Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:MTD 2014: First ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense
author:Sushil Jajodia and
Kun Sun
Toward Proactive, Adaptive Defense:
A Survey on Moving Target Defense
Jin-Hee Cho, Dilli P. Sharma, Hooman Alavizadeh, Seunghyun Yoon, Noam Ben-Asher, Terrence J. Moore, Dong
Seong Kim, Hyuk Lim, and Frederica F. Nelson
1
Abstract—Reactive defense mechanisms, such as intrusion
detection systems, have made signiﬁcant efforts to secure a system
or network for the last several decades. However, the nature of
reactive security mechanisms has limitations because potential
attackers cannot be prevented in advance. We are facing a
reality with the proliferation of persistent, advanced, intelligent
attacks while defenders are often way behind attackers in taking
appropriate actions to thwart potential attackers. The concept
of moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive
defense mechanism aiming to prevent attacks. In this work,
we conducted a comprehensive, in-depth survey to discuss the
following aspects of MTD: key roles, design principles, classiﬁca-
tions, common attacks, key methodologies, important algorithms,
metrics, evaluation methods, and application domains. We discuss
the pros and cons of all aspects of MTD surveyed in this work.
Lastly, we highlight insights and lessons learned from this study
and suggest future work directions. The aim of this paper is
to provide the overall trends of MTD research in terms of
critical aspects of defense systems for researchers who seek for
developing proactive, adaptive MTD mechanisms.
Index Terms—Moving target defense, proactive defense, cyber-
security, attack surface, shufﬂing, diversity, redundancy
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In the classic “shell game,” dating at least to the times of
ancient Greece, a pea or ball is hidden under one of three
shells or cups, and players gamble to guess the location of the
pea after the shells have been moved. This game is also known
as “thimblerig,” “three shells and a pea,” and the ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MTD 2014: First ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense
author:Sushil Jajodia and
Kun Sun
Toward Proactive, Adaptive Defense:
A Survey on Moving Target Defense
Jin-Hee Cho, Dilli P. Sharma, Hooman Alavizadeh, Seunghyun Yoon, Noam Ben-Asher, Terrence J. Moore, Dong
Seong Kim, Hyuk Lim, and Frederica F. Nelson
1
Abstract—Reactive defense mechanisms, such as intrusion
detection systems, have made signiﬁcant efforts to secure a system
or network for the last several decades. However, the nature of
reactive security mechanisms has limitations because potential
attackers cannot be prevented in advance. We are facing a
reality with the proliferation of persistent, advanced, intelligent
attacks while defenders are often way behind attackers in taking
appropriate actions to thwart potential attackers. The concept
of moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive
defense mechanism aiming to prevent attacks. In this work,
we conducted a comprehensive, in-depth survey to discuss the
following aspects of MTD: key roles, design principles, classiﬁca-
tions, common attacks, key methodologies, important algorithms,
metrics, evaluation methods, and application domains. We discuss
the pros and cons of all aspects of MTD surveyed in this work.
Lastly, we highlight insights and lessons learned from this study
and suggest future work directions. The aim of this paper is
to provide the overall trends of MTD research in terms of
critical aspects of defense systems for researchers who seek for
developing proactive, adaptive MTD mechanisms.
Index Terms—Moving target defense, proactive defense, cyber-
security, attack surface, shufﬂing, diversity, redundancy
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In the classic “shell game,” dating at least to the times of
ancient Greece, a pea or ball is hidden under one of three
shells or cups, and players gamble to guess the location of the
pea after the shells have been moved. This game is also known
as “thimblerig,” “three shells and a pea,” and the ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely
Used RSA Moduli
author:Mat'us Nemec and
Marek S'ys and
Petr Svenda and
Dusan Klinec and
Vashek Matyas
The Return of Coppersmith’s A(cid:130)ack:
Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli
Matus Nemec
Petr Svenda
Masaryk University,
Marek Sys∗
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
mnemec@mail.muni.cz
Masaryk University
syso@(cid:128).muni.cz
Masaryk University
svenda@(cid:128).muni.cz
Dusan Klinec
EnigmaBridge, Masaryk University
dusan@enigmabridge.com
ABSTRACT
We report on our discovery of an algorithmic (cid:131)aw in the construc-
tion of primes for RSA key generation in a widely-used library
of a major manufacturer of cryptographic hardware. (cid:140)e primes
generated by the library su(cid:130)er from a signi(cid:128)cant loss of entropy.
We propose a practical factorization method for various key lengths
including 1024 and 2048 bits. Our method requires no additional
information except for the value of the public modulus and does
not depend on a weak or a faulty random number generator. We
devised an extension of Coppersmith’s factorization a(cid:138)ack utilizing
an alternative form of the primes in question. (cid:140)e library in ques-
tion is found in NIST FIPS 140-2 and CC EAL 5+ certi(cid:128)ed devices
used for a wide range of real-world applications, including identity
cards, passports, Trusted Platform Modules, PGP and tokens for
authentication or so(cid:137)ware signing. As the relevant library code was
introduced in 2012 at the latest (and probably earlier), the impacted
devices are now widespread. Tens of thousands of such keys were
directly identi(cid:128)ed, many with signi(cid:128)cant impacts, especially for
electronic identity documents, so(cid:137)ware signing, Trusted Comput-
ing and PGP. We estimate the number of a(cid:130)ected devices to be in
the order of at least tens of millions.
(cid:140)e worst cases for the factorization of 1024 and 2048-bit keys
a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Advanced Client/Server Authentication in TLS
author:Adam Hess and
Jared Jacobson and
Hyrum Mills and
Ryan Wamsley and
Kent E. Seamons and
Bryan Smith
Advanced Client/Server Authentication in TLS
Adam Hess, Jared Jacobson, Hyrum Mills, Ryan Wamsley, Kent E. Seamons, Bryan Smith
Computer Science Department
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah, USA 84602
seamons@cs.byu.edu
ABSTRACT
  This  paper  describes
Many  business  transactions  on  the  Internet  occur
between  strangers,  that  is,  between  entities  with  no  prior
relationship and no common security domain.  Traditional
security  approaches  based  on  identity  or  capabilities  do
not  solve  the  problem  of  establishing  trust  between
strangers.    New  approaches  to  trust  establishment  are
required that are secure, scalable, and portable.  One new
approach to mutual trust establishment is trust negotiation,
the  bilateral  exchange  of  digital  credentials  to  establish
trust  gradually.
the  Trust
Negotiation  in  TLS  (TNT)  protocol,  an  extension  to  the
TLS handshake protocol that incorporates recent advances
in
to  provide  advanced
client/server  authentication  in  TLS.    In  this  paper  we
describe  the  current  limitations  in  TLS  client/server
authentication  with  respect  to  trust  establishment,  and
show  how  the  TNT  protocol  overcomes  them.    We  also
describe our implementation of TNT, built using PureTLS,
a  Java  TLS  package  that  is  freely  available.    This
implementation  is  the  first  to  provide  confidential  trust
negotiation,  verification  of  private  keys  during  trust
negotiation,  and  a  single  trust  negotiation  protocol
supporting interoperable trust negotiation strategies.
trust  negotiation
into  TLS
1.  Introduction
that
Many  interactions  on  the  Internet  occur  between
strangers,
is,  between  entities  with  no  prior
relationship and no common security domain.  Traditional
security...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Advanced Client/Server Authentication in TLS
author:Adam Hess and
Jared Jacobson and
Hyrum Mills and
Ryan Wamsley and
Kent E. Seamons and
Bryan Smith
Advanced Client/Server Authentication in TLS
Adam Hess, Jared Jacobson, Hyrum Mills, Ryan Wamsley, Kent E. Seamons, Bryan Smith
Computer Science Department
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah, USA 84602
seamons@cs.byu.edu
ABSTRACT
  This  paper  describes
Many  business  transactions  on  the  Internet  occur
between  strangers,  that  is,  between  entities  with  no  prior
relationship and no common security domain.  Traditional
security  approaches  based  on  identity  or  capabilities  do
not  solve  the  problem  of  establishing  trust  between
strangers.    New  approaches  to  trust  establishment  are
required that are secure, scalable, and portable.  One new
approach to mutual trust establishment is trust negotiation,
the  bilateral  exchange  of  digital  credentials  to  establish
trust  gradually.
the  Trust
Negotiation  in  TLS  (TNT)  protocol,  an  extension  to  the
TLS handshake protocol that incorporates recent advances
in
to  provide  advanced
client/server  authentication  in  TLS.    In  this  paper  we
describe  the  current  limitations  in  TLS  client/server
authentication  with  respect  to  trust  establishment,  and
show  how  the  TNT  protocol  overcomes  them.    We  also
describe our implementation of TNT, built using PureTLS,
a  Java  TLS  package  that  is  freely  available.    This
implementation  is  the  first  to  provide  confidential  trust
negotiation,  verification  of  private  keys  during  trust
negotiation,  and  a  single  trust  negotiation  protocol
supporting interoperable trust negotiation strategies.
trust  negotiation
into  TLS
1.  Introduction
that
Many  interactions  on  the  Internet  occur  between
strangers,
is,  between  entities  with  no  prior
relationship and no common security domain.  Traditional
security...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
author:Dennis Andriesse and
Xi Chen and
Victor van der Veen and
Asia Slowinska and
Herbert Bos
An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly
on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
Dennis Andriesse, Xi Chen, and Victor van der Veen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam;
Asia Slowinska, Lastline, Inc.; Herbert Bos, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
 https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/andriesse
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 10–12, 2016 • Austin, TXISBN 978-1-931971-32-4Open access to the Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
Dennis Andriesse†§, Xi Chen†§, Victor van der Veen†§, Asia Slowinska‡, and Herbert Bos†§
†{d.a.andriesse,x.chen,v.vander.veen,h.j.bos}@vu.nl
Computer Science Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
§Amsterdam Department of Informatics
‡asia@lastline.com
Lastline, Inc.
Abstract
It is well-known that static disassembly is an unsolved
problem, but how much of a problem is it in real software—
for instance, for binary protection schemes? This work
studies the accuracy of nine state-of-the-art disassemblers
on 981 real-world compiler-generated binaries with a
wide variety of properties. In contrast, prior work focuses
on isolated corner cases; we show that this has led to a
widespread and overly pessimistic view on the prevalence
of complex constructs like inline data and overlapping
code, leading reviewers and researchers to underestimate
the potential of binary-based research. On the other hand,
some constructs, such as function boundaries, are much
harder to recover accurately than is reﬂected in the litera-
ture, which rarely discusses much needed error handling
for these primitives. We study 30 papers recently pub-
lished in six major security venues, and reveal a mismatch
between expectations in the ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
author:Dennis Andriesse and
Xi Chen and
Victor van der Veen and
Asia Slowinska and
Herbert Bos
An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly
on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
Dennis Andriesse, Xi Chen, and Victor van der Veen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam;
Asia Slowinska, Lastline, Inc.; Herbert Bos, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
 https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/andriesse
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 10–12, 2016 • Austin, TXISBN 978-1-931971-32-4Open access to the Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
Dennis Andriesse†§, Xi Chen†§, Victor van der Veen†§, Asia Slowinska‡, and Herbert Bos†§
†{d.a.andriesse,x.chen,v.vander.veen,h.j.bos}@vu.nl
Computer Science Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
§Amsterdam Department of Informatics
‡asia@lastline.com
Lastline, Inc.
Abstract
It is well-known that static disassembly is an unsolved
problem, but how much of a problem is it in real software—
for instance, for binary protection schemes? This work
studies the accuracy of nine state-of-the-art disassemblers
on 981 real-world compiler-generated binaries with a
wide variety of properties. In contrast, prior work focuses
on isolated corner cases; we show that this has led to a
widespread and overly pessimistic view on the prevalence
of complex constructs like inline data and overlapping
code, leading reviewers and researchers to underestimate
the potential of binary-based research. On the other hand,
some constructs, such as function boundaries, are much
harder to recover accurately than is reﬂected in the litera-
ture, which rarely discusses much needed error handling
for these primitives. We study 30 papers recently pub-
lished in six major security venues, and reveal a mismatch
between expectations in the ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:NoSQL Breakdown: A Large-scale Analysis of Misconfigured NoSQL Services
author:Dario Ferrari and
Michele Carminati and
Mario Polino and
Stefano Zanero
A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
NoSQL BreakDown:
Dario Ferrari, Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, and Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2020)
Why look at NoSQL Security ?
The requirements of database
storage systems have changed
They become popular
● Scalability
● Redundancy
● Flexibility
● Rapid Development/Deployment
● Low Cost
● Easy to Use
2 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
NoSQL means “No Security”?
Most NoSQL services offer built-in security features
... but ...
Not enabled by default
Not trivial to configure for non-expert users
Instance is exposed to the Internet
MISCONFIGURATIONS
Information Leakage
Data Tampering
3 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Threat Scenarios
Data Leakage
(Reading Privileges)
Ransom Demand
(Writing Privileges)
Web Resource Tampering
(Writing Privileges)
4 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.com
thehackernews.com
5 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.co
m
thehackernews.com
6 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.co
m
thehackernews.com
7 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Research Goals
Large-scale analysis of the usage of NoSQL services
1. Identify unprotected instances
2. Measure the impact of the misconfigurations
3. Raise awareness on the risk of data leakage and tampering
8 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
A Word of Warning: Ethical Concerns
●...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:NoSQL Breakdown: A Large-scale Analysis of Misconfigured NoSQL Services
author:Dario Ferrari and
Michele Carminati and
Mario Polino and
Stefano Zanero
A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
NoSQL BreakDown:
Dario Ferrari, Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, and Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2020)
Why look at NoSQL Security ?
The requirements of database
storage systems have changed
They become popular
● Scalability
● Redundancy
● Flexibility
● Rapid Development/Deployment
● Low Cost
● Easy to Use
2 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
NoSQL means “No Security”?
Most NoSQL services offer built-in security features
... but ...
Not enabled by default
Not trivial to configure for non-expert users
Instance is exposed to the Internet
MISCONFIGURATIONS
Information Leakage
Data Tampering
3 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Threat Scenarios
Data Leakage
(Reading Privileges)
Ransom Demand
(Writing Privileges)
Web Resource Tampering
(Writing Privileges)
4 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.com
thehackernews.com
5 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.co
m
thehackernews.com
6 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Vulnerable Instances...Hacked in the Wild
pandasecurity.co
m
thehackernews.com
7 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
Research Goals
Large-scale analysis of the usage of NoSQL services
1. Identify unprotected instances
2. Measure the impact of the misconfigurations
3. Raise awareness on the risk of data leakage and tampering
8 | NOSQL BreakDown: A Large-scale Analysis of misconfigured NoSQL Services
A Word of Warning: Ethical Concerns
●...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat
author:Lance Spitzner
Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat
Lance Spitzner
Honeypot Technologies Inc
lance@honeypots.com
Abstract
into  honeypot
technologies,  primarily
In  the  past  several  years  there  has  been  extensive
research
for
detection  and  information  gathering  against  external
threats.  However, little research has been done for one of
the  most  dangerous  threats,  the  advance  insider,  the
trusted  individual who knows your internal organization.
These  individuals  are  not  after  your  systems,  they  are
after  your  information.    This  presentation  discusses  how
honeypot technologies can be used to detect, identify, and
gather information on these specific threats.
1.
Introduction
Honeypots  are  a  powerful,  new  technology  with
incredible  potential.    They  can  do  everything  from
detecting  new  attacks  never  seen  in  the  wild  before,  to
tracking automated credit card fraud and identity theft.  In
the past several years we have seen the technology rapidly
develop,  with  new  concepts  such  as  honeypot  farms,
commercial  and  open  source  solutions,  and  documented
findings  released.   However, a  great deal  of  research has
been  focused  on  identifying,  capturing,  and  researching
external  threats.    While  malicious  and  dangerous,  these
attacks are often random with attackers more interested in
how  many  systems  they  can  break  into  then  which
systems  they  break  into.    To  date,  limited  research  has
been  done  on  how  honeypots  can  apply  to  a  far  more
dangerous  and  devastating  threat,  the  advanced  insider.
This
individual  knows  your  networks  and
organization.    Often,  these  individuals  are  not  after
computers,  but  specific  information.    This  is  a  risk  that
has  proven  far  more  dangerous,  and  far  more  difficult  to
mitigate.
trusted
This  paper  attempts  to  ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat
author:Lance Spitzner
Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat
Lance Spitzner
Honeypot Technologies Inc
lance@honeypots.com
Abstract
into  honeypot
technologies,  primarily
In  the  past  several  years  there  has  been  extensive
research
for
detection  and  information  gathering  against  external
threats.  However, little research has been done for one of
the  most  dangerous  threats,  the  advance  insider,  the
trusted  individual who knows your internal organization.
These  individuals  are  not  after  your  systems,  they  are
after  your  information.    This  presentation  discusses  how
honeypot technologies can be used to detect, identify, and
gather information on these specific threats.
1.
Introduction
Honeypots  are  a  powerful,  new  technology  with
incredible  potential.    They  can  do  everything  from
detecting  new  attacks  never  seen  in  the  wild  before,  to
tracking automated credit card fraud and identity theft.  In
the past several years we have seen the technology rapidly
develop,  with  new  concepts  such  as  honeypot  farms,
commercial  and  open  source  solutions,  and  documented
findings  released.   However, a  great deal  of  research has
been  focused  on  identifying,  capturing,  and  researching
external  threats.    While  malicious  and  dangerous,  these
attacks are often random with attackers more interested in
how  many  systems  they  can  break  into  then  which
systems  they  break  into.    To  date,  limited  research  has
been  done  on  how  honeypots  can  apply  to  a  far  more
dangerous  and  devastating  threat,  the  advanced  insider.
This
individual  knows  your  networks  and
organization.    Often,  these  individuals  are  not  after
computers,  but  specific  information.    This  is  a  risk  that
has  proven  far  more  dangerous,  and  far  more  difficult  to
mitigate.
trusted
This  paper  attempts  to  ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Dynamic Application-Layer Protocol Analysis for Network Intrusion
Detection
author:Holger Dreger and
Anja Feldmann
Dynamic Application-Layer Protocol Analysis
for Network Intrusion Detection
Holger Dreger
TU M¨unchen
dreger@in.tum.de
Anja Feldmann
TU M¨unchen
feldmann@in.tum.de
Michael Mai
TU M¨unchen
maim@in.tum.de
Vern Paxson
ICSI/LBNL
vern@icir.org
Robin Sommer
ICSI
robin@icir.org
Abstract
Many network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) rely
on protocol-speciﬁc analyzers to extract the higher-level
semantic context from a trafﬁc stream. To select the cor-
rect kind of analysis, traditional systems exclusively de-
pend on well-known port numbers. However, based on
our experience, increasingly signiﬁcant portions of to-
day’s trafﬁc are not classiﬁable by such a scheme. Yet for
a NIDS, this trafﬁc is very interesting, as a primary rea-
son for not using a standard port is to evade security and
policy enforcement monitoring. In this paper, we dis-
cuss the design and implementation of a NIDS extension
to perform dynamic application-layer protocol analysis.
For each connection, the system ﬁrst identiﬁes potential
protocols in use and then activates appropriate analyz-
ers to verify the decision and extract higher-level seman-
tics. We demonstrate the power of our enhancement with
three examples: reliable detection of applications not us-
ing their standard ports, payload inspection of FTP data
transfers, and detection of IRC-based botnet clients and
servers. Prototypes of our system currently run at the
border of three large-scale operational networks. Due to
its success, the bot-detection is already integrated into a
dynamic inline blocking of production trafﬁc at one of
the sites.
1 Introduction
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) analyze
streams of network packets in order to detect attacks
and, more generally, violations of a site’s security pol-
icy. NIDSs often rely on protocol-speciﬁc analyzers to
extract the higher-level semantic context associa...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Dynamic Application-Layer Protocol Analysis for Network Intrusion
Detection
author:Holger Dreger and
Anja Feldmann
Dynamic Application-Layer Protocol Analysis
for Network Intrusion Detection
Holger Dreger
TU M¨unchen
dreger@in.tum.de
Anja Feldmann
TU M¨unchen
feldmann@in.tum.de
Michael Mai
TU M¨unchen
maim@in.tum.de
Vern Paxson
ICSI/LBNL
vern@icir.org
Robin Sommer
ICSI
robin@icir.org
Abstract
Many network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) rely
on protocol-speciﬁc analyzers to extract the higher-level
semantic context from a trafﬁc stream. To select the cor-
rect kind of analysis, traditional systems exclusively de-
pend on well-known port numbers. However, based on
our experience, increasingly signiﬁcant portions of to-
day’s trafﬁc are not classiﬁable by such a scheme. Yet for
a NIDS, this trafﬁc is very interesting, as a primary rea-
son for not using a standard port is to evade security and
policy enforcement monitoring. In this paper, we dis-
cuss the design and implementation of a NIDS extension
to perform dynamic application-layer protocol analysis.
For each connection, the system ﬁrst identiﬁes potential
protocols in use and then activates appropriate analyz-
ers to verify the decision and extract higher-level seman-
tics. We demonstrate the power of our enhancement with
three examples: reliable detection of applications not us-
ing their standard ports, payload inspection of FTP data
transfers, and detection of IRC-based botnet clients and
servers. Prototypes of our system currently run at the
border of three large-scale operational networks. Due to
its success, the bot-detection is already integrated into a
dynamic inline blocking of production trafﬁc at one of
the sites.
1 Introduction
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) analyze
streams of network packets in order to detect attacks
and, more generally, violations of a site’s security pol-
icy. NIDSs often rely on protocol-speciﬁc analyzers to
extract the higher-level semantic context associa...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents
author:Leyla Bilge and
Yufei Han and
Matteo Dell'Amico
RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents
Leyla Bilge
Yufei Han
Matteo Dell’Amico
Symantec Research Labs
matteo_dellamico@symantec.com
Symantec Research Labs
leyla_bilge@symantec.com
Symantec Research Labs
yufei_han@symantec.com
ABSTRACT
The current evolution of the cyber-threat ecosystem shows that no
system can be considered invulnerable. It is therefore important
to quantify the risk level within a system and devise risk predic-
tion methods such that proactive measures can be taken to reduce
the damage of cyber attacks. We present RiskTeller, a system that
analyzes binary file appearance logs of machines to predict which
machines are at risk of infection months in advance. Risk prediction
models are built by creating, for each machine, a comprehensive
profile capturing its usage patterns, and then associating each pro-
file to a risk level through both fully and semi-supervised learning
methods. We evaluate RiskTeller on a year-long dataset containing
information about all the binaries appearing on machines of 18
enterprises. We show that RiskTeller can use the machine profile
computed for a given machine to predict subsequent infections
with the highest prediction precision achieved to date.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the cyber-threat ecosystem faced dra-
matic changes. On the one hand, attackers now use sophisticated
tools and techniques to breach systems [32]; on the other hand,
the stakes at risk become larger every year. Experian reports that
almost half of business organizations suffer at least one security
incident per year [8]; despite the efforts in developing and defend-
ing secure systems, hardly anybody in the industry – especially in
large organizations – can feel that their infrastructure is invulnera-
ble. Rather than wondering if they would be victims of malicious
actions, IT administrators are shifting towards t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents
author:Leyla Bilge and
Yufei Han and
Matteo Dell'Amico
RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents
Leyla Bilge
Yufei Han
Matteo Dell’Amico
Symantec Research Labs
matteo_dellamico@symantec.com
Symantec Research Labs
leyla_bilge@symantec.com
Symantec Research Labs
yufei_han@symantec.com
ABSTRACT
The current evolution of the cyber-threat ecosystem shows that no
system can be considered invulnerable. It is therefore important
to quantify the risk level within a system and devise risk predic-
tion methods such that proactive measures can be taken to reduce
the damage of cyber attacks. We present RiskTeller, a system that
analyzes binary file appearance logs of machines to predict which
machines are at risk of infection months in advance. Risk prediction
models are built by creating, for each machine, a comprehensive
profile capturing its usage patterns, and then associating each pro-
file to a risk level through both fully and semi-supervised learning
methods. We evaluate RiskTeller on a year-long dataset containing
information about all the binaries appearing on machines of 18
enterprises. We show that RiskTeller can use the machine profile
computed for a given machine to predict subsequent infections
with the highest prediction precision achieved to date.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the cyber-threat ecosystem faced dra-
matic changes. On the one hand, attackers now use sophisticated
tools and techniques to breach systems [32]; on the other hand,
the stakes at risk become larger every year. Experian reports that
almost half of business organizations suffer at least one security
incident per year [8]; despite the efforts in developing and defend-
ing secure systems, hardly anybody in the industry – especially in
large organizations – can feel that their infrastructure is invulnera-
ble. Rather than wondering if they would be victims of malicious
actions, IT administrators are shifting towards t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting malware's failover C&C strategies with squeeze
author:Matthias Neugschwandtner and
Paolo Milani Comparetti and
Christian Platzer
Detecting Malware’s Failover C&C Strategies with
SQUEEZE
Matthias Neugschwandtner1, Paolo Milani Comparetti1, and Christian Platzer1
1Vienna University of Technology, {mneug,pmilani,cplatzer}@seclab.tuwien.ac.at
ABSTRACT
The ability to remote-control infected PCs is a fundamental com-
ponent of modern malware campaigns. At the same time, the com-
mand and control (C&C) infrastructure that provides this capability
is an attractive target for mitigation. In recent years, more or less
successful takedown operations have been conducted against bot-
nets employing both client-server and peer-to-peer C&C architec-
tures. To improve their robustness against such disruptions of their
illegal business, botnet operators routinely deploy redundant C&C
infrastructure and implement failover C&C strategies.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose techniques based on multi-path ex-
ploration [1] to discover how malware behaves when faced with
the simulated take-down of some of the network endpoints it com-
municates with. We implement these techniques in a tool called
SQUEEZE, and show that it allows us to detect backup C&C servers,
increasing the coverage of an automatically generated C&C black-
list by 19.7%, and can trigger domain generation algorithms that
malware implements for disaster-recovery.
1
Malicious code, also known as malware, is an essential compo-
nent of criminal activity on the internet. Miscreants use a variety
of strategies to infect computers with malware and organize them
into networks of remote-controlled bots. These botnets can then
be used for a variety of harmful activities. These include identity
theft (such as stealing a user’s credit card number or online bank-
ing credentials), sending out unwanted email (SPAM), performing
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), tricking the user into
purchasing fak...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting malware's failover C&C strategies with squeeze
author:Matthias Neugschwandtner and
Paolo Milani Comparetti and
Christian Platzer
Detecting Malware’s Failover C&C Strategies with
SQUEEZE
Matthias Neugschwandtner1, Paolo Milani Comparetti1, and Christian Platzer1
1Vienna University of Technology, {mneug,pmilani,cplatzer}@seclab.tuwien.ac.at
ABSTRACT
The ability to remote-control infected PCs is a fundamental com-
ponent of modern malware campaigns. At the same time, the com-
mand and control (C&C) infrastructure that provides this capability
is an attractive target for mitigation. In recent years, more or less
successful takedown operations have been conducted against bot-
nets employing both client-server and peer-to-peer C&C architec-
tures. To improve their robustness against such disruptions of their
illegal business, botnet operators routinely deploy redundant C&C
infrastructure and implement failover C&C strategies.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose techniques based on multi-path ex-
ploration [1] to discover how malware behaves when faced with
the simulated take-down of some of the network endpoints it com-
municates with. We implement these techniques in a tool called
SQUEEZE, and show that it allows us to detect backup C&C servers,
increasing the coverage of an automatically generated C&C black-
list by 19.7%, and can trigger domain generation algorithms that
malware implements for disaster-recovery.
1
Malicious code, also known as malware, is an essential compo-
nent of criminal activity on the internet. Miscreants use a variety
of strategies to infect computers with malware and organize them
into networks of remote-controlled bots. These botnets can then
be used for a variety of harmful activities. These include identity
theft (such as stealing a user’s credit card number or online bank-
ing credentials), sending out unwanted email (SPAM), performing
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), tricking the user into
purchasing fak...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
author:Marc Ju'arez and
Sadia Afroz and
Gunes Acar and
Claudia D'ıaz and
Rachel Greenstadt
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Marc Juarez1, Sadia Afroz2, Gunes Acar1, Claudia Diaz1, Rachel Greenstadt3
1KU Leuven, ESAT/COSIC and iMinds, Leuven, Belgium
{name.surname}@esat.kuleuven.be
2UC Berkeley
sadia.afroz@berkeley.edu
3Drexel University
greenie@cs.drexel.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to
have found highly eﬀective attacks on Tor. However, these
studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary ca-
pabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessar-
ily hold in practical scenarios. The following study criti-
cally evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack
where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain
variables, for example, user’s browsing habits, diﬀerences in
location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually
omitted from the current WF model have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the eﬃcacy of the attack. We also empirically show
how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the
open-world scenario. We address this problem by augment-
ing our classiﬁcation method with a veriﬁcation step. We
conclude that even though this approach reduces the num-
ber of false positives over 63%, it does not completely solve
the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection; K.4 [Computers and So-
ciety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Website ﬁngerprinting; Tor; privacy
1.
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication systems are designed to pro-
tect users from malicious websites and network eavesdrop-
pers by providing means to hide the content and metadata of
communications. The Onion Router (Tor), with about three
million daily users, is the most popular anonymous commu-
nication network.
It is s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
author:Marc Ju'arez and
Sadia Afroz and
Gunes Acar and
Claudia D'ıaz and
Rachel Greenstadt
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Marc Juarez1, Sadia Afroz2, Gunes Acar1, Claudia Diaz1, Rachel Greenstadt3
1KU Leuven, ESAT/COSIC and iMinds, Leuven, Belgium
{name.surname}@esat.kuleuven.be
2UC Berkeley
sadia.afroz@berkeley.edu
3Drexel University
greenie@cs.drexel.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to
have found highly eﬀective attacks on Tor. However, these
studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary ca-
pabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessar-
ily hold in practical scenarios. The following study criti-
cally evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack
where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain
variables, for example, user’s browsing habits, diﬀerences in
location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually
omitted from the current WF model have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the eﬃcacy of the attack. We also empirically show
how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the
open-world scenario. We address this problem by augment-
ing our classiﬁcation method with a veriﬁcation step. We
conclude that even though this approach reduces the num-
ber of false positives over 63%, it does not completely solve
the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection; K.4 [Computers and So-
ciety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Website ﬁngerprinting; Tor; privacy
1.
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication systems are designed to pro-
tect users from malicious websites and network eavesdrop-
pers by providing means to hide the content and metadata of
communications. The Onion Router (Tor), with about three
million daily users, is the most popular anonymous commu-
nication network.
It is s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
author:Rafael Pass and
Abhi Shelat
Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
∗
Rafael Pass
Cornell University
rafael@cs.cornell.com
†
abhi shelat
U of Virginia
abhi@virginia.edu
ABSTRACT
Electronic ﬁnancial transactions in the US, even those en-
abled by Bitcoin, have relatively high transaction costs. As
a result, it becomes infeasible to make micropayments, i.e.
payments that are pennies or fractions of a penny.
To circumvent the cost of recording all transactions, Wheeler
(1996) and Rivest (1997) suggested the notion of a prob-
abilistic payment, that is, one implements payments that
have expected value on the order of micro pennies by run-
ning an appropriately biased lottery for a larger payment.
While there have been quite a few proposed solutions to such
lottery-based micropayment schemes, all these solutions rely
on a trusted third party to coordinate the transactions; fur-
thermore, to implement these systems in today’s economy
would require a a global change to how either banks or elec-
tronic payment companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) han-
dle transactions.
We put forth a new lottery-based micropayment scheme
for any ledger-based transaction system, that can be used
today without any change to the current infrastructure. We
implement our scheme in a sample web application and show
how a single server can handle thousands of micropayment
requests per second. We analyze how the scheme can work
at Internet scale.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers methods for transacting very small
th to 1 penny. Traditional bank-based
amounts such as 1
10
transactions usually incur fees of between 21 to 25 cents
(in the US) plus a percentage of the transaction [16] and
thus transactions that are less than 1$ are rare because of
this ineﬃciency; credit-card based transactions can be more
expensive.
∗Supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1217821, NSF
†Supported by NSF Award CNS-0845811, TC-1111781, and
Award CCF-1214844 and ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
author:Rafael Pass and
Abhi Shelat
Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
∗
Rafael Pass
Cornell University
rafael@cs.cornell.com
†
abhi shelat
U of Virginia
abhi@virginia.edu
ABSTRACT
Electronic ﬁnancial transactions in the US, even those en-
abled by Bitcoin, have relatively high transaction costs. As
a result, it becomes infeasible to make micropayments, i.e.
payments that are pennies or fractions of a penny.
To circumvent the cost of recording all transactions, Wheeler
(1996) and Rivest (1997) suggested the notion of a prob-
abilistic payment, that is, one implements payments that
have expected value on the order of micro pennies by run-
ning an appropriately biased lottery for a larger payment.
While there have been quite a few proposed solutions to such
lottery-based micropayment schemes, all these solutions rely
on a trusted third party to coordinate the transactions; fur-
thermore, to implement these systems in today’s economy
would require a a global change to how either banks or elec-
tronic payment companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) han-
dle transactions.
We put forth a new lottery-based micropayment scheme
for any ledger-based transaction system, that can be used
today without any change to the current infrastructure. We
implement our scheme in a sample web application and show
how a single server can handle thousands of micropayment
requests per second. We analyze how the scheme can work
at Internet scale.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers methods for transacting very small
th to 1 penny. Traditional bank-based
amounts such as 1
10
transactions usually incur fees of between 21 to 25 cents
(in the US) plus a percentage of the transaction [16] and
thus transactions that are less than 1$ are rare because of
this ineﬃciency; credit-card based transactions can be more
expensive.
∗Supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1217821, NSF
†Supported by NSF Award CNS-0845811, TC-1111781, and
Award CCF-1214844 and ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analysis of security data from a large computing organization
author:Aashish Sharma and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
James Barlow and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
Analysis of Security Data from a Large Computing Organization
A. Sharma, Z. Kalbarczyk, J. Barlow, and R. Iyer
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1308. Main St. Urbana, IL 61801, USA
 aashish@lbl.gov, {kalbarcz, jbarlow, rkiyer}@illinois.edu
Abstract  —  This  paper  presents  an  in-depth  study  of  the
forensic  data  on  security  incidents  that  have  occurred  over  a
period  of  5  years  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The  proposed
methodology  combines  automated  analysis  of  data  from
security  monitors  and  system  logs  with  human  expertise  to
extract and process relevant data in order to: (i) determine the
progression of an attack, (ii) establish incident categories and
characterize their severity, (iii) associate alerts with incidents,
and (iv) identify incidents missed by the monitoring tools and
examine  the  reasons  for  the  escapes.  The  analysis  conducted
provides  the  basis  for  incident  modeling  and  design  of  new
techniques for security monitoring.
Keywords - incident/attack data analysis, security monitoring,
alerts, large scale computing systems.
I.
INTRODUCTION
include
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  security  incidents  that  have
occurred  over  a  period  of  5  years  across  5000  machines
monitored  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  (NCSA)  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The
monitored  systems
i)  eight  high-performance
computational  clusters  (each  consisting  of  2k  –  12k
processors) participating in grid computing and accessed by
users  world-wide;
iii)
production  infrastructure  systems,  e.g.,  mail,  web,  domain
name, and authentication servers, certification authority; iv)
file servers (which include NFS, AFS, GPF...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analysis of security data from a large computing organization
author:Aashish Sharma and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
James Barlow and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
Analysis of Security Data from a Large Computing Organization
A. Sharma, Z. Kalbarczyk, J. Barlow, and R. Iyer
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1308. Main St. Urbana, IL 61801, USA
 aashish@lbl.gov, {kalbarcz, jbarlow, rkiyer}@illinois.edu
Abstract  —  This  paper  presents  an  in-depth  study  of  the
forensic  data  on  security  incidents  that  have  occurred  over  a
period  of  5  years  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The  proposed
methodology  combines  automated  analysis  of  data  from
security  monitors  and  system  logs  with  human  expertise  to
extract and process relevant data in order to: (i) determine the
progression of an attack, (ii) establish incident categories and
characterize their severity, (iii) associate alerts with incidents,
and (iv) identify incidents missed by the monitoring tools and
examine  the  reasons  for  the  escapes.  The  analysis  conducted
provides  the  basis  for  incident  modeling  and  design  of  new
techniques for security monitoring.
Keywords - incident/attack data analysis, security monitoring,
alerts, large scale computing systems.
I.
INTRODUCTION
include
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  security  incidents  that  have
occurred  over  a  period  of  5  years  across  5000  machines
monitored  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  (NCSA)  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The
monitored  systems
i)  eight  high-performance
computational  clusters  (each  consisting  of  2k  –  12k
processors) participating in grid computing and accessed by
users  world-wide;
iii)
production  infrastructure  systems,  e.g.,  mail,  web,  domain
name, and authentication servers, certification authority; iv)
file servers (which include NFS, AFS, GPF...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Pinpointing delay and forwarding anomalies using large-scale traceroute
measurements
author:Romain Fontugne and
Cristel Pelsser and
Emile Aben and
Randy Bush
Pinpointing Delay and Forwarding Anomalies Using
Large-Scale Traceroute Measurements
Romain Fontugne
IIJ Research Lab
Emile Aben
RIPE NCC
Cristel Pelsser
University of Strasbourg / CNRS
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab
7
1
0
2
y
a
M
5
1
]
I
N
.
s
c
[
2
v
4
8
7
4
0
.
5
0
6
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
Understanding data plane health is essential to improving
Internet reliability and usability. For instance, detecting dis-
ruptions in peer and provider networks can identify repairable
connectivity problems. Currently this task is time consum-
ing as it involves a fair amount of manual observation, as an
operator has poor visibility beyond their network’s border.
In this paper we leverage existing public RIPE Atlas mea-
surement data to monitor and analyze network conditions;
creating no new measurements. We demonstrate a set of
complementary methods to detect network disruptions using
traceroute measurements, and to report problems in near real
time. A novel method of detecting changes in delay is used
to identify congested links, and a packet forwarding model
is employed to predict trafﬁc paths and to identify faulty
routers and links in cases of packet loss.
In addition, ag-
gregating results from each method allows us to easily mon-
itor a network and correlate related reports of signiﬁcant net-
work disruptions, reducing uninteresting alarms. Our contri-
butions consist of a statistical approach to providing robust
estimation of Internet delays and the study of hundreds of
thousands link delays. We present three cases demonstrat-
ing that the proposed methods detect real disruptions and
provide valuable insights, as well as surprising ﬁndings, on
the location and impact of the identiﬁed events.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s decentralized design allows disparate
networks to cooperate and provides resilience to fai...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Pinpointing delay and forwarding anomalies using large-scale traceroute
measurements
author:Romain Fontugne and
Cristel Pelsser and
Emile Aben and
Randy Bush
Pinpointing Delay and Forwarding Anomalies Using
Large-Scale Traceroute Measurements
Romain Fontugne
IIJ Research Lab
Emile Aben
RIPE NCC
Cristel Pelsser
University of Strasbourg / CNRS
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab
7
1
0
2
y
a
M
5
1
]
I
N
.
s
c
[
2
v
4
8
7
4
0
.
5
0
6
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
Understanding data plane health is essential to improving
Internet reliability and usability. For instance, detecting dis-
ruptions in peer and provider networks can identify repairable
connectivity problems. Currently this task is time consum-
ing as it involves a fair amount of manual observation, as an
operator has poor visibility beyond their network’s border.
In this paper we leverage existing public RIPE Atlas mea-
surement data to monitor and analyze network conditions;
creating no new measurements. We demonstrate a set of
complementary methods to detect network disruptions using
traceroute measurements, and to report problems in near real
time. A novel method of detecting changes in delay is used
to identify congested links, and a packet forwarding model
is employed to predict trafﬁc paths and to identify faulty
routers and links in cases of packet loss.
In addition, ag-
gregating results from each method allows us to easily mon-
itor a network and correlate related reports of signiﬁcant net-
work disruptions, reducing uninteresting alarms. Our contri-
butions consist of a statistical approach to providing robust
estimation of Internet delays and the study of hundreds of
thousands link delays. We present three cases demonstrat-
ing that the proposed methods detect real disruptions and
provide valuable insights, as well as surprising ﬁndings, on
the location and impact of the identiﬁed events.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s decentralized design allows disparate
networks to cooperate and provides resilience to fai...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Web Performance Pitfalls
author:Theresa Enghardt and
Thomas Zinner and
Anja Feldmann
Web Performance Pitfalls
Theresa Enghardt1(B), Thomas Zinner1, and Anja Feldmann2
1 TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany
{theresa,zinner}@inet.tu-berlin.de
2 Max-Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
anja@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract. Web performance is widely studied in terms of load times,
numbers of objects, object sizes, and total page sizes. However, for all
these metrics, there are various deﬁnitions, data sources, and measure-
ment tools. These often lead to diﬀerent results and almost all studies do
not provide suﬃcient details about the deﬁnition of metrics and the data
sources they use. This hinders reproducibility as well as comparability
of the results. This paper revisits the various deﬁnitions and quantiﬁes
their impact on performance results. To do so we assess Web metrics
across a large variety of Web pages.
Amazingly, even for such “obvious” metrics as load times, diﬀerences
can be huge. For example, for more than 50% of the pages, the load times
vary by more than 19.1% and for 10% by more than 47% depending on
the exact deﬁnition of load time. Among the main culprits for such dif-
ference are the in-/exclusion of initial redirects and the choice of data
source, e.g., Resource Timings API or HTTP Archive (HAR) ﬁles. Even
“simpler” metrics such as the number of objects per page have a huge
variance. For the Alexa 1000, we observed a diﬀerence of more than 67
objects for 10% of the pages with a median of 7 objects. This highlights
the importance of precisely specifying all metrics including how and from
which data source they are computed.
Keywords: Web performance · Measurement
1 Introduction
Web browsing is one of the most prevalent applications in today’s Internet.
Thus, understanding its performance is critical. Hereby, both metrics as well
as experiments have to realistically reﬂect possible performance improvements
for actual users. Moreover, they need ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Web Performance Pitfalls
author:Theresa Enghardt and
Thomas Zinner and
Anja Feldmann
Web Performance Pitfalls
Theresa Enghardt1(B), Thomas Zinner1, and Anja Feldmann2
1 TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany
{theresa,zinner}@inet.tu-berlin.de
2 Max-Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
anja@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract. Web performance is widely studied in terms of load times,
numbers of objects, object sizes, and total page sizes. However, for all
these metrics, there are various deﬁnitions, data sources, and measure-
ment tools. These often lead to diﬀerent results and almost all studies do
not provide suﬃcient details about the deﬁnition of metrics and the data
sources they use. This hinders reproducibility as well as comparability
of the results. This paper revisits the various deﬁnitions and quantiﬁes
their impact on performance results. To do so we assess Web metrics
across a large variety of Web pages.
Amazingly, even for such “obvious” metrics as load times, diﬀerences
can be huge. For example, for more than 50% of the pages, the load times
vary by more than 19.1% and for 10% by more than 47% depending on
the exact deﬁnition of load time. Among the main culprits for such dif-
ference are the in-/exclusion of initial redirects and the choice of data
source, e.g., Resource Timings API or HTTP Archive (HAR) ﬁles. Even
“simpler” metrics such as the number of objects per page have a huge
variance. For the Alexa 1000, we observed a diﬀerence of more than 67
objects for 10% of the pages with a median of 7 objects. This highlights
the importance of precisely specifying all metrics including how and from
which data source they are computed.
Keywords: Web performance · Measurement
1 Introduction
Web browsing is one of the most prevalent applications in today’s Internet.
Thus, understanding its performance is critical. Hereby, both metrics as well
as experiments have to realistically reﬂect possible performance improvements
for actual users. Moreover, they need ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
author:Michael E. Locasto and
Ke Wang and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Salvatore J. Stolfo
FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
Michael E. Locasto, Ke Wang, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University,
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailcode 0401,
New York, NY 10027
{locasto, kewang, angelos, sal}@cs.columbia.edu
+1 212 939 7177
Abstract. Intrusion detection systems are fundamentally passive and
fail–open. Because their primary task is classiﬁcation, they do noth-
ing to prevent an attack from succeeding. An intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) adds protection mechanisms that provide fail–safe semantics,
automatic response capabilities, and adaptive enforcement. We present
FLIPS (Feedback Learning IPS), a hybrid approach to host security that
prevents binary code injection attacks. It incorporates three major com-
ponents: an anomaly-based classiﬁer, a signature-based ﬁltering scheme,
and a supervision framework that employs Instruction Set Randomiza-
tion (ISR). Since ISR prevents code injection attacks and can also pre-
cisely identify the injected code, we can tune the classiﬁer and the ﬁlter
via a learning mechanism based on this feedback. Capturing the injected
code allows FLIPS to construct signatures for zero-day exploits. The
ﬁlter can discard input that is anomalous or matches known malicious
input, eﬀectively protecting the application from additional instances of
an attack – even zero-day attacks or attacks that are metamorphic in
nature. FLIPS does not require a known user base and can be deployed
transparently to clients and with minimal impact on servers. We describe
a prototype that protects HTTP servers, but FLIPS can be applied to a
variety of server and client applications.
Keywords: Adaptive Response,
Tolerance.
Intrusion Prevention,
Intrusion
1 Introduction
One key problem for network defense systems is the inability to automatically
mount a reliable...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
author:Michael E. Locasto and
Ke Wang and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Salvatore J. Stolfo
FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
Michael E. Locasto, Ke Wang, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University,
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailcode 0401,
New York, NY 10027
{locasto, kewang, angelos, sal}@cs.columbia.edu
+1 212 939 7177
Abstract. Intrusion detection systems are fundamentally passive and
fail–open. Because their primary task is classiﬁcation, they do noth-
ing to prevent an attack from succeeding. An intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) adds protection mechanisms that provide fail–safe semantics,
automatic response capabilities, and adaptive enforcement. We present
FLIPS (Feedback Learning IPS), a hybrid approach to host security that
prevents binary code injection attacks. It incorporates three major com-
ponents: an anomaly-based classiﬁer, a signature-based ﬁltering scheme,
and a supervision framework that employs Instruction Set Randomiza-
tion (ISR). Since ISR prevents code injection attacks and can also pre-
cisely identify the injected code, we can tune the classiﬁer and the ﬁlter
via a learning mechanism based on this feedback. Capturing the injected
code allows FLIPS to construct signatures for zero-day exploits. The
ﬁlter can discard input that is anomalous or matches known malicious
input, eﬀectively protecting the application from additional instances of
an attack – even zero-day attacks or attacks that are metamorphic in
nature. FLIPS does not require a known user base and can be deployed
transparently to clients and with minimal impact on servers. We describe
a prototype that protects HTTP servers, but FLIPS can be applied to a
variety of server and client applications.
Keywords: Adaptive Response,
Tolerance.
Intrusion Prevention,
Intrusion
1 Introduction
One key problem for network defense systems is the inability to automatically
mount a reliable...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
author:Fuyuan Zhang and
Limin Jia and
Cristina Basescu and
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim and
Yih-Chun Hu and
Adrian Perrig
Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
Fuyuan Zhang
CyLab, CMU
fuzh@andrew.cmu.edu
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim
CyLab, CMU
hyunjin@cmu.edu
Limin Jia
ECE & INI, CMU
liminjia@cmu.edu
Yih-Chun Hu
UIUC
yihchun@uiuc.edu
ETH Zürich
Cristina Basescu
cba@inf.ethz.ch
Adrian Perrig
CyLab, CMU/ETH Zürich
aperrig@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
A secure routing infrastructure is vital for secure and reliable Inter-
net services. Source authentication and path validation are two fun-
damental primitives for building a more secure and reliable Inter-
net. Although several protocols have been proposed to implement
these primitives, they have not been formally analyzed for their
security guarantees. In this paper, we apply proof techniques for
verifying cryptographic protocols (e.g., key exchange protocols) to
analyzing network protocols. We encode LS2, a program logic for
reasoning about programs that execute in an adversarial environ-
ment, in Coq. We also encode protocol-speciﬁc data structures,
predicates, and axioms. To analyze a source-routing protocol that
uses chained MACs to provide origin and path validation, we con-
struct Coq proofs to show that the protocol satisﬁes its desired prop-
erties. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to formalize
origin and path authenticity properties, and mechanize proofs that
chained MACs can provide the desired authenticity properties.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security and pro-
tection; C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Protocol veriﬁcation
Keywords
Origin authenticity, path authenticity, secrecy, formal methods, mech-
anized proofs
1.
INTRODUCTION
A secure routing infrastructure is central to providing secure and
reliable Internet services. The current Internet routing infrastruc-
ture has many known security issues...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
author:Fuyuan Zhang and
Limin Jia and
Cristina Basescu and
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim and
Yih-Chun Hu and
Adrian Perrig
Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
Fuyuan Zhang
CyLab, CMU
fuzh@andrew.cmu.edu
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim
CyLab, CMU
hyunjin@cmu.edu
Limin Jia
ECE & INI, CMU
liminjia@cmu.edu
Yih-Chun Hu
UIUC
yihchun@uiuc.edu
ETH Zürich
Cristina Basescu
cba@inf.ethz.ch
Adrian Perrig
CyLab, CMU/ETH Zürich
aperrig@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
A secure routing infrastructure is vital for secure and reliable Inter-
net services. Source authentication and path validation are two fun-
damental primitives for building a more secure and reliable Inter-
net. Although several protocols have been proposed to implement
these primitives, they have not been formally analyzed for their
security guarantees. In this paper, we apply proof techniques for
verifying cryptographic protocols (e.g., key exchange protocols) to
analyzing network protocols. We encode LS2, a program logic for
reasoning about programs that execute in an adversarial environ-
ment, in Coq. We also encode protocol-speciﬁc data structures,
predicates, and axioms. To analyze a source-routing protocol that
uses chained MACs to provide origin and path validation, we con-
struct Coq proofs to show that the protocol satisﬁes its desired prop-
erties. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to formalize
origin and path authenticity properties, and mechanize proofs that
chained MACs can provide the desired authenticity properties.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security and pro-
tection; C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Protocol veriﬁcation
Keywords
Origin authenticity, path authenticity, secrecy, formal methods, mech-
anized proofs
1.
INTRODUCTION
A secure routing infrastructure is central to providing secure and
reliable Internet services. The current Internet routing infrastruc-
ture has many known security issues...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:In search of an anonymous and secure lookup: attacks on structured
peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
author:Qiyan Wang and
Prateek Mittal and
Nikita Borisov
In Search of an Anonymous and Secure Lookup
Attacks on Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
Qiyan Wang
UIUC
qwang26@illinois.edu
Prateek Mittal
UIUC
mittal2@illinois.edu
Nikita Borisov
UIUC
nikita@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The ability to locate random relays is a key challenge for
peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems. Ear-
lier attempts like Salsa and AP3 used distributed hash ta-
ble lookups to locate relays, but the lack of anonymity in
their lookup mechanisms enables an adversary to infer the
path structure and compromise user anonymity. NISAN
and Torsk are state-of-the-art systems for P2P anonymous
communication. Their designs include mechanisms that are
speciﬁcally tailored to mitigate information leak attacks.
NISAN proposes to add anonymity into the lookup mech-
anism itself, while Torsk proposes the use of secret buddy
nodes to anonymize the lookup initiator.
In this paper, we attack the key mechanisms that hide
the relationship between a lookup initiator and its selected
relays in NISAN and Torsk. We present passive attacks
on the NISAN lookup and show that it is not as anony-
mous as previously thought. We analyze three circuit con-
struction mechanisms for anonymous communication using
the NISAN lookup, and show that the information leaks in
the NISAN lookup lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in user
anonymity. We also propose active attacks on Torsk that
defeat its secret buddy mechanism and consequently com-
promise user anonymity. Our results are backed up by prob-
abilistic modeling and extensive simulations. Our study mo-
tivates the search for a DHT lookup mechanism that is both
secure and anonymous.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:In search of an anonymous and secure lookup: attacks on structured
peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
author:Qiyan Wang and
Prateek Mittal and
Nikita Borisov
In Search of an Anonymous and Secure Lookup
Attacks on Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
Qiyan Wang
UIUC
qwang26@illinois.edu
Prateek Mittal
UIUC
mittal2@illinois.edu
Nikita Borisov
UIUC
nikita@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The ability to locate random relays is a key challenge for
peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems. Ear-
lier attempts like Salsa and AP3 used distributed hash ta-
ble lookups to locate relays, but the lack of anonymity in
their lookup mechanisms enables an adversary to infer the
path structure and compromise user anonymity. NISAN
and Torsk are state-of-the-art systems for P2P anonymous
communication. Their designs include mechanisms that are
speciﬁcally tailored to mitigate information leak attacks.
NISAN proposes to add anonymity into the lookup mech-
anism itself, while Torsk proposes the use of secret buddy
nodes to anonymize the lookup initiator.
In this paper, we attack the key mechanisms that hide
the relationship between a lookup initiator and its selected
relays in NISAN and Torsk. We present passive attacks
on the NISAN lookup and show that it is not as anony-
mous as previously thought. We analyze three circuit con-
struction mechanisms for anonymous communication using
the NISAN lookup, and show that the information leaks in
the NISAN lookup lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in user
anonymity. We also propose active attacks on Torsk that
defeat its secret buddy mechanism and consequently com-
promise user anonymity. Our results are backed up by prob-
abilistic modeling and extensive simulations. Our study mo-
tivates the search for a DHT lookup mechanism that is both
secure and anonymous.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Noise*: A Library of Verified High-Performance Secure Channel Protocol
Implementations
author:Son Ho and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Abhishek Bichhawat and
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
1
2
6
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8
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2
2
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2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Noise*: A Library of Veriﬁed High-Performance
Secure Channel Protocol Implementations
Son Ho
Inria Paris
Jonathan Protzenko
Microsoft Research
Abhishek Bichhawat
IIT Gandhinagar
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Inria Paris
Abstract—The Noise protocol framework deﬁnes a succinct
notation and execution framework for a large class of 59+
secure channel protocols, some of which are used in popular
applications such as WhatsApp and WireGuard. We present a
veriﬁed implementation of a Noise protocol compiler that takes
any Noise protocol, and produces an optimized C implementation
with extensive correctness and security guarantees. To this end,
we formalize the complete Noise stack in F*, from the low-level
cryptographic library to a high-level API. We write our compiler
also in F*, prove that it meets our formal speciﬁcation once and
for all, and then specialize it on-demand for any given Noise
protocol, relying on a novel technique called hybrid embedding.
We thus establish functional correctness, memory safety and a
form of side-channel resistance for the generated C code for
each Noise protocol. We propagate these guarantees to the high-
level API, using defensive dynamic checks to prevent incorrect
uses of the protocol. Finally, we formally state and prove the
security of our Noise code, by building on a symbolic model of
cryptography in F*, and formally link high-level API security
goals stated in terms of security levels to low-level cryptographic
guarantees. Ours are the ﬁrst comprehensive veriﬁcation results
for a protocol compiler t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Noise*: A Library of Verified High-Performance Secure Channel Protocol
Implementations
author:Son Ho and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Abhishek Bichhawat and
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
1
2
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
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2
2
0
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©
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1
3
$
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2
2
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9
-
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1
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4
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6
6
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8
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P
S
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y
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n
o
m
u
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s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Noise*: A Library of Veriﬁed High-Performance
Secure Channel Protocol Implementations
Son Ho
Inria Paris
Jonathan Protzenko
Microsoft Research
Abhishek Bichhawat
IIT Gandhinagar
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Inria Paris
Abstract—The Noise protocol framework deﬁnes a succinct
notation and execution framework for a large class of 59+
secure channel protocols, some of which are used in popular
applications such as WhatsApp and WireGuard. We present a
veriﬁed implementation of a Noise protocol compiler that takes
any Noise protocol, and produces an optimized C implementation
with extensive correctness and security guarantees. To this end,
we formalize the complete Noise stack in F*, from the low-level
cryptographic library to a high-level API. We write our compiler
also in F*, prove that it meets our formal speciﬁcation once and
for all, and then specialize it on-demand for any given Noise
protocol, relying on a novel technique called hybrid embedding.
We thus establish functional correctness, memory safety and a
form of side-channel resistance for the generated C code for
each Noise protocol. We propagate these guarantees to the high-
level API, using defensive dynamic checks to prevent incorrect
uses of the protocol. Finally, we formally state and prove the
security of our Noise code, by building on a symbolic model of
cryptography in F*, and formally link high-level API security
goals stated in terms of security levels to low-level cryptographic
guarantees. Ours are the ﬁrst comprehensive veriﬁcation results
for a protocol compiler t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Enhancing Survivability of Security Services Using Redundanc
author:Matti A. Hiltunen and
Richard D. Schlichting and
Carlos A. Ugarte
Enhancing Survivability of Security Services using Redundancy*
Matti A. Hiltunen  Richard D. Schlichting
AT&T Shannon Laboratory
180 Park Avenue
Florham Park, NJ 07932
hiltunen/rick@research.att.com
Carlos A. Ugarte
Department of  Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
cau@cs.arizona.edu
Abstract
Traditional distributed system services that provide guaran-
tees related to conjidentiality, integrity, and authenticity en-
hance security, but ure not survivable since each attribute is
inipleniented by a single  method.  This paper advocates the
use  of  redundancy to increase  survivability  by using  mul-
tiple methods to implement each security attribute and do-
ing so in ways that can vary  unpredictably.  As a  concrete
exanzple, the design and iniplenzentution of u highly config-
urable secure coniniunication  service  called SecConim ure
presented.  The service has been implemented using Cactus,
a s)$steni for building highly conjigurable protocols and ser-
vices for distributed systems.  Initial petforniunce results for
a protoQpe iniplenierrtution on Linux are also given.
1  Introduction
Security  services  that  provide attributes  such  as  confi-
dentiality,  integrity,  and  authenticity  typically  implement
each  attribute  using  a  single  method.  For  example,  in  a
secure communication service, confidentiality may  be pro-
vided by  DES and integrity by keyed MD5. Although such
an  approach  may  be  secure  in  the  traditional  sense,  it  is
a  method  is  compromised, all  secu-
not  survivable-once
rity guarantees on the connection related to that attribute are
gone. Each method is, in essence, a single point of vulnera-
bility very much analogous to a single point of system fail-
ure when  considering fault-tolerance  attributes.  This prob-
lem is...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Enhancing Survivability of Security Services Using Redundanc
author:Matti A. Hiltunen and
Richard D. Schlichting and
Carlos A. Ugarte
Enhancing Survivability of Security Services using Redundancy*
Matti A. Hiltunen  Richard D. Schlichting
AT&T Shannon Laboratory
180 Park Avenue
Florham Park, NJ 07932
hiltunen/rick@research.att.com
Carlos A. Ugarte
Department of  Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
cau@cs.arizona.edu
Abstract
Traditional distributed system services that provide guaran-
tees related to conjidentiality, integrity, and authenticity en-
hance security, but ure not survivable since each attribute is
inipleniented by a single  method.  This paper advocates the
use  of  redundancy to increase  survivability  by using  mul-
tiple methods to implement each security attribute and do-
ing so in ways that can vary  unpredictably.  As a  concrete
exanzple, the design and iniplenzentution of u highly config-
urable secure coniniunication  service  called SecConim ure
presented.  The service has been implemented using Cactus,
a s)$steni for building highly conjigurable protocols and ser-
vices for distributed systems.  Initial petforniunce results for
a protoQpe iniplenierrtution on Linux are also given.
1  Introduction
Security  services  that  provide attributes  such  as  confi-
dentiality,  integrity,  and  authenticity  typically  implement
each  attribute  using  a  single  method.  For  example,  in  a
secure communication service, confidentiality may  be pro-
vided by  DES and integrity by keyed MD5. Although such
an  approach  may  be  secure  in  the  traditional  sense,  it  is
a  method  is  compromised, all  secu-
not  survivable-once
rity guarantees on the connection related to that attribute are
gone. Each method is, in essence, a single point of vulnera-
bility very much analogous to a single point of system fail-
ure when  considering fault-tolerance  attributes.  This prob-
lem is...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty
World
author:Robert Schilling and
Mario Werner and
Pascal Nasahl and
Stefan Mangard
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a
Faulty World
Robert Schilling
Graz University of Technology
Know-Center GmbH
robert.schilling@iaik.tugraz.at
8
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Pascal Nasahl
Graz University of Technology
pascal.nasahl@student.tugraz.at
ABSTRACT
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most
common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these
operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any
program. However, as soon as fault attacks are considered, assuming
that the hardware performs its memory operations as instructed is
not valid anymore. In particular, attackers may induce faults with
the goal of reading or writing incorrectly addressed memory, which
can have various critical safety and security implications.
In this work, we present a solution to this problem and propose
a new method for protecting every memory access inside a pro-
gram against address tampering. The countermeasure comprises
two building blocks. First, every pointer inside the program is re-
dundantly encoded using a multi-residue error detection code. The
redundancy information is stored in the unused upper bits of the
pointer with zero overhead in terms of storage. Second, load and
store instructions are extended to link data with the corresponding
encoded address from the pointer. Wrong memory accesses subse-
quently infect the data value allowing the software to detect the
error.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our countermeasure
into a RISC-V processor, tested it on a FPGA development board,
and evaluated the induced overhead. Furthermore, a LLVM-based
C compiler has been modified to automatically encode all data
pointers, to perform encoded pointer arithmetic, and to emit the
extended load/store instr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty
World
author:Robert Schilling and
Mario Werner and
Pascal Nasahl and
Stefan Mangard
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a
Faulty World
Robert Schilling
Graz University of Technology
Know-Center GmbH
robert.schilling@iaik.tugraz.at
8
1
0
2
p
e
S
4
2
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
1
v
1
1
8
8
0
.
9
0
8
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
Pascal Nasahl
Graz University of Technology
pascal.nasahl@student.tugraz.at
ABSTRACT
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most
common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these
operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any
program. However, as soon as fault attacks are considered, assuming
that the hardware performs its memory operations as instructed is
not valid anymore. In particular, attackers may induce faults with
the goal of reading or writing incorrectly addressed memory, which
can have various critical safety and security implications.
In this work, we present a solution to this problem and propose
a new method for protecting every memory access inside a pro-
gram against address tampering. The countermeasure comprises
two building blocks. First, every pointer inside the program is re-
dundantly encoded using a multi-residue error detection code. The
redundancy information is stored in the unused upper bits of the
pointer with zero overhead in terms of storage. Second, load and
store instructions are extended to link data with the corresponding
encoded address from the pointer. Wrong memory accesses subse-
quently infect the data value allowing the software to detect the
error.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our countermeasure
into a RISC-V processor, tested it on a FPGA development board,
and evaluated the induced overhead. Furthermore, a LLVM-based
C compiler has been modified to automatically encode all data
pointers, to perform encoded pointer arithmetic, and to emit the
extended load/store instr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Portable and Efficient Continuous Data Protection for Network File
Servers
author:Ningning Zhu and
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Portable and Efﬁcient Continuous Data Protection for
Network File Servers
Ningning Zhu
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Computer Science Department
Stony Brook University
Abstract
Continuous data protection, which logs every update to
a ﬁle system, is an enabling technology to protect ﬁle sys-
tems against malicious attacks and/or user mistakes, be-
cause it allows each ﬁle update to be undoable. Existing
implementations of continuous data protection work either
at disk access interface or within the ﬁle system. Despite
the implementation complexity, their performance overhead
is signiﬁcant when compared with ﬁle systems that do not
support continuous data protection. Moreover, such kernel-
level ﬁle update logging implementation is complex and
cannot be easily ported to other operating systems. This
paper describes the design and implementation of four user-
level continuous data protection implementations for NFS
servers, all of which work on top of the NFS protocol and
thus can be easily ported to any operating systems that sup-
port NFS. Measurements obtained from running standard
benchmarks and real-world NFS traces on these user-level
continuous data protection systems demonstrate a surpris-
ing result: Performance of NFS servers protected by pure
user-level continuous data protection schemes is compara-
ble to that of unprotected vanilla NFS servers.
1
Introduction
Data in a ﬁle system could be lost or corrupted in the
face of natural disasters, hardware/software failures, human
mistakes or malicious attacks. While replication and mirror-
ing represent effective defenses against hardware and site
failures, they cannot protect ﬁle system data from human
mistakes, software failures and malicious attacks, against
which conventional data backup systems provide limited
protection. Advanced multi-snapshots backup systems [12]
decrease the amount of potential data...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Portable and Efficient Continuous Data Protection for Network File
Servers
author:Ningning Zhu and
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Portable and Efﬁcient Continuous Data Protection for
Network File Servers
Ningning Zhu
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Computer Science Department
Stony Brook University
Abstract
Continuous data protection, which logs every update to
a ﬁle system, is an enabling technology to protect ﬁle sys-
tems against malicious attacks and/or user mistakes, be-
cause it allows each ﬁle update to be undoable. Existing
implementations of continuous data protection work either
at disk access interface or within the ﬁle system. Despite
the implementation complexity, their performance overhead
is signiﬁcant when compared with ﬁle systems that do not
support continuous data protection. Moreover, such kernel-
level ﬁle update logging implementation is complex and
cannot be easily ported to other operating systems. This
paper describes the design and implementation of four user-
level continuous data protection implementations for NFS
servers, all of which work on top of the NFS protocol and
thus can be easily ported to any operating systems that sup-
port NFS. Measurements obtained from running standard
benchmarks and real-world NFS traces on these user-level
continuous data protection systems demonstrate a surpris-
ing result: Performance of NFS servers protected by pure
user-level continuous data protection schemes is compara-
ble to that of unprotected vanilla NFS servers.
1
Introduction
Data in a ﬁle system could be lost or corrupted in the
face of natural disasters, hardware/software failures, human
mistakes or malicious attacks. While replication and mirror-
ing represent effective defenses against hardware and site
failures, they cannot protect ﬁle system data from human
mistakes, software failures and malicious attacks, against
which conventional data backup systems provide limited
protection. Advanced multi-snapshots backup systems [12]
decrease the amount of potential data...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited
author:Michael Backes and
Tongbo Chen and
Markus D"urmuth and
Hendrik P. A. Lensch and
Martin Welk
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reﬂections Revisited
Michael Backes
∗†
‡
, Tongbo Chen
∗
∗
, Hendrik P. A. Lensch
§
, and Martin Welk
∗
, Markus Dürmuth
Saarland University, Germany
‡
§
MPI Informatik, Germany
Ulm University, Germany
†
MPI-SWS
Abstract
Reﬂecting objects such as tea pots and glasses, but also
diffusely reﬂecting objects such as a user’s shirt, can be used
to spy on conﬁdential data displayed on a monitor. First, we
show how reﬂections in the user’s eye can be exploited for
spying on conﬁdential data. Second, we investigate to what
extent monitor images can be reconstructed from the diffuse
reﬂections on a wall or the user’s clothes, and provide
information-theoretic bounds limiting this type of attack.
Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of several countermea-
sures. This substantially improves previous work (Backes et
al., IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2008).
1. Introduction
Emanations leaking potential conﬁdential
information,
from computers or similar devices, have been a topic of
concern for a long time. Although the military had prior
knowledge [34], [14], techniques to use the electromagnetic
emanation of CRT monitors to reconstruct a monitor’s
content were publicly known only by 1985 [31]. This
technique was further reﬁned and applied to similar types
of emanation, e.g., to capture the monitor’s content from
the emanations of the cable connecting the monitor and the
computer [15].
Prior work [3] presented a novel method to exploit the
optical, i.e., the unavoidable emanation of every monitor, not
just CRT monitors. It showed how to exploit tiny reﬂections
in a variety of objects to spy on conﬁdential data displayed
on a computer monitor. Appropriate objects are typically
located in most ofﬁces. This approach used astronom...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited
author:Michael Backes and
Tongbo Chen and
Markus D"urmuth and
Hendrik P. A. Lensch and
Martin Welk
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reﬂections Revisited
Michael Backes
∗†
‡
, Tongbo Chen
∗
∗
, Hendrik P. A. Lensch
§
, and Martin Welk
∗
, Markus Dürmuth
Saarland University, Germany
‡
§
MPI Informatik, Germany
Ulm University, Germany
†
MPI-SWS
Abstract
Reﬂecting objects such as tea pots and glasses, but also
diffusely reﬂecting objects such as a user’s shirt, can be used
to spy on conﬁdential data displayed on a monitor. First, we
show how reﬂections in the user’s eye can be exploited for
spying on conﬁdential data. Second, we investigate to what
extent monitor images can be reconstructed from the diffuse
reﬂections on a wall or the user’s clothes, and provide
information-theoretic bounds limiting this type of attack.
Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of several countermea-
sures. This substantially improves previous work (Backes et
al., IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2008).
1. Introduction
Emanations leaking potential conﬁdential
information,
from computers or similar devices, have been a topic of
concern for a long time. Although the military had prior
knowledge [34], [14], techniques to use the electromagnetic
emanation of CRT monitors to reconstruct a monitor’s
content were publicly known only by 1985 [31]. This
technique was further reﬁned and applied to similar types
of emanation, e.g., to capture the monitor’s content from
the emanations of the cable connecting the monitor and the
computer [15].
Prior work [3] presented a novel method to exploit the
optical, i.e., the unavoidable emanation of every monitor, not
just CRT monitors. It showed how to exploit tiny reﬂections
in a variety of objects to spy on conﬁdential data displayed
on a computer monitor. Appropriate objects are typically
located in most ofﬁces. This approach used astronom...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
author:Kimberly Ruth and
Tadayoshi Kohno and
Franziska Roesner
Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for
Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner, University of Washington
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/ruth
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth
kcr32@cs.washington.edu
Tadayoshi Kohno
yoshi@cs.washington.edu
Franziska Roesner
franzi@cs.washington.edu
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington
https://ar-sec.cs.washington.edu/
Abstract
Augmented reality (AR), which overlays virtual content on
top of the user’s perception of the real world, has now be-
gun to enter the consumer market. Besides smartphone plat-
forms, early-stage head-mounted displays such as the Mi-
crosoft HoloLens are under active development. Many com-
pelling uses of these technologies are multi-user: e.g., in-
person collaborative tools, multiplayer gaming, and telep-
resence. While prior work on AR security and privacy has
studied potential risks from AR applications, new risks will
also arise among multiple human users. In this work, we ex-
plore the challenges that arise in designing secure and private
content sharing for multi-user AR. We analyze representative
application case studies and systematize design goals for se-
curity and functionality that a multi-user AR platform should
support. We design an AR content sharing control module
that achieves these goals and build a prototype implementa-
tion (ShareAR) for the HoloLens. This work builds founda-
tions for secure and private multi-user AR interactions.
1 Introduction
Augmented real...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
author:Kimberly Ruth and
Tadayoshi Kohno and
Franziska Roesner
Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for
Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner, University of Washington
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/ruth
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth
kcr32@cs.washington.edu
Tadayoshi Kohno
yoshi@cs.washington.edu
Franziska Roesner
franzi@cs.washington.edu
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington
https://ar-sec.cs.washington.edu/
Abstract
Augmented reality (AR), which overlays virtual content on
top of the user’s perception of the real world, has now be-
gun to enter the consumer market. Besides smartphone plat-
forms, early-stage head-mounted displays such as the Mi-
crosoft HoloLens are under active development. Many com-
pelling uses of these technologies are multi-user: e.g., in-
person collaborative tools, multiplayer gaming, and telep-
resence. While prior work on AR security and privacy has
studied potential risks from AR applications, new risks will
also arise among multiple human users. In this work, we ex-
plore the challenges that arise in designing secure and private
content sharing for multi-user AR. We analyze representative
application case studies and systematize design goals for se-
curity and functionality that a multi-user AR platform should
support. We design an AR content sharing control module
that achieves these goals and build a prototype implementa-
tion (ShareAR) for the HoloLens. This work builds founda-
tions for secure and private multi-user AR interactions.
1 Introduction
Augmented real...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Deforestation of L2
author:James Murphy McCauley and
Mingjie Zhao and
Ethan J. Jackson and
Barath Raghavan and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker
The Deforestation of L2
James McCauley
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Mingjie Zhao
UESTC / ICSI
Ethan J. Jackson
UC Berkeley
Barath Raghavan
ICSI
Sylvia Ratnasamy
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Scott Shenker
UC Berkeley / ICSI
ABSTRACT
A major staple of layer 2 has long been the combination of
ﬂood-and-learn Ethernet switches with some variant of the
Spanning Tree Protocol. However, STP has signiﬁcant short-
comings – chieﬂy, that it throws away network capacity by
removing links, and that it can be relatively slow to recon-
verge after topology changes. In recent years, attempts to
rectify these shortcomings have been made by either making
L2 look more like L3 (notably TRILL and SPB, which both in-
corporate L3-like routing) or by replacing L2 switches with
“L3 switching” hardware and extending IP all the way to
the host. In this paper, we examine an alternate point in
the L2 design space, which is simple (in that it is a sin-
gle data plane mechanism with no separate control plane),
converges quickly, delivers packets during convergence, uti-
lizes all available links, and can be extended to support both
equal-cost multipath and efﬁcient multicast.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocol design; Link-layer proto-
cols;
Keywords
L2 routing, spanning tree
1 Introduction
Layer 2 was originally developed to provide local connectiv-
ity while requiring little conﬁguration. This plug-and-play
property ensures that when new hosts arrive (or move), there
is no need to (re)conﬁgure the host or manually (re)conﬁgure
switches with new routing state. This is in contrast to IP (L3)
where one must assign an IP address to a newly arriving host,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Deforestation of L2
author:James Murphy McCauley and
Mingjie Zhao and
Ethan J. Jackson and
Barath Raghavan and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker
The Deforestation of L2
James McCauley
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Mingjie Zhao
UESTC / ICSI
Ethan J. Jackson
UC Berkeley
Barath Raghavan
ICSI
Sylvia Ratnasamy
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Scott Shenker
UC Berkeley / ICSI
ABSTRACT
A major staple of layer 2 has long been the combination of
ﬂood-and-learn Ethernet switches with some variant of the
Spanning Tree Protocol. However, STP has signiﬁcant short-
comings – chieﬂy, that it throws away network capacity by
removing links, and that it can be relatively slow to recon-
verge after topology changes. In recent years, attempts to
rectify these shortcomings have been made by either making
L2 look more like L3 (notably TRILL and SPB, which both in-
corporate L3-like routing) or by replacing L2 switches with
“L3 switching” hardware and extending IP all the way to
the host. In this paper, we examine an alternate point in
the L2 design space, which is simple (in that it is a sin-
gle data plane mechanism with no separate control plane),
converges quickly, delivers packets during convergence, uti-
lizes all available links, and can be extended to support both
equal-cost multipath and efﬁcient multicast.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocol design; Link-layer proto-
cols;
Keywords
L2 routing, spanning tree
1 Introduction
Layer 2 was originally developed to provide local connectiv-
ity while requiring little conﬁguration. This plug-and-play
property ensures that when new hosts arrive (or move), there
is no need to (re)conﬁgure the host or manually (re)conﬁgure
switches with new routing state. This is in contrast to IP (L3)
where one must assign an IP address to a newly arriving host,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Predicting Users' Motivations behind Location Check-Ins and Utility
Implications of Privacy Protection Mechanisms
author:Igor Bilogrevic and
K'evin Huguenin and
Stefan Mihaila and
Reza Shokri and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Predicting Users’ Motivations behind Location
Check-Ins and Utility Implications of Privacy
Protection Mechanisms
Igor Bilogrevic*
K´evin Huguenin*
Stefan Mihaila
Google
Switzerland
LAAS-CNRS
France
EPFL
Switzerland
Reza Shokri†
University of Texas, Austin
USA
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
EPFL
Switzerland
ibilogrevic@google.com
huguenin@laas.fr
stefan.mihaila@epﬂ.ch
shokri@cs.utexas.edu
jean-pierre.hubaux@epﬂ.ch
Abstract—Location check-ins contain both geographical and
semantic information about the visited venues, in the form of
tags (e.g., “restaurant”). Such data might reveal some personal
information about users beyond what they actually want to
disclose, hence their privacy is threatened. In this paper, we study
users’ motivations behind location check-ins, and we quantify the
effect of a privacy-preserving technique (i.e., generalization) on
the perceived utility of check-ins. By means of a targeted user-
study on Foursquare (N = 77), we show that the motivation behind
Foursquare check-ins is a mediator of the loss of utility caused
by generalization. Using these ﬁndings, we propose a machine-
learning method for determining the motivation behind each
check-in, and we design a motivation-based predictive model for
utility. Our results show that the model accurately predicts the
loss of utility caused by semantic and geographical generalization;
this model enables the design of utility-aware, privacy-enhancing
mechanisms in location-based social networks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and
Foursquare, allow their users to share location information with
each other. Such a feature is quite popular, as 30% of users
attach locations to their posts [36]. The reason for sharing
locations include the desire to connect with...