Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Ally Friendly Jamming: How to Jam Your Enemy and Maintain Your Own
Wireless Connectivity at the Same Time
author:Wenbo Shen and
Peng Ning and
Xiaofan He and
Huaiyu Dai
2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Ally Friendly Jamming: How to Jam Your Enemy and Maintain Your Own Wireless
Connectivity at the Same Time
Wenbo Shen, Peng Ning
Department of Computer Science
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, NC 27695
{wshen3, pning}@ncsu.edu
Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, NC 27695
{xhe6, hdai}@ncsu.edu
Abstract—This paper presents a novel mechanism, called
Ally Friendly Jamming, which aims at providing an intelligent
jamming capability that can disable unauthorized (enemy)
wireless communication but at
the same time still allow
authorized wireless devices to communicate, even if all these
devices operate at the same frequency. The basic idea is to
jam the wireless channel continuously but properly control the
jamming signals with secret keys, so that the jamming signals
are unpredictable interference to unauthorized devices, but are
recoverable by authorized ones equipped with the secret keys.
To achieve the ally friendly jamming capability, we develop
new techniques to generate ally jamming signals, to identify
and synchronize with multiple ally jammers. This paper
also reports the analysis, implementation, and experimental
evaluation of ally friendly jamming on a software deﬁned
radio platform. Both the analytical and experimental results
indicate that the proposed techniques can effectively disable
enemy wireless communication and at the same time maintain
wireless communication between authorized devices.
Keywords-Wireless; friendly jamming; interference cancella-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technology has been widely de-
ployed and increasingly adopted due to the ease of instal-
lation and reduced operational cost. The applications that
beneﬁt from wireless ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Privacy Preserving Disease Treatment & Complication Prediction
System (PDTCPS)
author:Qinghan Xue and
Mooi Choo Chuah and
Yingying Chen
Privacy Preserving Disease Treatment & Complication
Prediction System (PDTCPS)
Qinghan Xue
Department of CSE
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA, USA
qix213@lehigh.edu
Mooi Choo Chuah
Department of CSE
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA, USA
mcc7@lehigh.edu
Yingying Chen
Department of ECE
Stevens Institute of
Technology
Hoboken, NJ, USA
yingying.chen@stevens.edu
ABSTRACT
Aﬀordable cloud computing technologies allow users to ef-
ﬁciently store, and manage their Personal Health Records
(PHRs) and share with their caregivers or physicians. This
in turn improves the quality of healthcare services, and lower
health care cost. However, serious security and privacy con-
cerns emerge because people upload their personal infor-
mation and PHRs to the public cloud. Data encryption
provides privacy protection of medical information but it
is challenging to utilize encrypted data. In this paper, we
present a privacy-preserving disease treatment, complica-
tion prediction scheme (P DT CP S), which allows autho-
rized users to conduct searches for disease diagnosis, per-
sonalized treatments, and prediction of potential complica-
tions. P DT CP S uses a tree-based structure to boost search
eﬃciency, a wildcard approach to support fuzzy keyword
search, and a Bloom-ﬁlter to improve search accuracy and
storage eﬃciency. In addition, our design also allows health
care providers and the public cloud to collectively gener-
ate aggregated training models for disease diagnosis, per-
sonalized treatments and complications prediction. More-
over, our design provides query unlinkability and hides both
search & access patterns. Finally, our evaluation results us-
ing two U CI datasets show that our scheme is more eﬃcient
and accurate than two existing schemes.
Keywords
Cloud Computing; PHR; Fuzzy Keyword; Query Privacy;
Data Mining
1.
INTRODUCTION
In rece...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Privacy Preserving Disease Treatment & Complication Prediction
System (PDTCPS)
author:Qinghan Xue and
Mooi Choo Chuah and
Yingying Chen
Privacy Preserving Disease Treatment & Complication
Prediction System (PDTCPS)
Qinghan Xue
Department of CSE
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA, USA
qix213@lehigh.edu
Mooi Choo Chuah
Department of CSE
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA, USA
mcc7@lehigh.edu
Yingying Chen
Department of ECE
Stevens Institute of
Technology
Hoboken, NJ, USA
yingying.chen@stevens.edu
ABSTRACT
Aﬀordable cloud computing technologies allow users to ef-
ﬁciently store, and manage their Personal Health Records
(PHRs) and share with their caregivers or physicians. This
in turn improves the quality of healthcare services, and lower
health care cost. However, serious security and privacy con-
cerns emerge because people upload their personal infor-
mation and PHRs to the public cloud. Data encryption
provides privacy protection of medical information but it
is challenging to utilize encrypted data. In this paper, we
present a privacy-preserving disease treatment, complica-
tion prediction scheme (P DT CP S), which allows autho-
rized users to conduct searches for disease diagnosis, per-
sonalized treatments, and prediction of potential complica-
tions. P DT CP S uses a tree-based structure to boost search
eﬃciency, a wildcard approach to support fuzzy keyword
search, and a Bloom-ﬁlter to improve search accuracy and
storage eﬃciency. In addition, our design also allows health
care providers and the public cloud to collectively gener-
ate aggregated training models for disease diagnosis, per-
sonalized treatments and complications prediction. More-
over, our design provides query unlinkability and hides both
search & access patterns. Finally, our evaluation results us-
ing two U CI datasets show that our scheme is more eﬃcient
and accurate than two existing schemes.
Keywords
Cloud Computing; PHR; Fuzzy Keyword; Query Privacy;
Data Mining
1.
INTRODUCTION
In rece...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Implementation and implications of a stealth hard-drive backdoor
author:Jonas Zaddach and
Anil Kurmus and
Davide Balzarotti and
Erik-Oliver Blass and
Aur'elien Francillon and
Travis Goodspeed and
Moitrayee Gupta and
Ioannis Koltsidas
Implementation and Implications of
a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor
Jonas Zaddach
†∗
Anil Kurmus
‡∗
¶
Travis Goodspeed
†
Davide Balzarotti
Erik-Oliver Blass
§
†
Aur´elien Francillon
‡
Moitrayee Gupta
(cid:3)
Ioannis Koltsidas
ABSTRACT
Modern workstations and servers implicitly trust hard disks
to act as well-behaved block devices. This paper analyzes
the catastrophic loss of security that occurs when hard disks
are not trustworthy. First, we show that it is possible to
compromise the ﬁrmware of a commercial oﬀ-the-shelf hard
drive, by resorting only to public information and reverse en-
gineering. Using such a compromised ﬁrmware, we present
a stealth rootkit that replaces arbitrary blocks from the disk
while they are written, providing a data replacement back-
door. The measured performance overhead of the compro-
mised disk drive is less than 1% compared with a normal,
non-malicious disk drive. We then demonstrate that a re-
mote attacker can even establish a communication channel
with a compromised disk to inﬁltrate commands and to ex-
ﬁltrate data.
In our example, this channel is established
over the Internet to an unmodiﬁed web server that relies
on the compromised drive for its storage, passing through
the original webserver, database server, database storage en-
gine, ﬁlesystem driver, and block device driver. Additional
experiments, performed in an emulated disk-drive environ-
ment, could automatically extract sensitive data such as
/etc/shadow (or a secret key ﬁle) in less than a minute. This
paper claims that the diﬃculty of implementing such an at-
tack is not limited to the area of government cyber-warfare;
rather, it is well within the reach of moderately funded crim-
inals, botnet herders and academic researchers.
...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Implementation and implications of a stealth hard-drive backdoor
author:Jonas Zaddach and
Anil Kurmus and
Davide Balzarotti and
Erik-Oliver Blass and
Aur'elien Francillon and
Travis Goodspeed and
Moitrayee Gupta and
Ioannis Koltsidas
Implementation and Implications of
a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor
Jonas Zaddach
†∗
Anil Kurmus
‡∗
¶
Travis Goodspeed
†
Davide Balzarotti
Erik-Oliver Blass
§
†
Aur´elien Francillon
‡
Moitrayee Gupta
(cid:3)
Ioannis Koltsidas
ABSTRACT
Modern workstations and servers implicitly trust hard disks
to act as well-behaved block devices. This paper analyzes
the catastrophic loss of security that occurs when hard disks
are not trustworthy. First, we show that it is possible to
compromise the ﬁrmware of a commercial oﬀ-the-shelf hard
drive, by resorting only to public information and reverse en-
gineering. Using such a compromised ﬁrmware, we present
a stealth rootkit that replaces arbitrary blocks from the disk
while they are written, providing a data replacement back-
door. The measured performance overhead of the compro-
mised disk drive is less than 1% compared with a normal,
non-malicious disk drive. We then demonstrate that a re-
mote attacker can even establish a communication channel
with a compromised disk to inﬁltrate commands and to ex-
ﬁltrate data.
In our example, this channel is established
over the Internet to an unmodiﬁed web server that relies
on the compromised drive for its storage, passing through
the original webserver, database server, database storage en-
gine, ﬁlesystem driver, and block device driver. Additional
experiments, performed in an emulated disk-drive environ-
ment, could automatically extract sensitive data such as
/etc/shadow (or a secret key ﬁle) in less than a minute. This
paper claims that the diﬃculty of implementing such an at-
tack is not limited to the area of government cyber-warfare;
rather, it is well within the reach of moderately funded crim-
inals, botnet herders and academic researchers.
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:POSTER: Positioning Attack on Proximity-Based People Discovery
author:Huan Feng and
Kang G. Shin
POSTER: Positioning Attack on Proximity-Based People
Discovery
Huan Feng
The University of Michigan
Michigan, USA
huanfeng@umich.edu
Kang G. Shin
The University of Michigan
Michigan, USA
kgshin@umich.edu
ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, Proximity-based People Discov-
ery (PBPD) services, typically known as Nearby Friends,
have been increasingly popular among geosocial apps. Un-
like many unsuccessful predecessors which directly pinpoint
users’ exact locations on the map, PBPD services provide
coarse-grained (discretized) proximity information, such as
“Jennifer is within 2 miles,” striking a useful balance between
privacy and functionality. Considering PBPD’s business po-
tential, many companies including Facebook have been try-
ing to promote this feature and instill the perception in mo-
bile users that coarse-grained proximity information is in-
nocuous to share. Here, we propose a novel positioning at-
tack which can locate end-users of PBPD services with high
precision using only coarse-grained (discretized) proximity
information. This attack requires neither specialized hard-
ware nor server-side collusion and can be easily automated.
Based on this attack, we design and implement Geosocial
Positioning System (GsPS) and show that GsPS can eﬀec-
tively locate users with high precision (10m) in a matter of
a few minutes under real-world settings, and is capable of
performing eﬀective city-scale scanning and long-term proﬁl-
ing at low costs. The public and the social network industry
should therefore be aware of the potential risk introduced by
this attack and consider use of PBPD services with caution.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public policy issues—privacy
Keywords
Geosocial network, location privacy, triangulation
1.
INTRODUCTION
Proximity-Based ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:POSTER: Positioning Attack on Proximity-Based People Discovery
author:Huan Feng and
Kang G. Shin
POSTER: Positioning Attack on Proximity-Based People
Discovery
Huan Feng
The University of Michigan
Michigan, USA
huanfeng@umich.edu
Kang G. Shin
The University of Michigan
Michigan, USA
kgshin@umich.edu
ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, Proximity-based People Discov-
ery (PBPD) services, typically known as Nearby Friends,
have been increasingly popular among geosocial apps. Un-
like many unsuccessful predecessors which directly pinpoint
users’ exact locations on the map, PBPD services provide
coarse-grained (discretized) proximity information, such as
“Jennifer is within 2 miles,” striking a useful balance between
privacy and functionality. Considering PBPD’s business po-
tential, many companies including Facebook have been try-
ing to promote this feature and instill the perception in mo-
bile users that coarse-grained proximity information is in-
nocuous to share. Here, we propose a novel positioning at-
tack which can locate end-users of PBPD services with high
precision using only coarse-grained (discretized) proximity
information. This attack requires neither specialized hard-
ware nor server-side collusion and can be easily automated.
Based on this attack, we design and implement Geosocial
Positioning System (GsPS) and show that GsPS can eﬀec-
tively locate users with high precision (10m) in a matter of
a few minutes under real-world settings, and is capable of
performing eﬀective city-scale scanning and long-term proﬁl-
ing at low costs. The public and the social network industry
should therefore be aware of the potential risk introduced by
this attack and consider use of PBPD services with caution.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public policy issues—privacy
Keywords
Geosocial network, location privacy, triangulation
1.
INTRODUCTION
Proximity-Based ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Toward Whole-System Dynamic Analysis for ARM-Based Mobile Devices
author:Ryan Whelan and
David R. Kaeli
Toward Whole-System Dynamic Analysis for
ARM-Based Mobile Devices
Ryan Whelan and David Kaeli
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Northeastern University
Boston, MA, USA
rwhelan@coe.neu.edu, kaeli@ece.neu.edu
Abstract. The ARM architecture is presently the chipset of choice for
today’s smartphones - this demand has spurred new advances in func-
tionality and services, and as the number of smartphones increases, so
has the number of applications being migrated to them. As a result, the
amount of malware targeting them will also increase. We present our pre-
liminary work on an ARM-based dynamic proﬁling platform that allows
analysts to study malware that targets ARM-based smartphone systems.
Mobile malware exploits have only begun to appear recently, but analysts expect
this trend to accelerate in future years as smartphones begin to dominate the
mobile communications market. Smartphones introduce additional attack vec-
tors unavailable on PCs, including Short Messaging Service (SMS), Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS), and Bluetooth. While security experts (especially
white hat hackers) have begun to exploit and disclose these vulnerabilities so
they can be patched, a new group of embedded systems black hat hackers will
soon emerge given the personal and ﬁnancial data being managed from these
systems. As new mobile malware culture continues to mature, security analysts
will need a platform that will allow them to study exploits and intrusions. At
the moment, a complete ARM-based security analysis platform does not exist
that is appropriate for studying mobile malware.
In this paper we report on our implementation of such a platform that is
based on QEMU [1]. QEMU provides a whole-system emulator for many guest
architectures, including ARM. Since the open source development emulator for
the Android smartphone operating system is based on QEMU wi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Toward Whole-System Dynamic Analysis for ARM-Based Mobile Devices
author:Ryan Whelan and
David R. Kaeli
Toward Whole-System Dynamic Analysis for
ARM-Based Mobile Devices
Ryan Whelan and David Kaeli
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Northeastern University
Boston, MA, USA
rwhelan@coe.neu.edu, kaeli@ece.neu.edu
Abstract. The ARM architecture is presently the chipset of choice for
today’s smartphones - this demand has spurred new advances in func-
tionality and services, and as the number of smartphones increases, so
has the number of applications being migrated to them. As a result, the
amount of malware targeting them will also increase. We present our pre-
liminary work on an ARM-based dynamic proﬁling platform that allows
analysts to study malware that targets ARM-based smartphone systems.
Mobile malware exploits have only begun to appear recently, but analysts expect
this trend to accelerate in future years as smartphones begin to dominate the
mobile communications market. Smartphones introduce additional attack vec-
tors unavailable on PCs, including Short Messaging Service (SMS), Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS), and Bluetooth. While security experts (especially
white hat hackers) have begun to exploit and disclose these vulnerabilities so
they can be patched, a new group of embedded systems black hat hackers will
soon emerge given the personal and ﬁnancial data being managed from these
systems. As new mobile malware culture continues to mature, security analysts
will need a platform that will allow them to study exploits and intrusions. At
the moment, a complete ARM-based security analysis platform does not exist
that is appropriate for studying mobile malware.
In this paper we report on our implementation of such a platform that is
based on QEMU [1]. QEMU provides a whole-system emulator for many guest
architectures, including ARM. Since the open source development emulator for
the Android smartphone operating system is based on QEMU wi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An accurate flip-flop selection technique for reducing logic SER
author:Eric L. Hill and
Mikko H. Lipasti and
Kewal K. Saluja
International Conference on Dependable Systems &Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
An Accurate Flip-flop Selection Technique for Reducing Logic SER
Eric L. Hill, Mikko H. Lipasti, Kewal K. Saluja
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Wisconsin - Madison
{elhill, mikko, saluja}@ece.wisc.edu
Abstract
lent to that of storage structures [11].
The combination ofcontinued technology scaling and in(cid:173)
creased on-chip transistor densities has made vulnerability
to radiation induced so.ft errors a significant design con(cid:173)
cern. In particular, the effects ofthese errors on logic nodes
are predicted to play an increasingly large role in deter(cid:173)
mining the overall failure rate offuture VLSI chips. While
a myriad oftechniques have been proposed to mitigate the
effects ofsoft errors, system designers must ensure that the
application ofthese solutions does not come at the expense
ofother design goals. This work presents a heuristic to se(cid:173)
lectively apply temporal redundancy to .flip-.flops within a
pipelined logic unit, achieving significant reductions in fail(cid:173)
ures associated with soft errors with minimal overhead.
1. Introduction
As computing systems become increasingly ubiquitous,
architects strive to create robust systems capable of operat(cid:173)
ing in a wide variety of environments. In addition to meet(cid:173)
ing performance and power requirements, engineers now
have to spend a significant amount of time ensuring their
designs also meet reliability goals. The combination of
continued technology scaling and increased on-chip transis(cid:173)
tor densities have made vulnerability to radiation-induced
soft errors a significant design concern [8]. The majority
of work on soft errors has focused on understanding and
mitigating their effects on storage structures [3]. In terms...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An accurate flip-flop selection technique for reducing logic SER
author:Eric L. Hill and
Mikko H. Lipasti and
Kewal K. Saluja
International Conference on Dependable Systems &Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
An Accurate Flip-flop Selection Technique for Reducing Logic SER
Eric L. Hill, Mikko H. Lipasti, Kewal K. Saluja
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Wisconsin - Madison
{elhill, mikko, saluja}@ece.wisc.edu
Abstract
lent to that of storage structures [11].
The combination ofcontinued technology scaling and in(cid:173)
creased on-chip transistor densities has made vulnerability
to radiation induced so.ft errors a significant design con(cid:173)
cern. In particular, the effects ofthese errors on logic nodes
are predicted to play an increasingly large role in deter(cid:173)
mining the overall failure rate offuture VLSI chips. While
a myriad oftechniques have been proposed to mitigate the
effects ofsoft errors, system designers must ensure that the
application ofthese solutions does not come at the expense
ofother design goals. This work presents a heuristic to se(cid:173)
lectively apply temporal redundancy to .flip-.flops within a
pipelined logic unit, achieving significant reductions in fail(cid:173)
ures associated with soft errors with minimal overhead.
1. Introduction
As computing systems become increasingly ubiquitous,
architects strive to create robust systems capable of operat(cid:173)
ing in a wide variety of environments. In addition to meet(cid:173)
ing performance and power requirements, engineers now
have to spend a significant amount of time ensuring their
designs also meet reliability goals. The combination of
continued technology scaling and increased on-chip transis(cid:173)
tor densities have made vulnerability to radiation-induced
soft errors a significant design concern [8]. The majority
of work on soft errors has focused on understanding and
mitigating their effects on storage structures [3]. In terms...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:MEDUSA: Mining Events to Detect Undesirable uSer Actions in SCADA
author:Dina Hadziosmanovic and
Damiano Bolzoni and
Pieter H. Hartel
MEDUSA:
Mining Events to Detect Undesirable uSer
Actions in SCADA
Dina Hadˇziosmanovi´c, Damiano Bolzoni and Pieter Hartel
Distributed and Embedded Security, University of Twente
{dina.hadziosmanovic,damiano.bolzoni,pieter.hartel}@utwente.nl
Abstract. Standard approaches for detecting malicious behaviors, e.g.
monitoring network traﬃc, cannot address process-related threats in
SCADA(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems. These
threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs
actions which look legitimate, but which can disrupt the industrial pro-
cess. We believe that it is possible to detect such behavior by analysing
SCADA system logs. We present MEDUSA, an anomaly-based tool for
detecting user actions that may negatively impact the system.
1 Problem
There is a wide range of possible attacks that can be carried out against SCADA
environments [1,2]. We classify possible threats in two groups: system- and
process-related. System-related threats are typical of “regular” computer net-
works, e.g., malware or Denial of Service attacks. Attackers leverage vulnerabil-
ities in networked systems and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to alter
or disrupt the industrial process. Process-related threats imply that an attacker
gains user access rights (e.g., through social engineering) and performs legiti-
mate SCADA commands which will negatively aﬀect the industrial processes.
Typical security countermeasures, e.g., antivirus or network IDSes, can hardly
detect process-related threats, as they lack process semantic.
In this work, we focus on the detection of process-related threats. Based on in-
terviews with stakeholders, we distinguish two types of threat scenarios, namely
1) an attacker impersonates a system user or 2) a legitimate system user makes
an operational mistake. A SCADA engineer mana...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MEDUSA: Mining Events to Detect Undesirable uSer Actions in SCADA
author:Dina Hadziosmanovic and
Damiano Bolzoni and
Pieter H. Hartel
MEDUSA:
Mining Events to Detect Undesirable uSer
Actions in SCADA
Dina Hadˇziosmanovi´c, Damiano Bolzoni and Pieter Hartel
Distributed and Embedded Security, University of Twente
{dina.hadziosmanovic,damiano.bolzoni,pieter.hartel}@utwente.nl
Abstract. Standard approaches for detecting malicious behaviors, e.g.
monitoring network traﬃc, cannot address process-related threats in
SCADA(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems. These
threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs
actions which look legitimate, but which can disrupt the industrial pro-
cess. We believe that it is possible to detect such behavior by analysing
SCADA system logs. We present MEDUSA, an anomaly-based tool for
detecting user actions that may negatively impact the system.
1 Problem
There is a wide range of possible attacks that can be carried out against SCADA
environments [1,2]. We classify possible threats in two groups: system- and
process-related. System-related threats are typical of “regular” computer net-
works, e.g., malware or Denial of Service attacks. Attackers leverage vulnerabil-
ities in networked systems and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to alter
or disrupt the industrial process. Process-related threats imply that an attacker
gains user access rights (e.g., through social engineering) and performs legiti-
mate SCADA commands which will negatively aﬀect the industrial processes.
Typical security countermeasures, e.g., antivirus or network IDSes, can hardly
detect process-related threats, as they lack process semantic.
In this work, we focus on the detection of process-related threats. Based on in-
terviews with stakeholders, we distinguish two types of threat scenarios, namely
1) an attacker impersonates a system user or 2) a legitimate system user makes
an operational mistake. A SCADA engineer mana...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Ghost in the Binder: Binder Transaction Redirection Attacks in Android
System Services
author:Xiaobo Xiang and
Ren Zhang and
Hanxiang Wen and
Xiaorui Gong and
Baoxu Liu
Ghost in the Binder: Binder Transaction Redirection Attacks in
Android System Services
Xiaobo Xiang
xiangxiaobo@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Alpha Lab∗, 360 GESG‡
Beijing, China
Ren Zhang
ren@nervos.org
Nervos
Beijing, China
Shandong Institute of Blockchain
Hanxiang Wen
arnow117@gmail.com
Ant Group
Hangzhou, China
Xiaorui Gong (cid:66)
gongxiaorui@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Beijing, China
Baoxu Liu
liubaoxu@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
Binder, the main mechanism for Android applications to access
system services, adopts a client-server role model in its design,
assuming the system service as the server and the application as
the client. However, a growing number of scenarios require the
system service to act as a Binder client and to send queries to a
Binder server possibly instantiated by the application. Departing
from this role-reversal possibility, this paper proposes the Binder
Transaction Redirection (BiTRe) attacks, where the attacker induces
the system service to transact with a customized Binder server and
then attacks from the Binder server—an often unprotected direction.
We demonstrate the scale of the attack surface by enumerating the
utilizable Binder interfaces in BiTRe, and discover that the attack
surface grows with the Android release version. In Android 11,
more than 70% of the Binder interfaces are affected by or can be
utilized in BiTRe. We prove the attacks’ feasibility by (1) construct-
ing a prototype system that can automatically generate executable
programs to reach a substantial part of the attack surface, and (2)
identifying a series of vulnerabilities, which are acknowledged by
Google and assigned ten CVEs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Ghost in the Binder: Binder Transaction Redirection Attacks in Android
System Services
author:Xiaobo Xiang and
Ren Zhang and
Hanxiang Wen and
Xiaorui Gong and
Baoxu Liu
Ghost in the Binder: Binder Transaction Redirection Attacks in
Android System Services
Xiaobo Xiang
xiangxiaobo@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Alpha Lab∗, 360 GESG‡
Beijing, China
Ren Zhang
ren@nervos.org
Nervos
Beijing, China
Shandong Institute of Blockchain
Hanxiang Wen
arnow117@gmail.com
Ant Group
Hangzhou, China
Xiaorui Gong (cid:66)
gongxiaorui@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Beijing, China
Baoxu Liu
liubaoxu@iie.ac.cn
CAS-KLONAT§, IIE, CAS†
School of Cyber Security, UCAS¶
Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
Binder, the main mechanism for Android applications to access
system services, adopts a client-server role model in its design,
assuming the system service as the server and the application as
the client. However, a growing number of scenarios require the
system service to act as a Binder client and to send queries to a
Binder server possibly instantiated by the application. Departing
from this role-reversal possibility, this paper proposes the Binder
Transaction Redirection (BiTRe) attacks, where the attacker induces
the system service to transact with a customized Binder server and
then attacks from the Binder server—an often unprotected direction.
We demonstrate the scale of the attack surface by enumerating the
utilizable Binder interfaces in BiTRe, and discover that the attack
surface grows with the Android release version. In Android 11,
more than 70% of the Binder interfaces are affected by or can be
utilized in BiTRe. We prove the attacks’ feasibility by (1) construct-
ing a prototype system that can automatically generate executable
programs to reach a substantial part of the attack surface, and (2)
identifying a series of vulnerabilities, which are acknowledged by
Google and assigned ten CVEs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Cost-Effective Configuration of Content Resiliency Services Under
Correlated Failures
author:Jinliang Fan and
Tianying Chang and
Dimitrios E. Pendarakis and
Zhen Liu
Cost-Effective Conﬁguration of Content Resiliency Services
Under Correlated Failures
Jinliang Fan
Tianying Chang
Georgia Institute of Technology
{jlfan,tychang}@cc.gatech.edu
Dimitrios Pendarakis Zhen Liu
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
{dimitris,zhenl}@us.ibm.com.
Abstract
Value-added content resiliency services help to migrate
the burden of resiliency provisioning and maintenance from
service users, especially home users and small/medium or-
ganizations, who have difﬁculty in handling correlated fail-
ures that impact large areas. For service providers to
achieve business success, however, the cost-effectiveness of
their resiliency strategies is critical: while the content re-
siliency requirements speciﬁed by the end users have to be
satisﬁed, excessive preventive operation costs caused by the
over-reaction to potential risks should be avoided. In this
paper, we study the problem of cost-effective conﬁguration
in content resiliency service networks under both indepen-
dent and geographically correlated failures. We propose
a new approach to modeling correlated failures in a rep-
resentable, quantiﬁable and consistent way, which allows
for both quantiﬁed availability guarantees and aggressive
prevention cost optimization. We then formulate the cost-
effective conﬁguration problem in content resiliency ser-
vices and develop both real optimal and heuristic-based al-
gorithms for solving the problem. Our experiments show
that with the help of good models for correlated failures, the
operation cost of the services can be signiﬁcantly reduced
without impairing the user-speciﬁed content resiliency.
1
Introduction
While engineers have invested a signiﬁcant amount of ef-
fort in improving the reliability of computer hardware and
software, failures are still common in today’s computer and
network syste...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Cost-Effective Configuration of Content Resiliency Services Under
Correlated Failures
author:Jinliang Fan and
Tianying Chang and
Dimitrios E. Pendarakis and
Zhen Liu
Cost-Effective Conﬁguration of Content Resiliency Services
Under Correlated Failures
Jinliang Fan
Tianying Chang
Georgia Institute of Technology
{jlfan,tychang}@cc.gatech.edu
Dimitrios Pendarakis Zhen Liu
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
{dimitris,zhenl}@us.ibm.com.
Abstract
Value-added content resiliency services help to migrate
the burden of resiliency provisioning and maintenance from
service users, especially home users and small/medium or-
ganizations, who have difﬁculty in handling correlated fail-
ures that impact large areas. For service providers to
achieve business success, however, the cost-effectiveness of
their resiliency strategies is critical: while the content re-
siliency requirements speciﬁed by the end users have to be
satisﬁed, excessive preventive operation costs caused by the
over-reaction to potential risks should be avoided. In this
paper, we study the problem of cost-effective conﬁguration
in content resiliency service networks under both indepen-
dent and geographically correlated failures. We propose
a new approach to modeling correlated failures in a rep-
resentable, quantiﬁable and consistent way, which allows
for both quantiﬁed availability guarantees and aggressive
prevention cost optimization. We then formulate the cost-
effective conﬁguration problem in content resiliency ser-
vices and develop both real optimal and heuristic-based al-
gorithms for solving the problem. Our experiments show
that with the help of good models for correlated failures, the
operation cost of the services can be signiﬁcantly reduced
without impairing the user-speciﬁed content resiliency.
1
Introduction
While engineers have invested a signiﬁcant amount of ef-
fort in improving the reliability of computer hardware and
software, failures are still common in today’s computer and
network syste...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:dRMT: Disaggregated Programmable Switching
author:Sharad Chole and
Andy Fingerhut and
Sha Ma and
Anirudh Sivaraman and
Shay Vargaftik and
Alon Berger and
Gal Mendelson and
Mohammad Alizadeh and
Shang-Tse Chuang and
Isaac Keslassy and
Ariel Orda and
Tom Edsall
dRMT: Disaggregated Programmable Switching
Sharad Chole1, Andy Fingerhut1, Sha Ma1, Anirudh Sivaraman2, Shay Vargaftik3, Alon Berger3,
Gal Mendelson3, Mohammad Alizadeh2, Shang-Tse Chuang1, Isaac Keslassy3,4, Ariel Orda3, Tom Edsall1
1 Cisco Systems, Inc.
2 MIT
3 Technion
4 VMware, Inc.
ABSTRACT
We present dRMT (disaggregated Reconfigurable Match-Action
Table), a new architecture for programmable switches. dRMT over-
comes two important restrictions of RMT, the predominant pipeline-
based architecture for programmable switches: (1) table memory
is local to an RMT pipeline stage, implying that memory not used
by one stage cannot be reclaimed by another, and (2) RMT is hard-
wired to always sequentially execute matches followed by actions
as packets traverse pipeline stages. We show that these restrictions
make it difficult to execute programs efficiently on RMT.
dRMT resolves both issues by disaggregating the memory and
compute resources of a programmable switch. Specifically, dRMT
moves table memories out of pipeline stages and into a centralized
pool that is accessible through a crossbar. In addition, dRMT replaces
RMT’s pipeline stages with a cluster of processors that can execute
match and action operations in any order.
We show how to schedule a P4 program on dRMT at compile
time to guarantee deterministic throughput and latency. We also
present a hardware design for dRMT and analyze its feasibility and
chip area. Our results show that dRMT can run programs at line rate
with fewer processors compared to RMT, and avoids performance
cliffs when there are not enough processors to run a program at line
rate. dRMT’s hardware design incurs a modest increase in chip area
relative to RMT, mainly due to the cr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:dRMT: Disaggregated Programmable Switching
author:Sharad Chole and
Andy Fingerhut and
Sha Ma and
Anirudh Sivaraman and
Shay Vargaftik and
Alon Berger and
Gal Mendelson and
Mohammad Alizadeh and
Shang-Tse Chuang and
Isaac Keslassy and
Ariel Orda and
Tom Edsall
dRMT: Disaggregated Programmable Switching
Sharad Chole1, Andy Fingerhut1, Sha Ma1, Anirudh Sivaraman2, Shay Vargaftik3, Alon Berger3,
Gal Mendelson3, Mohammad Alizadeh2, Shang-Tse Chuang1, Isaac Keslassy3,4, Ariel Orda3, Tom Edsall1
1 Cisco Systems, Inc.
2 MIT
3 Technion
4 VMware, Inc.
ABSTRACT
We present dRMT (disaggregated Reconfigurable Match-Action
Table), a new architecture for programmable switches. dRMT over-
comes two important restrictions of RMT, the predominant pipeline-
based architecture for programmable switches: (1) table memory
is local to an RMT pipeline stage, implying that memory not used
by one stage cannot be reclaimed by another, and (2) RMT is hard-
wired to always sequentially execute matches followed by actions
as packets traverse pipeline stages. We show that these restrictions
make it difficult to execute programs efficiently on RMT.
dRMT resolves both issues by disaggregating the memory and
compute resources of a programmable switch. Specifically, dRMT
moves table memories out of pipeline stages and into a centralized
pool that is accessible through a crossbar. In addition, dRMT replaces
RMT’s pipeline stages with a cluster of processors that can execute
match and action operations in any order.
We show how to schedule a P4 program on dRMT at compile
time to guarantee deterministic throughput and latency. We also
present a hardware design for dRMT and analyze its feasibility and
chip area. Our results show that dRMT can run programs at line rate
with fewer processors compared to RMT, and avoids performance
cliffs when there are not enough processors to run a program at line
rate. dRMT’s hardware design incurs a modest increase in chip area
relative to RMT, mainly due to the cr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect
author:Jing Tian and
Chengzhang Qu and
Wenyuan Xu and
Song Wang
KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect
Jing Tian∗1, Chengzhang Qu ∗2, Wenyuan Xu†1 and Song Wang‡1
1Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina
2School of Computer Science, Wuhan University
Abstract
Password-based authentication is easy to use but its
security is bounded by how much a user can remember.
Biometrics-based authentication requires no memorization
but ‘resetting’ a biometric password may not always be pos-
sible.
In this paper, we propose a user-friendly authenti-
cation system (KinWrite) that allows users to choose ar-
bitrary, short and easy-to-memorize passwords while pro-
viding resilience to password cracking and password theft.
KinWrite lets users write their passwords in 3D space and
captures the handwriting motion using a low cost motion
input sensing device—Kinect. The low resolution and noisy
data captured by Kinect, combined with low consistency
of in-space handwriting, have made it challenging to ver-
ify users. To overcome these challenges, we exploit the
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm to quantify sim-
ilarities between handwritten passwords. Our experimen-
tal results involving 35 signatures from 18 subjects and a
brute-force attacker have shown that KinWrite can achieve
a 100% precision and a 70% recall (the worst case) for
verifying honest users, encouraging us to carry out a much
larger scale study towards designing a foolproof system.
1 Introduction
Authentication plays a key role in securing various re-
sources including corporate facilities or electronic assets.
Naturally, numerous authentication mechanisms have been
proposed in the past, and in general they can be divided
into three categories:
(a) knowledge-based, (b) token-
based, (c) biometrics-based. Knowledge-based authentica-
tion (e.g., text passwords) has been widely utilized because
of its ease of use...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect
author:Jing Tian and
Chengzhang Qu and
Wenyuan Xu and
Song Wang
KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect
Jing Tian∗1, Chengzhang Qu ∗2, Wenyuan Xu†1 and Song Wang‡1
1Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina
2School of Computer Science, Wuhan University
Abstract
Password-based authentication is easy to use but its
security is bounded by how much a user can remember.
Biometrics-based authentication requires no memorization
but ‘resetting’ a biometric password may not always be pos-
sible.
In this paper, we propose a user-friendly authenti-
cation system (KinWrite) that allows users to choose ar-
bitrary, short and easy-to-memorize passwords while pro-
viding resilience to password cracking and password theft.
KinWrite lets users write their passwords in 3D space and
captures the handwriting motion using a low cost motion
input sensing device—Kinect. The low resolution and noisy
data captured by Kinect, combined with low consistency
of in-space handwriting, have made it challenging to ver-
ify users. To overcome these challenges, we exploit the
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm to quantify sim-
ilarities between handwritten passwords. Our experimen-
tal results involving 35 signatures from 18 subjects and a
brute-force attacker have shown that KinWrite can achieve
a 100% precision and a 70% recall (the worst case) for
verifying honest users, encouraging us to carry out a much
larger scale study towards designing a foolproof system.
1 Introduction
Authentication plays a key role in securing various re-
sources including corporate facilities or electronic assets.
Naturally, numerous authentication mechanisms have been
proposed in the past, and in general they can be divided
into three categories:
(a) knowledge-based, (b) token-
based, (c) biometrics-based. Knowledge-based authentica-
tion (e.g., text passwords) has been widely utilized because
of its ease of use...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy
author:Zeyu Ding and
Yuxin Wang and
Guanhong Wang and
Danfeng Zhang and
Daniel Kifer
Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy
Zeyu Ding
Pennsylvania State University
dxd437@psu.edu
Yuxin Wang
Pennsylvania State University
ywang@cse.psu.edu
Guanhong Wang
Pennsylvania State University
gpw5092@psu.edu
Danfeng Zhang
Pennsylvania State University
zhang@cse.psu.edu
Daniel Kifer
Pennsylvania State University
dkifer@cse.psu.edu
9
1
0
2
p
e
S
5
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
5
v
7
7
2
0
1
.
5
0
8
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
The widespread acceptance of differential privacy has led to the
publication of many sophisticated algorithms for protecting privacy.
However, due to the subtle nature of this privacy definition, many
such algorithms have bugs that make them violate their claimed
privacy. In this paper, we consider the problem of producing coun-
terexamples for such incorrect algorithms. The counterexamples
are designed to be short and human-understandable so that the
counterexample generator can be used in the development process
– a developer could quickly explore variations of an algorithm and
investigate where they break down. Our approach is statistical in
nature. It runs a candidate algorithm many times and uses statistical
tests to try to detect violations of differential privacy. An evalua-
tion on a variety of incorrect published algorithms validates the
usefulness of our approach: it correctly rejects incorrect algorithms
and provides counterexamples for them within a few seconds.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy protections.
KEYWORDS
Differential privacy; counterexample detection; statistical testing
ACM Reference Format:
Zeyu Ding, Yuxin Wang, Guanhong Wang, Danfeng Zhang, and Daniel Kifer.
2018. Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy. In 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’18), October
15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages.
https://doi.org/10....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy
author:Zeyu Ding and
Yuxin Wang and
Guanhong Wang and
Danfeng Zhang and
Daniel Kifer
Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy
Zeyu Ding
Pennsylvania State University
dxd437@psu.edu
Yuxin Wang
Pennsylvania State University
ywang@cse.psu.edu
Guanhong Wang
Pennsylvania State University
gpw5092@psu.edu
Danfeng Zhang
Pennsylvania State University
zhang@cse.psu.edu
Daniel Kifer
Pennsylvania State University
dkifer@cse.psu.edu
9
1
0
2
p
e
S
5
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
5
v
7
7
2
0
1
.
5
0
8
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
The widespread acceptance of differential privacy has led to the
publication of many sophisticated algorithms for protecting privacy.
However, due to the subtle nature of this privacy definition, many
such algorithms have bugs that make them violate their claimed
privacy. In this paper, we consider the problem of producing coun-
terexamples for such incorrect algorithms. The counterexamples
are designed to be short and human-understandable so that the
counterexample generator can be used in the development process
– a developer could quickly explore variations of an algorithm and
investigate where they break down. Our approach is statistical in
nature. It runs a candidate algorithm many times and uses statistical
tests to try to detect violations of differential privacy. An evalua-
tion on a variety of incorrect published algorithms validates the
usefulness of our approach: it correctly rejects incorrect algorithms
and provides counterexamples for them within a few seconds.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy protections.
KEYWORDS
Differential privacy; counterexample detection; statistical testing
ACM Reference Format:
Zeyu Ding, Yuxin Wang, Guanhong Wang, Danfeng Zhang, and Daniel Kifer.
2018. Detecting Violations of Differential Privacy. In 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’18), October
15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages.
https://doi.org/10....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The SPHINCS\(^\mbox+\) Signature Framework
author:Daniel J. Bernstein and
Andreas H"ulsing and
Stefan K"olbl and
Ruben Niederhagen and
Joost Rijneveld and
Peter Schwabe
The SPHINCS+ Signature Framework
Daniel J. Bernstein
University of Illinois at Chicago
Ruhr University Bochum
djb@cr.yp.to
Andreas Hülsing
Eindhoven University of Technology
andreas@huelsing.net
Ruben Niederhagen
Fraunhofer SIT, Darmstadt
ruben@polycephaly.org
Joost Rijneveld
Radboud University
joost@joostrijneveld.nl
Stefan Kölbl
Cybercrypt
stek@mailbox.org
Peter Schwabe
Radboud University
peter@cryptojedi.org
ABSTRACT
We introduce SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based signature frame-
work. SPHINCS+ has significant advantages over the state of the
art in terms of speed, signature size, and security, and is among the
nine remaining signature schemes in the second round of the NIST
PQC standardization project. One of our main contributions in this
context is a new few-time signature scheme that we call FORS. Our
second main contribution is the introduction of tweakable hash
functions and a demonstration how they allow for a unified security
analysis of hash-based signature schemes. We give a security reduc-
tion for SPHINCS+ using this abstraction and derive secure param-
eters in accordance with the resulting bound. Finally, we present
speed results for our optimized implementation of SPHINCS+ and
compare to SPHINCS-256, Gravity-SPHINCS, and Picnic.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Digital signatures.
KEYWORDS
Post-quantum cryptography, SPHINCS, hash-based signatures, state-
less, tweakable hash functions, NIST PQC, exact security
ACM Reference Format:
Daniel J. Bernstein, Andreas Hülsing, Stefan Kölbl, Ruben Niederhagen,
Joost Rijneveld, and Peter Schwabe. 2019. The SPHINCS+ Signature Frame-
work. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 18 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/331...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The SPHINCS\(^\mbox+\) Signature Framework
author:Daniel J. Bernstein and
Andreas H"ulsing and
Stefan K"olbl and
Ruben Niederhagen and
Joost Rijneveld and
Peter Schwabe
The SPHINCS+ Signature Framework
Daniel J. Bernstein
University of Illinois at Chicago
Ruhr University Bochum
djb@cr.yp.to
Andreas Hülsing
Eindhoven University of Technology
andreas@huelsing.net
Ruben Niederhagen
Fraunhofer SIT, Darmstadt
ruben@polycephaly.org
Joost Rijneveld
Radboud University
joost@joostrijneveld.nl
Stefan Kölbl
Cybercrypt
stek@mailbox.org
Peter Schwabe
Radboud University
peter@cryptojedi.org
ABSTRACT
We introduce SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based signature frame-
work. SPHINCS+ has significant advantages over the state of the
art in terms of speed, signature size, and security, and is among the
nine remaining signature schemes in the second round of the NIST
PQC standardization project. One of our main contributions in this
context is a new few-time signature scheme that we call FORS. Our
second main contribution is the introduction of tweakable hash
functions and a demonstration how they allow for a unified security
analysis of hash-based signature schemes. We give a security reduc-
tion for SPHINCS+ using this abstraction and derive secure param-
eters in accordance with the resulting bound. Finally, we present
speed results for our optimized implementation of SPHINCS+ and
compare to SPHINCS-256, Gravity-SPHINCS, and Picnic.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Digital signatures.
KEYWORDS
Post-quantum cryptography, SPHINCS, hash-based signatures, state-
less, tweakable hash functions, NIST PQC, exact security
ACM Reference Format:
Daniel J. Bernstein, Andreas Hülsing, Stefan Kölbl, Ruben Niederhagen,
Joost Rijneveld, and Peter Schwabe. 2019. The SPHINCS+ Signature Frame-
work. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 18 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/331...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
author:Rob Jansen and
Nicholas Hopper and
Yongdae Kim
Recruiting New Tor Relays with BRAIDS
Rob Jansen, Nicholas Hopper, and Yongdae Kim
{jansen, hopper, kyd}@cs.umn.edu
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
ABSTRACT
Tor, a distributed Internet anonymizing system, relies on
volunteers who run dedicated relays. Other than altruism,
these volunteers have no incentive to run relays, causing a
large disparity between the number of users and available re-
lays. We introduce BRAIDS, a set of practical mechanisms
that encourages users to run Tor relays, allowing them to
earn credits redeemable for improved performance of both
interactive and non-interactive Tor traﬃc. These perfor-
mance incentives will allow Tor to support increasing re-
source demands with almost no loss in anonymity: BRAIDS
is robust to well-known attacks. Using a simulation of 20,300
Tor nodes, we show that BRAIDS allows relays to achieve
75% lower latency than non-relays for interactive traﬃc, and
90% higher bandwidth utilization for non-interactive traﬃc.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Dist-
ributed Systems; C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: General—Security and Protection
General Terms
Algorithms, Security
Keywords
Anonymous Communication, Peer-to-Peer Networks
1.
INTRODUCTION
Tor [53] uses Onion Routing [24] to create a practical sys-
tem for low-latency anonymity [14]. Tor clients periodically
retrieve a list of relays from the Tor directory service and
connect to Internet services by relaying requests through a
circuit of multiple relays chosen from the downloaded list.
The aggregate bandwidth costs of sending communication
securely through multiple relays are signiﬁcantly higher than
direct communication: the amount of bandwidth expended
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
author:Rob Jansen and
Nicholas Hopper and
Yongdae Kim
Recruiting New Tor Relays with BRAIDS
Rob Jansen, Nicholas Hopper, and Yongdae Kim
{jansen, hopper, kyd}@cs.umn.edu
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
ABSTRACT
Tor, a distributed Internet anonymizing system, relies on
volunteers who run dedicated relays. Other than altruism,
these volunteers have no incentive to run relays, causing a
large disparity between the number of users and available re-
lays. We introduce BRAIDS, a set of practical mechanisms
that encourages users to run Tor relays, allowing them to
earn credits redeemable for improved performance of both
interactive and non-interactive Tor traﬃc. These perfor-
mance incentives will allow Tor to support increasing re-
source demands with almost no loss in anonymity: BRAIDS
is robust to well-known attacks. Using a simulation of 20,300
Tor nodes, we show that BRAIDS allows relays to achieve
75% lower latency than non-relays for interactive traﬃc, and
90% higher bandwidth utilization for non-interactive traﬃc.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Dist-
ributed Systems; C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: General—Security and Protection
General Terms
Algorithms, Security
Keywords
Anonymous Communication, Peer-to-Peer Networks
1.
INTRODUCTION
Tor [53] uses Onion Routing [24] to create a practical sys-
tem for low-latency anonymity [14]. Tor clients periodically
retrieve a list of relays from the Tor directory service and
connect to Internet services by relaying requests through a
circuit of multiple relays chosen from the downloaded list.
The aggregate bandwidth costs of sending communication
securely through multiple relays are signiﬁcantly higher than
direct communication: the amount of bandwidth expended
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:HERA: Hotpatching of Embedded Real-time Applications
author:Christian Niesler and
Sebastian Surminski and
Lucas Davi
HERA: Hotpatching of Embedded
Real-time Applications
Christian Niesler, Sebastian Surminski, Lucas Davi
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
{christian.niesler, sebastian.surminski, lucas.davi}@uni-due.de
Abstract—Memory  corruption  attacks  are  a  pre-dominant
attack  vector  against  IoT  devices.  Simply  updating  vulnerable
IoT software is not always possible due to unacceptable downtime
and  a  required  reboot.  These  side-effects  must  be  avoided  for
highly-available  embedded  systems  such  as  medical  devices  and,
generally  speaking,  for  any  embedded  system  with  real-time
constraints. To avoid downtime and reboot of a system, previous
research has introduced the concept of hotpatching. However, the
existing  approaches  cannot  be  applied  to  resource-constrained
IoT  devices.  Furthermore,  possible  hardware-related  issues  have
not  been  addressed,  i.e.,  the  inability  to  directly  modify  the
ﬁrmware  image  due  to  read-only  memory.
In  this  paper,  we  present  the  design  and  implementation  of
HERA (Hotpatching of Embedded Real-time Applications) which
utilizes hardware-based built-in features of commodity Cortex-M
microcontrollers  to  perform  hotpatching  of  embedded  systems.
HERA  preserves  hard  real-time  constraints  while  keeping  the
additional  resource  usage  to  a  minimum.  In  a  case  study,  we
apply  HERA  to  two  vulnerable  medical  devices.  Furthermore,
we  leverage  HERA  to  patch  an  existing  vulnerability  in  the
FreeRTOS operating system. These applications demonstrate the
high  practicality  and  efﬁciency  of  our  approach.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The  Internet  of  Things  (IoT)  enables  new  use-cases  and
connectivity in many different domains: consumer electronics,
household  appliances,  and  even  medical  devices  are  increas-
ingly conn...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:HERA: Hotpatching of Embedded Real-time Applications
author:Christian Niesler and
Sebastian Surminski and
Lucas Davi
HERA: Hotpatching of Embedded
Real-time Applications
Christian Niesler, Sebastian Surminski, Lucas Davi
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
{christian.niesler, sebastian.surminski, lucas.davi}@uni-due.de
Abstract—Memory  corruption  attacks  are  a  pre-dominant
attack  vector  against  IoT  devices.  Simply  updating  vulnerable
IoT software is not always possible due to unacceptable downtime
and  a  required  reboot.  These  side-effects  must  be  avoided  for
highly-available  embedded  systems  such  as  medical  devices  and,
generally  speaking,  for  any  embedded  system  with  real-time
constraints. To avoid downtime and reboot of a system, previous
research has introduced the concept of hotpatching. However, the
existing  approaches  cannot  be  applied  to  resource-constrained
IoT  devices.  Furthermore,  possible  hardware-related  issues  have
not  been  addressed,  i.e.,  the  inability  to  directly  modify  the
ﬁrmware  image  due  to  read-only  memory.
In  this  paper,  we  present  the  design  and  implementation  of
HERA (Hotpatching of Embedded Real-time Applications) which
utilizes hardware-based built-in features of commodity Cortex-M
microcontrollers  to  perform  hotpatching  of  embedded  systems.
HERA  preserves  hard  real-time  constraints  while  keeping  the
additional  resource  usage  to  a  minimum.  In  a  case  study,  we
apply  HERA  to  two  vulnerable  medical  devices.  Furthermore,
we  leverage  HERA  to  patch  an  existing  vulnerability  in  the
FreeRTOS operating system. These applications demonstrate the
high  practicality  and  efﬁciency  of  our  approach.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The  Internet  of  Things  (IoT)  enables  new  use-cases  and
connectivity in many different domains: consumer electronics,
household  appliances,  and  even  medical  devices  are  increas-
ingly conn...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs
author:Ghada Dessouky and
David Gens and
Patrick Haney and
Garrett Persyn and
Arun K. Kanuparthi and
Hareesh Khattri and
Jason M. Fung and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Jeyavijayan Rajendran
HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable
Hardware Bugs
Ghada Dessouky and David Gens, Technische Universität Darmstadt; Patrick Haney and
Garrett Persyn, Texas A&M University; Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, and Jason
M. Fung, Intel Corporation; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technische Universität Darmstadt;
Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Texas A&M University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/dessouky
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs
Ghada Dessouky†, David Gens†, Patrick Haney∗, Garrett Persyn∗, Arun Kanuparthi◦,
Hareesh Khattri◦, Jason M. Fung◦, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi†, Jeyavijayan Rajendran∗
†Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. ∗Texas A&M University, College Station, USA.
◦Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, OR, USA.
ghada.dessouky@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,david.gens@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,
prh537@tamu.edu,gpersyn@tamu.edu,arun.kanuparthi@intel.com,
hareesh.khattri@intel.com,jason.m.fung@intel.com,
ahmad.sadeghi@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,jv.rajendran@tamu.edu
Abstract
Modern computer systems are becoming faster, more efﬁcient,
and increasingly interconnected with each generation. Thus,
these platforms grow more complex, with new features con-
tinually introducing the possibility of new bugs. Although the
semiconductor industry employs a combination of different
veriﬁcation techniques to ensure the security of System-on-
Chip (SoC) designs, a growing number of increasingly so-
phisticated attacks are starting to leverage cross-layer bugs.
These attacks le...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs
author:Ghada Dessouky and
David Gens and
Patrick Haney and
Garrett Persyn and
Arun K. Kanuparthi and
Hareesh Khattri and
Jason M. Fung and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Jeyavijayan Rajendran
HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable
Hardware Bugs
Ghada Dessouky and David Gens, Technische Universität Darmstadt; Patrick Haney and
Garrett Persyn, Texas A&M University; Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, and Jason
M. Fung, Intel Corporation; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technische Universität Darmstadt;
Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Texas A&M University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/dessouky
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.HardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs
Ghada Dessouky†, David Gens†, Patrick Haney∗, Garrett Persyn∗, Arun Kanuparthi◦,
Hareesh Khattri◦, Jason M. Fung◦, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi†, Jeyavijayan Rajendran∗
†Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. ∗Texas A&M University, College Station, USA.
◦Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, OR, USA.
ghada.dessouky@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,david.gens@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,
prh537@tamu.edu,gpersyn@tamu.edu,arun.kanuparthi@intel.com,
hareesh.khattri@intel.com,jason.m.fung@intel.com,
ahmad.sadeghi@trust.tu-darmstadt.de,jv.rajendran@tamu.edu
Abstract
Modern computer systems are becoming faster, more efﬁcient,
and increasingly interconnected with each generation. Thus,
these platforms grow more complex, with new features con-
tinually introducing the possibility of new bugs. Although the
semiconductor industry employs a combination of different
veriﬁcation techniques to ensure the security of System-on-
Chip (SoC) designs, a growing number of increasingly so-
phisticated attacks are starting to leverage cross-layer bugs.
These attacks le...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain Classification and Intelligence
author:Samuel Sch"uppen and
Dominik Teubert and
Patrick Herrmann and
Ulrike Meyer
FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain
Classification and Intelligence
Samuel Schüppen, RWTH Aachen University; Dominik Teubert, Siemens CERT;
Patrick Herrmann and Ulrike Meyer, RWTH Aachen University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/schuppen
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
ISBN 978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain Classiﬁcation and
Intelligence
Samuel Sch¨uppen
RWTH Aachen University
Dominik Teubert
Siemens CERT
Patrick Herrmann
RWTH Aachen University
Ulrike Meyer
RWTH Aachen University
Abstract
FANCI is a novel system for detecting infections with
domain generation algorithm (DGA) based malware by
monitoring non-existent domain (NXD) responses in
DNS trafﬁc. It relies on machine-learning based classiﬁ-
cation of NXDs (i.e., domain names included in negative
DNS responses), into DGA-related and benign NXDs.
The features for classiﬁcation are extracted exclusively
from the individual NXD that is to be classiﬁed. We eval-
uate the system on malicious data generated by 59 DGAs
from the DGArchive, data recorded in a large university’s
campus network, and data recorded on the internal net-
work of a large company. We show that the system yields
a very high classiﬁcation accuracy at a low false positive
rate, generalizes very well, and is able to identify previ-
ously unknown DGAs.
1
Introduction
Modern botnets
rely on domain generation algo-
rithms (DGAs) for establishing a connection with their
command & control (C2) server instead of using ﬁxed
domain names or ﬁxed IP addresses [14, 2]. According
to DGArchive1, to date more than 72 different DGAs are
known and the numbe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain Classification and Intelligence
author:Samuel Sch"uppen and
Dominik Teubert and
Patrick Herrmann and
Ulrike Meyer
FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain
Classification and Intelligence
Samuel Schüppen, RWTH Aachen University; Dominik Teubert, Siemens CERT;
Patrick Herrmann and Ulrike Meyer, RWTH Aachen University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/schuppen
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
ISBN 978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FANCI : Feature-based Automated NXDomain Classiﬁcation and
Intelligence
Samuel Sch¨uppen
RWTH Aachen University
Dominik Teubert
Siemens CERT
Patrick Herrmann
RWTH Aachen University
Ulrike Meyer
RWTH Aachen University
Abstract
FANCI is a novel system for detecting infections with
domain generation algorithm (DGA) based malware by
monitoring non-existent domain (NXD) responses in
DNS trafﬁc. It relies on machine-learning based classiﬁ-
cation of NXDs (i.e., domain names included in negative
DNS responses), into DGA-related and benign NXDs.
The features for classiﬁcation are extracted exclusively
from the individual NXD that is to be classiﬁed. We eval-
uate the system on malicious data generated by 59 DGAs
from the DGArchive, data recorded in a large university’s
campus network, and data recorded on the internal net-
work of a large company. We show that the system yields
a very high classiﬁcation accuracy at a low false positive
rate, generalizes very well, and is able to identify previ-
ously unknown DGAs.
1
Introduction
Modern botnets
rely on domain generation algo-
rithms (DGAs) for establishing a connection with their
command & control (C2) server instead of using ﬁxed
domain names or ﬁxed IP addresses [14, 2]. According
to DGArchive1, to date more than 72 different DGAs are
known and the numbe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:DoS protection for UDP-based protocols
author:Charlie Kaufman and
Radia J. Perlman and
Bill Sommerfeld
DoS Protection for UDP-Based Protocols
Charlie Kaufman
IBM
ckaufman@us.ibm.com
Radia Perlman
Sun Microsystems Laboratories
radia.perlman@sun.com
Bill Sommerfeld
Sun Microsystems
sommerfeld@east.sun.com
ABSTRACT
Since IP packet reassembly requires resources, a denial of service
attack can be mounted by swamping a receiver with IP fragments.
In this paper we argue how this attack need not affect protocols
that do not rely on IP fragmentation, and argue how most
protocols, e.g., those that run on top of TCP, can avoid the need for
fragmentation. However, protocols such as IPsec’s IKE protocol,
which both runs on top of UDP and requires sending large packets,
depend on IP packet reassembly. Photuris, an early proposal for
IKE, introduced the concept of a stateless cookie, intended for
DoS protection. However, the stateless cookie mechanism cannot
protect against a DoS attack unless the receiver can successfully
receive the cookie, which it will not be able to do if reassembly
resources are exhausted. Thus, without additional design and/or
implementation defenses, an attacker can successfully, through a
fragmentation attack, prevent legitimate IKE handshakes from
completing. Defense against this attack requires both protocol
design and implementation defenses. The IKEv2 protocol was
designed to make it easy to design a defensive implementation.
This paper explains the defense strategy designed into the IKEv2
protocol, along with the additional needed implementation
mechanisms. It also describes and contrasts several other potential
strategies that could work for similar UDP-based protocols.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0
Security and Protection.
[Computer-Communication Networks]: General---
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Design, Security, Reliability.
Keywords
DoS, IPsec, IKE, fragmentation, protocol design, network
security, denial of service, b...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:DoS protection for UDP-based protocols
author:Charlie Kaufman and
Radia J. Perlman and
Bill Sommerfeld
DoS Protection for UDP-Based Protocols
Charlie Kaufman
IBM
ckaufman@us.ibm.com
Radia Perlman
Sun Microsystems Laboratories
radia.perlman@sun.com
Bill Sommerfeld
Sun Microsystems
sommerfeld@east.sun.com
ABSTRACT
Since IP packet reassembly requires resources, a denial of service
attack can be mounted by swamping a receiver with IP fragments.
In this paper we argue how this attack need not affect protocols
that do not rely on IP fragmentation, and argue how most
protocols, e.g., those that run on top of TCP, can avoid the need for
fragmentation. However, protocols such as IPsec’s IKE protocol,
which both runs on top of UDP and requires sending large packets,
depend on IP packet reassembly. Photuris, an early proposal for
IKE, introduced the concept of a stateless cookie, intended for
DoS protection. However, the stateless cookie mechanism cannot
protect against a DoS attack unless the receiver can successfully
receive the cookie, which it will not be able to do if reassembly
resources are exhausted. Thus, without additional design and/or
implementation defenses, an attacker can successfully, through a
fragmentation attack, prevent legitimate IKE handshakes from
completing. Defense against this attack requires both protocol
design and implementation defenses. The IKEv2 protocol was
designed to make it easy to design a defensive implementation.
This paper explains the defense strategy designed into the IKEv2
protocol, along with the additional needed implementation
mechanisms. It also describes and contrasts several other potential
strategies that could work for similar UDP-based protocols.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0
Security and Protection.
[Computer-Communication Networks]: General---
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Design, Security, Reliability.
Keywords
DoS, IPsec, IKE, fragmentation, protocol design, network
security, denial of service, b...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting third-party addresses in traceroute IP paths
author:Pietro Marchetta and
Walter de Donato and
Antonio Pescapè
Detecting Third-party Addresses in Traceroute IP Paths
Pietro Marchetta, Walter de Donato, Antonio Pescapé
University of Napoli Federico II
Napoli, Italy
{pietro.marchetta,walter.dedonato,pescape}@unina.it
ABSTRACT
Traceroute is probably the most famous computer networks diag-
nostic tool, widely adopted for both performance troubleshooting
and research. Unfortunately, traceroute is not free of inaccuracies.
In this poster, we present our ongoing work to address the inac-
curacy caused by third-party addresses. We discuss the impact of
third-party addresses on traceroute applications and present a novel
active probing technique able to identify such addresses in tracer-
oute traces. Finally, we detail preliminary results suggesting how
this phenomenon has been largely underestimated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-communication networks]: Network Architec-
ture and Design—Network topology
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Traceroute, Internet topology, AS-level path.
1. MOTIVATION AND SUMMARY
In the last decade many research works have used traceroute (or
its variants) to infer network topological properties [5,8], and, more
in general, in active monitoring approaches for anomaly detection,
performance analysis, and geolocation. Traceroute is known to be
affected by several inaccuracies that can produce errors or wrong
assumptions when using its results to infer other information [7]:
third-party (TP) addresses have been pointed out as an uncommon
case mostly appearing at the border of multi-homed Autonomous
Systems (ASes) [6].
To the best of our knowledge, the occurrence of TP addresses
in IP paths has not been properly quantiﬁed and we believe that its
impact has been largely underestimated. In this poster, to shed light
on this topic, we propose a novel active probing technique based
on the IP prespeciﬁed timestamp opt...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting third-party addresses in traceroute IP paths
author:Pietro Marchetta and
Walter de Donato and
Antonio Pescapè
Detecting Third-party Addresses in Traceroute IP Paths
Pietro Marchetta, Walter de Donato, Antonio Pescapé
University of Napoli Federico II
Napoli, Italy
{pietro.marchetta,walter.dedonato,pescape}@unina.it
ABSTRACT
Traceroute is probably the most famous computer networks diag-
nostic tool, widely adopted for both performance troubleshooting
and research. Unfortunately, traceroute is not free of inaccuracies.
In this poster, we present our ongoing work to address the inac-
curacy caused by third-party addresses. We discuss the impact of
third-party addresses on traceroute applications and present a novel
active probing technique able to identify such addresses in tracer-
oute traces. Finally, we detail preliminary results suggesting how
this phenomenon has been largely underestimated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-communication networks]: Network Architec-
ture and Design—Network topology
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Traceroute, Internet topology, AS-level path.
1. MOTIVATION AND SUMMARY
In the last decade many research works have used traceroute (or
its variants) to infer network topological properties [5,8], and, more
in general, in active monitoring approaches for anomaly detection,
performance analysis, and geolocation. Traceroute is known to be
affected by several inaccuracies that can produce errors or wrong
assumptions when using its results to infer other information [7]:
third-party (TP) addresses have been pointed out as an uncommon
case mostly appearing at the border of multi-homed Autonomous
Systems (ASes) [6].
To the best of our knowledge, the occurrence of TP addresses
in IP paths has not been properly quantiﬁed and we believe that its
impact has been largely underestimated. In this poster, to shed light
on this topic, we propose a novel active probing technique based
on the IP prespeciﬁed timestamp opt...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against
side-channel key recovery
author:Christophe Petit and
François-Xavier Standaert and
Olivier Pereira and
Tal Malkin and
Moti Yung
A Block Cipher based Pseudo Random Number Generator
Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery
Christophe Petit 1,∗, François-Xavier Standaert 1,†,
Olivier Pereira 1,(cid:166), Tal G. Malkin 2, Moti Yung 2,3.
1 UCL Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain.
2 Dept. of Computer Science, Columbia University., 3 Google Inc.
e-mails: christophe.petit,fstandae,olivier.pereira@uclouvain.be; tal,moti@cs.columbia.edu
ABSTRACT
We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG), both in the black box world and
in the physical world, separately. We ﬁrst show that the
construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model.
Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-
channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show
that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the
adversary does not increase with the number of physical ob-
servations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we
observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel
attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typi-
cally the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor in-
volves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by
an exponential factor, making the probability of a success-
ful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a ﬁrst
interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a
cryptographic scheme inﬂuences its side-channel resistance.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are a powerful cryptanalytic technique
that exploits data-dependent physical leakages (e.g. power
consumption or electromagnetic radiation) in order to re-
cover secret data from actual implementations. Following
their demonstration in the late 1990s, a number of coun-
termeasures have been proposed to increase the security of
crypt...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against
side-channel key recovery
author:Christophe Petit and
François-Xavier Standaert and
Olivier Pereira and
Tal Malkin and
Moti Yung
A Block Cipher based Pseudo Random Number Generator
Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery
Christophe Petit 1,∗, François-Xavier Standaert 1,†,
Olivier Pereira 1,(cid:166), Tal G. Malkin 2, Moti Yung 2,3.
1 UCL Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain.
2 Dept. of Computer Science, Columbia University., 3 Google Inc.
e-mails: christophe.petit,fstandae,olivier.pereira@uclouvain.be; tal,moti@cs.columbia.edu
ABSTRACT
We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG), both in the black box world and
in the physical world, separately. We ﬁrst show that the
construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model.
Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-
channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show
that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the
adversary does not increase with the number of physical ob-
servations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we
observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel
attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typi-
cally the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor in-
volves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by
an exponential factor, making the probability of a success-
ful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a ﬁrst
interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a
cryptographic scheme inﬂuences its side-channel resistance.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are a powerful cryptanalytic technique
that exploits data-dependent physical leakages (e.g. power
consumption or electromagnetic radiation) in order to re-
cover secret data from actual implementations. Following
their demonstration in the late 1990s, a number of coun-
termeasures have been proposed to increase the security of
crypt...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation: A Computationally-Scalable
Approach for Providing Privacy-Preserving Authentication
author:Vireshwar Kumar and
He Li and
Jung-Min "Jerry" Park and
Kaigui Bian and
Yaling Yang
Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation: A
Computationally-Scalable Approach for Providing
Privacy-Preserving Authentication
Vireshwar Kumar1, He Li1, Jung-Min (Jerry) Park1, Kaigui Bian2, Yaling Yang1
1 Electrical and Computer Engineering
2 Electronics Engineering and Computer Science
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
{viresh, heli, jungmin, yyang8}@vt.edu
Peking University
Beijing, China
bkg@pku.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Group signatures (GSs) is an elegant approach for provid-
ing privacy-preserving authentication. Unfortunately, mod-
ern GS schemes have limited practical value for use in large
networks due to the high computational complexity of their
revocation check procedures. We propose a novel GS scheme
called the Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation
(GSPR), which signiﬁcantly improves scalability with regard
to revocation. GSPR employs the novel notion of probabilis-
tic revocation, which enables the veriﬁer to check the revo-
cation status of the private key of a given signature very ef-
ﬁciently. However, GSPR’s revocation check procedure pro-
duces probabilistic results, which may include false positive
results but no false negative results. GSPR includes a pro-
cedure that can be used to iteratively decrease the probabil-
ity of false positives. GSPR makes an advantageous trade-
oﬀ between computational complexity and communication
overhead, resulting in a GS scheme that oﬀers a number of
practical advantages over the prior art. We provide a proof
of security for GSPR in the random oracle model using the
decisional linear assumption and the bilinear strong Diﬃe-
Hellman assumption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Public Key Cryptosystems;
K.4.1 [Computer and Society]: Public Policy Issues—
...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation: A Computationally-Scalable
Approach for Providing Privacy-Preserving Authentication
author:Vireshwar Kumar and
He Li and
Jung-Min "Jerry" Park and
Kaigui Bian and
Yaling Yang
Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation: A
Computationally-Scalable Approach for Providing
Privacy-Preserving Authentication
Vireshwar Kumar1, He Li1, Jung-Min (Jerry) Park1, Kaigui Bian2, Yaling Yang1
1 Electrical and Computer Engineering
2 Electronics Engineering and Computer Science
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
{viresh, heli, jungmin, yyang8}@vt.edu
Peking University
Beijing, China
bkg@pku.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Group signatures (GSs) is an elegant approach for provid-
ing privacy-preserving authentication. Unfortunately, mod-
ern GS schemes have limited practical value for use in large
networks due to the high computational complexity of their
revocation check procedures. We propose a novel GS scheme
called the Group Signatures with Probabilistic Revocation
(GSPR), which signiﬁcantly improves scalability with regard
to revocation. GSPR employs the novel notion of probabilis-
tic revocation, which enables the veriﬁer to check the revo-
cation status of the private key of a given signature very ef-
ﬁciently. However, GSPR’s revocation check procedure pro-
duces probabilistic results, which may include false positive
results but no false negative results. GSPR includes a pro-
cedure that can be used to iteratively decrease the probabil-
ity of false positives. GSPR makes an advantageous trade-
oﬀ between computational complexity and communication
overhead, resulting in a GS scheme that oﬀers a number of
practical advantages over the prior art. We provide a proof
of security for GSPR in the random oracle model using the
decisional linear assumption and the bilinear strong Diﬃe-
Hellman assumption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Public Key Cryptosystems;
K.4.1 [Computer and Society]: Public Policy Issues—
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Behavioral Distance Measurement Using Hidden Markov Models
author:Debin Gao and
Michael K. Reiter and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Behavioral Distance Measurement Using
Hidden Markov Models
Debin Gao, Michael K. Reiter, and Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
dgao@ece.cmu.edu, reiter@cmu.edu, dawnsong@cmu.edu
Abstract. The behavioral distance between two processes is a measure
of the deviation of their behaviors. Behavioral distance has been proposed
for detecting the compromise of a process, by computing its behavioral
distance from another process executed on the same input. Provided that
the two processes are diverse and so unlikely to fall prey to the same at-
tacks, an increase in behavioral distance might indicate the compromise
of one of them. In this paper we propose a new approach to behavioral
distance calculation using a new type of Hidden Markov Model. We also
empirically evaluate the intrusion detection capability of our proposal
when used to measure the distance between the system-call behaviors of
diverse web servers. Our experiments show that it detects intrusions with
substantially greater accuracy and with performance overhead compara-
ble to that of prior proposals.
Keywords: intrusion detection, anomaly detection, system call, behav-
ioral distance.
1 Introduction
A predominant form of host-based anomaly detection involves monitoring a pro-
cess to see if its behavior conforms to the program it is ostensibly executing,
e.g., see [15,35,32,28,19,14,17,13,20,16]. Deviation from the behavior prescribed
by a program is characteristic of, e.g., code-injection attacks exploiting buﬀer
overﬂow or format-string vulnerabilities, and so should be investigated. A cen-
tral research challenge is constructing the model to which the process behavior
is compared. This is especially challenging in light of mimicry attacks [31,33]
on virtually all such models, wherein an adversary injects code that executes its
attacks using behaviors that the model does not disting...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Behavioral Distance Measurement Using Hidden Markov Models
author:Debin Gao and
Michael K. Reiter and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Behavioral Distance Measurement Using
Hidden Markov Models
Debin Gao, Michael K. Reiter, and Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
dgao@ece.cmu.edu, reiter@cmu.edu, dawnsong@cmu.edu
Abstract. The behavioral distance between two processes is a measure
of the deviation of their behaviors. Behavioral distance has been proposed
for detecting the compromise of a process, by computing its behavioral
distance from another process executed on the same input. Provided that
the two processes are diverse and so unlikely to fall prey to the same at-
tacks, an increase in behavioral distance might indicate the compromise
of one of them. In this paper we propose a new approach to behavioral
distance calculation using a new type of Hidden Markov Model. We also
empirically evaluate the intrusion detection capability of our proposal
when used to measure the distance between the system-call behaviors of
diverse web servers. Our experiments show that it detects intrusions with
substantially greater accuracy and with performance overhead compara-
ble to that of prior proposals.
Keywords: intrusion detection, anomaly detection, system call, behav-
ioral distance.
1 Introduction
A predominant form of host-based anomaly detection involves monitoring a pro-
cess to see if its behavior conforms to the program it is ostensibly executing,
e.g., see [15,35,32,28,19,14,17,13,20,16]. Deviation from the behavior prescribed
by a program is characteristic of, e.g., code-injection attacks exploiting buﬀer
overﬂow or format-string vulnerabilities, and so should be investigated. A cen-
tral research challenge is constructing the model to which the process behavior
is compared. This is especially challenging in light of mimicry attacks [31,33]
on virtually all such models, wherein an adversary injects code that executes its
attacks using behaviors that the model does not disting...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Measuring the Adoption of DDoS Protection Services
author:Mattijs Jonker and
Anna Sperotto and
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij and
Ramin Sadre and
Aiko Pras
Measuring the Adoption of DDoS Protection Services
Mattijs Jonker
University of Twente
m.jonker@utwente.nl
Anna Sperotto
University of Twente
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij
University of Twente and SURFnet bv
Ramin Sadre
Université catholique de Louvain
Aiko Pras
University of Twente
ABSTRACT
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have steadily
gained in popularity over the last decade, their intensity
ranging from mere nuisance to severe. The increased num-
ber of attacks, combined with the loss of revenue for the
targets, has given rise to a market for DDoS Protection Ser-
vice (DPS) providers, to whom victims can outsource the
cleansing of their traﬃc by using traﬃc diversion.
In this paper, we investigate the adoption of cloud-based
DPSs worldwide. We focus on nine leading providers. Our
outlook on adoption is made on the basis of active DNS
measurements. We introduce a methodology that allows us,
for a given domain name, to determine if traﬃc diversion to
a DPS is in eﬀect. It also allows us to distinguish various
methods of traﬃc diversion and protection. For our analysis
we use a long-term, large-scale data set that covers well over
50% of all names in the global domain namespace, in daily
snapshots, over a period of 1.5 years.
Our results show that DPS adoption has grown by 1.24×
during our measurement period, a prominent trend com-
pared to the overall expansion of the namespace. Our study
also reveals that adoption is often lead by big players such
as large Web hosters, which activate or deactivate DDoS
protection for millions of domain names at once.
Keywords
DDoS attack mitigation; cloud-based security; protection
networks; protection services; active DNS measurements
1.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have seen a rise of a simple yet very
eﬀective class of attacks: (Distributed) Denial of Service at...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Measuring the Adoption of DDoS Protection Services
author:Mattijs Jonker and
Anna Sperotto and
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij and
Ramin Sadre and
Aiko Pras
Measuring the Adoption of DDoS Protection Services
Mattijs Jonker
University of Twente
m.jonker@utwente.nl
Anna Sperotto
University of Twente
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij
University of Twente and SURFnet bv
Ramin Sadre
Université catholique de Louvain
Aiko Pras
University of Twente
ABSTRACT
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have steadily
gained in popularity over the last decade, their intensity
ranging from mere nuisance to severe. The increased num-
ber of attacks, combined with the loss of revenue for the
targets, has given rise to a market for DDoS Protection Ser-
vice (DPS) providers, to whom victims can outsource the
cleansing of their traﬃc by using traﬃc diversion.
In this paper, we investigate the adoption of cloud-based
DPSs worldwide. We focus on nine leading providers. Our
outlook on adoption is made on the basis of active DNS
measurements. We introduce a methodology that allows us,
for a given domain name, to determine if traﬃc diversion to
a DPS is in eﬀect. It also allows us to distinguish various
methods of traﬃc diversion and protection. For our analysis
we use a long-term, large-scale data set that covers well over
50% of all names in the global domain namespace, in daily
snapshots, over a period of 1.5 years.
Our results show that DPS adoption has grown by 1.24×
during our measurement period, a prominent trend com-
pared to the overall expansion of the namespace. Our study
also reveals that adoption is often lead by big players such
as large Web hosters, which activate or deactivate DDoS
protection for millions of domain names at once.
Keywords
DDoS attack mitigation; cloud-based security; protection
networks; protection services; active DNS measurements
1.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have seen a rise of a simple yet very
eﬀective class of attacks: (Distributed) Denial of Service at...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards
author:Josyula R. Rao and
Pankaj Rohatgi and
Helmut Scherzer and
St'ephane Tinguely
Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards
Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi and Helmut Scherzer
Stephane Tinguely
IBM Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 704
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
fjrrao@us, rohatgi@us, scherzer@deg.ibm.com
Communications Systems Division
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
1015 Lausanne
Switzerland
stephane.tinguely@epﬂ.ch
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new class of side–channel
attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully
launched a version of the attack on several implementa-
tions of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algo-
rithm that has been deployed by different service providers
in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key
using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how parti-
tioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implemen-
tations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inade-
quate countermeasures against side–channel attacks. Such
ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations
of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which re-
quire the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken
belief that sound countermeasures require more resources
than are available. To address this problem, we describe
a new resource–efﬁcient countermeasure for protecting ta-
ble lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its
correctness rigorously.
Keywords: smartcards, authentication, security protocols,
commercial and industrial security, side channel attacks,
GSM, COMP128.
1. Introduction
Side–channel attacks [6, 8, 2, 10] have recently gained
prominence as an effective and practical means for attack-
ing cryptographic systems. Cryptographic algorithms are
traditionally designed to withstand attacks that treat the im-
plementation as a black box, focusing instead on exploiting
subtle relationships between in...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards
author:Josyula R. Rao and
Pankaj Rohatgi and
Helmut Scherzer and
St'ephane Tinguely
Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards
Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi and Helmut Scherzer
Stephane Tinguely
IBM Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 704
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
fjrrao@us, rohatgi@us, scherzer@deg.ibm.com
Communications Systems Division
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
1015 Lausanne
Switzerland
stephane.tinguely@epﬂ.ch
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new class of side–channel
attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully
launched a version of the attack on several implementa-
tions of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algo-
rithm that has been deployed by different service providers
in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key
using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how parti-
tioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implemen-
tations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inade-
quate countermeasures against side–channel attacks. Such
ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations
of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which re-
quire the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken
belief that sound countermeasures require more resources
than are available. To address this problem, we describe
a new resource–efﬁcient countermeasure for protecting ta-
ble lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its
correctness rigorously.
Keywords: smartcards, authentication, security protocols,
commercial and industrial security, side channel attacks,
GSM, COMP128.
1. Introduction
Side–channel attacks [6, 8, 2, 10] have recently gained
prominence as an effective and practical means for attack-
ing cryptographic systems. Cryptographic algorithms are
traditionally designed to withstand attacks that treat the im-
plementation as a black box, focusing instead on exploiting
subtle relationships between in...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Transparent Highway for inter-Virtual Network Function Communication
with Open vSwitch
author:Mauricio V'asquez Bernal and
Ivano Cerrato and
Fulvio Risso and
David Verbeiren
A Transparent Highway for inter-Virtual Network
Function Communication with Open vSwitch
Mauricio Vásquez Bernal1, Ivano Cerrato1, Fulvio Risso1, David Verbeiren2
1Dept. of Computer and Control Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
2Tessares SA, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, formerly at Intel Corporation NV/SA, Belgium
1{mauricio.vasquez, ivano.cerrato, fulvio.risso}@polito.it; 2david.verbeiren@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a software architecture that can
dynamically and transparently establish direct commu-
nication paths between DPDK-based virtual network
functions executed in virtual machines, by recognizing
new point-to-point connections in traﬃc steering rules.
We demonstrate the huge advantages of this architec-
ture in terms of performance and the possibility to im-
plement it with localized modiﬁcations in Open vSwitch
and DPDK, without touching the VNFs.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Middle boxes / network appliances;
Keywords
NFV; Open vSwitch; DPDK; performance
1.
INTRODUCTION
In Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), complex
services can be delivered by rearranging multiple Vir-
tual Network Functions (VNFs) in arbitrary graphs (Fig-
ure 1(a)), with multiple VNFs often executed on a single
physical server as distinct machines (VMs). This paper
presents a set of interacting software components that
optimize the inter-VNF communications by creating a
direct connection between two VMs, hence bypassing
the vSwitch when two VNFs are logically connected
through a point-to-point (p-2-p) link.
Diﬀerently from other proposals [1], we can acceler-
ate transparently and dynamically the packets exchange
between VMs on a widespread vSwitch. Transparency
refers to the possibility for an application to exploit the
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part o...