Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:AVANT-GUARD: scalable and vigilant switch flow management in software-defined
networks
author:Seungwon Shin and
Vinod Yegneswaran and
Phillip A. Porras and
Guofei Gu
AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow
Management in Software-Deﬁned Networks
Seungwon Shin† Vinod Yegneswaran‡ Phillip Porras‡ Guofei Gu†
{swshin,guofei}@cse.tamu.edu {vinod, porras}@csl.sri.com
†Texas A&M University
‡SRI International
ABSTRACT
Among the leading reference implementations of the Software De-
ﬁned Networking (SDN) paradigm is the OpenFlow framework,
which decouples the control plane into a centralized application. In
this paper, we consider two aspects of OpenFlow that pose secu-
rity challenges, and we propose two solutions that could address
these concerns. The ﬁrst challenge is the inherent communication
bottleneck that arises between the data plane and the control plane,
which an adversary could exploit by mounting a control plane sat-
uration attack that disrupts network operations. Indeed, even well-
mined adversarial models, such as scanning or denial-of-service
(DoS) activity, can produce more potent impacts on OpenFlow net-
works than traditional networks. To address this challenge, we in-
troduce an extension to the OpenFlow data plane called connec-
tion migration, which dramatically reduces the amount of data-
to-control-plane interactions that arise during such attacks. The
second challenge is that of enabling the control plane to expedite
both detection of, and responses to, the changing ﬂow dynamics
within the data plane. For this, we introduce actuating triggers
over the data plane’s existing statistics collection services. These
triggers are inserted by control layer applications to both register
for asynchronous call backs, and insert conditional ﬂow rules that
are only activated when a trigger condition is detected within the
data plane’s statistics module. We present AVANT-GUARD, an im-
plementation of our two data plane extensions, evaluate the perfor-
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Ananta: cloud scale load balancing
author:Parveen Patel and
Deepak Bansal and
Lihua Yuan and
Ashwin Murthy and
Albert G. Greenberg and
David A. Maltz and
Randy Kern and
Hemant Kumar and
Marios Zikos and
Hongyu Wu and
Changhoon Kim and
Naveen Karri
Ananta: Cloud Scale Load Balancing
Parveen Patel, Deepak Bansal, Lihua Yuan, Ashwin Murthy, Albert Greenberg,
David A. Maltz, Randy Kern, Hemant Kumar, Marios Zikos, Hongyu Wu,
Changhoon Kim, Naveen Karri
Microsoft
ABSTRACT
Layer-4 load balancing is fundamental to creating scale-out web
services. We designed and implemented Ananta, a scale-out layer-4
load balancer that runs on commodity hardware and meets the per-
formance, reliability and operational requirements of multi-tenant
cloud computing environments. Ananta combines existing tech-
niques in routing and distributed systems in a unique way and splits
the components of a load balancer into a consensus-based reliable
control plane and a decentralized scale-out data plane. A key com-
ponent of Ananta is an agent in every host that can take over the
packet modiﬁcation function from the load balancer, thereby en-
abling the load balancer to naturally scale with the size of the data
center. Due to its distributed architecture, Ananta provides direct
server return (DSR) and network address translation (NAT) capa-
bilities across layer-2 boundaries. Multiple instances of Ananta
have been deployed in the Windows Azure public cloud with com-
bined bandwidth capacity exceeding 1Tbps.
It is serving trafﬁc
needs of a diverse set of tenants, including the blob, table and rela-
tional storage services. With its scale-out data plane we can easily
achieve more than 100Gbps throughput for a single public IP ad-
dress. In this paper, we describe the requirements of a cloud-scale
load balancer, the design of Ananta and lessons learnt from its im-
plementation and operation in the Windows Azure public cloud.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.4 [Computer-Communi-
cation Netw...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Ananta: cloud scale load balancing
author:Parveen Patel and
Deepak Bansal and
Lihua Yuan and
Ashwin Murthy and
Albert G. Greenberg and
David A. Maltz and
Randy Kern and
Hemant Kumar and
Marios Zikos and
Hongyu Wu and
Changhoon Kim and
Naveen Karri
Ananta: Cloud Scale Load Balancing
Parveen Patel, Deepak Bansal, Lihua Yuan, Ashwin Murthy, Albert Greenberg,
David A. Maltz, Randy Kern, Hemant Kumar, Marios Zikos, Hongyu Wu,
Changhoon Kim, Naveen Karri
Microsoft
ABSTRACT
Layer-4 load balancing is fundamental to creating scale-out web
services. We designed and implemented Ananta, a scale-out layer-4
load balancer that runs on commodity hardware and meets the per-
formance, reliability and operational requirements of multi-tenant
cloud computing environments. Ananta combines existing tech-
niques in routing and distributed systems in a unique way and splits
the components of a load balancer into a consensus-based reliable
control plane and a decentralized scale-out data plane. A key com-
ponent of Ananta is an agent in every host that can take over the
packet modiﬁcation function from the load balancer, thereby en-
abling the load balancer to naturally scale with the size of the data
center. Due to its distributed architecture, Ananta provides direct
server return (DSR) and network address translation (NAT) capa-
bilities across layer-2 boundaries. Multiple instances of Ananta
have been deployed in the Windows Azure public cloud with com-
bined bandwidth capacity exceeding 1Tbps.
It is serving trafﬁc
needs of a diverse set of tenants, including the blob, table and rela-
tional storage services. With its scale-out data plane we can easily
achieve more than 100Gbps throughput for a single public IP ad-
dress. In this paper, we describe the requirements of a cloud-scale
load balancer, the design of Ananta and lessons learnt from its im-
plementation and operation in the Windows Azure public cloud.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.4 [Computer-Communi-
cation Netw...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Ask the Experts: What Should Be on an IoT Privacy and Security Label?
author:Pardis Emami Naeini and
Yuvraj Agarwal and
Lorrie Faith Cranor and
Hanan Hibshi
Ask the Experts: What Should Be on an IoT
Privacy and Security Label?
Pardis Emami-Naeini
Yuvraj Agarwal
Carnegie Mellon University
Carnegie Mellon University
pardis@cmu.edu
yuvraj@cs.cmu.edu
Lorrie Faith Cranor
Carnegie Mellon University
lorrie@cmu.edu
Hanan Hibshi
Carnegie Mellon University
hibshi@andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract—Information about the privacy and security of Inter-
net of Things (IoT) devices is not readily available to consumers
who want to consider it before making purchase decisions. While
legislators have proposed adding succinct, consumer accessible,
labels, they do not provide guidance on the content of these
labels. In this paper, we report on the results of a series of
interviews and surveys with privacy and security experts, as well
as consumers, where we explore and test the design space of
the content to include on an IoT privacy and security label. We
conduct an expert elicitation study by following a three-round
Delphi process with 22 privacy and security experts to identify the
factors that experts believed are important for consumers when
comparing the privacy and security of IoT devices to inform
their purchase decisions. Based on how critical experts believed
each factor is in conveying risk to consumers, we distributed
these factors across two layers—a primary layer to display on
the product package itself or prominently on a website, and a
secondary layer available online through a web link or a QR
code. We report on the experts’ rationale and arguments used to
support their choice of factors. Moreover, to study how consumers
would perceive the privacy and security information speciﬁed by
experts, we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with
15 participants, who had purchased at least one IoT device (smart
home device or wearable). Based on the results of our expert...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Ask the Experts: What Should Be on an IoT Privacy and Security Label?
author:Pardis Emami Naeini and
Yuvraj Agarwal and
Lorrie Faith Cranor and
Hanan Hibshi
Ask the Experts: What Should Be on an IoT
Privacy and Security Label?
Pardis Emami-Naeini
Yuvraj Agarwal
Carnegie Mellon University
Carnegie Mellon University
pardis@cmu.edu
yuvraj@cs.cmu.edu
Lorrie Faith Cranor
Carnegie Mellon University
lorrie@cmu.edu
Hanan Hibshi
Carnegie Mellon University
hibshi@andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract—Information about the privacy and security of Inter-
net of Things (IoT) devices is not readily available to consumers
who want to consider it before making purchase decisions. While
legislators have proposed adding succinct, consumer accessible,
labels, they do not provide guidance on the content of these
labels. In this paper, we report on the results of a series of
interviews and surveys with privacy and security experts, as well
as consumers, where we explore and test the design space of
the content to include on an IoT privacy and security label. We
conduct an expert elicitation study by following a three-round
Delphi process with 22 privacy and security experts to identify the
factors that experts believed are important for consumers when
comparing the privacy and security of IoT devices to inform
their purchase decisions. Based on how critical experts believed
each factor is in conveying risk to consumers, we distributed
these factors across two layers—a primary layer to display on
the product package itself or prominently on a website, and a
secondary layer available online through a web link or a QR
code. We report on the experts’ rationale and arguments used to
support their choice of factors. Moreover, to study how consumers
would perceive the privacy and security information speciﬁed by
experts, we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with
15 participants, who had purchased at least one IoT device (smart
home device or wearable). Based on the results of our expert...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:EvilCoder: automated bug insertion
author:Jannik Pewny and
Thorsten Holz
EvilCoder: Automated Bug Insertion
Horst Görtz Institut (HGI)
Jannik Pewny
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum, Germany
jannik.pewny@rub.de
Horst Görtz Institut (HGI)
Thorsten Holz
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum, Germany
thorsten.holz@rub.de
ABSTRACT
The art of ﬁnding software vulnerabilities has been covered
extensively in the literature and there is a huge body of work
on this topic. In contrast, the intentional insertion of ex-
ploitable, security-critical bugs has received little (public)
attention yet. Wanting more bugs seems to be counterpro-
ductive at ﬁrst sight, but the comprehensive evaluation of
bug-ﬁnding techniques suﬀers from a lack of ground truth
and the scarcity of bugs.
In this paper, we propose EvilCoder, a system to auto-
matically ﬁnd potentially vulnerable source code locations
and modify the source code to be actually vulnerable. More
speciﬁcally, we leverage automated program analysis tech-
niques to ﬁnd sensitive sinks which match typical bug pat-
terns (e.g., a sensitive API function with a preceding san-
ity check), and try to ﬁnd data-ﬂow connections to user-
controlled sources. We then transform the source code such
that exploitation becomes possible, for example by remov-
ing or modifying input sanitization or other types of security
checks. Our tool is designed to randomly pick vulnerable lo-
cations and possible modiﬁcations, such that it can generate
numerous diﬀerent vulnerabilities on the same software cor-
pus. We evaluated our tool on several open-source projects
such as for example libpng and vsftpd, where we found
between 22 and 158 unique connected source-sink pairs per
project. This translates to hundreds of potentially vulner-
able data-ﬂow paths and hundreds of bugs we can insert.
We hope to support future bug-ﬁnding techniques by sup-
plying freshly generated, bug-ridden test corpora so that
such techniques can (ﬁnally) be evaluated and compared in
a comprehensive...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:EvilCoder: automated bug insertion
author:Jannik Pewny and
Thorsten Holz
EvilCoder: Automated Bug Insertion
Horst Görtz Institut (HGI)
Jannik Pewny
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum, Germany
jannik.pewny@rub.de
Horst Görtz Institut (HGI)
Thorsten Holz
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum, Germany
thorsten.holz@rub.de
ABSTRACT
The art of ﬁnding software vulnerabilities has been covered
extensively in the literature and there is a huge body of work
on this topic. In contrast, the intentional insertion of ex-
ploitable, security-critical bugs has received little (public)
attention yet. Wanting more bugs seems to be counterpro-
ductive at ﬁrst sight, but the comprehensive evaluation of
bug-ﬁnding techniques suﬀers from a lack of ground truth
and the scarcity of bugs.
In this paper, we propose EvilCoder, a system to auto-
matically ﬁnd potentially vulnerable source code locations
and modify the source code to be actually vulnerable. More
speciﬁcally, we leverage automated program analysis tech-
niques to ﬁnd sensitive sinks which match typical bug pat-
terns (e.g., a sensitive API function with a preceding san-
ity check), and try to ﬁnd data-ﬂow connections to user-
controlled sources. We then transform the source code such
that exploitation becomes possible, for example by remov-
ing or modifying input sanitization or other types of security
checks. Our tool is designed to randomly pick vulnerable lo-
cations and possible modiﬁcations, such that it can generate
numerous diﬀerent vulnerabilities on the same software cor-
pus. We evaluated our tool on several open-source projects
such as for example libpng and vsftpd, where we found
between 22 and 158 unique connected source-sink pairs per
project. This translates to hundreds of potentially vulner-
able data-ﬂow paths and hundreds of bugs we can insert.
We hope to support future bug-ﬁnding techniques by sup-
plying freshly generated, bug-ridden test corpora so that
such techniques can (ﬁnally) be evaluated and compared in
a comprehensive...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Authentication Using Pulse-Response Biometrics
author:Kasper Bonne Rasmussen and
Marc Roeschlin and
Ivan Martinovic and
Gene Tsudik
Authentication Using Pulse-Response Biometrics
Kasper B. Rasmussen
Marc Roeschlin
University of California, Irvine
University of California, Irvine
Computer Science Dept.
kbrasmus@ics.uci.edu
Computer Science Dept.
mroeschl@uci.edu
Ivan Martinovic
University of Oxford
Computer Science Dept.
ivan.martinovic@cs.ox.ac.uk
Gene Tsudik
University of California, Irvine
Computer Science Dept.
gts@uci.edu
Abstract—We propose a new biometric based on the human
body’s response to an electric square pulse signal, that we call
pulse-response. We explore how this biometric can be used to
enhance security in the context of two example applications: (1)
as an additional authentication mechanism in PIN entry systems,
and (2) as a continuous authentication mechanism on a secure
terminal. The pulse-response biometric is effective because each
human body exhibits a unique response to a signal pulse applied
at the palm of one hand, and measured at the palm of the other.
Using a prototype setup, we show that users can be correctly
identiﬁed, with high probability, in a matter of seconds. This
identiﬁcation mechanism integrates very well with other well-
established methods and offers a reliable additional
layer of
additional security, either on a continuous basis or at login time.
We build a proof-of-concept prototype and perform experiments
to validate the feasability of using pulse-response as a biometric.
Our results are very encuraging: we achieve accuracies of 100%
over a static data set and 88% over a data set with samples taken
over several weeks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Many modern access control systems augment the traditional
two-factor authentication procedure (something you know and
something you have) with a third factor: “something you are”,
i.e., some form of biometric authentication. This additional layer
of security comes in many ﬂavors: from ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Authentication Using Pulse-Response Biometrics
author:Kasper Bonne Rasmussen and
Marc Roeschlin and
Ivan Martinovic and
Gene Tsudik
Authentication Using Pulse-Response Biometrics
Kasper B. Rasmussen
Marc Roeschlin
University of California, Irvine
University of California, Irvine
Computer Science Dept.
kbrasmus@ics.uci.edu
Computer Science Dept.
mroeschl@uci.edu
Ivan Martinovic
University of Oxford
Computer Science Dept.
ivan.martinovic@cs.ox.ac.uk
Gene Tsudik
University of California, Irvine
Computer Science Dept.
gts@uci.edu
Abstract—We propose a new biometric based on the human
body’s response to an electric square pulse signal, that we call
pulse-response. We explore how this biometric can be used to
enhance security in the context of two example applications: (1)
as an additional authentication mechanism in PIN entry systems,
and (2) as a continuous authentication mechanism on a secure
terminal. The pulse-response biometric is effective because each
human body exhibits a unique response to a signal pulse applied
at the palm of one hand, and measured at the palm of the other.
Using a prototype setup, we show that users can be correctly
identiﬁed, with high probability, in a matter of seconds. This
identiﬁcation mechanism integrates very well with other well-
established methods and offers a reliable additional
layer of
additional security, either on a continuous basis or at login time.
We build a proof-of-concept prototype and perform experiments
to validate the feasability of using pulse-response as a biometric.
Our results are very encuraging: we achieve accuracies of 100%
over a static data set and 88% over a data set with samples taken
over several weeks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Many modern access control systems augment the traditional
two-factor authentication procedure (something you know and
something you have) with a third factor: “something you are”,
i.e., some form of biometric authentication. This additional layer
of security comes in many ﬂavors: from ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Sipster: Settling IOU Privately and Quickly with Smart Meters
author:Sherman S. M. Chow and
Ming Li and
Yongjun Zhao and
Wenqiang Jin
Sipster: Settling IOU Privately and Quickly
with Smart Meters
Sherman S. M. Chow∗
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong
The University of Texas at Arlington
Ming Li
USA
Yongjun Zhao†
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems revolutionize how we interact with physi-
cal systems. Smart grid is a prominent example. With new features
such as fine-grained billing, user privacy is at a greater risk than
before. For instance, a utility company (UC) can infer users’ (fine-
grained) usage patterns from their payment. The literature only
focuses on hiding individual meter readings in bill calculation. It
is unclear how to preserve amount privacy when the UC needs to
assert that each user has settled the amount as calculated in the bill.
We advocate a new paradigm of cash payment settlement en-
abling payment privacy. Users pay their bills in unit amount so that
they can hide in the crowd. Meanwhile, UC can obtain payments
earlier in the pay-as-you-go model, leading to a win-win situation.
A highlight of our proposed system, Sipster, is that the receipts for
the payments can be combined into a O(1)-size receipt certifying the
smart meter’s certification. Without such aggregation, techniques
such as zero-knowledge proof would fail since it typically cannot
hide the size of the witness. Seemingly helpful tools, e.g., aggregate
signatures or fully homomorphic signatures, also fail.
The novelty of Sipster lies in fulfilling our five goals simulta-
neously: 1) privacy-preserving: the UC cannot infer a user’s pay-
ment amount; 2) prover-efficient: no zero-knowledge proof is ever
needed; 3) verifier-efficient: it takes O(1) time to verify a combined
receipt; 4) double-claiming-free: users cannot present the same re-
ceipt twice; and 5) minimalistic smart meter: it has the capability
to repor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Sipster: Settling IOU Privately and Quickly with Smart Meters
author:Sherman S. M. Chow and
Ming Li and
Yongjun Zhao and
Wenqiang Jin
Sipster: Settling IOU Privately and Quickly
with Smart Meters
Sherman S. M. Chow∗
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong
The University of Texas at Arlington
Ming Li
USA
Yongjun Zhao†
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems revolutionize how we interact with physi-
cal systems. Smart grid is a prominent example. With new features
such as fine-grained billing, user privacy is at a greater risk than
before. For instance, a utility company (UC) can infer users’ (fine-
grained) usage patterns from their payment. The literature only
focuses on hiding individual meter readings in bill calculation. It
is unclear how to preserve amount privacy when the UC needs to
assert that each user has settled the amount as calculated in the bill.
We advocate a new paradigm of cash payment settlement en-
abling payment privacy. Users pay their bills in unit amount so that
they can hide in the crowd. Meanwhile, UC can obtain payments
earlier in the pay-as-you-go model, leading to a win-win situation.
A highlight of our proposed system, Sipster, is that the receipts for
the payments can be combined into a O(1)-size receipt certifying the
smart meter’s certification. Without such aggregation, techniques
such as zero-knowledge proof would fail since it typically cannot
hide the size of the witness. Seemingly helpful tools, e.g., aggregate
signatures or fully homomorphic signatures, also fail.
The novelty of Sipster lies in fulfilling our five goals simulta-
neously: 1) privacy-preserving: the UC cannot infer a user’s pay-
ment amount; 2) prover-efficient: no zero-knowledge proof is ever
needed; 3) verifier-efficient: it takes O(1) time to verify a combined
receipt; 4) double-claiming-free: users cannot present the same re-
ceipt twice; and 5) minimalistic smart meter: it has the capability
to repor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:TxBox: Building Secure, Efficient Sandboxes with System Transactions
author:Suman Jana and
Donald E. Porter and
Vitaly Shmatikov
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
TxBox: Building Secure, Efﬁcient Sandboxes with System Transactions
Suman Jana
The University of Texas at Austin
suman@cs.utexas.edu
Donald E. Porter
Stony Brook University
porter@cs.sunysb.edu
Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin
shmat@cs.utexas.edu
Abstract—TXBOX is a new system for sandboxing untrusted
applications. It speculatively executes the application in a
system transaction, allowing security checks to be parallelized
and yielding signiﬁcant performance gains for techniques such
as on-access anti-virus scanning. TXBOX is not vulnerable to
TOCTTOU attacks and incorrect mirroring of kernel state.
Furthermore, TXBOX supports automatic recovery: if a viola-
tion is detected, the sandboxed program is terminated and all
of its effects on the host are rolled back. This enables effective
enforcement of security policies that span multiple system calls.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure execution and conﬁnement of untrusted applica-
tions is a long-standing problem in system security [35].
We present a new approach to constructing secure, efﬁcient
sandboxes based on system transactions.1 In general, sys-
tem transactions guarantee that a sequence of updates to
system resources satisﬁes atomicity, consistency, isolation,
and durability (ACID). Transactions are increasingly popular
for managing concurrency in modern operating systems.
Our prototype system, TXBOX, uses transactions for (1)
speculative execution of untrusted applications, (2) uncir-
cumventable enforcement of system-call policies, and (3)
automatic recovery from the effects of malicious execution.
TXBOX consists of a relatively simple, policy-agnostic
security monitor running in the OS kernel and a user-level
policy manager. The separation of the security policy and the
enforcement mechanism facilitates management of polici...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:TxBox: Building Secure, Efficient Sandboxes with System Transactions
author:Suman Jana and
Donald E. Porter and
Vitaly Shmatikov
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
TxBox: Building Secure, Efﬁcient Sandboxes with System Transactions
Suman Jana
The University of Texas at Austin
suman@cs.utexas.edu
Donald E. Porter
Stony Brook University
porter@cs.sunysb.edu
Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin
shmat@cs.utexas.edu
Abstract—TXBOX is a new system for sandboxing untrusted
applications. It speculatively executes the application in a
system transaction, allowing security checks to be parallelized
and yielding signiﬁcant performance gains for techniques such
as on-access anti-virus scanning. TXBOX is not vulnerable to
TOCTTOU attacks and incorrect mirroring of kernel state.
Furthermore, TXBOX supports automatic recovery: if a viola-
tion is detected, the sandboxed program is terminated and all
of its effects on the host are rolled back. This enables effective
enforcement of security policies that span multiple system calls.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure execution and conﬁnement of untrusted applica-
tions is a long-standing problem in system security [35].
We present a new approach to constructing secure, efﬁcient
sandboxes based on system transactions.1 In general, sys-
tem transactions guarantee that a sequence of updates to
system resources satisﬁes atomicity, consistency, isolation,
and durability (ACID). Transactions are increasingly popular
for managing concurrency in modern operating systems.
Our prototype system, TXBOX, uses transactions for (1)
speculative execution of untrusted applications, (2) uncir-
cumventable enforcement of system-call policies, and (3)
automatic recovery from the effects of malicious execution.
TXBOX consists of a relatively simple, policy-agnostic
security monitor running in the OS kernel and a user-level
policy manager. The separation of the security policy and the
enforcement mechanism facilitates management of polici...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation
Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
author:Yazhou Tu and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Insup Lee and
Xiali Hei
Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit
Control over Actuation Systems
by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
Yazhou Tu, University of Louisiana at Lafayette; Zhiqiang Lin, Ohio State University;
Insup Lee, University of Pennsylvania; Xiali Hei, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/tu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over
Actuation Systems by Spooﬁng Inertial Sensors
Zhiqiang Lin†
Insup Lee‡
Xiali Hei∗
Yazhou Tu∗
∗University of Louisiana at Lafayette
†The Ohio State University
‡University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Inertial sensors provide crucial feedback for control sys-
tems to determine motional status and make timely, auto-
mated decisions. Prior efforts tried to control the output
of inertial sensors with acoustic signals. However, their
approaches did not consider sample rate drifts in analog-
to-digital converters as well as many other realistic fac-
tors. As a result, few attacks demonstrated effective con-
trol over inertial sensors embedded in real systems.
This work studies the out-of-band signal injection
methods to deliver adversarial control
to embedded
MEMS inertial sensors and evaluates consequent vul-
nerabilities exposed in control systems relying on them.
Acoustic signals injected into inertial sensors are out-of-
band analog signals. Consequently, slight sample rate
drifts could be ampliﬁed and cause deviations in the fre-
quency of digital signals. Such deviations result in ﬂuc-
tuating sensor output; nevertheless, we characterize two
methods to control the output: d...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over Actuation
Systems by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
author:Yazhou Tu and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Insup Lee and
Xiali Hei
Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit
Control over Actuation Systems
by Spoofing Inertial Sensors
Yazhou Tu, University of Louisiana at Lafayette; Zhiqiang Lin, Ohio State University;
Insup Lee, University of Pennsylvania; Xiali Hei, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/tu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Injected and Delivered: Fabricating Implicit Control over
Actuation Systems by Spooﬁng Inertial Sensors
Zhiqiang Lin†
Insup Lee‡
Xiali Hei∗
Yazhou Tu∗
∗University of Louisiana at Lafayette
†The Ohio State University
‡University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Inertial sensors provide crucial feedback for control sys-
tems to determine motional status and make timely, auto-
mated decisions. Prior efforts tried to control the output
of inertial sensors with acoustic signals. However, their
approaches did not consider sample rate drifts in analog-
to-digital converters as well as many other realistic fac-
tors. As a result, few attacks demonstrated effective con-
trol over inertial sensors embedded in real systems.
This work studies the out-of-band signal injection
methods to deliver adversarial control
to embedded
MEMS inertial sensors and evaluates consequent vul-
nerabilities exposed in control systems relying on them.
Acoustic signals injected into inertial sensors are out-of-
band analog signals. Consequently, slight sample rate
drifts could be ampliﬁed and cause deviations in the fre-
quency of digital signals. Such deviations result in ﬂuc-
tuating sensor output; nevertheless, we characterize two
methods to control the output: d...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among
Cryptographic Clouds
author:Peng Xu and
Jun Xu and
Wei Wang and
Hai Jin and
Willy Susilo and
Deqing Zou
Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data
Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds
Peng Xu†, Jun Xu†, Wei Wang‡, Hai Jin†, Willy Susilo§, Deqing Zou†
†Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab, School of
Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074,
‡Cyber-Physical-Social Systems Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong
§Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
China
Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
xupeng@mail.hust.edu.cn, cs_xujun@mail.hust.edu.cn, viviawangww@gmail.com,
hjin@mail.hust.edu.cn, wsusilo@uow.edu.au, deqingzou@mail.hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to real-
ize a cryptographic cloud with secure and ﬂexible data shar-
ing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile ca-
pabilities have been proposed for diﬀerent applications. The
secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE
scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data
sharing among diﬀerent PRE schemes in a general manner.
Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge
diﬀerences among the existing PRE schemes in their alge-
braic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem
more generally, this paper uniforms the deﬁnitions of the
existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes,
and further uniforms their security deﬁnitions. Then tak-
ing any uniformly deﬁned PRE scheme and any uniformly
deﬁned PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper con-
structs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE)
scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys
to achieve secure data sharing betwe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among
Cryptographic Clouds
author:Peng Xu and
Jun Xu and
Wei Wang and
Hai Jin and
Willy Susilo and
Deqing Zou
Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data
Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds
Peng Xu†, Jun Xu†, Wei Wang‡, Hai Jin†, Willy Susilo§, Deqing Zou†
†Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab, School of
Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074,
‡Cyber-Physical-Social Systems Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong
§Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
China
Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
xupeng@mail.hust.edu.cn, cs_xujun@mail.hust.edu.cn, viviawangww@gmail.com,
hjin@mail.hust.edu.cn, wsusilo@uow.edu.au, deqingzou@mail.hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to real-
ize a cryptographic cloud with secure and ﬂexible data shar-
ing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile ca-
pabilities have been proposed for diﬀerent applications. The
secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE
scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data
sharing among diﬀerent PRE schemes in a general manner.
Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge
diﬀerences among the existing PRE schemes in their alge-
braic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem
more generally, this paper uniforms the deﬁnitions of the
existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes,
and further uniforms their security deﬁnitions. Then tak-
ing any uniformly deﬁned PRE scheme and any uniformly
deﬁned PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper con-
structs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE)
scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys
to achieve secure data sharing betwe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
author:Daniel W. Woods and
Rainer B"ohme
3
5
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S
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m
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1
2
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2
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
Daniel W. Woods
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
daniel.woods@uibk.ac.at
Rainer B¨ohme
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at
Abstract—This paper introduces a causal model inspired by
structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes
in terms of latent factors measured using reﬂexive indicators.
First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies.
We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical
or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches
is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are
becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone
breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating
the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple
statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more
security spending or applying updates are associated with greater
rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure,
indicators of security are shown to be important factors in
explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when
the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.
Index Terms—cyber risk, security metrics, cyber harm, con-
trol effectiveness, science of security, causal model, structural
equation modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
Unsupported claims about
the increasing risk of cyber
attacks pervade introductions to security talks and papers. Or-
ganisations are expected to invest more in security even though
research has inconsistently demonstrated how interventions
reduce risk. This state of affairs leads to perceptions that ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
author:Daniel W. Woods and
Rainer B"ohme
3
5
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
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/
9
0
1
1
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©
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1
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7
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1
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8
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P
S
(
y
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a
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a
y
t
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1
2
0
2
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
Daniel W. Woods
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
daniel.woods@uibk.ac.at
Rainer B¨ohme
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at
Abstract—This paper introduces a causal model inspired by
structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes
in terms of latent factors measured using reﬂexive indicators.
First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies.
We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical
or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches
is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are
becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone
breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating
the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple
statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more
security spending or applying updates are associated with greater
rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure,
indicators of security are shown to be important factors in
explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when
the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.
Index Terms—cyber risk, security metrics, cyber harm, con-
trol effectiveness, science of security, causal model, structural
equation modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
Unsupported claims about
the increasing risk of cyber
attacks pervade introductions to security talks and papers. Or-
ganisations are expected to invest more in security even though
research has inconsistently demonstrated how interventions
reduce risk. This state of affairs leads to perceptions that ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fuzzification: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
author:Jinho Jung and
Hong Hu and
David Solodukhin and
Daniel Pagan and
Kyu Hyung Lee and
Taesoo Kim
FuzziFication: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, and Daniel Pagan, Georgia Institute of Technology;
Kyu Hyung Lee, University of Georgia; Taesoo Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/jung
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FUZZIFICATION: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, Daniel Pagan, Kyu Hyung Lee†, Taesoo Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
† University of Georgia
Abstract
Fuzzing is a software testing technique that quickly and
automatically explores the input space of a program without
knowing its internals. Therefore, developers commonly use
fuzzing as part of test integration throughout the software
development process. Unfortunately, it also means that such a
blackbox and the automatic natures of fuzzing are appealing
to adversaries who are looking for zero-day vulnerabilities.
To solve this problem, we propose a new mitigation ap-
proach, called FUZZIFICATION, that helps developers protect
the released, binary-only software from attackers who are ca-
pable of applying state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques. Given a
performance budget, this approach aims to hinder the fuzzing
process from adversaries as much as possible. We propose
three FUZZIFICATION techniques: 1) SpeedBump, which am-
plifies the slowdown in normal executions by hundreds of
times to the fuzzed execution, 2) BranchTrap, interfering with
feedback logic by hiding paths and polluting coverage maps,
and 3) AntiHybrid, hindering taint-analysis and symbolic exe-
cution. Each technique is designed with best-effort, defensive
measures that attempt...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fuzzification: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
author:Jinho Jung and
Hong Hu and
David Solodukhin and
Daniel Pagan and
Kyu Hyung Lee and
Taesoo Kim
FuzziFication: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, and Daniel Pagan, Georgia Institute of Technology;
Kyu Hyung Lee, University of Georgia; Taesoo Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/jung
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FUZZIFICATION: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, Daniel Pagan, Kyu Hyung Lee†, Taesoo Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
† University of Georgia
Abstract
Fuzzing is a software testing technique that quickly and
automatically explores the input space of a program without
knowing its internals. Therefore, developers commonly use
fuzzing as part of test integration throughout the software
development process. Unfortunately, it also means that such a
blackbox and the automatic natures of fuzzing are appealing
to adversaries who are looking for zero-day vulnerabilities.
To solve this problem, we propose a new mitigation ap-
proach, called FUZZIFICATION, that helps developers protect
the released, binary-only software from attackers who are ca-
pable of applying state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques. Given a
performance budget, this approach aims to hinder the fuzzing
process from adversaries as much as possible. We propose
three FUZZIFICATION techniques: 1) SpeedBump, which am-
plifies the slowdown in normal executions by hundreds of
times to the fuzzed execution, 2) BranchTrap, interfering with
feedback logic by hiding paths and polluting coverage maps,
and 3) AntiHybrid, hindering taint-analysis and symbolic exe-
cution. Each technique is designed with best-effort, defensive
measures that attempt...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL-\textgreaterFile-\textgreaterMachine
Graph Mining
author:Babak Rahbarinia and
Marco Balduzzi and
Roberto Perdisci
Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via
Large-Scale URL→File→Machine Graph Mining
Babak Rahbarinia
Auburn University at
Montgomery
Montgomery, AL 36117, USA
brahbari@aum.edu
Marco Balduzzi
Trend Micro Research, Italy
marco_balduzzi@trendmicro.com
Roberto Perdisci
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602, USA
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system
to detect malware download events. A download event is a
3-tuple that identiﬁes the action of downloading a ﬁle from
a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino
utilizes global situation awareness and continuously moni-
tors various network- and system-level events of the clients’
machines across the Internet and provides real time clas-
siﬁcation of both ﬁles and URLs to the clients upon sub-
mission of a new, unknown ﬁle or URL to the system. To
enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a
large download graph that captures the subtle relationships
among the entities of download events, i.e. ﬁles, URLs, and
machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino
and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our
experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately
classify malware download events with an average of 95.5%
true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false pos-
itives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify
a new download event as either benign or malware in just a
fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time
defense system.
Keywords
Graph Mining; Malware Detection; Machine Learning
1.
INTRODUCTION
Remote malware downloads, e.g., via drive-by exploits, so-
cial engineering attacks, second-stage malware drops, etc.,
currently represent one of the most eﬀective infection vec-
tors. Unfortunately, existing de...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL-\textgreaterFile-\textgreaterMachine
Graph Mining
author:Babak Rahbarinia and
Marco Balduzzi and
Roberto Perdisci
Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via
Large-Scale URL→File→Machine Graph Mining
Babak Rahbarinia
Auburn University at
Montgomery
Montgomery, AL 36117, USA
brahbari@aum.edu
Marco Balduzzi
Trend Micro Research, Italy
marco_balduzzi@trendmicro.com
Roberto Perdisci
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602, USA
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system
to detect malware download events. A download event is a
3-tuple that identiﬁes the action of downloading a ﬁle from
a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino
utilizes global situation awareness and continuously moni-
tors various network- and system-level events of the clients’
machines across the Internet and provides real time clas-
siﬁcation of both ﬁles and URLs to the clients upon sub-
mission of a new, unknown ﬁle or URL to the system. To
enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a
large download graph that captures the subtle relationships
among the entities of download events, i.e. ﬁles, URLs, and
machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino
and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our
experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately
classify malware download events with an average of 95.5%
true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false pos-
itives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify
a new download event as either benign or malware in just a
fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time
defense system.
Keywords
Graph Mining; Malware Detection; Machine Learning
1.
INTRODUCTION
Remote malware downloads, e.g., via drive-by exploits, so-
cial engineering attacks, second-stage malware drops, etc.,
currently represent one of the most eﬀective infection vec-
tors. Unfortunately, existing de...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Authenticated System Calls
author:Mohan Rajagopalan and
Matti A. Hiltunen and
Trevor Jim and
Richard D. Schlichting
Authenticated System Calls
Mohan Rajagopalan
Matti Hiltunen Trevor Jim Richard Schlichting
Department of Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
Email: mohan@cs.arizona.edu
AT&T Labs-Research
180 Park Avenue
Email: {hiltunen,trevor,rick}@research.att.com
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Abstract
System call monitoring is a technique for detecting and
controlling compromised applications by checking at run-
time that each system call conforms to a policy that speciﬁes
the program’s normal behavior. Here, a new approach to
system call monitoring based on authenticated system calls
is introduced. An authenticated system call is a system call
augmented with extra arguments that specify the policy for
that call and a cryptographic message authentication code
(MAC) that guarantees the integrity of the policy and the
system call arguments. This extra information is used by the
kernel to verify the system call. The version of the applica-
tion in which regular system calls have been replaced by au-
thenticated calls is generated automatically by an installer
program that reads the application binary, uses static anal-
ysis to generate policies, and then rewrites the binary with
the authenticated calls. This paper presents the approach,
describes a prototype implementation based on Linux and
the PLTO binary rewriting system, and gives experimental
results suggesting that the approach is effective in protect-
ing against compromised applications at modest cost.
Keywords: Intrusion tolerance, operating systems, security
policy, sandboxing, compiler techniques
1. Introduction
System call monitoring is a widely used technique for
detecting compromised applications and for sandboxing ap-
plications to minimize the damage they can cause if they
become compromised [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,
22, 24]. The intuition is that a compromised appl...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Authenticated System Calls
author:Mohan Rajagopalan and
Matti A. Hiltunen and
Trevor Jim and
Richard D. Schlichting
Authenticated System Calls
Mohan Rajagopalan
Matti Hiltunen Trevor Jim Richard Schlichting
Department of Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
Email: mohan@cs.arizona.edu
AT&T Labs-Research
180 Park Avenue
Email: {hiltunen,trevor,rick}@research.att.com
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Abstract
System call monitoring is a technique for detecting and
controlling compromised applications by checking at run-
time that each system call conforms to a policy that speciﬁes
the program’s normal behavior. Here, a new approach to
system call monitoring based on authenticated system calls
is introduced. An authenticated system call is a system call
augmented with extra arguments that specify the policy for
that call and a cryptographic message authentication code
(MAC) that guarantees the integrity of the policy and the
system call arguments. This extra information is used by the
kernel to verify the system call. The version of the applica-
tion in which regular system calls have been replaced by au-
thenticated calls is generated automatically by an installer
program that reads the application binary, uses static anal-
ysis to generate policies, and then rewrites the binary with
the authenticated calls. This paper presents the approach,
describes a prototype implementation based on Linux and
the PLTO binary rewriting system, and gives experimental
results suggesting that the approach is effective in protect-
ing against compromised applications at modest cost.
Keywords: Intrusion tolerance, operating systems, security
policy, sandboxing, compiler techniques
1. Introduction
System call monitoring is a widely used technique for
detecting compromised applications and for sandboxing ap-
plications to minimize the damage they can cause if they
become compromised [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,
22, 24]. The intuition is that a compromised appl...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Scamper: a scalable and extensible packet prober for active measurement
of the internet
author:Matthew J. Luckie
Scamper: a Scalable and Extensible Packet Prober for
Active Measurement of the Internet
Matthew Luckie
Department of Computer Science
University of Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
mjl@wand.net.nz
ABSTRACT
Large scale active measurement of the Internet requires ap-
propriate software support. The better tools that we have
for executing consistent and systematic measurements, the
more conﬁdence we can have in the results. This paper
presents scamper, a powerful open-source packet-prober for
active measurement of the Internet designed to stand alone
from coordination mechanisms. We built scamper and pop-
ulated it with speciﬁc measurement techniques, making de-
sign decisions aimed at allowing Internet researchers to focus
on scientiﬁc experiments rather than building accurate in-
strumentation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Active measurement, Software, Tools
1.
INTRODUCTION
Packet probing experiments capture relatively simple mea-
surements – typically delay, loss, reordering, and topology
– that yield surprising insights into the structure and be-
haviour of the Internet. An early measurement experiment
investigating the eﬀect of packet size on delay suggested that
TCP implementers should reﬁne the algorithm used to com-
pute the TCP RTO value [1]. The massive scale and contin-
uing growth of the Internet has increased the complexity of
measuring it, both technically and methodologically. In the
past decade, researchers have built and operated many large-
scale active Internet measurement platforms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] where each typically reproduces a tremendous amount
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comm...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Scamper: a scalable and extensible packet prober for active measurement
of the internet
author:Matthew J. Luckie
Scamper: a Scalable and Extensible Packet Prober for
Active Measurement of the Internet
Matthew Luckie
Department of Computer Science
University of Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
mjl@wand.net.nz
ABSTRACT
Large scale active measurement of the Internet requires ap-
propriate software support. The better tools that we have
for executing consistent and systematic measurements, the
more conﬁdence we can have in the results. This paper
presents scamper, a powerful open-source packet-prober for
active measurement of the Internet designed to stand alone
from coordination mechanisms. We built scamper and pop-
ulated it with speciﬁc measurement techniques, making de-
sign decisions aimed at allowing Internet researchers to focus
on scientiﬁc experiments rather than building accurate in-
strumentation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Active measurement, Software, Tools
1.
INTRODUCTION
Packet probing experiments capture relatively simple mea-
surements – typically delay, loss, reordering, and topology
– that yield surprising insights into the structure and be-
haviour of the Internet. An early measurement experiment
investigating the eﬀect of packet size on delay suggested that
TCP implementers should reﬁne the algorithm used to com-
pute the TCP RTO value [1]. The massive scale and contin-
uing growth of the Internet has increased the complexity of
measuring it, both technically and methodologically. In the
past decade, researchers have built and operated many large-
scale active Internet measurement platforms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] where each typically reproduces a tremendous amount
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comm...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
author:Achour Most'efaoui and
Eric Mourgaya and
Michel Raynal
Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
Achour MOSTEFAOUI, Eric MOURGAYA, Michel RAYNAL
IRISA, Universit´e de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
{achour|emourgay|raynal}@irisa.fr
Abstract
1
Introduction
Unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and
Toueg are abstract mechanisms that provide information on
process failures. On the one hand, failure detectors allow to
state the minimal requirements on process failures that al-
low to solve problems that cannot be solved in purely asyn-
chronous systems. But, on the other hand, they cannot be
implemented in such systems: their implementation requires
that the underlying distributed system be enriched with ad-
ditional assumptions. The usual failure detector implemen-
tations rely on additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., par-
tial synchrony).
This paper proposes a new look at the implementation of
failure detectors and more speciﬁcally at Chandra-Toueg’s
failure detectors. The proposed approach does not rely on
synchrony assumptions (e.g., it allows the communication
delays to always increase). It is based on a query-response
mechanism and assumes that the query/response messages
exchanged obey a pattern where the responses from some
processes to a query arrive among the (n − f) ﬁrst ones
(n being the total number of processes, f the maximum
number of them that can crash, with 1 ≤ f < n). When we
consider the particular case f = 1, and the implementation
of a failure detector of the class denoted 3S (the weakest
class that allows to solve the consensus problem),
the
additional assumption the underlying system has to satisfy
boils down to a simple channel property, namely, there is
eventually a pair of processes (pi, pj) such that the channel
connecting them is never the slowest among the channels
connecting pi or pj to the other processes. A probabilistic
ana...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
author:Achour Most'efaoui and
Eric Mourgaya and
Michel Raynal
Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
Achour MOSTEFAOUI, Eric MOURGAYA, Michel RAYNAL
IRISA, Universit´e de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
{achour|emourgay|raynal}@irisa.fr
Abstract
1
Introduction
Unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and
Toueg are abstract mechanisms that provide information on
process failures. On the one hand, failure detectors allow to
state the minimal requirements on process failures that al-
low to solve problems that cannot be solved in purely asyn-
chronous systems. But, on the other hand, they cannot be
implemented in such systems: their implementation requires
that the underlying distributed system be enriched with ad-
ditional assumptions. The usual failure detector implemen-
tations rely on additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., par-
tial synchrony).
This paper proposes a new look at the implementation of
failure detectors and more speciﬁcally at Chandra-Toueg’s
failure detectors. The proposed approach does not rely on
synchrony assumptions (e.g., it allows the communication
delays to always increase). It is based on a query-response
mechanism and assumes that the query/response messages
exchanged obey a pattern where the responses from some
processes to a query arrive among the (n − f) ﬁrst ones
(n being the total number of processes, f the maximum
number of them that can crash, with 1 ≤ f < n). When we
consider the particular case f = 1, and the implementation
of a failure detector of the class denoted 3S (the weakest
class that allows to solve the consensus problem),
the
additional assumption the underlying system has to satisfy
boils down to a simple channel property, namely, there is
eventually a pair of processes (pi, pj) such that the channel
connecting them is never the slowest among the channels
connecting pi or pj to the other processes. A probabilistic
ana...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
author:Boniface Hicks and
Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and
Patrick D. McDaniel
From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
Boniface Hicks, Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and Patrick McDaniel
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS)
Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University
{phicks,ahmadiza,mcdaniel}@cse.psu.edu
Abstract
Security-typed languages are an evolving tool for imple-
menting systems with provable security guarantees. How-
ever, to date, these tools have only been used to build simple
“toy” programs. As described in this paper, we have devel-
oped the ﬁrst real-world, security-typed application: a se-
cure email system written in the Java language variant Jif.
Real-world policies are mapped onto the information ﬂows
controlled by the language primitives, and we consider the
process and tractability of broadly enforcing security policy
in commodity applications. We ﬁnd that while the language
provided the rudimentary tools to achieve low-level secu-
rity goals, additional tools, services, and language exten-
sions were necessary to formulate and enforce application
policy. We detail the design and use of these tools. We also
show how the strong guarantees of Jif in conjunction with
our policy tools can be used to evaluate security. This work
serves as a starting point–we have demonstrated that it is
possible to implement real-world systems and policy using
security-typed languages. However, further investigation of
the developer tools and supporting policy infrastructure is
necessary before they can fulﬁll their considerable promise
of enabling more secure systems.
1
Introduction
The exposure of private data is an increasingly critical
concern of online organizations [7, 8]. The huge costs
of exposure can be measured both in ﬁnancial and in hu-
man terms. The central cause i...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
author:Boniface Hicks and
Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and
Patrick D. McDaniel
From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
Boniface Hicks, Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and Patrick McDaniel
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS)
Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University
{phicks,ahmadiza,mcdaniel}@cse.psu.edu
Abstract
Security-typed languages are an evolving tool for imple-
menting systems with provable security guarantees. How-
ever, to date, these tools have only been used to build simple
“toy” programs. As described in this paper, we have devel-
oped the ﬁrst real-world, security-typed application: a se-
cure email system written in the Java language variant Jif.
Real-world policies are mapped onto the information ﬂows
controlled by the language primitives, and we consider the
process and tractability of broadly enforcing security policy
in commodity applications. We ﬁnd that while the language
provided the rudimentary tools to achieve low-level secu-
rity goals, additional tools, services, and language exten-
sions were necessary to formulate and enforce application
policy. We detail the design and use of these tools. We also
show how the strong guarantees of Jif in conjunction with
our policy tools can be used to evaluate security. This work
serves as a starting point–we have demonstrated that it is
possible to implement real-world systems and policy using
security-typed languages. However, further investigation of
the developer tools and supporting policy infrastructure is
necessary before they can fulﬁll their considerable promise
of enabling more secure systems.
1
Introduction
The exposure of private data is an increasingly critical
concern of online organizations [7, 8]. The huge costs
of exposure can be measured both in ﬁnancial and in hu-
man terms. The central cause i...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis and evaluation
study
author:Yi Cao and
Arpit Jain and
Kriti Sharma and
Aruna Balasubramanian and
Anshul Gandhi
When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study
Yi Cao
Stony Brook University
yicao1@cs.stonybrook.edu
Arpit Jain
Stony Brook University
arjain@cs.stonybrook.edu
Kriti Sharma
Stony Brook University
krisharma@cs.stonybrook.edu
Aruna Balasubramanian
Stony Brook University
arunab@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
This short paper presents a detailed empirical study of BBR’s per-
formance under different real-world and emulated testbeds across a
range of network operating conditions. Our empirical results help
to identify network conditions under which BBR outperforms, in
terms of goodput, contemporary TCP congestion control algorithms.
We find that BBR is well suited for networks with shallow buffers,
despite its high retransmissions, whereas existing loss-based algo-
rithms are better suited for deep buffers.
To identify the root causes of BBR’s limitations, we carefully
analyze our empirical results. Our analysis reveals that, contrary
to BBR’s design goal, BBR often exhibits large queue sizes. Further,
the regimes where BBR performs well are often the same regimes
where BBR is unfair to competing flows. Finally, we demonstrate the
existence of a loss rate “cliff point” beyond which BBR’s goodput
drops abruptly. Our empirical investigation identifies the likely
culprits in each of these cases as specific design options in BBR’s
source code.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols; Network performance
analysis; Network measurement.
ACM Reference Format:
Yi Cao, Arpit Jain, Kriti Sharma, Aruna Balasubramanian, and Anshul
Gandhi. 2019. When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study. In Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’19), October
21–23, 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/335536...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis and evaluation
study
author:Yi Cao and
Arpit Jain and
Kriti Sharma and
Aruna Balasubramanian and
Anshul Gandhi
When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study
Yi Cao
Stony Brook University
yicao1@cs.stonybrook.edu
Arpit Jain
Stony Brook University
arjain@cs.stonybrook.edu
Kriti Sharma
Stony Brook University
krisharma@cs.stonybrook.edu
Aruna Balasubramanian
Stony Brook University
arunab@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
This short paper presents a detailed empirical study of BBR’s per-
formance under different real-world and emulated testbeds across a
range of network operating conditions. Our empirical results help
to identify network conditions under which BBR outperforms, in
terms of goodput, contemporary TCP congestion control algorithms.
We find that BBR is well suited for networks with shallow buffers,
despite its high retransmissions, whereas existing loss-based algo-
rithms are better suited for deep buffers.
To identify the root causes of BBR’s limitations, we carefully
analyze our empirical results. Our analysis reveals that, contrary
to BBR’s design goal, BBR often exhibits large queue sizes. Further,
the regimes where BBR performs well are often the same regimes
where BBR is unfair to competing flows. Finally, we demonstrate the
existence of a loss rate “cliff point” beyond which BBR’s goodput
drops abruptly. Our empirical investigation identifies the likely
culprits in each of these cases as specific design options in BBR’s
source code.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols; Network performance
analysis; Network measurement.
ACM Reference Format:
Yi Cao, Arpit Jain, Kriti Sharma, Aruna Balasubramanian, and Anshul
Gandhi. 2019. When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study. In Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’19), October
21–23, 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/335536...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation
author:Frederik Armknecht and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Steffen Schulz and
Christian Wachsmann
A Security Framework for the Analysis and Design
of Software Attestation
Frederik Armknecht
Universität Mannheim,
Germany
armknecht@uni-mannheim.de
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Technische Universität
Darmstadt (CASED),
Germany
ahmad.sadeghi@cased.de
Christian Wachsmann
Intel CRI-SC at TU Darmstadt,
Germany
christian.wachsmann@cased.de
∗
Steffen Schulz
Intel Corporation
steffen.schulz@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Software attestation has become a popular and challenging
research topic at many established security conferences with
an expected strong impact in practice. It aims at verifying
the software integrity of (typically) resource-constrained em-
bedded devices. However, for practical reasons, software at-
testation cannot rely on stored cryptographic secrets or ded-
icated trusted hardware. Instead, it exploits side-channel in-
formation, such as the time that the underlying device needs
for a speciﬁc computation. As traditional cryptographic so-
lutions and arguments are not applicable, novel approaches
for the design and analysis are necessary. This is certainly
one of the main reasons why the security goals, properties
and underlying assumptions of existing software attestation
schemes have been only vaguely discussed so far, limiting
the conﬁdence in their security claims. Thus, putting soft-
ware attestation on a solid ground and having a founded
approach for designing secure software attestation schemes
is still an important open problem.
We provide the ﬁrst steps towards closing this gap. Our
ﬁrst contribution is a security framework that formally cap-
tures security goals, attacker models and various system and
design parameters. Moreover, we present a generic software
attestation scheme that covers most existing schemes in the
literature. Finally, we analyze its security within our frame-
work, yielding s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation
author:Frederik Armknecht and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Steffen Schulz and
Christian Wachsmann
A Security Framework for the Analysis and Design
of Software Attestation
Frederik Armknecht
Universität Mannheim,
Germany
armknecht@uni-mannheim.de
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Technische Universität
Darmstadt (CASED),
Germany
ahmad.sadeghi@cased.de
Christian Wachsmann
Intel CRI-SC at TU Darmstadt,
Germany
christian.wachsmann@cased.de
∗
Steffen Schulz
Intel Corporation
steffen.schulz@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Software attestation has become a popular and challenging
research topic at many established security conferences with
an expected strong impact in practice. It aims at verifying
the software integrity of (typically) resource-constrained em-
bedded devices. However, for practical reasons, software at-
testation cannot rely on stored cryptographic secrets or ded-
icated trusted hardware. Instead, it exploits side-channel in-
formation, such as the time that the underlying device needs
for a speciﬁc computation. As traditional cryptographic so-
lutions and arguments are not applicable, novel approaches
for the design and analysis are necessary. This is certainly
one of the main reasons why the security goals, properties
and underlying assumptions of existing software attestation
schemes have been only vaguely discussed so far, limiting
the conﬁdence in their security claims. Thus, putting soft-
ware attestation on a solid ground and having a founded
approach for designing secure software attestation schemes
is still an important open problem.
We provide the ﬁrst steps towards closing this gap. Our
ﬁrst contribution is a security framework that formally cap-
tures security goals, attacker models and various system and
design parameters. Moreover, we present a generic software
attestation scheme that covers most existing schemes in the
literature. Finally, we analyze its security within our frame-
work, yielding s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:AI3: application-independent information infrastructure
author:Bo Zhang and
Jinfan Wang and
Xinyu Wang and
Tracy Yingying Cheng and
Xiaohua Jia and
Jianfei He
AI3: Application-Independent Information Infrastructure
Bo Zhang1, Jinfan Wang1, Xinyu Wang1, Yingying Cheng1, Xiaohua Jia1, Jianfei He2
1{bo.zhang, jfwang4, xinywang, yincheng, csjia}@cityu.edu.hk
1City University of Hong Kong
2Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
2jeffrey.he@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
In the current Internet architecture, application service pro-
viders (ASPs) own users’ data and social groups informa-
tion, which made a handful of ASP companies growing big-
ger and bigger and denied small and medium companies
from entering this business. We propose a new architecture,
called Application Independent Information Infrastructure
(AI3). The design goals of AI3 are: 1) Decoupling user-
s’ data from ASPs and users’ social relations from ASPs,
such that ASPs become independent from users’ data and
social relations. 2) Open architecture, such that diﬀeren-
t ASPs can interoperate with each other. This demo is to
show a prototype of AI3. The demo has four parts: 1) ASP-
independent data management in AI3; 2) ASP-independent
management of users’ social relations in AI3; 3) inter-domain
data transport and user roaming; 4) real-time communica-
tions by using AI3. The demo video can be watched at:
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/~jia/AI3_DemoVideo.mp4
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network com-
munications
Keywords
Internet architecture, network infrastructure, storage sys-
tem
1.
INTRODUCTION
Fueled up by the explosive growth of social networks in re-
cent years, User Generated Contents (UGC), such as videos,
photos, and blogs, have become a dominant source of Inter-
net traﬃc. The constant eﬀorts of developing new Inter-
net architectures have led to several projects for informa-
tion dissemination, sharing and networking. The well-known
projects [1, 2, 3, 4] include Infor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:AI3: application-independent information infrastructure
author:Bo Zhang and
Jinfan Wang and
Xinyu Wang and
Tracy Yingying Cheng and
Xiaohua Jia and
Jianfei He
AI3: Application-Independent Information Infrastructure
Bo Zhang1, Jinfan Wang1, Xinyu Wang1, Yingying Cheng1, Xiaohua Jia1, Jianfei He2
1{bo.zhang, jfwang4, xinywang, yincheng, csjia}@cityu.edu.hk
1City University of Hong Kong
2Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
2jeffrey.he@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
In the current Internet architecture, application service pro-
viders (ASPs) own users’ data and social groups informa-
tion, which made a handful of ASP companies growing big-
ger and bigger and denied small and medium companies
from entering this business. We propose a new architecture,
called Application Independent Information Infrastructure
(AI3). The design goals of AI3 are: 1) Decoupling user-
s’ data from ASPs and users’ social relations from ASPs,
such that ASPs become independent from users’ data and
social relations. 2) Open architecture, such that diﬀeren-
t ASPs can interoperate with each other. This demo is to
show a prototype of AI3. The demo has four parts: 1) ASP-
independent data management in AI3; 2) ASP-independent
management of users’ social relations in AI3; 3) inter-domain
data transport and user roaming; 4) real-time communica-
tions by using AI3. The demo video can be watched at:
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/~jia/AI3_DemoVideo.mp4
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network com-
munications
Keywords
Internet architecture, network infrastructure, storage sys-
tem
1.
INTRODUCTION
Fueled up by the explosive growth of social networks in re-
cent years, User Generated Contents (UGC), such as videos,
photos, and blogs, have become a dominant source of Inter-
net traﬃc. The constant eﬀorts of developing new Inter-
net architectures have led to several projects for informa-
tion dissemination, sharing and networking. The well-known
projects [1, 2, 3, 4] include Infor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real
author:Hany Ragab and
Alyssa Milburn and
Kaveh Razavi and
Herbert Bos and
Cristiano Giuffrida
0
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2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
CROSSTALK: Speculative Data Leaks
Across Cores Are Real
Hany Ragab∗†, Alyssa Milburn∗†, Kaveh Razavi§, Herbert Bos∗, and Cristiano Giuffrida∗
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
∗Department of Computer Science
{hany.ragab, a.a.milburn}@vu.nl
{herbertb, giuffrida}@cs.vu.nl
§D-ITET
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
kaveh@ethz.ch
†Equal contribution joint ﬁrst authors
Abstract—Recent
transient execution attacks have demon-
strated that attackers may leak sensitive information across
security boundaries on a shared CPU core. Up until now, it
seemed possible to prevent this by isolating potential victims and
attackers on separate cores. In this paper, we show that the
situation is more serious, as transient execution attacks can leak
data across different cores on many modern Intel CPUs.
We do so by investigating the behavior of x86 instructions,
and in particular, we focus on complex microcoded instructions
which perform offcore requests. Combined with transient execu-
tion vulnerabilities such as Micro-architectural Data Sampling
(MDS), these operations can reveal internal CPU state. Using
performance counters, we build a proﬁler, CROSSTALK,
to
examine the number and nature of such operations for many
x86 instructions, and ﬁnd that some instructions read data from
a staging buffer which is shared between all CPU cores.
To demonstrate the security impact of this behavior, we present
the ﬁrst cross-core attack using transient execution, showing that
even the seemingly-innocuous CPUID instruction can be used by
attackers to sample the entire staging buffer ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real
author:Hany Ragab and
Alyssa Milburn and
Kaveh Razavi and
Herbert Bos and
Cristiano Giuffrida
0
2
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
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1
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0
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9
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1
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0
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©
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1
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$
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8
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1
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7
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8
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P
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2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
CROSSTALK: Speculative Data Leaks
Across Cores Are Real
Hany Ragab∗†, Alyssa Milburn∗†, Kaveh Razavi§, Herbert Bos∗, and Cristiano Giuffrida∗
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
∗Department of Computer Science
{hany.ragab, a.a.milburn}@vu.nl
{herbertb, giuffrida}@cs.vu.nl
§D-ITET
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
kaveh@ethz.ch
†Equal contribution joint ﬁrst authors
Abstract—Recent
transient execution attacks have demon-
strated that attackers may leak sensitive information across
security boundaries on a shared CPU core. Up until now, it
seemed possible to prevent this by isolating potential victims and
attackers on separate cores. In this paper, we show that the
situation is more serious, as transient execution attacks can leak
data across different cores on many modern Intel CPUs.
We do so by investigating the behavior of x86 instructions,
and in particular, we focus on complex microcoded instructions
which perform offcore requests. Combined with transient execu-
tion vulnerabilities such as Micro-architectural Data Sampling
(MDS), these operations can reveal internal CPU state. Using
performance counters, we build a proﬁler, CROSSTALK,
to
examine the number and nature of such operations for many
x86 instructions, and ﬁnd that some instructions read data from
a staging buffer which is shared between all CPU cores.
To demonstrate the security impact of this behavior, we present
the ﬁrst cross-core attack using transient execution, showing that
even the seemingly-innocuous CPUID instruction can be used by
attackers to sample the entire staging buffer ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:WebJail: least-privilege integration of third-party components in
web mashups
author:Steven Van Acker and
Philippe De Ryck and
Lieven Desmet and
Frank Piessens and
Wouter Joosen
WebJail: Least-privilege Integration of Third-party
Components in Web Mashups
Steven Van Acker, Philippe De Ryck, Lieven Desmet, Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen
IBBT-Distrinet, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
Steven.VanAcker@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Internet landscape has transformed
from a mostly static world into Web 2.0, where the use of
web applications and mashups has become a daily routine
for many Internet users. Web mashups are web applications
that combine data and functionality from several sources
or components.
Ideally, these components contain benign
code from trusted sources. Unfortunately, the reality is very
diﬀerent. Web mashup components can misbehave and per-
form unwanted actions on behalf of the web mashup’s user.
Current mashup integration techniques either impose no
restrictions on the execution of a third-party component, or
simply rely on the Same-Origin Policy. A least-privilege
approach,
in which a mashup integrator can restrict the
functionality available to each component, can not be im-
plemented using the current integration techniques, without
ownership over the component’s code.
We propose WebJail, a novel client-side security architec-
ture to enable least-privilege integration of components into
a web mashup, based on high-level policies that restrict the
available functionality in each individual component. The
policy language was synthesized from a study and catego-
rization of sensitive operations in the upcoming HTML 5
JavaScript APIs, and full mediation is achieved via the use
of deep aspects in the browser.
We have implemented a prototype of WebJail in Mozilla
Firefox 4.0, and applied it successfully to mainstream plat-
forms such as iGoogle and Facebook.
In addition, micro-
benchmarks registered a negli...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:WebJail: least-privilege integration of third-party components in
web mashups
author:Steven Van Acker and
Philippe De Ryck and
Lieven Desmet and
Frank Piessens and
Wouter Joosen
WebJail: Least-privilege Integration of Third-party
Components in Web Mashups
Steven Van Acker, Philippe De Ryck, Lieven Desmet, Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen
IBBT-Distrinet, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
Steven.VanAcker@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Internet landscape has transformed
from a mostly static world into Web 2.0, where the use of
web applications and mashups has become a daily routine
for many Internet users. Web mashups are web applications
that combine data and functionality from several sources
or components.
Ideally, these components contain benign
code from trusted sources. Unfortunately, the reality is very
diﬀerent. Web mashup components can misbehave and per-
form unwanted actions on behalf of the web mashup’s user.
Current mashup integration techniques either impose no
restrictions on the execution of a third-party component, or
simply rely on the Same-Origin Policy. A least-privilege
approach,
in which a mashup integrator can restrict the
functionality available to each component, can not be im-
plemented using the current integration techniques, without
ownership over the component’s code.
We propose WebJail, a novel client-side security architec-
ture to enable least-privilege integration of components into
a web mashup, based on high-level policies that restrict the
available functionality in each individual component. The
policy language was synthesized from a study and catego-
rization of sensitive operations in the upcoming HTML 5
JavaScript APIs, and full mediation is achieved via the use
of deep aspects in the browser.
We have implemented a prototype of WebJail in Mozilla
Firefox 4.0, and applied it successfully to mainstream plat-
forms such as iGoogle and Facebook.
In addition, micro-
benchmarks registered a negli...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
author:Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Data Poisoning Attacks to
Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/cao-xiaoyu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Duke University
{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols enable an un-
trusted data collector to perform privacy-preserving data an-
alytics. In particular, each user locally perturbs its data to
preserve privacy before sending it to the data collector, who
aggregates the perturbed data to obtain statistics of interest. In
the past several years, researchers from multiple communities–
such as security, database, and theoretical computer science–
have proposed many LDP protocols. These studies mainly fo-
cused on improving the utility of the LDP protocols. However,
the security of LDP protocols is largely unexplored.
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. We focus on LDP
protocols for frequency estimation and heavy hitter identiﬁ-
cation, which are two basic data analytics tasks. Speciﬁcally,
we show that an attacker can inject fake users into an LDP
protocol and the fake users send carefully crafted data to the
data collector such that the LDP protocol estimates high fre-
quencies for arbitrary attacker-chosen items or identiﬁes them
as heavy hitters. We call our attacks data poisoning attacks.
We theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness of
our attacks. We also explore three countermeasures against
our attacks. Our experimental results show that they can eff...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
author:Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Data Poisoning Attacks to
Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/cao-xiaoyu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Duke University
{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols enable an un-
trusted data collector to perform privacy-preserving data an-
alytics. In particular, each user locally perturbs its data to
preserve privacy before sending it to the data collector, who
aggregates the perturbed data to obtain statistics of interest. In
the past several years, researchers from multiple communities–
such as security, database, and theoretical computer science–
have proposed many LDP protocols. These studies mainly fo-
cused on improving the utility of the LDP protocols. However,
the security of LDP protocols is largely unexplored.
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. We focus on LDP
protocols for frequency estimation and heavy hitter identiﬁ-
cation, which are two basic data analytics tasks. Speciﬁcally,
we show that an attacker can inject fake users into an LDP
protocol and the fake users send carefully crafted data to the
data collector such that the LDP protocol estimates high fre-
quencies for arbitrary attacker-chosen items or identiﬁes them
as heavy hitters. We call our attacks data poisoning attacks.
We theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness of
our attacks. We also explore three countermeasures against
our attacks. Our experimental results show that they can eff...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness Detection
for Face Authentication
author:Yan Li and
Zilong Wang and
Yingjiu Li and
Robert H. Deng and
Binbin Chen and
Weizhi Meng and
Hui Li
A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness
Detection for Face Authentication
Yan Li
Xidian University
Zilong Wang
Xidian University
Yingjiu Li
Singapore Management University
Advanced Digital Science Center
zlwang@xidian.edu.cn
yjli@smu.edu.sg
li.yan@adsc-create.edu.sg
Robert Deng
Binbin Chen
Weizhi Meng
Singapore Management University
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Advanced Digital Science Center
binbin.chen@adsc-create.edu.sg
Technical University of Denmark
weme@dtu.dk
Hui Li
Xidian University
lihui@xidian.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Face authentication is vulnerable to media-based virtual face
forgery (MVFF) where adversaries display photos/videos or
3D virtual face models of victims to spoof face authentication
systems. In this paper, we propose a liveness detection mech-
anism, called FaceCloseup, to protect the face authentication
on mobile devices. FaceCloseup detects MVFF-based attacks
by analyzing the distortion of face regions in a user’s closeup
facial videos captured by built-in camera on mobile device. It
can detect MVFF-based attacks with an accuracy of 99.48%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Biometrics; Usability in secu-
rity and privacy.
KEYWORDS
Liveness detection, perspective distortion, face authentication
ACM Reference Format:
Yan Li, Zilong Wang, Yingjiu Li, Robert Deng, Binbin Chen,
Weizhi Meng, and Hui Li. 2019. A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial
Distortion Based Liveness Detection for Face Authentication. In
ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(AsiaCCS ’19), July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3321705.
3329850
INTRODUCTION
1
Most of existing face authentication systems are vulnerable to
media-based virtual face forgery (MVFF) where an adversary
Permis...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness Detection
for Face Authentication
author:Yan Li and
Zilong Wang and
Yingjiu Li and
Robert H. Deng and
Binbin Chen and
Weizhi Meng and
Hui Li
A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness
Detection for Face Authentication
Yan Li
Xidian University
Zilong Wang
Xidian University
Yingjiu Li
Singapore Management University
Advanced Digital Science Center
zlwang@xidian.edu.cn
yjli@smu.edu.sg
li.yan@adsc-create.edu.sg
Robert Deng
Binbin Chen
Weizhi Meng
Singapore Management University
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Advanced Digital Science Center
binbin.chen@adsc-create.edu.sg
Technical University of Denmark
weme@dtu.dk
Hui Li
Xidian University
lihui@xidian.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Face authentication is vulnerable to media-based virtual face
forgery (MVFF) where adversaries display photos/videos or
3D virtual face models of victims to spoof face authentication
systems. In this paper, we propose a liveness detection mech-
anism, called FaceCloseup, to protect the face authentication
on mobile devices. FaceCloseup detects MVFF-based attacks
by analyzing the distortion of face regions in a user’s closeup
facial videos captured by built-in camera on mobile device. It
can detect MVFF-based attacks with an accuracy of 99.48%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Biometrics; Usability in secu-
rity and privacy.
KEYWORDS
Liveness detection, perspective distortion, face authentication
ACM Reference Format:
Yan Li, Zilong Wang, Yingjiu Li, Robert Deng, Binbin Chen,
Weizhi Meng, and Hui Li. 2019. A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial
Distortion Based Liveness Detection for Face Authentication. In
ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(AsiaCCS ’19), July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3321705.
3329850
INTRODUCTION
1
Most of existing face authentication systems are vulnerable to
media-based virtual face forgery (MVFF) where an adversary
Permis...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them
author:Andrew Kwong and
Daniel Genkin and
Daniel Gruss and
Yuval Yarom
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without
Accessing Them
Andrew Kwong
University of Michigan
ankwong@umich.edu
Daniel Genkin
Daniel Gruss
Yuval Yarom
University of Michigan
Graz University of Technology
University of Adelaide and Data61
genkin@umich.edu
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract—The Rowhammer bug is a reliability issue in DRAM
cells that can enable an unprivileged adversary to ﬂip the values
of bits in neighboring rows on the memory module. Previous
work has exploited this for various types of fault attacks across
security boundaries, where the attacker ﬂips inaccessible bits,
often resulting in privilege escalation. It is widely assumed
however, that bit ﬂips within the adversary’s own private memory
have no security implications, as the attacker can already modify
its private memory via regular write operations.
We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect, by em-
ploying Rowhammer as a read side channel. More speciﬁcally,
we show how an unprivileged attacker can exploit the data
dependence between Rowhammer induced bit ﬂips and the bits
in nearby rows to deduce these bits, including values belonging to
other processes and the kernel. Thus, the primary contribution
of this work is to show that Rowhammer is a threat to not only
integrity, but to conﬁdentiality as well.
Furthermore, in contrast to Rowhammer write side channels,
which require persistent bit ﬂips, our read channel succeeds even
when ECC memory detects and corrects every bit ﬂip. Thus,
we demonstrate the ﬁrst security implication of successfully-
corrected bit ﬂips, which were previously considered benign.
To demonstrate the implications of this read side channel, we
present an end-to-end attack on OpenSSH 7.9 that extracts an
RSA-2048 key from the root level SSH daemon. To accomplish
this, ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them
author:Andrew Kwong and
Daniel Genkin and
Daniel Gruss and
Yuval Yarom
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without
Accessing Them
Andrew Kwong
University of Michigan
ankwong@umich.edu
Daniel Genkin
Daniel Gruss
Yuval Yarom
University of Michigan
Graz University of Technology
University of Adelaide and Data61
genkin@umich.edu
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract—The Rowhammer bug is a reliability issue in DRAM
cells that can enable an unprivileged adversary to ﬂip the values
of bits in neighboring rows on the memory module. Previous
work has exploited this for various types of fault attacks across
security boundaries, where the attacker ﬂips inaccessible bits,
often resulting in privilege escalation. It is widely assumed
however, that bit ﬂips within the adversary’s own private memory
have no security implications, as the attacker can already modify
its private memory via regular write operations.
We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect, by em-
ploying Rowhammer as a read side channel. More speciﬁcally,
we show how an unprivileged attacker can exploit the data
dependence between Rowhammer induced bit ﬂips and the bits
in nearby rows to deduce these bits, including values belonging to
other processes and the kernel. Thus, the primary contribution
of this work is to show that Rowhammer is a threat to not only
integrity, but to conﬁdentiality as well.
Furthermore, in contrast to Rowhammer write side channels,
which require persistent bit ﬂips, our read channel succeeds even
when ECC memory detects and corrects every bit ﬂip. Thus,
we demonstrate the ﬁrst security implication of successfully-
corrected bit ﬂips, which were previously considered benign.
To demonstrate the implications of this read side channel, we
present an end-to-end attack on OpenSSH 7.9 that extracts an
RSA-2048 key from the root level SSH daemon. To accomplish
this, ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multi-module vulnerability analysis of web-based applications
author:Davide Balzarotti and
Marco Cova and
Viktoria Felmetsger and
Giovanni Vigna
Multi-Module Vulnerability Analysis of Web-based
Applications
Davide Balzarotti, Marco Cova, Viktoria V. Felmetsger, and Giovanni Vigna
Computer Security Group
University of California, Santa Barbara
{balzarot, marco, rusvika, vigna}@cs.ucsb.edu
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
In recent years, web applications have become tremendously pop-
ular, and nowadays they are routinely used in security-critical envi-
ronments, such as medical, ﬁnancial, and military systems. As the
use of web applications for critical services has increased, the num-
ber and sophistication of attacks against these applications have
grown as well. Current approaches to securing web applications
focus either on detecting and blocking web-based attacks using
application-level ﬁrewalls, or on using vulnerability analysis tech-
niques to identify security problems before deployment.
The vulnerability analysis of web applications is made difﬁcult
by a number of factors, such as the use of scripting languages, the
structuring of the application logic into separate pages and code
modules, and the interaction with back-end databases. So far, ap-
proaches to web application vulnerability analysis have focused on
single application modules to identify insecure uses of informa-
tion provided as input to the application. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are limited in scope, and, therefore, they cannot detect
multi-step attacks that exploit the interaction among multiple mod-
ules of an application.
We have developed a novel vulnerability analysis approach that
characterizes both the extended state and the intended workﬂow of
a web application. By doing this, our analysis approach is able to
take into account inter-module relationships as well as the interac-
tion of an application’s modules with back-end databases. As a re-
sult, our vulnerability analys...