Instruction:
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## 内容1
### 文件路径：
lib/cookie.js
### 代码内容：
'use strict';
var net = require('net');
var urlParse = require('url').parse;
var pubsuffix = require('./pubsuffix');
var Store = require('./store').Store;
var MemoryCookieStore = require('./memstore').MemoryCookieStore;
var pathMatch = require('./pathMatch').pathMatch;
var VERSION = require('../package.json').version;

var punycode;
try {
  punycode = require('punycode');
} catch(e) {
  console.warn("cookie: can't load punycode; won't use punycode for domain normalization");
}

var DATE_DELIM = /[\x09\x20-\x2F\x3B-\x40\x5B-\x60\x7B-\x7E]/;

// From RFC6265 S4.1.1
// note that it excludes \x3B ";"
var COOKIE_OCTET  = /[\x21\x23-\x2B\x2D-\x3A\x3C-\x5B\x5D-\x7E]/;
var COOKIE_OCTETS = new RegExp('^'+COOKIE_OCTET.source+'+$');

var CONTROL_CHARS = /[\x00-\x1F]/;

// Double quotes are part of the value (see: S4.1.1).
// '\r', '\n' and '\0' should be treated as a terminator in the "relaxed" mode
// (see: https://github.com/ChromiumWebApps/chromium/blob/b3d3b4da8bb94c1b2e061600df106d590fda3620/net/cookies/parsed_cookie.cc#L60)
// '=' and ';' are attribute/values separators
// (see: https://github.com/ChromiumWebApps/chromium/blob/b3d3b4da8bb94c1b2e061600df106d590fda3620/net/cookies/parsed_cookie.cc#L64)
var COOKIE_PAIR = /^(([^=;]+))\s*=\s*([^\n\r\0]*)/;

// Used to parse non-RFC-compliant cookies like '=abc' when given the `loose`
// option in Cookie.parse:
var LOOSE_COOKIE_PAIR = /^((?:=)?([^=;]*)\s*=\s*)?([^\n\r\0]*)/;

// RFC6265 S4.1.1 defines path value as 'any CHAR except CTLs or ";"'
// Note ';' is \x3B
var PATH_VALUE = /[\x20-\x3A\x3C-\x7E]+/;

// Used for checking whether or not there is a trailing semi-colon
var TRAILING_SEMICOLON = /;+$/;

var DAY_OF_MONTH = /^(\d{1,2})[^\d]*$/;
var TIME = /^(\d{1,2})[^\d]*:(\d{1,2})[^\d]*:(\d{1,2})[^\d]*$/;
var MONTH = /^(Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec)/i;

var MONTH_TO_NUM = {
  jan:0, feb:1, mar:2, apr:3, may:4, jun:5,
  jul:6, aug:7, sep:8, oct:9, nov:10, dec:11
};
var NUM_TO_MONTH = [
  'Jan','Feb','Mar','Apr','May','Jun','Jul','Aug','Sep','Oct','Nov','Dec'
];
var NUM_TO_DAY = [
  'Sun','Mon','Tue','Wed','Thu','Fri','Sat'
];

var YEAR = /^(\d{2}|\d{4})$/; // 2 to 4 digits

var MAX_TIME = 2147483647000; // 31-bit max
var MIN_TIME = 0; // 31-bit min

// RFC6265 S5.1.1 date parser:
function parseDate(str) {
  if (!str) {
    return;
  }

  /* RFC6265 S5.1.1:
   * 2. Process each date-token sequentially in the order the date-tokens
   * appear in the cookie-date
   */
  var tokens = str.split(DATE_DELIM);
  if (!tokens) {
    return;
  }

  var hour = null;
  var minutes = null;
  var seconds = null;
  var day = null;
  var month = null;
  var year = null;

  for (var i=0; i<tokens.length; i++) {
    var token = tokens[i].trim();
    if (!token.length) {
      continue;
    }

    var result;

    /* 2.1. If the found-time flag is not set and the token matches the time
     * production, set the found-time flag and set the hour- value,
     * minute-value, and second-value to the numbers denoted by the digits in
     * the date-token, respectively.  Skip the remaining sub-steps and continue
     * to the next date-token.
     */
    if (seconds === null) {
      result = TIME.exec(token);
      if (result) {
        hour = parseInt(result[1], 10);
        minutes = parseInt(result[2], 10);
        seconds = parseInt(result[3], 10);
        /* RFC6265 S5.1.1.5:
         * [fail if]
         * *  the hour-value is greater than 23,
         * *  the minute-value is greater than 59, or
         * *  the second-value is greater than 59.
         */
        if(hour > 23 || minutes > 59 || seconds > 59) {
          return;
        }

        continue;
      }
    }

    /* 2.2. If the found-day-of-month flag is not set and the date-token matches
     * the day-of-month production, set the found-day-of- month flag and set
     * the day-of-month-value to the number denoted by the date-token.  Skip
     * the remaining sub-steps and continue to the next date-token.
     */
    if (day === null) {
      result = DAY_OF_MONTH.exec(token);
      if (result) {
        day = parseInt(result, 10);
        /* RFC6265 S5.1.1.5:
         * [fail if] the day-of-month-value is less than 1 or greater than 31
         */
        if(day < 1 || day > 31) {
          return;
        }
        continue;
      }
    }

    /* 2.3. If the found-month flag is not set and the date-token matches the
     * month production, set the found-month flag and set the month-value to
     * the month denoted by the date-token.  Skip the remaining sub-steps and
     * continue to the next date-token.
     */
    if (month === null) {
      result = MONTH.exec(token);
      if (result) {
        month = MONTH_TO_NUM[result[1].toLowerCase()];
        continue;
      }
    }

    /* 2.4. If the found-year flag is not set and the date-token matches the year
     * production, set the found-year flag and set the year-value to the number
     * denoted by the date-token.  Skip the remaining sub-steps and continue to
     * the next date-token.
     */
    if (year === null) {
      result = YEAR.exec(token);
      if (result) {
        year = parseInt(result[0], 10);
        /* From S5.1.1:
         * 3.  If the year-value is greater than or equal to 70 and less
         * than or equal to 99, increment the year-value by 1900.
         * 4.  If the year-value is greater than or equal to 0 and less
         * than or equal to 69, increment the year-value by 2000.
         */
        if (70 <= year && year <= 99) {
          year += 1900;
        } else if (0 <= year && year <= 69) {
          year += 2000;
        }

        if (year < 1601) {
          return; // 5. ... the year-value is less than 1601
        }
      }
    }
  }

  if (seconds === null || day === null || month === null || year === null) {
    return; // 5. ... at least one of the found-day-of-month, found-month, found-
            // year, or found-time flags is not set,
  }

  return new Date(Date.UTC(year, month, day, hour, minutes, seconds));
}

function formatDate(date) {
  var d = date.getUTCDate(); d = d >= 10 ? d : '0'+d;
  var h = date.getUTCHours(); h = h >= 10 ? h : '0'+h;
  var m = date.getUTCMinutes(); m = m >= 10 ? m : '0'+m;
  var s = date.getUTCSeconds(); s = s >= 10 ? s : '0'+s;
  return NUM_TO_DAY[date.getUTCDay()] + ', ' +
    d+' '+ NUM_TO_MONTH[date.getUTCMonth()] +' '+ date.getUTCFullYear() +' '+
    h+':'+m+':'+s+' GMT';
}

// S5.1.2 Canonicalized Host Names
function canonicalDomain(str) {
  if (str == null) {
    return null;
  }
  str = str.trim().replace(/^\./,''); // S4.1.2.3 & S5.2.3: ignore leading .

  // convert to IDN if any non-ASCII characters
  if (punycode && /[^\u0001-\u007f]/.test(str)) {
    str = punycode.toASCII(str);
  }

  return str.toLowerCase();
}

// S5.1.3 Domain Matching
function domainMatch(str, domStr, canonicalize) {
  if (str == null || domStr == null) {
    return null;
  }
  if (canonicalize !== false) {
    str = canonicalDomain(str);
    domStr = canonicalDomain(domStr);
  }

  /*
   * "The domain string and the string are identical. (Note that both the
   * domain string and the string will have been canonicalized to lower case at
   * this point)"
   */
  if (str == domStr) {
    return true;
  }

  /* "All of the following [three] conditions hold:" (order adjusted from the RFC) */

  /* "* The string is a host name (i.e., not an IP address)." */
  if (net.isIP(str)) {
    return false;
  }

  /* "* The domain string is a suffix of the string" */
  var idx = str.indexOf(domStr);
  if (idx <= 0) {
    return false; // it's a non-match (-1) or prefix (0)
  }

  // e.g "a.b.c".indexOf("b.c") === 2
  // 5 === 3+2
  if (str.length !== domStr.length + idx) { // it's not a suffix
    return false;
  }

  /* "* The last character of the string that is not included in the domain
  * string is a %x2E (".") character." */
  if (str.substr(idx-1,1) !== '.') {
    return false;
  }

  return true;
}

// RFC6265 S5.1.4 Paths and Path-Match

/*
 * "The user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following algorithm
 * to compute the default-path of a cookie:"
 *
 * Assumption: the path (and not query part or absolute uri) is passed in.
 */
function defaultPath(path) {
  // "2. If the uri-path is empty or if the first character of the uri-path is not
  // a %x2F ("/") character, output %x2F ("/") and skip the remaining steps.
  if (!path || path.substr(0,1) !== "/") {
    return "/";
  }

  // "3. If the uri-path contains no more than one %x2F ("/") character, output
  // %x2F ("/") and skip the remaining step."
  if (path === "/") {
    return path;
  }

  var rightSlash = path.lastIndexOf("/");
  if (rightSlash === 0) {
    return "/";
  }

  // "4. Output the characters of the uri-path from the first character up to,
  // but not including, the right-most %x2F ("/")."
  return path.slice(0, rightSlash);
}

function parse(str, options) {
  if (!options || typeof options !== 'object') {
    options = {};
  }
  str = str.trim();

  // S4.1.1 Trailing semi-colons are not part of the specification.
  var semiColonCheck = TRAILING_SEMICOLON.exec(str);
  if (semiColonCheck) {
    str = str.slice(0, semiColonCheck.index);
  }

  // We use a regex to parse the "name-value-pair" part of S5.2
  var firstSemi = str.indexOf(';'); // S5.2 step 1
  var pairRe = options.loose ? LOOSE_COOKIE_PAIR : COOKIE_PAIR;
  var result = pairRe.exec(firstSemi === -1 ? str : str.substr(0,firstSemi));

  // Rx satisfies the "the name string is empty" and "lacks a %x3D ("=")"
  // constraints as well as trimming any whitespace.
  if (!result) {
    return;
  }

  var c = new Cookie();
  if (result[1]) {
    c.key = result[2].trim();
  } else {
    c.key = '';
  }
  c.value = result[3].trim();
  if (CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.key) || CONTROL_CHARS.test(c.value)) {
    return;
  }

  if (firstSemi === -1) {
    return c;
  }

  // S5.2.3 "unparsed-attributes consist of the remainder of the set-cookie-string
  // (including the %x3B (";") in question)." plus later on in the same section
  // "discard the first ";" and trim".
  var unparsed = str.slice(firstSemi).replace(/^\s*;\s*/,'').trim();

  // "If the unparsed-attributes string is empty, skip the rest of these
  // steps."
  if (unparsed.length === 0) {
    return c;
  }

  /*
   * S5.2 says that when looping over the items "[p]rocess the attribute-name
   * and attribute-value according to the requirements in the following
   * subsections" for every item.  Plus, for many of the individual attributes
   * in S5.3 it says to use the "attribute-value of the last attribute in the
   * cookie-attribute-list".  Therefore, in this implementation, we overwrite
   * the previous value.
   */
  var cookie_avs = unparsed.split(/\s*;\s*/);
  while (cookie_avs.length) {
    var av = cookie_avs.shift();
    var av_sep = av.indexOf('=');
    var av_key, av_value;

    if (av_sep === -1) {
      av_key = av;
      av_value = null;
    } else {
      av_key = av.substr(0,av_sep);
      av_value = av.substr(av_sep+1);
    }

    av_key = av_key.trim().toLowerCase();

    if (av_value) {
      av_value = av_value.trim();
    }

    switch(av_key) {
    case 'expires': // S5.2.1
      if (av_value) {
        var exp = parseDate(av_value);
        // "If the attribute-value failed to parse as a cookie date, ignore the
        // cookie-av."
        if (exp) {
          // over and underflow not realistically a concern: V8's getTime() seems to
          // store something larger than a 32-bit time_t (even with 32-bit node)
          c.expires = exp;
        }
      }
      break;

    case 'max-age': // S5.2.2
      if (av_value) {
        // "If the first character of the attribute-value is not a DIGIT or a "-"
        // character ...[or]... If the remainder of attribute-value contains a
        // non-DIGIT character, ignore the cookie-av."
        if (/^-?[0-9]+$/.test(av_value)) {
          var delta = parseInt(av_value, 10);
          // "If delta-seconds is less than or equal to zero (0), let expiry-time
          // be the earliest representable date and time."
          c.setMaxAge(delta);
        }
      }
      break;

    case 'domain': // S5.2.3
      // "If the attribute-value is empty, the behavior is undefined.  However,
      // the user agent SHOULD ignore the cookie-av entirely."
      if (av_value) {
        // S5.2.3 "Let cookie-domain be the attribute-value without the leading %x2E
        // (".") character."
        var domain = av_value.trim().replace(/^\./, '');
        if (domain) {
          // "Convert the cookie-domain to lower case."
          c.domain = domain.toLowerCase();
        }
      }
      break;

    case 'path': // S5.2.4
      /*
       * "If the attribute-value is empty or if the first character of the
       * attribute-value is not %x2F ("/"):
       *   Let cookie-path be the default-path.
       * Otherwise:
       *   Let cookie-path be the attribute-value."
       *
       * We'll represent the default-path as null since it depends on the
       * context of the parsing.
       */
      c.path = av_value && av_value[0] === "/" ? av_value : null;
      break;

    case 'secure': // S5.2.5
      /*
       * "If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "Secure",
       * the user agent MUST append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list
       * with an attribute-name of Secure and an empty attribute-value."
       */
      c.secure = true;
      break;

    case 'httponly': // S5.2.6 -- effectively the same as 'secure'
      c.httpOnly = true;
      break;

    default:
      c.extensions = c.extensions || [];
      c.extensions.push(av);
      break;
    }
  }

  return c;
}

// avoid the V8 deoptimization monster!
function jsonParse(str) {
  var obj;
  try {
    obj = JSON.parse(str);
  } catch (e) {
    return e;
  }
  return obj;
}

function fromJSON(str) {
  if (!str) {
    return null;
  }

  var obj;
  if (typeof str === 'string') {
    obj = jsonParse(str);
    if (obj instanceof Error) {
      return null;
    }
  } else {
    // assume it's an Object
    obj = str;
  }

  var c = new Cookie();
  for (var i=0; i<Cookie.serializableProperties.length; i++) {
    var prop = Cookie.serializableProperties[i];
    if (obj[prop] === undefined ||
        obj[prop] === Cookie.prototype[prop])
    {
      continue; // leave as prototype default
    }

    if (prop === 'expires' ||
        prop === 'creation' ||
        prop === 'lastAccessed')
    {
      if (obj[prop] === null) {
        c[prop] = null;
      } else {
        c[prop] = obj[prop] == "Infinity" ?
          "Infinity" : new Date(obj[prop]);
      }
    } else {
      c[prop] = obj[prop];
    }
  }

  return c;
}

/* Section 5.4 part 2:
 * "*  Cookies with longer paths are listed before cookies with
 *     shorter paths.
 *
 *  *  Among cookies that have equal-length path fields, cookies with
 *     earlier creation-times are listed before cookies with later
 *     creation-times."
 */

function cookieCompare(a,b) {
  var cmp = 0;

  // descending for length: b CMP a
  var aPathLen = a.path ? a.path.length : 0;
  var bPathLen = b.path ? b.path.length : 0;
  cmp = bPathLen - aPathLen;
  if (cmp !== 0) {
    return cmp;
  }

  // ascending for time: a CMP b
  var aTime = a.creation ? a.creation.getTime() : MAX_TIME;
  var bTime = b.creation ? b.creation.getTime() : MAX_TIME;
  cmp = aTime - bTime;
  if (cmp !== 0) {
    return cmp;
  }

  // break ties for the same millisecond (precision of JavaScript's clock)
  cmp = a.creationIndex - b.creationIndex;

  return cmp;
}

// Gives the permutation of all possible pathMatch()es of a given path. The
// array is in longest-to-shortest order.  Handy for indexing.
function permutePath(path) {
  if (path === '/') {
    return ['/'];
  }
  if (path.lastIndexOf('/') === path.length-1) {
    path = path.substr(0,path.length-1);
  }
  var permutations = [path];
  while (path.length > 1) {
    var lindex = path.lastIndexOf('/');
    if (lindex === 0) {
      break;
    }
    path = path.substr(0,lindex);
    permutations.push(path);
  }
  permutations.push('/');
  return permutations;
}

function getCookieContext(url) {
  if (url instanceof Object) {
    return url;
  }
  // NOTE: decodeURI will throw on malformed URIs (see GH-32).
  // Therefore, we will just skip decoding for such URIs.
  try {
    url = decodeURI(url);
  }
  catch(err) {
    // Silently swallow error
  }

  return urlParse(url);
}

function Cookie(options) {
  options = options || {};

  Object.keys(options).forEach(function(prop) {
    if (Cookie.prototype.hasOwnProperty(prop) &&
        Cookie.prototype[prop] !== options[prop] &&
        prop.substr(0,1) !== '_')
    {
      this[prop] = options[prop];
    }
  }, this);

  this.creation = this.creation || new Date();

  // used to break creation ties in cookieCompare():
  Object.defineProperty(this, 'creationIndex', {
    configurable: false,
    enumerable: false, // important for assert.deepEqual checks
    writable: true,
    value: ++Cookie.cookiesCreated
  });
}

Cookie.cookiesCreated = 0; // incremented each time a cookie is created

Cookie.parse = parse;
Cookie.fromJSON = fromJSON;

Cookie.prototype.key = "";
Cookie.prototype.value = "";

// the order in which the RFC has them:
Cookie.prototype.expires = "Infinity"; // coerces to literal Infinity
Cookie.prototype.maxAge = null; // takes precedence over expires for TTL
Cookie.prototype.domain = null;
Cookie.prototype.path = null;
Cookie.prototype.secure = false;
Cookie.prototype.httpOnly = false;
Cookie.prototype.extensions = null;

// set by the CookieJar:
Cookie.prototype.hostOnly = null; // boolean when set
Cookie.prototype.pathIsDefault = null; // boolean when set
Cookie.prototype.creation = null; // Date when set; defaulted by Cookie.parse
Cookie.prototype.lastAccessed = null; // Date when set
Object.defineProperty(Cookie.prototype, 'creationIndex', {
  configurable: true,
  enumerable: false,
  writable: true,
  value: 0
});

Cookie.serializableProperties = Object.keys(Cookie.prototype)
  .filter(function(prop) {
    return !(
      Cookie.prototype[prop] instanceof Function ||
      prop === 'creationIndex' ||
      prop.substr(0,1) === '_'
    );
  });

Cookie.prototype.inspect = function inspect() {
  var now = Date.now();
  return 'Cookie="'+this.toString() +
    '; hostOnly='+(this.hostOnly != null ? this.hostOnly : '?') +
    '; aAge='+(this.lastAccessed ? (now-this.lastAccessed.getTime())+'ms' : '?') +
    '; cAge='+(this.creation ? (now-this.creation.getTime())+'ms' : '?') +
    '"';
};

Cookie.prototype.toJSON = function() {
  var obj = {};

  var props = Cookie.serializableProperties;
  for (var i=0; i<props.length; i++) {
    var prop = props[i];
    if (this[prop] === Cookie.prototype[prop]) {
      continue; // leave as prototype default
    }

    if (prop === 'expires' ||
        prop === 'creation' ||
        prop === 'lastAccessed')
    {
      if (this[prop] === null) {
        obj[prop] = null;
      } else {
        obj[prop] = this[prop] == "Infinity" ? // intentionally not ===
          "Infinity" : this[prop].toISOString();
      }
    } else if (prop === 'maxAge') {
      if (this[prop] !== null) {
        // again, intentionally not ===
        obj[prop] = (this[prop] == Infinity || this[prop] == -Infinity) ?
          this[prop].toString() : this[prop];
      }
    } else {
      if (this[prop] !== Cookie.prototype[prop]) {
        obj[prop] = this[prop];
      }
    }
  }

  return obj;
};

Cookie.prototype.clone = function() {
  return fromJSON(this.toJSON());
};

Cookie.prototype.validate = function validate() {
  if (!COOKIE_OCTETS.test(this.value)) {
    return false;
  }
  if (this.expires != Infinity && !(this.expires instanceof Date) && !parseDate(this.expires)) {
    return false;
  }
  if (this.maxAge != null && this.maxAge <= 0) {
    return false; // "Max-Age=" non-zero-digit *DIGIT
  }
  if (this.path != null && !PATH_VALUE.test(this.path)) {
    return false;
  }

  var cdomain = this.cdomain();
  if (cdomain) {
    if (cdomain.match(/\.$/)) {
      return false; // S4.1.2.3 suggests that this is bad. domainMatch() tests confirm this
    }
    var suffix = pubsuffix.getPublicSuffix(cdomain);
    if (suffix == null) { // it's a public suffix
      return false;
    }
  }
  return true;
};

Cookie.prototype.setExpires = function setExpires(exp) {
  if (exp instanceof Date) {
    this.expires = exp;
  } else {
    this.expires = parseDate(exp) || "Infinity";
  }
};

Cookie.prototype.setMaxAge = function setMaxAge(age) {
  if (age === Infinity || age === -Infinity) {
    this.maxAge = age.toString(); // so JSON.stringify() works
  } else {
    this.maxAge = age;
  }
};

// gives Cookie header format
Cookie.prototype.cookieString = function cookieString() {
  var val = this.value;
  if (val == null) {
    val = '';
  }
  if (this.key === '') {
    return val;
  }
  return this.key+'='+val;
};

// gives Set-Cookie header format
Cookie.prototype.toString = function toString() {
  var str = this.cookieString();

  if (this.expires != Infinity) {
    if (this.expires instanceof Date) {
      str += '; Expires='+formatDate(this.expires);
    } else {
      str += '; Expires='+this.expires;
    }
  }

  if (this.maxAge != null && this.maxAge != Infinity) {
    str += '; Max-Age='+this.maxAge;
  }

  if (this.domain && !this.hostOnly) {
    str += '; Domain='+this.domain;
  }
  if (this.path) {
    str += '; Path='+this.path;
  }

  if (this.secure) {
    str += '; Secure';
  }
  if (this.httpOnly) {
    str += '; HttpOnly';
  }
  if (this.extensions) {
    this.extensions.forEach(function(ext) {
      str += '; '+ext;
    });
  }

  return str;
};

// TTL() partially replaces the "expiry-time" parts of S5.3 step 3 (setCookie()
// elsewhere)
// S5.3 says to give the "latest representable date" for which we use Infinity
// For "expired" we use 0
Cookie.prototype.TTL = function TTL(now) {
  /* RFC6265 S4.1.2.2 If a cookie has both the Max-Age and the Expires
   * attribute, the Max-Age attribute has precedence and controls the
   * expiration date of the cookie.
   * (Concurs with S5.3 step 3)
   */
  if (this.maxAge != null) {
    return this.maxAge<=0 ? 0 : this.maxAge*1000;
  }

  var expires = this.expires;
  if (expires != Infinity) {
    if (!(expires instanceof Date)) {
      expires = parseDate(expires) || Infinity;
    }

    if (expires == Infinity) {
      return Infinity;
    }

    return expires.getTime() - (now || Date.now());
  }

  return Infinity;
};

// expiryTime() replaces the "expiry-time" parts of S5.3 step 3 (setCookie()
// elsewhere)
Cookie.prototype.expiryTime = function expiryTime(now) {
  if (this.maxAge != null) {
    var relativeTo = now || this.creation || new Date();
    var age = (this.maxAge <= 0) ? -Infinity : this.maxAge*1000;
    return relativeTo.getTime() + age;
  }

  if (this.expires == Infinity) {
    return Infinity;
  }
  return this.expires.getTime();
};

// expiryDate() replaces the "expiry-time" parts of S5.3 step 3 (setCookie()
// elsewhere), except it returns a Date
Cookie.prototype.expiryDate = function expiryDate(now) {
  var millisec = this.expiryTime(now);
  if (millisec == Infinity) {
    return new Date(MAX_TIME);
  } else if (millisec == -Infinity) {
    return new Date(MIN_TIME);
  } else {
    return new Date(millisec);
  }
};

// This replaces the "persistent-flag" parts of S5.3 step 3
Cookie.prototype.isPersistent = function isPersistent() {
  return (this.maxAge != null || this.expires != Infinity);
};

// Mostly S5.1.2 and S5.2.3:
Cookie.prototype.cdomain =
Cookie.prototype.canonicalizedDomain = function canonicalizedDomain() {
  if (this.domain == null) {
    return null;
  }
  return canonicalDomain(this.domain);
};

function CookieJar(store, options) {
  if (typeof options === "boolean") {
    options = {rejectPublicSuffixes: options};
  } else if (options == null) {
    options = {};
  }
  if (options.rejectPublicSuffixes != null) {
    this.rejectPublicSuffixes = options.rejectPublicSuffixes;
  }
  if (options.looseMode != null) {
    this.enableLooseMode = options.looseMode;
  }

  if (!store) {
    store = new MemoryCookieStore();
  }
  this.store = store;
}
CookieJar.prototype.store = null;
CookieJar.prototype.rejectPublicSuffixes = true;
CookieJar.prototype.enableLooseMode = false;
var CAN_BE_SYNC = [];

CAN_BE_SYNC.push('setCookie');
CookieJar.prototype.setCookie = function(cookie, url, options, cb) {
  var err;
  var context = getCookieContext(url);
  if (options instanceof Function) {
    cb = options;
    options = {};
  }

  var host = canonicalDomain(context.hostname);
  var loose = this.enableLooseMode;
  if (options.loose != null) {
    loose = options.loose;
  }

  // S5.3 step 1
  if (!(cookie instanceof Cookie)) {
    cookie = Cookie.parse(cookie, { loose: loose });
  }
  if (!cookie) {
    err = new Error("Cookie failed to parse");
    return cb(options.ignoreError ? null : err);
  }

  // S5.3 step 2
  var now = options.now || new Date(); // will assign later to save effort in the face of errors

  // S5.3 step 3: NOOP; persistent-flag and expiry-time is handled by getCookie()

  // S5.3 step 4: NOOP; domain is null by default

  // S5.3 step 5: public suffixes
  if (this.rejectPublicSuffixes && cookie.domain) {
    var suffix = pubsuffix.getPublicSuffix(cookie.cdomain());
    if (suffix == null) { // e.g. "com"
      err = new Error("Cookie has domain set to a public suffix");
      return cb(options.ignoreError ? null : err);
    }
  }

  // S5.3 step 6:
  if (cookie.domain) {
    if (!domainMatch(host, cookie.cdomain(), false)) {
      err = new Error("Cookie not in this host's domain. Cookie:"+cookie.cdomain()+" Request:"+host);
      return cb(options.ignoreError ? null : err);
    }

    if (cookie.hostOnly == null) { // don't reset if already set
      cookie.hostOnly = false;
    }

  } else {
    cookie.hostOnly = true;
    cookie.domain = host;
  }

  //S5.2.4 If the attribute-value is empty or if the first character of the
  //attribute-value is not %x2F ("/"):
  //Let cookie-path be the default-path.
  if (!cookie.path || cookie.path[0] !== '/') {
    cookie.path = defaultPath(context.pathname);
    cookie.pathIsDefault = true;
  }

  // S5.3 step 8: NOOP; secure attribute
  // S5.3 step 9: NOOP; httpOnly attribute

  // S5.3 step 10
  if (options.http === false && cookie.httpOnly) {
    err = new Error("Cookie is HttpOnly and this isn't an HTTP API");
    return cb(options.ignoreError ? null : err);
  }

  var store = this.store;

  if (!store.updateCookie) {
    store.updateCookie = function(oldCookie, newCookie, cb) {
      this.putCookie(newCookie, cb);
    };
  }

  function withCookie(err, oldCookie) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }

    var next = function(err) {
      if (err) {
        return cb(err);
      } else {
        cb(null, cookie);
      }
    };

    if (oldCookie) {
      // S5.3 step 11 - "If the cookie store contains a cookie with the same name,
      // domain, and path as the newly created cookie:"
      if (options.http === false && oldCookie.httpOnly) { // step 11.2
        err = new Error("old Cookie is HttpOnly and this isn't an HTTP API");
        return cb(options.ignoreError ? null : err);
      }
      cookie.creation = oldCookie.creation; // step 11.3
      cookie.creationIndex = oldCookie.creationIndex; // preserve tie-breaker
      cookie.lastAccessed = now;
      // Step 11.4 (delete cookie) is implied by just setting the new one:
      store.updateCookie(oldCookie, cookie, next); // step 12

    } else {
      cookie.creation = cookie.lastAccessed = now;
      store.putCookie(cookie, next); // step 12
    }
  }

  store.findCookie(cookie.domain, cookie.path, cookie.key, withCookie);
};

// RFC6365 S5.4
CAN_BE_SYNC.push('getCookies');
CookieJar.prototype.getCookies = function(url, options, cb) {
  var context = getCookieContext(url);
  if (options instanceof Function) {
    cb = options;
    options = {};
  }

  var host = canonicalDomain(context.hostname);
  var path = context.pathname || '/';

  var secure = options.secure;
  if (secure == null && context.protocol &&
      (context.protocol == 'https:' || context.protocol == 'wss:'))
  {
    secure = true;
  }

  var http = options.http;
  if (http == null) {
    http = true;
  }

  var now = options.now || Date.now();
  var expireCheck = options.expire !== false;
  var allPaths = !!options.allPaths;
  var store = this.store;

  function matchingCookie(c) {
    // "Either:
    //   The cookie's host-only-flag is true and the canonicalized
    //   request-host is identical to the cookie's domain.
    // Or:
    //   The cookie's host-only-flag is false and the canonicalized
    //   request-host domain-matches the cookie's domain."
    if (c.hostOnly) {
      if (c.domain != host) {
        return false;
      }
    } else {
      if (!domainMatch(host, c.domain, false)) {
        return false;
      }
    }

    // "The request-uri's path path-matches the cookie's path."
    if (!allPaths && !pathMatch(path, c.path)) {
      return false;
    }

    // "If the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then the request-uri's
    // scheme must denote a "secure" protocol"
    if (c.secure && !secure) {
      return false;
    }

    // "If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the cookie if the
    // cookie-string is being generated for a "non-HTTP" API"
    if (c.httpOnly && !http) {
      return false;
    }

    // deferred from S5.3
    // non-RFC: allow retention of expired cookies by choice
    if (expireCheck && c.expiryTime() <= now) {
      store.removeCookie(c.domain, c.path, c.key, function(){}); // result ignored
      return false;
    }

    return true;
  }

  store.findCookies(host, allPaths ? null : path, function(err,cookies) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }

    cookies = cookies.filter(matchingCookie);

    // sorting of S5.4 part 2
    if (options.sort !== false) {
      cookies = cookies.sort(cookieCompare);
    }

    // S5.4 part 3
    var now = new Date();
    cookies.forEach(function(c) {
      c.lastAccessed = now;
    });
    // TODO persist lastAccessed

    cb(null,cookies);
  });
};

CAN_BE_SYNC.push('getCookieString');
CookieJar.prototype.getCookieString = function(/*..., cb*/) {
  var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments,0);
  var cb = args.pop();
  var next = function(err,cookies) {
    if (err) {
      cb(err);
    } else {
      cb(null, cookies
        .sort(cookieCompare)
        .map(function(c){
          return c.cookieString();
        })
        .join('; '));
    }
  };
  args.push(next);
  this.getCookies.apply(this,args);
};

CAN_BE_SYNC.push('getSetCookieStrings');
CookieJar.prototype.getSetCookieStrings = function(/*..., cb*/) {
  var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments,0);
  var cb = args.pop();
  var next = function(err,cookies) {
    if (err) {
      cb(err);
    } else {
      cb(null, cookies.map(function(c){
        return c.toString();
      }));
    }
  };
  args.push(next);
  this.getCookies.apply(this,args);
};

CAN_BE_SYNC.push('serialize');
CookieJar.prototype.serialize = function(cb) {
  var type = this.store.constructor.name;
  if (type === 'Object') {
    type = null;
  }

  // update README.md "Serialization Format" if you change this, please!
  var serialized = {
    // The version of tough-cookie that serialized this jar. Generally a good
    // practice since future versions can make data import decisions based on
    // known past behavior. When/if this matters, use `semver`.
    version: 'tough-cookie@'+VERSION,

    // add the store type, to make humans happy:
    storeType: type,

    // CookieJar configuration:
    rejectPublicSuffixes: !!this.rejectPublicSuffixes,

    // this gets filled from getAllCookies:
    cookies: []
  };

  if (!(this.store.getAllCookies &&
        typeof this.store.getAllCookies === 'function'))
  {
    return cb(new Error('store does not support getAllCookies and cannot be serialized'));
  }

  this.store.getAllCookies(function(err,cookies) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }

    serialized.cookies = cookies.map(function(cookie) {
      // convert to serialized 'raw' cookies
      cookie = (cookie instanceof Cookie) ? cookie.toJSON() : cookie;

      // Remove the index so new ones get assigned during deserialization
      delete cookie.creationIndex;

      return cookie;
    });

    return cb(null, serialized);
  });
};

// well-known name that JSON.stringify calls
CookieJar.prototype.toJSON = function() {
  return this.serializeSync();
};

// use the class method CookieJar.deserialize instead of calling this directly
CAN_BE_SYNC.push('_importCookies');
CookieJar.prototype._importCookies = function(serialized, cb) {
  var jar = this;
  var cookies = serialized.cookies;
  if (!cookies || !Array.isArray(cookies)) {
    return cb(new Error('serialized jar has no cookies array'));
  }

  function putNext(err) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }

    if (!cookies.length) {
      return cb(err, jar);
    }

    var cookie;
    try {
      cookie = fromJSON(cookies.shift());
    } catch (e) {
      return cb(e);
    }

    if (cookie === null) {
      return putNext(null); // skip this cookie
    }

    jar.store.putCookie(cookie, putNext);
  }

  putNext();
};

CookieJar.deserialize = function(strOrObj, store, cb) {
  if (arguments.length !== 3) {
    // store is optional
    cb = store;
    store = null;
  }

  var serialized;
  if (typeof strOrObj === 'string') {
    serialized = jsonParse(strOrObj);
    if (serialized instanceof Error) {
      return cb(serialized);
    }
  } else {
    serialized = strOrObj;
  }

  var jar = new CookieJar(store, serialized.rejectPublicSuffixes);
  jar._importCookies(serialized, function(err) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }
    cb(null, jar);
  });
};

CookieJar.deserializeSync = function(strOrObj, store) {
  var serialized = typeof strOrObj === 'string' ?
    JSON.parse(strOrObj) : strOrObj;
  var jar = new CookieJar(store, serialized.rejectPublicSuffixes);

  // catch this mistake early:
  if (!jar.store.synchronous) {
    throw new Error('CookieJar store is not synchronous; use async API instead.');
  }

  jar._importCookiesSync(serialized);
  return jar;
};
CookieJar.fromJSON = CookieJar.deserializeSync;

CAN_BE_SYNC.push('clone');
CookieJar.prototype.clone = function(newStore, cb) {
  if (arguments.length === 1) {
    cb = newStore;
    newStore = null;
  }

  this.serialize(function(err,serialized) {
    if (err) {
      return cb(err);
    }
    CookieJar.deserialize(newStore, serialized, cb);
  });
};

// Use a closure to provide a true imperative API for synchronous stores.
function syncWrap(method) {
  return function() {
    if (!this.store.synchronous) {
      throw new Error('CookieJar store is not synchronous; use async API instead.');
    }

    var args = Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);
    var syncErr, syncResult;
    args.push(function syncCb(err, result) {
      syncErr = err;
      syncResult = result;
    });
    this[method].apply(this, args);

    if (syncErr) {
      throw syncErr;
    }
    return syncResult;
  };
}

// wrap all declared CAN_BE_SYNC methods in the sync wrapper
CAN_BE_SYNC.forEach(function(method) {
  CookieJar.prototype[method+'Sync'] = syncWrap(method);
});

module.exports = {
  CookieJar: CookieJar,
  Cookie: Cookie,
  Store: Store,
  MemoryCookieStore: MemoryCookieStore,
  parseDate: parseDate,
  formatDate: formatDate,
  parse: parse,
  fromJSON: fromJSON,
  domainMatch: domainMatch,
  defaultPath: defaultPath,
  pathMatch: pathMatch,
  getPublicSuffix: pubsuffix.getPublicSuffix,
  cookieCompare: cookieCompare,
  permuteDomain: require('./permuteDomain').permuteDomain,
  permutePath: permutePath,
  canonicalDomain: canonicalDomain
};

Output:
【漏洞类型】正则表达式滥用
【严重性】中
【漏洞摘要】原始代码中使用了正则表达式 `TRAILING_SEMICOLON = /;+$/;` 来检查并移除字符串末尾的分号。这个正则表达式的使用可能导致解析时间过长，特别是在处理包含大量分号的字符串时。这虽然不是传统意义上的安全漏洞（如代码注入、SQL注入等），但它确实影响了代码的性能和效率。
【关键代码模式】正则表达式 `TRAILING_SEMICOLON = /;+$/;` 及其在 `parse` 函数中的应用。相关关键词包括 `exec`、`slice`、`trim` 和 `replace`。
【修复方法说明】修复方法移除了不必要的正则表达式检查，并直接使用 `str.slice(firstSemi + 1).trim();` 来移除第一个分号及其前后的空白字符。这通过减少正则表达式的使用，提高了解析效率。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
litemall-wx-api/src/main/java/org/linlinjava/litemall/wx/web/WxStorageController.java
### 代码内容：
package org.linlinjava.litemall.wx.web;

import org.linlinjava.litemall.core.storage.StorageService;
import org.linlinjava.litemall.core.util.CharUtil;
import org.linlinjava.litemall.core.util.ResponseUtil;
import org.linlinjava.litemall.db.domain.LitemallStorage;
import org.linlinjava.litemall.db.service.LitemallStorageService;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.core.io.Resource;
import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.validation.annotation.Validated;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
import org.springframework.web.multipart.MultipartFile;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/wx/storage")
@Validated
public class WxStorageController {

    @Autowired
    private StorageService storageService;
    @Autowired
    private LitemallStorageService litemallStorageService;

    private String generateKey(String originalFilename) {
        int index = originalFilename.lastIndexOf('.');
        String suffix = originalFilename.substring(index);

        String key = null;
        LitemallStorage storageInfo = null;

        do {
            key = CharUtil.getRandomString(20) + suffix;
            storageInfo = litemallStorageService.findByKey(key);
        }
        while (storageInfo != null);

        return key;
    }

    @PostMapping("/upload")
    public Object upload(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file) throws IOException {
        String originalFilename = file.getOriginalFilename();
        String url = storageService.store(file.getInputStream(), file.getSize(), file.getContentType(), originalFilename);

        Map<String, Object> data = new HashMap<>();
        data.put("url", url);
        return ResponseUtil.ok(data);
    }

    @GetMapping("/fetch/{key:.+}")
    public ResponseEntity<Resource> fetch(@PathVariable String key) {
        LitemallStorage litemallStorage = litemallStorageService.findByKey(key);
        if (key == null) {
            ResponseEntity.notFound();
        }
        String type = litemallStorage.getType();
        MediaType mediaType = MediaType.parseMediaType(type);

        Resource file = storageService.loadAsResource(key);
        if (file == null) {
            ResponseEntity.notFound();
        }
        return ResponseEntity.ok().contentType(mediaType).body(file);
    }

    @GetMapping("/download/{key:.+}")
    public ResponseEntity<Resource> download(@PathVariable String key) {
        LitemallStorage litemallStorage = litemallStorageService.findByKey(key);
        if (key == null) {
            ResponseEntity.notFound();
        }
        String type = litemallStorage.getType();
        MediaType mediaType = MediaType.parseMediaType(type);

        Resource file = storageService.loadAsResource(key);
        if (file == null) {
            ResponseEntity.notFound();
        }
        return ResponseEntity.ok().contentType(mediaType).header(HttpHeaders.CONTENT_DISPOSITION,
                "attachment; filename=\"" + file.getFilename() + "\"").body(file);
    }

}

Output:
【漏洞类型】路径遍历漏洞
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】这是一个路径遍历漏洞，攻击者可以通过构造包含"../"的文件路径，访问存储在服务器上的敏感文件。具体表现为在`fetch`和`download`方法中，未对传入的`key`参数进行路径验证，导致攻击者可以利用路径遍历攻击访问服务器上的任意文件。
【关键代码模式】`fetch`和`download`方法中的`@PathVariable String key`参数，以及`storageService.loadAsResource(key)`函数调用。
【修复方法说明】修复方法通过对`key`参数进行路径验证，防止包含"../"的路径，从而避免路径遍历攻击。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
src/com/facebook/buck/cli/ParserCacheCommand.java
### 代码内容：
package com.facebook.buck.cli;

import com.facebook.buck.parser.ParserConfig;
import com.facebook.buck.parser.thrift.RemoteDaemonicParserState;
import com.facebook.buck.util.ExitCode;
import com.facebook.buck.util.json.ObjectMappers;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.google.common.base.Preconditions;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.FileOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.zip.ZipEntry;
import java.util.zip.ZipInputStream;
import java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
import org.kohsuke.args4j.Argument;
import org.kohsuke.args4j.Option;

/** A command for inspecting the artifact cache. */
public class ParserCacheCommand extends AbstractCommand {

  @Argument private List<String> arguments = new ArrayList<>();

  @Option(name = "--save", usage = "Save the parser cache state to the given file.")
  @Nullable
  private String saveFilename = null;

  @Option(name = "--load", usage = "Load the given parser cache from the given file.")
  @Nullable
  private String loadFilename = null;

  @Option(
    name = "--changes",
    usage =
        "File containing a JSON formatted list of changed files "
            + "that might invalidate the parser cache. The format of the file is an array of "
            + "objects with two keys: \"path\" and \"status\". "
            + "The path is relative to the root cell. "
            + "The status is the same as the one reported by \"hg status\" or \"git status\". "
            + "For example: \"A\", \"?\", \"R\", \"!\" or \"M\"."
  )
  @Nullable
  private String changesPath = null;

  @Override
  public ExitCode runWithoutHelp(CommandRunnerParams params)
      throws IOException, InterruptedException {

    if (saveFilename != null && loadFilename != null) {
      params.getConsole().printErrorText("Can't use both --load and --save");
      return ExitCode.COMMANDLINE_ERROR;
    }

    if (saveFilename != null) {
      invalidateChanges(params);
      RemoteDaemonicParserState state = params.getParser().storeParserState(params.getCell());
      try (FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(saveFilename);
          ZipOutputStream zipos = new ZipOutputStream(fos)) {
        zipos.putNextEntry(new ZipEntry("parser_data"));
        try (ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(zipos)) {
          oos.writeObject(state);
        }
      }
    } else if (loadFilename != null) {
      try (FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(loadFilename);
          ZipInputStream zipis = new ZipInputStream(fis)) {
        ZipEntry entry = zipis.getNextEntry();
        Preconditions.checkState(entry.getName().equals("parser_data"));
        try (ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(zipis)) {
          RemoteDaemonicParserState state;
          try {
            state = (RemoteDaemonicParserState) ois.readObject();
          } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
            params.getConsole().printErrorText("Invalid file format");
            return ExitCode.COMMANDLINE_ERROR;
          }
          params.getParser().restoreParserState(state, params.getCell());
        }
      }
      invalidateChanges(params);

      ParserConfig configView = params.getBuckConfig().getView(ParserConfig.class);
      if (configView.isParserCacheMutationWarningEnabled()) {
        params
            .getConsole()
            .printErrorText(
                params
                    .getConsole()
                    .getAnsi()
                    .asWarningText(
                        "WARNING: Buck injected a parser state that may not match the local state."));
      }
    }

    return ExitCode.SUCCESS;
  }

  private void invalidateChanges(CommandRunnerParams params) throws IOException {
    if (changesPath == null) {
      return;
    }
    try (FileInputStream is = new FileInputStream(changesPath)) {
      JsonNode responseNode = ObjectMappers.READER.readTree(is);
      Iterator<JsonNode> iterator = responseNode.elements();
      while (iterator.hasNext()) {
        JsonNode item = iterator.next();
        String path = item.get("path").asText();
        String status = item.get("status").asText();

        boolean isAdded = false;
        boolean isRemoved = false;
        if (status.equals("A") || status.equals("?")) {
          isAdded = true;
        } else if (status.equals("R") || status.equals("!")) {
          isRemoved = true;
        }
        Path fullPath = params.getCell().getRoot().resolve(path).normalize();
        params.getParser().invalidateBasedOnPath(fullPath, isAdded || isRemoved);
      }
    }
  }

  @Override
  public String getShortDescription() {
    return "Load and save state of the parser cache";
  }

  @Override
  public boolean isReadOnly() {
    return false;
  }
}

## 内容2
### 文件路径：
src/com/facebook/buck/parser/BUCK
### 代码内容：
load("//tools/build_rules:java_rules.bzl", "java_immutables_library")

java_immutables_library(
    name = "config",
    srcs = [
        "AbstractParserConfig.java",
    ],
    visibility = [
        "PUBLIC",
    ],
    deps = [
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/config:config",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io:executable-finder",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io:watchman",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/parser/api:api",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:exceptions",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:util",
    ],
)

java_immutables_library(
    name = "parser",
    srcs = [
        "AbstractBuildFileSpec.java",
        "AbstractBuildTargetSpec.java",
        "AbstractTargetNodePredicateSpec.java",
        "BuildTargetPatternTargetNodeParser.java",
        "ConcurrentMapCache.java",
        "ConvertingPipeline.java",
        "DaemonicCellState.java",
        "DaemonicParserState.java",
        "DefaultParserTargetNodeFactory.java",
        "ParseEvent.java",
        "ParsePipeline.java",
        "Parser.java",
        "ParserMessages.java",
        "ParserPythonInterpreterProvider.java",
        "ParserTargetNodeFactory.java",
        "PerBuildState.java",
        "PipelineNodeCache.java",
        "ProjectBuildFileParserFactory.java",
        "ProjectBuildFileParserPool.java",
        "RawNodeParsePipeline.java",
        "SymlinkCache.java",
        "TargetNodeListener.java",
        "TargetNodeParsePipeline.java",
        "TargetNodeSpec.java",
        "UnexpectedFlavorException.java",
    ],
    tests = [
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:integration",
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:parser",
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:unit",
    ],
    visibility = [
        "PUBLIC",
    ],
    deps = [
        ":config",
        ":rule_pattern",
        "//src-gen:thrift",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/config:config",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/counters:counters",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/event:event",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/event:interfaces",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/event/external:external_lib",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/event/listener:BroadcastEventListener",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/graph:graph",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io:executable-finder",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io:io",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io:watchman",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io/file:file",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io/filesystem:filesystem",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/io/filesystem/skylark:skylark",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/json:json",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/log:api",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/model:model",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/parser/api:api",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/parser/decorators:decorators",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/parser/exceptions:exceptions",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/parser/options:options",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules:rules",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules:types",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules/coercer:interface",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules/keys:keys",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules/keys/config:config",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/skylark/parser:parser",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:exceptions",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:process_executor",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:util",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util/concurrent:concurrent",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util/json:json",
        "//third-party/java/concurrent-locks:concurrent-locks",
        "//third-party/java/jackson:jackson-annotations",
        "//third-party/java/jackson:jackson-databind",
    ],
)

java_library(
    name = "rule_pattern",
    srcs = [
        "BuildTargetParseException.java",
        "BuildTargetParser.java",
        "BuildTargetPatternParser.java",
    ],
    exported_deps = [
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/model:model",
    ],
    tests = [
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:integration",
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:parser",
        "//test/com/facebook/buck/parser:unit",
    ],
    visibility = [
        "PUBLIC",
    ],
    deps = [
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/rules:interfaces",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:exceptions",
        "//src/com/facebook/buck/util:util",
        "//third-party/java/guava:guava",
    ],
)

Output:
【漏洞类型】反序列化漏洞
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】该代码存在反序列化漏洞，允许用户通过`--load`选项加载任意文件并反序列化其中的对象。具体表现为在`ParserCacheCommand`类中，`runWithoutHelp`方法在加载用户提供的文件时，使用`ObjectInputStream`直接反序列化文件内容，而没有对反序列化的类进行任何白名单或黑名单检查。这可能导致攻击者利用反序列化机制执行恶意代码，从而引发安全问题。
【关键代码模式】
- `ObjectInputStream`使用：`new ObjectInputStream(zipis)`
- 反序列化调用：`ois.readObject()`
- 未验证的用户输入：`loadFilename`
【修复方法说明】修复方法通过创建`ParserStateObjectInputStream`类，并在其中实现了一个白名单机制，只允许反序列化`RemoteDaemonicParserState`类。这样可以防止攻击者利用反序列化机制执行任意恶意代码。最佳实践是在反序列化操作中使用安全的输入流类，确保只反序列化预期的类。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
hsweb-system/hsweb-system-workflow/hsweb-system-workflow-local/src/main/java/org/hswebframework/web/workflow/web/FlowableModelManagerController.java
### 代码内容：
package org.hswebframework.web.workflow.web;

import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.ObjectNode;
import io.swagger.annotations.Api;
import io.swagger.annotations.ApiOperation;
import io.swagger.annotations.ApiParam;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import org.activiti.bpmn.converter.BpmnXMLConverter;
import org.activiti.bpmn.model.BpmnModel;
import org.activiti.editor.language.json.converter.BpmnJsonConverter;
import org.activiti.engine.RepositoryService;
import org.activiti.engine.impl.persistence.entity.ModelEntity;
import org.activiti.engine.repository.Deployment;
import org.activiti.engine.repository.Model;
import org.activiti.engine.repository.ModelQuery;
import org.apache.batik.transcoder.TranscoderException;
import org.apache.batik.transcoder.TranscoderInput;
import org.apache.batik.transcoder.TranscoderOutput;
import org.apache.batik.transcoder.image.PNGTranscoder;
import org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils;
import org.apache.commons.lang3.StringUtils;
import org.hswebframework.ezorm.core.PropertyWrapper;
import org.hswebframework.ezorm.core.SimplePropertyWrapper;
import org.hswebframework.ezorm.core.param.TermType;
import org.hswebframework.web.NotFoundException;
import org.hswebframework.web.authorization.Permission;
import org.hswebframework.web.authorization.annotation.Authorize;
import org.hswebframework.web.bean.FastBeanCopier;
import org.hswebframework.web.commons.entity.PagerResult;
import org.hswebframework.web.commons.entity.param.QueryParamEntity;
import org.hswebframework.web.controller.message.ResponseMessage;
import org.hswebframework.web.workflow.util.QueryUtils;
import org.hswebframework.web.workflow.web.request.ModelCreateRequest;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.http.HttpStatus;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;

import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/workflow/model")
@Api(tags = "工作流-模型管理", description = "工作流模型管理")
@Authorize(permission = "workflow-model", description = "工作流模型管理")
@Slf4j
public class FlowableModelManagerController {

    @Autowired
    private RepositoryService repositoryService;

    private final static String MODEL_ID          = "modelId";
    private final static String MODEL_NAME        = "name";
    private final static String MODEL_REVISION    = "revision";
    private final static String MODEL_DESCRIPTION = "description";
    private final static String MODEL_KEY         = "key";

    @GetMapping
    @Authorize(action = Permission.ACTION_QUERY)
    @ApiOperation("获取模型列表")
    public ResponseMessage<PagerResult<Model>> getModelList(QueryParamEntity param) {
        ModelQuery modelQuery = repositoryService.createModelQuery();
        return ResponseMessage.ok(
                QueryUtils.doQuery(modelQuery, param,
                        model -> FastBeanCopier.copy(model, new ModelEntity()),
                        (term, modelQuery1) -> {
                            if ("latestVersion".equals(term.getColumn())) {
                                modelQuery1.latestVersion();
                            }
                        }));
    }

    @PostMapping
    @ResponseStatus(value = HttpStatus.CREATED)
    @ApiOperation("创建模型")
    public ResponseMessage<Model> createModel(@RequestBody ModelCreateRequest model) throws Exception {
        JSONObject stencilset = new JSONObject();
        stencilset.put("namespace", "http://b3mn.org/stencilset/bpmn2.0#");
        JSONObject editorNode = new JSONObject();
        editorNode.put("id", "canvas");
        editorNode.put("resourceId", "canvas");
        editorNode.put("stencilset", stencilset);
        JSONObject modelObjectNode = new JSONObject();
        modelObjectNode.put(MODEL_REVISION, 1);
        modelObjectNode.put(MODEL_DESCRIPTION, model.getDescription());
        modelObjectNode.put(MODEL_KEY, model.getKey());
        modelObjectNode.put(MODEL_NAME, model.getName());

        Model modelData = repositoryService.newModel();
        modelData.setMetaInfo(modelObjectNode.toJSONString());
        modelData.setName(model.getName());
        modelData.setKey(model.getKey());
        repositoryService.saveModel(modelData);
        repositoryService.addModelEditorSource(modelData.getId(), editorNode.toString().getBytes("utf-8"));
        return ResponseMessage.ok(modelData).status(201);
    }

    @PostMapping("/{modelId}/deploy")
    @ApiOperation("发布模型")
    @Authorize(action = "deploy")
    public ResponseMessage<Deployment> deployModel(@PathVariable String modelId) throws Exception {
        Model modelData = repositoryService.getModel(modelId);
        if (modelData == null) {
            throw new NotFoundException("模型不存在!");
        }
        ObjectNode modelNode = (ObjectNode) new ObjectMapper().readTree(repositoryService.getModelEditorSource(modelData.getId()));
        BpmnModel model = new BpmnJsonConverter().convertToBpmnModel(modelNode);
        byte[] bpmnBytes = new BpmnXMLConverter().convertToXML(model);
        String processName = modelData.getName() + ".bpmn20.xml";
        Deployment deployment = repositoryService.createDeployment()
                .name(modelData.getName())
                .addString(processName, new String(bpmnBytes, "utf8"))
                .deploy();
        return ResponseMessage.ok(deployment).include(Deployment.class, "id", "name", "new");
    }

    /**
     * 导出model对象为指定类型
     *
     * @param modelId 模型ID
     * @param type    导出文件类型(bpmn\json)
     */
    @GetMapping(value = "export/{modelId}/{type}")
    @ApiOperation("导出模型")
    @Authorize(action = "export")
    public void export(@PathVariable("modelId") @ApiParam("模型ID") String modelId,
                       @PathVariable("type") @ApiParam(value = "类型", allowableValues = "bpmn,json", example = "json") String type,
                       @ApiParam(hidden = true) HttpServletResponse response) {
        try {
            Model modelData = repositoryService.getModel(modelId);
            BpmnJsonConverter jsonConverter = new BpmnJsonConverter();
            byte[] modelEditorSource = repositoryService.getModelEditorSource(modelData.getId());

            JsonNode editorNode = new ObjectMapper().readTree(modelEditorSource);
            BpmnModel bpmnModel = jsonConverter.convertToBpmnModel(editorNode);

            // 处理异常
            if (bpmnModel.getMainProcess() == null) {
                response.setStatus(HttpStatus.UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY.value());
                response.getOutputStream().println("no main process, can't export for dimension: " + type);
                response.flushBuffer();
                return;
            }

            String filename = "";
            byte[] exportBytes = null;

            String mainProcessId = bpmnModel.getMainProcess().getId();

            if ("bpmn".equals(type)) {

                BpmnXMLConverter xmlConverter = new BpmnXMLConverter();
                exportBytes = xmlConverter.convertToXML(bpmnModel);

                filename = mainProcessId + ".bpmn20.xml";
            } else if ("json".equals(type)) {

                exportBytes = modelEditorSource;
                filename = mainProcessId + ".json";

            } else {
                throw new UnsupportedOperationException("不支持的格式:" + type);
            }

            response.setCharacterEncoding("UTF-8");
            response.setContentType("application/octet-stream");
            response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=" + URLEncoder.encode(filename, "UTF-8"));

            /*创建输入流*/
            try (ByteArrayInputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(exportBytes)) {
                IOUtils.copy(in, response.getOutputStream());
                response.flushBuffer();
                in.close();
            }

        } catch (Exception e) {
            log.error("导出model的xml文件失败：modelId={}, type={}", modelId, type, e);
        }
    }

    @GetMapping(value = "/{modelId}/json")
    @Authorize(action = Permission.ACTION_GET)
    public Object getEditorJson(@PathVariable String modelId) {
        JSONObject modelNode;
        Model model = repositoryService.getModel(modelId);
        if (model == null) throw new NullPointerException("模型不存在");
        if (StringUtils.isNotEmpty(model.getMetaInfo())) {
            modelNode = JSON.parseObject(model.getMetaInfo());
        } else {
            modelNode = new JSONObject();
            modelNode.put(MODEL_NAME, model.getName());
        }
        modelNode.put(MODEL_ID, model.getId());
        modelNode.put("model", JSON.parse(new String(repositoryService.getModelEditorSource(model.getId()))));
        return modelNode;
    }

    @PutMapping(value = "/{modelId}")
    @ResponseStatus(value = HttpStatus.OK)
    @Authorize(action = Permission.ACTION_UPDATE)
    public void saveModel(@PathVariable String modelId,
                          @RequestParam Map<String, String> values) throws TranscoderException, IOException {
        Model model = repositoryService.getModel(modelId);
        JSONObject modelJson = JSON.parseObject(model.getMetaInfo());

        modelJson.put(MODEL_NAME, values.get("name"));
        modelJson.put(MODEL_DESCRIPTION, values.get("description"));

        model.setMetaInfo(modelJson.toString());
        model.setName(values.get("name"));

        repositoryService.saveModel(model);

        repositoryService.addModelEditorSource(model.getId(), values.get("json_xml").getBytes("utf-8"));

        InputStream svgStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(values.get("svg_xml").getBytes("utf-8"));
        TranscoderInput input = new TranscoderInput(svgStream);

        PNGTranscoder transcoder = new PNGTranscoder();
        // Setup output
        ByteArrayOutputStream outStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        TranscoderOutput output = new TranscoderOutput(outStream);

        // Do the transformation
        transcoder.transcode(input, output);
        final byte[] result = outStream.toByteArray();
        repositoryService.addModelEditorSourceExtra(model.getId(), result);
        outStream.close();
    }

    @DeleteMapping("/{modelId}")
    @Authorize(action = Permission.ACTION_DELETE)
    public ResponseMessage<Void> delete(@PathVariable String modelId) {
        repositoryService.deleteModel(modelId);
        return ResponseMessage.ok();
    }
}

Output:
【漏洞类型】反射型XSS（跨站脚本攻击）
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】原始代码中的`export`方法允许用户通过URL参数指定导出文件的类型。在设置`Content-Disposition`头时，直接使用了用户输入的`filename`，而没有进行适当的编码或验证。如果用户输入的`filename`包含恶意脚本（例如，`<script>alert('xss')</script>`），这些脚本可能会在客户端执行，导致反射型XSS攻击。具体代码问题出现在：
```java
response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=" + URLEncoder.encode(filename, "UTF-8"));
```
根本原因在于对用户输入的`filename`进行编码时，使用了`URLEncoder.encode`，而`Content-Disposition`头中的`filename`参数可能需要使用`Content-Type`头中的字符集进行编码，而不是简单的URL编码。此外，代码中没有对`filename`进行任何验证或清理。
【关键代码模式】与漏洞相关的关键代码模式包括：
- 用户输入被直接用于设置HTTP响应头，特别是`Content-Disposition`头。
- `URLEncoder.encode`被用于编码响应头中的`filename`参数。
- 没有对用户输入的`filename`进行验证或清理。
【修复方法说明】修复方法通过对`filename`进行适当的编码和验证来解决问题。具体修复代码如下：
```java
if (type == ModelType.bpmn) {
    BpmnXMLConverter xmlConverter = new BpmnXMLConverter();
    exportBytes = xmlConverter.convertToXML(bpmnModel);
    filename = mainProcessId + ".bpmn20.xml";
} else if (type == ModelType.json) {
    exportBytes = modelEditorSource;
    filename = mainProcessId + ".json";
} else {
    throw new UnsupportedOperationException("不支持的格式:" + type);
}

response.setCharacterEncoding("UTF-8");
response.setContentType("application/octet-stream");
response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=\"" + StringUtils.replaceChars(filename, "\"", "'") + "\"");

/*创建输入流*/
try (ByteArrayInputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(exportBytes)) {
    IOUtils.copy(in, response.getOutputStream());
    response.flushBuffer();
}
```
适用的最佳实践包括：对用户输入进行严格的验证和清理，确保响应头中的参数不会包含恶意脚本。在设置`Content-Disposition`头中的`filename`参数时，使用双引号包裹文件名并替换双引号以防止进一步的XSS攻击。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
hsweb-authorization/hsweb-authorization-oauth2/hsweb-authorization-oauth2-core/src/main/java/org/hswebframework/web/oauth2/core/ErrorType.java
### 代码内容：
package org.hswebframework.web.oauth2.core;

import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.function.BiFunction;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;

public enum ErrorType {
    ILLEGAL_CODE(1001), //错误的授权码
    ILLEGAL_ACCESS_TOKEN(1002), //错误的access_token
    ILLEGAL_CLIENT_ID(1003),//客户端信息错误
    ILLEGAL_CLIENT_SECRET(1004),//客户端密钥错误
    ILLEGAL_GRANT_TYPE(1005), //错误的授权方式
    ILLEGAL_RESPONSE_TYPE(1006),//response_type 错误
    ILLEGAL_AUTHORIZATION(1007),//Authorization 错误
    ILLEGAL_REFRESH_TOKEN(1008),//refresh_token 错误
    ILLEGAL_REDIRECT_URI(1009), //redirect_url 错误
    ILLEGAL_SCOPE(1010), //scope 错误
    ILLEGAL_USERNAME(1011), //username 错误
    ILLEGAL_PASSWORD(1012), //password 错误

    SCOPE_OUT_OF_RANGE(2010), //scope超出范围

    UNAUTHORIZED_CLIENT(4010), //无权限
    EXPIRED_TOKEN(4011), //TOKEN过期
    INVALID_TOKEN(4012), //TOKEN已失效
    UNSUPPORTED_GRANT_TYPE(4013), //不支持的认证类型
    UNSUPPORTED_RESPONSE_TYPE(4014), //不支持的响应类型

    EXPIRED_CODE(4015), //AUTHORIZATION_CODE过期
    EXPIRED_REFRESH_TOKEN(4020), //REFRESH_TOKEN过期

    CLIENT_DISABLED(4016),//客户端已被禁用

    CLIENT_NOT_EXIST(4040),//客户端不存在

    USER_NOT_EXIST(4041),//客户端不存在

    ACCESS_DENIED(503), //访问被拒绝

    OTHER(5001), //其他错误 ;

    PARSE_RESPONSE_ERROR(5002),//解析返回结果错误

    SERVICE_ERROR(5003); //服务器返回错误信息

    private final String message;
    private final int    code;
    static final Map<Integer, ErrorType> codeMapping = Arrays.stream(ErrorType.values())
            .collect(Collectors.toMap(ErrorType::code, type -> type));

    ErrorType(int code) {
        this.code = code;
        message = this.name().toLowerCase();
    }

    ErrorType(int code, String message) {
        this.message = message;
        this.code = code;
    }

    public String message() {
        if (message == null) {
            return this.name();
        }
        return message;
    }

    public int code() {
        return code;
    }

    public <T> T throwThis(Function<ErrorType, ? extends RuntimeException> errorTypeFunction) {
        throw errorTypeFunction.apply(this);
    }

    public <T> T throwThis(BiFunction<ErrorType, String, ? extends RuntimeException> errorTypeFunction, String message) {
        throw errorTypeFunction.apply(this, message);
    }

    public static Optional<ErrorType> fromCode(int code) {
        return Optional.ofNullable(codeMapping.get(code));
    }

}

## 内容2
### 文件路径：
hsweb-system/hsweb-system-oauth2-client/hsweb-system-oauth2-client-web/src/main/java/org/hswebframework/web/authorization/oauth2/controller/OAuth2ClientController.java
### 代码内容：
package org.hswebframework.web.authorization.oauth2.controller;

import io.swagger.annotations.Api;
import io.swagger.annotations.ApiOperation;
import org.hswebframework.web.WebUtil;
import org.hswebframework.web.authorization.oauth2.client.OAuth2RequestService;
import org.hswebframework.web.authorization.oauth2.client.listener.OAuth2CodeAuthBeforeEvent;
import org.hswebframework.web.controller.message.ResponseMessage;
import org.hswebframework.web.entity.oauth2.client.OAuth2ServerConfigEntity;
import org.hswebframework.web.id.IDGenerator;
import org.hswebframework.web.oauth2.core.OAuth2Constants;
import org.hswebframework.web.service.oauth2.client.OAuth2ServerConfigService;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
import org.springframework.web.servlet.view.RedirectView;

import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;
import java.net.URLDecoder;
import java.net.URLEncoder;

/**
 * @author zhouhao
 */
@Controller
@RequestMapping("${hsweb.web.mappings.oauth2-client-callback:oauth2}")
@Api(tags = "OAuth2.0-客户端-请求服务", value = "OAuth2.0客户端请求服务")
public class OAuth2ClientController {

    private OAuth2RequestService oAuth2RequestService;

    private OAuth2ServerConfigService oAuth2ServerConfigService;

    @Autowired
    public void setoAuth2ServerConfigService(OAuth2ServerConfigService oAuth2ServerConfigService) {
        this.oAuth2ServerConfigService = oAuth2ServerConfigService;
    }

    @Autowired
    public void setoAuth2RequestService(OAuth2RequestService oAuth2RequestService) {
        this.oAuth2RequestService = oAuth2RequestService;
    }

    private static final String STATE_SESSION_KEY = "OAUTH2_STATE";

    @GetMapping("/state")
    @ResponseBody
    @ApiOperation("申请一个state")
    public ResponseMessage<String> requestState(HttpSession session) {
        String state = IDGenerator.RANDOM.generate();
        session.setAttribute(STATE_SESSION_KEY, state);
        return ResponseMessage.ok(state);
    }

    @GetMapping("/boot/{serverId}")
    @ApiOperation("跳转至OAuth2.0服务授权页面")
    public RedirectView boot(@PathVariable String serverId,
                             @RequestParam(defaultValue = "/") String redirect,
                             HttpServletRequest request,
                             HttpSession session) throws UnsupportedEncodingException {
        OAuth2ServerConfigEntity entity = oAuth2ServerConfigService.selectByPk(serverId);
        if (entity == null) {
            return new RedirectView("/401.html");
        }
        String callback = WebUtil.getBasePath(request)
                .concat("oauth2/callback/")
                .concat(serverId).concat("/?redirect=")
                .concat(URLEncoder.encode(redirect, "UTF-8"));
        RedirectView view = new RedirectView(entity.getRealUrl(entity.getAuthUrl()));
        view.addStaticAttribute(OAuth2Constants.response_type, "code");
        view.addStaticAttribute(OAuth2Constants.state, requestState(session).getResult());
        view.addStaticAttribute(OAuth2Constants.client_id, entity.getClientId());
        view.addStaticAttribute(OAuth2Constants.redirect_uri, callback);
        return view;
    }

    @GetMapping("/callback/{serverId}")
    @ApiOperation(value = "OAuth2.0授权完成后回调", hidden = true)
    public RedirectView callback(@RequestParam(defaultValue = "/") String redirect,
                                 @PathVariable String serverId,
                                 @RequestParam String code,
                                 @RequestParam String state,
                                 HttpServletRequest request,
                                 HttpSession session) throws UnsupportedEncodingException {
        try {
            String cachedState = (String) session.getAttribute(STATE_SESSION_KEY);
            //  if (!state.equals(cachedState)) throw new BusinessException("state error");
            oAuth2RequestService.doEvent(serverId, new OAuth2CodeAuthBeforeEvent(code, state, request::getParameter));
            return new RedirectView(URLDecoder.decode(redirect, "UTF-8"));
        } finally {
            session.removeAttribute(STATE_SESSION_KEY);
        }
    }
}

Output:
【漏洞类型】CSRF（跨站请求伪造）漏洞
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】原始代码中存在CSRF漏洞的根本原因在于缺少对`state`参数的验证。虽然有`STATE_SESSION_KEY`用于存储和验证`state`，但在`callback`方法中，`state`的验证被注释掉了。这意味着攻击者可以构造一个恶意请求，绕过CSRF防护机制，利用用户的登录状态进行未经授权的操作。
【关键代码模式】
- `requestState(HttpSession session)` 方法生成并存储`state`参数。
- `callback` 方法中未对`state`参数进行验证，导致CSRF漏洞。
- 关键关键词：`STATE_SESSION_KEY`, `state`, `requestState`, `callback`
【修复方法说明】修复方法通过重新启用对`state`参数的验证，并使用`ErrorType.STATE_ERROR`来抛出具体的业务异常，以防止CSRF攻击。这遵循了最佳实践中的输入验证原则，确保只有通过验证的请求才能被处理。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
src/java/com/mchange/v2/c3p0/cfg/C3P0ConfigXmlUtils.java
### 代码内容：
package com.mchange.v2.c3p0.cfg;

import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import javax.xml.parsers.*;
import org.w3c.dom.*;
import com.mchange.v2.log.*;

import com.mchange.v1.xml.DomParseUtils;

public final class C3P0ConfigXmlUtils
{
    public final static String XML_CONFIG_RSRC_PATH     = "/c3p0-config.xml";

    final static MLogger logger = MLog.getLogger( C3P0ConfigXmlUtils.class );

    public final static String LINESEP;

    private final static String[] MISSPELL_PFXS = {"/c3p0", "/c3pO", "/c3po", "/C3P0", "/C3PO"};
    private final static char[]   MISSPELL_LINES = {'-', '_'};
    private final static String[] MISSPELL_CONFIG = {"config", "CONFIG"};
    private final static String[] MISSPELL_XML = {"xml", "XML"};

    // its an ugly way to do this, but since resources are not listable...
    //
    // this is only executed once, and does about 40 tests (for now)
    // should I care about the cost in initialization time?
    //
    // should only be run if we've checked for the correct file, but
    // not found it
    private final static void warnCommonXmlConfigResourceMisspellings()
    {
        if (logger.isLoggable( MLevel.WARNING) )
        {
            for (int a = 0, lena = MISSPELL_PFXS.length; a < lena; ++a)
            {
                StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer(16);
                sb.append( MISSPELL_PFXS[a] );
                for (int b = 0, lenb = MISSPELL_LINES.length; b < lenb; ++b)
                {
                    sb.append(MISSPELL_LINES[b]);
                    for (int c = 0, lenc = MISSPELL_CONFIG.length; c < lenc; ++c)
                    {
                        sb.append(MISSPELL_CONFIG[c]);
                        sb.append('.');
                        for (int d = 0, lend = MISSPELL_XML.length; d < lend; ++d)
                        {
                            sb.append(MISSPELL_XML[d]);
                            String test = sb.toString();
                            if (!test.equals(XML_CONFIG_RSRC_PATH))
                            {
                                Object hopefullyNull = C3P0ConfigXmlUtils.class.getResource( test );
                                if (hopefullyNull != null)
                                {
                                    logger.warning("POSSIBLY MISSPELLED c3p0-conf.xml RESOURCE FOUND. " +
                                                   "Please ensure the file name is c3p0-config.xml, all lower case, " +
                                                   "with the digit 0 (NOT the letter O) in c3p0. It should be placed " +
                                                   " in the top level of c3p0's effective classpath.");
                                    return;
                                }
                            }
                        }
                    }

                }
            }
        }
    }

    static
    {
        String ls;

        try
        { ls = System.getProperty("line.separator", "\r\n"); }
        catch (Exception e)
        { ls = "\r\n"; }

        LINESEP = ls;

    }

    public static C3P0Config extractXmlConfigFromDefaultResource() throws Exception
    {
        InputStream is = null;

        try
        {
            is = C3P0ConfigUtils.class.getResourceAsStream(XML_CONFIG_RSRC_PATH);
            if ( is == null )
            {
                warnCommonXmlConfigResourceMisspellings();
                return null;
            }
            else
                return extractXmlConfigFromInputStream( is );
        }
        finally
        {
            try { if (is != null) is.close(); }
            catch (Exception e)
            {
                if ( logger.isLoggable( MLevel.FINE ) )
                    logger.log(MLevel.FINE,"Exception on resource InputStream close.", e);
            }
        }
    }

    public static C3P0Config extractXmlConfigFromInputStream(InputStream is) throws Exception
    {
        DocumentBuilderFactory fact = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
        DocumentBuilder db = fact.newDocumentBuilder();
        Document doc = db.parse( is );

        return extractConfigFromXmlDoc(doc);
    }

    public static C3P0Config extractConfigFromXmlDoc(Document doc) throws Exception
    {
        Element docElem = doc.getDocumentElement();
        if (docElem.getTagName().equals("c3p0-config"))
        {
            NamedScope defaults;
            HashMap configNamesToNamedScopes = new HashMap();

            Element defaultConfigElem = DomParseUtils.uniqueChild( docElem, "default-config" );
            if (defaultConfigElem != null)
                defaults = extractNamedScopeFromLevel( defaultConfigElem );
            else
                defaults = new NamedScope();
            NodeList nl = DomParseUtils.immediateChildElementsByTagName(docElem, "named-config");
            for (int i = 0, len = nl.getLength(); i < len; ++i)
            {
                Element namedConfigElem = (Element) nl.item(i);
                String configName = namedConfigElem.getAttribute("name");
                if (configName != null && configName.length() > 0)
                {
                    NamedScope namedConfig = extractNamedScopeFromLevel( namedConfigElem );
                    configNamesToNamedScopes.put( configName, namedConfig);
                }
                else
                    logger.warning("Configuration XML contained named-config element without name attribute: " + namedConfigElem);
            }
            return new C3P0Config( defaults, configNamesToNamedScopes );
        }
        else
            throw new Exception("Root element of c3p0 config xml should be 'c3p0-config', not '" + docElem.getTagName() + "'.");
    }

    private static NamedScope extractNamedScopeFromLevel(Element elem)
    {
        HashMap props = extractPropertiesFromLevel( elem );
        HashMap userNamesToOverrides = new HashMap();

        NodeList nl = DomParseUtils.immediateChildElementsByTagName(elem, "user-overrides");
        for (int i = 0, len = nl.getLength(); i < len; ++i)
        {
            Element perUserConfigElem = (Element) nl.item(i);
            String userName = perUserConfigElem.getAttribute("user");
            if (userName != null && userName.length() > 0)
            {
                HashMap userProps = extractPropertiesFromLevel( perUserConfigElem );
                userNamesToOverrides.put( userName, userProps );
            }
            else
                logger.warning("Configuration XML contained user-overrides element without user attribute: " + LINESEP + perUserConfigElem);
        }

	HashMap extensions = extractExtensionsFromLevel( elem );

        return new NamedScope(props, userNamesToOverrides, extensions);
    }

    private static HashMap extractExtensionsFromLevel(Element elem)
    {
        HashMap out = new HashMap();
        NodeList nl = DomParseUtils.immediateChildElementsByTagName(elem, "extensions");
        for (int i = 0, len = nl.getLength(); i < len; ++i)
        {
            Element extensionsElem = (Element) nl.item(i);
	    out.putAll( extractPropertiesFromLevel( extensionsElem ) );
        }
	return out;
    }

    private static HashMap extractPropertiesFromLevel(Element elem)
    {
        // System.err.println( "extractPropertiesFromLevel()" );

        HashMap out = new HashMap();

        try
        {
            NodeList nl = DomParseUtils.immediateChildElementsByTagName(elem, "property");
            int len = nl.getLength();
            for (int i = 0; i < len; ++i)
            {
                Element propertyElem = (Element) nl.item(i);
                String propName = propertyElem.getAttribute("name");
                if (propName != null && propName.length() > 0)
                {
                    String propVal = DomParseUtils.allTextFromElement(propertyElem, true);
                    out.put( propName, propVal );
                    //System.err.println( propName + " -> " + propVal );
                }
                else
                    logger.warning("Configuration XML contained property element without name attribute: " + LINESEP + propertyElem);
            }
        }
        catch (Exception e)
        {
            logger.log( MLevel.WARNING,
                            "An exception occurred while reading config XML. " +
                            "Some configuration information has probably been ignored.",
                            e );
        }

        return out;
    }

    private C3P0ConfigXmlUtils()
    {}
}


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
retrofit/src/main/java/retrofit2/RequestBuilder.java
### 代码内容：
package retrofit2;

import java.io.IOException;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
import okhttp3.FormBody;
import okhttp3.Headers;
import okhttp3.HttpUrl;
import okhttp3.MediaType;
import okhttp3.MultipartBody;
import okhttp3.Request;
import okhttp3.RequestBody;
import okio.Buffer;
import okio.BufferedSink;

final class RequestBuilder {
  private static final char[] HEX_DIGITS =
      { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
  private static final String PATH_SEGMENT_ALWAYS_ENCODE_SET = " \"<>^`{}|\\?#";

  private final String method;

  private final HttpUrl baseUrl;
  private @Nullable String relativeUrl;
  private @Nullable HttpUrl.Builder urlBuilder;

  private final Request.Builder requestBuilder;
  private @Nullable MediaType contentType;

  private final boolean hasBody;
  private @Nullable MultipartBody.Builder multipartBuilder;
  private @Nullable FormBody.Builder formBuilder;
  private @Nullable RequestBody body;

  RequestBuilder(String method, HttpUrl baseUrl,
      @Nullable String relativeUrl, @Nullable Headers headers, @Nullable MediaType contentType,
      boolean hasBody, boolean isFormEncoded, boolean isMultipart) {
    this.method = method;
    this.baseUrl = baseUrl;
    this.relativeUrl = relativeUrl;
    this.requestBuilder = new Request.Builder();
    this.contentType = contentType;
    this.hasBody = hasBody;

    if (headers != null) {
      requestBuilder.headers(headers);
    }

    if (isFormEncoded) {
      // Will be set to 'body' in 'build'.
      formBuilder = new FormBody.Builder();
    } else if (isMultipart) {
      // Will be set to 'body' in 'build'.
      multipartBuilder = new MultipartBody.Builder();
      multipartBuilder.setType(MultipartBody.FORM);
    }
  }

  void setRelativeUrl(Object relativeUrl) {
    this.relativeUrl = relativeUrl.toString();
  }

  void addHeader(String name, String value) {
    if ("Content-Type".equalsIgnoreCase(name)) {
      try {
        contentType = MediaType.get(value);
      } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed content type: " + value, e);
      }
    } else {
      requestBuilder.addHeader(name, value);
    }
  }

  void addPathParam(String name, String value, boolean encoded) {
    if (relativeUrl == null) {
      // The relative URL is cleared when the first query parameter is set.
      throw new AssertionError();
    }
    relativeUrl = relativeUrl.replace("{" + name + "}", canonicalizeForPath(value, encoded));
  }

  private static String canonicalizeForPath(String input, boolean alreadyEncoded) {
    int codePoint;
    for (int i = 0, limit = input.length(); i < limit; i += Character.charCount(codePoint)) {
      codePoint = input.codePointAt(i);
      if (codePoint < 0x20 || codePoint >= 0x7f
          || PATH_SEGMENT_ALWAYS_ENCODE_SET.indexOf(codePoint) != -1
          || (!alreadyEncoded && (codePoint == '/' || codePoint == '%'))) {
        // Slow path: the character at i requires encoding!
        Buffer out = new Buffer();
        out.writeUtf8(input, 0, i);
        canonicalizeForPath(out, input, i, limit, alreadyEncoded);
        return out.readUtf8();
      }
    }

    // Fast path: no characters required encoding.
    return input;
  }

  private static void canonicalizeForPath(Buffer out, String input, int pos, int limit,
      boolean alreadyEncoded) {
    Buffer utf8Buffer = null; // Lazily allocated.
    int codePoint;
    for (int i = pos; i < limit; i += Character.charCount(codePoint)) {
      codePoint = input.codePointAt(i);
      if (alreadyEncoded
          && (codePoint == '\t' || codePoint == '\n' || codePoint == '\f' || codePoint == '\r')) {
        // Skip this character.
      } else if (codePoint < 0x20 || codePoint >= 0x7f
          || PATH_SEGMENT_ALWAYS_ENCODE_SET.indexOf(codePoint) != -1
          || (!alreadyEncoded && (codePoint == '/' || codePoint == '%'))) {
        // Percent encode this character.
        if (utf8Buffer == null) {
          utf8Buffer = new Buffer();
        }
        utf8Buffer.writeUtf8CodePoint(codePoint);
        while (!utf8Buffer.exhausted()) {
          int b = utf8Buffer.readByte() & 0xff;
          out.writeByte('%');
          out.writeByte(HEX_DIGITS[(b >> 4) & 0xf]);
          out.writeByte(HEX_DIGITS[b & 0xf]);
        }
      } else {
        // This character doesn't need encoding. Just copy it over.
        out.writeUtf8CodePoint(codePoint);
      }
    }
  }

  void addQueryParam(String name, @Nullable String value, boolean encoded) {
    if (relativeUrl != null) {
      // Do a one-time combination of the built relative URL and the base URL.
      urlBuilder = baseUrl.newBuilder(relativeUrl);
      if (urlBuilder == null) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException(
            "Malformed URL. Base: " + baseUrl + ", Relative: " + relativeUrl);
      }
      relativeUrl = null;
    }

    if (encoded) {
      //noinspection ConstantConditions Checked to be non-null by above 'if' block.
      urlBuilder.addEncodedQueryParameter(name, value);
    } else {
      //noinspection ConstantConditions Checked to be non-null by above 'if' block.
      urlBuilder.addQueryParameter(name, value);
    }
  }

  @SuppressWarnings("ConstantConditions") // Only called when isFormEncoded was true.
  void addFormField(String name, String value, boolean encoded) {
    if (encoded) {
      formBuilder.addEncoded(name, value);
    } else {
      formBuilder.add(name, value);
    }
  }

  @SuppressWarnings("ConstantConditions") // Only called when isMultipart was true.
  void addPart(Headers headers, RequestBody body) {
    multipartBuilder.addPart(headers, body);
  }

  @SuppressWarnings("ConstantConditions") // Only called when isMultipart was true.
  void addPart(MultipartBody.Part part) {
    multipartBuilder.addPart(part);
  }

  void setBody(RequestBody body) {
    this.body = body;
  }

  Request.Builder get() {
    HttpUrl url;
    HttpUrl.Builder urlBuilder = this.urlBuilder;
    if (urlBuilder != null) {
      url = urlBuilder.build();
    } else {
      // No query parameters triggered builder creation, just combine the relative URL and base URL.
      //noinspection ConstantConditions Non-null if urlBuilder is null.
      url = baseUrl.resolve(relativeUrl);
      if (url == null) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException(
            "Malformed URL. Base: " + baseUrl + ", Relative: " + relativeUrl);
      }
    }

    RequestBody body = this.body;
    if (body == null) {
      // Try to pull from one of the builders.
      if (formBuilder != null) {
        body = formBuilder.build();
      } else if (multipartBuilder != null) {
        body = multipartBuilder.build();
      } else if (hasBody) {
        // Body is absent, make an empty body.
        body = RequestBody.create(null, new byte[0]);
      }
    }

    MediaType contentType = this.contentType;
    if (contentType != null) {
      if (body != null) {
        body = new ContentTypeOverridingRequestBody(body, contentType);
      } else {
        requestBuilder.addHeader("Content-Type", contentType.toString());
      }
    }

    return requestBuilder
        .url(url)
        .method(method, body);
  }

  private static class ContentTypeOverridingRequestBody extends RequestBody {
    private final RequestBody delegate;
    private final MediaType contentType;

    ContentTypeOverridingRequestBody(RequestBody delegate, MediaType contentType) {
      this.delegate = delegate;
      this.contentType = contentType;
    }

    @Override public MediaType contentType() {
      return contentType;
    }

    @Override public long contentLength() throws IOException {
      return delegate.contentLength();
    }

    @Override public void writeTo(BufferedSink sink) throws IOException {
      delegate.writeTo(sink);
    }
  }
}

Output:
【漏洞类型】路径遍历漏洞
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】这是一个路径遍历漏洞。代码在`addPathParam`函数中，通过替换`relativeUrl`中的占位符来构建最终的URL。如果用户输入的路径参数包含`.`或`..`，将会导致路径遍历攻击，可能访问或修改未授权的文件或目录。
【关键代码模式】addPathParam, relativeUrl, canonicalizeForPath, PATH_TRAVERSAL
【修复方法说明】修复方法在替换路径参数后，使用正则表达式检查新的`relativeUrl`是否包含路径遍历字符，并在检测到时抛出异常。这通过限制用户输入来防止路径遍历攻击。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
hphp/runtime/base/output-file.cpp
### 代码内容：
#include "hphp/runtime/base/output-file.h"
#include "hphp/runtime/base/execution-context.h"
#include "hphp/runtime/base/runtime-error.h"

namespace HPHP {

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// constructor and destructor

const StaticString s_php_output("php://output");
const StaticString s_php("PHP");
const StaticString s_output("Output");

OutputFile::OutputFile(const String& filename): File(true, s_php, s_output) {
  if (filename != s_php_output) {
    raise_fatal_error("not a php://output file ");
  }
  setIsLocal(true);
}

OutputFile::~OutputFile() {
  OutputFile::closeImpl();
}

void OutputFile::sweep() {
  closeImpl();
  File::sweep();
}

bool OutputFile::open(const String& /*filename*/, const String& /*mode*/) {
  raise_fatal_error("cannot open a php://output file ");
}

bool OutputFile::close() {
  invokeFiltersOnClose();
  return closeImpl();
}

bool OutputFile::closeImpl() {
  *s_pcloseRet = 0;
  if (!isClosed()) {
    setIsClosed(true);
    return true;
  }
  return false;
}

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// virtual functions

int64_t OutputFile::readImpl(char* /*buffer*/, int64_t /*length*/) {
  raise_warning("cannot read from a php://output stream");
  return -1;
}

int OutputFile::getc() {
  raise_warning("cannot read from a php://output stream");
  return -1;
}

int64_t OutputFile::writeImpl(const char *buffer, int64_t length) {
  assertx(length > 0);
  if (isClosed()) return 0;
  g_context->write(buffer, length);
  return length;
}

bool OutputFile::seek(int64_t /*offset*/, int /*whence*/ /* = SEEK_SET */) {
  raise_warning("cannot seek a php://output stream");
  return false;
}

int64_t OutputFile::tell() {
  raise_warning("cannot tell a php://output stream");
  return -1;
}

bool OutputFile::eof() {
  return false;
}

bool OutputFile::rewind() {
  raise_warning("cannot rewind a php://output stream");
  return false;
}

bool OutputFile::flush() {
  if (!isClosed()) {
    g_context->flush();
    return true;
  }
  return false;
}

bool OutputFile::truncate(int64_t /*size*/) {
  raise_warning("cannot truncate a php://output stream");
  return false;
}

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
}

## 内容2
### 文件路径：
hphp/runtime/ext/bz2/bz2-file.cpp
### 代码内容：
#include "hphp/runtime/ext/bz2/bz2-file.h"
#include "hphp/runtime/base/array-init.h"

namespace HPHP {

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

BZ2File::BZ2File(): m_bzFile(nullptr), m_innerFile(req::make<PlainFile>()) {
  m_innerFile->unregister();
  setIsLocal(m_innerFile->isLocal());
}

BZ2File::BZ2File(req::ptr<PlainFile>&& innerFile)
: m_bzFile(nullptr), m_innerFile(std::move(innerFile)) {
  setIsLocal(m_innerFile->isLocal());
}

BZ2File::~BZ2File() {
  closeImpl();
}

void BZ2File::sweep() {
  closeImpl();
  File::sweep();
}

bool BZ2File::open(const String& filename, const String& mode) {
  assertx(m_bzFile == nullptr);

  return m_innerFile->open(filename, mode) &&
    (m_bzFile = BZ2_bzdopen(dup(m_innerFile->fd()), mode.data()));
}

bool BZ2File::close() {
  invokeFiltersOnClose();
  return closeImpl();
}

int64_t BZ2File::errnu() {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  int errnum = 0;
  BZ2_bzerror(m_bzFile, &errnum);
  return errnum;
}

String BZ2File::errstr() {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  int errnum;
  return BZ2_bzerror(m_bzFile, &errnum);
}

const StaticString
  s_errno("errno"),
  s_errstr("errstr");

Array BZ2File::error() {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  int errnum;
  const char * errstr;
  errstr = BZ2_bzerror(m_bzFile, &errnum);
  return make_map_array(s_errno, errnum, s_errstr, String(errstr));
}

bool BZ2File::flush() {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  return BZ2_bzflush(m_bzFile);
}

int64_t BZ2File::readImpl(char * buf, int64_t length) {
  if (length == 0) {
    return 0;
  }
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  int len = BZ2_bzread(m_bzFile, buf, length);
  /* Sometimes libbz2 will return fewer bytes than requested, and set bzerror
   * to BZ_STREAM_END, but it's not actually EOF, and you can keep reading from
   * the file - so, only set EOF after a failed read. This matches PHP5.
   */
  if (len <= 0) {
    setEof(true);
    if (len < 0) {
      return -1;
    }
  }
  return len;
}

int64_t BZ2File::writeImpl(const char * buf, int64_t length) {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  return BZ2_bzwrite(m_bzFile, (char *)buf, length);
}

bool BZ2File::closeImpl() {
  if (!isClosed()) {
    if (m_bzFile) {
      BZ2_bzclose(m_bzFile);
      m_bzFile = nullptr;
    }
    setIsClosed(true);
    if (m_innerFile) {
      m_innerFile->close();
    }
  }
  File::closeImpl();
  return true;
}

bool BZ2File::eof() {
  assertx(m_bzFile);
  return getEof();
}

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
}

Output:
【漏洞类型】越界读取（Out-of-Bounds Read）
【严重性】Medium
【漏洞摘要】此代码在处理文件读取错误时返回-1，这与预期的readImpl行为不符。readImpl函数应该在读取失败时返回0，但在OutputFile和BZ2File类的readImpl实现中，返回-1会导致调用者（如File::readRecord）尝试从其流缓冲区中读取(size_t)(-1)字节，从而引发越界读取错误。

【关键代码模式】
- 关键函数：OutputFile::readImpl, BZ2File::readImpl
- 关键行为：在读取错误时返回-1
- 关键关键词：`readImpl`, `return -1`

【修复方法说明】修复方法通过将返回值从-1改为0来解决越界读取问题。最佳实践是确保在处理文件读取错误时，返回值始终为非负数，以防止潜在的越界读取漏洞。


Instruction:
作为 Java 安全专家，检测此代码中的安全漏洞：
## 内容1
### 文件路径：
src/org/traccar/protocol/SpotProtocolDecoder.java
### 代码内容：
package org.traccar.protocol;

import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.util.ByteBufferBackedInputStream;
import io.netty.channel.Channel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.FullHttpRequest;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpResponseStatus;
import org.traccar.BaseHttpProtocolDecoder;
import org.traccar.DeviceSession;
import org.traccar.Protocol;
import org.traccar.helper.DateUtil;
import org.traccar.model.Position;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Node;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;

import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
import javax.xml.xpath.XPath;
import javax.xml.xpath.XPathConstants;
import javax.xml.xpath.XPathExpression;
import javax.xml.xpath.XPathExpressionException;
import javax.xml.xpath.XPathFactory;
import java.net.SocketAddress;
import java.util.LinkedList;
import java.util.List;

public class SpotProtocolDecoder extends BaseHttpProtocolDecoder {

    private DocumentBuilder documentBuilder;
    private XPath xPath;
    private XPathExpression messageExpression;

    public SpotProtocolDecoder(Protocol protocol) {
        super(protocol);
        try {
            documentBuilder = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder();
            xPath = XPathFactory.newInstance().newXPath();
            messageExpression = xPath.compile("//messageList/message");
        } catch (ParserConfigurationException | XPathExpressionException e) {
            throw new RuntimeException(e);
        }
    }

    @Override
    protected Object decode(
            Channel channel, SocketAddress remoteAddress, Object msg) throws Exception {

        FullHttpRequest request = (FullHttpRequest) msg;

        Document document = documentBuilder.parse(new ByteBufferBackedInputStream(request.content().nioBuffer()));
        NodeList nodes = (NodeList) messageExpression.evaluate(document, XPathConstants.NODESET);

        List<Position> positions = new LinkedList<>();

        for (int i = 0; i < nodes.getLength(); i++) {
            Node node = nodes.item(i);
            DeviceSession deviceSession = getDeviceSession(channel, remoteAddress, xPath.evaluate("esnName", node));
            if (deviceSession != null) {

                Position position = new Position(getProtocolName());
                position.setDeviceId(deviceSession.getDeviceId());

                position.setValid(true);
                position.setTime(DateUtil.parseDate(xPath.evaluate("timestamp", node)));
                position.setLatitude(Double.parseDouble(xPath.evaluate("latitude", node)));
                position.setLongitude(Double.parseDouble(xPath.evaluate("longitude", node)));

                position.set(Position.KEY_EVENT, xPath.evaluate("messageType", node));

                positions.add(position);

            }
        }

        sendResponse(channel, HttpResponseStatus.OK);
        return positions;
    }

}

Output:
【漏洞类型】XML外部实体（XXE）注入漏洞
【严重性】High
【漏洞摘要】原始代码使用了未配置的`DocumentBuilderFactory`来解析HTTP请求内容中的XML，这可能导致XML外部实体（XXE）注入攻击。攻击者可以通过构造恶意XML请求来执行拒绝服务（DoS）攻击，或者在某些情况下，获取服务器内部文件或执行其他恶意操作。
【关键代码模式】`DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder()`
【修复方法说明】修复方法通过设置多个安全特性来禁用XML外部实体解析，从而防止XXE攻击。最佳实践是始终禁用外部实体处理，除非应用程序需要处理它们。