Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:How to kill symbolic deobfuscation for free (or: unleashing the potential
of path-oriented protections)
author:Mathilde Ollivier and
S'ebastien Bardin and
Richard Bonichon and
Jean-Yves Marion
How to Kill Symbolic Deobfuscation for Free
(or: Unleashing the Potential of Path-Oriented Protections)
Mathilde Ollivier
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
mathilde.ollivier2@cea.fr
Richard Bonichon
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
richard.bonichon@cea.fr
Sébastien Bardin
CEA, LIST,
Paris-Saclay, France
sebastien.bardin@cea.fr
Jean-Yves Marion
Université de Lorraine, CNRS, LORIA
Nancy, France
Jean-Yves.Marion@loria.fr
ABSTRACT
Code obfuscation is a major tool for protecting software intellec-
tual property from attacks such as reverse engineering or code
tampering. Yet, recently proposed (automated) attacks based on
Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) shows very promising results,
hence threatening software integrity. Current defenses are not
fully satisfactory, being either not efficient against symbolic rea-
soning, or affecting runtime performance too much, or being too
easy to spot. We present and study a new class of anti-DSE pro-
tections coined as path-oriented protections targeting the weakest
spot of DSE, namely path exploration. We propose a lightweight,
efficient, resistant and analytically proved class of obfuscation algo-
rithms designed to hinder DSE-based attacks. Extensive evaluation
demonstrates that these approaches critically counter symbolic
deobfuscation while yielding only a very slight overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software reverse engineering; Logic
and verification; Malware and its mitigation; • Software and its
engineering → Formal methods.
KEYWORDS
Reverse Engineering; Code Protection; Obfuscation
ACM Reference Format:
Mathilde Ollivier, Sébastien Bardin, Richard Bonichon, and Jean-Yves Mar-
ion. 2019. How to Kill Symbolic Deobfuscation for Free (or: Unleashing the
Potential of Path-Oriented Protections) . In 2019 Annual Comput...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:When hardware meets software: a bulletproof solution to forensic memory
acquisition
author:Alessandro Reina and
Aristide Fattori and
Fabio Pagani and
Lorenzo Cavallaro and
Danilo Bruschi
When Hardware Meets Software:
A Bulletproof Solution to Forensic Memory Acquisition
Alessandro Reina
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Aristide Fattori
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Fabio Pagani
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Lorenzo Cavallaro
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
Danilo Bruschi
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
ABSTRACT
The acquisition of volatile memory of running systems has
become a prominent and essential procedure in digital foren-
sic analysis and incident responses.
In fact, unencrypted
passwords, cryptographic material, text fragments and latest-
generation malware may easily be protected as encrypted
blobs on persistent storage, while living seamlessly in the
volatile memory of a running system. Likewise, systems’
run-time information, such as open network connections,
open ﬁles and running processes, are by deﬁnition live en-
tities that can only be observed by examining the volatile
memory of a running system. In this context, tampering of
volatile data while an acquisition is in progress or during
transfer to an external trusted entity is an ongoing issue as
it may irremediably invalidate the collected evidence.
To overcome such issues, we present SMMDumper, a novel
technique to perform atomic acquisitions of volatile memory
of running systems. SMMDumper is implemented as an x86
ﬁrmware, which leverages the System Management Mode of
Intel CPUs to create a complete and reliable snapshot of the
state of the system that, with a minimal hardware support,
is resilient to malware attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
SMMDumper is the ﬁrst technique that is able to atomically
acquire the whole volatile memory, over...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:When hardware meets software: a bulletproof solution to forensic memory
acquisition
author:Alessandro Reina and
Aristide Fattori and
Fabio Pagani and
Lorenzo Cavallaro and
Danilo Bruschi
When Hardware Meets Software:
A Bulletproof Solution to Forensic Memory Acquisition
Alessandro Reina
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Aristide Fattori
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Fabio Pagani
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
Lorenzo Cavallaro
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
Danilo Bruschi
Dipartimento di Informatica
Università degli Studi di Milano
ABSTRACT
The acquisition of volatile memory of running systems has
become a prominent and essential procedure in digital foren-
sic analysis and incident responses.
In fact, unencrypted
passwords, cryptographic material, text fragments and latest-
generation malware may easily be protected as encrypted
blobs on persistent storage, while living seamlessly in the
volatile memory of a running system. Likewise, systems’
run-time information, such as open network connections,
open ﬁles and running processes, are by deﬁnition live en-
tities that can only be observed by examining the volatile
memory of a running system. In this context, tampering of
volatile data while an acquisition is in progress or during
transfer to an external trusted entity is an ongoing issue as
it may irremediably invalidate the collected evidence.
To overcome such issues, we present SMMDumper, a novel
technique to perform atomic acquisitions of volatile memory
of running systems. SMMDumper is implemented as an x86
ﬁrmware, which leverages the System Management Mode of
Intel CPUs to create a complete and reliable snapshot of the
state of the system that, with a minimal hardware support,
is resilient to malware attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
SMMDumper is the ﬁrst technique that is able to atomically
acquire the whole volatile memory, over...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch
Shadowing
author:Sangho Lee and
Ming-Wei Shih and
Prasun Gera and
Taesoo Kim and
Hyesoon Kim and
Marcus Peinado
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside
SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
Sangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim, and Hyesoon Kim,
Georgia Institute of Technology; Marcus Peinado, Microsoft Research
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/lee-sangho
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 16–18, 2017 • Vancouver, BC, CanadaISBN 978-1-931971-40-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXInferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside
SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
Sangho Lee† Ming-Wei Shih† Prasun Gera† Taesoo Kim† Hyesoon Kim† Marcus Peinado∗
† Georgia Institute of Technology
∗ Microsoft Research
Abstract
Intel has introduced a hardware-based trusted execution
environment, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX),
that provides a secure, isolated execution environment,
or enclave, for a user program without trusting any un-
derlying software (e.g., an operating system) or firmware.
Researchers have demonstrated that SGX is vulnerable
to a page-fault-based attack. However, the attack only
reveals page-level memory accesses within an enclave.
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-
channel attack, branch shadowing, that reveals fine-
grained control flows (branch granularity) in an enclave.
The root cause of this attack is that SGX does not clear
branch history when switching from enclave to non-
enclave mode, leaving fine-grained traces for the outside
world to observe, which gives rise to a branch-prediction
side channel. However, exploiting this channel in practice
is challenging because 1) measuring branch execution
time is too noisy for distinguishing fine-grained control-
flow changes and 2) pausing an enclave righ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch
Shadowing
author:Sangho Lee and
Ming-Wei Shih and
Prasun Gera and
Taesoo Kim and
Hyesoon Kim and
Marcus Peinado
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside
SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
Sangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim, and Hyesoon Kim,
Georgia Institute of Technology; Marcus Peinado, Microsoft Research
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/lee-sangho
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 16–18, 2017 • Vancouver, BC, CanadaISBN 978-1-931971-40-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXInferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside
SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing
Sangho Lee† Ming-Wei Shih† Prasun Gera† Taesoo Kim† Hyesoon Kim† Marcus Peinado∗
† Georgia Institute of Technology
∗ Microsoft Research
Abstract
Intel has introduced a hardware-based trusted execution
environment, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX),
that provides a secure, isolated execution environment,
or enclave, for a user program without trusting any un-
derlying software (e.g., an operating system) or firmware.
Researchers have demonstrated that SGX is vulnerable
to a page-fault-based attack. However, the attack only
reveals page-level memory accesses within an enclave.
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-
channel attack, branch shadowing, that reveals fine-
grained control flows (branch granularity) in an enclave.
The root cause of this attack is that SGX does not clear
branch history when switching from enclave to non-
enclave mode, leaving fine-grained traces for the outside
world to observe, which gives rise to a branch-prediction
side channel. However, exploiting this channel in practice
is challenging because 1) measuring branch execution
time is too noisy for distinguishing fine-grained control-
flow changes and 2) pausing an enclave righ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:IMP4GT: IMPersonation Attacks in 4G NeTworks
author:David Rupprecht and
Katharina Kohls and
Thorsten Holz and
Christina P"opper
IMP4GT: IMPersonation Attacks in 4G NeTworks
David Rupprecht
Ruhr University Bochum
david.rupprecht@rub.de
Katharina Kohls
Ruhr University Bochum
katharina.kohls@rub.de
Thorsten Holz
Ruhr University Bochum
thorsten.holz@rub.de
Christina P¨opper
NYU Abu Dhabi
christina.poepper@nyu.edu
Abstract—Long Term Evolution (LTE/4G) establishes mutual
authentication with a provably secure Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol on layer three of the network stack.
Permanent integrity protection of the control plane safeguards
the trafﬁc against manipulations. However, missing integrity pro-
tection of the user plane still allows an adversary to manipulate
and redirect IP packets, as recently demonstrated.
In this work, we introduce a novel cross-layer attack that
exploits the existing vulnerability on layer two and extends it
with an attack mechanism on layer three. More precisely, we take
advantage of the default IP stack behavior of operating systems
and show that combining it with the layer-two vulnerability allows
an active attacker to impersonate a user towards the network
and vice versa; we name these attacks IMP4GT (IMPersonation
attacks in 4G neTworks). In contrast to a simple redirection
attack as demonstrated in prior work, our attack dramatically
extends the possible attack scenarios and thus emphasizes the
need for user-plane integrity protection in mobile communication
standards. The results of our work imply that providers can no
longer rely on mutual authentication for billing, access control,
and legal prosecution. On the other hand, users are exposed
to any incoming IP connection as an adversary can bypass
the provider’s ﬁrewall. To demonstrate the practical impact of
our attack, we conduct two IMP4GT attack variants in a live,
commercial network, which—for the ﬁrst time—completely break
the mutual authentication aim...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:IMP4GT: IMPersonation Attacks in 4G NeTworks
author:David Rupprecht and
Katharina Kohls and
Thorsten Holz and
Christina P"opper
IMP4GT: IMPersonation Attacks in 4G NeTworks
David Rupprecht
Ruhr University Bochum
david.rupprecht@rub.de
Katharina Kohls
Ruhr University Bochum
katharina.kohls@rub.de
Thorsten Holz
Ruhr University Bochum
thorsten.holz@rub.de
Christina P¨opper
NYU Abu Dhabi
christina.poepper@nyu.edu
Abstract—Long Term Evolution (LTE/4G) establishes mutual
authentication with a provably secure Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol on layer three of the network stack.
Permanent integrity protection of the control plane safeguards
the trafﬁc against manipulations. However, missing integrity pro-
tection of the user plane still allows an adversary to manipulate
and redirect IP packets, as recently demonstrated.
In this work, we introduce a novel cross-layer attack that
exploits the existing vulnerability on layer two and extends it
with an attack mechanism on layer three. More precisely, we take
advantage of the default IP stack behavior of operating systems
and show that combining it with the layer-two vulnerability allows
an active attacker to impersonate a user towards the network
and vice versa; we name these attacks IMP4GT (IMPersonation
attacks in 4G neTworks). In contrast to a simple redirection
attack as demonstrated in prior work, our attack dramatically
extends the possible attack scenarios and thus emphasizes the
need for user-plane integrity protection in mobile communication
standards. The results of our work imply that providers can no
longer rely on mutual authentication for billing, access control,
and legal prosecution. On the other hand, users are exposed
to any incoming IP connection as an adversary can bypass
the provider’s ﬁrewall. To demonstrate the practical impact of
our attack, we conduct two IMP4GT attack variants in a live,
commercial network, which—for the ﬁrst time—completely break
the mutual authentication aim...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
author:Noor Michael and
Jaron Mink and
Jason Liu and
Sneha Gaur and
Wajih Ul Hassan and
Adam Bates
On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
Noor Michael
Jaron Mink
Jason Liu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
nsm2@illinois.edu
Sneha Gaur
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
sg2@illinois.edu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
jaronmm2@illinois.edu
Wajih Ul Hassan
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
whassan3@illinois.edu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
jdliu2@illinois.edu
Adam Bates
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
batesa@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Auditing is an increasingly essential tool for the defense of comput-
ing systems, but the unwieldy nature of log data imposes significant
burdens on administrators and analysts. To address this issue, a
variety of techniques have been proposed for approximating the
contents of raw audit logs, facilitating efficient storage and analysis.
However, the security value of these approximated logs is diffi-
cult to measure—relative to the original log, it is unclear if these
techniques retain the forensic evidence needed to effectively inves-
tigate threats. Unfortunately, prior work has only investigated this
issue anecdotally, demonstrating sufficient evidence is retained for
specific attack scenarios.
In this work, we address this gap in the literature through for-
malizing metrics for quantifying the forensic validity of an approxi-
mated audit log under differing threat models. In addition to provid-
ing quantifiable security arguments for prior work, we also identify
a novel point in the approximation design space—that log events
describing typical (benign) system activity can be aggressively ap-
proximated, while events that encode anomalous behavior should
be preserved with lossless fidelity. We instantiate this notion of
Attack-Preserving forensic validity in LogApprox, a new approxi-
mation technique that el...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
author:Noor Michael and
Jaron Mink and
Jason Liu and
Sneha Gaur and
Wajih Ul Hassan and
Adam Bates
On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
Noor Michael
Jaron Mink
Jason Liu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
nsm2@illinois.edu
Sneha Gaur
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
sg2@illinois.edu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
jaronmm2@illinois.edu
Wajih Ul Hassan
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
whassan3@illinois.edu
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
jdliu2@illinois.edu
Adam Bates
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
batesa@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
Auditing is an increasingly essential tool for the defense of comput-
ing systems, but the unwieldy nature of log data imposes significant
burdens on administrators and analysts. To address this issue, a
variety of techniques have been proposed for approximating the
contents of raw audit logs, facilitating efficient storage and analysis.
However, the security value of these approximated logs is diffi-
cult to measure—relative to the original log, it is unclear if these
techniques retain the forensic evidence needed to effectively inves-
tigate threats. Unfortunately, prior work has only investigated this
issue anecdotally, demonstrating sufficient evidence is retained for
specific attack scenarios.
In this work, we address this gap in the literature through for-
malizing metrics for quantifying the forensic validity of an approxi-
mated audit log under differing threat models. In addition to provid-
ing quantifiable security arguments for prior work, we also identify
a novel point in the approximation design space—that log events
describing typical (benign) system activity can be aggressively ap-
proximated, while events that encode anomalous behavior should
be preserved with lossless fidelity. We instantiate this notion of
Attack-Preserving forensic validity in LogApprox, a new approxi-
mation technique that el...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Ripcord: a modular platform for data center networking
author:Brandon Heller and
David Erickson and
Nick McKeown and
Rean Griffith and
Igor Ganichev and
Scott Whyte and
Kyriakos Zarifis and
Daekyeong Moon and
Scott Shenker and
Stephen Stuart
Ripcord: A Modular Platform for Data Center Networking
Brandon Heller,
David Erickson,
Nick McKeown
Stanford University
Stanford, CA, USA
{brandonh, derickso, nickm}
@stanford.edu
Rean Grifﬁth,
Igor Ganichev,
Scott Shenker
University of California
Berkeley, CA, USA
{rean, igor}
@eecs.berkeley.edu
shenker@icsi.berkeley.edu
Kyriakos Zariﬁs
International Computer
Science Institute
Berkeley, CA, USA
zariﬁs@icsi.berkeley.edu
Daekyeong Moon
Nicira Networks
Palo Alto, CA, USA
dkmoon@nicira.com
Scott Whyte,
Stephen Stuart
Google, Inc.
Mountain View, CA, USA
{swhyte, sstuart}@google.com
ABSTRACT
In this demo, we present Ripcord, a modular platform for
rapidly prototyping scale-out data center networks. Rip-
cord enables researchers to build and evaluate new network
features and topologies, using only commercially available
hardware and open-source software. The Ripcord demo will
show three examples of custom network functions, operating
together, on top of a 160-node cluster. The ﬁrst is a routing
engine that isolates classes of traﬃc. The second is a dy-
namic network manager than adjusts links and switch power
states to reduce energy. The third is a statistics aggrega-
tor that supports network health monitoring and automatic
alerts. The demo will be interactive, with a visualization of
live parameters for each link and switch, such as bandwidth,
drops, and power status, as well a control panel to modify
the traﬃc load. We feel that an interactive demo is the best
way to introduce the research community to Ripcord and
get their feedback.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.1 [Network
Architecture and Design]: Network communications; C.2.2
[Network Protocols] Routing protocols
General Terms: Design, Experimentation, Management...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Ripcord: a modular platform for data center networking
author:Brandon Heller and
David Erickson and
Nick McKeown and
Rean Griffith and
Igor Ganichev and
Scott Whyte and
Kyriakos Zarifis and
Daekyeong Moon and
Scott Shenker and
Stephen Stuart
Ripcord: A Modular Platform for Data Center Networking
Brandon Heller,
David Erickson,
Nick McKeown
Stanford University
Stanford, CA, USA
{brandonh, derickso, nickm}
@stanford.edu
Rean Grifﬁth,
Igor Ganichev,
Scott Shenker
University of California
Berkeley, CA, USA
{rean, igor}
@eecs.berkeley.edu
shenker@icsi.berkeley.edu
Kyriakos Zariﬁs
International Computer
Science Institute
Berkeley, CA, USA
zariﬁs@icsi.berkeley.edu
Daekyeong Moon
Nicira Networks
Palo Alto, CA, USA
dkmoon@nicira.com
Scott Whyte,
Stephen Stuart
Google, Inc.
Mountain View, CA, USA
{swhyte, sstuart}@google.com
ABSTRACT
In this demo, we present Ripcord, a modular platform for
rapidly prototyping scale-out data center networks. Rip-
cord enables researchers to build and evaluate new network
features and topologies, using only commercially available
hardware and open-source software. The Ripcord demo will
show three examples of custom network functions, operating
together, on top of a 160-node cluster. The ﬁrst is a routing
engine that isolates classes of traﬃc. The second is a dy-
namic network manager than adjusts links and switch power
states to reduce energy. The third is a statistics aggrega-
tor that supports network health monitoring and automatic
alerts. The demo will be interactive, with a visualization of
live parameters for each link and switch, such as bandwidth,
drops, and power status, as well a control panel to modify
the traﬃc load. We feel that an interactive demo is the best
way to introduce the research community to Ripcord and
get their feedback.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.1 [Network
Architecture and Design]: Network communications; C.2.2
[Network Protocols] Routing protocols
General Terms: Design, Experimentation, Management...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Chip and Skim: Cloning EMV Cards with the Pre-play Attack
author:Mike Bond and
Omar Choudary and
Steven J. Murdoch and
Sergei P. Skorobogatov and
Ross J. Anderson
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
Mike Bond, Omar Choudary, Steven J. Murdoch, Sergei Skorobogatov, Ross Anderson
Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK
forename.lastname@cl.cam.ac.uk
Abstract—EMV, also known as “Chip and PIN”,
is the
leading system for card payments worldwide. It
is used
throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be
introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a
chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This
protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to
generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each
transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious
problems: a widespread implementation ﬂaw and a deeper,
more difﬁcult to ﬁx ﬂaw with the EMV protocol itself. The
ﬁrst ﬂaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used
counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this
nonce. This exposes them to a “pre-play” attack which is
indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the
logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out
even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning
is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent.
We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey
methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness,
evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the ﬁeld, and
our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found ﬂaws
in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can
now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in
which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that
EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved
in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The
second problem was exposed b...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Chip and Skim: Cloning EMV Cards with the Pre-play Attack
author:Mike Bond and
Omar Choudary and
Steven J. Murdoch and
Sergei P. Skorobogatov and
Ross J. Anderson
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
Mike Bond, Omar Choudary, Steven J. Murdoch, Sergei Skorobogatov, Ross Anderson
Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK
forename.lastname@cl.cam.ac.uk
Abstract—EMV, also known as “Chip and PIN”,
is the
leading system for card payments worldwide. It
is used
throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be
introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a
chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This
protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to
generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each
transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered two serious
problems: a widespread implementation ﬂaw and a deeper,
more difﬁcult to ﬁx ﬂaw with the EMV protocol itself. The
ﬁrst ﬂaw is that some EMV implementers have merely used
counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this
nonce. This exposes them to a “pre-play” attack which is
indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the
logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out
even if it is impossible to clone a card physically. Card cloning
is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent.
We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey
methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness,
evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the ﬁeld, and
our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found ﬂaws
in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can
now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in
which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that
EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved
in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. The
second problem was exposed b...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Reuse-oriented camouflaging trojan: Vulnerability detection and attack
construction
author:Zhiqiang Lin and
Xiangyu Zhang and
Dongyan Xu
2010 IEEE/IFIP International
Conference
on Dependable
Systems
& Networks
(DSN)
Reuse-Oriented
Camouflaging
Trojan: Vulnerability
and
Detection
Attack Construction
Zhiqiang Lin Xiangyu Zhang Dongyan Xu
Department of Computer Science and CERIAS, Purdue University
{zlin,xyzhang,dxu}@cs.purdue.edu
Abstract
We introduce
the reuse-oriented
camouflaging
ma
trojan - a
in
action,
of implementing
Trojan
63%
invocation
At the network
of a targeted
to legitimate
software binaries.
such a trojan identifies
a legal invocation.
To perform a
and reuses an existing
this trojan is stealthy
function usually
where it is legal to do so, closely
new threat
licious
function in a legal binary program instead
the function itself. Furthermore,
that the malicious
takes place in a location
mimicking
tim binary can still
out exhibiting
close-source
shareware
can be maliciously
gets of this type of attack.
work to determine
to this attack and to construct
experiments
demonstrate
are a real threat
naries can be effectively
the vic
level,
protocol
follow its communication
with
Meanwhile,
many
are rich in functions
that
tar
a frame
with a number of real-world
that the reuse-oriented
trojan if so. Our
software binaries
trojans
camouflaging
of this type in legal bi
any anomalous behavior.
and vulnerabilities
making them attractive
In this paper, we present
and confirmed.
"reused",
a concrete
binaries
revealed
if a given binary program is vulnerable
TmJ::��:Ec:����
2%
Troj:m-13ankc;
4%
Trojan-
Gamc"lllicf
17%
I'll
Trojan·Dropper
5%
Trojan-Spy  Troj:m-PSW
10%
7%
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Distribution
(b) trojan payloads
in VxHeaven.
of (a) malware types and
1 Introduction
Trojan is the type of mal ware that appears
to perform a
logics.
It
and reliability.
securit...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Reuse-oriented camouflaging trojan: Vulnerability detection and attack
construction
author:Zhiqiang Lin and
Xiangyu Zhang and
Dongyan Xu
2010 IEEE/IFIP International
Conference
on Dependable
Systems
& Networks
(DSN)
Reuse-Oriented
Camouflaging
Trojan: Vulnerability
and
Detection
Attack Construction
Zhiqiang Lin Xiangyu Zhang Dongyan Xu
Department of Computer Science and CERIAS, Purdue University
{zlin,xyzhang,dxu}@cs.purdue.edu
Abstract
We introduce
the reuse-oriented
camouflaging
ma
trojan - a
in
action,
of implementing
Trojan
63%
invocation
At the network
of a targeted
to legitimate
software binaries.
such a trojan identifies
a legal invocation.
To perform a
and reuses an existing
this trojan is stealthy
function usually
where it is legal to do so, closely
new threat
licious
function in a legal binary program instead
the function itself. Furthermore,
that the malicious
takes place in a location
mimicking
tim binary can still
out exhibiting
close-source
shareware
can be maliciously
gets of this type of attack.
work to determine
to this attack and to construct
experiments
demonstrate
are a real threat
naries can be effectively
the vic
level,
protocol
follow its communication
with
Meanwhile,
many
are rich in functions
that
tar
a frame
with a number of real-world
that the reuse-oriented
trojan if so. Our
software binaries
trojans
camouflaging
of this type in legal bi
any anomalous behavior.
and vulnerabilities
making them attractive
In this paper, we present
and confirmed.
"reused",
a concrete
binaries
revealed
if a given binary program is vulnerable
TmJ::��:Ec:����
2%
Troj:m-13ankc;
4%
Trojan-
Gamc"lllicf
17%
I'll
Trojan·Dropper
5%
Trojan-Spy  Troj:m-PSW
10%
7%
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Distribution
(b) trojan payloads
in VxHeaven.
of (a) malware types and
1 Introduction
Trojan is the type of mal ware that appears
to perform a
logics.
It
and reliability.
securit...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Efficient attributes for anonymous credentials
author:Jan Camenisch and
Thomas Groß
Efﬁcient Attributes for Anonymous Credentials
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory
Jan Camenisch
Rüschlikon, Switzerland
jca@zurich.ibm.com
Thomas Groß
Rüschlikon, Switzerland
tgr@zurich.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
We extend the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya anonymous credential sys-
tem such that selective disclosure of attributes becomes highly ef-
ﬁcient. The resulting system signiﬁcantly improves upon existing
approaches, which suffer from a linear complexity in the total num-
ber of attributes. This limitation makes them unﬁt for many practi-
cal applications, such as electronic identity cards. Our system can
incorporate an arbitrary number of binary and ﬁnite-set attributes
without signiﬁcant performance impact. Our approach folds all
such attributes in a single attribute base and, thus, boosts the ef-
ﬁciency of all proofs of possession. The core idea is to encode dis-
crete binary and ﬁnite-set attribute values as prime numbers. We
use the divisibility property for efﬁcient proofs of their presence
or absence. We additionally contribute efﬁcient methods for con-
junctions and disjunctions. The system builds on the Strong-RSA
assumption alone.
We demonstrate the applicability and performance improve-
ments of our method in realistic application scenarios, such as,
electronic identity cards and complex/structured credentials. Our
method has crucial advantages in devices with restricted computa-
tional capabilities, such as smartcards and cell phones.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Public key cryptosystems
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Security
Keywords
Privacy, Anonymous Credential Systems, Cryptographic Protocols,
Efﬁcient Attribute Encoding
1.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of user-centric identity management ampliﬁes the need
for a combination of strong security and privacy protection. Anony-
mous credential sys...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Efficient attributes for anonymous credentials
author:Jan Camenisch and
Thomas Groß
Efﬁcient Attributes for Anonymous Credentials
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory
Jan Camenisch
Rüschlikon, Switzerland
jca@zurich.ibm.com
Thomas Groß
Rüschlikon, Switzerland
tgr@zurich.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
We extend the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya anonymous credential sys-
tem such that selective disclosure of attributes becomes highly ef-
ﬁcient. The resulting system signiﬁcantly improves upon existing
approaches, which suffer from a linear complexity in the total num-
ber of attributes. This limitation makes them unﬁt for many practi-
cal applications, such as electronic identity cards. Our system can
incorporate an arbitrary number of binary and ﬁnite-set attributes
without signiﬁcant performance impact. Our approach folds all
such attributes in a single attribute base and, thus, boosts the ef-
ﬁciency of all proofs of possession. The core idea is to encode dis-
crete binary and ﬁnite-set attribute values as prime numbers. We
use the divisibility property for efﬁcient proofs of their presence
or absence. We additionally contribute efﬁcient methods for con-
junctions and disjunctions. The system builds on the Strong-RSA
assumption alone.
We demonstrate the applicability and performance improve-
ments of our method in realistic application scenarios, such as,
electronic identity cards and complex/structured credentials. Our
method has crucial advantages in devices with restricted computa-
tional capabilities, such as smartcards and cell phones.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Public key cryptosystems
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Security
Keywords
Privacy, Anonymous Credential Systems, Cryptographic Protocols,
Efﬁcient Attribute Encoding
1.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of user-centric identity management ampliﬁes the need
for a combination of strong security and privacy protection. Anony-
mous credential sys...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption: An LWE-based Realization and Implementation
author:Lei Xu and
Xingliang Yuan and
Ron Steinfeld and
Cong Wang and
Chungen Xu
Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption: An LWE-based Realization
and Implementation
Lei Xu†§, Xingliang Yuan‡, Ron Steinfeld‡, Cong Wang§, and Chungen Xu†
† School of Science, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China
‡ Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia
§ Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, China
xuleicrypto@gmail.com,{xingliang.yuan,ron.steinfeld}@monash.edu,congwang@cityu.edu.hk,xuchung@njust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption, also known as public-key en-
cryption with keyword search(PEKS), serves a wide spectrum of
data sharing applications. It allows users to search over encrypted
data encrypted via different keys. However, most of the existing
PEKS schemes are built on classic security assumptions, which are
proven to be untenable to overcome the threats of quantum com-
puters. To address the above problem, in this paper, we propose a
lattice-based searchable encryption scheme from the learning with
errors (LWE) hardness assumption. Specifically, we observe that
the keys of each user in a basic scheme are composed of large-sized
matrices and basis of the lattice. To reduce the complexity of key
management, our scheme is designed to enable users to directly use
their identity for data encryption. We present several optimization
techniques for implementation to make our design nearly practical.
For completeness, we conduct rigorous security, complexity, and
parameter analysis on our scheme, and perform comprehensive
evaluations at a commodity machine. With a scenario of 100 users,
the cost of key generation for each user is 125s, and the cost of
searching a document with 1000 keywords is 13.4ms.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Management and querying of en-
crypted data; Privacy-preserving protocols;
KEYWORDS
Multi-w...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption: An LWE-based Realization and Implementation
author:Lei Xu and
Xingliang Yuan and
Ron Steinfeld and
Cong Wang and
Chungen Xu
Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption: An LWE-based Realization
and Implementation
Lei Xu†§, Xingliang Yuan‡, Ron Steinfeld‡, Cong Wang§, and Chungen Xu†
† School of Science, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China
‡ Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia
§ Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, China
xuleicrypto@gmail.com,{xingliang.yuan,ron.steinfeld}@monash.edu,congwang@cityu.edu.hk,xuchung@njust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption, also known as public-key en-
cryption with keyword search(PEKS), serves a wide spectrum of
data sharing applications. It allows users to search over encrypted
data encrypted via different keys. However, most of the existing
PEKS schemes are built on classic security assumptions, which are
proven to be untenable to overcome the threats of quantum com-
puters. To address the above problem, in this paper, we propose a
lattice-based searchable encryption scheme from the learning with
errors (LWE) hardness assumption. Specifically, we observe that
the keys of each user in a basic scheme are composed of large-sized
matrices and basis of the lattice. To reduce the complexity of key
management, our scheme is designed to enable users to directly use
their identity for data encryption. We present several optimization
techniques for implementation to make our design nearly practical.
For completeness, we conduct rigorous security, complexity, and
parameter analysis on our scheme, and perform comprehensive
evaluations at a commodity machine. With a scenario of 100 users,
the cost of key generation for each user is 125s, and the cost of
searching a document with 1000 keywords is 13.4ms.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Management and querying of en-
crypted data; Privacy-preserving protocols;
KEYWORDS
Multi-w...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions to Attacks on Avionic
Systems
author:Matthew Smith and
Martin Strohmeier and
Jon Harman and
Vincent Lenders and
Ivan Martinovic
A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions
to Attacks on Avionic Systems
Matthew Smith∗, Martin Strohmeier∗†, Jonathan Harman, Vincent Lenders† and Ivan Martinovic∗
∗Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK,
†Cyber-Defence Campus, armasuisse Science + Technology, Switzerland
ﬁrst.last@cs.ox.ac.uk
ﬁrst.last@armasuisse.ch
Abstract—Many wireless communications systems found in
aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them vulner-
able to attack. With affordable software-deﬁned radios readily
available, a novel threat has emerged which allows a wide range of
attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst
these vulnerabilities are known, predicting their ultimate effect is
difﬁcult. A major factor in this effect is how ﬂight crew respond,
especially whether their extensive training in fault handling helps
them to manage attacks.
To investigate this we conducted a user study, inviting 30
Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to ﬂy simulator scenarios in
which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We use
wireless attacks on three safety-related systems, based on existing
literature: Trafﬁc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing
System (ILS). To analyze their response, we collected control
input data coupled with closed and open interview responses.
We found that all three attack scenarios created signiﬁcant
control impact and disruption through missed approaches, avoid-
ance maneuvers and diversions. They further increased workload,
distrust in the affected system, and for each attack, at least a third
of our participants switched off the system entirely—even if they
were important safety systems. All pilots felt the scenarios were
useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulato...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions to Attacks on Avionic
Systems
author:Matthew Smith and
Martin Strohmeier and
Jon Harman and
Vincent Lenders and
Ivan Martinovic
A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions
to Attacks on Avionic Systems
Matthew Smith∗, Martin Strohmeier∗†, Jonathan Harman, Vincent Lenders† and Ivan Martinovic∗
∗Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK,
†Cyber-Defence Campus, armasuisse Science + Technology, Switzerland
ﬁrst.last@cs.ox.ac.uk
ﬁrst.last@armasuisse.ch
Abstract—Many wireless communications systems found in
aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them vulner-
able to attack. With affordable software-deﬁned radios readily
available, a novel threat has emerged which allows a wide range of
attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst
these vulnerabilities are known, predicting their ultimate effect is
difﬁcult. A major factor in this effect is how ﬂight crew respond,
especially whether their extensive training in fault handling helps
them to manage attacks.
To investigate this we conducted a user study, inviting 30
Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to ﬂy simulator scenarios in
which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We use
wireless attacks on three safety-related systems, based on existing
literature: Trafﬁc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing
System (ILS). To analyze their response, we collected control
input data coupled with closed and open interview responses.
We found that all three attack scenarios created signiﬁcant
control impact and disruption through missed approaches, avoid-
ance maneuvers and diversions. They further increased workload,
distrust in the affected system, and for each attack, at least a third
of our participants switched off the system entirely—even if they
were important safety systems. All pilots felt the scenarios were
useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulato...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Approximate fingerprinting to accelerate pattern matching
author:Ramaswamy Ramaswamy and
Lukas Kencl and
Gianluca Iannaccone
Approximate Fingerprinting to Accelerate Pattern Matching
Ramaswamy
Ramaswamy
Univ. of Massachusetts
Lukas Kencl
Intel Research
Cambridge, UK
Gianluca Iannaccone
Intel Research
Cambridge, UK
rramaswa@ecs.umass.edu
lukas.kencl@intel.com
gianluca.iannaccone@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Pattern matching and analysis over network data streams
is increasingly becoming an essential primitive of network
monitoring systems.
It is a fundamental part of most in-
trusion detection systems, worm detecting algorithms and
many other anomaly detection mechanisms. It is a processing-
intensive task, usually requiring to search for a large number
of patterns simultaneously.
We propose the technique of “approximate ﬁngerprinting”
to reduce the memory demands and signiﬁcantly accelerate
the pattern matching process. The method computes ﬁnger-
prints of preﬁxes of the patterns and matches them against
the input stream. It acts as a generic preprocessor to a stan-
dard pattern matching engine by “clearing” a large fraction
of the input that would not match any of the patterns. The
main contribution is the “approximate” characteristic of the
ﬁngerprint, which allows to slide the ﬁngerprinting window
through the packet at a faster rate, while maintaining a
small memory footprint and low number of false positives.
An improvement over a Bloom ﬁlter solution, a ﬁngerprint
can indicate which patterns are the candidate matches. We
validate our technique by presenting the performance gain
for the popular Snort intrusion detection system with the
preprocessor in place.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Network Operations]: Network monitoring; I.5.2
[Design Methodology]: Classiﬁer design and evaluation;
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection
General Terms
Performance, Design, Measurement
Keywords
Pattern matching, intrusion detection, ﬁngerprint, deep packet
inspectio...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Approximate fingerprinting to accelerate pattern matching
author:Ramaswamy Ramaswamy and
Lukas Kencl and
Gianluca Iannaccone
Approximate Fingerprinting to Accelerate Pattern Matching
Ramaswamy
Ramaswamy
Univ. of Massachusetts
Lukas Kencl
Intel Research
Cambridge, UK
Gianluca Iannaccone
Intel Research
Cambridge, UK
rramaswa@ecs.umass.edu
lukas.kencl@intel.com
gianluca.iannaccone@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Pattern matching and analysis over network data streams
is increasingly becoming an essential primitive of network
monitoring systems.
It is a fundamental part of most in-
trusion detection systems, worm detecting algorithms and
many other anomaly detection mechanisms. It is a processing-
intensive task, usually requiring to search for a large number
of patterns simultaneously.
We propose the technique of “approximate ﬁngerprinting”
to reduce the memory demands and signiﬁcantly accelerate
the pattern matching process. The method computes ﬁnger-
prints of preﬁxes of the patterns and matches them against
the input stream. It acts as a generic preprocessor to a stan-
dard pattern matching engine by “clearing” a large fraction
of the input that would not match any of the patterns. The
main contribution is the “approximate” characteristic of the
ﬁngerprint, which allows to slide the ﬁngerprinting window
through the packet at a faster rate, while maintaining a
small memory footprint and low number of false positives.
An improvement over a Bloom ﬁlter solution, a ﬁngerprint
can indicate which patterns are the candidate matches. We
validate our technique by presenting the performance gain
for the popular Snort intrusion detection system with the
preprocessor in place.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Network Operations]: Network monitoring; I.5.2
[Design Methodology]: Classiﬁer design and evaluation;
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection
General Terms
Performance, Design, Measurement
Keywords
Pattern matching, intrusion detection, ﬁngerprint, deep packet
inspectio...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Receipt-mode trust negotiation: efficient authorization through outsourced
interactions
author:Andrew K. Adams and
Adam J. Lee and
Daniel Moss'e
Receipt-Mode Trust Negotiation: Efﬁcient Authorization
Through Outsourced Interactions
Andrew K. Adams†‡, Adam J. Lee‡, Daniel Mossé‡
† Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Pittsburgh
akadams@psc.edu, {adamlee, mosse}@cs.pitt.edu
ABSTRACT
In trust negotiation approaches to authorization, previously unac-
quainted entities establish trust in one another gradually via the bi-
lateral and iterative exchange of policies and digital credentials. Al-
though this affords resource providers with an expressive means of
access control for open systems, the trust negotiation process incurs
non-trivial computational and communications costs. In this paper,
we propose Receipt-Mode Trust Negotiation (RMTN) as a means
of mitigating the performance penalties on servers that use trust
negotiation. RMTN provides a means of off-loading the major-
ity of the trust negotiation process to delegated receipt-generating
helper servers. RMTN ensures that helpers produce correct trust
negotiation protocol receipts, and that the helpers are incapable of
impersonating the resource server outside of the RMTN protocol.
We describe an initial implementation of our RMTN protocol on
a Linux testbed, discuss the security of this protocol, and present
experimental results indicating that the receipt-mode protocol does
indeed enhance the performance of resource servers that rely on
trust negotiation approaches to authorization.
Keywords
Security, optimization, load balancing, trust negotiation
1.
INTRODUCTION
In open computing systems where resources are shared across
organizational boundaries, users and resource providers may not
always have trust relationships that are established a priori. As
such, traditional identity-based authorization mechanisms are un-
desirable. In trust negotiation approaches to ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Receipt-mode trust negotiation: efficient authorization through outsourced
interactions
author:Andrew K. Adams and
Adam J. Lee and
Daniel Moss'e
Receipt-Mode Trust Negotiation: Efﬁcient Authorization
Through Outsourced Interactions
Andrew K. Adams†‡, Adam J. Lee‡, Daniel Mossé‡
† Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Pittsburgh
akadams@psc.edu, {adamlee, mosse}@cs.pitt.edu
ABSTRACT
In trust negotiation approaches to authorization, previously unac-
quainted entities establish trust in one another gradually via the bi-
lateral and iterative exchange of policies and digital credentials. Al-
though this affords resource providers with an expressive means of
access control for open systems, the trust negotiation process incurs
non-trivial computational and communications costs. In this paper,
we propose Receipt-Mode Trust Negotiation (RMTN) as a means
of mitigating the performance penalties on servers that use trust
negotiation. RMTN provides a means of off-loading the major-
ity of the trust negotiation process to delegated receipt-generating
helper servers. RMTN ensures that helpers produce correct trust
negotiation protocol receipts, and that the helpers are incapable of
impersonating the resource server outside of the RMTN protocol.
We describe an initial implementation of our RMTN protocol on
a Linux testbed, discuss the security of this protocol, and present
experimental results indicating that the receipt-mode protocol does
indeed enhance the performance of resource servers that rely on
trust negotiation approaches to authorization.
Keywords
Security, optimization, load balancing, trust negotiation
1.
INTRODUCTION
In open computing systems where resources are shared across
organizational boundaries, users and resource providers may not
always have trust relationships that are established a priori. As
such, traditional identity-based authorization mechanisms are un-
desirable. In trust negotiation approaches to ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:ShorTor: Improving Tor Network Latency via Multi-hop Overlay Routing
author:Kyle Hogan and
Sacha Servan-Schreiber and
Zachary Newman and
Ben Weintraub and
Cristina Nita-Rotaru and
Srinivas Devadas
9
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2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
ShorTor: Improving Tor Network Latency via
Multi-hop Overlay Routing
Kyle Hogan
MIT CSAIL
Sacha Servan-Schreiber
MIT CSAIL
Zachary Newman
MIT CSAIL
Ben Weintraub
Northeastern University
Cristina Nita-Rotaru
Northeastern University
Srinivas Devadas
MIT CSAIL
Abstract—We present ShorTor, a protocol for reducing latency
on the Tor network. ShorTor uses multi-hop overlay routing, a
technique typically employed by content delivery networks, to
inﬂuence the route Tor trafﬁc takes across the internet. In this
way, ShorTor avoids slow paths and improves the experience
for end users by reducing the latency of their connections while
imposing minimal bandwidth overhead.
ShorTor functions as an overlay on top of onion routing—Tor’s
existing routing protocol—and is run by Tor relays, making it
independent of the path selection performed by Tor clients. As
such, ShorTor reduces latency while preserving Tor’s existing
security properties. Speciﬁcally, the routes taken in ShorTor are
in no way correlated to either the Tor user or their destination,
including the geographic location of either party. We analyze
the security of ShorTor using the AnoA framework, showing
that ShorTor maintains all of Tor’s anonymity guarantees. We
augment our theoretical claims with an empirical analysis.
To evaluate ShorTor’s performance, we collect a real-world
dataset of over 400,000 latency measurements between the 1,000
most popular Tor relays, which collectively see the vast majority
of Tor trafﬁc. With this data, we identify pairs...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:ShorTor: Improving Tor Network Latency via Multi-hop Overlay Routing
author:Kyle Hogan and
Sacha Servan-Schreiber and
Zachary Newman and
Ben Weintraub and
Cristina Nita-Rotaru and
Srinivas Devadas
9
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2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
ShorTor: Improving Tor Network Latency via
Multi-hop Overlay Routing
Kyle Hogan
MIT CSAIL
Sacha Servan-Schreiber
MIT CSAIL
Zachary Newman
MIT CSAIL
Ben Weintraub
Northeastern University
Cristina Nita-Rotaru
Northeastern University
Srinivas Devadas
MIT CSAIL
Abstract—We present ShorTor, a protocol for reducing latency
on the Tor network. ShorTor uses multi-hop overlay routing, a
technique typically employed by content delivery networks, to
inﬂuence the route Tor trafﬁc takes across the internet. In this
way, ShorTor avoids slow paths and improves the experience
for end users by reducing the latency of their connections while
imposing minimal bandwidth overhead.
ShorTor functions as an overlay on top of onion routing—Tor’s
existing routing protocol—and is run by Tor relays, making it
independent of the path selection performed by Tor clients. As
such, ShorTor reduces latency while preserving Tor’s existing
security properties. Speciﬁcally, the routes taken in ShorTor are
in no way correlated to either the Tor user or their destination,
including the geographic location of either party. We analyze
the security of ShorTor using the AnoA framework, showing
that ShorTor maintains all of Tor’s anonymity guarantees. We
augment our theoretical claims with an empirical analysis.
To evaluate ShorTor’s performance, we collect a real-world
dataset of over 400,000 latency measurements between the 1,000
most popular Tor relays, which collectively see the vast majority
of Tor trafﬁc. With this data, we identify pairs...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Bulk of interest: performance measurement of content-centric routing
author:Matthias W"ahlisch and
Thomas C. Schmidt and
Markus Vahlenkamp
Bulk of Interest: Performance Measurement of
Content-Centric Routing
Matthias Wählisch
Freie Universität Berlin
waehlisch@ieee.org
Thomas C. Schmidt
HAW Hamburg, Informatik
t.schmidt@ieee.org
Markus Vahlenkamp
HAW Hamburg, Informatik
markus@vahlenkamp.net
ABSTRACT
The paradigm of information-centric networking subsumes
recent approaches to integrate content replication services
into a future Internet layer. Current concepts foster either a
dynamic mapping that directs content requests to a nearby
copy, or an immediate routing on content identiﬁers. In this
paper, we evaluate in practical experiments the performance
of content routing, which we analyze with a focus on con-
ceptual aspects. Our ﬁndings indicate that the performance
of the content distribution system is threatened by a heavy
management of states that arise from the strong coupling
of the control to the data plane in the underlying routing
infrastructure.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Comm. Networks]: Network Archi-
tecture and Design
General Terms
Measurement, Security
Keywords
Performance, Experimental Evaluation, Routing
1.
INTRODUCTION
One major dedication of today’s Internet is the global dis-
tribution of content in huge amounts. Content distribution
networks (CDNs) facilitate an eﬃcient, wide-area replica-
tion of static data for selected content providers, whereas
the end-to-end design of TCP/IP does not foresee implicit
replication and in-network storage. There is no openly avail-
able standard solution for the asynchronous, global replica-
tion of popular content in the current Internet. Currently,
Information-Centric Networks (ICN) [1] propose to ﬁll this
gap.
Essentially two approaches to routing exist in current ICN
proposals, an evolutionary path that routes on IP, and ‘clean
slate’ concepts that route on content identiti...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Bulk of interest: performance measurement of content-centric routing
author:Matthias W"ahlisch and
Thomas C. Schmidt and
Markus Vahlenkamp
Bulk of Interest: Performance Measurement of
Content-Centric Routing
Matthias Wählisch
Freie Universität Berlin
waehlisch@ieee.org
Thomas C. Schmidt
HAW Hamburg, Informatik
t.schmidt@ieee.org
Markus Vahlenkamp
HAW Hamburg, Informatik
markus@vahlenkamp.net
ABSTRACT
The paradigm of information-centric networking subsumes
recent approaches to integrate content replication services
into a future Internet layer. Current concepts foster either a
dynamic mapping that directs content requests to a nearby
copy, or an immediate routing on content identiﬁers. In this
paper, we evaluate in practical experiments the performance
of content routing, which we analyze with a focus on con-
ceptual aspects. Our ﬁndings indicate that the performance
of the content distribution system is threatened by a heavy
management of states that arise from the strong coupling
of the control to the data plane in the underlying routing
infrastructure.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Comm. Networks]: Network Archi-
tecture and Design
General Terms
Measurement, Security
Keywords
Performance, Experimental Evaluation, Routing
1.
INTRODUCTION
One major dedication of today’s Internet is the global dis-
tribution of content in huge amounts. Content distribution
networks (CDNs) facilitate an eﬃcient, wide-area replica-
tion of static data for selected content providers, whereas
the end-to-end design of TCP/IP does not foresee implicit
replication and in-network storage. There is no openly avail-
able standard solution for the asynchronous, global replica-
tion of popular content in the current Internet. Currently,
Information-Centric Networks (ICN) [1] propose to ﬁll this
gap.
Essentially two approaches to routing exist in current ICN
proposals, an evolutionary path that routes on IP, and ‘clean
slate’ concepts that route on content identiti...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:TransBlocker: Transforming and Taming Privacy-Breaching Android Applications
author:Mu Zhang and
Heng Yin
TransBlocker: Transforming and Taming Privacy-Breaching
Android Applications
Mu Zhang
Heng Yin
Department
  of
  Electrical
  Engineering
  and
  Computer
  Science,
Syracuse
  University
L.C.Smith College
  of
  Engineering
and
  Computer
  Science
Motivation: Privacy Leakage
•  A significant problem
– Various types of information
– Both benign and malicious apps
– Ads, analytic libraries
•  Information-flow security problem
– Individual checkpoints won’t work
– Dynamic analysis incurs performance overhead
Our Solution: Transblocker
A Running Example
Application-wide Dataflow Analysis
Static Instrumentation
•  Creating Shadow Variables
– Local Variables
– Static/Instance Fields
– Parameters and Return Value
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting the Source
– Initialize tainting
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting Taint Propagation
– Simple Assignments
– Function Calls
– API Calls
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting the Sink
Optimization
•  Removing Redundant BoolWrapper
Statements
•  Removing Redundant Function Parameters
•  Inlining Instrumentation Code
•  Soot Built-in Optimizations
Optimization
Evaluation(cid:1)
•  Lines of Instrumented Code
– Before Optimization: 10%
– After Optimization: 4.48%
•  Runtime  Overhead: 1.5%(cid:1)
12
Conclusion
•  Privacy leakage is an information-flow
security problem
•  Our solution: Combine static analysis and
bytecode re-writing
– Easy to deploy
– Minimal overhead
Questions?
Questions?
Static Instrumentation
•  Cleaning the Taint


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:TransBlocker: Transforming and Taming Privacy-Breaching Android Applications
author:Mu Zhang and
Heng Yin
TransBlocker: Transforming and Taming Privacy-Breaching
Android Applications
Mu Zhang
Heng Yin
Department
  of
  Electrical
  Engineering
  and
  Computer
  Science,
Syracuse
  University
L.C.Smith College
  of
  Engineering
and
  Computer
  Science
Motivation: Privacy Leakage
•  A significant problem
– Various types of information
– Both benign and malicious apps
– Ads, analytic libraries
•  Information-flow security problem
– Individual checkpoints won’t work
– Dynamic analysis incurs performance overhead
Our Solution: Transblocker
A Running Example
Application-wide Dataflow Analysis
Static Instrumentation
•  Creating Shadow Variables
– Local Variables
– Static/Instance Fields
– Parameters and Return Value
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting the Source
– Initialize tainting
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting Taint Propagation
– Simple Assignments
– Function Calls
– API Calls
Static Instrumentation
•  Instrumenting the Sink
Optimization
•  Removing Redundant BoolWrapper
Statements
•  Removing Redundant Function Parameters
•  Inlining Instrumentation Code
•  Soot Built-in Optimizations
Optimization
Evaluation(cid:1)
•  Lines of Instrumented Code
– Before Optimization: 10%
– After Optimization: 4.48%
•  Runtime  Overhead: 1.5%(cid:1)
12
Conclusion
•  Privacy leakage is an information-flow
security problem
•  Our solution: Combine static analysis and
bytecode re-writing
– Easy to deploy
– Minimal overhead
Questions?
Questions?
Static Instrumentation
•  Cleaning the Taint

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Tunable Add-On Diagnostic Protocol for Time-Triggered Systems
author:Marco Serafini and
Neeraj Suri and
Jonny Vinter and
Astrit Ademaj and
Wolfgang Brandst"atter and
Fulvio Tagliabo and
Jens Koch
A Tunable Add-On Diagnostic Protocol for Time-Triggered Systems ∗
Marco Seraﬁni and Neeraj Suri
TU Darmstadt, Germany
Jonny Vinter
SP, Sweden
Astrit Ademaj
TU Vienna, Austria
{marco, suri}@informatik.tu-darmstadt.de
jonny.vinter@sp.se
ademaj@vmars.tuwien.ac.at
Wolfgang Brandst¨atter
Audi, Germany
Fulvio Tagliab`o
Fiat, Italy
Jens Koch
Airbus Deutschland, Germany
wolfgang.brandstaetter@audi.de
fulvio.tagliabo@crf.it
jens.koch@airbus.com
Abstract
We
present
a
protocol
diagnostic
systems
for
tunable
generic time-triggered (TT)
to detect crash
and send/receive omission faults. Compared to existing
diagnostic and membership protocols for TT systems, it
does not rely on the single-fault assumption and tolerates
malicious faults. It runs at the application level and can be
added on top of any TT system (possibly as a middleware
component) without requiring modiﬁcations at the system
level. The information on detected faults is accumulated
using a penalty/reward algorithm to handle transient faults.
After a fault is detected, the likelihood of node isolation can
be adapted to different system conﬁgurations, including
those where functions with different criticality levels
are integrated. Using actual automotive and aerospace
parameters, we experimentally demonstrate the transient
fault handling capabilities of the protocol.
1. Introduction and contributions
In both automotive and aerospace X-by-wire appli-
cations, TT platforms such as Flexray [1], TTP/C [2],
SAFEbus [3] and TT-Ethernet are increasingly being
adopted. Most TT platforms develop their static, built-in
diagnostic and membership approach.
Instead, we deﬁne
an on-line diagnostic/membership protocol that is a tunable
and portable add-on application level module.
It can be
integrated as a plug-in middleware m...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Tunable Add-On Diagnostic Protocol for Time-Triggered Systems
author:Marco Serafini and
Neeraj Suri and
Jonny Vinter and
Astrit Ademaj and
Wolfgang Brandst"atter and
Fulvio Tagliabo and
Jens Koch
A Tunable Add-On Diagnostic Protocol for Time-Triggered Systems ∗
Marco Seraﬁni and Neeraj Suri
TU Darmstadt, Germany
Jonny Vinter
SP, Sweden
Astrit Ademaj
TU Vienna, Austria
{marco, suri}@informatik.tu-darmstadt.de
jonny.vinter@sp.se
ademaj@vmars.tuwien.ac.at
Wolfgang Brandst¨atter
Audi, Germany
Fulvio Tagliab`o
Fiat, Italy
Jens Koch
Airbus Deutschland, Germany
wolfgang.brandstaetter@audi.de
fulvio.tagliabo@crf.it
jens.koch@airbus.com
Abstract
We
present
a
protocol
diagnostic
systems
for
tunable
generic time-triggered (TT)
to detect crash
and send/receive omission faults. Compared to existing
diagnostic and membership protocols for TT systems, it
does not rely on the single-fault assumption and tolerates
malicious faults. It runs at the application level and can be
added on top of any TT system (possibly as a middleware
component) without requiring modiﬁcations at the system
level. The information on detected faults is accumulated
using a penalty/reward algorithm to handle transient faults.
After a fault is detected, the likelihood of node isolation can
be adapted to different system conﬁgurations, including
those where functions with different criticality levels
are integrated. Using actual automotive and aerospace
parameters, we experimentally demonstrate the transient
fault handling capabilities of the protocol.
1. Introduction and contributions
In both automotive and aerospace X-by-wire appli-
cations, TT platforms such as Flexray [1], TTP/C [2],
SAFEbus [3] and TT-Ethernet are increasingly being
adopted. Most TT platforms develop their static, built-in
diagnostic and membership approach.
Instead, we deﬁne
an on-line diagnostic/membership protocol that is a tunable
and portable add-on application level module.
It can be
integrated as a plug-in middleware m...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fast Secure Multiparty ECDSA with Practical Distributed Key Generation
and Applications to Cryptocurrency Custody
author:Yehuda Lindell and
Ariel Nof
Fast Secure Multiparty ECDSA with Practical
Distributed Key Generation and Applications to
Cryptocurrency Custody∗
Yehuda Lindell†
Ariel Nof†
Samuel Ranellucci‡
October 14, 2018
Abstract
ECDSA is a standardized signing algorithm that is widely used in TLS, code signing, cryp-
tocurrency and more. Due to its importance, the problem of securely computing ECDSA in a
distributed manner (known as threshold signing) has received considerable interest. However,
despite this interest, there is still no full threshold solution for more than 2 parties (meaning
that any t-out-of-n parties can sign, security is preserved for any t−1 or fewer corrupted parties,
and t ≤ n can be any value thus supporting an honest minority) that has practical key distri-
bution. This is due to the fact that all previous solutions for this utilize Paillier homomorphic
encryption, and eﬃcient distributed Paillier key generation for more than two parties is not
known.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst truly practical full threshold ECDSA signing protocol
that has both fast signing and fast key distribution. This solves a years-old open problem,
and opens the door to practical uses of threshold ECDSA signing that are in demand today.
One of these applications is the construction of secure cryptocurrency wallets (where key shares
are spread over multiple devices and so are hard to steal) and cryptocurrency custody solu-
tions (where large sums of invested cryptocurrency are strongly protected by splitting the key
between a bank/ﬁnancial institution, the customer who owns the currency, and possibly a third-
party trustee, in multiple shares at each). There is growing practical interest in such solutions,
but prior to our work these could not be deployed today due to the need for distributed key
generation.
1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Prior Wo...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fast Secure Multiparty ECDSA with Practical Distributed Key Generation
and Applications to Cryptocurrency Custody
author:Yehuda Lindell and
Ariel Nof
Fast Secure Multiparty ECDSA with Practical
Distributed Key Generation and Applications to
Cryptocurrency Custody∗
Yehuda Lindell†
Ariel Nof†
Samuel Ranellucci‡
October 14, 2018
Abstract
ECDSA is a standardized signing algorithm that is widely used in TLS, code signing, cryp-
tocurrency and more. Due to its importance, the problem of securely computing ECDSA in a
distributed manner (known as threshold signing) has received considerable interest. However,
despite this interest, there is still no full threshold solution for more than 2 parties (meaning
that any t-out-of-n parties can sign, security is preserved for any t−1 or fewer corrupted parties,
and t ≤ n can be any value thus supporting an honest minority) that has practical key distri-
bution. This is due to the fact that all previous solutions for this utilize Paillier homomorphic
encryption, and eﬃcient distributed Paillier key generation for more than two parties is not
known.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst truly practical full threshold ECDSA signing protocol
that has both fast signing and fast key distribution. This solves a years-old open problem,
and opens the door to practical uses of threshold ECDSA signing that are in demand today.
One of these applications is the construction of secure cryptocurrency wallets (where key shares
are spread over multiple devices and so are hard to steal) and cryptocurrency custody solu-
tions (where large sums of invested cryptocurrency are strongly protected by splitting the key
between a bank/ﬁnancial institution, the customer who owns the currency, and possibly a third-
party trustee, in multiple shares at each). There is growing practical interest in such solutions,
but prior to our work these could not be deployed today due to the need for distributed key
generation.
1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Prior Wo...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Automated Web Patrol with Strider HoneyMonkeys: Finding Web Sites
That Exploit Browser Vulnerabilities
author:Yi-Min Wang and
Doug Beck and
Xuxian Jiang and
Roussi Roussev and
Chad Verbowski and
Shuo Chen and
Samuel T. King
Automated Web Patrol with Strider HoneyMonkeys:
Finding Web Sites That Exploit Browser Vulnerabilities
Yi-Min Wang, Doug Beck, Xuxian Jiang, Roussi Roussev,
Chad Verbowski, Shuo Chen, and Sam King
Microsoft Research, Redmond
Abstract
Internet attacks that use malicious web sites to install
malware  programs  by  exploiting  browser  vulnerabilities
are  a  serious  emerging  threat.  In  response,  we  have
developed  an  automated  web  patrol
to
automatically  identify  and  monitor  these  malicious  sites.
We describe the design and implementation of the Strider
HoneyMonkey Exploit Detection System, which consists of
a  pipeline  of  “monkey  programs”  running  possibly
vulnerable  browsers  on  virtual  machines  with  different
patch  levels  and  patrolling  the  Web  to  seek  out  and
classify web sites that exploit browser vulnerabilities.
system
Within  the  first  month  of  utilizing  this  system,  we
identified 752 unique URLs hosted on 288 web sites that
could  successfully  exploit  unpatched  Windows  XP
machines. The system automatically constructed topology
graphs  based  on  traffic  redirection  to  capture  the
relationship between the exploit sites. This allowed us to
identify  several  major  players  who  are  responsible  for  a
large  number  of  exploit  pages.  By  monitoring  these  752
exploit-URLs on a daily basis, we discovered a malicious
web  site  that  was  performing  zero-day  exploits  of  the
unpatched  javaprxy.dll  vulnerability  and  was  operating
behind 25 exploit-URLs. It was confirmed as the first “in-
the-wild”,  zero-day  exploit  of  this  vulnerability  that  was
reported  to  the  Microsoft  Security  Response  Center.
Additionally,  by  scanning  the  m...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Automated Web Patrol with Strider HoneyMonkeys: Finding Web Sites
That Exploit Browser Vulnerabilities
author:Yi-Min Wang and
Doug Beck and
Xuxian Jiang and
Roussi Roussev and
Chad Verbowski and
Shuo Chen and
Samuel T. King
Automated Web Patrol with Strider HoneyMonkeys:
Finding Web Sites That Exploit Browser Vulnerabilities
Yi-Min Wang, Doug Beck, Xuxian Jiang, Roussi Roussev,
Chad Verbowski, Shuo Chen, and Sam King
Microsoft Research, Redmond
Abstract
Internet attacks that use malicious web sites to install
malware  programs  by  exploiting  browser  vulnerabilities
are  a  serious  emerging  threat.  In  response,  we  have
developed  an  automated  web  patrol
to
automatically  identify  and  monitor  these  malicious  sites.
We describe the design and implementation of the Strider
HoneyMonkey Exploit Detection System, which consists of
a  pipeline  of  “monkey  programs”  running  possibly
vulnerable  browsers  on  virtual  machines  with  different
patch  levels  and  patrolling  the  Web  to  seek  out  and
classify web sites that exploit browser vulnerabilities.
system
Within  the  first  month  of  utilizing  this  system,  we
identified 752 unique URLs hosted on 288 web sites that
could  successfully  exploit  unpatched  Windows  XP
machines. The system automatically constructed topology
graphs  based  on  traffic  redirection  to  capture  the
relationship between the exploit sites. This allowed us to
identify  several  major  players  who  are  responsible  for  a
large  number  of  exploit  pages.  By  monitoring  these  752
exploit-URLs on a daily basis, we discovered a malicious
web  site  that  was  performing  zero-day  exploits  of  the
unpatched  javaprxy.dll  vulnerability  and  was  operating
behind 25 exploit-URLs. It was confirmed as the first “in-
the-wild”,  zero-day  exploit  of  this  vulnerability  that  was
reported  to  the  Microsoft  Security  Response  Center.
Additionally,  by  scanning  the  m...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Framework for Evaluating Software on Reduced Margins Hardware
author:Konstantinos Parasyris and
Panos K. Koutsovasilis and
Vassilis Vassiliadis and
Christos D. Antonopoulos and
Nikolaos Bellas and
Spyros Lalis
2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
A Framework for Evaluating Software
on Reduced Margins Hardware
Konstantinos Parasyris, Panos Koutsovasilis, Vassilis Vassiliadis,
Christos D. Antonopoulos, Nikolaos Bellas, Spyros Lalis
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Email: {koparasy, pkoutsovasilis, vasiliad, cda, nbellas, lalis}@uth.gr
University of Thessaly
IR drops, aging, and so on. Even identical chips with the same
microarchitecture, using the same technology libraries and
executing identical code may exhibit different behavior [5].
Therefore, using simulation-based or software fault injection
to study the effects of timing errors may be inaccurate, since
it cannot capture all the complex effects that take place when
the CPU is stressed beyond its nominal operating points.
Recently, a number of commercial platforms have been
released, on which it is technically possible to set the operating
frequency and voltage beyond nominal values. This makes it
possible to evaluate the effects of reduced margins on software
reliability while running the software natively at full speed [1],
[6], [7], [8]. Building on the availability of such platforms,
we present eXtended Margins eXperiment Manager (XM2),
a framework for conducting experiments on real hardware at
non-nominal conﬁgurations. XM2 can be used (i) to study,
analyze and understand how and under what circumstances
modern CPU microarchitectures fail when executing code at
unsafe margins (sections VI-A and VI-B), and (ii) to evaluate
energy gains when operating the CPU with reduced, but still
safe margins (section VI-C). This is possible in modern CPUs
as has already been shown recently for ARMv8 cores [1]
(iii) to evaluate the resilience of appl...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Framework for Evaluating Software on Reduced Margins Hardware
author:Konstantinos Parasyris and
Panos K. Koutsovasilis and
Vassilis Vassiliadis and
Christos D. Antonopoulos and
Nikolaos Bellas and
Spyros Lalis
2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
A Framework for Evaluating Software
on Reduced Margins Hardware
Konstantinos Parasyris, Panos Koutsovasilis, Vassilis Vassiliadis,
Christos D. Antonopoulos, Nikolaos Bellas, Spyros Lalis
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Email: {koparasy, pkoutsovasilis, vasiliad, cda, nbellas, lalis}@uth.gr
University of Thessaly
IR drops, aging, and so on. Even identical chips with the same
microarchitecture, using the same technology libraries and
executing identical code may exhibit different behavior [5].
Therefore, using simulation-based or software fault injection
to study the effects of timing errors may be inaccurate, since
it cannot capture all the complex effects that take place when
the CPU is stressed beyond its nominal operating points.
Recently, a number of commercial platforms have been
released, on which it is technically possible to set the operating
frequency and voltage beyond nominal values. This makes it
possible to evaluate the effects of reduced margins on software
reliability while running the software natively at full speed [1],
[6], [7], [8]. Building on the availability of such platforms,
we present eXtended Margins eXperiment Manager (XM2),
a framework for conducting experiments on real hardware at
non-nominal conﬁgurations. XM2 can be used (i) to study,
analyze and understand how and under what circumstances
modern CPU microarchitectures fail when executing code at
unsafe margins (sections VI-A and VI-B), and (ii) to evaluate
energy gains when operating the CPU with reduced, but still
safe margins (section VI-C). This is possible in modern CPUs
as has already been shown recently for ARMv8 cores [1]
(iii) to evaluate the resilience of appl...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:S3: A Symbolic String Solver for Vulnerability Detection in Web
Applications
author:Minh-Thai Trinh and
Duc-Hiep Chu and
Joxan Jaffar
S3: A Symbolic String Solver for Vulnerability Detection
in Web Applications
Minh-Thai Trinh
trinhmt@comp.nus.edu.sg
Duc-Hiep Chu
hiepcd@comp.nus.edu.sg
Joxan Jaffar
joxan@comp.nus.edu.sg
National University of Singapore
ABSTRACT
Motivated by the vulnerability analysis of web programs which
work on string inputs, we present S3, a new symbolic string solver.
Our solver employs a new algorithm for a constraint language that
is expressive enough for widespread applicability. Speciﬁcally, our
language covers all the main string operations, such as those in
JavaScript. The algorithm ﬁrst makes use of a symbolic represen-
tation so that membership in a set deﬁned by a regular expression
can be encoded as string equations. Secondly, there is a constraint-
based generation of instances from these symbolic expressions so
that the total number of instances can be limited. We evaluate S3
on a well-known set of practical benchmarks, demonstrating both
its robustness (more deﬁnitive answers) and its efﬁciency (about 20
times faster) against the state-of-the-art.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Veriﬁcation; D.2.5 [Software
Engineering]: Testing and Debugging
General Terms
Security, Reliability, Veriﬁcation
Keywords
String Analysis; String Constraint Solver; Web Applications
1.
INTRODUCTION
Web applications nowadays provide critical services over the In-
ternet and frequently handle sensitive data. Unfortunately, the de-
velopment is error prone, resulting in applications that are vulnera-
ble to attacks by malicious users. The global accessibility of critical
web applications make this an extremely serious problem.
According to the Open Web Application Security Project, or
OWASP for short [26], the most serious web application vulner-
abilities include: (#1) Injection ﬂaws (such as SQL injection) and
(#3) C...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:S3: A Symbolic String Solver for Vulnerability Detection in Web
Applications
author:Minh-Thai Trinh and
Duc-Hiep Chu and
Joxan Jaffar
S3: A Symbolic String Solver for Vulnerability Detection
in Web Applications
Minh-Thai Trinh
trinhmt@comp.nus.edu.sg
Duc-Hiep Chu
hiepcd@comp.nus.edu.sg
Joxan Jaffar
joxan@comp.nus.edu.sg
National University of Singapore
ABSTRACT
Motivated by the vulnerability analysis of web programs which
work on string inputs, we present S3, a new symbolic string solver.
Our solver employs a new algorithm for a constraint language that
is expressive enough for widespread applicability. Speciﬁcally, our
language covers all the main string operations, such as those in
JavaScript. The algorithm ﬁrst makes use of a symbolic represen-
tation so that membership in a set deﬁned by a regular expression
can be encoded as string equations. Secondly, there is a constraint-
based generation of instances from these symbolic expressions so
that the total number of instances can be limited. We evaluate S3
on a well-known set of practical benchmarks, demonstrating both
its robustness (more deﬁnitive answers) and its efﬁciency (about 20
times faster) against the state-of-the-art.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Veriﬁcation; D.2.5 [Software
Engineering]: Testing and Debugging
General Terms
Security, Reliability, Veriﬁcation
Keywords
String Analysis; String Constraint Solver; Web Applications
1.
INTRODUCTION
Web applications nowadays provide critical services over the In-
ternet and frequently handle sensitive data. Unfortunately, the de-
velopment is error prone, resulting in applications that are vulnera-
ble to attacks by malicious users. The global accessibility of critical
web applications make this an extremely serious problem.
According to the Open Web Application Security Project, or
OWASP for short [26], the most serious web application vulner-
abilities include: (#1) Injection ﬂaws (such as SQL injection) and
(#3) C...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy Mechanisms for Distribution
Estimation
author:Takao Murakami and
Yusuke Kawamoto
Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy
Mechanisms for Distribution Estimation
Takao Murakami and Yusuke Kawamoto, AIST
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/murakami
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy Mechanisms for
Distribution Estimation ∗
Takao Murakami
AIST
Yusuke Kawamoto
AIST
Abstract
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) has been widely studied to
estimate statistics of personal data (e.g., distribution underly-
ing the data) while protecting users’ privacy. Although LDP
does not require a trusted third party, it regards all personal
data equally sensitive, which causes excessive obfuscation
hence the loss of utility. In this paper, we introduce the notion
of ULDP (Utility-optimized LDP), which provides a privacy
guarantee equivalent to LDP only for sensitive data. We ﬁrst
consider the setting where all users use the same obfuscation
mechanism, and propose two mechanisms providing ULDP:
utility-optimized randomized response and utility-optimized
RAPPOR. We then consider the setting where the distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data can be different from
user to user. For this setting, we propose a personalized ULDP
mechanism with semantic tags to estimate the distribution of
personal data with high utility while keeping secret what is
sensitive for each user. We show theoretically and experimen-
tally that our mechanisms provide much higher utility than
the existing LDP mechanisms when there are a lot of non-
sensitive data. We also show that when most of the data are
non-sensitive, our mechanisms even provide almost the same
utility as non-private mecha...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy Mechanisms for Distribution
Estimation
author:Takao Murakami and
Yusuke Kawamoto
Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy
Mechanisms for Distribution Estimation
Takao Murakami and Yusuke Kawamoto, AIST
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/murakami
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy Mechanisms for
Distribution Estimation ∗
Takao Murakami
AIST
Yusuke Kawamoto
AIST
Abstract
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) has been widely studied to
estimate statistics of personal data (e.g., distribution underly-
ing the data) while protecting users’ privacy. Although LDP
does not require a trusted third party, it regards all personal
data equally sensitive, which causes excessive obfuscation
hence the loss of utility. In this paper, we introduce the notion
of ULDP (Utility-optimized LDP), which provides a privacy
guarantee equivalent to LDP only for sensitive data. We ﬁrst
consider the setting where all users use the same obfuscation
mechanism, and propose two mechanisms providing ULDP:
utility-optimized randomized response and utility-optimized
RAPPOR. We then consider the setting where the distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data can be different from
user to user. For this setting, we propose a personalized ULDP
mechanism with semantic tags to estimate the distribution of
personal data with high utility while keeping secret what is
sensitive for each user. We show theoretically and experimen-
tally that our mechanisms provide much higher utility than
the existing LDP mechanisms when there are a lot of non-
sensitive data. We also show that when most of the data are
non-sensitive, our mechanisms even provide almost the same
utility as non-private mecha...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Attribute-based signature and its applications
author:Jin Li and
Man Ho Au and
Willy Susilo and
Dongqing Xie and
Kui Ren
Attribute-Based Signatures∗
Hemanta K. Maji†
Manoj Prabhakaran†
Mike Rosulek‡
November 22, 2010
Abstract
We introduce Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS), a versatile primitive that allows a party to
sign a message with ﬁne-grained control over identifying information. In ABS, a signer, who
possesses a set of attributes from the authority, can sign a message with a predicate that is
satisﬁed by his attributes. The signature reveals no more than the fact that a single user with
some set of attributes satisfying the predicate has attested to the message. In particular, the
signature hides the attributes used to satisfy the predicate and any identifying information about
the signer (that could link multiple signatures as being from the same signer). Furthermore,
users cannot collude to pool their attributes together.
We give a general framework for constructing ABS schemes, and then show several practical
instantiations based on groups with bilinear pairing operations, under standard assumptions.
Further, we give a construction which is secure even against a malicious attribute authority, but
the security for this scheme is proven in the generic group model. We describe several practical
problems that motivated this work, and how ABS can be used to solve them. Also, we show
how our techniques allow us to extend Groth-Sahai NIZK proofs to be simulation-extractable
and identity-based with low overhead.
1
Introduction
Alice, a ﬁnance manager in a big corporation, while going through her company’s ﬁnancial records,
has learned about a major international scandal. She decides to send these records to a major
newspaper, retaining her anonymity, but with a proof that she indeed has access to the records
in question. It turns out that several people, due to a combination of reasons, may have access
to these records: those in the New York, London or Tokyo ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Attribute-based signature and its applications
author:Jin Li and
Man Ho Au and
Willy Susilo and
Dongqing Xie and
Kui Ren
Attribute-Based Signatures∗
Hemanta K. Maji†
Manoj Prabhakaran†
Mike Rosulek‡
November 22, 2010
Abstract
We introduce Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS), a versatile primitive that allows a party to
sign a message with ﬁne-grained control over identifying information. In ABS, a signer, who
possesses a set of attributes from the authority, can sign a message with a predicate that is
satisﬁed by his attributes. The signature reveals no more than the fact that a single user with
some set of attributes satisfying the predicate has attested to the message. In particular, the
signature hides the attributes used to satisfy the predicate and any identifying information about
the signer (that could link multiple signatures as being from the same signer). Furthermore,
users cannot collude to pool their attributes together.
We give a general framework for constructing ABS schemes, and then show several practical
instantiations based on groups with bilinear pairing operations, under standard assumptions.
Further, we give a construction which is secure even against a malicious attribute authority, but
the security for this scheme is proven in the generic group model. We describe several practical
problems that motivated this work, and how ABS can be used to solve them. Also, we show
how our techniques allow us to extend Groth-Sahai NIZK proofs to be simulation-extractable
and identity-based with low overhead.
1
Introduction
Alice, a ﬁnance manager in a big corporation, while going through her company’s ﬁnancial records,
has learned about a major international scandal. She decides to send these records to a major
newspaper, retaining her anonymity, but with a proof that she indeed has access to the records
in question. It turns out that several people, due to a combination of reasons, may have access
to these records: those in the New York, London or Tokyo ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Availability, usage, and deployment characteristics of the domain
name system
author:Jeffrey Pang and
James Hendricks and
Aditya Akella and
Roberto De Prisco and
Bruce M. Maggs and
Srinivasan Seshan
Availability, Usage, and Deployment Characteristics of the
Domain Name System(cid:3)
Jeffrey Pang
Carnegie Mellon University
jeffpang@cs.cmu.edu
James Hendricks
Carnegie Mellon University
jimi@cs.cmu.edu
Aditya Akella
Carnegie Mellon University
aditya@cs.cmu.edu
Roberto De Priscoy
University of Salerno
robdep@unisa.it
Bruce Maggsy
Carnegie Mellon University
Srinivasan Seshan
Carnegie Mellon University
bmm@cs.cmu.edu
srini@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical part of the Internet’s
infrastructure, and is one of the few examples of a robust, highly-
scalable, and operational distributed system. Although a few stud-
ies have been devoted to characterizing its properties, such as its
workload and the stability of the top-level servers, many key com-
ponents of DNS have not yet been examined. Based on large-scale
measurements taken from servers in a large content distribution net-
work, we present a detailed study of key characteristics of the DNS
infrastructure, such as load distribution, availability, and deploy-
ment patterns of DNS servers. Our analysis includes both local
DNS servers and servers in the authoritative hierarchy. We ﬁnd
that (1) the vast majority of users use a small fraction of deployed
name servers, (2) the availability of most name servers is high, and
(3) there exists a larger degree of diversity in local DNS server de-
ployment and usage than for authoritative servers. Furthermore,
we use our DNS measurements to draw conclusions about feder-
ated infrastructures in general. We evaluate and discuss the impact
of federated deployment models on future systems, such as Dis-
tributed Hash Tables.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-Communication
Networks; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Availability, usage, and deployment characteristics of the domain
name system
author:Jeffrey Pang and
James Hendricks and
Aditya Akella and
Roberto De Prisco and
Bruce M. Maggs and
Srinivasan Seshan
Availability, Usage, and Deployment Characteristics of the
Domain Name System(cid:3)
Jeffrey Pang
Carnegie Mellon University
jeffpang@cs.cmu.edu
James Hendricks
Carnegie Mellon University
jimi@cs.cmu.edu
Aditya Akella
Carnegie Mellon University
aditya@cs.cmu.edu
Roberto De Priscoy
University of Salerno
robdep@unisa.it
Bruce Maggsy
Carnegie Mellon University
Srinivasan Seshan
Carnegie Mellon University
bmm@cs.cmu.edu
srini@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical part of the Internet’s
infrastructure, and is one of the few examples of a robust, highly-
scalable, and operational distributed system. Although a few stud-
ies have been devoted to characterizing its properties, such as its
workload and the stability of the top-level servers, many key com-
ponents of DNS have not yet been examined. Based on large-scale
measurements taken from servers in a large content distribution net-
work, we present a detailed study of key characteristics of the DNS
infrastructure, such as load distribution, availability, and deploy-
ment patterns of DNS servers. Our analysis includes both local
DNS servers and servers in the authoritative hierarchy. We ﬁnd
that (1) the vast majority of users use a small fraction of deployed
name servers, (2) the availability of most name servers is high, and
(3) there exists a larger degree of diversity in local DNS server de-
ployment and usage than for authoritative servers. Furthermore,
we use our DNS measurements to draw conclusions about feder-
ated infrastructures in general. We evaluate and discuss the impact
of federated deployment models on future systems, such as Dis-
tributed Hash Tables.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-Communication
Networks; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Taking Routers Off Their Meds: Why Assumptions Of Router Stability
Are Dangerous
author:Max Schuchard and
Christopher Thompson and
Nicholas Hopper and
Yongdae Kim
Taking Routers Off Their Meds:
Why Assumptions Of Router Stability Are Dangerous
Max Schuchard, Christopher Thompson, Nicholas Hopper, Yongdae Kim
University of Minnesota
{schuch, cthomp, hopper, kyd} @ cs.umn.edu
In this work, we examine how an adversary in control
of a BGP speaker in a transit AS can cause a victim router
in an arbitrary location on the Internet to become unstable.
Through experimentation with both hardware and software
routers, we look at the behavior of routers under abnor-
mal conditions and come to four conclusions. First, routers
placed in certain states behave in anything but a stable man-
ner. Second, unexpected but perfectly legal BGP messages
can place routers into those states with disconcerting ease.
Third, an adversary can use these messages to disrupt a vic-
tim router to which he is not directly connected. Fourth,
modern best practices do little to prevent these attacks.
)
(
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Time (s)
y
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o
m
e
M
CISCO
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Figure 1.
 500  1000  1500  2000  2500
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
-10.0
experi-
ments on hardware
and software routers,
we
observed what
happens when routers
ﬁnd
themselves
starved for CPU cy-
cles or memory. We
witnessed a variety of
failure modes, ranging
from severe perfor-
mance degradation to the unrecoverable failure of all active
routing sessions. We also observed that a router placed into
one of these states would more than likely cause its peers
to enter one or more of these states as well. An example of
this is a CPU starved router was the exhausting its peer’s
memory. When the rate of incoming BGP updates exceeds
a router’s computational capacity, the receiving router only
buffers a ﬁxed number of incoming BGP messages. When
those limits are reached it is up to the sender to buffer
all future updates until the CPU starved rout...