Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Adaptive semi-private email aliases
author:Beng Heng Ng and
Alexander Crowell and
Atul Prakash
Adaptive Semi-Private Email Aliases
Beng Heng Ng, Alexander Crowell, Atul Prakash
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
{bengheng, crowella, aprakash}@eecs.umich.edu
University of Michigan
ABSTRACT
Email address leakages are the cause of several security problems
including spam and privacy loss. With current email addresses,
once the address leaks without its owner’s consent, it becomes ef-
fectively compromised, creating a struggle for the user to keep the
address out of the hands of new spammers. To compound the prob-
lem, some websites require addresses belonging to a certain domain
(e.g., <university>.edu) as a partial proof of the user’s afﬁl-
iation with an organization. This leaves the user not much choice
except to have faith that the address will not be misused.
To address the problem, this paper improves on the prior work on
disposable email addresses by proposing a mechanism called semi-
private aliases. Semi-private aliases make two contributions. First,
they have a lifecycle model that permits gradual, selective controls
on the use of the alias by senders without requiring any special
infrastructure on the part of senders or receivers. Second, semi-
private aliases can be easily used to validate a user belonging to a
certain organization (e.g., university or company) and reveal only
selected attributes to a service while hiding the real identity. The
second aspect recently proved useful in allowing students in one of
our freshmen courses to register easily and safely at Piazza.com,
a discussion forum for courses, that, by default, requires students
to provide a university email address, but has privacy policies that
differ from a university’s.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and Protection; H.4.3 [Information Systems Applications]:
Communication Applications—Electronic Mail
General T...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Adaptive semi-private email aliases
author:Beng Heng Ng and
Alexander Crowell and
Atul Prakash
Adaptive Semi-Private Email Aliases
Beng Heng Ng, Alexander Crowell, Atul Prakash
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
{bengheng, crowella, aprakash}@eecs.umich.edu
University of Michigan
ABSTRACT
Email address leakages are the cause of several security problems
including spam and privacy loss. With current email addresses,
once the address leaks without its owner’s consent, it becomes ef-
fectively compromised, creating a struggle for the user to keep the
address out of the hands of new spammers. To compound the prob-
lem, some websites require addresses belonging to a certain domain
(e.g., <university>.edu) as a partial proof of the user’s afﬁl-
iation with an organization. This leaves the user not much choice
except to have faith that the address will not be misused.
To address the problem, this paper improves on the prior work on
disposable email addresses by proposing a mechanism called semi-
private aliases. Semi-private aliases make two contributions. First,
they have a lifecycle model that permits gradual, selective controls
on the use of the alias by senders without requiring any special
infrastructure on the part of senders or receivers. Second, semi-
private aliases can be easily used to validate a user belonging to a
certain organization (e.g., university or company) and reveal only
selected attributes to a service while hiding the real identity. The
second aspect recently proved useful in allowing students in one of
our freshmen courses to register easily and safely at Piazza.com,
a discussion forum for courses, that, by default, requires students
to provide a university email address, but has privacy policies that
differ from a university’s.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and Protection; H.4.3 [Information Systems Applications]:
Communication Applications—Electronic Mail
General T...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-Generation Networks
author:Xin Zhang and
Hsu-Chun Hsiao and
Geoffrey Hasker and
Haowen Chan and
Adrian Perrig and
David G. Andersen
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation On
Next-Generation Networks
Xin Zhang, Hsu-Chun Hsiao, Geoffrey Hasker, Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig and David G. Andersen
CyLab / Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract—We present the ﬁrst Internet architecture designed
to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust
information for end-to-end communications. SCION separates
ASes into groups of independent routing sub-planes, called trust
domains, which then interconnect to form complete routes. Trust
domains provide natural isolation of routing failures and human
misconﬁguration, give endpoints strong control for both inbound
and outbound trafﬁc, provide meaningful and enforceable trust,
and enable scalable routing updates with high path freshness. As
a result, our architecture provides strong resilience and security
properties as an intrinsic consequence of good design princi-
ples, avoiding piecemeal add-on protocols as security patches.
Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a few top-tier ISPs in
the trust domain are trusted for providing reliable end-to-end
communications, thus achieving a small Trusted Computing Base.
Both our security analysis and evaluation results show that
SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a high
level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is the most geographically, administratively,
and socially diverse distributed system ever invented. While
today’s Internet architecture admits some administrative di-
versity, such as by separating routing inside a domain (intra-
AS routing) from global inter-domain routing, it falls short
in handling the key challenges of security and isolation that
arise in this intensely heterogeneous setting. As a result, w...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation on Next-Generation Networks
author:Xin Zhang and
Hsu-Chun Hsiao and
Geoffrey Hasker and
Haowen Chan and
Adrian Perrig and
David G. Andersen
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation On
Next-Generation Networks
Xin Zhang, Hsu-Chun Hsiao, Geoffrey Hasker, Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig and David G. Andersen
CyLab / Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract—We present the ﬁrst Internet architecture designed
to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust
information for end-to-end communications. SCION separates
ASes into groups of independent routing sub-planes, called trust
domains, which then interconnect to form complete routes. Trust
domains provide natural isolation of routing failures and human
misconﬁguration, give endpoints strong control for both inbound
and outbound trafﬁc, provide meaningful and enforceable trust,
and enable scalable routing updates with high path freshness. As
a result, our architecture provides strong resilience and security
properties as an intrinsic consequence of good design princi-
ples, avoiding piecemeal add-on protocols as security patches.
Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a few top-tier ISPs in
the trust domain are trusted for providing reliable end-to-end
communications, thus achieving a small Trusted Computing Base.
Both our security analysis and evaluation results show that
SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a high
level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is the most geographically, administratively,
and socially diverse distributed system ever invented. While
today’s Internet architecture admits some administrative di-
versity, such as by separating routing inside a domain (intra-
AS routing) from global inter-domain routing, it falls short
in handling the key challenges of security and isolation that
arise in this intensely heterogeneous setting. As a result, w...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On the privacy provisions of Bloom filters in lightweight bitcoin
clients
author:Arthur Gervais and
Srdjan Capkun and
Ghassan O. Karame and
Damian Gruber
On the Privacy Provisions of Bloom Filters in Lightweight
Bitcoin Clients
Arthur Gervais†, Ghassan O. Karame‡, Damian Gruber(cid:96), Srdjan Capkun†
†(cid:96)ETH Zurich, Switzerland, ‡NEC Laboratories Europe, Germany
†ﬁrstname.lastname@inf.ethz.ch, ‡ﬁrstname.lastname@neclab.eu, (cid:96)gruberda@student.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
Lightweight Bitcoin clients are gaining increasing adoption among
Bitcoin users, owing to their reduced resource and bandwidth con-
sumption. These clients support a simpliﬁed payment veriﬁcation
(SPV) mode as they are only required to download and verify a part
of the block chain—thus supporting the usage of Bitcoin on con-
strained devices, such as smartphones. SPV clients rely on Bloom
ﬁlters to receive transactions that are relevant to their local wal-
let. These ﬁlters embed all the Bitcoin addresses used by the SPV
clients, and are outsourced to more powerful Bitcoin nodes which
then only forward to those clients transactions relevant to their out-
sourced Bloom ﬁlters.
In this paper, we explore the privacy of existing SPV clients.
We show analytically and empirically that the reliance on Bloom
ﬁlters within existing SPV clients leaks considerable information
about the addresses of Bitcoin users. Our results show that an SPV
client who uses a modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20)
risks revealing almost all of his addresses. We also show that this
information leakage is further exacerbated when users restart their
SPV clients and/or when the adversary has access to more than one
Bloom ﬁlter pertaining to the same SPV client. Motivated by these
ﬁndings, we propose an efﬁcient countermeasure to enhance the
privacy of users which rely on SPV clients; our proposal can be
directly integrated within existing SPV client implementations.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin has already witnessed a wi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On the privacy provisions of Bloom filters in lightweight bitcoin
clients
author:Arthur Gervais and
Srdjan Capkun and
Ghassan O. Karame and
Damian Gruber
On the Privacy Provisions of Bloom Filters in Lightweight
Bitcoin Clients
Arthur Gervais†, Ghassan O. Karame‡, Damian Gruber(cid:96), Srdjan Capkun†
†(cid:96)ETH Zurich, Switzerland, ‡NEC Laboratories Europe, Germany
†ﬁrstname.lastname@inf.ethz.ch, ‡ﬁrstname.lastname@neclab.eu, (cid:96)gruberda@student.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
Lightweight Bitcoin clients are gaining increasing adoption among
Bitcoin users, owing to their reduced resource and bandwidth con-
sumption. These clients support a simpliﬁed payment veriﬁcation
(SPV) mode as they are only required to download and verify a part
of the block chain—thus supporting the usage of Bitcoin on con-
strained devices, such as smartphones. SPV clients rely on Bloom
ﬁlters to receive transactions that are relevant to their local wal-
let. These ﬁlters embed all the Bitcoin addresses used by the SPV
clients, and are outsourced to more powerful Bitcoin nodes which
then only forward to those clients transactions relevant to their out-
sourced Bloom ﬁlters.
In this paper, we explore the privacy of existing SPV clients.
We show analytically and empirically that the reliance on Bloom
ﬁlters within existing SPV clients leaks considerable information
about the addresses of Bitcoin users. Our results show that an SPV
client who uses a modest number of Bitcoin addresses (e.g., < 20)
risks revealing almost all of his addresses. We also show that this
information leakage is further exacerbated when users restart their
SPV clients and/or when the adversary has access to more than one
Bloom ﬁlter pertaining to the same SPV client. Motivated by these
ﬁndings, we propose an efﬁcient countermeasure to enhance the
privacy of users which rely on SPV clients; our proposal can be
directly integrated within existing SPV client implementations.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin has already witnessed a wi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Proper Usage of the Group Signature Scheme in ISO/IEC 20008-2
author:Ai Ishida and
Yusuke Sakai and
Keita Emura and
Goichiro Hanaoka and
Keisuke Tanaka
Proper Usage of the Group Signature Scheme
in ISO/IEC 20008-2
(cid:3)
Ai Ishida
y
Yusuke Sakai
y
Keita Emura
z
Goichiro Hanaoka
y
x
Keisuke Tanaka
July 5, 2019
Abstract
In ISO/IEC 20008-2, several anonymous digital signature schemes are speci(cid:12)ed. Among these,
the scheme denoted as Mechanism 6, is the only plain group signature scheme that does not aim
at providing additional functionalities. The Intel Enhanced Privacy Identi(cid:12)cation (EPID) scheme,
which has many applications in connection with Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX), is in
practice derived from Mechanism 6. In this paper, we (cid:12)rstly show that Mechanism 6 does not satisfy
anonymity in the standard security model, i.e., the Bellare-Shi-Zhang model [CT-RSA 2005]. We
then provide a detailed analysis of the security properties oﬀered by Mechanism 6 and characterize
the conditions under which its anonymity is preserved. Consequently, it is seen that Mechanism 6 is
secure under the condition that the issuer, who generates user signing keys, does not join the attack.
We also derive a simple patch for Mechanism 6 from the analysis.
Keywords: Group signature, Cryptanalysis, ISO/IEC 20008-2, SGX
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The ISO/IEC standards are some of the most important reference documents representing a consensus
among the experts in the (cid:12)eld of information security. In practice, it is generally required to utilize the
technologies which are speci(cid:12)ed in standards to ensure interoperability.
In the case of cryptographic technologies, standardization plays an even more important role of
building trust. During the process of cryptographic standardizations, much work and time are required
in order to carefully examine the security of a proposed scheme even if it has already been published in a
(cid:13)agship confer...


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:"Recommended For You": A First Look at Content Recommendation Networks
author:Muhammad Ahmad Bashir and
Sajjad Arshad and
Christo Wilson
“Recommended For You”: A First Look at Content
Recommendation Networks
Muhammad Ahmad Bashir
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
ahmad@ccs.neu.edu
Sajjad Arshad
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
arshad@ccs.neu.edu
Christo Wilson
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
cbw@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
One advertising format that has grown signiﬁcantly in
recent years are known as Content Recommendation
Networks (CRNs). CRNs are responsible for the wid-
gets full of links that appear under headlines like “Rec-
ommended For You” and “Things You Might Like”. Al-
though CRNs have become quite popular with publish-
ers, users complain about the low-quality of content pro-
moted by CRNs, while regulators in the US and Europe
have faulted CRNs for failing to label sponsored links
as advertisements.
In this study, we present a ﬁrst look at ﬁve of the
largest CRNs, including their footprint on the web, how
their recommendations are labeled, and who their ad-
vertisers are. Our ﬁndings reveal that CRNs still fail
to prominently disclose the paid nature of their spon-
sored content. This suggests that additional interven-
tion is necessary to promote accepted best-practices in
the nascent CRN marketplace, and ultimately protect
online users.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As the online advertising ecosystem has grown and
matured, publishers and advertisers have experimented
with many diﬀerent advertising formats. Although dis-
play ads (a.k.a. banner ads) and keyword ads (a.k.a.
search ads) are perhaps the most well known ad for-
mats, advertisers continue to experiment with new for-
mats like native, social, and video ads (including 6 sec-
ond mini-videos known as “bumpers” [11]).
One advertising format that has grown signiﬁcantly
in recent years are known as Content Recommenda-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:"Recommended For You": A First Look at Content Recommendation Networks
author:Muhammad Ahmad Bashir and
Sajjad Arshad and
Christo Wilson
“Recommended For You”: A First Look at Content
Recommendation Networks
Muhammad Ahmad Bashir
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
ahmad@ccs.neu.edu
Sajjad Arshad
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
arshad@ccs.neu.edu
Christo Wilson
Northeastern University
Boston, MA
cbw@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
One advertising format that has grown signiﬁcantly in
recent years are known as Content Recommendation
Networks (CRNs). CRNs are responsible for the wid-
gets full of links that appear under headlines like “Rec-
ommended For You” and “Things You Might Like”. Al-
though CRNs have become quite popular with publish-
ers, users complain about the low-quality of content pro-
moted by CRNs, while regulators in the US and Europe
have faulted CRNs for failing to label sponsored links
as advertisements.
In this study, we present a ﬁrst look at ﬁve of the
largest CRNs, including their footprint on the web, how
their recommendations are labeled, and who their ad-
vertisers are. Our ﬁndings reveal that CRNs still fail
to prominently disclose the paid nature of their spon-
sored content. This suggests that additional interven-
tion is necessary to promote accepted best-practices in
the nascent CRN marketplace, and ultimately protect
online users.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As the online advertising ecosystem has grown and
matured, publishers and advertisers have experimented
with many diﬀerent advertising formats. Although dis-
play ads (a.k.a. banner ads) and keyword ads (a.k.a.
search ads) are perhaps the most well known ad for-
mats, advertisers continue to experiment with new for-
mats like native, social, and video ads (including 6 sec-
ond mini-videos known as “bumpers” [11]).
One advertising format that has grown signiﬁcantly
in recent years are known as Content Recommenda-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PlaceAvoider: Steering First-Person Cameras away from Sensitive Spaces
author:Robert Templeman and
Mohammed Korayem and
David J. Crandall and
Apu Kapadia
PlaceAvoider: Steering First-Person Cameras away from Sensitive Spaces
Robert Templeman,†‡ Mohammed Korayem,† David Crandall,† Apu Kapadia†
†School of Informatics and Computing
Indiana University Bloomington
{retemple, mkorayem, djcran, kapadia}@indiana.edu
‡Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division
robert.templeman@navy.mil
Abstract—Cameras are now commonplace in our social and
computing landscapes and embedded into consumer devices like
smartphones and tablets. A new generation of wearable devices
(such as Google Glass) will soon make ‘ﬁrst-person’ cameras
nearly ubiquitous, capturing vast amounts of imagery without
deliberate human action. ‘Lifelogging’ devices and applications
will record and share images from people’s daily lives with their
social networks. These devices that automatically capture images
in the background raise serious privacy concerns, since they are
likely to capture deeply private information. Users of these devices
need ways to identify and prevent the sharing of sensitive images.
As a ﬁrst step, we introduce PlaceAvoider, a technique for
owners of ﬁrst-person cameras to ‘blacklist’ sensitive spaces
(like bathrooms and bedrooms). PlaceAvoider recognizes images
captured in these spaces and ﬂags them for review before
the images are made available to applications. PlaceAvoider
performs novel
image analysis using both ﬁne-grained image
features (like speciﬁc objects) and coarse-grained, scene-level
features (like colors and textures) to classify where a photo was
taken. PlaceAvoider combines these features in a probabilistic
framework that jointly labels streams of images in order to
improve accuracy. We test the technique on ﬁve realistic ﬁrst-
person image datasets and show it is robust to blurriness, motion,
and occlusion.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Cameras have become commonplace in consume...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PlaceAvoider: Steering First-Person Cameras away from Sensitive Spaces
author:Robert Templeman and
Mohammed Korayem and
David J. Crandall and
Apu Kapadia
PlaceAvoider: Steering First-Person Cameras away from Sensitive Spaces
Robert Templeman,†‡ Mohammed Korayem,† David Crandall,† Apu Kapadia†
†School of Informatics and Computing
Indiana University Bloomington
{retemple, mkorayem, djcran, kapadia}@indiana.edu
‡Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division
robert.templeman@navy.mil
Abstract—Cameras are now commonplace in our social and
computing landscapes and embedded into consumer devices like
smartphones and tablets. A new generation of wearable devices
(such as Google Glass) will soon make ‘ﬁrst-person’ cameras
nearly ubiquitous, capturing vast amounts of imagery without
deliberate human action. ‘Lifelogging’ devices and applications
will record and share images from people’s daily lives with their
social networks. These devices that automatically capture images
in the background raise serious privacy concerns, since they are
likely to capture deeply private information. Users of these devices
need ways to identify and prevent the sharing of sensitive images.
As a ﬁrst step, we introduce PlaceAvoider, a technique for
owners of ﬁrst-person cameras to ‘blacklist’ sensitive spaces
(like bathrooms and bedrooms). PlaceAvoider recognizes images
captured in these spaces and ﬂags them for review before
the images are made available to applications. PlaceAvoider
performs novel
image analysis using both ﬁne-grained image
features (like speciﬁc objects) and coarse-grained, scene-level
features (like colors and textures) to classify where a photo was
taken. PlaceAvoider combines these features in a probabilistic
framework that jointly labels streams of images in order to
improve accuracy. We test the technique on ﬁve realistic ﬁrst-
person image datasets and show it is robust to blurriness, motion,
and occlusion.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Cameras have become commonplace in consume...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Reverse Engineering Intel Last-Level Cache Complex Addressing Using
Performance Counters
author:Cl'ementine Maurice and
Nicolas Le Scouarnec and
Christoph Neumann and
Olivier Heen and
Aur'elien Francillon
Reverse Engineering Intel Last-Level Cache
Complex Addressing Using Performance
Counters
Cl´ementine Maurice1,2(B), Nicolas Le Scouarnec1, Christoph Neumann1,
Olivier Heen1, and Aur´elien Francillon2
1 Technicolor, Rennes, France
2 Eurecom, Sophia Antipolis, France
clementine@cmaurice.fr
Abstract. Cache attacks, which exploit diﬀerences in timing to perform
covert or side channels, are now well understood. Recent works leverage
the last level cache to perform cache attacks across cores. This cache is
split in slices, with one slice per core. While predicting the slices used by
an address is simple in older processors, recent processors are using an
undocumented technique called complex addressing. This renders some
attacks more diﬃcult and makes other attacks impossible, because of the
loss of precision in the prediction of cache collisions.
In this paper, we build an automatic and generic method for reverse
engineering Intel’s last-level cache complex addressing, consequently ren-
dering the class of cache attacks highly practical. Our method relies on
CPU hardware performance counters to determine the cache slice an
address is mapped to. We show that our method gives a more precise
description of the complex addressing function than previous work. We
validated our method by reversing the complex addressing functions on
a diverse set of Intel processors. This set encompasses Sandy Bridge, Ivy
Bridge and Haswell micro-architectures, with diﬀerent number of cores,
for mobile and server ranges of processors. We show the correctness of
our function by building a covert channel. Finally, we discuss how other
attacks beneﬁt from knowing the complex addressing of a cache, such as
sandboxed rowhammer.
Keywords: Complex addressing · Covert channel · Cross-C...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Reverse Engineering Intel Last-Level Cache Complex Addressing Using
Performance Counters
author:Cl'ementine Maurice and
Nicolas Le Scouarnec and
Christoph Neumann and
Olivier Heen and
Aur'elien Francillon
Reverse Engineering Intel Last-Level Cache
Complex Addressing Using Performance
Counters
Cl´ementine Maurice1,2(B), Nicolas Le Scouarnec1, Christoph Neumann1,
Olivier Heen1, and Aur´elien Francillon2
1 Technicolor, Rennes, France
2 Eurecom, Sophia Antipolis, France
clementine@cmaurice.fr
Abstract. Cache attacks, which exploit diﬀerences in timing to perform
covert or side channels, are now well understood. Recent works leverage
the last level cache to perform cache attacks across cores. This cache is
split in slices, with one slice per core. While predicting the slices used by
an address is simple in older processors, recent processors are using an
undocumented technique called complex addressing. This renders some
attacks more diﬃcult and makes other attacks impossible, because of the
loss of precision in the prediction of cache collisions.
In this paper, we build an automatic and generic method for reverse
engineering Intel’s last-level cache complex addressing, consequently ren-
dering the class of cache attacks highly practical. Our method relies on
CPU hardware performance counters to determine the cache slice an
address is mapped to. We show that our method gives a more precise
description of the complex addressing function than previous work. We
validated our method by reversing the complex addressing functions on
a diverse set of Intel processors. This set encompasses Sandy Bridge, Ivy
Bridge and Haswell micro-architectures, with diﬀerent number of cores,
for mobile and server ranges of processors. We show the correctness of
our function by building a covert channel. Finally, we discuss how other
attacks beneﬁt from knowing the complex addressing of a cache, such as
sandboxed rowhammer.
Keywords: Complex addressing · Covert channel · Cross-C...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Adversarial Attacks Against Automatic Speech Recognition Systems via
Psychoacoustic Hiding
author:Lea Sch"onherr and
Katharina Kohls and
Steffen Zeiler and
Thorsten Holz and
Dorothea Kolossa
Adversarial Attacks Against Automatic Speech
Recognition Systems via Psychoacoustic Hiding
Lea Sch¨onherr, Katharina Kohls, Steffen Zeiler, Thorsten Holz, and Dorothea Kolossa
{lea.schoenherr, katharina.kohls, steffen.zeiler, thorsten.holz, dorothea.kolossa}@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
Abstract—Voice interfaces are becoming accepted widely as
input methods for a diverse set of devices. This development
is driven by rapid improvements in automatic speech recogni-
tion (ASR), which now performs on par with human listening in
many tasks. These improvements base on an ongoing evolution
of deep neural networks (DNNs) as the computational core of
ASR. However, recent research results show that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which allow attackers
to force the transcription into a malicious output. In this paper,
we introduce a new type of adversarial examples based on
psychoacoustic hiding. Our attack exploits the characteristics
of DNN-based ASR systems, where we extend the original
analysis procedure by an additional backpropagation step. We
use this backpropagation to learn the degrees of freedom for
the adversarial perturbation of the input signal, i.e., we apply a
psychoacoustic model and manipulate the acoustic signal below
the thresholds of human perception. To further minimize the
perceptibility of the perturbations, we use forced alignment to
ﬁnd the best ﬁtting temporal alignment between the original audio
sample and the malicious target transcription. These extensions
allow us to embed an arbitrary audio input with a malicious
voice command that is then transcribed by the ASR system,
with the audio signal remaining barely distinguishable from the
original signal. In an experimental evaluation, we attack the state-
of-the-art speech re...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Adversarial Attacks Against Automatic Speech Recognition Systems via
Psychoacoustic Hiding
author:Lea Sch"onherr and
Katharina Kohls and
Steffen Zeiler and
Thorsten Holz and
Dorothea Kolossa
Adversarial Attacks Against Automatic Speech
Recognition Systems via Psychoacoustic Hiding
Lea Sch¨onherr, Katharina Kohls, Steffen Zeiler, Thorsten Holz, and Dorothea Kolossa
{lea.schoenherr, katharina.kohls, steffen.zeiler, thorsten.holz, dorothea.kolossa}@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
Abstract—Voice interfaces are becoming accepted widely as
input methods for a diverse set of devices. This development
is driven by rapid improvements in automatic speech recogni-
tion (ASR), which now performs on par with human listening in
many tasks. These improvements base on an ongoing evolution
of deep neural networks (DNNs) as the computational core of
ASR. However, recent research results show that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which allow attackers
to force the transcription into a malicious output. In this paper,
we introduce a new type of adversarial examples based on
psychoacoustic hiding. Our attack exploits the characteristics
of DNN-based ASR systems, where we extend the original
analysis procedure by an additional backpropagation step. We
use this backpropagation to learn the degrees of freedom for
the adversarial perturbation of the input signal, i.e., we apply a
psychoacoustic model and manipulate the acoustic signal below
the thresholds of human perception. To further minimize the
perceptibility of the perturbations, we use forced alignment to
ﬁnd the best ﬁtting temporal alignment between the original audio
sample and the malicious target transcription. These extensions
allow us to embed an arbitrary audio input with a malicious
voice command that is then transcribed by the ASR system,
with the audio signal remaining barely distinguishable from the
original signal. In an experimental evaluation, we attack the state-
of-the-art speech re...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
author:Bryan D. Payne and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
Bryan D. Payne Martim D. P. de A. Carbone Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{bdpayne,mcarbone,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
The monitoring of virtual machines has many applica-
tions in areas such as security and systems management. A
monitoring technique known as introspection has received
signiﬁcant discussion in the research literature, but these
prior works have focused on the applications of introspec-
tion rather than how to properly build a monitoring archi-
tecture. In this paper we propose a set of requirements that
should guide the development of virtual machine monitor-
ing solutions. To illustrate the viability of these require-
ments, we describe the design of XenAccess, a monitoring
library for operating systems running on Xen. XenAccess
incorporates virtual memory introspection and virtual disk
monitoring capabilities, allowing monitor applications to
safely and efﬁciently access the memory state and disk ac-
tivity of a target operating system. XenAccess’ efﬁciency
and functionality are illustrated through a series of perfor-
mance tests and practical examples.
1 Introduction
On the wave of its renewed popularity, researchers are
identifying many new applications that leverage the abstrac-
tions and isolation provided by virtualization. One area that
has received signiﬁcant attention is security. Security ap-
plications beneﬁt from virtualization by running in isolated
virtual machines (VMs) and building smaller trusted com-
puting bases (TCBs). This technique has been used in a
variety of research projects [21, 9, 10, 18, 7, 15, 2].
Among the security research that uses virtualization, an
increasingly common practice is to setup a secure VM that
is used to monitor the other VMs running on the s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
author:Bryan D. Payne and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
Bryan D. Payne Martim D. P. de A. Carbone Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{bdpayne,mcarbone,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
The monitoring of virtual machines has many applica-
tions in areas such as security and systems management. A
monitoring technique known as introspection has received
signiﬁcant discussion in the research literature, but these
prior works have focused on the applications of introspec-
tion rather than how to properly build a monitoring archi-
tecture. In this paper we propose a set of requirements that
should guide the development of virtual machine monitor-
ing solutions. To illustrate the viability of these require-
ments, we describe the design of XenAccess, a monitoring
library for operating systems running on Xen. XenAccess
incorporates virtual memory introspection and virtual disk
monitoring capabilities, allowing monitor applications to
safely and efﬁciently access the memory state and disk ac-
tivity of a target operating system. XenAccess’ efﬁciency
and functionality are illustrated through a series of perfor-
mance tests and practical examples.
1 Introduction
On the wave of its renewed popularity, researchers are
identifying many new applications that leverage the abstrac-
tions and isolation provided by virtualization. One area that
has received signiﬁcant attention is security. Security ap-
plications beneﬁt from virtualization by running in isolated
virtual machines (VMs) and building smaller trusted com-
puting bases (TCBs). This technique has been used in a
variety of research projects [21, 9, 10, 18, 7, 15, 2].
Among the security research that uses virtualization, an
increasingly common practice is to setup a secure VM that
is used to monitor the other VMs running on the s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Triangle inequality variations in the internet
author:Cristian Lumezanu and
Randolph Baden and
Neil Spring and
Bobby Bhattacharjee
Triangle Inequality Variations in the Internet
Cristian Lumezanu, Randy Baden, Neil Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee
Department of Computer Science
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
{lume, randofu, nspring, bobby}@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Triangle inequality violations (TIVs) are important for latency sen-
sitive distributed applications. On one hand, they can expose op-
portunities to improve network routing by ﬁnding shorter paths be-
tween nodes. On the other hand, TIVs can frustrate network em-
bedding or positioning systems that treat the Internet as a metric
space where the triangle inequality holds. Even though triangle
inequality violations are both signiﬁcant and curious, their study
has been limited to aggregate data sets that combine measurements
taken over long periods of time.
The limitations of these data sets open crucial questions in the
design of systems that exploit (or avoid) TIVs: are TIVs stable or
transient? Or are they illusions caused by aggregating measure-
ments taken at different times? We collect latency matrices at vary-
ing sizes and time granularities and study dynamic properties of tri-
angle inequality violations in the Internet. We show that TIVs are
not results of measurement error and that their number varies with
time. We examine how latency aggregates of data measured over
longer periods of time preserve TIVs. Using medians to compute
violations eliminates most of the TIVs that appear sporadically dur-
ing the measurement but it misses many of the ones that are present
for more than ﬁve hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication networks]: Data communica-
tions; C.2.4 [Computer-communication networks]: Distributed
systems; C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques;
H.4.3 [Information systems applications]: Communications ap-
plications
General Terms
Mea...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Triangle inequality variations in the internet
author:Cristian Lumezanu and
Randolph Baden and
Neil Spring and
Bobby Bhattacharjee
Triangle Inequality Variations in the Internet
Cristian Lumezanu, Randy Baden, Neil Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee
Department of Computer Science
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
{lume, randofu, nspring, bobby}@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Triangle inequality violations (TIVs) are important for latency sen-
sitive distributed applications. On one hand, they can expose op-
portunities to improve network routing by ﬁnding shorter paths be-
tween nodes. On the other hand, TIVs can frustrate network em-
bedding or positioning systems that treat the Internet as a metric
space where the triangle inequality holds. Even though triangle
inequality violations are both signiﬁcant and curious, their study
has been limited to aggregate data sets that combine measurements
taken over long periods of time.
The limitations of these data sets open crucial questions in the
design of systems that exploit (or avoid) TIVs: are TIVs stable or
transient? Or are they illusions caused by aggregating measure-
ments taken at different times? We collect latency matrices at vary-
ing sizes and time granularities and study dynamic properties of tri-
angle inequality violations in the Internet. We show that TIVs are
not results of measurement error and that their number varies with
time. We examine how latency aggregates of data measured over
longer periods of time preserve TIVs. Using medians to compute
violations eliminates most of the TIVs that appear sporadically dur-
ing the measurement but it misses many of the ones that are present
for more than ﬁve hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication networks]: Data communica-
tions; C.2.4 [Computer-communication networks]: Distributed
systems; C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques;
H.4.3 [Information systems applications]: Communications ap-
plications
General Terms
Mea...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Comb for Decompiled C Code
author:Andrea Gussoni and
Alessandro Di Federico and
Pietro Fezzardi and
Giovanni Agosta
A Comb for Decompiled C Code
Andrea Gussoni
Politecnico di Milano
andrea1.gussoni@polimi.it
Pietro Fezzardi
rev.ng Srls
pietro@rev.ng
Alessandro Di Federico
rev.ng Srls
ale@rev.ng
Giovanni Agosta
Politecnico di Milano
agosta@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Decompilers are fundamental tools to perform security assessments
of third-party software. The quality of decompiled code can be a
game changer in order to reduce the time and effort required for
analysis. This paper proposes a novel approach to restructure the
control flow graph recovered from binary programs in a semantics-
preserving fashion. The algorithm is designed from the ground up
with the goal of producing C code that is both goto-free and dras-
tically reducing the mental load required for an analyst to under-
stand it. As a result, the code generated with this technique is well-
structured, idiomatic, readable, easy to understand and fully exploits
the expressiveness of C language. The algorithm has been imple-
mented on top of the rev.ng [11] static binary analysis framework.
The resulting decompiler, revng-c, is compared on real-world bi-
naries with state-of-the-art commercial and open source tools. The
results show that our decompilation process introduces between
40% and 50% less extra cyclomatic complexity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; Security requirements.
KEYWORDS
decompilation, reverse engineering, goto, control flow restructuring
ACM Reference Format:
Andrea Gussoni, Alessandro Di Federico, Pietro Fezzardi, and Giovanni
Agosta. 2020. A Comb for Decompiled C Code. In 15th ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS’20), Octo-
ber 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3384766
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, software has steadily b...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Comb for Decompiled C Code
author:Andrea Gussoni and
Alessandro Di Federico and
Pietro Fezzardi and
Giovanni Agosta
A Comb for Decompiled C Code
Andrea Gussoni
Politecnico di Milano
andrea1.gussoni@polimi.it
Pietro Fezzardi
rev.ng Srls
pietro@rev.ng
Alessandro Di Federico
rev.ng Srls
ale@rev.ng
Giovanni Agosta
Politecnico di Milano
agosta@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Decompilers are fundamental tools to perform security assessments
of third-party software. The quality of decompiled code can be a
game changer in order to reduce the time and effort required for
analysis. This paper proposes a novel approach to restructure the
control flow graph recovered from binary programs in a semantics-
preserving fashion. The algorithm is designed from the ground up
with the goal of producing C code that is both goto-free and dras-
tically reducing the mental load required for an analyst to under-
stand it. As a result, the code generated with this technique is well-
structured, idiomatic, readable, easy to understand and fully exploits
the expressiveness of C language. The algorithm has been imple-
mented on top of the rev.ng [11] static binary analysis framework.
The resulting decompiler, revng-c, is compared on real-world bi-
naries with state-of-the-art commercial and open source tools. The
results show that our decompilation process introduces between
40% and 50% less extra cyclomatic complexity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; Security requirements.
KEYWORDS
decompilation, reverse engineering, goto, control flow restructuring
ACM Reference Format:
Andrea Gussoni, Alessandro Di Federico, Pietro Fezzardi, and Giovanni
Agosta. 2020. A Comb for Decompiled C Code. In 15th ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS’20), Octo-
ber 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3384766
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, software has steadily b...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies, and Zone Size Detection
author:Jonathan Demke and
Casey T. Deccio
On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies,
and Zone Size Detection
Jonathan Demke
and Casey Deccio(B)
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA
{jpd0057,casey}@byu.edu
https://cs.byu.edu/
Abstract. The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) introduced additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records)
into negative DNS responses, which records can prove there is no trans-
lation for a queried domain name. We introduce a novel technique to
estimate the size of a DNS zone by analyzing the NSEC3 records returned
by only a small number of DNS queries issued. We survey the prevalence
of the deployment of diﬀerent variants of DNSSEC negative responses
across a large set of DNSSEC-signed zones in the wild, and identify
over 50% as applicable to our measurement technique. Of the applicable
zones, we show that 99% are composed of fewer than 40 names.
Keywords: DNS · DNSSEC · Privacy
1 Introduction
Since its inception over thirty years ago, the Domain Name System (DNS) [19,20]
has included provisions for so-called negative responses, which indicate that there
is no translation for a queried domain name. While the essential characteristic of
a negative response has always been the lack of an answer (i.e., translation), the
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [8,19,20,23] introduced the requirement
that additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records) be included in a negative
DNS response, which records can prove the non-translation of the domain name.
A side eﬀect of including these extra records is that additional information is
revealed about a domain—such as names that do exist. While this side eﬀect is
innocuous to some, to others it can be undesirable. In an attempt to reduce or
eliminate unwanted disclosure of information via DNSSEC negative responses,
new approaches have been introduced into the DNSSEC ecosystem. However,
each comes with its own caveats.
In t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies, and Zone Size Detection
author:Jonathan Demke and
Casey T. Deccio
On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies,
and Zone Size Detection
Jonathan Demke
and Casey Deccio(B)
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA
{jpd0057,casey}@byu.edu
https://cs.byu.edu/
Abstract. The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) introduced additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records)
into negative DNS responses, which records can prove there is no trans-
lation for a queried domain name. We introduce a novel technique to
estimate the size of a DNS zone by analyzing the NSEC3 records returned
by only a small number of DNS queries issued. We survey the prevalence
of the deployment of diﬀerent variants of DNSSEC negative responses
across a large set of DNSSEC-signed zones in the wild, and identify
over 50% as applicable to our measurement technique. Of the applicable
zones, we show that 99% are composed of fewer than 40 names.
Keywords: DNS · DNSSEC · Privacy
1 Introduction
Since its inception over thirty years ago, the Domain Name System (DNS) [19,20]
has included provisions for so-called negative responses, which indicate that there
is no translation for a queried domain name. While the essential characteristic of
a negative response has always been the lack of an answer (i.e., translation), the
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [8,19,20,23] introduced the requirement
that additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records) be included in a negative
DNS response, which records can prove the non-translation of the domain name.
A side eﬀect of including these extra records is that additional information is
revealed about a domain—such as names that do exist. While this side eﬀect is
innocuous to some, to others it can be undesirable. In an attempt to reduce or
eliminate unwanted disclosure of information via DNSSEC negative responses,
new approaches have been introduced into the DNSSEC ecosystem. However,
each comes with its own caveats.
In t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Protecting Cryptographic Keys from Memory Disclosure Attacks
author:Keith Harrison and
Shouhuai Xu
Protecting Cryptographic Keys From Memory Disclosure Attacks
Keith Harrison and Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio
{kharriso,shxu}@cs.utsa.edu
Abstract
Cryptography has become an indispensable mechanism
for securing systems, communications and applications.
While offering strong protection, cryptography makes the
assumption that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely se-
cret. In general this assumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee
in real life because computers may be compromised rela-
tively easily. In this paper we investigate a class of attacks,
which exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities to expose
cryptographic keys. We demonstrate that the threat is real
by formulating an attack that exposed the private key of an
OpenSSH server within 1 minute, and exposed the private
key of an Apache HTTP server within 5 minutes. We pro-
pose a set of techniques to address such attacks. Experi-
mental results show that our techniques are efﬁcient (i.e.,
imposing no performance penalty) and effective — unless a
large portion of allocated memory is disclosed.
Keywords: cryptographic key security, memory disclosure.
1 Introduction
The utility of cryptography is based on the assumption
that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely secret. This as-
sumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee in real-life systems
due to various software bugs in operating systems and ap-
plications. In this paper we focus on a class of attacks that
exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities, called memory
disclosure attacks. Such an attack can expose the content
of (a portion of) computer memory, and thus cryptographic
keys in the disclosed memory.
Our contributions. First, we thoroughly assess (Section 2)
the damage of memory disclosure attacks against the pri-
vate keys of OpenSSH servers and Apache HTTP servers.
The attacks exploit two reported vulnerab...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Protecting Cryptographic Keys from Memory Disclosure Attacks
author:Keith Harrison and
Shouhuai Xu
Protecting Cryptographic Keys From Memory Disclosure Attacks
Keith Harrison and Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio
{kharriso,shxu}@cs.utsa.edu
Abstract
Cryptography has become an indispensable mechanism
for securing systems, communications and applications.
While offering strong protection, cryptography makes the
assumption that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely se-
cret. In general this assumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee
in real life because computers may be compromised rela-
tively easily. In this paper we investigate a class of attacks,
which exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities to expose
cryptographic keys. We demonstrate that the threat is real
by formulating an attack that exposed the private key of an
OpenSSH server within 1 minute, and exposed the private
key of an Apache HTTP server within 5 minutes. We pro-
pose a set of techniques to address such attacks. Experi-
mental results show that our techniques are efﬁcient (i.e.,
imposing no performance penalty) and effective — unless a
large portion of allocated memory is disclosed.
Keywords: cryptographic key security, memory disclosure.
1 Introduction
The utility of cryptography is based on the assumption
that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely secret. This as-
sumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee in real-life systems
due to various software bugs in operating systems and ap-
plications. In this paper we focus on a class of attacks that
exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities, called memory
disclosure attacks. Such an attack can expose the content
of (a portion of) computer memory, and thus cryptographic
keys in the disclosed memory.
Our contributions. First, we thoroughly assess (Section 2)
the damage of memory disclosure attacks against the pri-
vate keys of OpenSSH servers and Apache HTTP servers.
The attacks exploit two reported vulnerab...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Internet optometry: assessing the broken glasses in internet reachability
author:Randy Bush and
Olaf Maennel and
Matthew Roughan and
Steve Uhlig
Assessing the Broken Glasses in Internet Reachability
Internet Optometry:
Randy Bush
IIJ
Tokyo, Japan
Olaf Maennel
Loughborough
University, UK
randy@psg.com olaf@maennel.net
ABSTRACT
Reachability is thought of as the most basic service provided by
today’s Internet. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the com-
munity has a deep understanding of it. Researchers and operators
rely on two views of reachability: control/routing- and data-plane
measurements, but both types of measurements suffer from biases
and limitations. In this paper, we illustrate some of these biases,
and show how to design controlled experiments which allow us to
"see" through the limitations of previous measurement techniques.
For example, we discover the extent of default routing and its im-
pact on reachability. This explains some of the previous unexpected
results from studies that compared control- and data-plane mea-
surements.
However, not all limitations of visibility given by routing and
probing tools can be compensated for by methodological improve-
ments. We will show in this paper, that some of the limitations can
be carefully addressed when designing an experiment, e.g. not see-
ing the reverse path taken by a probe can be partly compensated for
by our methodology, called dual probing. However, compensating
for other biases through more measurements may not always be
possible. Therefore, calibration of expectations and checks of as-
sumptions are critical when conducting measurements that aim at
making conclusions about topological properties of the Internet.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Internet]: Measurement
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Routing, Data-Plane, Control-Plane, Reachability, Limitation of
data, Default-Routing
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classro...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Internet optometry: assessing the broken glasses in internet reachability
author:Randy Bush and
Olaf Maennel and
Matthew Roughan and
Steve Uhlig
Assessing the Broken Glasses in Internet Reachability
Internet Optometry:
Randy Bush
IIJ
Tokyo, Japan
Olaf Maennel
Loughborough
University, UK
randy@psg.com olaf@maennel.net
ABSTRACT
Reachability is thought of as the most basic service provided by
today’s Internet. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the com-
munity has a deep understanding of it. Researchers and operators
rely on two views of reachability: control/routing- and data-plane
measurements, but both types of measurements suffer from biases
and limitations. In this paper, we illustrate some of these biases,
and show how to design controlled experiments which allow us to
"see" through the limitations of previous measurement techniques.
For example, we discover the extent of default routing and its im-
pact on reachability. This explains some of the previous unexpected
results from studies that compared control- and data-plane mea-
surements.
However, not all limitations of visibility given by routing and
probing tools can be compensated for by methodological improve-
ments. We will show in this paper, that some of the limitations can
be carefully addressed when designing an experiment, e.g. not see-
ing the reverse path taken by a probe can be partly compensated for
by our methodology, called dual probing. However, compensating
for other biases through more measurements may not always be
possible. Therefore, calibration of expectations and checks of as-
sumptions are critical when conducting measurements that aim at
making conclusions about topological properties of the Internet.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Internet]: Measurement
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Routing, Data-Plane, Control-Plane, Reachability, Limitation of
data, Default-Routing
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classro...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
author:Jens M"uller and
Fabian Ising and
Vladislav Mladenov and
Christian Mainka and
Sebastian Schinzel and
J"org Schwenk
Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
Jens Müller
jens.a.mueller@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Fabian Ising
f.ising@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Christian Mainka
christian.mainka@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Sebastian Schinzel
schinzel@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Vladislav Mladenov
vladislav.mladenov@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Jörg Schwenk
joerg.schwenk@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
ABSTRACT
The Portable Document Format, better known as PDF, is one of the
most widely used document formats worldwide, and in order to en-
sure information confidentiality, this file format supports document
encryption. In this paper, we analyze PDF encryption and show
two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted
documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted
documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within
attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext
once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse
a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate
encrypted content. The only requirement is that a single block of
known plaintext is needed, and we show that this is fulfilled by
design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of en-
crypted documents by using exfiltration channels which are based
on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and
found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the
vulnerabilities and supported the vendors in fixing the issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privac...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
author:Jens M"uller and
Fabian Ising and
Vladislav Mladenov and
Christian Mainka and
Sebastian Schinzel and
J"org Schwenk
Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
Jens Müller
jens.a.mueller@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Fabian Ising
f.ising@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Christian Mainka
christian.mainka@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Sebastian Schinzel
schinzel@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Vladislav Mladenov
vladislav.mladenov@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Jörg Schwenk
joerg.schwenk@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
ABSTRACT
The Portable Document Format, better known as PDF, is one of the
most widely used document formats worldwide, and in order to en-
sure information confidentiality, this file format supports document
encryption. In this paper, we analyze PDF encryption and show
two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted
documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted
documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within
attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext
once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse
a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate
encrypted content. The only requirement is that a single block of
known plaintext is needed, and we show that this is fulfilled by
design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of en-
crypted documents by using exfiltration channels which are based
on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and
found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the
vulnerabilities and supported the vendors in fixing the issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privac...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics on Social Relationships
author:Changchang Liu and
Prateek Mittal
LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics
on Social Relationships
Changchang Liu, Prateek Mittal
Email: cl12@princeton.edu, pmittal@princeton.edu
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
Abstract—Social relationships present a critical
foundation
for many real-world applications. However, both users and
online social network (OSN) providers are hesitant to share
social relationships with untrusted external applications due to
privacy concerns. In this work, we design LinkMirage, a system
that mediates privacy-preserving access to social relationships.
LinkMirage takes users’ social relationship graph as an input,
obfuscates the social graph topology, and provides untrusted
external applications with an obfuscated view of
the social
relationship graph while preserving graph utility.
Our key contributions are (1) a novel algorithm for obfus-
cating social relationship graph while preserving graph utility,
(2) theoretical and experimental analysis of privacy and utility
using real-world social network topologies, including a large-scale
Google+ dataset with 940 million links. Our experimental results
demonstrate that LinkMirage provides up to 10x improvement in
privacy guarantees compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Overall, LinkMirage enables the design of real-world applications
such as recommendation systems, graph analytics, anonymous
communications, and Sybil defenses while protecting the privacy
of social relationships.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have revolutionized the way
our society interacts and communicates with each other. Under
the hood, OSNs can be viewed as a special graph structure
composed of individuals (or organizations) and connections
between these entities. These social relationships represent
sensitive relationships between entities, for example, trusted
friendships or import...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics on Social Relationships
author:Changchang Liu and
Prateek Mittal
LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics
on Social Relationships
Changchang Liu, Prateek Mittal
Email: cl12@princeton.edu, pmittal@princeton.edu
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
Abstract—Social relationships present a critical
foundation
for many real-world applications. However, both users and
online social network (OSN) providers are hesitant to share
social relationships with untrusted external applications due to
privacy concerns. In this work, we design LinkMirage, a system
that mediates privacy-preserving access to social relationships.
LinkMirage takes users’ social relationship graph as an input,
obfuscates the social graph topology, and provides untrusted
external applications with an obfuscated view of
the social
relationship graph while preserving graph utility.
Our key contributions are (1) a novel algorithm for obfus-
cating social relationship graph while preserving graph utility,
(2) theoretical and experimental analysis of privacy and utility
using real-world social network topologies, including a large-scale
Google+ dataset with 940 million links. Our experimental results
demonstrate that LinkMirage provides up to 10x improvement in
privacy guarantees compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Overall, LinkMirage enables the design of real-world applications
such as recommendation systems, graph analytics, anonymous
communications, and Sybil defenses while protecting the privacy
of social relationships.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have revolutionized the way
our society interacts and communicates with each other. Under
the hood, OSNs can be viewed as a special graph structure
composed of individuals (or organizations) and connections
between these entities. These social relationships represent
sensitive relationships between entities, for example, trusted
friendships or import...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting spammers on social networks
author:Gianluca Stringhini and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara
26th ACSAC(December, 2010)
Presented by
Alankrit Chona 2009CS10176
Nikita Gupta 2009CS50248
 Motivation
 The Popular Social Networks
 Data Collection
 Analysis of Collected Data
 Spam Profile Detection
 Our Proposals
SIL 765
2
 To conduct a comprehensive survey of
existing and potential attack behaviors in
social network sites
 Identify patterns in such attack behaviors
 Detect Spammers in a real-world social
network
 Review existing solutions, measurement as
well as defense mechanisms
 “Unsolicited usually commercial e-mail sent
to a large number of addresses” – Merriam
Webster Online
 As the Internet has supported new
applications, many other forms are
common, requiring a much broader
definition
Capturing user attention unjustifiably in Internet
enabled applications (e-mail, Web, Social Media
etc..)
INTERNET SPAM
[Forms]
DIRECT
INDIRECT
E-Mail Spam
IM Spam (SPIM)
Social Network Spam
Spam Blogs (Splogs)
General Web Spam
[Mechanisms]
Social Media Spam
Spamdexing
Auto-generated and/or
Plagiarized Content
Advertisements in
Profitable Contexts
Link Farms to promote
other spam pages
 Sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are
consistently among the top 20 most-viewed web
sites of the Internet
 In 2008, 83% of the users of social networks have
received at least one unwanted friend request or
message
 A previous study showed that 45% of users on a
social networking site readily click on links
posted by their “friend” accounts, even if they do
not know that person in real life
SIL 765
7
SIL 765
8
◦ Facebook administrators claim to have more than
400 million active users all over the world
◦ Most Facebook users were grouped in networks,
where people coming from a certain...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting spammers on social networks
author:Gianluca Stringhini and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara
26th ACSAC(December, 2010)
Presented by
Alankrit Chona 2009CS10176
Nikita Gupta 2009CS50248
 Motivation
 The Popular Social Networks
 Data Collection
 Analysis of Collected Data
 Spam Profile Detection
 Our Proposals
SIL 765
2
 To conduct a comprehensive survey of
existing and potential attack behaviors in
social network sites
 Identify patterns in such attack behaviors
 Detect Spammers in a real-world social
network
 Review existing solutions, measurement as
well as defense mechanisms
 “Unsolicited usually commercial e-mail sent
to a large number of addresses” – Merriam
Webster Online
 As the Internet has supported new
applications, many other forms are
common, requiring a much broader
definition
Capturing user attention unjustifiably in Internet
enabled applications (e-mail, Web, Social Media
etc..)
INTERNET SPAM
[Forms]
DIRECT
INDIRECT
E-Mail Spam
IM Spam (SPIM)
Social Network Spam
Spam Blogs (Splogs)
General Web Spam
[Mechanisms]
Social Media Spam
Spamdexing
Auto-generated and/or
Plagiarized Content
Advertisements in
Profitable Contexts
Link Farms to promote
other spam pages
 Sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are
consistently among the top 20 most-viewed web
sites of the Internet
 In 2008, 83% of the users of social networks have
received at least one unwanted friend request or
message
 A previous study showed that 45% of users on a
social networking site readily click on links
posted by their “friend” accounts, even if they do
not know that person in real life
SIL 765
7
SIL 765
8
◦ Facebook administrators claim to have more than
400 million active users all over the world
◦ Most Facebook users were grouped in networks,
where people coming from a certain...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on Behavior Profiles
author:Vanessa Fr'ıas-Mart'ınez and
Joseph Sherrick and
Salvatore J. Stolfo and
Angelos D. Keromytis
2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on
Behavior Proﬁles
Vanessa Frias-Martinez
∗
[1], Joseph Sherrick
†
, Salvatore J. Stolfo
†
, Angelos D. Keromytis
†
∗
†
Telefonica Research
Madrid,Spain
vanessa@tid.es
Columbia University
New York, USA
js2778,sal,angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract—Current Network Access Control (NAC) technolo-
gies manage the access of new devices into a network to prevent
rogue devices from attacking network hosts or services. Typically,
new devices are checked against a set of manually deﬁned
policies (rules) before being granted access by the NAC enforcer.
The main difﬁculty with this approach lies in the generation
and update of new policies manually as time elapses and all
devices have to reestablish their access rights. The BB-NAC
mechanism was the ﬁrst to introduce a novel Behavior-Based
Network Access Control architecture based on behavior proﬁles
and not rules, where behavior-based access control policies were
automatically generated. As originally presented, BB-NAC relied
on manually pre-determined clusters of behavior which required
human intervention and prevented the fully automation of the
mechanism. In this paper, we present an enhanced BB-NAC
mechanism that fully automatizes the creation of clusters of
behavior. The access control is enhanced with the incorporation
of automatic behavior clustering, which improves the intrusion
detection capabilities by allowing for a more ﬁne-grained def-
inition of normal behavior. Apart from the lack of automatic
clustering, the original BB-NAC overlooked the evolution of the
mechanism as new behavior proﬁles were computed over time.
As part of our enhancements, we also present an incremental-
learning algorithm that automatically updates the behavior-based
access...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on Behavior Profiles
author:Vanessa Fr'ıas-Mart'ınez and
Joseph Sherrick and
Salvatore J. Stolfo and
Angelos D. Keromytis
2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on
Behavior Proﬁles
Vanessa Frias-Martinez
∗
[1], Joseph Sherrick
†
, Salvatore J. Stolfo
†
, Angelos D. Keromytis
†
∗
†
Telefonica Research
Madrid,Spain
vanessa@tid.es
Columbia University
New York, USA
js2778,sal,angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract—Current Network Access Control (NAC) technolo-
gies manage the access of new devices into a network to prevent
rogue devices from attacking network hosts or services. Typically,
new devices are checked against a set of manually deﬁned
policies (rules) before being granted access by the NAC enforcer.
The main difﬁculty with this approach lies in the generation
and update of new policies manually as time elapses and all
devices have to reestablish their access rights. The BB-NAC
mechanism was the ﬁrst to introduce a novel Behavior-Based
Network Access Control architecture based on behavior proﬁles
and not rules, where behavior-based access control policies were
automatically generated. As originally presented, BB-NAC relied
on manually pre-determined clusters of behavior which required
human intervention and prevented the fully automation of the
mechanism. In this paper, we present an enhanced BB-NAC
mechanism that fully automatizes the creation of clusters of
behavior. The access control is enhanced with the incorporation
of automatic behavior clustering, which improves the intrusion
detection capabilities by allowing for a more ﬁne-grained def-
inition of normal behavior. Apart from the lack of automatic
clustering, the original BB-NAC overlooked the evolution of the
mechanism as new behavior proﬁles were computed over time.
As part of our enhancements, we also present an incremental-
learning algorithm that automatically updates the behavior-based
access...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:NodeSentry: least-privilege library integration for server-side JavaScript
author:Willem De Groef and
Fabio Massacci and
Frank Piessens
NodeSentry: Least-privilege Library Integration for
Server-Side JavaScript
Willem De Groef
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Willem.DeGroef@cs.kuleuven.be
Fabio Massacci
University of Trento
Fabio.Massacci@unitn.it
Frank Piessens
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Frank.Piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
Node.js is a popular JavaScript server-side framework with an
eﬃcient runtime for cloud-based event-driven architectures.
Its strength is the presence of thousands of third-party
libraries which allow developers to quickly build and deploy
applications. These very libraries are a source of security
threats as a vulnerability in one library can (and in some
cases did) compromise one’s entire server.
In order to support the least-privilege integration of li-
braries, we developed NodeSentry, the ﬁrst security archi-
tecture for server-side JavaScript. Our policy enforcement
infrastructure supports an easy deployment of web-hardening
techniques and access control policies on interactions between
libraries and their environment, including any dependent
library.
We discuss the implementation of NodeSentry, and
present its practical evaluation. For hundreds of concurrent
clients, NodeSentry has the same capacity and throughput
as plain Node.js. Only on a large scale, when Node.js
itself yields to a heavy load, NodeSentry shows a limited
overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.3.5 [Information
Storage and Retrieval]: Web-based services
Keywords
Web security, JavaScript
1.
INTRODUCTION
Services oﬀered on the web have a standard conceptual
architecture: a client (or tenant) accesses a web application
which talks to one or more databases [8]. In order to serve
multiple clients, the traditional approach (represented by e.g.,
Apache and IIS) has been...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:NodeSentry: least-privilege library integration for server-side JavaScript
author:Willem De Groef and
Fabio Massacci and
Frank Piessens
NodeSentry: Least-privilege Library Integration for
Server-Side JavaScript
Willem De Groef
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Willem.DeGroef@cs.kuleuven.be
Fabio Massacci
University of Trento
Fabio.Massacci@unitn.it
Frank Piessens
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Frank.Piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
Node.js is a popular JavaScript server-side framework with an
eﬃcient runtime for cloud-based event-driven architectures.
Its strength is the presence of thousands of third-party
libraries which allow developers to quickly build and deploy
applications. These very libraries are a source of security
threats as a vulnerability in one library can (and in some
cases did) compromise one’s entire server.
In order to support the least-privilege integration of li-
braries, we developed NodeSentry, the ﬁrst security archi-
tecture for server-side JavaScript. Our policy enforcement
infrastructure supports an easy deployment of web-hardening
techniques and access control policies on interactions between
libraries and their environment, including any dependent
library.
We discuss the implementation of NodeSentry, and
present its practical evaluation. For hundreds of concurrent
clients, NodeSentry has the same capacity and throughput
as plain Node.js. Only on a large scale, when Node.js
itself yields to a heavy load, NodeSentry shows a limited
overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.3.5 [Information
Storage and Retrieval]: Web-based services
Keywords
Web security, JavaScript
1.
INTRODUCTION
Services oﬀered on the web have a standard conceptual
architecture: a client (or tenant) accesses a web application
which talks to one or more databases [8]. In order to serve
multiple clients, the traditional approach (represented by e.g.,
Apache and IIS) has been...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against AMD's
Secure Encrypted Virtualization
author:Robert Buhren and
Hans Niklas Jacob and
Thilo Krachenfels and
Jean-Pierre Seifert
One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Robert Buhren
robert.buhren@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Hans Niklas Jacob
hnj@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Thilo Krachenfels
tkrachenfels@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Jean-Pierre Seifert
jpseifert@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Fraunhofer SIT
ABSTRACT
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers protection mech-
anisms for virtual machines in untrusted environments through
memory and register encryption. To separate security-sensitive op-
erations from software executing on the main x86 cores, SEV lever-
ages the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP). This paper introduces
a new approach to attack SEV-protected virtual machines (VMs) by
targeting the AMD-SP. We present a voltage glitching attack that
allows an attacker to execute custom payloads on the AMD-SPs
of all microarchitectures that support SEV currently on the mar-
ket (Zen 1, Zen 2, and Zen 3). The presented methods allow us
to deploy a custom SEV firmware on the AMD-SP, which enables
an adversary to decrypt a VM’s memory. Furthermore, using our
approach, we can extract endorsement keys of SEV-enabled CPUs,
which allows us to fake attestation reports or to pose as a valid
target for VM migration without requiring physical access to the
target host. Moreover, we reverse-engineered the Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK) mechanism introduced with SEV Secure
Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). The VCEK binds the endorsement keys
to the firmware version of TCB components relevant for SEV. Build-
ing on the ability to extract the endorsement keys, we show how
to derive valid VCEKs for arbitrary firmware versions. With our
findings, we ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against AMD's
Secure Encrypted Virtualization
author:Robert Buhren and
Hans Niklas Jacob and
Thilo Krachenfels and
Jean-Pierre Seifert
One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Robert Buhren
robert.buhren@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Hans Niklas Jacob
hnj@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Thilo Krachenfels
tkrachenfels@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Jean-Pierre Seifert
jpseifert@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Fraunhofer SIT
ABSTRACT
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers protection mech-
anisms for virtual machines in untrusted environments through
memory and register encryption. To separate security-sensitive op-
erations from software executing on the main x86 cores, SEV lever-
ages the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP). This paper introduces
a new approach to attack SEV-protected virtual machines (VMs) by
targeting the AMD-SP. We present a voltage glitching attack that
allows an attacker to execute custom payloads on the AMD-SPs
of all microarchitectures that support SEV currently on the mar-
ket (Zen 1, Zen 2, and Zen 3). The presented methods allow us
to deploy a custom SEV firmware on the AMD-SP, which enables
an adversary to decrypt a VM’s memory. Furthermore, using our
approach, we can extract endorsement keys of SEV-enabled CPUs,
which allows us to fake attestation reports or to pose as a valid
target for VM migration without requiring physical access to the
target host. Moreover, we reverse-engineered the Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK) mechanism introduced with SEV Secure
Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). The VCEK binds the endorsement keys
to the firmware version of TCB components relevant for SEV. Build-
ing on the ability to extract the endorsement keys, we show how
to derive valid VCEKs for arbitrary firmware versions. With our
findings, we ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On Ends-to-Ends Encryption: Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong
Security Guarantees
author:Katriel Cohn-Gordon and
Cas Cremers and
Luke Garratt and
Jon Millican and
Kevin Milner
On Ends-to-Ends Encryption:
Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees
Katriel Cohn-Gordon∗1, Cas Cremers2, Luke Garratt1, Jon Millican3, and Kevin Milner1
1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
2CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
3Facebook
Version 2.3, March 2nd, 2020†
Abstract
In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion
active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides
a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that
many of its implementations provide, without notiﬁcation, a weaker property for group
messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject
messages indeﬁnitely.
We show for the ﬁrst time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic,
asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratchet-
ing Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of
users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time.
ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable
security guarantees. It has seen signiﬁcant interest from industry, and forms the basis
for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong
security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
∗K.C-G. thanks Merton College and the Oxford CDT in Cyber Security for their support.
†An extended abstract of this paper appears at ACM CCS 2018 [15]; this is the full version. A summary of
changes is given in Appendix F.
1
forward
secrecy (FS)
post-compromise
security (PCS)
communications
under a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On Ends-to-Ends Encryption: Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong
Security Guarantees
author:Katriel Cohn-Gordon and
Cas Cremers and
Luke Garratt and
Jon Millican and
Kevin Milner
On Ends-to-Ends Encryption:
Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees
Katriel Cohn-Gordon∗1, Cas Cremers2, Luke Garratt1, Jon Millican3, and Kevin Milner1
1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
2CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
3Facebook
Version 2.3, March 2nd, 2020†
Abstract
In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion
active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides
a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that
many of its implementations provide, without notiﬁcation, a weaker property for group
messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject
messages indeﬁnitely.
We show for the ﬁrst time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic,
asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratchet-
ing Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of
users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time.
ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable
security guarantees. It has seen signiﬁcant interest from industry, and forms the basis
for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong
security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
∗K.C-G. thanks Merton College and the Oxford CDT in Cyber Security for their support.
†An extended abstract of this paper appears at ACM CCS 2018 [15]; this is the full version. A summary of
changes is given in Appendix F.
1
forward
secrecy (FS)
post-compromise
security (PCS)
communications
under a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:DynaMiner: Leveraging Offline Infection Analytics for On-the-Wire
Malware Detection
author:Birhanu Eshete and
V. N. Venkatakrishnan
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
DYNAMINER: Leveraging Ofﬂine Infection
Analytics for On-the-Wire Malware Detection
Birhanu Eshete and V.N. Venkatakrishnan
University of Illinois at Chicago
{eshete5, venkat}@uic.edu
Abstract—Web-borne malware continues to be a major threat
on the Web. At the core of malware infection are for-crime
toolkits that exploit vulnerabilities in browsers and their exten-
sions. When a victim host gets infected, the infection dynamics is
often buried in benign trafﬁc, which makes the task of inferring
malicious behavior a non-trivial exercise.
In this paper, we leverage web conversation graph analytics to
tap into the rich dynamics of the interaction between a victim and
malicious host(s) without the need for analyzing exploit payload.
Based on insights derived from infection graph analytics, we
formulate the malware detection challenge as a graph-analytics
based learning problem. The key insight of our approach is
the payload-agnostic abstraction and comprehensive analytics of
malware infection dynamics pre-, during-, and post- infection.
Our technique leverages 3 years of infection intelligence spanning
9 popular exploit kit families.
Our approach is implemented in a tool called DYNAMINER and
evaluated on infection and benign HTTP trafﬁc. DYNAMINER
achieves a 97.3% true positive rate with false positive rate of
1.5%. Our forensic and live case studies suggest the effectiveness
of comprehensive graph abstraction malware infection. In some
instances, DYNAMINER detected unknown malware 11 days
earlier than existing AV engines.
Index Terms— malware detection, graph analytics, machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware infection via drive-by-downloads has become a
day-to-day encounter in the current state of the Web. As
cybercriminals step up their evasion ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:DynaMiner: Leveraging Offline Infection Analytics for On-the-Wire
Malware Detection
author:Birhanu Eshete and
V. N. Venkatakrishnan
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
DYNAMINER: Leveraging Ofﬂine Infection
Analytics for On-the-Wire Malware Detection
Birhanu Eshete and V.N. Venkatakrishnan
University of Illinois at Chicago
{eshete5, venkat}@uic.edu
Abstract—Web-borne malware continues to be a major threat
on the Web. At the core of malware infection are for-crime
toolkits that exploit vulnerabilities in browsers and their exten-
sions. When a victim host gets infected, the infection dynamics is
often buried in benign trafﬁc, which makes the task of inferring
malicious behavior a non-trivial exercise.
In this paper, we leverage web conversation graph analytics to
tap into the rich dynamics of the interaction between a victim and
malicious host(s) without the need for analyzing exploit payload.
Based on insights derived from infection graph analytics, we
formulate the malware detection challenge as a graph-analytics
based learning problem. The key insight of our approach is
the payload-agnostic abstraction and comprehensive analytics of
malware infection dynamics pre-, during-, and post- infection.
Our technique leverages 3 years of infection intelligence spanning
9 popular exploit kit families.
Our approach is implemented in a tool called DYNAMINER and
evaluated on infection and benign HTTP trafﬁc. DYNAMINER
achieves a 97.3% true positive rate with false positive rate of
1.5%. Our forensic and live case studies suggest the effectiveness
of comprehensive graph abstraction malware infection. In some
instances, DYNAMINER detected unknown malware 11 days
earlier than existing AV engines.
Index Terms— malware detection, graph analytics, machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware infection via drive-by-downloads has become a
day-to-day encounter in the current state of the Web. As
cybercriminals step up their evasion ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
author:Frank Li and
Vern Paxson
A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
Frank Li
Vern Paxson
{frankli, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley and International Computer Science Institute
the patch development process and the characteristics of the result-
ing fixes. Illuminating the nature of security patch development
can inform us of shortcomings in existing remediation processes
and provide insights for improving current practices.
Seeking such understanding has motivated several studies ex-
ploring various aspects of vulnerability and patching life cycles.
Some have analyzed public documentation about vulnerabilities,
such as security advisories, to shed light on the vulnerability dis-
closure process [14, 32]. These studies, however, did not include
analyses of the corresponding code bases and the patch develop-
ment process itself. Others have tracked the development of specific
projects to better understand patching dynamics [18, 28, 41]. While
providing insights on the responsiveness of particular projects to
security issues, these investigations have been limited to a smaller
scale across a few (often one) projects.
ABSTRACT
Given how the “patching treadmill” plays a central role for enabling
sites to counter emergent security concerns, it behooves the secu-
rity community to understand the patch development process and
characteristics of the resulting fixes. Illumination of the nature of se-
curity patch development can inform us of shortcomings in existing
remediation processes and provide insights for improving current
practices. In this work we conduct a large-scale empirical study of
security patches, investigating more than 4,000 bug fixes for over
3,000 vulnerabilities that affected a diverse set of 682 open-source
software projects. For our analysis we draw upon the National
Vulnerability Database, information scraped from relevant external
references, affected softw...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
author:Frank Li and
Vern Paxson
A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
Frank Li
Vern Paxson
{frankli, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley and International Computer Science Institute
the patch development process and the characteristics of the result-
ing fixes. Illuminating the nature of security patch development
can inform us of shortcomings in existing remediation processes
and provide insights for improving current practices.
Seeking such understanding has motivated several studies ex-
ploring various aspects of vulnerability and patching life cycles.
Some have analyzed public documentation about vulnerabilities,
such as security advisories, to shed light on the vulnerability dis-
closure process [14, 32]. These studies, however, did not include
analyses of the corresponding code bases and the patch develop-
ment process itself. Others have tracked the development of specific
projects to better understand patching dynamics [18, 28, 41]. While
providing insights on the responsiveness of particular projects to
security issues, these investigations have been limited to a smaller
scale across a few (often one) projects.
ABSTRACT
Given how the “patching treadmill” plays a central role for enabling
sites to counter emergent security concerns, it behooves the secu-
rity community to understand the patch development process and
characteristics of the resulting fixes. Illumination of the nature of se-
curity patch development can inform us of shortcomings in existing
remediation processes and provide insights for improving current
practices. In this work we conduct a large-scale empirical study of
security patches, investigating more than 4,000 bug fixes for over
3,000 vulnerabilities that affected a diverse set of 682 open-source
software projects. For our analysis we draw upon the National
Vulnerability Database, information scraped from relevant external
references, affected softw...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently
Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
author:Jianting Ning and
Xinyi Huang and
Geong Sen Poh and
Jiaming Yuan and
Yingjiu Li and
Jian Weng and
Robert H. Deng
LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable,
Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
Jianting Ning∗
Fujian Normal University &
Singapore Management University
Fuzhou, China
jtning88@gmail.com
Jiaming Yuan
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
jiamingy@uoregon.edu
Geong Sen Poh
S-Lab for Advanced Intelligence,
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
geongsen.poh@ntu.edu.sg
Jian Weng
Jinan University
Guangzhou, China
cryptjweng@gmail.com
Xinyi Huang†
Fujian Normal University
Fuzhou, China
xyhuang81@gmail.com
Yingjiu Li
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
yingjiul@uoregon.edu
Robert H. Deng
Singapore Management University
Singapore
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables private queries on encrypted doc-
uments. Most existing SE schemes focus on constructing industrial-
ready, practical solutions at the expense of information leakages
that are considered acceptable. In particular, ShadowCrypt utilizes
a cryptographic approach named “efficiently deployable, efficiently
searchable encryption” (EDESE) that reveals the encrypted dataset
and the query tokens among other information. However, recent
attacks showed that such leakages can be exploited to (partially)
recover the underlying keywords of query tokens under certain
assumptions on the attacker’s background knowledge.
We continue this line of work by presenting LEAP, a new leakage-
abuse attack on EDESE schemes that can accurately recover the
underlying keywords of query tokens based on partially known
documents and the L2 leakage as per defined by Cash et al. (CCS
’15). As an auxiliary function, our attack supports document re-
covery in the similar setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently
Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
author:Jianting Ning and
Xinyi Huang and
Geong Sen Poh and
Jiaming Yuan and
Yingjiu Li and
Jian Weng and
Robert H. Deng
LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable,
Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
Jianting Ning∗
Fujian Normal University &
Singapore Management University
Fuzhou, China
jtning88@gmail.com
Jiaming Yuan
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
jiamingy@uoregon.edu
Geong Sen Poh
S-Lab for Advanced Intelligence,
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
geongsen.poh@ntu.edu.sg
Jian Weng
Jinan University
Guangzhou, China
cryptjweng@gmail.com
Xinyi Huang†
Fujian Normal University
Fuzhou, China
xyhuang81@gmail.com
Yingjiu Li
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
yingjiul@uoregon.edu
Robert H. Deng
Singapore Management University
Singapore
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables private queries on encrypted doc-
uments. Most existing SE schemes focus on constructing industrial-
ready, practical solutions at the expense of information leakages
that are considered acceptable. In particular, ShadowCrypt utilizes
a cryptographic approach named “efficiently deployable, efficiently
searchable encryption” (EDESE) that reveals the encrypted dataset
and the query tokens among other information. However, recent
attacks showed that such leakages can be exploited to (partially)
recover the underlying keywords of query tokens under certain
assumptions on the attacker’s background knowledge.
We continue this line of work by presenting LEAP, a new leakage-
abuse attack on EDESE schemes that can accurately recover the
underlying keywords of query tokens based on partially known
documents and the L2 leakage as per defined by Cash et al. (CCS
’15). As an auxiliary function, our attack supports document re-
covery in the similar setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
author:Platon Kotzias and
Abbas Razaghpanah and
Johanna Amann and
Kenneth G. Paterson and
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez and
Juan Caballero
Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
Platon Kotzias
IMDEA Software Institute
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Abbas Razaghpanah
Stony Brook University
Johanna Amann
ICSI/Corelight/LBNL
Kenneth G. Paterson
Royal Holloway, University of London
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
IMDEA Networks Institute
ICSI
Juan Caballero
IMDEA Software Institue
ABSTRACT
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the de-facto standard
for encrypted communication on the Internet. However, it has been
plagued by a number of different attacks and security issues over
the last years. Addressing these attacks requires changes to the
protocol, to server- or client-software, or to all of them. In this
paper we conduct the first large-scale longitudinal study examining
the evolution of the TLS ecosystem over the last six years. We
place a special focus on the ecosystem’s evolution in response to
high-profile attacks.
For our analysis, we use a passive measurement dataset with
more than 319.3B connections since February 2012, and an active
dataset that contains TLS and SSL scans of the entire IPv4 address
space since August 2015. To identify the evolution of specific clients
we also create the—to our knowledge—largest TLS client fingerprint
database to date, consisting of 1,684 fingerprints.
We observe that the ecosystem has shifted significantly since
2012, with major changes in which cipher suites and TLS extensions
are offered by clients and accepted by servers having taken place.
Where possible, we correlate these with the timing of specific at-
tacks on TLS. At the same time, our results show that while clients,
especially browsers, are quick to adopt new algorithms, they are
also slow to drop support for older ones. We also encounter signif-
icant amounts of client software that probab...