Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Robotron: Top-down Network Management at Facebook Scale
author:Yu-Wei Eric Sung and
Xiaozheng Tie and
Starsky H. Y. Wong and
Hongyi Zeng
Robotron: Top-down Network Management at
Facebook Scale
Yu-Wei Eric Sung, Xiaozheng Tie, Starsky H.Y. Wong, and Hongyi Zeng
Facebook, Inc.
robotron@fb.com
ABSTRACT
Network management facilitates a healthy and sustain-
able network. However, its practice is not well under-
stood outside the network engineering community. In
this paper, we present Robotron, a system for manag-
ing a massive production network in a top-down fash-
ion. The system’s goal is to reduce eﬀort and errors on
management tasks by minimizing direct human inter-
action with network devices. Engineers use Robotron
to express high-level design intent, which is translated
into low-level device conﬁgurations and deployed safely.
Robotron also monitors devices’ operational state to en-
sure it does not deviate from the desired state. Since
2008, Robotron has been used to manage tens of thou-
sands of network devices connecting hundreds of thou-
sands of servers globally at Facebook.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network management;
Keywords
Robotron, Network Management, Facebook
1.
INTRODUCTION
“Lots of folks confuse bad management
with destiny.” — Kin Hubbard
Managing a large, dynamic, and heavily utilized net-
work is challenging. Everyday, network engineers per-
form numerous diverse tasks such as circuit turn-up and
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice
and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. Copyrights for components of this work
owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is
permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to
lists, requires prior speciﬁc permission and/or a fee. Request permissions...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FTP: The Forgotten Cloud
author:Drew Springall and
Zakir Durumeric and
J. Alex Halderman
2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
FTP: The Forgotten Cloud
Drew Springall Zakir Durumeric
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
{aaspring, zakir, jhalderm}@umich.edu
Abstract—Once pervasive, the File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
has been largely supplanted by HTTP, SCP, and BitTorrent for
transferring data between hosts. Yet, in a comprehensive analysis
of the FTP ecosystem as of 2015, we ﬁnd that there are still more
than 13 million FTP servers in the IPv4 address space, 1.1 million
of which allow “anonymous” (public) access. These anonymous
FTP servers leak sensitive information, such as tax documents
and cryptographic secrets. More than 20,000 FTP servers allow
public write access, which has facilitated malicious actors’ use
of free storage as well as malware deployment and click-fraud
attacks. We further investigate real-world attacks by deploying
eight FTP honeypots, shedding light on how attackers are abusing
and exploiting vulnerable servers. We conclude with lessons and
recommendations for securing FTP.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP), ﬁrst introduced nearly
45 years ago [7], was for decades the protocol of choice for
moving ﬁles between hosts and for distributing them to the
world [17]. In recent years, FTP has been largely eclipsed
by newer protocols such as HTTP, SCP, and BitTorrent— all
of which have received vastly more attention from security
researchers. Nevertheless, as of 2015, FTP remains in use by
millions of servers that offer more than half a billion ﬁles to
the public: it is largely forgotten but far from gone.
We present the ﬁrst comprehensive security analysis on
how FTP is used and abused in modern practice. We begin by
using Internet-wide scanning to characterize the contemporary
FTP server ecosystem, which we ﬁnd consists of 13.8 million
servers in the public IPv4 address space1....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FTP: The Forgotten Cloud
author:Drew Springall and
Zakir Durumeric and
J. Alex Halderman
2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
FTP: The Forgotten Cloud
Drew Springall Zakir Durumeric
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
{aaspring, zakir, jhalderm}@umich.edu
Abstract—Once pervasive, the File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
has been largely supplanted by HTTP, SCP, and BitTorrent for
transferring data between hosts. Yet, in a comprehensive analysis
of the FTP ecosystem as of 2015, we ﬁnd that there are still more
than 13 million FTP servers in the IPv4 address space, 1.1 million
of which allow “anonymous” (public) access. These anonymous
FTP servers leak sensitive information, such as tax documents
and cryptographic secrets. More than 20,000 FTP servers allow
public write access, which has facilitated malicious actors’ use
of free storage as well as malware deployment and click-fraud
attacks. We further investigate real-world attacks by deploying
eight FTP honeypots, shedding light on how attackers are abusing
and exploiting vulnerable servers. We conclude with lessons and
recommendations for securing FTP.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP), ﬁrst introduced nearly
45 years ago [7], was for decades the protocol of choice for
moving ﬁles between hosts and for distributing them to the
world [17]. In recent years, FTP has been largely eclipsed
by newer protocols such as HTTP, SCP, and BitTorrent— all
of which have received vastly more attention from security
researchers. Nevertheless, as of 2015, FTP remains in use by
millions of servers that offer more than half a billion ﬁles to
the public: it is largely forgotten but far from gone.
We present the ﬁrst comprehensive security analysis on
how FTP is used and abused in modern practice. We begin by
using Internet-wide scanning to characterize the contemporary
FTP server ecosystem, which we ﬁnd consists of 13.8 million
servers in the public IPv4 address space1....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Is the Web HTTP/2 Yet?
author:Matteo Varvello and
Kyle Schomp and
David Naylor and
Jeremy Blackburn and
Alessandro Finamore and
Konstantina Papagiannaki
Is the Web HTTP/2 Yet?
Matteo Varvello1(B), Kyle Schomp2, David Naylor3, Jeremy Blackburn1,
Alessandro Finamore1, and Konstantina Papagiannaki1
1 Telef´onica Research, Barcelona, Spain
matteo.varvello@telefonica.com
2 Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA
3 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
http://isthewebhttp2yet.com/
Abstract. Version 2 of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/2) was
ﬁnalized in May 2015 as RFC 7540. It addresses well-known problems
with HTTP/1.1 (e.g., head of line blocking and redundant headers) and
introduces new features (e.g., server push and content priority). Though
HTTP/2 is designed to be the future of the web, it remains unclear
whether the web will—or should—hop on board. To shed light on this
question, we built a measurement platform that monitors HTTP/2 adop-
tion and performance across the Alexa top 1 million websites on a daily
basis. Our system is live and up-to-date results can be viewed at [1].
In this paper, we report ﬁndings from an 11 month measurement cam-
paign (November 2014 – October 2015). As of October 2015, we ﬁnd
68,000 websites reporting HTTP/2 support, of which about 10,000 actu-
ally serve content with it. Unsurprisingly, popular sites are quicker to
adopt HTTP/2 and 31 % of the Alexa top 100 already support it. For
the most part, websites do not change as they move from HTTP/1.1
to HTTP/2; current web development practices like inlining and domain
sharding are still present. Contrary to previous results, we ﬁnd that these
practices make HTTP/2 more resilient to losses and jitter. In all, we ﬁnd
that 80 % of websites supporting HTTP/2 experience a decrease in page
load time compared with HTTP/1.1 and the decrease grows in mobile
networks.
1 Introduction
HTTP/2 (H2 for short) is the new version of HTTP, expected to replace version
1.1 (H1), ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Is the Web HTTP/2 Yet?
author:Matteo Varvello and
Kyle Schomp and
David Naylor and
Jeremy Blackburn and
Alessandro Finamore and
Konstantina Papagiannaki
Is the Web HTTP/2 Yet?
Matteo Varvello1(B), Kyle Schomp2, David Naylor3, Jeremy Blackburn1,
Alessandro Finamore1, and Konstantina Papagiannaki1
1 Telef´onica Research, Barcelona, Spain
matteo.varvello@telefonica.com
2 Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA
3 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
http://isthewebhttp2yet.com/
Abstract. Version 2 of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/2) was
ﬁnalized in May 2015 as RFC 7540. It addresses well-known problems
with HTTP/1.1 (e.g., head of line blocking and redundant headers) and
introduces new features (e.g., server push and content priority). Though
HTTP/2 is designed to be the future of the web, it remains unclear
whether the web will—or should—hop on board. To shed light on this
question, we built a measurement platform that monitors HTTP/2 adop-
tion and performance across the Alexa top 1 million websites on a daily
basis. Our system is live and up-to-date results can be viewed at [1].
In this paper, we report ﬁndings from an 11 month measurement cam-
paign (November 2014 – October 2015). As of October 2015, we ﬁnd
68,000 websites reporting HTTP/2 support, of which about 10,000 actu-
ally serve content with it. Unsurprisingly, popular sites are quicker to
adopt HTTP/2 and 31 % of the Alexa top 100 already support it. For
the most part, websites do not change as they move from HTTP/1.1
to HTTP/2; current web development practices like inlining and domain
sharding are still present. Contrary to previous results, we ﬁnd that these
practices make HTTP/2 more resilient to losses and jitter. In all, we ﬁnd
that 80 % of websites supporting HTTP/2 experience a decrease in page
load time compared with HTTP/1.1 and the decrease grows in mobile
networks.
1 Introduction
HTTP/2 (H2 for short) is the new version of HTTP, expected to replace version
1.1 (H1), ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated Threat
author:Ding Wang and
Zijian Zhang and
Ping Wang and
Jeff Yan and
Xinyi Huang
Targeted Online Password Guessing:
An Underestimated Threat
Ding Wang†, Zijian Zhang†, Ping Wang†, Jeff Yan∗, Xinyi Huang‡
†School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
*School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, United Kingdom
‡School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350007, China
{wangdingg, zhangzj, pwang}@pku.edu.cn; jeff.yan@lancaster.ac.uk; xyhuang81@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
While trawling online/ofﬂine password guessing has been inten-
sively studied, only a few studies have examined targeted online
guessing, where an attacker guesses a speciﬁc victim’s password
for a service, by exploiting the victim’s personal information such
as one sister password leaked from her another account and some
personally identiﬁable information (PII). A key challenge for tar-
geted online guessing is to choose the most effective password can-
didates, while the number of guess attempts allowed by a server’s
lockout or throttling mechanisms is typically very small.
We propose TarGuess, a framework that systematically charac-
terizes typical targeted guessing scenarios with seven sound math-
ematical models, each of which is based on varied kinds of data
available to an attacker. These models allow us to design novel and
efﬁcient guessing algorithms. Extensive experiments on 10 large
real-world password datasets show the effectiveness of TarGuess.
Particularly, TarGuess I(cid:24)IV capture the four most representative
scenarios and within 100 guesses: (1) TarGuess-I outperforms its
foremost counterpart by 142% against security-savvy users and by
46% against normal users; (2) TarGuess-II outperforms its fore-
most counterpart by 169% on security-savvy users and by 72%
against normal users; and (3) Both TarGuess-III and IV gain suc-
cess rates over 73% against normal users and ove...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Targeted Online Password Guessing: An Underestimated Threat
author:Ding Wang and
Zijian Zhang and
Ping Wang and
Jeff Yan and
Xinyi Huang
Targeted Online Password Guessing:
An Underestimated Threat
Ding Wang†, Zijian Zhang†, Ping Wang†, Jeff Yan∗, Xinyi Huang‡
†School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
*School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, United Kingdom
‡School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350007, China
{wangdingg, zhangzj, pwang}@pku.edu.cn; jeff.yan@lancaster.ac.uk; xyhuang81@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
While trawling online/ofﬂine password guessing has been inten-
sively studied, only a few studies have examined targeted online
guessing, where an attacker guesses a speciﬁc victim’s password
for a service, by exploiting the victim’s personal information such
as one sister password leaked from her another account and some
personally identiﬁable information (PII). A key challenge for tar-
geted online guessing is to choose the most effective password can-
didates, while the number of guess attempts allowed by a server’s
lockout or throttling mechanisms is typically very small.
We propose TarGuess, a framework that systematically charac-
terizes typical targeted guessing scenarios with seven sound math-
ematical models, each of which is based on varied kinds of data
available to an attacker. These models allow us to design novel and
efﬁcient guessing algorithms. Extensive experiments on 10 large
real-world password datasets show the effectiveness of TarGuess.
Particularly, TarGuess I(cid:24)IV capture the four most representative
scenarios and within 100 guesses: (1) TarGuess-I outperforms its
foremost counterpart by 142% against security-savvy users and by
46% against normal users; (2) TarGuess-II outperforms its fore-
most counterpart by 169% on security-savvy users and by 72%
against normal users; and (3) Both TarGuess-III and IV gain suc-
cess rates over 73% against normal users and ove...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SpanDex: Secure Password Tracking for Android
author:Landon P. Cox and
Peter Gilbert and
Geoffrey Lawler and
Valentin Pistol and
Ali Razeen and
Bi Wu and
Sai Cheemalapati
SAVE THE DATE
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
AUGUST 20–22, 2014 • SAN DIEGO, CA
The USENIX Security Symposium brings together researchers, practitioners, system admin istrators,  system programmers,
and others interested in the latest advances in the security of computer  systems and networks. The Symposium will
include a 3-day technical program with refereed papers, invited talks, posters, panel discussions, and Birds-of-a-Feather
sessions. Featured speakers/sessions include:
Keynote Address by Phil Lapsley, author of Exploding the
Phone: The Untold Story of the Teenagers and Outlaws Who
Hacked Ma Bell
Panel: “The Future of Crypto: Getting from Here to
Guarantees” with Daniel J. Bernstein, Matt Blaze, and
Tanja Lange
Invited Talk: “Battling Human Trafficking with Big Data”
by Rolando R. Lopez, Orphan Secure
Invited Talk: “Insight into the NSA’s Weakening
of Crypto Standards” by Joseph Menn, Reuters
The following co-located events will precede the Symposium on August 18–19, 2014:
EVT/WOTE ’14: 2014 Electronic Voting Technology
Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
USENIX Journal of Election Technology
and Systems (JETS)
Published in conjunction with EVT/WOTE
www.usenix.org/jets
CSET ’14: 7th Workshop on Cyber Security
Experimentation and Test
NEW! 3GSE ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Gaming,
Games, and Gamification in Security Education
FOCI ’14: 4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open
Communications on the Internet
HotSec ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Hot Topics
in Security
HealthTech ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Health
Information Technologies
Safety, Security, Privacy, and Interoperability
of Health Information Technologies
WOOT ’14: 8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive
Technologies
www.usenix.org/sec14
Stay Connected...
twitter.com/USENIXSecurity
www.usenix.org/facebook
w...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SpanDex: Secure Password Tracking for Android
author:Landon P. Cox and
Peter Gilbert and
Geoffrey Lawler and
Valentin Pistol and
Ali Razeen and
Bi Wu and
Sai Cheemalapati
SAVE THE DATE
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
AUGUST 20–22, 2014 • SAN DIEGO, CA
The USENIX Security Symposium brings together researchers, practitioners, system admin istrators,  system programmers,
and others interested in the latest advances in the security of computer  systems and networks. The Symposium will
include a 3-day technical program with refereed papers, invited talks, posters, panel discussions, and Birds-of-a-Feather
sessions. Featured speakers/sessions include:
Keynote Address by Phil Lapsley, author of Exploding the
Phone: The Untold Story of the Teenagers and Outlaws Who
Hacked Ma Bell
Panel: “The Future of Crypto: Getting from Here to
Guarantees” with Daniel J. Bernstein, Matt Blaze, and
Tanja Lange
Invited Talk: “Battling Human Trafficking with Big Data”
by Rolando R. Lopez, Orphan Secure
Invited Talk: “Insight into the NSA’s Weakening
of Crypto Standards” by Joseph Menn, Reuters
The following co-located events will precede the Symposium on August 18–19, 2014:
EVT/WOTE ’14: 2014 Electronic Voting Technology
Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
USENIX Journal of Election Technology
and Systems (JETS)
Published in conjunction with EVT/WOTE
www.usenix.org/jets
CSET ’14: 7th Workshop on Cyber Security
Experimentation and Test
NEW! 3GSE ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Gaming,
Games, and Gamification in Security Education
FOCI ’14: 4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open
Communications on the Internet
HotSec ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Hot Topics
in Security
HealthTech ’14: 2014 USENIX Summit on Health
Information Technologies
Safety, Security, Privacy, and Interoperability
of Health Information Technologies
WOOT ’14: 8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive
Technologies
www.usenix.org/sec14
Stay Connected...
twitter.com/USENIXSecurity
www.usenix.org/facebook
w...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:j"Ak: Using Dynamic Analysis to Crawl and Test Modern Web
Applications
author:Giancarlo Pellegrino and
Constantin Tsch"urtz and
Eric Bodden and
Christian Rossow
j¨Ak: Using Dynamic Analysis to Crawl
and Test Modern Web Applications
Giancarlo Pellegrino1(B), Constantin Tsch¨urtz2, Eric Bodden2,
and Christian Rossow1
1 Center for IT-Security, Privacy, and Accountability (CISPA),
Saarland University, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
{gpellegrino,crossow}@cispa.saarland
2 Secure Software Engineering Group, Technische Universit¨at Darmstadt,
Darmstadt, Germany
constantin.tschuertz@gmail.com, eric.bodden@sit.fraunhofer.de
Abstract. Web application scanners are popular tools to perform black
box testing and are widely used to discover bugs in websites. For them to
work eﬀectively, they either rely on a set of URLs that they can test, or
use their own implementation of a crawler that discovers new parts of a
web application. Traditional crawlers would extract new URLs by pars-
ing HTML documents and applying static regular expressions. While this
approach can extract URLs in classic web applications, it fails to explore
large parts of modern JavaScript-based applications.
In this paper, we present a novel technique to explore web applica-
tions based on the dynamic analysis of the client-side JavaScript program.
We use dynamic analysis to hook JavaScript APIs, which enables us to
detect the registration of events, the use of network communication APIs,
and dynamically-generated URLs or user forms. We then propose to use a
navigation graph to perform further crawling. Based on this new crawl-
ing technique, we present j¨Ak, a web application scanner. We compare
j¨Ak against four existing web-application scanners on 13 web applications.
The experiments show that our approach can explore a surface of the web
applications that is 86 % larger than with existing approaches.
1 Introduction
Web application scanners are black box security testing tools that are widely
used to d...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:j"Ak: Using Dynamic Analysis to Crawl and Test Modern Web
Applications
author:Giancarlo Pellegrino and
Constantin Tsch"urtz and
Eric Bodden and
Christian Rossow
j¨Ak: Using Dynamic Analysis to Crawl
and Test Modern Web Applications
Giancarlo Pellegrino1(B), Constantin Tsch¨urtz2, Eric Bodden2,
and Christian Rossow1
1 Center for IT-Security, Privacy, and Accountability (CISPA),
Saarland University, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
{gpellegrino,crossow}@cispa.saarland
2 Secure Software Engineering Group, Technische Universit¨at Darmstadt,
Darmstadt, Germany
constantin.tschuertz@gmail.com, eric.bodden@sit.fraunhofer.de
Abstract. Web application scanners are popular tools to perform black
box testing and are widely used to discover bugs in websites. For them to
work eﬀectively, they either rely on a set of URLs that they can test, or
use their own implementation of a crawler that discovers new parts of a
web application. Traditional crawlers would extract new URLs by pars-
ing HTML documents and applying static regular expressions. While this
approach can extract URLs in classic web applications, it fails to explore
large parts of modern JavaScript-based applications.
In this paper, we present a novel technique to explore web applica-
tions based on the dynamic analysis of the client-side JavaScript program.
We use dynamic analysis to hook JavaScript APIs, which enables us to
detect the registration of events, the use of network communication APIs,
and dynamically-generated URLs or user forms. We then propose to use a
navigation graph to perform further crawling. Based on this new crawl-
ing technique, we present j¨Ak, a web application scanner. We compare
j¨Ak against four existing web-application scanners on 13 web applications.
The experiments show that our approach can explore a surface of the web
applications that is 86 % larger than with existing approaches.
1 Introduction
Web application scanners are black box security testing tools that are widely
used to d...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Tracing your roots: exploring the TLS trust anchor ecosystem
author:Zane Ma and
James Austgen and
Joshua Mason and
Zakir Durumeric and
Michael Bailey
Tracing Your Roots: Exploring the TLS Trust Anchor Ecosystem
Zane Ma
Georgia Institute of Technology
USA
zanema@gatech.edu
James Austgen
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
jaa2@illinois.edu
Joshua Mason
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
joshm@illinois.edu
Zakir Durumeric
Stanford University
USA
zakir@cs.stanford.edu
Michael Bailey
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
mdbailey@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Secure TLS server authentication depends on reliable trust anchors.
The fault intolerant design of today’s system—where a single com-
promised trust anchor can impersonate nearly all web entities—
necessitates the careful assessment of each trust anchor found in
a root store. In this work, we present a first look at the root store
ecosystem that underlies the accelerating deployment of TLS. Our
broad collection of TLS user agents, libraries, and operating systems
reveals a surprisingly condensed root store ecosystem, with nearly
all user agents ultimately deriving their roots from one of three
root programs: Apple, Microsoft, and NSS. This inverted pyramid
structure further magnifies the importance of judicious root store
management by these foundational root programs.
Our analysis of root store management presents evidence of
NSS’s relative operational agility, transparency, and rigorous in-
clusion policies. Unsurprisingly, all derivative root stores in our
dataset (e.g., Linuxes, Android, NodeJS) draw their roots from NSS.
Despite this solid footing, derivative root stores display lax update
routines and often customize their root stores in questionable ways.
By scrutinizing these practices, we highlight two fundamental ob-
stacles to existing NSS-derived root stores: rigid on-or-off trust and
multi-purpose root stores. Taken together, our study highlights
the concentration of root ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Tracing your roots: exploring the TLS trust anchor ecosystem
author:Zane Ma and
James Austgen and
Joshua Mason and
Zakir Durumeric and
Michael Bailey
Tracing Your Roots: Exploring the TLS Trust Anchor Ecosystem
Zane Ma
Georgia Institute of Technology
USA
zanema@gatech.edu
James Austgen
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
jaa2@illinois.edu
Joshua Mason
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
joshm@illinois.edu
Zakir Durumeric
Stanford University
USA
zakir@cs.stanford.edu
Michael Bailey
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
USA
mdbailey@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Secure TLS server authentication depends on reliable trust anchors.
The fault intolerant design of today’s system—where a single com-
promised trust anchor can impersonate nearly all web entities—
necessitates the careful assessment of each trust anchor found in
a root store. In this work, we present a first look at the root store
ecosystem that underlies the accelerating deployment of TLS. Our
broad collection of TLS user agents, libraries, and operating systems
reveals a surprisingly condensed root store ecosystem, with nearly
all user agents ultimately deriving their roots from one of three
root programs: Apple, Microsoft, and NSS. This inverted pyramid
structure further magnifies the importance of judicious root store
management by these foundational root programs.
Our analysis of root store management presents evidence of
NSS’s relative operational agility, transparency, and rigorous in-
clusion policies. Unsurprisingly, all derivative root stores in our
dataset (e.g., Linuxes, Android, NodeJS) draw their roots from NSS.
Despite this solid footing, derivative root stores display lax update
routines and often customize their root stores in questionable ways.
By scrutinizing these practices, we highlight two fundamental ob-
stacles to existing NSS-derived root stores: rigid on-or-off trust and
multi-purpose root stores. Taken together, our study highlights
the concentration of root ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:JShield: towards real-time and vulnerability-based detection of polluted
drive-by download attacks
author:Yinzhi Cao and
Xiang Pan and
Yan Chen and
Jianwei Zhuge
JShield: Towards Real-time and Vulnerability-based
Detection of Polluted Drive-by Download Attacks
Yinzhi Cao†, Xiang Pan, Yan Chen, and Jianwei Zhuge††
Northwestern University
†Columbia University
††Tsinghua University
ABSTRACT
Drive-by download attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities of web
browsers to control client computers, have become a major venue
for attackers. To detect such attacks, researchers have proposed
many approaches such as anomaly-based [22, 23] and vulnerability-
based [44, 50] detections. However, anomaly-based approaches are
vulnerable to data pollution, and existing vulnerability-based ap-
proaches cannot accurately describe the vulnerability condition of
all the drive-by download attacks.
In this paper, we propose a vulnerability-based approach, namely
JShield, which uses novel opcode vulnerability signature, a deter-
ministic ﬁnite automaton (DFA) with a variable pool at opcode
level, to match drive-by download vulnerabilities. We investigate
all the JavaScript engine vulnerabilities of web browsers from 2009
to 2014, as well as those of portable document ﬁles (PDF) readers
from 2007 to 2014. JShield is able to match all of those vulnera-
bilities; furthermore, the overall evaluation shows that JShield is so
lightweight that it only adds 2.39 percent of overhead to original
execution as the median among top 500 Alexa web sites.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, drive-by download attacks exploiting
browser vulnerabilities have become a major venue for attackers
to control benign computers including those of reputable compa-
nies. For example, in February 2013, both Facebook and Apple
conﬁrm being hit in “watering hole attack” [4], a variance of drive-
by download attack. In such an attack, the attacker compromises a
web site commonly visited by victims, injects drive-by do...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:JShield: towards real-time and vulnerability-based detection of polluted
drive-by download attacks
author:Yinzhi Cao and
Xiang Pan and
Yan Chen and
Jianwei Zhuge
JShield: Towards Real-time and Vulnerability-based
Detection of Polluted Drive-by Download Attacks
Yinzhi Cao†, Xiang Pan, Yan Chen, and Jianwei Zhuge††
Northwestern University
†Columbia University
††Tsinghua University
ABSTRACT
Drive-by download attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities of web
browsers to control client computers, have become a major venue
for attackers. To detect such attacks, researchers have proposed
many approaches such as anomaly-based [22, 23] and vulnerability-
based [44, 50] detections. However, anomaly-based approaches are
vulnerable to data pollution, and existing vulnerability-based ap-
proaches cannot accurately describe the vulnerability condition of
all the drive-by download attacks.
In this paper, we propose a vulnerability-based approach, namely
JShield, which uses novel opcode vulnerability signature, a deter-
ministic ﬁnite automaton (DFA) with a variable pool at opcode
level, to match drive-by download vulnerabilities. We investigate
all the JavaScript engine vulnerabilities of web browsers from 2009
to 2014, as well as those of portable document ﬁles (PDF) readers
from 2007 to 2014. JShield is able to match all of those vulnera-
bilities; furthermore, the overall evaluation shows that JShield is so
lightweight that it only adds 2.39 percent of overhead to original
execution as the median among top 500 Alexa web sites.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, drive-by download attacks exploiting
browser vulnerabilities have become a major venue for attackers
to control benign computers including those of reputable compa-
nies. For example, in February 2013, both Facebook and Apple
conﬁrm being hit in “watering hole attack” [4], a variance of drive-
by download attack. In such an attack, the attacker compromises a
web site commonly visited by victims, injects drive-by do...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Xede: Practical Exploit Early Detection
author:Meining Nie and
Purui Su and
Qi Li and
Zhi Wang and
Lingyun Ying and
Jinlong Hu and
Dengguo Feng
Xede: Practical Exploit Early Detection
Meining Nie1, Purui Su1,2(B), Qi Li3, Zhi Wang4, Lingyun Ying1,
Jinlong Hu5, and Dengguo Feng1
1 Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory,
Institute of Software, CAS, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
purui@iscas.ac.cn
2 State Key Laboratory of Computer Science,
Institute of Software, CAS, Beijing, China
3 Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
4 Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
5 South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
Abstract. Code reuse and code injection attacks have become the
popular techniques for advanced persistent threat (APT) to bypass
exploit-mitigation mechanisms deployed in modern operating systems.
Meanwhile, complex, benign programs such as Microsoft Oﬃce employ
many advanced techniques to improve the performance. Code execu-
tion patterns generated by these techniques are surprisingly similar to
exploits. This makes the practical exploit detection very challenging,
especially on the Windows platform. In this paper, we propose a practi-
cal exploit early detection system called Xede to comprehensively detect
code reuse and code injection attacks. Xede can eﬀectively reduce false
positives and false negatives in the exploit detection. We demonstrate
the eﬀectiveness of Xede by experimenting with exploit samples and
deploying Xede on the Internet. Xede can accurately detect all types of
exploits. In particular, it can capture many exploits that cannot be cap-
tured by mainstream anti-virus software and detect exploits that fail to
compromise the systems due to variations in the system conﬁgurations.
Keywords: Exploits · Code injection · Code reuse · ROP · Detection
1 Introduction
Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a stealthy, continuous, and targeted attack
against high-value targets, such as enterprises and government agencie...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Xede: Practical Exploit Early Detection
author:Meining Nie and
Purui Su and
Qi Li and
Zhi Wang and
Lingyun Ying and
Jinlong Hu and
Dengguo Feng
Xede: Practical Exploit Early Detection
Meining Nie1, Purui Su1,2(B), Qi Li3, Zhi Wang4, Lingyun Ying1,
Jinlong Hu5, and Dengguo Feng1
1 Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory,
Institute of Software, CAS, Beijing, People’s Republic of China
purui@iscas.ac.cn
2 State Key Laboratory of Computer Science,
Institute of Software, CAS, Beijing, China
3 Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
4 Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
5 South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
Abstract. Code reuse and code injection attacks have become the
popular techniques for advanced persistent threat (APT) to bypass
exploit-mitigation mechanisms deployed in modern operating systems.
Meanwhile, complex, benign programs such as Microsoft Oﬃce employ
many advanced techniques to improve the performance. Code execu-
tion patterns generated by these techniques are surprisingly similar to
exploits. This makes the practical exploit detection very challenging,
especially on the Windows platform. In this paper, we propose a practi-
cal exploit early detection system called Xede to comprehensively detect
code reuse and code injection attacks. Xede can eﬀectively reduce false
positives and false negatives in the exploit detection. We demonstrate
the eﬀectiveness of Xede by experimenting with exploit samples and
deploying Xede on the Internet. Xede can accurately detect all types of
exploits. In particular, it can capture many exploits that cannot be cap-
tured by mainstream anti-virus software and detect exploits that fail to
compromise the systems due to variations in the system conﬁgurations.
Keywords: Exploits · Code injection · Code reuse · ROP · Detection
1 Introduction
Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a stealthy, continuous, and targeted attack
against high-value targets, such as enterprises and government agencie...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Treasury System for Cryptocurrencies: Enabling Better Collaborative
Intelligence
author:Bingsheng Zhang and
Roman Oliynykov and
Hamed Balogun
A Treasury System for Cryptocurrencies:
Enabling Better Collaborative Intelligence
Bingsheng Zhang
Lancaster University, UK
b.zhang2@lancaster.ac.uk
Roman Oliynykov
Input Output Hong Kong
roman.oliynykov@iohk.io
Hamed Balogun
Lancaster University, UK
h.balogun@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract—A treasury system is a community-controlled and
decentralized collaborative decision-making mechanism for sus-
tainable funding of blockchain development and maintenance.
During each treasury period, project proposals are submitted,
discussed, and voted for; top-ranked projects are funded from the
treasury. The Dash governance system is a real-world example
of such kind of systems. In this work, we, for the ﬁrst time,
provide a rigorous study of the treasury system. We modelled,
designed, and implemented a provably secure treasury system
that is compatible with most existing blockchain infrastructures,
such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. More speciﬁcally, the proposed
treasury system supports liquid democracy/delegative voting for
better collaborative intelligence. Namely, the stake holders can
either vote directly on the proposed projects or delegate their
votes to experts. Its core component is a distributed universally
composable secure end-to-end veriﬁable voting protocol. The
integrity of the treasury voting decisions is guaranteed even when
all the voting committee members are corrupted. To further
improve efﬁciency, we proposed the world’s ﬁrst honest veriﬁer
zero-knowledge proof for unit vector encryption with logarithmic
size communication. This partial result may be of independent
interest
to other cryptographic protocols. A pilot system is
implemented in Scala over the Scorex 2.0 framework, and its
benchmark results indicate that the proposed system can support
tens of thousands of treasury participants with high efﬁciency.
I.
INTR...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Treasury System for Cryptocurrencies: Enabling Better Collaborative
Intelligence
author:Bingsheng Zhang and
Roman Oliynykov and
Hamed Balogun
A Treasury System for Cryptocurrencies:
Enabling Better Collaborative Intelligence
Bingsheng Zhang
Lancaster University, UK
b.zhang2@lancaster.ac.uk
Roman Oliynykov
Input Output Hong Kong
roman.oliynykov@iohk.io
Hamed Balogun
Lancaster University, UK
h.balogun@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract—A treasury system is a community-controlled and
decentralized collaborative decision-making mechanism for sus-
tainable funding of blockchain development and maintenance.
During each treasury period, project proposals are submitted,
discussed, and voted for; top-ranked projects are funded from the
treasury. The Dash governance system is a real-world example
of such kind of systems. In this work, we, for the ﬁrst time,
provide a rigorous study of the treasury system. We modelled,
designed, and implemented a provably secure treasury system
that is compatible with most existing blockchain infrastructures,
such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. More speciﬁcally, the proposed
treasury system supports liquid democracy/delegative voting for
better collaborative intelligence. Namely, the stake holders can
either vote directly on the proposed projects or delegate their
votes to experts. Its core component is a distributed universally
composable secure end-to-end veriﬁable voting protocol. The
integrity of the treasury voting decisions is guaranteed even when
all the voting committee members are corrupted. To further
improve efﬁciency, we proposed the world’s ﬁrst honest veriﬁer
zero-knowledge proof for unit vector encryption with logarithmic
size communication. This partial result may be of independent
interest
to other cryptographic protocols. A pilot system is
implemented in Scala over the Scorex 2.0 framework, and its
benchmark results indicate that the proposed system can support
tens of thousands of treasury participants with high efﬁciency.
I.
INTR...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Chaos Monkey: Increasing SDN Reliability through Systematic Network
Destruction
author:Michael Alan Chang and
Brendan Tschaen and
Theophilus Benson and
Laurent Vanbever
Chaos Monkey: Increasing SDN Reliability through
Systematic Network Destruction
Michael Alan Chang
Princeton University
machang@princeton.edu
Brendan Tschaen
Duke University
btschaen@cs.duke.edu
Theophilus Benson
Duke University
tbenson@cs.duke.edu
Laurent Vanbever
lvanbever@ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
1.
INTRODUCTION
As modern networking applications become increasingly
dynamic and high-bandwidth, software deﬁned networking
(SDN) has emerged as an agile, cost eﬀective architecture
with widespread adoption across industry.
In SDN, the
control-plane program runs on a logically-centralized con-
troller which directly conﬁgures the packet-handling mech-
anisms in the underlying switches using an open API (e.g.,
OpenFlow). While the controller makes it exceptionally con-
venient for a network operator to control and manage a net-
work, the controller requires complex logic and becomes a
single point of failure within the network. As a result, con-
ﬁguration errors by the controller could be extremely costly
for the network provider.
Several SDN controllers have been developed since the
conception of SDN, and network operators have utilized very
traditional means of identifying bugs in the controller, such
as unit testing and model checking [1]. However, it has be-
come apparent that these methods cannot practically handle
the inherent complexity of the controller platform that man-
ages large networks. Ultimately, one major source of this
complexity are network failures, as they trigger execution of
unexplored portions of code; these network failures are in-
evitable, costly, and considering all possible interleaving of
bugs is simply unfeasible.
To address this problem, we propose “Chaos Monkey” a
real-time post-deployment failure injection tool. Inspired by
industry practices in the cloud [2], Chaos Monke...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Chaos Monkey: Increasing SDN Reliability through Systematic Network
Destruction
author:Michael Alan Chang and
Brendan Tschaen and
Theophilus Benson and
Laurent Vanbever
Chaos Monkey: Increasing SDN Reliability through
Systematic Network Destruction
Michael Alan Chang
Princeton University
machang@princeton.edu
Brendan Tschaen
Duke University
btschaen@cs.duke.edu
Theophilus Benson
Duke University
tbenson@cs.duke.edu
Laurent Vanbever
lvanbever@ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
1.
INTRODUCTION
As modern networking applications become increasingly
dynamic and high-bandwidth, software deﬁned networking
(SDN) has emerged as an agile, cost eﬀective architecture
with widespread adoption across industry.
In SDN, the
control-plane program runs on a logically-centralized con-
troller which directly conﬁgures the packet-handling mech-
anisms in the underlying switches using an open API (e.g.,
OpenFlow). While the controller makes it exceptionally con-
venient for a network operator to control and manage a net-
work, the controller requires complex logic and becomes a
single point of failure within the network. As a result, con-
ﬁguration errors by the controller could be extremely costly
for the network provider.
Several SDN controllers have been developed since the
conception of SDN, and network operators have utilized very
traditional means of identifying bugs in the controller, such
as unit testing and model checking [1]. However, it has be-
come apparent that these methods cannot practically handle
the inherent complexity of the controller platform that man-
ages large networks. Ultimately, one major source of this
complexity are network failures, as they trigger execution of
unexplored portions of code; these network failures are in-
evitable, costly, and considering all possible interleaving of
bugs is simply unfeasible.
To address this problem, we propose “Chaos Monkey” a
real-time post-deployment failure injection tool. Inspired by
industry practices in the cloud [2], Chaos Monke...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Federated infrastructure: usage, patterns, and insights from "the
people's network"
author:Dhananjay Jagtap and
Alex Yen and
Huanlei Wu and
Aaron Schulman and
Pat Pannuto
Federated Infrastructure: Usage, Patterns, and Insights from
“The People’s Network”
Dhananjay Jagtap∗
dtjagtap@eng.ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Alex Yen∗
alyen@ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Huanlei Wu
huw012@ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Aaron Schulman
schulman@cs.ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we provide the first broad measurement study of
the operation, adoption, performance, and efficacy of Helium. The
Helium network aims to provide low-power, wide-area network
wireless coverage for Internet of Things-class devices. In contrast to
traditional infrastructure, “hotspots” (base stations) are owned and
operated by individuals who are paid by the network for providing
coverage and are paid directly by users for ferrying data.
As of May, 2021, Helium has over 40,000 active hotspots with
1,000 new hotspots coming online every day. This deployment is
decentralized – 84% of users own at most three hotspots. Some
support infrastructure remains highly centralized, however, with
over 99% of data traffic routed through one cloud endpoint and
multiple cities in which all hotspots rely on one ISP for backhaul.
Helium is largely speculative today with more hotspot activity
than user activity. Crowdsourced, incentive-guided infrastructure
deployment largely works but shows evidence of gamification and
apathy. As Helium lacks clear, radio-oriented coverage maps, we
develop and test coverage models based on network incentives.
Finally, empirical testing with IoT devices finds basic success, but
uncovers numerous reliability issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement; Network performance
analysis.
KEYWORDS
Decentralized wireless, LoRa, Internet of Things, Helium, LPWAN
ACM Reference Format:
Dhananjay Jagtap, Alex Yen, Huanlei Wu, Aaron Schulman, and Pat Pannuto.
2021. Federated Infrastructure: Usage, Patte...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Federated infrastructure: usage, patterns, and insights from "the
people's network"
author:Dhananjay Jagtap and
Alex Yen and
Huanlei Wu and
Aaron Schulman and
Pat Pannuto
Federated Infrastructure: Usage, Patterns, and Insights from
“The People’s Network”
Dhananjay Jagtap∗
dtjagtap@eng.ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Alex Yen∗
alyen@ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Huanlei Wu
huw012@ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
Aaron Schulman
schulman@cs.ucsd.edu
UC San Diego
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we provide the first broad measurement study of
the operation, adoption, performance, and efficacy of Helium. The
Helium network aims to provide low-power, wide-area network
wireless coverage for Internet of Things-class devices. In contrast to
traditional infrastructure, “hotspots” (base stations) are owned and
operated by individuals who are paid by the network for providing
coverage and are paid directly by users for ferrying data.
As of May, 2021, Helium has over 40,000 active hotspots with
1,000 new hotspots coming online every day. This deployment is
decentralized – 84% of users own at most three hotspots. Some
support infrastructure remains highly centralized, however, with
over 99% of data traffic routed through one cloud endpoint and
multiple cities in which all hotspots rely on one ISP for backhaul.
Helium is largely speculative today with more hotspot activity
than user activity. Crowdsourced, incentive-guided infrastructure
deployment largely works but shows evidence of gamification and
apathy. As Helium lacks clear, radio-oriented coverage maps, we
develop and test coverage models based on network incentives.
Finally, empirical testing with IoT devices finds basic success, but
uncovers numerous reliability issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks→ Network measurement; Network performance
analysis.
KEYWORDS
Decentralized wireless, LoRa, Internet of Things, Helium, LPWAN
ACM Reference Format:
Dhananjay Jagtap, Alex Yen, Huanlei Wu, Aaron Schulman, and Pat Pannuto.
2021. Federated Infrastructure: Usage, Patte...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Neuroscience Meets Cryptography: Designing Crypto Primitives Secure
Against Rubber Hose Attacks
author:Hristo Bojinov and
Daniel S'anchez and
Paul J. Reber and
Dan Boneh and
Patrick Lincoln
Neuroscience Meets Cryptography:
Designing Crypto Primitives Secure Against Rubber Hose Attacks
Hristo Bojinov
Stanford University
Daniel Sanchez, Paul Reber
Northwestern University
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
Patrick Lincoln
SRI
Abstract
Cryptographic systems often rely on the secrecy of cryp-
tographic keys given to users. Many schemes, however,
cannot resist coercion attacks where the user is forcibly
asked by an attacker to reveal the key. These attacks,
known as rubber hose cryptanalysis, are often the easiest
way to defeat cryptography. We present a defense against
coercion attacks using the concept of implicit learning
from cognitive psychology.
Implicit learning refers to
learning of patterns without any conscious knowledge of
the learned pattern. We use a carefully crafted computer
game to plant a secret password in the participant’s brain
without the participant having any conscious knowledge
of the trained password. While the planted secret can
be used for authentication, the participant cannot be co-
erced into revealing it since he or she has no conscious
knowledge of it. We performed a number of user studies
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to verify that partici-
pants can successfully re-authenticate over time and that
they are unable to reconstruct or even recognize short
fragments of the planted secret.
1
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: a high security facility
employs a sophisticated authentication system to check
that only persons who know a secret key, possess a hard-
ware token, and have an authorized biometric can enter.
Guards ensure that only people who successfully authen-
ticate can enter the facility. Now, suppose a clever at-
tacker captures an authenticated user. The attacker can
steal the user’s hardware token, fake the user...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Neuroscience Meets Cryptography: Designing Crypto Primitives Secure
Against Rubber Hose Attacks
author:Hristo Bojinov and
Daniel S'anchez and
Paul J. Reber and
Dan Boneh and
Patrick Lincoln
Neuroscience Meets Cryptography:
Designing Crypto Primitives Secure Against Rubber Hose Attacks
Hristo Bojinov
Stanford University
Daniel Sanchez, Paul Reber
Northwestern University
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
Patrick Lincoln
SRI
Abstract
Cryptographic systems often rely on the secrecy of cryp-
tographic keys given to users. Many schemes, however,
cannot resist coercion attacks where the user is forcibly
asked by an attacker to reveal the key. These attacks,
known as rubber hose cryptanalysis, are often the easiest
way to defeat cryptography. We present a defense against
coercion attacks using the concept of implicit learning
from cognitive psychology.
Implicit learning refers to
learning of patterns without any conscious knowledge of
the learned pattern. We use a carefully crafted computer
game to plant a secret password in the participant’s brain
without the participant having any conscious knowledge
of the trained password. While the planted secret can
be used for authentication, the participant cannot be co-
erced into revealing it since he or she has no conscious
knowledge of it. We performed a number of user studies
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to verify that partici-
pants can successfully re-authenticate over time and that
they are unable to reconstruct or even recognize short
fragments of the planted secret.
1
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: a high security facility
employs a sophisticated authentication system to check
that only persons who know a secret key, possess a hard-
ware token, and have an authorized biometric can enter.
Guards ensure that only people who successfully authen-
ticate can enter the facility. Now, suppose a clever at-
tacker captures an authenticated user. The attacker can
steal the user’s hardware token, fake the user...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Towards Database Firewall: Mining the Damage Spreading Patterns
author:Kun Bai and
Peng Liu
Towards Database Firewall: Mining the Damage Spreading Patterns
Kun Bai Peng Liu
College of Information Sciences and Technology
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802, USA
{kbai, pliu}@ist.psu.edu
Abstract
Access control and integrity constraints are well known ap-
proaches to ensure data integrity in commercial database systems.
However, due to operational mistakes, malicious intent of insiders
or vulnerabilities exploited by outsiders, data stored in a database
can still be compromised. When the database is under an attack,
rolling back and re-executing the damaged transactions are the
most used mechanisms during system recovery. This kind of mech-
anism either stops (or greatly restricts) the database service dur-
ing repair, which causes unacceptable availability loss or denial-
of-service for mission critical applications, or may cause serious
damage spreading during on-the-ﬂy recovery where many clean
data items are accidentally corrupted by legitimate new trans-
actions. To resolve this dilemma, we devise a novel mechanism,
called database ﬁrewall in this paper. This ﬁrewall is designed to
protect good data from being corrupted due to damage spreading.
Pattern mining and Bayesian network techniques are adopted in
the framework to mine frequent damage spreading patterns and to
predict the data integrity in the face of attack. Our approach pro-
vides a probability based strategy to estimate the data integrity on
the ﬂy. With this feature, the database ﬁrewall is able to enforce a
policy of transaction ﬁltering to dynamically ﬁlter out the potential
spreading transactions.
1 Introduction
Transactional processing systems (e.g., database sys-
tems) have become increasingly sophisticated and been
critical to most cyber infrastructures, such as banking, e-
Commerce, military combat-ﬁeld command centers, etc.
Data availability and integrity are cruci...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Towards Database Firewall: Mining the Damage Spreading Patterns
author:Kun Bai and
Peng Liu
Towards Database Firewall: Mining the Damage Spreading Patterns
Kun Bai Peng Liu
College of Information Sciences and Technology
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802, USA
{kbai, pliu}@ist.psu.edu
Abstract
Access control and integrity constraints are well known ap-
proaches to ensure data integrity in commercial database systems.
However, due to operational mistakes, malicious intent of insiders
or vulnerabilities exploited by outsiders, data stored in a database
can still be compromised. When the database is under an attack,
rolling back and re-executing the damaged transactions are the
most used mechanisms during system recovery. This kind of mech-
anism either stops (or greatly restricts) the database service dur-
ing repair, which causes unacceptable availability loss or denial-
of-service for mission critical applications, or may cause serious
damage spreading during on-the-ﬂy recovery where many clean
data items are accidentally corrupted by legitimate new trans-
actions. To resolve this dilemma, we devise a novel mechanism,
called database ﬁrewall in this paper. This ﬁrewall is designed to
protect good data from being corrupted due to damage spreading.
Pattern mining and Bayesian network techniques are adopted in
the framework to mine frequent damage spreading patterns and to
predict the data integrity in the face of attack. Our approach pro-
vides a probability based strategy to estimate the data integrity on
the ﬂy. With this feature, the database ﬁrewall is able to enforce a
policy of transaction ﬁltering to dynamically ﬁlter out the potential
spreading transactions.
1 Introduction
Transactional processing systems (e.g., database sys-
tems) have become increasingly sophisticated and been
critical to most cyber infrastructures, such as banking, e-
Commerce, military combat-ﬁeld command centers, etc.
Data availability and integrity are cruci...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Certified Verification of Algebraic Properties on Low-Level Mathematical
Constructs in Cryptographic Programs
author:Ming-Hsien Tsai and
Bow-Yaw Wang and
Bo-Yin Yang
Certified Verification of Algebraic Properties on Low-
Level Mathematical Constructs in Cryptographic Programs
Ming-Hsien Tsai
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
mhtsai208@gmail.com
Bow-Yaw Wang
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
bywang@iis.sinica.edu.tw
Bo-Yin Yang
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
byyang@iis.sinica.edu.tw
ABSTRACT
Mathematical constructs are necessary for computation on the
underlying algebraic structures of cryptosystems. They are often
written in assembly language and optimized manually for efficiency.
We develop a certified technique to verify low-level mathematical
constructs in X25519, the default elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol used in OpenSSH. Our technique translates an
algebraic specification of mathematical constructs into an algebraic
problem. The algebraic problem in turn is solved by the computer
algebra system Singular. The proof assistant Coq certifies the
translation and solution to algebraic problems. Specifications about
output ranges and potential program overflows are translated to
SMT problems and verified by SMT solvers. We report our case
studies on verifying arithmetic computation over a large finite field
and the Montgomery Ladderstep, a crucial loop in X25519.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Logic and verification;
KEYWORDS
cryptography; verification; low-level implementation
1 INTRODUCTION
In order to take advantage of computer security offered by modern
cryptography, cryptosystems must be realized by cryptographic
programs where mathematical constructs are required to compute
on the underlying algebraic structures of cryptosystems. Such math-
ematical constructs are frequently invoked in cryptographic pro-
grams; they are often written in assembly language and manually
optimized for efficiency. Security of cryptosystems could be com-
pr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Certified Verification of Algebraic Properties on Low-Level Mathematical
Constructs in Cryptographic Programs
author:Ming-Hsien Tsai and
Bow-Yaw Wang and
Bo-Yin Yang
Certified Verification of Algebraic Properties on Low-
Level Mathematical Constructs in Cryptographic Programs
Ming-Hsien Tsai
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
mhtsai208@gmail.com
Bow-Yaw Wang
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
bywang@iis.sinica.edu.tw
Bo-Yin Yang
Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
byyang@iis.sinica.edu.tw
ABSTRACT
Mathematical constructs are necessary for computation on the
underlying algebraic structures of cryptosystems. They are often
written in assembly language and optimized manually for efficiency.
We develop a certified technique to verify low-level mathematical
constructs in X25519, the default elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol used in OpenSSH. Our technique translates an
algebraic specification of mathematical constructs into an algebraic
problem. The algebraic problem in turn is solved by the computer
algebra system Singular. The proof assistant Coq certifies the
translation and solution to algebraic problems. Specifications about
output ranges and potential program overflows are translated to
SMT problems and verified by SMT solvers. We report our case
studies on verifying arithmetic computation over a large finite field
and the Montgomery Ladderstep, a crucial loop in X25519.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Logic and verification;
KEYWORDS
cryptography; verification; low-level implementation
1 INTRODUCTION
In order to take advantage of computer security offered by modern
cryptography, cryptosystems must be realized by cryptographic
programs where mathematical constructs are required to compute
on the underlying algebraic structures of cryptosystems. Such math-
ematical constructs are frequently invoked in cryptographic pro-
grams; they are often written in assembly language and manually
optimized for efficiency. Security of cryptosystems could be com-
pr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Dynamix: anonymity on dynamic social structures
author:Abedelaziz Mohaisen and
Yongdae Kim
Dynamix: Anonymity on Dynamic Social Structures
Abedelaziz Mohaisen
Verisign Labs, VA, USA
Yongdae Kim
KAIST, Daejeon, South Korea
ABSTRACT
In this paper we advance communication using social networks in
two directions by considering dynamics of social graphs. First,
we formally deﬁne the problem of routing on dynamic graphs and
show an interesting and intuitive connection between graph dy-
namics and random walks on weighted graphs; graphs in which
weights summarize history of edge dynamics and allow for future
dynamics to be used as weight adjustment. Second, we present sev-
eral measurements of our proposed model on dynamic graphs ex-
tracted from real-world social networks and compare them to static
structures driven from the same graphs. We show several interest-
ing trade-offs and highlight the potential of our model to capture
dynamics, enrich graph structure, and improves the quantitative
sender anonymity when compared to the case of static graphs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General – Security
and Protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Design studies
Keywords
Social networks, Anonymity, Dynamics, P2P communication.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Social networks provide rich algorithmic and structural prop-
erties that can be used for building certain classes of application
beneﬁting from these properties. When considered along with the
main characteristic of social networks, trust, the potential of these
networks becomes very promising in solving real-world problems.
For example, social networks have been proposed as a building
block to defend against the Sybil attack [19], to enable routing
in delay tolerant networks[3, 6], and to provide peer-to-peer and
private communication [14, 9, 4]. However, social network-based
systems make certain assumptions towards achieving their goals;
trust among nodes is assumed binary [10], ass...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Dynamix: anonymity on dynamic social structures
author:Abedelaziz Mohaisen and
Yongdae Kim
Dynamix: Anonymity on Dynamic Social Structures
Abedelaziz Mohaisen
Verisign Labs, VA, USA
Yongdae Kim
KAIST, Daejeon, South Korea
ABSTRACT
In this paper we advance communication using social networks in
two directions by considering dynamics of social graphs. First,
we formally deﬁne the problem of routing on dynamic graphs and
show an interesting and intuitive connection between graph dy-
namics and random walks on weighted graphs; graphs in which
weights summarize history of edge dynamics and allow for future
dynamics to be used as weight adjustment. Second, we present sev-
eral measurements of our proposed model on dynamic graphs ex-
tracted from real-world social networks and compare them to static
structures driven from the same graphs. We show several interest-
ing trade-offs and highlight the potential of our model to capture
dynamics, enrich graph structure, and improves the quantitative
sender anonymity when compared to the case of static graphs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General – Security
and Protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Design studies
Keywords
Social networks, Anonymity, Dynamics, P2P communication.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Social networks provide rich algorithmic and structural prop-
erties that can be used for building certain classes of application
beneﬁting from these properties. When considered along with the
main characteristic of social networks, trust, the potential of these
networks becomes very promising in solving real-world problems.
For example, social networks have been proposed as a building
block to defend against the Sybil attack [19], to enable routing
in delay tolerant networks[3, 6], and to provide peer-to-peer and
private communication [14, 9, 4]. However, social network-based
systems make certain assumptions towards achieving their goals;
trust among nodes is assumed binary [10], ass...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Minimizing Noise in HyperLogLog-Based Spread Estimation of Multiple
Flows
author:Dinhnguyen Dao and
Rhongho Jang and
Changhun Jung and
David Mohaisen and
DaeHun Nyang
2022 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)
2
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Minimizing Noise in HyperLogLog-Based Spread
Estimation of Multiple Flows
Rhongho Jang†
Wayne State Univ.
r.jang@wayne.edu
Ewha Womans Univ.
mizno@ewha.ac.kr
Univ. of Central Florida
David Mohaisen
Changhun Jung
Dinh Nguyen Dao†
Inha Univ.
nguyen@inha.edu
mohaisen@ucf.edu
DaeHun Nyang
Ewha Womans Univ.
nyang@ewha.ac.kr
Abstract—Cardinality estimation has become an essential
building block of modern network monitoring systems due to
the increasing concerns of cyberattacks (e.g., Denial-of-Service,
worm, spammer, scanner, etc.). However, the ever-increasing at-
tack scale and the diversity of patterns (i.e., ﬂow size distribution)
will produce a biased estimation of existing solutions if apply a
monotonic hypothesis for network trafﬁc. The most representa-
tive solution is virtual HyperLogLog (vHLL), which extended the
proven HLL, a single element cardinality estimation solution, to
a multi-tenant version using a memory random sharing and noise
elimination approach. In this paper, we show that the assumption
made by vHLL’s does not work for large-scale network trafﬁc
with diverse ﬂow distributions. To resolve the issue, we propose
a novel noise elimination method, called Rank Recovery-based
Spread Estimator (RRSE), which is tolerant to both attack and
normal trafﬁc scenarios while using limited computation and
storage. We show that our recovery function is more reliable than
state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover,...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Minimizing Noise in HyperLogLog-Based Spread Estimation of Multiple
Flows
author:Dinhnguyen Dao and
Rhongho Jang and
Changhun Jung and
David Mohaisen and
DaeHun Nyang
2022 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)
2
4
0
0
0
.
2
2
0
2
.
5
0
4
3
5
N
S
D
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
1
-
3
9
6
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
N
S
D
(
s
k
r
o
w
t
e
N
d
n
a
s
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t
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l
a
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F
I
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E
E
I
l
a
u
n
n
A
d
n
2
5
2
2
0
2
Minimizing Noise in HyperLogLog-Based Spread
Estimation of Multiple Flows
Rhongho Jang†
Wayne State Univ.
r.jang@wayne.edu
Ewha Womans Univ.
mizno@ewha.ac.kr
Univ. of Central Florida
David Mohaisen
Changhun Jung
Dinh Nguyen Dao†
Inha Univ.
nguyen@inha.edu
mohaisen@ucf.edu
DaeHun Nyang
Ewha Womans Univ.
nyang@ewha.ac.kr
Abstract—Cardinality estimation has become an essential
building block of modern network monitoring systems due to
the increasing concerns of cyberattacks (e.g., Denial-of-Service,
worm, spammer, scanner, etc.). However, the ever-increasing at-
tack scale and the diversity of patterns (i.e., ﬂow size distribution)
will produce a biased estimation of existing solutions if apply a
monotonic hypothesis for network trafﬁc. The most representa-
tive solution is virtual HyperLogLog (vHLL), which extended the
proven HLL, a single element cardinality estimation solution, to
a multi-tenant version using a memory random sharing and noise
elimination approach. In this paper, we show that the assumption
made by vHLL’s does not work for large-scale network trafﬁc
with diverse ﬂow distributions. To resolve the issue, we propose
a novel noise elimination method, called Rank Recovery-based
Spread Estimator (RRSE), which is tolerant to both attack and
normal trafﬁc scenarios while using limited computation and
storage. We show that our recovery function is more reliable than
state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Financial Institution's Legacy Mainframe Access Control System in
Light of the Proposed NIST RBAC Standard
author:Andrew D. Marshall
A Financial Institution’s Legacy Mainframe Access Control System in Light of
the Proposed NIST RBAC Standard
Andrew D. Marshall
TD Bank Financial Group
275 Dundas Street
London, Ontario, Canada
andrew.marshall@td.com
Abstract
In this paper we describe a mainframe access control
system (DENT) and its associated delegated administration
tool (DSAS) that were used in a ﬁnancial institution for over
20 years to control access to banking transaction products.
The ﬁr st part of this paper describes the design and oper-
ation of DENT/DSAS as an example of a long-lived access
control system in a ﬁnancial institution.
A standard for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has
recently been proposed by the United States National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The second part
of this paper discusses how the functionality of DENT/DSAS
could be achieved by applying its principles of operation
within the NIST model. In so doing we also evaluate the
proposed standard by validating it against the requirements
embodied in a successful access control system.
We conclude with some observations about the design
of DENT/DSAS and suggestions for changes in the pro-
posed RBAC standard to accommodate some features of
DENT/DSAS that it does not appear to support.
1. Introduction
The The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD)
is one of
Canada’s largest ﬁnancial
institutions. On February 1,
2000, it acquired the assets of CT Financial Services (CT),
which operated a trust company and related ﬁnancial ser-
vices businesses under the name Canada Trust. With the
purchase TD acquired a portfolio of software that consti-
tuted the banking systems of the former Canada Trust. As a
consequence of system integration decisions driven by busi-
ness requirements, much of the CT software portfolio has
been or shortly will be retired, including the access control
syste...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Financial Institution's Legacy Mainframe Access Control System in
Light of the Proposed NIST RBAC Standard
author:Andrew D. Marshall
A Financial Institution’s Legacy Mainframe Access Control System in Light of
the Proposed NIST RBAC Standard
Andrew D. Marshall
TD Bank Financial Group
275 Dundas Street
London, Ontario, Canada
andrew.marshall@td.com
Abstract
In this paper we describe a mainframe access control
system (DENT) and its associated delegated administration
tool (DSAS) that were used in a ﬁnancial institution for over
20 years to control access to banking transaction products.
The ﬁr st part of this paper describes the design and oper-
ation of DENT/DSAS as an example of a long-lived access
control system in a ﬁnancial institution.
A standard for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has
recently been proposed by the United States National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The second part
of this paper discusses how the functionality of DENT/DSAS
could be achieved by applying its principles of operation
within the NIST model. In so doing we also evaluate the
proposed standard by validating it against the requirements
embodied in a successful access control system.
We conclude with some observations about the design
of DENT/DSAS and suggestions for changes in the pro-
posed RBAC standard to accommodate some features of
DENT/DSAS that it does not appear to support.
1. Introduction
The The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD)
is one of
Canada’s largest ﬁnancial
institutions. On February 1,
2000, it acquired the assets of CT Financial Services (CT),
which operated a trust company and related ﬁnancial ser-
vices businesses under the name Canada Trust. With the
purchase TD acquired a portfolio of software that consti-
tuted the banking systems of the former Canada Trust. As a
consequence of system integration decisions driven by busi-
ness requirements, much of the CT software portfolio has
been or shortly will be retired, including the access control
syste...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Identifying elephant flows through periodically sampled packets
author:Tatsuya Mori and
Masato Uchida and
Ryoichi Kawahara and
Jianping Pan and
Shigeki Goto
Identifying Elephant Flows Through
Periodically Sampled Packets
Tatsuya Mori
NTT Service Integration Labs
Waseda University
mori.tatsuya@lab.ntt.co.jp
Masato Uchida
NTT Service Integration Labs
uchida.masato@lab.ntt.co.jp
Ryoichi Kawahara
NTT Service Integration Labs
kawahara.ryoichi@lab.ntt.co.jp
Jianping Pan
NTT MCL
panjianping@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Identifying elephant ﬂows is very important in developing
eﬀective and eﬃcient traﬃc engineering schemes. In addi-
tion, obtaining the statistics of these ﬂows is also very useful
for network operation and management. On the other hand,
with the rapid growth of link speed in recent years, packet
sampling has become a very attractive and scalable means
to measure ﬂow statistics; however, it also makes identi-
fying elephant ﬂows become much more diﬃcult. Based on
Bayes’ theorem, this paper develops techniques and schemes
to identify elephant ﬂows in periodically sampled packets.
We show that our basic framework is very ﬂexible in mak-
ing appropriate trade-oﬀs between false positives (misiden-
tiﬁed ﬂows) and false negatives (missed elephant ﬂows) with
regard to a given sampling frequency. We further validate
and evaluate our approach by using some publicly available
traces. Our schemes are generic and require no per-packet
processing; hence, they allow a very cost-eﬀective imple-
mentation for being deployed in large-scale high-speed net-
works.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.3 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Operations—Network
monitoring
General Terms: Measurement, Theory, Veriﬁcation
Keywords: measurement, ﬂow statistics, packet sampling,
Bayes’ theorem, the elephant and mice phenomenon
1.
INTRODUCTION
As many measurement-based studies have revealed, ﬂow
statistics exhibit strong heavy-tail behaviors in various net-
works (including the Inte...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Identifying elephant flows through periodically sampled packets
author:Tatsuya Mori and
Masato Uchida and
Ryoichi Kawahara and
Jianping Pan and
Shigeki Goto
Identifying Elephant Flows Through
Periodically Sampled Packets
Tatsuya Mori
NTT Service Integration Labs
Waseda University
mori.tatsuya@lab.ntt.co.jp
Masato Uchida
NTT Service Integration Labs
uchida.masato@lab.ntt.co.jp
Ryoichi Kawahara
NTT Service Integration Labs
kawahara.ryoichi@lab.ntt.co.jp
Jianping Pan
NTT MCL
panjianping@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Identifying elephant ﬂows is very important in developing
eﬀective and eﬃcient traﬃc engineering schemes. In addi-
tion, obtaining the statistics of these ﬂows is also very useful
for network operation and management. On the other hand,
with the rapid growth of link speed in recent years, packet
sampling has become a very attractive and scalable means
to measure ﬂow statistics; however, it also makes identi-
fying elephant ﬂows become much more diﬃcult. Based on
Bayes’ theorem, this paper develops techniques and schemes
to identify elephant ﬂows in periodically sampled packets.
We show that our basic framework is very ﬂexible in mak-
ing appropriate trade-oﬀs between false positives (misiden-
tiﬁed ﬂows) and false negatives (missed elephant ﬂows) with
regard to a given sampling frequency. We further validate
and evaluate our approach by using some publicly available
traces. Our schemes are generic and require no per-packet
processing; hence, they allow a very cost-eﬀective imple-
mentation for being deployed in large-scale high-speed net-
works.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.3 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Operations—Network
monitoring
General Terms: Measurement, Theory, Veriﬁcation
Keywords: measurement, ﬂow statistics, packet sampling,
Bayes’ theorem, the elephant and mice phenomenon
1.
INTRODUCTION
As many measurement-based studies have revealed, ﬂow
statistics exhibit strong heavy-tail behaviors in various net-
works (including the Inte...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect Covert Botnet Channels
author:Fr'ed'eric Giroire and
Jaideep Chandrashekar and
Nina Taft and
Eve M. Schooler and
Dina Papagiannaki
Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect
Covert Botnet Channels
Frederic Giroire1, Jaideep Chandrashekar2, Nina Taft2, Eve Schooler2,
and Dina Papagiannaki2
1 Project Mascotte, I3S(CNRS/UNS)/INRIA
2 Intel Research
Abstract. We describe a method to detect botnet command and con-
trol traﬃc and individual end-hosts. We introduce the notion of “desti-
nation traﬃc atoms” which aggregate the destinations and services that
are communicated with. We then compute the ”persistence”, which is
a measure of temporal regularity and that we propose in this paper,
for individual destination atoms. Very persistent destination atoms are
added to a host’s whitelist during a training period. Subsequently, we
track the persistence of new destination atoms not already whitelisted
in order to identify suspicious C&C destinations. A particularly novel
aspect is that we track persistence at multiple timescales concurrently.
Importantly, our method does not require any a-priori information about
destinations, ports, or protocols used by the C&C communication, nor
do we require payload inspection. We evaluate our system using exten-
sive user traﬃc traces collected from an enterprise network, along with
collected botnet traces.
We demonstrate that our method correctly identiﬁes a botnet’s C&C
traﬃc, even when it is very stealthy. We also show that ﬁltering outgoing
traﬃc with the constructed whitelists dramatically improves the perfor-
mance of traditional anomaly detectors. Finally, we show that the C&C
detection can be achieved with a very low false positive rate.
1 Introduction
A botnet is a collection of compromised end-hosts all under the control of a
particular bot-master (or bot-herder). The recruited end-hosts, also called drones
or zombies, are marshalled and controlled by the bot-herders via a ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect Covert Botnet Channels
author:Fr'ed'eric Giroire and
Jaideep Chandrashekar and
Nina Taft and
Eve M. Schooler and
Dina Papagiannaki
Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect
Covert Botnet Channels
Frederic Giroire1, Jaideep Chandrashekar2, Nina Taft2, Eve Schooler2,
and Dina Papagiannaki2
1 Project Mascotte, I3S(CNRS/UNS)/INRIA
2 Intel Research
Abstract. We describe a method to detect botnet command and con-
trol traﬃc and individual end-hosts. We introduce the notion of “desti-
nation traﬃc atoms” which aggregate the destinations and services that
are communicated with. We then compute the ”persistence”, which is
a measure of temporal regularity and that we propose in this paper,
for individual destination atoms. Very persistent destination atoms are
added to a host’s whitelist during a training period. Subsequently, we
track the persistence of new destination atoms not already whitelisted
in order to identify suspicious C&C destinations. A particularly novel
aspect is that we track persistence at multiple timescales concurrently.
Importantly, our method does not require any a-priori information about
destinations, ports, or protocols used by the C&C communication, nor
do we require payload inspection. We evaluate our system using exten-
sive user traﬃc traces collected from an enterprise network, along with
collected botnet traces.
We demonstrate that our method correctly identiﬁes a botnet’s C&C
traﬃc, even when it is very stealthy. We also show that ﬁltering outgoing
traﬃc with the constructed whitelists dramatically improves the perfor-
mance of traditional anomaly detectors. Finally, we show that the C&C
detection can be achieved with a very low false positive rate.
1 Introduction
A botnet is a collection of compromised end-hosts all under the control of a
particular bot-master (or bot-herder). The recruited end-hosts, also called drones
or zombies, are marshalled and controlled by the bot-herders via a ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Toward the Analysis of Embedded Firmware through Automated Re-hosting
author:Eric Gustafson and
Marius Muench and
Chad Spensky and
Nilo Redini and
Aravind Machiry and
Yanick Fratantonio and
Davide Balzarotti and
Aur'elien Francillon and
Yung Ryn Choe and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Toward the Analysis of Embedded Firmware through Automated Re-hosting
Eric Gustafson1,2, Marius Muench3, Chad Spensky1, Nilo Redini1, Aravind Machiry1, Yanick Fratantonio3
Aurélien Francillon3, Davide Balzarotti3, Yung Ryn Choe2, Christopher Kruegel1, and Giovanni Vigna1
1University of California, Santa Barbara
{edg, cspensky, nredini, machiry, chris, vigna}@cs.ucsb.edu
2Sandia National Laboratories
{edgusta, yrchoe}@sandia.gov
3EURECOM
{marius.muench, francill, yanick.fratantonio, balzarot}@eurecom.fr
Abstract
The recent paradigm shift introduced by the Internet of
Things (IoT) has brought embedded systems into focus as
a target for both security analysts and malicious adversaries.
Typiﬁed by their lack of standardized hardware, diverse soft-
ware, and opaque functionality, IoT devices present unique
challenges to security analysts due to the tight coupling
between their ﬁrmware and the hardware for which it was de-
signed. In order to take advantage of modern program analysis
techniques, such as fuzzing or symbolic execution, with any
kind of scale or depth, analysts must have the ability to exe-
cute ﬁrmware code in emulated (or virtualized) environments.
However, these emulation environments are rarely available
and are cumbersome to create through manual reverse
engineering, greatly limiting the analysis of binary ﬁrmware.
In this work, we explore the problem of ﬁrmware
re-hosting, the process by which ﬁrmware is migrated
from its original hardware environment into a virtualized
one. We show that an approach capable of creating virtual,
interactive environments in an automated manner is a
necessity to enable ﬁrmware analysis at scale. We present
the ﬁrst proof-o...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Toward the Analysis of Embedded Firmware through Automated Re-hosting
author:Eric Gustafson and
Marius Muench and
Chad Spensky and
Nilo Redini and
Aravind Machiry and
Yanick Fratantonio and
Davide Balzarotti and
Aur'elien Francillon and
Yung Ryn Choe and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Toward the Analysis of Embedded Firmware through Automated Re-hosting
Eric Gustafson1,2, Marius Muench3, Chad Spensky1, Nilo Redini1, Aravind Machiry1, Yanick Fratantonio3
Aurélien Francillon3, Davide Balzarotti3, Yung Ryn Choe2, Christopher Kruegel1, and Giovanni Vigna1
1University of California, Santa Barbara
{edg, cspensky, nredini, machiry, chris, vigna}@cs.ucsb.edu
2Sandia National Laboratories
{edgusta, yrchoe}@sandia.gov
3EURECOM
{marius.muench, francill, yanick.fratantonio, balzarot}@eurecom.fr
Abstract
The recent paradigm shift introduced by the Internet of
Things (IoT) has brought embedded systems into focus as
a target for both security analysts and malicious adversaries.
Typiﬁed by their lack of standardized hardware, diverse soft-
ware, and opaque functionality, IoT devices present unique
challenges to security analysts due to the tight coupling
between their ﬁrmware and the hardware for which it was de-
signed. In order to take advantage of modern program analysis
techniques, such as fuzzing or symbolic execution, with any
kind of scale or depth, analysts must have the ability to exe-
cute ﬁrmware code in emulated (or virtualized) environments.
However, these emulation environments are rarely available
and are cumbersome to create through manual reverse
engineering, greatly limiting the analysis of binary ﬁrmware.
In this work, we explore the problem of ﬁrmware
re-hosting, the process by which ﬁrmware is migrated
from its original hardware environment into a virtualized
one. We show that an approach capable of creating virtual,
interactive environments in an automated manner is a
necessity to enable ﬁrmware analysis at scale. We present
the ﬁrst proof-o...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:InjectaBLE: Injecting malicious traffic into established Bluetooth
Low Energy connections
author:Romain Cayre and
Florent Galtier and
Guillaume Auriol and
Vincent Nicomette and
Mohamed Kaâniche and
G'eraldine Marconato
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2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)
InjectaBLE: Injecting malicious trafﬁc into
established Bluetooth Low Energy connections
Romain Cayre∗‡, Florent Galtier∗, Guillaume Auriol∗†, Vincent Nicomette∗†, Mohamed Kaˆaniche∗, G´eraldine Marconato‡
∗CNRS, LAAS, 7 avenue du colonel Roche, F-31400
†Univ de Toulouse, INSA, LAAS, F-31400
‡APSYS.Lab, APSYS
Email: ∗ﬁrstname.lastname@laas.fr ‡ﬁrstname.lastname@airbus.com
Abstract—Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is nowadays one of
the most popular wireless communication protocols for Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. As a result, several attacks have targeted
this protocol or its implementations in recent years, illustrating
the growing interest for this technology. However, some major
challenges remain from an offensive perspective, such as injecting
arbitrary frames, hijacking the Slave role or performing a Man-
in-The-Middle in an already established connection. In this paper,
we describe a novel attack called InjectaBLE, allowing to inject
malicious trafﬁc into an existing connection. This attack is highly
critical as the vulnerability exploited is inherent to the BLE
speciﬁcation itself, which means that any BLE connection can
be possibly vulnerable, regardless of the BLE devices involved
in the connection. We describe the theoretical foundations of the
attack, how to implement it in practice, and we explore four
critical attack scenarios allowing to mali...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:InjectaBLE: Injecting malicious traffic into established Bluetooth
Low Energy connections
author:Romain Cayre and
Florent Galtier and
Guillaume Auriol and
Vincent Nicomette and
Mohamed Kaâniche and
G'eraldine Marconato
0
5
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
7
8
9
8
4
N
S
D
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
7
-
2
7
5
3
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
N
S
D
(
s
k
r
o
w
t
e
N
d
n
a
s
m
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s
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e
l
b
a
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p
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f
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l
a
n
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t
a
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t
n
I
P
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a
u
n
n
A
t
s
1
5
1
2
0
2
2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)
InjectaBLE: Injecting malicious trafﬁc into
established Bluetooth Low Energy connections
Romain Cayre∗‡, Florent Galtier∗, Guillaume Auriol∗†, Vincent Nicomette∗†, Mohamed Kaˆaniche∗, G´eraldine Marconato‡
∗CNRS, LAAS, 7 avenue du colonel Roche, F-31400
†Univ de Toulouse, INSA, LAAS, F-31400
‡APSYS.Lab, APSYS
Email: ∗ﬁrstname.lastname@laas.fr ‡ﬁrstname.lastname@airbus.com
Abstract—Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is nowadays one of
the most popular wireless communication protocols for Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. As a result, several attacks have targeted
this protocol or its implementations in recent years, illustrating
the growing interest for this technology. However, some major
challenges remain from an offensive perspective, such as injecting
arbitrary frames, hijacking the Slave role or performing a Man-
in-The-Middle in an already established connection. In this paper,
we describe a novel attack called InjectaBLE, allowing to inject
malicious trafﬁc into an existing connection. This attack is highly
critical as the vulnerability exploited is inherent to the BLE
speciﬁcation itself, which means that any BLE connection can
be possibly vulnerable, regardless of the BLE devices involved
in the connection. We describe the theoretical foundations of the
attack, how to implement it in practice, and we explore four
critical attack scenarios allowing to mali...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
author:Minghong Fang and
Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust
Federated Learning
Minghong Fang, Iowa State University; Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and
Neil Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/fang
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
Minghong Fang∗1, Xiaoyu Cao∗2, Jinyuan Jia2, Neil Zhenqiang Gong2
1CS Department, Iowa State University, 2ECE Department, Duke University
1myfang@iastate.edu, 2{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a
machine learning model: each client device maintains a local
model for its local training dataset, while a master device
maintains a global model via aggregating the local models
from the client devices. The machine learning community
recently proposed several federated learning methods that
were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g.,
system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client
devices. In this work, we perform the ﬁrst systematic study
on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We
assume an attacker has compromised some client devices,
and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on
the compromised client devices during the learning process
such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We
formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply
our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning
methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets
show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates
of the models learnt by the federated learning...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
author:Minghong Fang and
Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust
Federated Learning
Minghong Fang, Iowa State University; Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and
Neil Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/fang
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
Minghong Fang∗1, Xiaoyu Cao∗2, Jinyuan Jia2, Neil Zhenqiang Gong2
1CS Department, Iowa State University, 2ECE Department, Duke University
1myfang@iastate.edu, 2{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a
machine learning model: each client device maintains a local
model for its local training dataset, while a master device
maintains a global model via aggregating the local models
from the client devices. The machine learning community
recently proposed several federated learning methods that
were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g.,
system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client
devices. In this work, we perform the ﬁrst systematic study
on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We
assume an attacker has compromised some client devices,
and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on
the compromised client devices during the learning process
such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We
formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply
our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning
methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets
show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates
of the models learnt by the federated learning...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Nabs: A System for Detecting Resource Abuses via Characterization
of Flow Content Type
author:Kulesh Shanmugasundaram and
Mehdi Kharrazi and
Nasir D. Memon
Nabs: A System for Detecting Resource Abuses via Characterization
of Flow Content Type
Kulesh Shanmugasundaram
Mehdi Kharrazi
Nasir Memon
kulesh@isis.poly.edu
mehdi@isis.poly.edu
memon@poly.edu
Polytechnic University
Brooklyn, NY11201
Abstract
One of the growing problems faced by network ad-
ministrators is the abuse of computing resources by
authorized and unauthorized personnel. The nature
of abuse may vary from using unauthorized applica-
tions to serving unauthorized content. Proliferation of
peer-to-peer networks and wide use of tunnels makes
it diﬃcult to detect such abuses and easy to circum-
vent security policies. This paper presents the design
and implementation of a system, called Nabs, that
characterizes content types of network ﬂows based
solely on the payload which can then be used to iden-
tify abuses of computing resources. The proposed
method does not depend on packet headers or other
simple packet characteristics hence is more robust to
circumvention.
1 Introduction
Abuse of computing resources is one of the growing
problems. Network administrators deal with a vari-
ety of abuses such as, network bandwidth by unau-
thorized application services, and the distribution of
unauthorized content to name a few. Abusers can be
malicious attackers looking for free resources to host
their illegal activities, a malicious insider running a
peer-to-peer hub, or simply an ill informed user unin-
tentionally running an application proxy.
The two most common defenses that are used to
prevent network abuses are ﬁrewalls and Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS). An IDS is not useful in de-
tecting many types of abuses where the essence of the
abuse is not captured by a simple set of signatures.
Firewalls, on the other hand, are more eﬀective in pre-
venting abuse. Firewalls use port blocking to thwart
unauth...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Nabs: A System for Detecting Resource Abuses via Characterization
of Flow Content Type
author:Kulesh Shanmugasundaram and
Mehdi Kharrazi and
Nasir D. Memon
Nabs: A System for Detecting Resource Abuses via Characterization
of Flow Content Type
Kulesh Shanmugasundaram
Mehdi Kharrazi
Nasir Memon
kulesh@isis.poly.edu
mehdi@isis.poly.edu
memon@poly.edu
Polytechnic University
Brooklyn, NY11201
Abstract
One of the growing problems faced by network ad-
ministrators is the abuse of computing resources by
authorized and unauthorized personnel. The nature
of abuse may vary from using unauthorized applica-
tions to serving unauthorized content. Proliferation of
peer-to-peer networks and wide use of tunnels makes
it diﬃcult to detect such abuses and easy to circum-
vent security policies. This paper presents the design
and implementation of a system, called Nabs, that
characterizes content types of network ﬂows based
solely on the payload which can then be used to iden-
tify abuses of computing resources. The proposed
method does not depend on packet headers or other
simple packet characteristics hence is more robust to
circumvention.
1 Introduction
Abuse of computing resources is one of the growing
problems. Network administrators deal with a vari-
ety of abuses such as, network bandwidth by unau-
thorized application services, and the distribution of
unauthorized content to name a few. Abusers can be
malicious attackers looking for free resources to host
their illegal activities, a malicious insider running a
peer-to-peer hub, or simply an ill informed user unin-
tentionally running an application proxy.
The two most common defenses that are used to
prevent network abuses are ﬁrewalls and Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS). An IDS is not useful in de-
tecting many types of abuses where the essence of the
abuse is not captured by a simple set of signatures.
Firewalls, on the other hand, are more eﬀective in pre-
venting abuse. Firewalls use port blocking to thwart
unauth...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:How to kill symbolic deobfuscation for free (or: unleashing the potential
of path-oriented protections)
author:Mathilde Ollivier and
S'ebastien Bardin and
Richard Bonichon and
Jean-Yves Marion
How to Kill Symbolic Deobfuscation for Free
(or: Unleashing the Potential of Path-Oriented Protections)
Mathilde Ollivier
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
mathilde.ollivier2@cea.fr
Richard Bonichon
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
richard.bonichon@cea.fr
Sébastien Bardin
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
sebastien.bardin@cea.fr
Jean-Yves Marion
Université de Lorraine, CNRS, LORIA
Nancy, France
Jean-Yves.Marion@loria.fr
ABSTRACT
Code obfuscation is a major tool for protecting software intellec-
tual property from attacks such as reverse engineering or code
tampering. Yet, recently proposed (automated) attacks based on
Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) shows very promising results,
hence threatening software integrity. Current defenses are not
fully satisfactory, being either not efficient against symbolic rea-
soning, or affecting runtime performance too much, or being too
easy to spot. We present and study a new class of anti-DSE pro-
tections coined as path-oriented protections targeting the weakest
spot of DSE, namely path exploration. We propose a lightweight,
efficient, resistant and analytically proved class of obfuscation algo-
rithms designed to hinder DSE-based attacks. Extensive evaluation
demonstrates that these approaches critically counter symbolic
deobfuscation while yielding only a very slight overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software reverse engineering; Logic
and verification; Malware and its mitigation; • Software and its
engineering → Formal methods.
KEYWORDS
Reverse Engineering; Code Protection; Obfuscation
ACM Reference Format:
Mathilde Ollivier, Sébastien Bardin, Richard Bonichon, and Jean-Yves Mar-
ion. 2019. How to Kill Symbolic Deobfuscation for Free (or: Unleashing the
Potential of Path-Oriented Protections) . In 2019 Annual Comput...