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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T0852
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screen Capture
Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information.  Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate administrators and users in the domain.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.[169]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY's amsiPatch.py module can disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.[80]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[151][152][153]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Authentication Process
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise is capable of launching a remote shell on the host to delete itself.[62]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has extracted messages from chat programs, such as WeChat.[3]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-21 TeamTNT: Explosive Cryptomining
Since the introduction of Amazon Web Services (AWS) there has been a steady migration from on-premise to cloud deployments. Misconfigured cloud services can be low-hanging fruit for an attacker. Palo Alto Networks found that Docker services were attacked about every 90 minutes during the Spring of 2021. Of these attacks, around 76% were by cryptojacking threat actors, one of the most active in this field being TeamTNT.TeamTNT is one of the predominant cryptojacking threat actors currently targeting Linux servers. This session will present the threat actor's activity and their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) throughout their different campaigns. The first public report on TeamTNT was published in May 2020 by Trend Micro and covered attacks against servers running exposed Docker instances. While this is early activity, it is not the earliest that can be attributed to the threat actor. Based on our findings, we can conclude that they have been active since the Fall of 2019, which was six months before the initial report on the threat actor's activity. While TeamTNT is mainly known for compromising Kubernetes clusters and servers running Docker, this session will also highlight campaigns against servers running Redis and Windows.The threat actor maintains a public persona on Twitter. In addition to some of the technical details, this session will present the threat actor's social media activity and how they are uniquely interacting with the security research community.The session and the accompanying whitepaper will provide defenders with all information needed to better protect and detect attacks by this threat actor. The whole toolset will be presented, including: scripts, DDoS malware, backdoors, and rootkits.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has used compromised websites and Google Ads to bait victims into downloading its installer.[29][30]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the username of the victim system.[166]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0110
ATT&CK Technique Name:at
at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.[4][1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has used rundll32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.[84]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has used a custom encryption algorithm to encrypt collected data.[25]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.[35]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can execute PowerShell commands and scripts with the use of .NET DLL, WoodyPowerSession.[248]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote command execution.[11][12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with Bandook's payload.[9][10][11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has encrypted drives using the core encryption mechanism from DiskCryptor.[40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use AdjustTokenPrivileges() to elevate privileges.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can intercept two-factor authentication codes transmitted via SMS.[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can copy itself to and launch itself from hidden folders.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[80]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-18 Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)
With a 19 year old vulnerability, we were able to sign a message with the private key of Facebook. We'll show how we found one of the oldest TLS vulnerabilities in products of 10 different vendors and how we practically exploited it on famous sites. We'll also discuss how the countermeasures introduced back in TLS 1.0 and expanded over the years failed to prevent this and why RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption should be deprecated. Finally, we'll present what related problems are still present and unfixed in many popular TLS libraries.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has hidden the C2 server address using base-64 encoding. [3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations by changing the top-level domain (TLD) to ".us", ".co" or ".biz".[24]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt has been delivered via spearphishing emails with Microsoft Office attachments.[166]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. [29][30][31]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-21 Windows Heap-backed Pool: The Good, the Bad, and the Encoded
For decades, the Windows kernel pool remained the same, using simple structures that were easy to read, parse and search for, but recently this all changed, with a new and complex design that breaks assumptions and exploits, and of course, tools and debugger extensions.This new design modernizes the kernel pool and makes it significantly more efficient. Additionally, it has significant security implications - both good and bad. Major code changes break a lot of existing code and might make future pool-related exploits more difficult, or in some cases nearly impossible to write.But could this open up a whole new attack surface as well?


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used Trojans from underground hacker websites.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been embedded in documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2017-8570.[71][72]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1546.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trap
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has compromised social media accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[123]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.[206]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer will attempt to enumerate mapped network shares to later attempt to wipe all files on those shares.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[59]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1541
ATT&CK Technique Name:Foreground Persistence
Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope. Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s startForeground() API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-18 When Everyone's Dog is Named Fluffy: Abusing the Brand New Security Questions in Windows 10 to Gain Domain-Wide Persistence
In Windows domain environments most attacks involve obtaining domain admin privileges. But that's not enough - once an attacker gets them, he has to make sure he doesn't lose his grip in the domain. That's why, in recent years, new levels of innovation are being focused on means of establishing domain persistence. New ideas are emerging, such as DCShadow and DACL-based methods. In this session we will present an effective approach for creating such persistence, exploiting new opportunities offered by the Win 10 security questions feature.The new feature, introduced this April, is a good example of how a well-intended idea can become a security nightmare. It allows a user to provide security questions and answers which he can later use to regain access to a local account. Yep, questions like "What was the name of your first pet?" are now safe-guarding your domain.We dug into the implementation of this feature and discovered that it can be abused to create a very durable, low profile backdoor. Once an attacker compromises a network, this backdoor can be remotely distributed to any Win 10 machine in the network - without even executing code on the targeted machine. We'll present this method and the challenges we faced while implementing it, including:How to remotely set the security questions featureHow to get remote access to the "Password Reset" screenHow to revert back to the user's original password after password reset, to avoid leaving traces (using Mimikatz existing features)We'll also share methods of mitigating this attack, including an open source tool we've developed that can control or disable the security questions feature, thus preventing security questions being used as a backdoor.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has deleted itself after creating a service as well as deleted a temporary file when the system reboots.[262]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.[3]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-20 First Contact - Vulnerabilities in Contactless Payments
Introduced in 2007, contactless (NFC) payments have been used widely for a decade. Accounting for more than 40% of transactions globally, contactless payments are fast replacing cash and CHIP. Yet, contactless makes use of protocols much older than the technology itself. So, how safe and secure are contactless payments? In this talk we discuss how the EMV protocols and magstripe modes used for contactless are equally flawed. For the first time we show how to bypass the UK £30 limit for contactless payments made using physical cards. Then how to circumvent limits for mobile wallets using locked mobile phones. What's more, we cover flaws in the generation keys values, the unpredictable number (UN) and application transaction counter (ATC). Another first, we perform a pre-play attack using EMV without downgrading to legacy modes.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rootkit
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.[41]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android listens for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent in order to maintain persistence and activate its functionality at device boot time.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore changes the permissions of a payload using the command chmod -R 755.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass application control. [44] Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through regsvr32 functionality by using application control [45] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[46], AppLocker, [47] [48] or Software Restriction Policies [49] where appropriate. [50]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 Applied Self-Driving Car Security
In the not too distant future, we'll live in a world where computers are driving our cars.  Soon, cars may not even have steering wheels or brake pedals.  But, in this scenario, should we be worried about cyber attack of these vehicles?  In this talk, two researchers who have headed self-driving car security teams for multiple companies will discuss how self driving cars work, how they might be attacked, and how they can ultimately be secured.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork collected the victim username and whether it was running as admin, then sent the information to its C2 server.[139][127]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has the ability to download files from its C2 server.[160][161]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox has the ability to execute an LDAP query to enumerate the distinguished name, SAM account name, and display name for all domain users.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie appends a total of 64MB of garbage data to a file to deter any security products in place that may be scanning files on disk.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can decrypt the payload into memory, create a new suspended process of itself, then inject a decrypted payload to the new process and resume new process execution.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[98]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1651
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Administration Command
Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines or hybrid-joined devices. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. Similarly, in Azure AD environments, Microsoft Endpoint Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to the Azure AD.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[8][9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.[9] This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cherry Picker
Some variants of Cherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows "AppInit_DLLs"="pserver32.dll"[5]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-23 firmWar: An Imminent Threat to the Foundation of Computing
The global IT supply chain is under a heavy spotlight, amidst covid-impacted production shortages, work-from-home policies, geopolitical tensions, and an overall re-balkanization of technology design and production. The 2020 SolarWinds attacks brought the real-world risk of a supply chain attack to the forefront. More commonly overlooked, however, is the risk posed by enterprise devices and the firmware which controls them. These systems exist in highly privileged areas of the computing industry, and due to both their mission criticality and difficulty in patching are mostly forgotten - but not to attackers. We'll reveal new research which began with a ransomware group and ended with a significant coordinated disclosure effort to remediate vulnerabilities discovered at the top of the firmware supply chain. The vulnerabilities we found are in an industry-standard management API, easily exploitable but well-hidden, and it took a data exposure before they were discovered. The access afforded by the exploitation of these flaws can provide an attacker with permanent administrative access to millions of servers worldwide. We will discuss how low-level attacks, once relegated only to nation-states, are being added to the arsenal of cybercriminals and ransomware groups. The talk will also highlight the challenges posed to organizations in assessing their firmware risk and the importance of accountability for the modern technology supply chain.Please note that this will be a remote (virtual) presentation.


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ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.[45]


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titleblackhat:us-22 Déjà Vu: Uncovering Stolen Algorithms in Commercial Products
In an ideal world, members of a community work together towards a common goal or greater good. Unfortunately, we do not (yet) live in such a world. In this talk, we discuss what appears to be a systemic issue impacting our cyber-security community: the theft and unauthorized use of algorithms by corporate entities. Entities who themselves may be part of the community.First, we’ll present a variety of search techniques that can automatically point to unauthorized code in commercial products. Then we’ll show how reverse-engineering and binary comparison techniques can confirm such findings. Next, we will apply these approaches in a real-world case study. Specifically, we’ll focus on a popular tool from a non-profit organization that was reverse-engineered by multiple entities such that its core algorithm could be recovered and used (unauthorized), in multiple commercial products.The talk will end with actionable takeaways and recommendations, as who knows, this may happen to you too! For one, we'll present strategic approaches (and the challenges) of confronting culpable commercial entities (and their legal teams). Moreover, we’ll provide recommendations for corporations to ensure this doesn’t happen in the first place, thus ensuring that our community can remain cohesively focused on its mutual goals.


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ATT&CK ID:T1481.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bidirectional Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR, named "WinUpdate" [66]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used LinkedIn to send spearphishing links.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1568
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Resolution
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.[346]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox has collected all outgoing phone numbers that start with "86".[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has used VBA macros to execute shellcode.[152]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.[62]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with "wallet" in their name using find.[83]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.[293]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[44]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.[36]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can collect the username from a compromised host.[163]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to discover the hostname of a compromised host.[226]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can capture files and photos from the compromised device.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can identify the IP and port numbers for all remote connections from the compromised host.[47]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-21 Bridging Security Infrastructure Between the Data Center and AWS Lambda
While serverless is all the rage, creating secure infrastructure that integrates serverless technology with existing Data Center (DC) services remains a challenge. Square's DC uses a microservice architecture. Services communicate over an envoy service mesh with short-lived mTLS certificates using SPIFFE identity for zero-trust based authentication. To achieve higher flexibility and scalability we have been migrating to the cloud, a gradual process that is still in progress.Why bother? Workloads have different characteristics, while a payment system might be required to be available all the time and have predictable traffic, other applications might have unpredictable bursts of use but otherwise receive no traffic. This flexibility draws developers to Lambda. Applications can scale up immediately, but also scale down when demand is low. However, these characteristics also make security engineering challenging. In this talk we will explain what challenges we were confronted with and how we solved them, bridging security properties we require in the DC to be compatible with AWS Lambda.How is this challenging? Complications with AWS Lambda fall broadly into two categories. One, operational requirements for Lambda that make developers choose it in the first place, such as near immediate response time. Two, providing parity with our DC security infrastructure so developers can engineer in a fashion they are used to while observing security best practices. Simply reimplementing the systems we use in the DC was not possible, but using native cloud functionality alone wasn't possible either.How did we solve this? This talk will cover how we architected workload identity in AWS Lambda, sharing identity between DC and the cloud. We built a custom certificate issuance on top of AWS Private CA that is compatible with the SPIFFE standard, but issues certificates ahead of time to not bloc...


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titleblackhat:us-20 A Little Less Speculation, a Little More Action: A Deep Dive into Fuchsia's Mitigations for Specific CPU Side-Channel Attacks
We know the story by now: researchers find a new side-channel attack and disclose it under embargo. Vendors build patches and ship them. We read about it on $TechSite and move on.But what happens if you show up after the party's over and want to understand and mitigate these problems in your own codebase? That's the problem faced by the Fuchsia team at Google, which is building a new open-source operating system based on a microkernel called Zircon. Fuchsia needs to handle user, kernel, and hypervisor attacks across x86 and ARM processors.In this talk, we will walk through how the Fuchsia team enumerated existing CPU side-channels, explored how they are mitigated in well-known operating systems, and undertook the engineering work of applying these mitigations to Fuchsia. We will also describe how Fuchsia is testing those mitigations to make sure they keep working.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a plugin designed to obtain a list of processes.[158][159]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using wscript and wrote the decoded output to a text file.[108]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can use VNC for remote access to targeted systems.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can monitor device photos and can also access browser history and bookmarks.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.[15][16]


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titleblackhat:us-19 Debug for Bug: Crack and Hack Apple Core by Itself - Fun and Profit to Debug and Fuzz Apple Kernel by lldb Script
As we know for security researchers, almost every operation system vendor has highly raised the bar of security vulnerability credit or bonus criteria and lots of security mitigations such CFI on Android 9 or PAC based on hardware on iOS 12 have been integrated to vendor system.What is more, industrial standard fuzzers (typical as AFL, syzkaller based on code coverage feedback) have been deployed on large scale. The survival space of bug hunting left for security researchers seems to be much smaller. Code reviewing based on threat expert knowledge seems to be the only way but which is obvious time consuming and dummy effort.Any idea on how to break the deadlock now? As security researchers, maybe you could try our debug fuzzer for bug hunt. This method we pledged has been verified to be effective to find and expand new attack interface but also flexible, scalable and scriptable for vulnerability research utilities. Based on our fuzzing methodology, we found dozens of vulnerabilities, including double free, oob read/write etc. which we will provide a detailed analysis of. However, these 10 vulnerabilities is the only part of we found, others will be analyzed later and submitted to Apple.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to query device information.[102]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can check device system properties to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.[29][30]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS can receive a command line argument to limit file encryption to specified directories.[22][23]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses the function kill_unwanted to obtain a list of running processes and kills each process matching a list of security related processes.[88]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can compile and execute source code sent to the compromised AD FS server via a specific HTTP POST.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can dynamically load additional functionality.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used Cobalt Strike C2 beacons for data exfiltration.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0222
ATT&CK Technique Name:CCBkdr
CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner's distribution site.[4][5][1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to use TCP sockets to send data and ICMP to ping the C2 server.[65][66]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
In some cases a local DNS sinkhole may be used to help prevent behaviors associated with dynamic resolution.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1590.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:IP Addresses
Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used the command net localgroup "adminstrator" to identify accounts with local administrator rights.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Malware researchers can reverse engineer malware variants that use DGAs and determine future domains that the malware will attempt to contact, but this is a time and resource intensive effort.[1][32] Malware is also increasingly incorporating seed values that can be unique for each instance, which would then need to be determined to extract future generated domains. In some cases, the seed that a particular sample uses can be extracted from DNS traffic.[5] Even so, there can be thousands of possible domains generated per day; this makes it impractical for defenders to preemptively register all possible C2 domains due to the cost.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can delete downloaded executables after running them.[175]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has attempted to lure users to click on a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[30]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to execute the command ipconfig /all.[80]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can delete the original executable after initial installation in addition to unused functions.[89][90]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot dropper can delay dropping the payload to evade detection.[34][35]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1056.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential API Hooking
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging,  this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[53]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses scp to access the ~/Library/Cookies/Cookies.binarycookies file.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to identify running services on a compromised host.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1461
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lockscreen Bypass
An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has the ability to gather browser data such as bookmarks and visited sites.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used the command timeout 20 to pause the execution of its initial loader.[37]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.[12]


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安全文本分析：

title:botconf2013 Spam and All Things Salty: Spambot v2013
This presentation will discuss our research on a threat that involves the massive attacks on WordPress, Joomla and Drupal sites and where they attempt to test the waters on a new spamming cycle. This routine involves different forms of web threats working independently of each other and has posed a challenge when it comes to email authentication. We will look into the (1) compromised website, (2) compromised machine, (3) command and control server, the (4) payloads and/or aliates involved and (5) the telemetry of the data we collected.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/03-JessadelaTorre-SpamBot-1.pdf


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions associated with creating and modifying platform images or containers based on the principle of least privilege.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can perform credential dumping from memory to obtain account and password information.[46]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
Enterprise policies should prevent enabling USB debugging on Android devices unless specifically needed (e.g., if the device is used for application development).


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group performed brute force attacks against administrator accounts.[18]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0654
ATT&CK Technique Name:ProLock
ProLock can encrypt files on a compromised host with RC6, and encrypts the key with RSA-1024.[65]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.[18]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil utilizes JavaScript, WScript, and PowerShell scripts to execute. The malicious JavaScript attachment has an obfuscated PowerShell script that executes the malware. [5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge, sometimes using esentutl.[87][88][89]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1584
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Infrastructure
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle. Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[87]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can take pictures with the device cameras.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1564.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBA Stomping
Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT stores a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications within a Registry key (such as HKCU\Office365DCOMCheck) in the HKCU hive.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris can download files and execute them on a victim's system.[444]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use asynchronous procedure call (APC) injection to execute commands received from C2.[6]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Breaking Encrypted Databases: Generic Attacks on Range Queries
Security researchers and practitioners have proposed many techniques for securely storing and querying outsourced data. I'll start this talk with an overview of common building blocks and the latest commercial and academic solutions, focusing on those that support range queries (e.g., selecting all records where the age attribute is between 18 and 65). These techniques are tailored to specific threat models. For example, if the database server is trusted but not the network, connections can be encrypted with TLS. If the database server is trusted but there is a risk of disk theft, full-disk encryption or page-level encryption of database files and logs (e.g., Transparent Data Encryption) can be enabled. If the database server isn't trusted at all, a system that encrypts all data before uploading it (e.g., via a CipherCloud gateway or CryptDB proxy server) could be employed.All of these solutions, however, leak some information when a query is processed -- like the set of records matching the query, or the size of this set. This information leaks even to an observer who doesn't have any cryptographic keys. The source of the leakage can vary; it could be network traffic, observed memory accesses, or database logs recovered by forensic analysis. I'll explain how this leakage can be exploited by an attacker to break the encryption and recover values in the database. These attacks are entirely generic and don't depend on the database implementation. They have connections to graph theory, Golomb rulers, and machine learning. I'll discuss proposed countermeasures, and finish by offering guidelines that practitioners can use when assessing the security claims of the latest and greatest database encryption solutions.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.[46]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.[132]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Traffic Signaling
Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of recording keystrokes.[25]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers/applications to regularly delete persistent web cookies.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
HAMMERTOSS exfiltrates data by uploading it to accounts created by the actors on Web cloud storage providers for the adversaries to retrieve later.[14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can use TCP to communicate between its agent and client modules.[23]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.[64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can intercept SMS messages containing two factor authentication codes.[1]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-21 Demystify AI Security Products With a Universal Pluggable XAI Translator
In the past years, we witnessed a dramatic rise in the platforms and apps based on machine learning and artificial intelligence. Inevitably, nearly every security product claims to be powered by deep learning technology and achieve an incredible detection rate. Confused by the various fancy terms advertised by security companies, the dilemma faced by customers is how to determine the quality of these products and how to choose the suitable one. Previous studies have proposed various ways to evaluate many kinds of ML-based security products (e.g malware detection, cloud-based, endpoint av). Our presentation tends to bridge the research‐to‐practice gap by sharing our experience when evaluating the real-world vendor's products.


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-22 I Am Whoever I Say I Am: Infiltrating Identity Providers Using a 0Click Exploit
Single Sign On (SSO) has become the dominant authentication scheme to login to several related, yet independent, software systems. At the core of this are the identity providers (IdP). Their role is to perform credential verification and to supply a signed token that service providers (SP) can consume for access control.On the other hand, when an application requests resources on behalf of a user and they're granted, then an authorization request is made to an authorization server (AS). The AS exchanges a code for a token which is presented to a resource server (RS) and the requested resources are consumed by the requesting application.Whilst OAuth2 handles authorization, and SAML handles authentication and as such Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions have become very popular in the enterprise environment to handle both use cases. What if IAM solutions are vulnerable to critical remote attacks? They need to be exposed on the internet, trusted to guard identities and facilitate access to hundreds if not thousands of users and applications.To begin with, I will cover the foundational use-case for IAM solutions and some past in the wild attacks (ITW) attacks with the extent of their impact.Continuing, I will present the approach I took with the audit including the challenges and pitfalls that I was faced with and how I overcame them. The result concluding with an unauthenticated remote code execution as root by chaining multiple vulnerabilities on a very popular IAM solution used by several Fortune 500 companies and government organizations.The vulnerabilities will be discussed in detail including novel exploitation strategies for bypassing strict outbound network access. Finally, a live demo will be presented with a release of functional exploit code so that penetration testers and network administrators can validate and remediate these critical findings.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher probes the system to check for antimalware processes.[40][41]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1574.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan has maliciously altered the OpenSSH binary on targeted systems to create a backdoor.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can collect the TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and network adapter configuration on a compromised host via ipconfig.exe /all.[214]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a command to modify a Registry key.[32]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has decrypted and dropped the DCSrv payload to disk.[180]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:asia-23 Prototype Pollution Leads to RCE: Gadgets Everywhere
Many have heard about Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in JavaScript applications. This kind of vulnerability allows an attacker to inject properties into an object's root prototype that may lead to flow control alteration and unexpected program behavior. Every time a successful exploit looks like magic or is limited to a denial of service (DoS). Would you be surprised if I told you that every application has a chain of methods that can be triggered by Prototype Pollution and leads to arbitrary code execution? Such gadgets populated Node.js core code and popular NPM packages. Keep calm. Not every app can be exploited! However, this fact increases the risk of exploitation many times over.In our research, we studied Prototype Pollution beyond DoS and analyzed Node.js source code against the gadgets. We then analyzed 15 popular Node.js apps from GitHub and got 8 RCEs. Through this talk, I will elaborate on the detected gadgets and vulnerabilities. We will also take a look at how the recent changes in Node.js mitigate these issues.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit is disguised as an Adobe Flash installer. When the file is opened it starts locking the infected computer. [5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can exfiltrate files from the victim machine.[191]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has the ability to download additional files from C2.[209]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [18]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect sent and received SMS messages.[25]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.[23][24]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can download files to compromised systems after receiving a command with the string downloaddd.[146]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCSync and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.[8][9][10][11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded files and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.[202][203]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can capture all keystrokes on a compromised host.[109]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider used fake updates for FlashPlayer plugin and Google Chrome as initial infection vectors.[74]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can capture clipboard data from a compromised host.[24]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.[13][14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leverages a reconstructed TriStation protocol within its framework to trigger APIs related to program download, program allocation, and program changes. [1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can recursively wipe folders and files in Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), PerfLogs, Boot, System, Volume Information, and AppData folders using FSCTL_MOVE_FILE. HermeticWiper can also overwrite symbolic links and big files in My Documents and on the Desktop with random bytes.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The Komplex trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used Web shells to persist in victim environments and assist in execution and exfiltration.[15][16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has deleted files related to its dynamic debugger feature.[109]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has used Powershell to retrieve the malicious payload and download additional resources like Mimikatz. [82][83][84][85][86]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.[48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute loadfromfile, loadfromstorage, and loadfrommem to inject a DLL  from disk, storage, or memory respectively.[54]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from databases. [8] [9]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has a module to perform any API hooking it desires.[2]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-21 CnCHunter: An MITM-Approach to Identify Live CnC Servers
How can we identify active CnC servers? Answering this question is critical for containing and combating botnets. Finding CnC servers is not trivial because: CnC servers can change locations expressly to avoid detection, use proprietary communication protocols, and often use end-to-end encryption. Most prior efforts first "learn" a malware communication protocol, and then, scan the Internet in search of live CnC servers. Although useful, this approach will not work with sophisticated malware that may use encryption or communication protocol that is hard to reverse engineer.In this session, we propose CnCHunter, a systematic tool that discovers live CnC servers efficiently. The novelty of our approach is that it uses real "activated" malware to search for live CnC servers, with CnCHunter acting as a Man-In-The-Middle. As a result, our approach overcomes the limitations of prior efforts. For example, the malware binary knows how to communicate with its server even if in the presence of encryption. We randomly selected 50 IoT malware samples collected between 2017 and 2021, and found their CnC servers. CnCHunter could automatically activate 96% of the malware and dynamically find the CnC servers.Additionally, we demonstrate the potential of our system by activating an old Gafgyt malware sample and enabling it to communicate with a live CnC server for a recent sample of the same family. This proves that an old malware binary of a family can be used to scan the Internet and find live Cnc servers for that malware family.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can exfiltrate SSH credentials through custom DNS queries.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has obtained and used open-source tools such as QuasarRAT.[83]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-22 Fault-Injection Detection Circuits: Design, Calibration, Validation and Tuning
This session covers the tunable replica circuit (TRC), a fault-injection detection circuit that has been integrated into Intel® Converged Security and Management Engine (Intel® CSME) in the recent 12th Gen Intel® Core™ Processor.  This is Intel's first foray into active fault-injection attack detection in high-volume products such as CPUs and chipsets.Ultimately, since a timing failure is the primary goal of fault-injection attacks and has been shown as the vehicle to cause unsigned code to run on other security engines, using the TRC to explicitly detect timing failures is Intel's current approach to fault-injection detection in client security engines. Unlike traditional analog voltage and clock monitors, the TRC detects timing failures that result from voltage, clock, temperature, and other glitch attacks, such as electromagnetic radiation. This session will introduce the TRC technology, how the TRC was integrated into Intel CSME, the process for calibrating the TRC in high volume manufacturing (HVM), as well as the false-positive and fault-injection testing that occurred in our physical attack labs.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has named the malicious DLL the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors.[175]


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

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安全论文分析：

title:Disavowable Public Key Encryption with Non-interactive Opening
author:Ai Ishida and
Keita Emura and
Goichiro Hanaoka and
Yusuke Sakai and
Keisuke Tanaka
Disavowable Public Key Encryption
with Non-interactive Opening
Ai Ishida
Tokyo Instutitute of Technology
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
ishida0@is.titech.ac.jp
Keita Emura
National Institute of
Information and
Communications Technology,
Japan
k-emura@nict.go.jp
Goichiro Hanaoka
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
hanaoka-
goichiro@aist.go.jp
Yusuke Sakai
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
yusuke.sakai@aist.go.jp
ABSTRACT
We propose the notion of disavowable public key encryption
with non-interactive opening (disavowable PKENO) where,
for a ciphertext and a message, the receiver of the ciphertext
can issue a proof that the plaintext of the ciphertext is NOT
the message, and give a fairly practical construction.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption|public key cryptosystems
General Terms
Theory, Security
Keywords
PKENO, disavowability, Groth-Sahai proof
1.
INTRODUCTION
The primitive public key encryption with non-interactive
opening (PKENO) [1] is a class of public key encryption with
additional functionality. By using this, a user can prove
that a ciphertext is an encryption of a certain message and
it is publicly veriﬁed. In some situation that a user needs
to claim that a ciphertext is NOT decrypted to a certain
message, if he proves the fact by using PKENO, the real
message of the ciphertext is revealed and a veriﬁer checks
that it is diﬀerent from the certain message about which
the user wants to prove. However, this naive solution is
problematic in terms of privacy. For example, a customer
of a store is required to prove that he did not buy a certain
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Disavowable Public Key Encryption with Non-interactive Opening
author:Ai Ishida and
Keita Emura and
Goichiro Hanaoka and
Yusuke Sakai and
Keisuke Tanaka
Disavowable Public Key Encryption
with Non-interactive Opening
Ai Ishida
Tokyo Instutitute of Technology
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
ishida0@is.titech.ac.jp
Keita Emura
National Institute of
Information and
Communications Technology,
Japan
k-emura@nict.go.jp
Goichiro Hanaoka
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
hanaoka-
goichiro@aist.go.jp
Yusuke Sakai
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology, Japan
yusuke.sakai@aist.go.jp
ABSTRACT
We propose the notion of disavowable public key encryption
with non-interactive opening (disavowable PKENO) where,
for a ciphertext and a message, the receiver of the ciphertext
can issue a proof that the plaintext of the ciphertext is NOT
the message, and give a fairly practical construction.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption|public key cryptosystems
General Terms
Theory, Security
Keywords
PKENO, disavowability, Groth-Sahai proof
1.
INTRODUCTION
The primitive public key encryption with non-interactive
opening (PKENO) [1] is a class of public key encryption with
additional functionality. By using this, a user can prove
that a ciphertext is an encryption of a certain message and
it is publicly veriﬁed. In some situation that a user needs
to claim that a ciphertext is NOT decrypted to a certain
message, if he proves the fact by using PKENO, the real
message of the ciphertext is revealed and a veriﬁer checks
that it is diﬀerent from the certain message about which
the user wants to prove. However, this naive solution is
problematic in terms of privacy. For example, a customer
of a store is required to prove that he did not buy a certain
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Neural Machine Translation Inspired Binary Code Similarity Comparison
beyond Function Pairs
author:Fei Zuo and
Xiaopeng Li and
Patrick Young and
Lannan Luo and
Qiang Zeng and
Zhexin Zhang
Neural Machine Translation Inspired Binary Code
Similarity Comparison beyond Function Pairs
Fei Zuo†, Xiaopeng Li†, Patrick Young‡, Lannan Luo†*, Qiang Zeng†*, Zhexin Zhang†
†University of South Carolina, ‡Temple University
{fzuo, xl4, zhexin}@email.sc.edu, {lluo, zeng1}@cse.sc.edu
Abstract—Binary code analysis allows analyzing binary code
without having access to the corresponding source code. A binary,
after disassembly, is expressed in an assembly language. This
inspires us to approach binary analysis by leveraging ideas and
techniques from Natural Language Processing (NLP), a fruitful
area focused on processing text of various natural languages. We
notice that binary code analysis and NLP share many analogical
topics, such as semantics extraction, classiﬁcation, and code/text
comparison. This work thus borrows ideas from NLP to address
two important code similarity comparison problems. (I) Given
a pair of basic blocks of different instruction set architectures
(ISAs), determining whether their semantics is similar; and (II)
given a piece of code of interest, determining if it is contained in
another piece of code of a different ISA. The solutions to these
two problems have many applications, such as cross-architecture
vulnerability discovery and code plagiarism detection.
Despite the evident importance of Problem I, existing solutions
are either inefﬁcient or imprecise. Inspired by Neural Machine
Translation (NMT), which is a new approach that tackles text
across natural languages very well, we regard instructions as
words and basic blocks as sentences, and propose a novel cross-
(assembly)-lingual deep learning approach to solving Problem I,
attaining high efﬁciency and precision. Many solutions have been
proposed to determine whether two pieces of code, e.g., functions,...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Neural Machine Translation Inspired Binary Code Similarity Comparison
beyond Function Pairs
author:Fei Zuo and
Xiaopeng Li and
Patrick Young and
Lannan Luo and
Qiang Zeng and
Zhexin Zhang
Neural Machine Translation Inspired Binary Code
Similarity Comparison beyond Function Pairs
Fei Zuo†, Xiaopeng Li†, Patrick Young‡, Lannan Luo†*, Qiang Zeng†*, Zhexin Zhang†
†University of South Carolina, ‡Temple University
{fzuo, xl4, zhexin}@email.sc.edu, {lluo, zeng1}@cse.sc.edu
Abstract—Binary code analysis allows analyzing binary code
without having access to the corresponding source code. A binary,
after disassembly, is expressed in an assembly language. This
inspires us to approach binary analysis by leveraging ideas and
techniques from Natural Language Processing (NLP), a fruitful
area focused on processing text of various natural languages. We
notice that binary code analysis and NLP share many analogical
topics, such as semantics extraction, classiﬁcation, and code/text
comparison. This work thus borrows ideas from NLP to address
two important code similarity comparison problems. (I) Given
a pair of basic blocks of different instruction set architectures
(ISAs), determining whether their semantics is similar; and (II)
given a piece of code of interest, determining if it is contained in
another piece of code of a different ISA. The solutions to these
two problems have many applications, such as cross-architecture
vulnerability discovery and code plagiarism detection.
Despite the evident importance of Problem I, existing solutions
are either inefﬁcient or imprecise. Inspired by Neural Machine
Translation (NMT), which is a new approach that tackles text
across natural languages very well, we regard instructions as
words and basic blocks as sentences, and propose a novel cross-
(assembly)-lingual deep learning approach to solving Problem I,
attaining high efﬁciency and precision. Many solutions have been
proposed to determine whether two pieces of code, e.g., functions,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:What Mobile Ads Know About Mobile Users
author:Sooel Son and
Daehyeok Kim and
Vitaly Shmatikov
What Mobile Ads Know About Mobile Users
Sooel Son
Daehyeok Kim
Vitaly Shmatikov
Google
KAIST
Cornell Tech
Abstract
We analyze the software stack of popular mobile adver-
tising libraries on Android and investigate how they protect
the users of advertising-supported apps from malicious
advertising. We ﬁnd that, by and large, Android adver-
tising libraries properly separate the privileges of the ads
from the host app by conﬁning ads to dedicated browser
instances that correctly apply the same origin policy.
We then demonstrate how malicious ads can infer sensi-
tive information about users by accessing external storage,
which is essential for media-rich ads in order to cache
video and images. Even though the same origin policy
prevents conﬁned ads from reading other apps’ external-
storage ﬁles, it does not prevent them from learning that a
ﬁle with a particular name exists. We show how, depending
on the app, the mere existence of a ﬁle can reveal sensitive
information about the user. For example, if the user has
a pharmacy price-comparison app installed on the device,
the presence of external-storage ﬁles with certain names
reveals which drugs the user has looked for.
We conclude with our recommendations for redesigning
mobile advertising software to better protect users from
malicious advertising.
I.
Introduction
Many mobile apps rely on advertising for at least part of
their revenue. An advertising-supported app typically in-
corporates multiple advertising libraries (AdSDKs). While
the app is running, each AdSDK fetches ads from its
servers, where they have been uploaded by advertisers, and
displays them to the app’s user.
Business imperatives are driving the development of
re-
mobile advertising technology. To increase users’
Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial
purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:What Mobile Ads Know About Mobile Users
author:Sooel Son and
Daehyeok Kim and
Vitaly Shmatikov
What Mobile Ads Know About Mobile Users
Sooel Son
Daehyeok Kim
Vitaly Shmatikov
Google
KAIST
Cornell Tech
Abstract
We analyze the software stack of popular mobile adver-
tising libraries on Android and investigate how they protect
the users of advertising-supported apps from malicious
advertising. We ﬁnd that, by and large, Android adver-
tising libraries properly separate the privileges of the ads
from the host app by conﬁning ads to dedicated browser
instances that correctly apply the same origin policy.
We then demonstrate how malicious ads can infer sensi-
tive information about users by accessing external storage,
which is essential for media-rich ads in order to cache
video and images. Even though the same origin policy
prevents conﬁned ads from reading other apps’ external-
storage ﬁles, it does not prevent them from learning that a
ﬁle with a particular name exists. We show how, depending
on the app, the mere existence of a ﬁle can reveal sensitive
information about the user. For example, if the user has
a pharmacy price-comparison app installed on the device,
the presence of external-storage ﬁles with certain names
reveals which drugs the user has looked for.
We conclude with our recommendations for redesigning
mobile advertising software to better protect users from
malicious advertising.
I.
Introduction
Many mobile apps rely on advertising for at least part of
their revenue. An advertising-supported app typically in-
corporates multiple advertising libraries (AdSDKs). While
the app is running, each AdSDK fetches ads from its
servers, where they have been uploaded by advertisers, and
displays them to the app’s user.
Business imperatives are driving the development of
re-
mobile advertising technology. To increase users’
Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial
purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure Integration of Web Content and Applications on Commodity Mobile
Operating Systems
author:Drew Davidson and
Yaohui Chen and
Franklin George and
Long Lu and
Somesh Jha
Secure Integration of Web Content and Applications on
Commodity Mobile Operating Systems
Drew Davidson
University of Wisconsin
Yaohui Chen
Stony Brook University
Franklin George
Stony Brook University
Long Lu
Stony Brook University
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
ABSTRACT
A majority of today’s mobile apps integrate web content
of various kinds. Unfortunately, the interactions between
app code and web content expose new attack vectors: a
malicious app can subvert its embedded web content to steal
user secrets; on the other hand, malicious web content can
use the privileges of its embedding app to exﬁltrate sensitive
information such as the user’s location and contacts.
In this paper, we discuss security weaknesses of the in-
terface between app code and web content through attacks,
then introduce defenses that can be deployed without mod-
ifying the OS. Our defenses feature WIREframe, a service
that securely embeds and renders external web content in
Android apps, and in turn, prevents attacks between em-
bedded web and host apps. WIREframe fully mediates the
interface between app code and embedded web content. Un-
like the existing web-embedding mechanisms, WIREframe
allows both apps and embedded web content to deﬁne sim-
ple access policies to protect their own resources. These
policies recognize ﬁne-grained security principals, such as
origins, and control all interactions between apps and the
web. We also introduce WIRE (Web Isolation Rewriting
Engine), an o✏ine app rewriting tool that allows app users
to inject WIREframe protections into existing apps. Our
evaluation, based on 7166 popular apps and 20 specially se-
lected apps, shows these techniques work on complex apps
and incur acceptable end-to-end performance overhead.
1.
INTRODUCTION
A common app design paradigm is to embed web...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure Integration of Web Content and Applications on Commodity Mobile
Operating Systems
author:Drew Davidson and
Yaohui Chen and
Franklin George and
Long Lu and
Somesh Jha
Secure Integration of Web Content and Applications on
Commodity Mobile Operating Systems
Drew Davidson
University of Wisconsin
Yaohui Chen
Stony Brook University
Franklin George
Stony Brook University
Long Lu
Stony Brook University
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
ABSTRACT
A majority of today’s mobile apps integrate web content
of various kinds. Unfortunately, the interactions between
app code and web content expose new attack vectors: a
malicious app can subvert its embedded web content to steal
user secrets; on the other hand, malicious web content can
use the privileges of its embedding app to exﬁltrate sensitive
information such as the user’s location and contacts.
In this paper, we discuss security weaknesses of the in-
terface between app code and web content through attacks,
then introduce defenses that can be deployed without mod-
ifying the OS. Our defenses feature WIREframe, a service
that securely embeds and renders external web content in
Android apps, and in turn, prevents attacks between em-
bedded web and host apps. WIREframe fully mediates the
interface between app code and embedded web content. Un-
like the existing web-embedding mechanisms, WIREframe
allows both apps and embedded web content to deﬁne sim-
ple access policies to protect their own resources. These
policies recognize ﬁne-grained security principals, such as
origins, and control all interactions between apps and the
web. We also introduce WIRE (Web Isolation Rewriting
Engine), an o✏ine app rewriting tool that allows app users
to inject WIREframe protections into existing apps. Our
evaluation, based on 7166 popular apps and 20 specially se-
lected apps, shows these techniques work on complex apps
and incur acceptable end-to-end performance overhead.
1.
INTRODUCTION
A common app design paradigm is to embed web...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting and Analyzing Automated Activity on Twitter
author:Chao Michael Zhang and
Vern Paxson
Detecting and Analyzing Automated Activity on Twitter
Chao Michael Zhang1 and Vern Paxson1,2,(cid:2)
1 University of California, Berkeley, CA
2 International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Abstract. We present a method for determining whether a Twitter account ex-
hibits automated behavior in publishing status updates known as tweets. The ap-
proach uses only the publicly available timestamp information associated with
each tweet. After evaluating its effectiveness, we use it to analyze the Twitter
landscape, ﬁnding that 16% of active accounts exhibit a high degree of automa-
tion. We also ﬁnd that 11% of accounts that appear to publish exclusively through
the browser are in fact automated accounts that spoof the source of the updates.
1 Introduction
Twitter is a microblogging service that allows its members to publish short status up-
dates known as tweets. Over 180 M visitors interact with Twitter each month, generating
55 M tweets/day [13]. User accounts and their status updates are public by default, ac-
cessible by the general public via Twitter’s two application program interfaces (APIs).
The large number of users, low privacy expectations, and easy-to-use API have made
Twitter a target of abuse, whether relatively benign in the form of spam and disruptive
marketing tactics [5], or malicious in the form of links to malware [17] and phishing
schemes [8]. Often abuse on Twitter employs automation for actions such as publishing
tweets, following another user, and sending links through private messages.
Prior research on Twitter has studied the properties of the social network [10], char-
acteristics of users and their behavior [11], and social interactions between users [9], but
not speciﬁcally regarding the issue of automation on Twitter (other than our own use
of the technique we develop here to assist with ﬁnding Twitter “career” spammers [7]).
In th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting and Analyzing Automated Activity on Twitter
author:Chao Michael Zhang and
Vern Paxson
Detecting and Analyzing Automated Activity on Twitter
Chao Michael Zhang1 and Vern Paxson1,2,(cid:2)
1 University of California, Berkeley, CA
2 International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Abstract. We present a method for determining whether a Twitter account ex-
hibits automated behavior in publishing status updates known as tweets. The ap-
proach uses only the publicly available timestamp information associated with
each tweet. After evaluating its effectiveness, we use it to analyze the Twitter
landscape, ﬁnding that 16% of active accounts exhibit a high degree of automa-
tion. We also ﬁnd that 11% of accounts that appear to publish exclusively through
the browser are in fact automated accounts that spoof the source of the updates.
1 Introduction
Twitter is a microblogging service that allows its members to publish short status up-
dates known as tweets. Over 180 M visitors interact with Twitter each month, generating
55 M tweets/day [13]. User accounts and their status updates are public by default, ac-
cessible by the general public via Twitter’s two application program interfaces (APIs).
The large number of users, low privacy expectations, and easy-to-use API have made
Twitter a target of abuse, whether relatively benign in the form of spam and disruptive
marketing tactics [5], or malicious in the form of links to malware [17] and phishing
schemes [8]. Often abuse on Twitter employs automation for actions such as publishing
tweets, following another user, and sending links through private messages.
Prior research on Twitter has studied the properties of the social network [10], char-
acteristics of users and their behavior [11], and social interactions between users [9], but
not speciﬁcally regarding the issue of automation on Twitter (other than our own use
of the technique we develop here to assist with ﬁnding Twitter “career” spammers [7]).
In th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Structured streams: a new transport abstraction
author:Bryan Ford
Structured Streams: a New Transport Abstraction
Bryan Ford
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Internet applications currently have a choice between stream
and datagram transport abstractions. Datagrams eﬃciently
support small transactions and streams are suited for long-
running conversations, but neither abstraction adequately
supports applications like HTTP that exhibit a mixture of
transaction sizes, or applications like FTP and SIP that use
multiple transport instances. Structured Stream Transport
(SST) enhances the traditional stream abstraction with a hi-
erarchical hereditary structure, allowing applications to cre-
ate lightweight child streams from any existing stream. Un-
like TCP streams, these lightweight streams incur neither
3-way handshaking delays on startup nor TIME-WAIT pe-
riods on close. Each stream oﬀers independent data transfer
and ﬂow control, allowing diﬀerent transactions to proceed
in parallel without head-of-line blocking, but all streams
share one congestion control context. SST supports both
reliable and best-eﬀort delivery in a way that semantically
uniﬁes datagrams with streams and solves the classic “large
datagram” problem, where a datagram’s loss probability in-
creases exponentially with fragment count. Finally, an ap-
plication can prioritize its streams relative to each other and
adjust priorities dynamically through out-of-band signaling.
A user-space prototype shows that SST is TCP-friendly to
within 2%, and performs comparably to a user-space TCP
and to within 10% of kernel TCP on a WiFi network.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols; C.2.6 [Computer-Communication Networks]:
Internetworking—Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Performance, Security, Standardization
Keywords
SST, transport protocols, stream, datagram, reliable, best-
eﬀort, web transport, multimedia, ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Structured streams: a new transport abstraction
author:Bryan Ford
Structured Streams: a New Transport Abstraction
Bryan Ford
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Internet applications currently have a choice between stream
and datagram transport abstractions. Datagrams eﬃciently
support small transactions and streams are suited for long-
running conversations, but neither abstraction adequately
supports applications like HTTP that exhibit a mixture of
transaction sizes, or applications like FTP and SIP that use
multiple transport instances. Structured Stream Transport
(SST) enhances the traditional stream abstraction with a hi-
erarchical hereditary structure, allowing applications to cre-
ate lightweight child streams from any existing stream. Un-
like TCP streams, these lightweight streams incur neither
3-way handshaking delays on startup nor TIME-WAIT pe-
riods on close. Each stream oﬀers independent data transfer
and ﬂow control, allowing diﬀerent transactions to proceed
in parallel without head-of-line blocking, but all streams
share one congestion control context. SST supports both
reliable and best-eﬀort delivery in a way that semantically
uniﬁes datagrams with streams and solves the classic “large
datagram” problem, where a datagram’s loss probability in-
creases exponentially with fragment count. Finally, an ap-
plication can prioritize its streams relative to each other and
adjust priorities dynamically through out-of-band signaling.
A user-space prototype shows that SST is TCP-friendly to
within 2%, and performs comparably to a user-space TCP
and to within 10% of kernel TCP on a WiFi network.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols; C.2.6 [Computer-Communication Networks]:
Internetworking—Standards (e.g., TCP/IP)
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Performance, Security, Standardization
Keywords
SST, transport protocols, stream, datagram, reliable, best-
eﬀort, web transport, multimedia, ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:KHyperLogLog: Estimating Reidentifiability and Joinability of Large
Data at Scale
author:Pern Hui Chia and
Damien Desfontaines and
Irippuge Milinda Perera and
Daniel Simmons-Marengo and
Chao Li and
Wei-Yen Day and
Qiushi Wang and
Miguel Guevara
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
KHyperLogLog: Estimating Reidentiﬁability and
∗
, Daniel Simmons-Marengo
,
Joinability of Large Data at Scale
∗
Pern Hui Chia
∗†
∗
, Irippuge Milinda Perera
∗
, Wei-Yen Day
∗
, Miguel Guevara
, Damien Desfontaines
∗
Chao Li
∗
∗
, Qiushi Wang
ETH Z¨urich
†
Google,
∗{pernhc, milinda, dasm, chaoli, wday, qiushi, mgt}@google.com,
†
damien@desfontain.es
Abstract—Understanding the privacy relevant charac-
teristics of data sets, such as reidentiﬁability and joinabil-
ity, is crucial for data governance, yet can be difﬁcult for
large data sets. While computing the data characteristics
by brute force is straightforward, the scale of systems
and data collected by large organizations demands an
efﬁcient approach. We present KHyperLogLog (KHLL),
an algorithm based on approximate counting techniques
that can estimate the reidentiﬁability and joinability risks
of very large databases using linear runtime and minimal
memory. KHLL enables one to measure reidentiﬁability of
data quantitatively, rather than based on expert judgement
or manual reviews. Meanwhile, joinability analysis using
KHLL helps ensure the separation of pseudonymous
and identiﬁed data sets. We describe how organizations
can use KHLL to improve protection of user privacy.
The efﬁciency of KHLL allows one to schedule periodic
analyses that detect any deviations from the expected risks
over time as a regression test for privacy. We vali...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:KHyperLogLog: Estimating Reidentifiability and Joinability of Large
Data at Scale
author:Pern Hui Chia and
Damien Desfontaines and
Irippuge Milinda Perera and
Daniel Simmons-Marengo and
Chao Li and
Wei-Yen Day and
Qiushi Wang and
Miguel Guevara
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
KHyperLogLog: Estimating Reidentiﬁability and
∗
, Daniel Simmons-Marengo
,
Joinability of Large Data at Scale
∗
Pern Hui Chia
∗†
∗
, Irippuge Milinda Perera
∗
, Wei-Yen Day
∗
, Miguel Guevara
, Damien Desfontaines
∗
Chao Li
∗
∗
, Qiushi Wang
ETH Z¨urich
†
Google,
∗{pernhc, milinda, dasm, chaoli, wday, qiushi, mgt}@google.com,
†
damien@desfontain.es
Abstract—Understanding the privacy relevant charac-
teristics of data sets, such as reidentiﬁability and joinabil-
ity, is crucial for data governance, yet can be difﬁcult for
large data sets. While computing the data characteristics
by brute force is straightforward, the scale of systems
and data collected by large organizations demands an
efﬁcient approach. We present KHyperLogLog (KHLL),
an algorithm based on approximate counting techniques
that can estimate the reidentiﬁability and joinability risks
of very large databases using linear runtime and minimal
memory. KHLL enables one to measure reidentiﬁability of
data quantitatively, rather than based on expert judgement
or manual reviews. Meanwhile, joinability analysis using
KHLL helps ensure the separation of pseudonymous
and identiﬁed data sets. We describe how organizations
can use KHLL to improve protection of user privacy.
The efﬁciency of KHLL allows one to schedule periodic
analyses that detect any deviations from the expected risks
over time as a regression test for privacy. We vali...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。