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ATT&CK ID:T1055.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thread Local Storage
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.


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ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a variety of public exploits, including CVE 2020-0688 and CVE 2020-17144, to gain execution on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange; they have also conducted SQL injection attacks against external websites.[10][11]


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ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors installed DLLs and backdoors as Windows services.[85]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
To protect against AiTM, authentication mechanisms should not send credentials across the network in plaintext and should also implement mechanisms to prevent replay attacks (such as nonces or timestamps). Challenge-response based authentication techniques that do not directly send credentials over the network provide better protection from AiTM.


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titleblackhat:us-21 Your Software IS/NOT Vulnerable: CSAF, VEX, and the Future of Advisories
As more attention is paid to security and the underlying components used in developing software, more organizations will be sending out security advisories. As SBOMs become more widespread, many of these advisories will actually be "false positives," when the underlying component vulnerability isn't actually exploitable. Organizations developing and using software will thus face an increasing amount of information to process and prioritize if they want to address the constantly evolving risk.The German and US governments have ended up partnering to coordinate industry-led initiatives to help automate the production, consumption, and scale of advisories, with particular attention to non-traditional software areas like ICS and healthcare. The Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) is an OASIS project that seeks to help automate the creation, management, and use of machine-readable vulnerability-related advisories. This talk will further introduce a key idea at the intersection of advisories and SBOM: the "Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange" (VEX) that allows software providers to explicitly communicate that they are *not* affected by a vulnerability. We close with an overview of the policy context to help practitioners understand where the world of SBOM and advisories is heading.


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ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" to execute a malicious file hourly.[166]


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ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can capture screenshots of the victims’ machine.[116][117][118]


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ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [2]


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ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to inject code into the svchost.exe, iexplorer.exe, explorer.exe, and default browser processes.[64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can spread across systems by infecting removable media.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.[31]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can use different cloud providers for its C2.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky collects information about running processes from victims.[85][86]


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title:blackhat:us-20 NoJITsu: Locking Down JavaScript Engines
Data-only attacks against dynamic scripting environments have become common. Web browsers and other modern applications embed scripting engines to support interactive content. The scripting engines optimize performance via just-in-time compilation. Since applications are increasingly hardened against code-reuse attacks, adversaries are looking to achieve code execution or elevate privileges by corrupting sensitive data like the intermediate representation of optimizing JIT compilers. This has inspired numerous defenses for just-in-time compilers.Our work demonstrates that securing JIT compilation is not sufficient. First, we present a proof-of-concept data-only attack against a recent version of Mozilla's SpiderMonkey JIT in which the attacker only corrupts heap objects to successfully issue a system call from within bytecode execution at run time. Previous work assumed that bytecode execution is safe by construction since interpreters only allow a narrow set of benign instructions and bytecode is always checked for validity before execution. We show that this does not prevent malicious code execution in practice. Second, we design a novel defense, dubbed NOJITSU to protect complex, real-world scripting engines from data-only attacks against interpreted code.The key idea behind our defense is to enable fine-grained memory access control for individual memory regions based on their roles throughout the JavaScript lifecycle. For this we combine automated analysis, instrumentation, compartmentalization, and Intel's Memory-Protection Keys to secure SpiderMonkey against existing and newly synthesized attacks. We implement and thoroughly test our implementation using a number of real-world scenarios as well as standard benchmarks. We show that NOJITSU successfully thwarts code-reuse as well as data-only attacks against any part of the scripting engine while offering a modest run-time overhead of only 5%.


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ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.[55][56][57]


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title:blackhat:us-21 How I Used a JSON Deserialization 0day to Steal Your Money on the Blockchain
Fastjson is a widely used open source JSON parser with 23'100 stars on GitHub. As a basic module of countless java web services, it serves hundreds of millions of users. We managed to find a way to bypass many security checks and mitigations by using the inheritance process of some basic classes, and achieve remote code execution successfully. We will disclose these high-risk and universal gadgets for the first time in this talk.Now, we can control many important websites and affect millions of users. Let's make things more interesting. We found that this fastjson vulnerability affects a multi-billion-dollar blockchain. We designed multiple complex gadgets based on the features of the blockchain, and exquisitely achieved information leakage and pointer hijacking. Putting all these gadgets together, we achieved remote code execution on the blockchain nodes.However, generally after remote code execution, we seem to have no better exploit method other than the 51% attack, which will lead to serious accounting confusion. After a detailed analysis of the architecture design of the public blockchain, we found a way from RCE to steal the public blockchain users' assets almost without any notification.To the best of our knowledge, this is the first published attack case on the realization of covertly stealing user assets after RCE on the public blockchain nodes. We will propose a more covert post penetration exploit method for public blockchain nodes in this talk.Blockchain is not bulletproof to security vulnerability and we hope our work can notify blockchain developers and users to be more careful about security.


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ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used trojanized documents that retrieved remote templates from an adversary-controlled website.[15]


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ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has used an encrypted configuration file for its loader.[38]


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title:blackhat:asia-19 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Asia 2019
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways coming out of Black Hat Asia and how these trends will impact future InfoSec strategies.


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ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.[93]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has used HTTP POST requests for C2.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector can use an IronPython scripts to load a .NET injector to inject a payload into its own or a remote process.[31]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT has a command to delete its Registry key and scheduled task.[192]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.[164]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton uses a Python script that is capable of detecting Triconex controllers on the network by sending a specific UDP broadcast packet over port 1502. [8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use a timer to delay execution of core functionality.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[188]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to set its file attributes to hidden.[14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can use the Windows command line to delete volume shadow copies and disable recovery.[282][283][284][285]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.[21][22]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.[14]


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titleblackhat:us-21 Zero - The Funniest Number in Cryptography
What is the funniest number in cryptography? 0. The reason is that for all x, x*0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is.  This talk will explore crypto bugs in four BLS signatures' libraries (ethereum/py ecc, supranational/blst, herumi/bls, sigp/milagro bls) that revolve around 0. Furthermore, we developed "splitting zero" attacks to show a weakness in the proof-of-possession aggregate signature scheme standardized in BLS RFC draft v4. Eth2 bug bounties program generously awarded $35,000 in total for the reported bugs.


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title:botconf2016 Detecting the Behavioral Relationships of Malware Connections
A normal computer infected with malware is difficult to detect. There have been several approaches in the last years which analyze the behavior of malware and obtain good results. The malware traffic may be detected, but it is very common to miss-detect normal traffic as malicious and generate false positives. This is specially the case when the methods are tested in real and large networks. The detection errors are generated due to the malware changing and rapidly adapting its domains and patterns to mimic normal connections. To better detect malware infections and separate them from normal traffic we propose to detect the behavior of the group of connections generated by the malware. It is known that malware usually generates various related connections simultaneously and therefore it shows a group pattern. Based on previous experiments, this paper suggests that the behavior of a group of connections can be modelled as a directed cyclic graph with special properties, such as its internal patterns, relationships, frequencies and sequences of connections. By training the group models on known traffic it may be possible to better distinguish between a malware connection and a normal connection.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/PR16-Detecting-the-Behavioral-Relationships-of-Malware-Connections-GARCIA.pdf


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ATT&CK ID:M0919
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.[109]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create "hidden" scheduled tasks.[325]


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title:botconf2016 A Tete-a-Tete with RSA Bots
The expansion and specifically the sophistication of botnets has brought with it an increased use of cryptography for safe-guarding communication channels between bots and their command-and-control instances. Asymmetric encryption (or public-key cryptography) currently poses a major challenge for malware analysts. In this regard, understanding the communication protocol is a critical requirement in the analysis of botnets.The goal of this short-talk is to present a generic, fully automated method for tracking botnet communication protocols and a prototype implementation for recovering obfuscated network traffic. Our method arises from the need of constantly analyzing highly active botnet families while sparing significant reverse engineering effort. The results show that our approach successfully obtains changes in message structures by circumventing encryption and interacting directly with the bots.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/PR14-Tete-aTete_with_RSA_Bots_presentation-FRIESS-2.pdf


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can enumerate through all open processes to search for any that have the string "sql" in their process name.[65]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 GDPArrrrr: Using Privacy Laws to Steal Identities
On May 25, 2018 the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect, bringing with it the most expansive governmental effort to regulate data security and privacy to date. Among the GDPR's many provisions is the "Right of Access," which states that individuals have the right to access their personal data. This provision can be easily abused by social engineers to steal sensitive information that does not belong to them.My research centers on a practical case study wherein I attempted to steal as much information as possible about my fiancé (with her consent) using GDPR Subject Access Requests. In a survey of more than 150 companies, I demonstrate that organizations willingly provide highly sensitive information in response to GDPR right of access requests with little or no verification of the individual making the request. This ranges from typical sensitive identity data like addresses and credit card information to esoteric data such as a history of train journeys or a list of domains owned. While far too often no proof of identity is required at all, even in the best cases the GDPR permits someone capable of stealing or forging a driving license nearly complete access to your digital life. Moreover, the highly standardized nature of GDPR requests makes it possible to automate this process at immense scale and provides one of the most reliable general phishing attack typologies to date.This is a solvable problem, and one which could have been incorporated into the initial GDPR if regulatory legislation were subjected to security assessments like those used for modern software. The presentation suggests possible remediations and offers a cautionary tale for future policymakers designing GDPR-inspired privacy legislation. It also suggests short-term ways in which individuals and businesses seeking to protect themselves against these attacks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow remote access to services as a privileged account unless necessary.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a shell script as the main executable inside an app bundle and drops an embedded base64-encoded payload to the /tmp folder.[34][35]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named "Maintenance" to establish persistence.[154]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect domain group information by running net group /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.[24]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can download additional payloads to a compromised host.[159]


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title:botconf2019 The Cereals Botnet
A new under-the-radar botnet targeting Network Access Storage (NAS) and Network Video Recorder (NVR) devices, has been discovered. The botnet originates back to 2013, uses a known vulnerability for infection, and is still active as of today. Our research shows that it is infecting a range of devices from a well-known vendor in the consumer software space, however these devices are so popular that compromised examples can be found in both small businesses and governments alike. What makes this botnet unique is the way that it was built from stock components with only very few custom-built binaries; the separation of its subnets; and the way host nodes communicate with the C2. Years later the vendor fixed the targeted vulnerability, however, a large chunk of infected nodes’ firmware has either never been updated or the devices have not been restarted in years.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/B2019-Neumann-Eberhardt-the_cereals_botnet_botconf_2019_final-2.pdf


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title:blackhat:us-18 For the Love of Money: Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Mobile Point of Sales Systems
These days it's hard to find a business that doesn't accept faster payments. Mobile Point of Sales (mPOS) terminals have propelled this growth lowering the barriers for small and micro-sized businesses to accept non-cash payments. Older payment technologies like mag-stripe still account for the largest majority of all in-person transactions. This is complicated further by the introduction of new payment standards such as NFC. As with each new iteration in payment technology, inevitably weaknesses are introduced into this increasingly complex payment eco-system.In this talk, we ask what are the security and fraud implications of removing the economic barriers to accepting card payments; and what are the risks associated with continued reliance on old card standards like mag-stripe? In the past, testing for payment attack vectors has been limited to the scope of individual projects and to those that have permanent access to POS and payment infrastructure. Not anymore!In what we believe to be the most comprehensive research conducted in this area, we consider four of the major mPOS providers spread across the US and Europe; Square, SumUp, iZettle, and Paypal. We provide live demonstrations of new vulnerabilities that allow you to MitM transactions, send arbitrary code via Bluetooth and mobile application, modify payment values for mag-stripe transactions, and a vulnerability in firmware; DoS to RCE. Using this sampled geographic approach, we are able to show the current attack surface of mPOS and, to predict how this will evolve over the coming years.For audience members that are interested in integrating testing practices into their organization or research practices, we will show you how to use mPOS to identify weaknesses in payment technologies, and how to remain undetected in spite of anti-fraud and security mechanisms.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
If NETEAGLE does not detect a proxy configured on the infected machine, it will send beacons via UDP/6000. Also, after retrieving a C2 IP address and Port Number, NETEAGLE will initiate a TCP connection to this socket. The ensuing connection is a plaintext C2 channel in which commands are specified by DWORDs.[42]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT creates a Registry key at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell to survive a system reboot.[223]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.[21]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has been encoded to avoid detection from static analysis tools.[366]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can exfiltrate files over C2 infrastructure.[36]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1048.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers or tasks to regularly delete persistent cookies.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions).


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can detect presence of an emulator by using two calls to GetTickCount API, and checking whether the time has been accelerated.[31]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS uses encoded strings in its process kill list.[111]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS update and sends the location of the phone.[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service. PoisonIvy also creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[94]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will perform UAC bypass either through fodhelper.exe or eventvwr.exe.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used MS-SQL access to a pivot machine, allowing code execution throughout the ICS network.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[93]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties.


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titleblackhat:us-18 Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)
With a 19 year old vulnerability, we were able to sign a message with the private key of Facebook. We'll show how we found one of the oldest TLS vulnerabilities in products of 10 different vendors and how we practically exploited it on famous sites. We'll also discuss how the countermeasures introduced back in TLS 1.0 and expanded over the years failed to prevent this and why RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption should be deprecated. Finally, we'll present what related problems are still present and unfixed in many popular TLS libraries.


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ATT&CK ID:T1137.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Outlook Forms
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.


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ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites.[22]


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ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can compress and archive collected files using WinRAR.[63][64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda has been obfuscated and contains encrypted functions.[201]


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ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload.[4][5]


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ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.[32][33][34][35]


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ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys associated with COR_PROFILER.


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ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[8]


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ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can capture screenshots from a compromised host.[135]


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title:blackhat:eu-21 A Deep Dive into Privacy Dashboard of Top Android Vendors
Most android vendors designed privacy dashboards before Android 12 to allow users to monitor sensitive behaviors of their installed apps, such as clipboard access, location collection, file operation, etc. However, we conducted comprehensive research about them and found that it is not accurate and complete for most privacy dashboards. Many design or development flaws allow malicious apps to bypass their monitor or report a false alarm for a benign App.Our research dive deep into the implementation of the privacy protection mechanism includes five top vendors and explains the difference of design in the aspect of sensitivity level, operation frequency, and behavior status, etc. We will discuss the flaws of these vendor's coarse-grained behavior control and how a malicious app performs sensitive operations without invoking the dashboard. For example, collecting your location leaving no trace, deleting your album silently, etc. Besides, we also found some vendor's over-designed monitoring strategies will generate a false positive report or alarm under some extreme conditions.Finally, we will present our method of how to extract sensitive APIs from custom android ROMs and our test process to verify the privacy dashboard report. By our presentation, we want to improve the privacy protection mechanism of vendors and better protect billions of users' privacy.


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ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files.[20][21]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can use XOR, AES, and DES to encrypt loader shellcode.[110]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[138][139][140][141]


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title:blackhat:asia-21 Wideshears: Investigating and Breaking Widevine on QTEE
Widevine is a DRM solution, and QTEE is the TrustZone implement of Qualcomm, both running on billions of devices. In this presentation, we will share our latest study of Widevine on QTEE. We will first explain why QTEE and Widevine are high-value targets and share the basics about them in brief. After the opening, we will show how to locate the command handling logic and get the logic explained to show how we found a vulnerability.With the vulnerability in hand, we need the following in order to achieve the exploit:1. We need to know the memory model of a QTEE TA, especially how commands are delivered and how buffers are shared between the two worlds. Another vulnerability is put forward to do information leak with the model.2. We need to know where the TA is loaded and find a way to break ASLR.3. We need to find a memory layout to access TA from the user-controlled location.After the above is resolved, we will put them together to exploit the Widevine TA and extract data from SFS, the trusted storage of QTEE.Prior knowledge is not mandatory but is recommended.


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ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host.[8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp creates a user account as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised machine.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used the NtQueueApcThread syscall to inject code into svchost.exe.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1574.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from %SYSTEM32%.[19]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of certutil, onto a compromised host .[218][442]


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ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) from victim networks.[34]


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titleblackhat:us-18 No Royal Road … Notes on Dangerous Game
Attribution fatigue is real. We are 20 years past Moonlight Maze, 15 years past Titan Rain, and a decade past the formation of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre in Estonia. These recent ten years have seen the public dumping of stolen nation-state toolchains, a worm renaissance, and increasingly adventurous forays by states far beyond the limits of espionage, into active operations. Small wonder we’re tired… but what have we learned about technical and contextual analysis as nation-state threats roll into their third decade? What are we missing? Does any of this even matter?Network defenders and threat intelligence analysts tend to be sharply divided on this question of nation-state threat attribution. Reasonable network defenders may decide ‘How?’ is all that matters (observables || GTFO); reasonable threat intel analysts may feel similarly about ‘Who?’ (APT1 || GTFO). This talk addresses each of these reasonable extremes, and further advocates for the neglected value of ‘Why?’ in surfacing adversary requirements, targeting, and constraints. We will look at how nation-states have used malware as a form of geopolitical signalling, the myth of vendor neutrality in the nation-state threat ecosystem, and opportunistic distortion of technical analysis. Words and PE headers are hard, nation-states are weird, but more perfect nation-state threat analysis is possible within – and beyond – the binary.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a VisualBasic script named MicrosoftUpdator.vbs for execution of a PowerShell keylogger.[64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used keylogging tools in their operations.[176]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can remotely read the OCP UA structure from devices.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can display popups over running applications.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape has decrypted the password of the C2 server with a simple byte by byte XOR. Siloscape also writes both an archive of Tor and the unzip binary to disk from data embedded within the payload using Visual Studio’s Resource Manager.[214]


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titleblackhat:eu-18 Video Killed the Text Star: OSINT Approach
In 1979 The Buggles launched the hit song "Video Killed the Radio Star." Nowadays The Buggles could write a new song titled "Video Killed the Text Star." Social networks are growing around video content. This means that if OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) wants to stay alive needs to start getting value from video content. Video analysis, and person recognition in particular, is a very interesting task to security managers, CISOs, and analysts with responsibilities in physical security. However, video and image processing is gaining prominence. Internet content grows exponentially and there is a trend of publishing content in a video format. It's time to focus on this kind of information and start to move OSINT techniques and technologies to be able to process this type of information. Human face recognition is one of the Machine Learning applications which has had more advances in recent years. This advances and the actual power of hardware make it possible to implement this kind of service at a very low cost.We can use Open Source components to implement a fast and scalable infrastructure that allows you to analyze hundreds of hours of video in a simple way. The work that will be shown in this presentation will allow people to be identified and compared with a series of images of people to determine if these people appear or not in the recorded video images.


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title:blackhat:us-22 Talent Need Not Apply: Tradecraft and Objectives of Job-themed APT Social Engineering
When a job offer looks too good to be true… it probably is. As the COVID-19 pandemic has led workers to rethink their careers and long-term goals, threat actors have exploited it as an opportunity to fulfill strategic objectives. Over the past two years, PwC's Global Threat Intelligence team has tracked nation state threat actors as they socially engineered employees at high-profile companies over email, social media and beyond, enticing them with promising job opportunities - only to infect them with malware and disappear.In this talk, we unmask how ongoing operations by advanced persistent threats based in different countries (North Korea and Iran) are using recruitment themes to compromise victims. We draw the profiles of three different threat actors that conduct such operations: North Korea-based Lazarus Group and Black Alicanto; an emerging Iran-based intrusion set which we call Yellow Dev 13; and a threat actor targeting former intelligence officers. Phishing is the oldest trick in the book, but this presentation holds the mirror up to threat actors' faces: the ways they use job themes for phishing, from fake career websites to recruiter personae, become the CV we read to learn their capabilities (their tools, techniques, and procedures); the targets they choose become their cover letters, revealing their intelligence requirements and strategic objectives, from counterintelligence to cryptocurrency theft.Ultimately, this talk will leave attendees with different insights depending on their role. Business executives will get an overview of the threat landscape and why their organization might be targeted. Defenders will gain actionable intelligence on how to recognize and defend from, activity by advanced persistent adversaries. Ethical hackers might encounter a few tricks to try - and mistakes to avoid! - in phishing exercises and adversary emulation. As ...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu has included encoded shell scripts to potentially aid in the rooting process.[1]


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title:blackhat:us-20 All You Ever Wanted to Know about the AMD Platform Security Processor and were Afraid to Emulate - Inside a Deeply Embedded Security Processor
AMDs Zen (and later) CPUs contain the "(Platform) Secure Processor" (PSP) which is an embedded ARM core inside your x86 CPU responsible for initial system bootstrapping. The PSP is running even before the main x86 cores and has full access to the main memory. During system runtime it serves as a trust anchor for features like AMDs "Secure Encrypted Virtualization" feature and recently a generic TEE interface for which there are Linux kernel patches pending currently. The firmware running on the PSP is completely proprietary and there is almost no public documentation available. These are more than enough reasons for us to have a closer look at this system.During the last two years, we reverse engineered several components of the PSP firmware and hardware in order to gain an understanding of the capabilities of this critical component looking for possible security issues. We found multiple security issues that allow us to gain code execution on the PSP.Lately, we developed an emulator for the PSP which enables us to trace the execution of the firmware and to make it easier to develop and test our own code which will later run on the PSP by exploiting found security issues. The emulator is able to run the on-chip and off-chip bootloader that are used to bootstrap the systems. In the emulated setup, it is also possible to put the firmware into a debug mode where signature verifications are disabled, and additional debug output is generated.We'll also present a mode where a stub is running on the physical PSP and takes commands from the emulator to forward hardware accesses from the firmware in order to bootstrap the real system using the firmware running inside the emulator.The emulator and all other developed tools are open source and available on github: https://github.com/PSPReverse


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed enumerating system drives and partitions.[142]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.[183]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can check for the number of devices plugged into an infected host.[43]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1543.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Service
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer registers the broadcast receiver to listen for events related to device boot-up.[14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has registered to receive the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent to activate on device startup.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.[71][72]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP variants have harvested credentials from browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge.[85]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use various API calls to see if it is running in a sandbox.[71]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect the username on a compromised host.[26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT operators have used dynamic DNS to mask the true location of their C2 behind rapidly changing IP addresses.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can conduct command and control over protocols like HTTP and HTTPS.[113]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest obtains a list of running processes using the function kill_unwanted.[256]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can detect the victim's file or folder list.[306]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used process hollowing to inject itself into legitimate Windows process.[24][25]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure least privilege principles are applied to Identity and Access Management (IAM) security policies.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has used contact forms on victim websites to generate phishing e-mails.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can obtain credentials from databases, mail, and WiFi across multiple platforms.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can collect the username from the victim's machine.[75]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[57][55]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu collects the username from the victim.[124]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems.By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate local admin accounts.[51]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used a malicious shim database to maintain persistence.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has Gzipped information and saved it to a random temp file before exfil.[61]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.[80]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's kerberos module can create golden tickets.[7][8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
The IceApple OWA credential logger can monitor for OWA authentication requests and log the credentials.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as .txt files.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.[28][29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[77]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[176]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has removed the com.apple.quarantineattribute from the dropped file, $TMPDIR/airportpaird.[8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. [7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1222
ATT&CK Technique Name:File and Directory Permissions Modification
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).


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ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[1]


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titleblackhat:asia-21 The B-MAD Approach to Threat Modeling
Threat modeling is a family of techniques for discovering what can go wrong with a system and improve its security. Threat modeling techniques often aim to be structured, systematic and comprehensive and have to intersect with the organization's systems for delivering products.In many ways, threat modeling is very easy, as long as you avoid the many traps that await the unwary. This talk is about one particular set of traps in the way that threat modeling is deployed across an organization.The B-MAD approach to threat modeling is an anti-pattern for threat modeling. It starts with the words "Bring me a diagram" and ends with escalations between security and operations, security and development, and security and the world. Why is that? How can we predict that it's all going to go downhill from those 4 little words? Why do they make up an anti-pattern?


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ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to delete local files.[56]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca adopted Cloudflare as a proxy for compromised servers.[13]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 None of My Pixel is Your Business: Active Watermarking Cancellation Against Video Streaming Service
Live video streaming services are getting more and more popular in China. In order to ensure their own interests, various service providers have added visible watermarks, which have become increasingly fierce and vicious. Users (originators and viewers) are fed up with those ugly watermarks which are taking up more and more of the screen.
We have found that some of the service providers' watermarks can be actively eliminated, that is, originators can place a reverse watermark in their own video stream beforehand to cancel the service provider's watermark. Although the idea is intuitive, there are some problems in implementation, such as size, position, and shadow. After we theoretically provided an estimation of the achievable limits with computer graphics theory, we did a PoC against one of the largest video streaming service providers in China, which is also listed on the NYSE. The results were very good. After solving some problems related to the parameters related to color management and color space conversion, we can achieve nearly 100% active cancellation of watermarks.
To automate this process, we also build a ffmpeg filter as well as an OBS plugin, which can be helpful to do real-time adjusting with very short training sequence of frames during live broadcasting, so as to achieve a better watermark cancellation effect.
In addition, we propose several existential risks for watermarks that cannot be actively canceled: a) Transform Attack: to transform one watermark into another provider's.  b) Code Rate Jitter Attack: adding high-frequency components to force video codec to reduce the code rate near watermark. c) Frame Squeezing Attack: sacrificing some resolution by squeezing screen, then restoring with user-defined javascript to bypass watermark. Corresponding examples and security countermeasures are also provided.


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ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.[25][26][27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can be used to create SAML tokens using the AD Federated Services token signing certificate.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can determine the system architecture it is running on to choose which version of the DLL to use.[250]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda searches for specific directories on the victim’s machine.[339]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe" to establish persistence.[119][120]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can inject its modules into various processes using reflective DLL loading.[49]


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title:blackhat:asia-21 Stuxnet-in-a-Box: In-Field Emulation and Fuzzing of PLCs to Uncover the Next Zero-Day Threat in Industrial Control Systems
Recent years have been pivotal in the field of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security, with a large number of high-profile attacks exposing the lack of a design-for-security initiative in ICS, as well as a substantial number of research works that try to proactively uncover underlying vulnerabilities. The main focus on both sides, though, has been the first and obvious choices when it comes to exploitation, namely the network level as the main gateway to an ICS and the control operation performed by it. As ICS evolve abstracting the control logic to a purely software level hosted on a generic OS, software level evaluation of multiple levels of an ICS is a straightforward choice. In this work, we will present a new tool for the cybersecurity assessment of ICS such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) for in-field security evaluation with no disruption to the actual process.More specifically, we will deploy system emulation to eliminate the need for experiments directly on the actual hardware device, massively improve scalability and compatibility for easy deployment on a multitude of platforms. On the emulated platform, we will apply fuzzing across software levels of the device, the system itself, the hosted PLC abstracting platform as well as the application performing the control logic. Through fuzzing we expose vulnerabilities existing on the system either by poor maintenance or sloppy programming. The PLC platform of choice is the Codesys runtime, an industry-leading solution existing in a quarter of the currently deployed PLC.Furthermore, we will combine the knowledge of the uncovered vulnerabilities with a custom reverse engineering tool to dynamically synthesize a new cyber threat that integrates operational manipulation, system exploitation and stealth to become a Stuxnet-level threat to an ICS.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to unpack itself into memory using XOR.[22][23]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.[38]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[80]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.[118]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.[16]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:asia-23 Fireside Chat: Jeff Moss and Gaurav Keerthi
In this fireside chat, Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss sits down with Gaurav Keerthi, Former Deputy Chief Executive, CSA to discuss the ongoing tension between regulating emerging technologies and the drive for innovation in cybersecurity. They also examine the role of government vs the private sector in fostering innovation while also protecting against security threats and addressing privacy concerns. Join this session to learn if government technology regulations save humanity or kill innovation.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.[67][68]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL can delete files and directories.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has gathered credentials from the Windows Credential Manager tool.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can collect Microsoft Word documents from the target's file system, as well as .txt, .doc, and .xls files from the Internet Explorer cache.[153][154]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky can delete files it creates from the infected system.[60]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can open a dialog box to ask the user for passwords.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[111]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.[2]


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titleblackhat:us-18 InfoSec Philosophies for the Corrupt Economy
The majority of systematic approaches to information security are created by contributors from stable nation states, where the design assumes that the originator is wholesome and true, the playing field is lush and green and the children frolic care-free making daisy-chain bracelets. This talk discusses the realities of corruption, with real-life anecdotes from interviews conducted with real criminals and victims. This talk also explains the challenges and differences between trying to 'do' information security in developed and developing countries, where often corruption can derail security efforts and the people put in place to run the show are working against you. I also discuss typical challenges of working in difficult climates, how this can impact us (as security warriors), with first-hand accounts from those involved and some of the things we can do to combat corruption.
A basic understanding of threat modelling and a slightly dark sense of humour are advantageous in getting the most out of this talk.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can communicate with C2 over TCP and UDP.[26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[56][17][53]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the ~/Library/ folder.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to identify the OS version, OS bit information and computer name.[145][15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta had added data prior to the Portable Executable (PE) header to prevent automatic scanners from identifying the payload.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to discover processes.[35]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-20 Quantum Security and Cryptography: You Are (Probably) Doing it Wrong
Quantum Cryptography is not just Alice and Bob exchanging qubits: There is a whole world of exotic applications that use quantum effects for securing information and that are just impossible to achieve with traditional cryptography. But why should we care given that most of these applications are still at a far research stage?In this talk, we will face an uncomfortable fact about quantum computing (QC) and cryptography: all the recent attention brought to quantum-resistant cryptography (fueled by the advancement in QC research and the NIST standardization process) leads only to a short-term security solution once QC becomes available. The reason: quantum-resistant cryptography (often dubbed "post-quantum") can only protect classical digital (binary) information. But given the very peculiar characteristics of quantum information (such as the impossibility of copying data and the destructive action of observation), new encryption systems able to cope with quantum data and quantum networks have to be designed with a completely different approach, and show surprising behaviors. Not to be confused with currently existing "quantum key distribution" (QKD), which is a very specific and limited branch of it, quantum cryptography is designed to be run natively on a QC device proper, and able to act on quantum data.In this talk (that does not assume expertise in quantum mechanics) we will dive into quantum cryptography and we will see:How many classical cryptographic tasks (one-time pad, block ciphers, public-key encryption, etc.) have a quantum counterpart;How some other ones are very hard to translate quantumly (e.g., authentication) or simply impossible (digital ...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites.[19]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reg
Reg may be used to find credentials in the Windows Registry.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0592
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteUtilities
RemoteUtilities can take screenshots on a compromised host.[141]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can use encrypted string blocks for obfuscation.[324]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.[18]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials from Windows vault credential objects.[11][12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has set an Office 365 tenant level mail transport rule to send all mail in and out of the targeted organization to the newly created account.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform can use Windows admin shares to move laterally.[44]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to delete files from a compromised host.[210]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[62][63][64][65] OilRig has also used tool named PICKPOCKET to dump passwords from web browsers.[65]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can collect information related to a compromised host, including OS version and a list of drives.[335]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can collect the time zone information from the system.[10][11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot downloads several additional files and saves them to the victim's machine.[446][447]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.[3]


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titleblackhat:eu-21 Practical Attacks Against Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) implements fine-grained access control on data where the ability to decrypt a ciphertext is determined by the attributes owned by a user of the system. Hence, data can be stored by an entity that is not necessarily trusted to enforce access control. Moreover, multi-authority variants of ABE extend these capabilities to multiple-domain settings and remove the requirement of having a trusted third party. ABE is typically exemplified in the healthcare setting, where all "nurses" of the hospital "A" can only decrypt certain records whereas "doctors" of the same hospital have access to additional information about the patients. Further, ABE has been proposed to secure the Internet of Things and enforce authorization in cloud systems.At the CT-RSA 2021 conference, Venema and Alpár presented attacks against 11 ABE and MA-ABE schemes, including the highly cited DAC-MACS scheme with applications to the cloud. In this work, we demonstrate the practicality of the attacks. We have implemented three different types of attacks: a decryption attack against DAC-MACS, where a single user is able to decrypt ciphertexts with policies she cannot satisfy. This user does not even need to collude with other users or corrupt an authority. Second, a decryption attack with corruption of one of the authorities against the YJ14-MA-ABE scheme. And third, a decryption attack against the YCT14 scheme where two users collude in order to obtain a decryption key based on the work of Tan et al. and Herranz (2019). We implement the attacks in the CHARM cryptographic library and show that the implementations of DAC-MACS, YJ14-MA-ABE and YCT14 schemes provided by this particular library are vulnerable to decryption attacks. Finally, we provide a library implementing the cryptanalytic attacks of Venema and Alpár against the aforementioned ABE schemes and Juypter notebooks, where ABE and the practical...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[15]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Inside the Apple T2
Apple's T2 Security Chip promised to bring "a new level of integration and security" to new generation Mac systems. The T2 chip provides systems with a secure enclave coprocessor that is leveraged to protect Touch ID data, enable encrypted storage and provide secure boot capabilities. In this presentation we will share a deep dive into the inner workings of the T2 going way beyond the limited technical details Apple have made public up to now. In addition, we will share our methodology along with the tooling we developed and subsequently released in an effort to enable the audience to learn about our process of tackling complex security research tasks as well as being able to build on top of our initial research.
Our goal was to assess the current security posture of the T2 chip as well as build tools to enable future research into the platform. Two specific areas of interest for us were Apple's secure boot process as well as how the T2 chip communicates with macOS. Our research of Secure Boot functionality outlines how the process works, what attacks may be mitigated and what attack surface remains.  In addition we will cover how Apple implemented eSPI and what this means from an attacker's perspective. Attendees will obtain an understanding of how the T2 chip has been implemented and what services it exposes to both the OS and application layers.
In exploring the T2's communication, we reverse engineered Apple's proprietary XPC protocol, which previously had near-zero third-party documentation. In addition to decoding the messaging format, we demonstrate the ability to interface directly with the T2 chip from unprivileged userspace code by writing our own client application. Our talk will present methods and tooling to query the T2's exposed services as well as decode and encode valid messages.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used HTTP to download payloads for CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-10189 exploits.[26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can collect data on running and parent processes.[71]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has been distributed in obfuscated and packed form.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi uses BITSAdmin to communicate with the C2 server over HTTP.[276]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used voStro.exe, a compiled pypykatz (Python version of Mimikatz), to steal credentials.[72]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records.[3]


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titleblackhat:us-19 Hacking Your Non-Compete
Nearly everyone in the cybersecurity community found themselves contemplating leaving an employer, been offered an opportunity to really stretch their wings as part of a start-up or just become fed-up with their current work environment. While many of us are masters of technology few of us have a good understanding of what comes next when planning to leave one company and move to the next. Does your employment agreement allow you to take the next job or jump on that great opportunity? Are you going to be able to go to a company that your employer sees as a competitor or live that startup dream?We'll present real cases involving competing with a former employer, soliciting work from a current client at your new company and how to protect intellectual property you bring to a new employer. You'll hear from a computer forensics investigator on where people typically go wrong when transitioning from one employer to the next and from a technology and intellectual property attorney on the real legal outcomes of those cases.Commonly misunderstood concepts like "work for hire" and "right to work" will be explained. We'll talk attendees through the working details of non-compete agreements, operating agreements between tech company founders and what to do when it all goes wrong. Finally, we'll discuss what you should do after having left a previous employer and you receive an angry letter saying that you've violate multiple agreements and are about to be sued down to your socks. You'll leave the session better understanding of the details of your non-compete or employment agreement and what is enforceable versus hot air.


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ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[74]


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title:blackhat:eu-20 Story of Jailbreaking iOS 13
Jailbreaking refers to obtaining the kernel privilege of iOS, by means of the development of vulnerabilities. Usually, at least one kernel vulnerability is used. By overwriting the sensitive data structure in the kernel, the jailbreaker could run unauthorized code on the device without restrictions. It could then be used for performing code injection and data interception upon any process on the device. Thus, sometimes, a jailbreaker may not be the owner of the device, but an intruder who wants to steal or manipulate information, and that includes spreading misinformation.This talk will cover in detail how a series of iOS vulnerabilities are exploited to achieve Jailbreak on iOS 13.7. I'll be talking about their root cause, techniques used during the exploit development to bypass the mitigations that are unique to iOS, ultimately get the privilege of reading and writing kernel memory and demonstrate the potential malicious impact of the attack. The rest of my talk will be related to how these vulnerabilities were discovered, tips for reverse engineering. As an independent researcher, I hope to give some inspiration to the audience.


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ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named Lost_{Unique Identifier}.[19]


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ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of ScriptModification modules that compress and encode scripts and payloads.[68][69]


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ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control to mitigate installation and use of unapproved software that can be used for remote access.


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titleblackhat:us-22 Whip the Whisperer: Simulating Side Channel Leakage
Cryptographic side channels are well-understood from a mathematical perspective, and many countermeasures exist that reduce leakage. Yet, there are many implementations in the field that leak. This is caused by a combination of lack of security experts, the fact that upon implementation countermeasures can become leaky, and the absence of good pre-silicon side channel analysis tools. In this presentation, we show how common hardware design tools can be used to perform pre-silicon power simulations, and how that can be used to detect leaky implementations. We show a case study of how countermeasure implementations that look fine in source are actually leaky, and how simulation can help pinpoint individual leaky elements, both in software and hardware. There are surprising results where non-related software instructions leak, caused by microarchitectural interactions in the CPU pipeline. Armed with all this knowledge, those issues can be fixed. This talk is interesting for hardware and software designers to see how tools can be used to pinpoint leakage down to the gate or code level, and for researchers in finding new side channels due to processor design.


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ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[7]


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ATT&CK ID:T1595.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.


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ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has downloaded additional files and programs from its C2 server.[25][26]


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ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can download and execute additional files.[190][358][359]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.[75][76]


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ATT&CK ID:S0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Credential Editor
Windows Credential Editor can dump credentials.[87]


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ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS can use an embedded NTRU public key to encrypt data for ransom.[41][47][48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER can download or upload files from its C2 server.[73]


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ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.[141][142][143][144]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba loaded the payload into memory using PowerShell.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.[6]


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ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to install itself as a Windows service.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark binaries have been named audioddg.pdb and Winlangdb.pdb in order to appear legitimate.[44]


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ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Administrators can block end-user consent to OAuth applications, disabling users from authorizing third-party apps through OAuth 2.0 and forcing administrative consent for all requests. They can also block end-user registration of applications by their users, to reduce risk. A Cloud Access Security Broker can also be used to ban applications.Azure offers a couple of enterprise policy settings in the Azure Management Portal that may help:"Users -> User settings -> App registrations: Users can register applications" can be set to "no" to prevent users from registering new applications. "Enterprise applications -> User settings -> Enterprise applications: Users can consent to apps accessing company data on their behalf" can be set to "no" to prevent users from consenting to allow third-party multi-tenant applications


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ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware can list a victim's logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices. Other malware can list a directory's contents.[189]


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titleblackhat:eu-18 Under the SEA - A Look at the Syrian Electronic Army's Mobile Tooling
This briefing will highlight the most recent expansion of the tools of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), which are now known to include an entire mobile surveillanceware family (SilverHawk). This is the first time a family of mobile surveillanceware has been directly attributed to the SEA with high certainty, highlighting a new stage in the group's technical evolution. To date, SilverHawk has been identified in over 30 trojanized versions of many well known apps, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Microsoft Word, YouTube, and the Guardian Project's Chat Secure app. We'll take a look at the SEA's past notable activities, but primarily dive into SilverHawk's capabilities, as well as the significance of the group's ability to develop this toolset. Additionally, we'll explain how we attributed and tied infrastructure to one of the SEA's most high profile hackers, known as th3pro, who is currently on the FBI Cyber's Most Wanted list.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create new instances.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leveraged the TriStation protocol to download programs onto Triconex Safety Instrumented System. [5]


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title:blackhat:us-19 Managing for Success: Maintaining a Healthy Bug Bounty Program Long Term
Your bounty program has launched and is clicking along… but are you getting optimal results once the initial excitement wanes?  How do you measure and report on program success?  How can you build gamification and incentive models that lead to high value vulnerability reports, while discouraging low impact reports that distract your engineers from issues that put customers at risk?  And while everyone hopes to never need it, what’s the playbook for handling conflict or vulnerability disclosure situations?


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1626
ATT&CK Technique Name:Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that are designated as higher risk. An adversary can use several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[38][39]


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titleblackhat:us-18 Software Attacks on Hardware Wallets
Almost all security research has a question often left unanswered: what would be the financial consequence, if a discovered vulnerability is maliciously exploited? The security community almost never knows, unless a real attack takes place and the damage becomes known to the public. Development of the cryptocurrencies made it even more difficult to control the impact of an attack since all the security relies on a single wallet's private key which needs to stay secure. Multiple breaches of private wallets and public currency exchange services are well-known, and to address the issue a few companies have come up with secure hardware storage devices to preserve the wallet's secrets at all costs.But, how secure are they? In this research, we show how software attacks can be used to break in the most protected part of the hardware wallet, the Secure Element, and how it can be exploited by an attacker. The number of identified vulnerabilities in the hardware wallet show how software vulnerabilities in the TEE operating system can lead to a compromise of the memory isolation and a reveal of secrets of the OS and other user applications. Finally, based on the identified vulnerabilities an attack is proposed which allows anyone with only physical access to the hardware wallet to retrieve secret keys and data from the device. Additionally, a supply chain attack on a device allowing an attacker to bypass security features of the device and have full control of the installed wallets on the device.


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title:botconf2022 Remote Threat Reconnaissance
This workshop aims to share knowledge of live triage and analysis of remote compromised systems to assist incident response, digital forensics, or malware discovery and in-place analysis. There are many other applications of the techniques and tools that the participants are encouraged to explore on their own.Although the knowledge shared during the workshop can be applied independently of the tools proposed, it starts with the attendees building their own toolkit for remote threat reconnaissance. It features bitscout, a project based on a collection of free open-source software for linux, that is extendable with any set of tools the analyst wants to embed before or in the middle of the operation.incident response to live cyberattacks requires silent navigation through compromised assets, sometimes in large distributed networks. The popular approach relies on edr or other live agent-based solutions. However, the activation of security agents and obvious activities on live compromised systems may trigger alerts of advanced threat actors. Once alerted, a clean-up operation and destruction of evidence can happen. Moreover, offline system analysis may not be easy due to the physical distance to the compromised system or scale of the network. This is where remote stealthy threat discovery with “scoutware”, software for threat hunting and instant system analysis, becomes incredibly useful. Bitscout, used for the workshop is just one such toolkit.in addition to working with local virtual machines during the workshop, the attendees will be provided with access to 60+ live servers to be analysed simultaneously to simulate large-scale compromise – online access will therefore be required.


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ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call EnumWindows, and checking for Qemu guest agent.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap checks the Android version to determine which system library to patch.[14]


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titleblackhat:eu-18 Attacking Hardware Systems Using Resonance and the Laws of Physics
Everything has a resonant frequency. By finding the resonant frequency of certain electronic sensors, programmable logic, and other devices, it is possible to subvert certain systems that are supposedly secured by the electronic components targeted in this research. From ultrasonic attacks on MEM's microphones in most voice enabled IoT and mobile equipment to high frequency electrical resonance inside certain programmable logic, these resonance attacks are all about leveraging physical properties of the target device and by chaining both these attacks and other hardware attacks together can allow software to bypass quite complex hardware security sub systems.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[183]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.[72]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to use the command line to control execution on compromised hosts.[30][31]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo accesses databases from WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Line.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can upload files.[351]


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title:blackhat:us-19 Practical Approach to Automate the Discovery and Eradication of Open-Source Software Vulnerabilities at Scale
Over the last decade, there has been steady growth in the adoption of open-source components in modern web applications. Although this is generally a good trend for the industry, there are potential risks stemming from this practice that requires careful attention. In this talk, we will describe a simple but pragmatic approach to identifying and eliminating open-source vulnerabilities in Netflix applications at scale.Our solution at Netflix is focused on identifying, triaging, and eliminating vulnerabilities in common software packages and their transitive dependencies.This talk will cover the following topics:A brief history of open source security and vulnerabilitiesReasons why this attack surface is still a problem in modern open-source librariesMethods that attackers use to exploit vulnerabilities in open-source librariesReasons why it is easy to carry out attacks against any organizationWe will then explore how the Netflix AppSec team has worked to solve the problem at scale, describing the various stages in our automation strategy and the tools that we are using to help us achieve our goals.


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title:blackhat:eu-20 Hacking Government Cybersecurity
This session delivered by Pete Cooper, the Deputy Director for Cyber Defence at the Cabinet Office will focus on his perspectives and the latest developments in cyber security across government and beyond. From understanding and managing risk at government scale, to collaborating with industry partners and the hacker community, this session will explore how we can view and work through our cyber challenges to reduce risks to our societies.  As hostile actors seek to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic for their strategic advantage, confidence in the security of our digital lives becomes ever more important. Pete will talk about cyber security across government and utilising his diverse military, private sector and government background to drive cutting edge thinking, collaboration and change.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE allows adversaries to enumerate and modify the infected host's file system. It supports searching for directories, creating directories, listing directory contents, reading and writing to files, retrieving file attributes, and retrieving volume information.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to discover drive information on the infected host.[307]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [235][236]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can find the presence of a specific security software.[112]