of accessibility support. Based on
our ﬁndings, we propose a number of recommendations to either
make the implementat...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:WindowGuard: Systematic Protection of GUI Security in Android
author:Chuangang Ren and
Peng Liu and
Sencun Zhu
WindowGuard: Systematic Protection of GUI
Security in Android
Chuangang Ren
Peng Liu
Sencun Zhu
The Pennsylvania State University
The Pennsylvania State University
The Pennsylvania State University
cyr5126@cse.psu.com
pliu@ist.psu.com
szhu@cse.psu.com
Abstract—Android graphic user interface (GUI) system plays
an important role in rendering app GUIs on display and
interacting with users. However, the security of this critical sub-
system remains under-investigated. In fact, Android GUI has been
plagued by a variety of GUI attacks in recent years. GUI attack
refers to any harmful behavior that attempts to adversely affect
the integrity or availability of the GUIs belonging to other apps.
These attacks are real threats and can cause severe consequences,
such as sensitive user information leakage, user device denial
of service, etc. Given the seriousness and rapid growth of GUI
attacks, we are in a pressing need for a comprehensive defense
solution. Nevertheless, existing defense methods fall short in
defense coverage, effectiveness and practicality.
To overcome these challenges, we systematically scrutinize the
security implications of Android GUI system design and propose
a new security model, Android Window Integrity (AWI), to com-
prehensively protect the system against GUI attacks. The AWI
model deﬁnes the user session to be protected and the legitimacy
of GUI system states in the unique mobile GUI environment. By
doing so, it can protect a normal user session against arbitrary
manipulation by attackers, and still preserve the original user
experience. Our implementation, WindowGuard, enforces the
AWI model and responds to a suspicious behavior by brieﬁng the
user about a security event and asking for the ﬁnal decision from
the user. This design not only improves the detection accuracy,
but also makes WindowGuard more usable and practical to meet
div...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:WindowGuard: Systematic Protection of GUI Security in Android
author:Chuangang Ren and
Peng Liu and
Sencun Zhu
WindowGuard: Systematic Protection of GUI
Security in Android
Chuangang Ren
Peng Liu
Sencun Zhu
The Pennsylvania State University
The Pennsylvania State University
The Pennsylvania State University
cyr5126@cse.psu.com
pliu@ist.psu.com
szhu@cse.psu.com
Abstract—Android graphic user interface (GUI) system plays
an important role in rendering app GUIs on display and
interacting with users. However, the security of this critical sub-
system remains under-investigated. In fact, Android GUI has been
plagued by a variety of GUI attacks in recent years. GUI attack
refers to any harmful behavior that attempts to adversely affect
the integrity or availability of the GUIs belonging to other apps.
These attacks are real threats and can cause severe consequences,
such as sensitive user information leakage, user device denial
of service, etc. Given the seriousness and rapid growth of GUI
attacks, we are in a pressing need for a comprehensive defense
solution. Nevertheless, existing defense methods fall short in
defense coverage, effectiveness and practicality.
To overcome these challenges, we systematically scrutinize the
security implications of Android GUI system design and propose
a new security model, Android Window Integrity (AWI), to com-
prehensively protect the system against GUI attacks. The AWI
model deﬁnes the user session to be protected and the legitimacy
of GUI system states in the unique mobile GUI environment. By
doing so, it can protect a normal user session against arbitrary
manipulation by attackers, and still preserve the original user
experience. Our implementation, WindowGuard, enforces the
AWI model and responds to a suspicious behavior by brieﬁng the
user about a security event and asking for the ﬁnal decision from
the user. This design not only improves the detection accuracy,
but also makes WindowGuard more usable and practical to meet
div...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Enhancing DNS Resilience against Denial of Service Attacks
author:Vasileios Pappas and
Daniel Massey and
Lixia Zhang
Enhancing DNS Resilience against Denial of Service Attacks
Vasileios Pappas
T.J. Watson Center
IBM Research
vpappas@us.ibm.com
Dan Massey
Lixia Zhang
Computer Science Department
Computer Science Department
Colorado State University
massey@cs.colostate.edu
UCLA
lixia@cs.ucla.edu
Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical Internet
infrastructure that provides name to address mapping ser-
vices. In the past few years, distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks have targeted the DNS infrastructure and
threaten to disrupt this critical service. In this paper we
show that the existing DNS can gain signiﬁcant resilience
against DDoS attacks through a simple change to the cur-
rent DNS operations, by setting longer time-to-live values
for a special class of DNS resource records, the infras-
tructure records. These records are used to navigate the
DNS hierarchy and change infrequently. Furthermore, in
combination with a set of simple and incrementally deploy-
able record renewal policies, the DNS service availabil-
ity can be improved by one order of magnitude. Our ap-
proach requires neither additional physical resources nor
any change to the existing DNS design. We evaluate the
effectiveness of our proposed enhancement by using DNS
traces collected from multiple locations.
Keywords: DDoS, DNS, resilience, caching
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) [16] provides name
services for the Internet. It maps hostnames to IP addresses
and also provides services for a growing number of other
applications, such as mapping IP addresses to geographic
locations or directory services for legacy telephony appli-
cations. Furthermore, protocols such as SMTP and SIP de-
pend on the DNS in order to route messages through appro-
priate application level gateways. As a result, the availabil-
ity of the DNS can affect the availability of a large number
o...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Enhancing DNS Resilience against Denial of Service Attacks
author:Vasileios Pappas and
Daniel Massey and
Lixia Zhang
Enhancing DNS Resilience against Denial of Service Attacks
Vasileios Pappas
T.J. Watson Center
IBM Research
vpappas@us.ibm.com
Dan Massey
Lixia Zhang
Computer Science Department
Computer Science Department
Colorado State University
massey@cs.colostate.edu
UCLA
lixia@cs.ucla.edu
Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical Internet
infrastructure that provides name to address mapping ser-
vices. In the past few years, distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks have targeted the DNS infrastructure and
threaten to disrupt this critical service. In this paper we
show that the existing DNS can gain signiﬁcant resilience
against DDoS attacks through a simple change to the cur-
rent DNS operations, by setting longer time-to-live values
for a special class of DNS resource records, the infras-
tructure records. These records are used to navigate the
DNS hierarchy and change infrequently. Furthermore, in
combination with a set of simple and incrementally deploy-
able record renewal policies, the DNS service availabil-
ity can be improved by one order of magnitude. Our ap-
proach requires neither additional physical resources nor
any change to the existing DNS design. We evaluate the
effectiveness of our proposed enhancement by using DNS
traces collected from multiple locations.
Keywords: DDoS, DNS, resilience, caching
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) [16] provides name
services for the Internet. It maps hostnames to IP addresses
and also provides services for a growing number of other
applications, such as mapping IP addresses to geographic
locations or directory services for legacy telephony appli-
cations. Furthermore, protocols such as SMTP and SIP de-
pend on the DNS in order to route messages through appro-
priate application level gateways. As a result, the availabil-
ity of the DNS can affect the availability of a large number
o...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few Signatures
author:Shuqin Fan and
Wenbo Wang and
Qingfeng Cheng
Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few
Signatures
State Key Laboratory of
Luoyang University of Foreign
School of Computer Science
Wenbo Wang
Qingfeng Cheng
Shuqin Fan
Cryptology
P.O. Box 5159
Beijing, 100878, P.R.China
fansq@sklc.org
Languages
Luoyang, Henan, P.R.China
&
State Key Laboratory of
Cryptology
P.O. Box 5159
and Technology
Xidian University
Xi’an, Shanxi, P.R.China
&
Luoyang University of Foreign
Languages
Beijing, 100878,P.R.China
wangwenbo0305@-
Luoyang, Henan, P.R.China
qingfengc2008@sina.com
sina.com
ABSTRACT
In this work, we give a lattice attack on the ECDSA imple-
mentation in the latest version of OpenSSL, which imple-
ment the scalar multiplication by windowed Non-Adjacent
Form method. We propose a totally di(cid:11)erent but more ef-
(cid:12)cient method of extracting and utilizing information from
the side-channel results, remarkably improving the previous
attacks. First, we develop a new e(cid:14)cient method, which can
extract almost all information from the side-channel results,
obtaining 105.8 bits of information per signature on average
for 256-bit ECDSA. Then in order to make the utmost of our
extracted information, we translate the problem of recover-
ing secret key to the Extended Hidden Number Problem,
which can be solved by lattice reduction algorithms. Final-
ly, we introduce the methods of elimination, merging, most
signi(cid:12)cant digit recovering and enumeration to improve the
attack. Our attack is mounted to the secp256k1 curve, and
the result shows that only 4 signatures would be enough to
recover the secret key if the Flush+Reload attack is im-
plemented perfectly without any error,which is much better
than the best known result needing at least 13 signatures.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Digital signatures; Crypt-
analysis and other attacks; Side-channel analysis and
countermeasures...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few Signatures
author:Shuqin Fan and
Wenbo Wang and
Qingfeng Cheng
Attacking OpenSSL Implementation of ECDSA with a Few
Signatures
State Key Laboratory of
Luoyang University of Foreign
School of Computer Science
Wenbo Wang
Qingfeng Cheng
Shuqin Fan
Cryptology
P.O. Box 5159
Beijing, 100878, P.R.China
fansq@sklc.org
Languages
Luoyang, Henan, P.R.China
&
State Key Laboratory of
Cryptology
P.O. Box 5159
and Technology
Xidian University
Xi’an, Shanxi, P.R.China
&
Luoyang University of Foreign
Languages
Beijing, 100878,P.R.China
wangwenbo0305@-
Luoyang, Henan, P.R.China
qingfengc2008@sina.com
sina.com
ABSTRACT
In this work, we give a lattice attack on the ECDSA imple-
mentation in the latest version of OpenSSL, which imple-
ment the scalar multiplication by windowed Non-Adjacent
Form method. We propose a totally di(cid:11)erent but more ef-
(cid:12)cient method of extracting and utilizing information from
the side-channel results, remarkably improving the previous
attacks. First, we develop a new e(cid:14)cient method, which can
extract almost all information from the side-channel results,
obtaining 105.8 bits of information per signature on average
for 256-bit ECDSA. Then in order to make the utmost of our
extracted information, we translate the problem of recover-
ing secret key to the Extended Hidden Number Problem,
which can be solved by lattice reduction algorithms. Final-
ly, we introduce the methods of elimination, merging, most
signi(cid:12)cant digit recovering and enumeration to improve the
attack. Our attack is mounted to the secp256k1 curve, and
the result shows that only 4 signatures would be enough to
recover the secret key if the Flush+Reload attack is im-
plemented perfectly without any error,which is much better
than the best known result needing at least 13 signatures.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Digital signatures; Crypt-
analysis and other attacks; Side-channel analysis and
countermeasures...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Network dialog minimization and network dialog diffing: two novel
primitives for network security applications
author:M. Zubair Rafique and
Juan Caballero and
Christophe Huygens and
Wouter Joosen
Network Dialog Minimization and Network Dialog Difﬁng:
Two Novel Primitives for Network Security Applications
M. Zubair Raﬁque
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
zubair.raﬁque@cs.kuleuven.be
Christophe Huygens
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
christophe.huygens@cs.kuleuven.be
Juan Caballero
IMDEA Software Institute
Madrid, Spain
juan.caballero@imdea.org
Wouter Joosen
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
wouter.joosen@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
1.
INTRODUCTION
In this work, we present two fundamental primitives for network
security: network dialog minimization and network dialog difﬁng.
Network dialog minimization (NDM) simpliﬁes an original dialog
with respect to a goal, so that the minimized dialog when replayed
still achieves the goal, but requires minimal network communica-
tion, achieving signiﬁcant time and bandwidth savings. We present
network delta debugging, the ﬁrst technique to solve NDM. Net-
work dialog difﬁng compares two dialogs, aligns them, and identi-
ﬁes their common and different parts. We propose a novel dialog
difﬁng technique that aligns two dialogs by ﬁnding a mapping that
maximizes similarity.
We have applied our techniques to 5 applications. We apply
our dialog minimization approach for: building drive-by download
milkers for 9 exploit kits, integrating them in a infrastructure that
has collected over 14,000 malware samples running from a single
machine; efﬁciently measuring the percentage of popular sites that
allow cookie replay, ﬁnding that 31% do not destroy the server-side
state when a user logs out and that 17% provide cookies that live
over a month; simplifying a cumbersome user interface, saving our
institution 3 hours of time per year and employee; and ﬁnding a
new vulnerability in a SIP server. ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Network dialog minimization and network dialog diffing: two novel
primitives for network security applications
author:M. Zubair Rafique and
Juan Caballero and
Christophe Huygens and
Wouter Joosen
Network Dialog Minimization and Network Dialog Difﬁng:
Two Novel Primitives for Network Security Applications
M. Zubair Raﬁque
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
zubair.raﬁque@cs.kuleuven.be
Christophe Huygens
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
christophe.huygens@cs.kuleuven.be
Juan Caballero
IMDEA Software Institute
Madrid, Spain
juan.caballero@imdea.org
Wouter Joosen
iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven
3001 Leuven, Belgium
wouter.joosen@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
1.
INTRODUCTION
In this work, we present two fundamental primitives for network
security: network dialog minimization and network dialog difﬁng.
Network dialog minimization (NDM) simpliﬁes an original dialog
with respect to a goal, so that the minimized dialog when replayed
still achieves the goal, but requires minimal network communica-
tion, achieving signiﬁcant time and bandwidth savings. We present
network delta debugging, the ﬁrst technique to solve NDM. Net-
work dialog difﬁng compares two dialogs, aligns them, and identi-
ﬁes their common and different parts. We propose a novel dialog
difﬁng technique that aligns two dialogs by ﬁnding a mapping that
maximizes similarity.
We have applied our techniques to 5 applications. We apply
our dialog minimization approach for: building drive-by download
milkers for 9 exploit kits, integrating them in a infrastructure that
has collected over 14,000 malware samples running from a single
machine; efﬁciently measuring the percentage of popular sites that
allow cookie replay, ﬁnding that 31% do not destroy the server-side
state when a user logs out and that 17% provide cookies that live
over a month; simplifying a cumbersome user interface, saving our
institution 3 hours of time per year and employee; and ﬁnding a
new vulnerability in a SIP server. ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Breaking and Fixing VoLTE: Exploiting Hidden Data Channels and Mis-implementations
author:Hongil Kim and
Dongkwan Kim and
Minhee Kwon and
HyungSeok Han and
Yeongjin Jang and
Dongsu Han and
Taesoo Kim and
Yongdae Kim
Exploiting Hidden Data Channels and Mis-implementations
Breaking and Fixing VoLTE:
∗Hongil Kim† ∗Dongkwan Kim† Minhee Kwon† Hyungseok Han†
Yeongjin Jang§ Dongsu Han† Taesoo Kim§ Yongdae Kim†
†
§
KAIST, Republic of Korea
Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
{hongilk, dkay, minhee.k, han456, dongsu_han, yongdaek}@kaist.ac.kr,
{yeongjin.jang, taesoo}@gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is becoming the dominant cellular
networking technology, shifting the cellular network away from
its circuit-switched legacy towards a packet-switched network that
resembles the Internet. To support voice calls over the LTE net-
work, operators have introduced Voice-over-LTE (VoLTE), which
dramatically changes how voice calls are handled, both from user
equipment and infrastructure perspectives. We ﬁnd that this dra-
matic shift opens up a number of new attack surfaces that have not
been previously explored. To call attention to this matter, this paper
presents a systematic security analysis.
Unlike the traditional call setup, the VoLTE call setup is controlled
and performed at the Application Processor (AP), using the SIP over
IP. A legitimate user who has control over the AP can potentially
control and exploit the call setup process to establish a VoLTE
channel. This combined with the legacy accounting policy (e.g.,
unlimited voice and the separation of data and voice) leads to a
number of free data channels. In the process of unveiling the free
data channels, we identify a number of additional vulnerabilities
of early VoLTE implementations, which lead to serious exploits,
such as caller spooﬁng, over-billing, and denial-of-service attacks.
We identify the nature of these vulnerabilities and concrete exploits
that directly result from the adoption of VoLTE. ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Breaking and Fixing VoLTE: Exploiting Hidden Data Channels and Mis-implementations
author:Hongil Kim and
Dongkwan Kim and
Minhee Kwon and
HyungSeok Han and
Yeongjin Jang and
Dongsu Han and
Taesoo Kim and
Yongdae Kim
Exploiting Hidden Data Channels and Mis-implementations
Breaking and Fixing VoLTE:
∗Hongil Kim† ∗Dongkwan Kim† Minhee Kwon† Hyungseok Han†
Yeongjin Jang§ Dongsu Han† Taesoo Kim§ Yongdae Kim†
†
§
KAIST, Republic of Korea
Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
{hongilk, dkay, minhee.k, han456, dongsu_han, yongdaek}@kaist.ac.kr,
{yeongjin.jang, taesoo}@gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is becoming the dominant cellular
networking technology, shifting the cellular network away from
its circuit-switched legacy towards a packet-switched network that
resembles the Internet. To support voice calls over the LTE net-
work, operators have introduced Voice-over-LTE (VoLTE), which
dramatically changes how voice calls are handled, both from user
equipment and infrastructure perspectives. We ﬁnd that this dra-
matic shift opens up a number of new attack surfaces that have not
been previously explored. To call attention to this matter, this paper
presents a systematic security analysis.
Unlike the traditional call setup, the VoLTE call setup is controlled
and performed at the Application Processor (AP), using the SIP over
IP. A legitimate user who has control over the AP can potentially
control and exploit the call setup process to establish a VoLTE
channel. This combined with the legacy accounting policy (e.g.,
unlimited voice and the separation of data and voice) leads to a
number of free data channels. In the process of unveiling the free
data channels, we identify a number of additional vulnerabilities
of early VoLTE implementations, which lead to serious exploits,
such as caller spooﬁng, over-billing, and denial-of-service attacks.
We identify the nature of these vulnerabilities and concrete exploits
that directly result from the adoption of VoLTE. ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:e-NeXSh: Achieving an Effectively Non-Executable Stack and Heap via
System-Call Policing
author:Gaurav S. Kc and
Angelos D. Keromytis
e-NeXSh: Achieving an Effectively Non-Executable Stack and Heap via
System-Call Policing
Google Inc., Mountain View, CA 94043, USA
Gaurav S. Kc
gskc@google.com
Angelos D. Keromytis
Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA
angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract
We present e-NeXSh, a novel security approach that
utilises kernel and LIBC support for efﬁciently defending
systems against process-subversion attacks. Such attacks
exploit vulnerabilities in software to override its program
control-ﬂow and consequently invoke system calls, caus-
ing out-of-process damage. Our technique defeats such at-
tacks by monitoring all LIBC function and system-call in-
vocations, and validating them against process-speciﬁc in-
formation that strictly prescribes the permissible behaviour
for the program (unlike general sandboxing techniques that
require manually maintained, explicit policies, we use the
program code itself as a guideline for an implicit policy).
Any deviation from this behaviour is considered malicious,
and we halt the attack, limiting its damage to within the
subverted process.
We implemented e-NeXSh as a set of modiﬁcations to the
linux-2.4.18-3 kernel and a new user-space shared
library (e-NeXSh.so). The technique is transparent, re-
quiring no modiﬁcations to existing libraries or applica-
tions. e-NeXSh was able to successfully defeat both code-
injection and libc-based attacks in our effectiveness tests.
The technique is simple and lightweight, demonstrating no
measurable overhead for select UNIX utilities, and a negli-
gible 1.55% performance impact on the Apache web server.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the issue of process-subversion attacks
has become very important, as is evidenced by the number
of CERT advisories [2]. These are attacks that exploit pro-
gramming errors in software to compromise running sys-
tems. Such ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:e-NeXSh: Achieving an Effectively Non-Executable Stack and Heap via
System-Call Policing
author:Gaurav S. Kc and
Angelos D. Keromytis
e-NeXSh: Achieving an Effectively Non-Executable Stack and Heap via
System-Call Policing
Google Inc., Mountain View, CA 94043, USA
Gaurav S. Kc
gskc@google.com
Angelos D. Keromytis
Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA
angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract
We present e-NeXSh, a novel security approach that
utilises kernel and LIBC support for efﬁciently defending
systems against process-subversion attacks. Such attacks
exploit vulnerabilities in software to override its program
control-ﬂow and consequently invoke system calls, caus-
ing out-of-process damage. Our technique defeats such at-
tacks by monitoring all LIBC function and system-call in-
vocations, and validating them against process-speciﬁc in-
formation that strictly prescribes the permissible behaviour
for the program (unlike general sandboxing techniques that
require manually maintained, explicit policies, we use the
program code itself as a guideline for an implicit policy).
Any deviation from this behaviour is considered malicious,
and we halt the attack, limiting its damage to within the
subverted process.
We implemented e-NeXSh as a set of modiﬁcations to the
linux-2.4.18-3 kernel and a new user-space shared
library (e-NeXSh.so). The technique is transparent, re-
quiring no modiﬁcations to existing libraries or applica-
tions. e-NeXSh was able to successfully defeat both code-
injection and libc-based attacks in our effectiveness tests.
The technique is simple and lightweight, demonstrating no
measurable overhead for select UNIX utilities, and a negli-
gible 1.55% performance impact on the Apache web server.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the issue of process-subversion attacks
has become very important, as is evidenced by the number
of CERT advisories [2]. These are attacks that exploit pro-
gramming errors in software to compromise running sys-
tems. Such ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Security Model and Fully Verified Implementation for the IETF
QUIC Record Layer
author:Antoine Delignat-Lavaud and
C'edric Fournet and
Bryan Parno and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Tahina Ramananandro and
Jay Bosamiya and
Joseph Lallemand and
Itsaka Rakotonirina and
Yi Zhou
9
3
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0
0
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2
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1
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/
9
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1
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0
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0
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1
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2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
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P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
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d
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2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
A Security Model and Fully Veriﬁed Implementation
for the IETF QUIC Record Layer
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud∗, Cédric Fournet∗, Bryan Parno†, Jonathan Protzenko∗, Tahina Ramananandro∗,
Jay Bosamiya†, Joseph Lallemand‡, Itsaka Rakotonirina‡, Yi Zhou†
∗Microsoft Research †Carnegie Mellon University ‡INRIA Nancy Grand-Est, LORIA
Abstract—Drawing on earlier protocol-veriﬁcation work, we
investigate the security of the QUIC record layer, as standardized
by the IETF in draft version 30. This version features major
differences compared to Google’s original protocol and early
IETF drafts. It serves as a useful test case for our veriﬁcation
methodology and toolchain, while also, hopefully, drawing atten-
tion to a little studied yet crucially important emerging standard.
We model QUIC packet and header encryption, which uses
a custom construction for privacy. To capture its goals, we
propose a security deﬁnition for authenticated encryption with
semi-implicit nonces. We show that QUIC uses an instance of a
generic construction parameterized by a standard AEAD-secure
scheme and a PRF-secure cipher. We formalize and verify the
security of this construction in F(cid:2). The proof uncovers interesting
limitations of nonce conﬁdentiality, due to the malleability of short
headers and the ability to choose the number of least signiﬁcant
bits included in the packet counter. We propose improvements
that simplify the proof and increase robustness agai...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Security Model and Fully Verified Implementation for the IETF
QUIC Record Layer
author:Antoine Delignat-Lavaud and
C'edric Fournet and
Bryan Parno and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Tahina Ramananandro and
Jay Bosamiya and
Joseph Lallemand and
Itsaka Rakotonirina and
Yi Zhou
9
3
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
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©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
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P
d
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a
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2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
A Security Model and Fully Veriﬁed Implementation
for the IETF QUIC Record Layer
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud∗, Cédric Fournet∗, Bryan Parno†, Jonathan Protzenko∗, Tahina Ramananandro∗,
Jay Bosamiya†, Joseph Lallemand‡, Itsaka Rakotonirina‡, Yi Zhou†
∗Microsoft Research †Carnegie Mellon University ‡INRIA Nancy Grand-Est, LORIA
Abstract—Drawing on earlier protocol-veriﬁcation work, we
investigate the security of the QUIC record layer, as standardized
by the IETF in draft version 30. This version features major
differences compared to Google’s original protocol and early
IETF drafts. It serves as a useful test case for our veriﬁcation
methodology and toolchain, while also, hopefully, drawing atten-
tion to a little studied yet crucially important emerging standard.
We model QUIC packet and header encryption, which uses
a custom construction for privacy. To capture its goals, we
propose a security deﬁnition for authenticated encryption with
semi-implicit nonces. We show that QUIC uses an instance of a
generic construction parameterized by a standard AEAD-secure
scheme and a PRF-secure cipher. We formalize and verify the
security of this construction in F(cid:2). The proof uncovers interesting
limitations of nonce conﬁdentiality, due to the malleability of short
headers and the ability to choose the number of least signiﬁcant
bits included in the packet counter. We propose improvements
that simplify the proof and increase robustness agai...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
author:Steven Gianvecchio and
Haining Wang
Detecting Covert Timing Channels: An Entropy-Based
Approach
Steven Gianvecchio and Haining Wang
Department of Computer Science
The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA
{srgian, hnw}@cs.wm.edu
ABSTRACT
The detection of covert timing channels is of increasing in-
terest in light of recent practice on the exploitation of covert
timing channels over the Internet. However, due to the high
variation in legitimate network traﬃc, detecting covert tim-
ing channels is a challenging task. The existing detection
schemes are ineﬀective to detect most of the covert timing
channels known to the security community. In this paper, we
introduce a new entropy-based approach to detecting vari-
ous covert timing channels. Our new approach is based on
the observation that the creation of a covert timing chan-
nel has certain eﬀects on the entropy of the original process,
and hence, a change in the entropy of a process provides a
critical clue for covert timing channel detection. Exploiting
this observation, we investigate the use of entropy and con-
ditional entropy in detecting covert timing channels. Our
experimental results show that our entropy-based approach
is sensitive to the current covert timing channels, and is ca-
pable of detecting them in an accurate manner.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and Protection
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Covert Timing Channels, Detection
1.
INTRODUCTION
As an eﬀective way to exﬁltrate data from a well-protected
network, a covert timing channel manipulates the timing or
ordering of network events (e.g., packet arrivals) for secret
information transfer over the Internet, even without com-
promising an end-host inside the network. On the one hand,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted wi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
author:Steven Gianvecchio and
Haining Wang
Detecting Covert Timing Channels: An Entropy-Based
Approach
Steven Gianvecchio and Haining Wang
Department of Computer Science
The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA
{srgian, hnw}@cs.wm.edu
ABSTRACT
The detection of covert timing channels is of increasing in-
terest in light of recent practice on the exploitation of covert
timing channels over the Internet. However, due to the high
variation in legitimate network traﬃc, detecting covert tim-
ing channels is a challenging task. The existing detection
schemes are ineﬀective to detect most of the covert timing
channels known to the security community. In this paper, we
introduce a new entropy-based approach to detecting vari-
ous covert timing channels. Our new approach is based on
the observation that the creation of a covert timing chan-
nel has certain eﬀects on the entropy of the original process,
and hence, a change in the entropy of a process provides a
critical clue for covert timing channel detection. Exploiting
this observation, we investigate the use of entropy and con-
ditional entropy in detecting covert timing channels. Our
experimental results show that our entropy-based approach
is sensitive to the current covert timing channels, and is ca-
pable of detecting them in an accurate manner.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and Protection
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Covert Timing Channels, Detection
1.
INTRODUCTION
As an eﬀective way to exﬁltrate data from a well-protected
network, a covert timing channel manipulates the timing or
ordering of network events (e.g., packet arrivals) for secret
information transfer over the Internet, even without com-
promising an end-host inside the network. On the one hand,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted wi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:WebShield: Enabling Various Web Defense Techniques without Client
Side Modifications
author:Zhichun Li and
Yi Tang and
Yinzhi Cao and
Vaibhav Rastogi and
Yan Chen and
Bin Liu and
Clint Sbisa
WebShield: Enabling Various Web Defense Techniques without Client Side
Modiﬁcations
Zhichun Li§ Tang Yi† Yinzhi Cao‡ Vaibhav Rastogi‡ Yan Chen‡ Bin Liu† Clint Sbisa‡
§NEC Laboratories America
†Tsinghua University, China
§zhichun@nec-labs.com †tangy05@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
†bliu@tsinghua.edu.cn
‡ychen@northwestern.edu
‡{yinzhicao2013,vrastogi,c-sbisa}@u.northwestern.edu
‡Northwestern University
Abstract
Today, web attacks are increasing in frequency, sever-
ity and sophistication. Existing solutions are either host-
based which suffer deployment problems or middlebox ap-
proaches that can only accommodate certain security pro-
tection mechanisms with limited protection. In this paper,
we propose four design principles for general middlebox
frameworks of web protection, and apply these principles to
design WebShield, which can enable various host-based se-
curity mechanisms. In particular, we run all the JavaScript
from remote web servers only at shadow browser instances
inside the middlebox, and only run our trusted JavaScript
rendering agent at client browsers. The trusted rendering
agent turns browsers into a thin web terminal by recon-
structing the encoded DOM of a webpage.
We implement a prototype of WebShield. Evaluation
demonstrates that a general JavaScript rendering agent
can render webpages precisely and be just slightly slower
than direct access. We further demonstrate that our design
can work well with interactive web applications such as
JavaScript games. WebShield can detect attacks deeply em-
bedded in dynamic HTML pages including the ones in com-
plex Web 2.0 applications, and can also detect both known
and unknown vulnerabilities. We further show that Web-
Shield is scalable for deployment.
anisms have been proposed [12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 26, 30, 34,
36]. For...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:WebShield: Enabling Various Web Defense Techniques without Client
Side Modifications
author:Zhichun Li and
Yi Tang and
Yinzhi Cao and
Vaibhav Rastogi and
Yan Chen and
Bin Liu and
Clint Sbisa
WebShield: Enabling Various Web Defense Techniques without Client Side
Modiﬁcations
Zhichun Li§ Tang Yi† Yinzhi Cao‡ Vaibhav Rastogi‡ Yan Chen‡ Bin Liu† Clint Sbisa‡
§NEC Laboratories America
†Tsinghua University, China
§zhichun@nec-labs.com †tangy05@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
†bliu@tsinghua.edu.cn
‡ychen@northwestern.edu
‡{yinzhicao2013,vrastogi,c-sbisa}@u.northwestern.edu
‡Northwestern University
Abstract
Today, web attacks are increasing in frequency, sever-
ity and sophistication. Existing solutions are either host-
based which suffer deployment problems or middlebox ap-
proaches that can only accommodate certain security pro-
tection mechanisms with limited protection. In this paper,
we propose four design principles for general middlebox
frameworks of web protection, and apply these principles to
design WebShield, which can enable various host-based se-
curity mechanisms. In particular, we run all the JavaScript
from remote web servers only at shadow browser instances
inside the middlebox, and only run our trusted JavaScript
rendering agent at client browsers. The trusted rendering
agent turns browsers into a thin web terminal by recon-
structing the encoded DOM of a webpage.
We implement a prototype of WebShield. Evaluation
demonstrates that a general JavaScript rendering agent
can render webpages precisely and be just slightly slower
than direct access. We further demonstrate that our design
can work well with interactive web applications such as
JavaScript games. WebShield can detect attacks deeply em-
bedded in dynamic HTML pages including the ones in com-
plex Web 2.0 applications, and can also detect both known
and unknown vulnerabilities. We further show that Web-
Shield is scalable for deployment.
anisms have been proposed [12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 26, 30, 34,
36]. For...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Networked Cryptographic Devices Resilient to Capture
author:Philip D. MacKenzie and
Michael K. Reiter
Networked Cryptographic Devices Resilient to Capture
(Extended Abstract)
Philip MacKenzie
Michael K. Reiter
Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, New Jersey, USA
{philmac,reiter}@research.bell-labs.com
Abstract
We present  a  simple  technique  by  which a  device  that
performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions)
in networked applications,  and whose local private  key  is
activated with a password or PIN, can be immunized to off-
line dictionary attacks in case the device is captured.  Our
techniques do not assume tamper resistance of  the device,
but rather exploit the networked nature of  the device, in that
the device’s private  key  operations are pe formed  using  a
simple  interaction with a  remote sewer:  This sewer; how-
ever; is untrusted-its
compromise does not reduce the se-
curiv of  the device’s private  key  unless the device  is also
captured-and  need not have a prior relationship with the
device.  We further  extend  this approach with  support for
key disabling, by which the rightj‘ul owner of  a  stolen de-
vice can disable the device’s private key even if the attacker
already knows the user’s password.
1. Introduction
A  device that  performs  signatures or decryptions using
the private key of a public key  pair, and that stores the pri-
vate key locally on stable storage, is typically vulnerable to
exposure of that private key if the device is captured. While
encryption of the private key under a password is common,
the  ease with  which  passwords succumb to  offline dictio-
nary  attacks (e.g.,  see [35, 27,  18, 411) implies that better
protections are needed.  Many such protections have been
proposed, but most require tamper-resistance of the device.
Others used in practice replace the password with a stronger
key stored on another device that the user holds, thus mov-
ing th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Networked Cryptographic Devices Resilient to Capture
author:Philip D. MacKenzie and
Michael K. Reiter
Networked Cryptographic Devices Resilient to Capture
(Extended Abstract)
Philip MacKenzie
Michael K. Reiter
Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, New Jersey, USA
{philmac,reiter}@research.bell-labs.com
Abstract
We present  a  simple  technique  by  which a  device  that
performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions)
in networked applications,  and whose local private  key  is
activated with a password or PIN, can be immunized to off-
line dictionary attacks in case the device is captured.  Our
techniques do not assume tamper resistance of  the device,
but rather exploit the networked nature of  the device, in that
the device’s private  key  operations are pe formed  using  a
simple  interaction with a  remote sewer:  This sewer; how-
ever; is untrusted-its
compromise does not reduce the se-
curiv of  the device’s private  key  unless the device  is also
captured-and  need not have a prior relationship with the
device.  We further  extend  this approach with  support for
key disabling, by which the rightj‘ul owner of  a  stolen de-
vice can disable the device’s private key even if the attacker
already knows the user’s password.
1. Introduction
A  device that  performs  signatures or decryptions using
the private key of a public key  pair, and that stores the pri-
vate key locally on stable storage, is typically vulnerable to
exposure of that private key if the device is captured. While
encryption of the private key under a password is common,
the  ease with  which  passwords succumb to  offline dictio-
nary  attacks (e.g.,  see [35, 27,  18, 411) implies that better
protections are needed.  Many such protections have been
proposed, but most require tamper-resistance of the device.
Others used in practice replace the password with a stronger
key stored on another device that the user holds, thus mov-
ing th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures
author:David Dagon and
Guofei Gu and
Christopher P. Lee and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures
David Dagon, Guofei Gu, Christopher P. Lee, Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{dagon@cc., guofei@cc., chrislee@, wenke@cc.}gatech.edu
Abstract
We propose a taxonomy of botnet structures, based on
their utility to the botmaster. We propose key metrics
to measure their utility for various activities (e.g., spam,
ddos). Using these performance metrics, we consider the
ability of different response techniques to degrade or dis-
rupt botnets.
In particular, our models show that targeted responses
are particularly effective against scale free botnets and ef-
forts to increase the robustness of scale free networks comes
at a cost of diminished transitivity. Botmasters do not ap-
pear to have any structural solutions to this problem in
scale free networks. We also show that random graph bot-
nets (e.g., those using P2P formations) are highly resistant
to both random and targeted responses.
We evaluate the impact of responses on different topolo-
gies using simulation and demonstrate the utility of our pro-
posed metrics by performing novel measurements of a P2P
network. Our analysis shows how botnets may be classiﬁed
according to structure and given rank or priority using our
proposed metrics. This may help direct responses and sug-
gests which general remediation strategies are more likely
to succeed.
1 Introduction
Malware authors routinely harness the resources of their
victims, creating networks of compromised machines called
botnets. The attackers’ ability to coordinate the victim com-
puters presents novel challenges for researchers. To fully
understand the threat posed by such networks, we must
identify classes of botnet topologies, their potential uses,
and the challenges each class presents for detection and re-
m...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures
author:David Dagon and
Guofei Gu and
Christopher P. Lee and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures
David Dagon, Guofei Gu, Christopher P. Lee, Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{dagon@cc., guofei@cc., chrislee@, wenke@cc.}gatech.edu
Abstract
We propose a taxonomy of botnet structures, based on
their utility to the botmaster. We propose key metrics
to measure their utility for various activities (e.g., spam,
ddos). Using these performance metrics, we consider the
ability of different response techniques to degrade or dis-
rupt botnets.
In particular, our models show that targeted responses
are particularly effective against scale free botnets and ef-
forts to increase the robustness of scale free networks comes
at a cost of diminished transitivity. Botmasters do not ap-
pear to have any structural solutions to this problem in
scale free networks. We also show that random graph bot-
nets (e.g., those using P2P formations) are highly resistant
to both random and targeted responses.
We evaluate the impact of responses on different topolo-
gies using simulation and demonstrate the utility of our pro-
posed metrics by performing novel measurements of a P2P
network. Our analysis shows how botnets may be classiﬁed
according to structure and given rank or priority using our
proposed metrics. This may help direct responses and sug-
gests which general remediation strategies are more likely
to succeed.
1 Introduction
Malware authors routinely harness the resources of their
victims, creating networks of compromised machines called
botnets. The attackers’ ability to coordinate the victim com-
puters presents novel challenges for researchers. To fully
understand the threat posed by such networks, we must
identify classes of botnet topologies, their potential uses,
and the challenges each class presents for detection and re-
m...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Confidentiality of event data in policy-based monitoring
author:Mirko Montanari and
Roy H. Campbell
Conﬁdentiality of Event Data in Policy-based
Monitoring
Mirko Montanari, Roy H. Campbell
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
{mmontan2, rhc}@illinois.edu
Abstract—Monitoring systems observe important information
that could be a valuable resource to malicious users: attackers
can use the knowledge of topology information, application logs,
or conﬁguration data to target attacks and make them hard to
detect. The increasing need for correlating information across
distributed systems to better detect potential attacks and to meet
regulatory requirements can potentially exacerbate the problem
if the monitoring is centralized. A single zero-day vulnerability
would permit an attacker to access all information.
This paper introduces a novel algorithm for performing
policy-based security monitoring. We use policies to distribute
information across several hosts, so that any host compromise
has limited impact on the conﬁdentiality of the data about
the overall system. Experiments show that our solution spreads
information uniformly across distributed monitoring hosts and
forces attackers to perform multiple actions to acquire important
data.
Index Terms—security; monitoring; policy compliance; conﬁ-
dentiality; distributed systems;
I. INTRODUCTION
Directed attacks toward organizations are becoming com-
monplace. While these attacks often use targeted ﬁshing
emails for getting a foothold into the organization, once inside
they require information about network topology, ﬁrewalls,
and placement of critical systems to further perpetrate the
attack [1]. Attackers need to identify critical resources, and
malware needs to target systems with speciﬁc characteristics in
order to exploit vulnerabilities. Searching for such information
through the network using port scanning or using random
infections of non-critical systems increases the chance of
detecting the malware proc...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Confidentiality of event data in policy-based monitoring
author:Mirko Montanari and
Roy H. Campbell
Conﬁdentiality of Event Data in Policy-based
Monitoring
Mirko Montanari, Roy H. Campbell
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
{mmontan2, rhc}@illinois.edu
Abstract—Monitoring systems observe important information
that could be a valuable resource to malicious users: attackers
can use the knowledge of topology information, application logs,
or conﬁguration data to target attacks and make them hard to
detect. The increasing need for correlating information across
distributed systems to better detect potential attacks and to meet
regulatory requirements can potentially exacerbate the problem
if the monitoring is centralized. A single zero-day vulnerability
would permit an attacker to access all information.
This paper introduces a novel algorithm for performing
policy-based security monitoring. We use policies to distribute
information across several hosts, so that any host compromise
has limited impact on the conﬁdentiality of the data about
the overall system. Experiments show that our solution spreads
information uniformly across distributed monitoring hosts and
forces attackers to perform multiple actions to acquire important
data.
Index Terms—security; monitoring; policy compliance; conﬁ-
dentiality; distributed systems;
I. INTRODUCTION
Directed attacks toward organizations are becoming com-
monplace. While these attacks often use targeted ﬁshing
emails for getting a foothold into the organization, once inside
they require information about network topology, ﬁrewalls,
and placement of critical systems to further perpetrate the
attack [1]. Attackers need to identify critical resources, and
malware needs to target systems with speciﬁc characteristics in
order to exploit vulnerabilities. Searching for such information
through the network using port scanning or using random
infections of non-critical systems increases the chance of
detecting the malware proc...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Group Signatures with Time-bound Keys Revisited: A New Model and
an Efficient Construction
author:Keita Emura and
Takuya Hayashi and
Ai Ishida
Group Signatures with Time-bound Keys Revisited:
A New Model and an Efﬁcient Construction
Keita Emura
National Institute of
Information and
Takuya Hayashi
National Institute of
Information and
Communications Technology
Communications Technology
(NICT)
(NICT)
k-emura@nict.go.jp
takuya.hayashi@nict.go.jp
Ai Ishida
Tokyo Institute of
Technology/National Institute
of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology
(AIST)
ishida0@is.titech.ac.jp
ABSTRACT
Chu et al. (ASIACCS 2012) proposed group signature with
time-bound keys (GS-TBK) where each signing key is asso-
ciated to an expiry time τ . In addition to prove the mem-
bership of the group, a signer needs to prove that the ex-
piry time has not passed, i.e., t < τ where t is the current
time. A signer whose expiry time has passed is automatically
revoked, and this revocation is called natural revocation.
Simultaneously, signers can be revoked before their expiry
times have passed due to the compromise of the credential.
This revocation is called premature revocation. A nice prop-
erty of the Chu et al. proposal is that the size of revocation
lists can be reduced compared to those of Veriﬁer-Local Re-
vocation (VLR) group signature schemes, by assuming that
natural revocation accounts for most of signer revocations in
practice, and prematurely revoked signers are only a small
fraction. In this paper, we point out that the deﬁnition of
traceability of Chu et al. did not capture unforgeability of
expiry time of signing keys which guarantees that no adver-
sary who has a signing key associated to an expiry time τ can
compute a valid signature after τ has passed. We introduce
a security model that captures unforgeability, and propose
a GS-TBK scheme secure in the new model. Our scheme
also provides the constant signing costs whereas those of
the previous schemes depend on the bit-...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Group Signatures with Time-bound Keys Revisited: A New Model and
an Efficient Construction
author:Keita Emura and
Takuya Hayashi and
Ai Ishida
Group Signatures with Time-bound Keys Revisited:
A New Model and an Efﬁcient Construction
Keita Emura
National Institute of
Information and
Takuya Hayashi
National Institute of
Information and
Communications Technology
Communications Technology
(NICT)
(NICT)
k-emura@nict.go.jp
takuya.hayashi@nict.go.jp
Ai Ishida
Tokyo Institute of
Technology/National Institute
of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology
(AIST)
ishida0@is.titech.ac.jp
ABSTRACT
Chu et al. (ASIACCS 2012) proposed group signature with
time-bound keys (GS-TBK) where each signing key is asso-
ciated to an expiry time τ . In addition to prove the mem-
bership of the group, a signer needs to prove that the ex-
piry time has not passed, i.e., t < τ where t is the current
time. A signer whose expiry time has passed is automatically
revoked, and this revocation is called natural revocation.
Simultaneously, signers can be revoked before their expiry
times have passed due to the compromise of the credential.
This revocation is called premature revocation. A nice prop-
erty of the Chu et al. proposal is that the size of revocation
lists can be reduced compared to those of Veriﬁer-Local Re-
vocation (VLR) group signature schemes, by assuming that
natural revocation accounts for most of signer revocations in
practice, and prematurely revoked signers are only a small
fraction. In this paper, we point out that the deﬁnition of
traceability of Chu et al. did not capture unforgeability of
expiry time of signing keys which guarantees that no adver-
sary who has a signing key associated to an expiry time τ can
compute a valid signature after τ has passed. We introduce
a security model that captures unforgeability, and propose
a GS-TBK scheme secure in the new model. Our scheme
also provides the constant signing costs whereas those of
the previous schemes depend on the bit-...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Reviving delay-based TCP for data centers
author:Changhyun Lee and
Keon Jang and
Sue B. Moon
Reviving Delay-based TCP for Data Centers
Changhyun Lee
KAIST
Daejeon, Korea
chlee@an.kaist.ac.kr
Keon Jang
Microsoft Research
Cambridge, UK
keonjang@microsoft.com
Sue Moon
KAIST
Daejeon, Korea
sbmoon@kaist.edu
ABSTRACT
With the rapid growth of data centers, minimizing the queueing de-
lay at network switches has been one of the key challenges. In this
work, we analyze the shortcomings of the current TCP algorithm
when used in data center networks, and we propose to use latency-
based congestion detection and rate-based transfer to achieve ultra-
low queueing delay in data centers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Proto-
cols
General Terms
Performance
Keywords
Data centers, Latency, TCP
1.
INTRODUCTION
The recent growth of data centers has brought new challenges
to network research. Among the challenges, minimizing network
delay within a data center is one of the key concerns for service op-
erators. Previous work [1] has well pointed out that user experience
is badly affected in data center applications when even a single ﬂow
suffers from a large latency.
In today’s data centers, the largest part of network delay comes
from the queueing delay at switches since the propagation delay
within a data center can be almost negligible; ideally, 100 meters
of network cabling between two nodes adds only 0.5µs of propa-
gation delay, while a single 1,500 byte packet queued at a 10Gbps
switch already costs 1.2µs. Recently, much effort has been put to
reduce the queueing delay at switches. DCTCP [2] uses ECN mark-
ing to slow down ﬂows before the queue becomes full. HULL [3]
takes a further step and give up a little bandwidth to have even
lower latency than DCTCP. Our work is also motivated to reduce
the queueing delay in data centers, but we focus on the end-to-end
congestion control not on queue management at switches. The ﬁnal
...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Reviving delay-based TCP for data centers
author:Changhyun Lee and
Keon Jang and
Sue B. Moon
Reviving Delay-based TCP for Data Centers
Changhyun Lee
KAIST
Daejeon, Korea
chlee@an.kaist.ac.kr
Keon Jang
Microsoft Research
Cambridge, UK
keonjang@microsoft.com
Sue Moon
KAIST
Daejeon, Korea
sbmoon@kaist.edu
ABSTRACT
With the rapid growth of data centers, minimizing the queueing de-
lay at network switches has been one of the key challenges. In this
work, we analyze the shortcomings of the current TCP algorithm
when used in data center networks, and we propose to use latency-
based congestion detection and rate-based transfer to achieve ultra-
low queueing delay in data centers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Proto-
cols
General Terms
Performance
Keywords
Data centers, Latency, TCP
1.
INTRODUCTION
The recent growth of data centers has brought new challenges
to network research. Among the challenges, minimizing network
delay within a data center is one of the key concerns for service op-
erators. Previous work [1] has well pointed out that user experience
is badly affected in data center applications when even a single ﬂow
suffers from a large latency.
In today’s data centers, the largest part of network delay comes
from the queueing delay at switches since the propagation delay
within a data center can be almost negligible; ideally, 100 meters
of network cabling between two nodes adds only 0.5µs of propa-
gation delay, while a single 1,500 byte packet queued at a 10Gbps
switch already costs 1.2µs. Recently, much effort has been put to
reduce the queueing delay at switches. DCTCP [2] uses ECN mark-
ing to slow down ﬂows before the queue becomes full. HULL [3]
takes a further step and give up a little bandwidth to have even
lower latency than DCTCP. Our work is also motivated to reduce
the queueing delay in data centers, but we focus on the end-to-end
congestion control not on queue management at switches. The ﬁnal
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On the Feasibility of Automating Stock Market Manipulation
author:Carter Yagemann and
Simon P. Chung and
Erkam Uzun and
Sai Ragam and
Brendan Saltaformaggio and
Wenke Lee
On the Feasibility of Automating Stock
Market Manipulation
Carter Yagemann
yagemann@gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Sai Ragam
sragam3@gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Simon P. Chung
pchung34@mail.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Brendan Saltaformaggio
brendan@ece.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Georgia Institute of Technology
Erkam Uzun
euzun@gatech.edu
Atlanta, Georgia
Wenke Lee
wenke@cc.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
ABSTRACT
This work presents the first findings on the feasibility of using
botnets to automate stock market manipulation. Our analysis incor-
porates data gathered from SEC case files, security surveys of online
brokerages, and dark web marketplace data. We address several
technical challenges, including how to adapt existing techniques
for automation, the cost of hijacking brokerage accounts, avoiding
detection, and more. We consolidate our findings into a working
proof-of-concept, man-in-the-browser malware, Bot2Stock, capable
of controlling victim email and brokerage accounts to commit fraud.
We evaluate our bots and protocol using agent-based market simu-
lations, where we find that a 1.5% ratio of bots to benign traders
yields a 2.8% return on investment (ROI) per attack. Given the short
duration of each attack (< 1 minute), achieving this ratio is trivial,
requiring only 4 bots to target stocks like IBM. 1,000 bots, cumu-
latively gathered over 1 year, can turn $100,000 into $1,022,000,
placing Bot2Stock on par with existing botnet scams.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy;
Distributed systems security.
KEYWORDS
fraud, stock markets, economics, botnets, malware
ACM Reference Format:
Carter Yagemann,...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On the Feasibility of Automating Stock Market Manipulation
author:Carter Yagemann and
Simon P. Chung and
Erkam Uzun and
Sai Ragam and
Brendan Saltaformaggio and
Wenke Lee
On the Feasibility of Automating Stock
Market Manipulation
Carter Yagemann
yagemann@gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Sai Ragam
sragam3@gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Simon P. Chung
pchung34@mail.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Brendan Saltaformaggio
brendan@ece.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
Georgia Institute of Technology
Erkam Uzun
euzun@gatech.edu
Atlanta, Georgia
Wenke Lee
wenke@cc.gatech.edu
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
ABSTRACT
This work presents the first findings on the feasibility of using
botnets to automate stock market manipulation. Our analysis incor-
porates data gathered from SEC case files, security surveys of online
brokerages, and dark web marketplace data. We address several
technical challenges, including how to adapt existing techniques
for automation, the cost of hijacking brokerage accounts, avoiding
detection, and more. We consolidate our findings into a working
proof-of-concept, man-in-the-browser malware, Bot2Stock, capable
of controlling victim email and brokerage accounts to commit fraud.
We evaluate our bots and protocol using agent-based market simu-
lations, where we find that a 1.5% ratio of bots to benign traders
yields a 2.8% return on investment (ROI) per attack. Given the short
duration of each attack (< 1 minute), achieving this ratio is trivial,
requiring only 4 bots to target stocks like IBM. 1,000 bots, cumu-
latively gathered over 1 year, can turn $100,000 into $1,022,000,
placing Bot2Stock on par with existing botnet scams.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy;
Distributed systems security.
KEYWORDS
fraud, stock markets, economics, botnets, malware
ACM Reference Format:
Carter Yagemann,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity by Adversarial Training of Neural
Machine Translation
author:Rakshith Shetty and
Bernt Schiele and
Mario Fritz
A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity by Adversarial
Training of Neural Machine Translation
Rakshith Shetty, Bernt Schiele, and Mario Fritz, Max Planck Institute for Informatics
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/shetty
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity
by Adversarial Training of Neural Machine Translation
Rakshith Shetty Bernt Schiele Mario Fritz
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Saarland Informatics Campus
Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
Email: firstname.lastname@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract
Text-based analysis methods enable an adversary to reveal
privacy relevant author attributes such as gender, age and
can identify the text’s author. Such methods can compro-
mise the privacy of an anonymous author even when the
author tries to remove privacy sensitive content. In this
paper, we propose an automatic method, called the Ad-
versarial Author Attribute Anonymity Neural Translation
(A4NT), to combat such text-based adversaries. Unlike
prior works on obfuscation, we propose a system that
is fully automatic and learns to perform obfuscation en-
tirely from the data. This allows us to easily apply the
A4NT system to obfuscate different author attributes. We
propose a sequence-to-sequence language model, inspired
by machine translation, and an adversarial training frame-
work to design a system which learns to transform the
input text to obfuscate the author attributes without paired
data. We also propose and evaluate techniques to impose
constraints on our A4NT model to preserve the semantics
of the input text. A4NT learns to make minimal changes
to the input to successfully fool a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity by Adversarial Training of Neural
Machine Translation
author:Rakshith Shetty and
Bernt Schiele and
Mario Fritz
A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity by Adversarial
Training of Neural Machine Translation
Rakshith Shetty, Bernt Schiele, and Mario Fritz, Max Planck Institute for Informatics
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/shetty
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A4NT: Author Attribute Anonymity
by Adversarial Training of Neural Machine Translation
Rakshith Shetty Bernt Schiele Mario Fritz
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Saarland Informatics Campus
Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
Email: firstname.lastname@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract
Text-based analysis methods enable an adversary to reveal
privacy relevant author attributes such as gender, age and
can identify the text’s author. Such methods can compro-
mise the privacy of an anonymous author even when the
author tries to remove privacy sensitive content. In this
paper, we propose an automatic method, called the Ad-
versarial Author Attribute Anonymity Neural Translation
(A4NT), to combat such text-based adversaries. Unlike
prior works on obfuscation, we propose a system that
is fully automatic and learns to perform obfuscation en-
tirely from the data. This allows us to easily apply the
A4NT system to obfuscate different author attributes. We
propose a sequence-to-sequence language model, inspired
by machine translation, and an adversarial training frame-
work to design a system which learns to transform the
input text to obfuscate the author attributes without paired
data. We also propose and evaluate techniques to impose
constraints on our A4NT model to preserve the semantics
of the input text. A4NT learns to make minimal changes
to the input to successfully fool a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Wide-area routing dynamics of malicious networks
author:Maria Konte and
Nick Feamster
Wide-area Routing Dynamics of Malicious Networks
Maria Konte, Nick Feamster
Georgia Tech
{mkonte, feamster}@cc.gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the routing dynamics of malicious networks. We
characterize the routing behavior of malicious networks on both
short and long timescales. We ﬁnd that malicious networks more
consistently advertise preﬁxes with short durations and long inter-
arrival times; over longer timescales, we ﬁnd that malicious ASes
connect with more upstream providers than legitimate ASes, and
they also change upstream providers more frequently.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer Commu-
nication Networks]: Security and protection.
General Terms: Measurement, Security, Management.
Keywords: Hostexploit, malicious networks, BGP, routing dynam-
ics, security.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Attackers use advanced techniques to launch spam campaigns or
mount attacks; in particular, Ramchandran et al. [?] observed that
some some attackers send spam from hijacked preﬁxes. Previous
studies have studied different malicious activities in isolation such
as worms, botnets, spam, and Internet scam infrastructure [?, ?]
and proposed detection solutions for each of them. Unfortunately,
observing just the nature of the attack itself is not sufﬁcient, be-
cause any given network or host may mount different attacks on
different days. Rather than attempting to detect any individual at-
tack, we characterize the routing behavior of malicious networks
that are primarily responsible for cybercriminal activities and iden-
tify features of this behavior that may be more stable across time.
Although our initial goal is simply to characterize this behavior,
our belief is that ultimately certain aspects of routing behavior may
serve as invariants for detecting malicious infrastructure, even as
the attacks themselves evolve. Speciﬁcally, we believe that rout-
ing behavior may ult...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Wide-area routing dynamics of malicious networks
author:Maria Konte and
Nick Feamster
Wide-area Routing Dynamics of Malicious Networks
Maria Konte, Nick Feamster
Georgia Tech
{mkonte, feamster}@cc.gatech.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the routing dynamics of malicious networks. We
characterize the routing behavior of malicious networks on both
short and long timescales. We ﬁnd that malicious networks more
consistently advertise preﬁxes with short durations and long inter-
arrival times; over longer timescales, we ﬁnd that malicious ASes
connect with more upstream providers than legitimate ASes, and
they also change upstream providers more frequently.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer Commu-
nication Networks]: Security and protection.
General Terms: Measurement, Security, Management.
Keywords: Hostexploit, malicious networks, BGP, routing dynam-
ics, security.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Attackers use advanced techniques to launch spam campaigns or
mount attacks; in particular, Ramchandran et al. [?] observed that
some some attackers send spam from hijacked preﬁxes. Previous
studies have studied different malicious activities in isolation such
as worms, botnets, spam, and Internet scam infrastructure [?, ?]
and proposed detection solutions for each of them. Unfortunately,
observing just the nature of the attack itself is not sufﬁcient, be-
cause any given network or host may mount different attacks on
different days. Rather than attempting to detect any individual at-
tack, we characterize the routing behavior of malicious networks
that are primarily responsible for cybercriminal activities and iden-
tify features of this behavior that may be more stable across time.
Although our initial goal is simply to characterize this behavior,
our belief is that ultimately certain aspects of routing behavior may
serve as invariants for detecting malicious infrastructure, even as
the attacks themselves evolve. Speciﬁcally, we believe that rout-
ing behavior may ult...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Sys: A Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs in Good (Browser)
Code
author:Fraser Brown and
Deian Stefan and
Dawson R. Engler
Sys: a Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs
in Good (Browser) Code
Fraser Brown, Stanford University; Deian Stefan, UC San Diego;
Dawson Engler, Stanford University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/brown
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Sys: a Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs in Good (Browser) Code
Fraser Brown
Stanford University
Deian Stefan
UC San Diego
Dawson Engler
Stanford University
Abstract
We describe and evaluate an extensible bug-ﬁnding tool, Sys,
designed to automatically ﬁnd security bugs in huge code-
bases, even when easy-to-ﬁnd bugs have been already picked
clean by years of aggressive automatic checking. Sys uses a
two-step approach to ﬁnd such tricky errors. First, it breaks
down large—tens of millions of lines—systems into small
pieces using user-extensible static checkers to quickly ﬁnd and
mark potential errorsites. Second, it uses user-extensible sym-
bolic execution to deeply examine these potential errorsites
for actual bugs. Both the checkers and the system itself are
small (6KLOC total). Sys is ﬂexible, because users must be
able to exploit domain- or system-speciﬁc knowledge in order
to detect errors and suppress false positives in real codebases.
Sys ﬁnds many security bugs (51 bugs, 43 conﬁrmed) in well-
checked code—the Chrome and Firefox web browsers—and
code that some symbolic tools struggle with—the FreeBSD
operating system. Sys’s most interesting results include: an
exploitable, cash bountied CVE in Chrome that was ﬁxed in
seven hours (and whose patch was backported in two days); a
trio of bountied bugs with a CVE in Firefox; and a bountied
bug in Chrome’s audio support.
1 Intro...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Sys: A Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs in Good (Browser)
Code
author:Fraser Brown and
Deian Stefan and
Dawson R. Engler
Sys: a Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs
in Good (Browser) Code
Fraser Brown, Stanford University; Deian Stefan, UC San Diego;
Dawson Engler, Stanford University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/brown
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Sys: a Static/Symbolic Tool for Finding Good Bugs in Good (Browser) Code
Fraser Brown
Stanford University
Deian Stefan
UC San Diego
Dawson Engler
Stanford University
Abstract
We describe and evaluate an extensible bug-ﬁnding tool, Sys,
designed to automatically ﬁnd security bugs in huge code-
bases, even when easy-to-ﬁnd bugs have been already picked
clean by years of aggressive automatic checking. Sys uses a
two-step approach to ﬁnd such tricky errors. First, it breaks
down large—tens of millions of lines—systems into small
pieces using user-extensible static checkers to quickly ﬁnd and
mark potential errorsites. Second, it uses user-extensible sym-
bolic execution to deeply examine these potential errorsites
for actual bugs. Both the checkers and the system itself are
small (6KLOC total). Sys is ﬂexible, because users must be
able to exploit domain- or system-speciﬁc knowledge in order
to detect errors and suppress false positives in real codebases.
Sys ﬁnds many security bugs (51 bugs, 43 conﬁrmed) in well-
checked code—the Chrome and Firefox web browsers—and
code that some symbolic tools struggle with—the FreeBSD
operating system. Sys’s most interesting results include: an
exploitable, cash bountied CVE in Chrome that was ﬁxed in
seven hours (and whose patch was backported in two days); a
trio of bountied bugs with a CVE in Firefox; and a bountied
bug in Chrome’s audio support.
1 Intro...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。