Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Security Namespace: Making Linux Security Frameworks Available to
Containers
author:Yuqiong Sun and
David Safford and
Mimi Zohar and
Dimitrios Pendarakis and
Zhongshu Gu and
Trent Jaeger
Security Namespace: Making Linux Security
Frameworks Available to Containers
Yuqiong Sun, Symantec Research Labs; David Safford, GE Global Research;
Mimi Zohar, Dimitrios Pendarakis, and Zhongshu Gu, IBM Research;
Trent Jaeger, Pennsylvania State University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/sun
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Security Namespace : Making Linux Security
Frameworks Available to Containers
Yuqiong Sun
Symantec Research Labs
David Safford
GE Global Research
Mimi Zohar
IBM Research
Dimitrios Pendarakis
IBM Research
Zhongshu Gu
IBM Research
Trent Jaeger
Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
1
Introduction
Lightweight virtualization (i.e., containers) offers a vir-
tual host environment for applications without the need
for a separate kernel, enabling better resource utiliza-
tion and improved efﬁciency. However, the shared ker-
nel also prevents containers from taking advantage of se-
curity features that are available to traditional VMs and
hosts. Containers cannot apply local policies to gov-
ern integrity measurement, code execution, mandatory
access control, etc.
to prevent application-speciﬁc se-
curity problems. Changes have been proposed to make
kernel security mechanisms available to containers, but
such changes are often adhoc and expose the challenges
of trusting containers to make security decisions without
compromising host system or other containers. In this
paper, we propose security namespaces, a kernel abstrac-
tion that enables containers to have an autonomous con-
trol over their security. The security namespace rela...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Security Namespace: Making Linux Security Frameworks Available to
Containers
author:Yuqiong Sun and
David Safford and
Mimi Zohar and
Dimitrios Pendarakis and
Zhongshu Gu and
Trent Jaeger
Security Namespace: Making Linux Security
Frameworks Available to Containers
Yuqiong Sun, Symantec Research Labs; David Safford, GE Global Research;
Mimi Zohar, Dimitrios Pendarakis, and Zhongshu Gu, IBM Research;
Trent Jaeger, Pennsylvania State University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/sun
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Security Namespace : Making Linux Security
Frameworks Available to Containers
Yuqiong Sun
Symantec Research Labs
David Safford
GE Global Research
Mimi Zohar
IBM Research
Dimitrios Pendarakis
IBM Research
Zhongshu Gu
IBM Research
Trent Jaeger
Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
1
Introduction
Lightweight virtualization (i.e., containers) offers a vir-
tual host environment for applications without the need
for a separate kernel, enabling better resource utiliza-
tion and improved efﬁciency. However, the shared ker-
nel also prevents containers from taking advantage of se-
curity features that are available to traditional VMs and
hosts. Containers cannot apply local policies to gov-
ern integrity measurement, code execution, mandatory
access control, etc.
to prevent application-speciﬁc se-
curity problems. Changes have been proposed to make
kernel security mechanisms available to containers, but
such changes are often adhoc and expose the challenges
of trusting containers to make security decisions without
compromising host system or other containers. In this
paper, we propose security namespaces, a kernel abstrac-
tion that enables containers to have an autonomous con-
trol over their security. The security namespace rela...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Platform-Oblivious Anti-Spam Gateway
author:Yihe Zhang and
Xu Yuan and
Nian-Feng Tzeng
Platform-Oblivious Anti-Spam Gateway
Yihe Zhang
yihe.zhang1@louisiana.edu
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Lafayette, LA, USA
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Nian-Feng Tzeng
tzeng@louisiana.edu
Lafayette, LA, USA
Xu Yuan∗
xu.yuan@louisiana.edu
Lafayette, LA, USA
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a novel anti-spam gateway targeting multiple
linguistic-based social platforms to expose the outlier property of
their spam messages uniformly for effective detection. Instead of la-
beling ground truth datasets and extracting key features, which are
labor-intensive and time-consuming, we start with coarsely mining
seed corpora of spams and hams from the target data (aiming for
spam classification), before reconstructing them as the reference.
To catch each word’s rich information in the semantic and syntac-
tic perspectives, we then leverage the natural language processing
(NLP) model to embed each word into the high-dimensional vec-
tor space and use a neural network to train a spam word model.
After that, each message is encoded by using the predicted spam
scores from this model for all included stem words. The encoded
messages are processed by the prominent outlier techniques to pro-
duce their respective scores, allowing us to rank them for making
the outlier visible. Our solution is unsupervised, without relying
on specifics of any platform or dataset, to be platform-oblivious.
Through extensive experiments, our solution is demonstrated to
expose spammers’ outlier characteristics effectively, outperform
all examined unsupervised methods in almost all metrics, and may
even better supervised counterparts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Web application security; Network
security; Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation.
KEYWORDS
Anti-Spam; Unsupervised; Outlier Detection
ACM Reference Format:
Yihe Zhang, Xu Yuan, and Nian...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Platform-Oblivious Anti-Spam Gateway
author:Yihe Zhang and
Xu Yuan and
Nian-Feng Tzeng
Platform-Oblivious Anti-Spam Gateway
Yihe Zhang
yihe.zhang1@louisiana.edu
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Lafayette, LA, USA
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Nian-Feng Tzeng
tzeng@louisiana.edu
Lafayette, LA, USA
Xu Yuan∗
xu.yuan@louisiana.edu
Lafayette, LA, USA
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a novel anti-spam gateway targeting multiple
linguistic-based social platforms to expose the outlier property of
their spam messages uniformly for effective detection. Instead of la-
beling ground truth datasets and extracting key features, which are
labor-intensive and time-consuming, we start with coarsely mining
seed corpora of spams and hams from the target data (aiming for
spam classification), before reconstructing them as the reference.
To catch each word’s rich information in the semantic and syntac-
tic perspectives, we then leverage the natural language processing
(NLP) model to embed each word into the high-dimensional vec-
tor space and use a neural network to train a spam word model.
After that, each message is encoded by using the predicted spam
scores from this model for all included stem words. The encoded
messages are processed by the prominent outlier techniques to pro-
duce their respective scores, allowing us to rank them for making
the outlier visible. Our solution is unsupervised, without relying
on specifics of any platform or dataset, to be platform-oblivious.
Through extensive experiments, our solution is demonstrated to
expose spammers’ outlier characteristics effectively, outperform
all examined unsupervised methods in almost all metrics, and may
even better supervised counterparts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Web application security; Network
security; Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation.
KEYWORDS
Anti-Spam; Unsupervised; Outlier Detection
ACM Reference Format:
Yihe Zhang, Xu Yuan, and Nian...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Flexible and scalable digital signatures in TPM 2.0
author:Liqun Chen and
Jiangtao Li
Flexible and Scalable Digital Signatures in TPM 2.0
Liqun Chen
HP Laboratories
Bristol, UK
liqun.chen@hp.com
ABSTRACT
Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are multipurpose hard-
ware chips, which provide support for various cryptographic
functions. Flexibility, scalability and high performance are
critical features for a TPM. In this paper, we present the new
method for implementing digital signatures that has been in-
cluded in TPM version 2.0. The core part of this method
is a single TPM signature primitive, which can be called by
diﬀerent software programmes, in order to implement sig-
nature schemes and cryptographic protocols with diﬀerent
security and privacy features. We prove security of the TPM
signature primitive under the static Diﬃe-Hellman assump-
tion and the random oracle model. We demonstrate how to
call this TPM signature primitive to implement anonymous
signatures (Direct Anonymous Attestation), pseudonym sys-
tems (U-Prove), and conventional signatures (the Schnorr
signature). To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
signature primitive implemented in a limited hardware en-
vironment capable of supporting various signature schemes
without adding additional hardware complexity compared
to a hardware implementation of a conventional signature
scheme.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
TPM; Digital Signatures; Direct Anonymous Attestation
1.
INTRODUCTION
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware chip
used to provide veriﬁable attestation and integrity for a com-
puter platform and to also provide support for multiple cryp-
tographic functions necessary to implement data protection
in the platform. The implementation of these functions in
hardware has an advantage that it provides much better
tamper resistance than any software. But the disadvantage
Permission to make ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Flexible and scalable digital signatures in TPM 2.0
author:Liqun Chen and
Jiangtao Li
Flexible and Scalable Digital Signatures in TPM 2.0
Liqun Chen
HP Laboratories
Bristol, UK
liqun.chen@hp.com
ABSTRACT
Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are multipurpose hard-
ware chips, which provide support for various cryptographic
functions. Flexibility, scalability and high performance are
critical features for a TPM. In this paper, we present the new
method for implementing digital signatures that has been in-
cluded in TPM version 2.0. The core part of this method
is a single TPM signature primitive, which can be called by
diﬀerent software programmes, in order to implement sig-
nature schemes and cryptographic protocols with diﬀerent
security and privacy features. We prove security of the TPM
signature primitive under the static Diﬃe-Hellman assump-
tion and the random oracle model. We demonstrate how to
call this TPM signature primitive to implement anonymous
signatures (Direct Anonymous Attestation), pseudonym sys-
tems (U-Prove), and conventional signatures (the Schnorr
signature). To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
signature primitive implemented in a limited hardware en-
vironment capable of supporting various signature schemes
without adding additional hardware complexity compared
to a hardware implementation of a conventional signature
scheme.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
TPM; Digital Signatures; Direct Anonymous Attestation
1.
INTRODUCTION
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware chip
used to provide veriﬁable attestation and integrity for a com-
puter platform and to also provide support for multiple cryp-
tographic functions necessary to implement data protection
in the platform. The implementation of these functions in
hardware has an advantage that it provides much better
tamper resistance than any software. But the disadvantage
Permission to make ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Control-Alt-Hack: the design and evaluation of a card game for computer
security awareness and education
author:Tamara Denning and
Adam Lerner and
Adam Shostack and
Tadayoshi Kohno
Control-Alt-Hack: The Design and Evaluation of a Card
Game for Computer Security Awareness and Education
Tamara Denning†, Adam Lerner†, Adam Shostack*, and Tadayoshi Kohno†
†
Computer Science & Engineering
University of Washington
Seattle, WA, USA
{tdenning, lerner, yoshi}@cs.washington.edu
*adam@homeport.org
ABSTRACT
We  scoped,  designed,  produced,  and  evaluated  the  effectiveness
of  a  recreational  tabletop  card  game  created  to  raise  awareness
of—and  alter  perceptions  regarding—computer  security.  We
discuss  our  process,  the  challenges  that  arose,  and  the  decisions
we  made  to  address  those  challenges.  As  of  May  2013,  we  have
shipped  approximately  800  free  copies  to  150  educators.  We
analyze and report on feedback from 22 of these educators about
their  experiences  using  Control-Alt-Hack  with  over  450  students
in classroom and non-classroom contexts. The responses from the
14 educators who reported on their use of the game in a classroom
context  variously  indicated  that:  their  students’  awareness  of
computer  security  as  a  complex  and  interesting  field  was
increased  (11/14);  they  would  use  the  game  again  in  their
classroom (10/14); and they would recommend the game to others
(13/14).  Of  note,  2  of  the  14  classroom  educators  reported  that
they would not have otherwise covered the material. Additionally,
we present results from user studies with 11 individuals and find
that  their  responses  indicate  that  8  of  the  11  had  an  increased
awareness  of  computer  security  or  a  changed  perception;
furthermore,  all  of  our  intended  goals  are  touched  upon  in  their
responses.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.3.2  [COMPUTERS  AND  EDUCATION]:  Computer ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Control-Alt-Hack: the design and evaluation of a card game for computer
security awareness and education
author:Tamara Denning and
Adam Lerner and
Adam Shostack and
Tadayoshi Kohno
Control-Alt-Hack: The Design and Evaluation of a Card
Game for Computer Security Awareness and Education
Tamara Denning†, Adam Lerner†, Adam Shostack*, and Tadayoshi Kohno†
†
Computer Science & Engineering
University of Washington
Seattle, WA, USA
{tdenning, lerner, yoshi}@cs.washington.edu
*adam@homeport.org
ABSTRACT
We  scoped,  designed,  produced,  and  evaluated  the  effectiveness
of  a  recreational  tabletop  card  game  created  to  raise  awareness
of—and  alter  perceptions  regarding—computer  security.  We
discuss  our  process,  the  challenges  that  arose,  and  the  decisions
we  made  to  address  those  challenges.  As  of  May  2013,  we  have
shipped  approximately  800  free  copies  to  150  educators.  We
analyze and report on feedback from 22 of these educators about
their  experiences  using  Control-Alt-Hack  with  over  450  students
in classroom and non-classroom contexts. The responses from the
14 educators who reported on their use of the game in a classroom
context  variously  indicated  that:  their  students’  awareness  of
computer  security  as  a  complex  and  interesting  field  was
increased  (11/14);  they  would  use  the  game  again  in  their
classroom (10/14); and they would recommend the game to others
(13/14).  Of  note,  2  of  the  14  classroom  educators  reported  that
they would not have otherwise covered the material. Additionally,
we present results from user studies with 11 individuals and find
that  their  responses  indicate  that  8  of  the  11  had  an  increased
awareness  of  computer  security  or  a  changed  perception;
furthermore,  all  of  our  intended  goals  are  touched  upon  in  their
responses.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.3.2  [COMPUTERS  AND  EDUCATION]:  Computer ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:DIFC programs by automatic instrumentation
author:William R. Harris and
Somesh Jha and
Thomas W. Reps
DIFC Programs by Automatic Instrumentation ∗
William R. Harris
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
wrharris@cs.wisc.edu
Somesh Jha
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
jha@cs.wisc.edu
Thomas Reps †
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
reps@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
Decentralized information ﬂow control (DIFC) operating
systems provide applications with mechanisms for enforcing
information-ﬂow policies for their data. However, signiﬁ-
cant obstacles keep such operating systems from achieving
widespread adoption. One key obstacle is that DIFC operat-
ing systems provide only low-level mechanisms for allowing
application programmers to enforce their desired policies. It
can be diﬃcult for the programmer to ensure that their use
of these mechanisms enforces their high-level policies, while
at the same time not breaking the underlying functionality
of their application. These are issues both for programmers
who would develop new applications for a DIFC operating
system and for programmers who would port existing appli-
cations to a DIFC operating system.
Our work signiﬁcantly eases these tasks. We present an
automatic technique that takes as input a program with no
DIFC code, and two policies: one that speciﬁes prohibited
information ﬂows and one that speciﬁes ﬂows that must be
allowed. Our technique then produces a new version of the
input program that satisﬁes the two policies. To evaluate our
technique, we implemented it in an automatic tool, called
Swim (for Secure What I Mean), and applied it to a set of
real-world programs and policies. The results of our evalu-
ation demonstrate that the technique is suﬃciently expres-
sive to produce programs for real-world policies, and that
it can produce such programs eﬃciently. It thus represents
a signiﬁcant contribution towards developing systems with
strong end-to-end...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:DIFC programs by automatic instrumentation
author:William R. Harris and
Somesh Jha and
Thomas W. Reps
DIFC Programs by Automatic Instrumentation ∗
William R. Harris
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
wrharris@cs.wisc.edu
Somesh Jha
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
jha@cs.wisc.edu
Thomas Reps †
Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Dept. of Computer Sciences
reps@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
Decentralized information ﬂow control (DIFC) operating
systems provide applications with mechanisms for enforcing
information-ﬂow policies for their data. However, signiﬁ-
cant obstacles keep such operating systems from achieving
widespread adoption. One key obstacle is that DIFC operat-
ing systems provide only low-level mechanisms for allowing
application programmers to enforce their desired policies. It
can be diﬃcult for the programmer to ensure that their use
of these mechanisms enforces their high-level policies, while
at the same time not breaking the underlying functionality
of their application. These are issues both for programmers
who would develop new applications for a DIFC operating
system and for programmers who would port existing appli-
cations to a DIFC operating system.
Our work signiﬁcantly eases these tasks. We present an
automatic technique that takes as input a program with no
DIFC code, and two policies: one that speciﬁes prohibited
information ﬂows and one that speciﬁes ﬂows that must be
allowed. Our technique then produces a new version of the
input program that satisﬁes the two policies. To evaluate our
technique, we implemented it in an automatic tool, called
Swim (for Secure What I Mean), and applied it to a set of
real-world programs and policies. The results of our evalu-
ation demonstrate that the technique is suﬃciently expres-
sive to produce programs for real-world policies, and that
it can produce such programs eﬃciently. It thus represents
a signiﬁcant contribution towards developing systems with
strong end-to-end...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:"I am uncomfortable sharing what I can't see": Privacy Concerns
of the Visually Impaired with Camera Based Assistive Applications
author:Taslima Akter and
Bryan Dosono and
Tousif Ahmed and
Apu Kapadia and
Bryan C. Semaan
“I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see”:
Privacy Concerns of the Visually Impaired with
Camera Based Assistive Applications
Taslima Akter, Indiana University Bloomington; Bryan Dosono, Syracuse University;
Tousif Ahmed and Apu Kapadia, Indiana University Bloomington; Bryan Semaan,
Syracuse University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/akter
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.“I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see”: Privacy Concerns of the
Visually Impaired with Camera Based Assistive Applications
Taslima Akter
Indiana University Bloomington
Bryan Dosono
Syracuse University
Tousif Ahmed
Indiana University Bloomington
Apu Kapadia
Indiana University Bloomington
Bryan Semaan
Syracuse University
Abstract
The emergence of camera-based assistive technologies has
empowered people with visual impairments (VIP) to obtain
independence in their daily lives. Popular services feature
volunteers who answer questions about photos or videos (e.g.,
to identify a medical prescription). However, people with
VIPs can (inadvertently) reveal sensitive information to these
volunteers. To better understand the privacy concerns regard-
ing the disclosure of background objects to different types of
human assistants (friends, family, and others), we conducted
an online survey with 155 visually impaired participants. In
general, our participants had varying concerns depending on
the type of assistants and the kind of information. We found
that our participants were more concerned about the privacy
of bystanders than their own when capturing people in im-
age...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:"I am uncomfortable sharing what I can't see": Privacy Concerns
of the Visually Impaired with Camera Based Assistive Applications
author:Taslima Akter and
Bryan Dosono and
Tousif Ahmed and
Apu Kapadia and
Bryan C. Semaan
“I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see”:
Privacy Concerns of the Visually Impaired with
Camera Based Assistive Applications
Taslima Akter, Indiana University Bloomington; Bryan Dosono, Syracuse University;
Tousif Ahmed and Apu Kapadia, Indiana University Bloomington; Bryan Semaan,
Syracuse University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/akter
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.“I am uncomfortable sharing what I can’t see”: Privacy Concerns of the
Visually Impaired with Camera Based Assistive Applications
Taslima Akter
Indiana University Bloomington
Bryan Dosono
Syracuse University
Tousif Ahmed
Indiana University Bloomington
Apu Kapadia
Indiana University Bloomington
Bryan Semaan
Syracuse University
Abstract
The emergence of camera-based assistive technologies has
empowered people with visual impairments (VIP) to obtain
independence in their daily lives. Popular services feature
volunteers who answer questions about photos or videos (e.g.,
to identify a medical prescription). However, people with
VIPs can (inadvertently) reveal sensitive information to these
volunteers. To better understand the privacy concerns regard-
ing the disclosure of background objects to different types of
human assistants (friends, family, and others), we conducted
an online survey with 155 visually impaired participants. In
general, our participants had varying concerns depending on
the type of assistants and the kind of information. We found
that our participants were more concerned about the privacy
of bystanders than their own when capturing people in im-
age...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:If you are not paying for it, you are the product: how much do advertisers
pay to reach you?
author:Panagiotis Papadopoulos and
Pablo Rodr'ıguez Rodr'ıguez and
Nicolas Kourtellis and
Nikolaos Laoutaris
If you are not paying for it, you are the product:
How much do advertisers pay to reach you?
Nicolas Kourtellis
Panagiotis Papadopoulos
FORTH-ICS, Greece
panpap@ics.forth.gr
Telefonica Research, Spain
nicolas.kourtellis@telefonica.com
Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez
Telefonica Alpha, Spain
pablo.rodriguezrodriguez@telefonica.com
7
1
0
2
p
e
S
4
2
]
T
G
.
s
c
[
3
v
8
5
0
7
0
.
1
0
7
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
Online advertising is progressively moving towards a programmatic
model in which ads are matched to actual interests of individuals
collected as they browse the web. Le(cid:138)ing the huge debate around
privacy aside, a very important question in this area, for which li(cid:138)le
is known, is: How much do advertisers pay to reach an individual?
In this study, we develop a (cid:128)rst of its kind methodology for
computing exactly that – the price paid for a web user by the ad
ecosystem – and we do that in real time. Our approach is based
on tapping on the Real Time Bidding (RTB) protocol to collect
cleartext and encrypted prices for winning bids paid by advertisers
in order to place targeted ads. Our main technical contribution is a
method for tallying winning bids even when they are encrypted.
We achieve this by training a model using as ground truth prices
obtained by running our own “probe” ad-campaigns. We design our
methodology through a browser extension and a back-end server
that provides it with fresh models for encrypted bids. We validate
our methodology using a one year long trace of 1600 mobile users
and demonstrate that it can estimate a user’s advertising worth
with more than 82% accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In today’s data-driven economy, the amount of user data an IT com-
pany holds has a direct and non-trivial contribution to its overall
market...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:If you are not paying for it, you are the product: how much do advertisers
pay to reach you?
author:Panagiotis Papadopoulos and
Pablo Rodr'ıguez Rodr'ıguez and
Nicolas Kourtellis and
Nikolaos Laoutaris
If you are not paying for it, you are the product:
How much do advertisers pay to reach you?
Nicolas Kourtellis
Panagiotis Papadopoulos
FORTH-ICS, Greece
panpap@ics.forth.gr
Telefonica Research, Spain
nicolas.kourtellis@telefonica.com
Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez
Telefonica Alpha, Spain
pablo.rodriguezrodriguez@telefonica.com
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ABSTRACT
Online advertising is progressively moving towards a programmatic
model in which ads are matched to actual interests of individuals
collected as they browse the web. Le(cid:138)ing the huge debate around
privacy aside, a very important question in this area, for which li(cid:138)le
is known, is: How much do advertisers pay to reach an individual?
In this study, we develop a (cid:128)rst of its kind methodology for
computing exactly that – the price paid for a web user by the ad
ecosystem – and we do that in real time. Our approach is based
on tapping on the Real Time Bidding (RTB) protocol to collect
cleartext and encrypted prices for winning bids paid by advertisers
in order to place targeted ads. Our main technical contribution is a
method for tallying winning bids even when they are encrypted.
We achieve this by training a model using as ground truth prices
obtained by running our own “probe” ad-campaigns. We design our
methodology through a browser extension and a back-end server
that provides it with fresh models for encrypted bids. We validate
our methodology using a one year long trace of 1600 mobile users
and demonstrate that it can estimate a user’s advertising worth
with more than 82% accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
In today’s data-driven economy, the amount of user data an IT com-
pany holds has a direct and non-trivial contribution to its overall
market...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:What You Need to Know About (Smart) Network Interface Cards
author:Georgios P. Katsikas and
Tom Barbette and
Marco Chiesa and
Dejan Kostic and
Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
What You Need to Know About (Smart)
Network Interface Cards
Georgios P. Katsikas
, Tom Barbette(B)
and Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
, Marco Chiesa , Dejan Kosti´c
,
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
{katsikas,barbette,mchiesa,dmk,maguire}@kth.se
Abstract. Network interface cards (NICs) are fundamental components
of modern high-speed networked systems, supporting multi-100 Gbps
speeds and increasing programmability. Oﬄoading computation from a
server’s CPU to a NIC frees a substantial amount of the server’s CPU
resources, making NICs key to oﬀer competitive cloud services. There-
fore, understanding the performance beneﬁts and limitations of oﬄoad-
ing a networking application to a NIC is of paramount importance.
In this paper, we measure the performance of four diﬀerent NICs
from one of the largest NIC vendors worldwide, supporting 100 Gbps and
200 Gbps. We show that while today’s NICs can easily support multi-
hundred-gigabit throughputs, performing frequent update operations of
a NIC’s packet classiﬁer—as network address translators (NATs) and
load balancers would do for each incoming connection—results in a dra-
matic throughput reduction of up to 70 Gbps or complete denial of service.
Our conclusion is that all tested NICs cannot support high-speed net-
working applications that require keeping track of a large number of
frequently arriving incoming connections. Furthermore, we show a vari-
ety of counter-intuitive performance artefacts including the performance
impact of using multiple tables to classify ﬂows of packets.
Keywords: Network interface cards · Hardware classiﬁer ·
Oﬄoading · Rule operations · Performance · Benchmarking · 100 GbE
1 Introduction
With the dramatic growth of Network Interface Card (NIC) speeds, optimizing
I/O operations is essential for supporting modern-d...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:What You Need to Know About (Smart) Network Interface Cards
author:Georgios P. Katsikas and
Tom Barbette and
Marco Chiesa and
Dejan Kostic and
Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
What You Need to Know About (Smart)
Network Interface Cards
Georgios P. Katsikas
, Tom Barbette(B)
and Gerald Q. Maguire Jr.
, Marco Chiesa , Dejan Kosti´c
,
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
{katsikas,barbette,mchiesa,dmk,maguire}@kth.se
Abstract. Network interface cards (NICs) are fundamental components
of modern high-speed networked systems, supporting multi-100 Gbps
speeds and increasing programmability. Oﬄoading computation from a
server’s CPU to a NIC frees a substantial amount of the server’s CPU
resources, making NICs key to oﬀer competitive cloud services. There-
fore, understanding the performance beneﬁts and limitations of oﬄoad-
ing a networking application to a NIC is of paramount importance.
In this paper, we measure the performance of four diﬀerent NICs
from one of the largest NIC vendors worldwide, supporting 100 Gbps and
200 Gbps. We show that while today’s NICs can easily support multi-
hundred-gigabit throughputs, performing frequent update operations of
a NIC’s packet classiﬁer—as network address translators (NATs) and
load balancers would do for each incoming connection—results in a dra-
matic throughput reduction of up to 70 Gbps or complete denial of service.
Our conclusion is that all tested NICs cannot support high-speed net-
working applications that require keeping track of a large number of
frequently arriving incoming connections. Furthermore, we show a vari-
ety of counter-intuitive performance artefacts including the performance
impact of using multiple tables to classify ﬂows of packets.
Keywords: Network interface cards · Hardware classiﬁer ·
Oﬄoading · Rule operations · Performance · Benchmarking · 100 GbE
1 Introduction
With the dramatic growth of Network Interface Card (NIC) speeds, optimizing
I/O operations is essential for supporting modern-d...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Cognitive Authentication Schemes Safe Against Spyware (Short Paper)
author:Daphna Weinshall
Cognitive Authentication Schemes Safe Against Spyware (Short Paper)
Daphna Weinshall
School of Computer Science and Engineering
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Israel 91904, daphna@cs.huji.ac.il
Abstract
Can we secure user authentication against eaves-
dropping adversaries, relying on human cognitive func-
tions alone, unassisted by any external computational
device? To accomplish this goal, we propose challenge
response protocols that rely on a shared secret set of pic-
tures. Under the considered brute-force attack the pro-
tocols are safe against eavesdropping, in that a modestly
powered adversary who fully records a series of success-
ful interactions cannot compute the user’s secret. More-
over, the protocols can be tuned to any desired level of
security against random guessing, where security can be
traded-off with authentication time. The proposed pro-
tocols have two drawbacks: First, training is required
to familiarize the user with the secret set of pictures.
Second, depending on the level of security required, en-
try time can be signiﬁcantly longer than with alternative
methods. We describe user studies showing that people
can use these protocols successfully, and quantify the
time it takes for training and for successful authentica-
tion. We show evidence that the secret can be maintained
for a long time (up to a year) with relatively low loss.
1. Introduction
We address the problem of user authentication over
insecure networks and from potentially compromised
computers, such as in internet cafes.
In such cases
there is a high risk that an eavesdropping adversary
may record the communication between the user and the
main computer, before it is possible to rely on the protec-
tion of secure encryption. We assume that this adversary
can record all information exchanged during the authen-
tication, including user input (such as keyboard entries
a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Cognitive Authentication Schemes Safe Against Spyware (Short Paper)
author:Daphna Weinshall
Cognitive Authentication Schemes Safe Against Spyware (Short Paper)
Daphna Weinshall
School of Computer Science and Engineering
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Israel 91904, daphna@cs.huji.ac.il
Abstract
Can we secure user authentication against eaves-
dropping adversaries, relying on human cognitive func-
tions alone, unassisted by any external computational
device? To accomplish this goal, we propose challenge
response protocols that rely on a shared secret set of pic-
tures. Under the considered brute-force attack the pro-
tocols are safe against eavesdropping, in that a modestly
powered adversary who fully records a series of success-
ful interactions cannot compute the user’s secret. More-
over, the protocols can be tuned to any desired level of
security against random guessing, where security can be
traded-off with authentication time. The proposed pro-
tocols have two drawbacks: First, training is required
to familiarize the user with the secret set of pictures.
Second, depending on the level of security required, en-
try time can be signiﬁcantly longer than with alternative
methods. We describe user studies showing that people
can use these protocols successfully, and quantify the
time it takes for training and for successful authentica-
tion. We show evidence that the secret can be maintained
for a long time (up to a year) with relatively low loss.
1. Introduction
We address the problem of user authentication over
insecure networks and from potentially compromised
computers, such as in internet cafes.
In such cases
there is a high risk that an eavesdropping adversary
may record the communication between the user and the
main computer, before it is possible to rely on the protec-
tion of secure encryption. We assume that this adversary
can record all information exchanged during the authen-
tication, including user input (such as keyboard entries
a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for Hardware Security Tokens
author:Katharina Pfeffer and
Alexandra Mai and
Adrian Dabrowski and
Matthias Gusenbauer and
Philipp Schindler and
Edgar R. Weippl and
Michael Franz and
Katharina Krombholz
On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for
Hardware Security Tokens
Katharina Pfeffer and Alexandra Mai, SBA Research; Adrian Dabrowski,
University of California, Irvine; Matthias Gusenbauer, Tokyo Institute of Technology
& SBA Research; Philipp Schindler, SBA Research; Edgar Weippl, University of Vienna;
Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine; Katharina Krombholz,
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/pfeffer
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for Hardware Security Tokens
Katharina Pfeffer
SBA Research
Alexandra Mai
SBA Research
Adrian Dabrowski
University of California, Irvine
Matthias Gusenbauer
Tokyo Institute of Technology & SBA Research
Philipp Schindler
SBA Research
Edgar Weippl
University of Vienna, Austria
Michael Franz
University of California, Irvine
Katharina Krombholz
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Abstract
The ﬁnal responsibility to verify whether a newly purchased
hardware security token (HST) is authentic and unmodiﬁed
lies with the end user. However, recently reported attacks
on such tokens suggest that users cannot take the security
guarantees of their HSTs for granted, even despite widely
deployed authenticity checks. We present the ﬁrst comprehen-
sive market review evaluating the effectiveness and usability
of authenticity checks for the most commonly used HSTs.
Furthermore, we conducted a survey (n = 194) to examine
users’ perceptions and usage of these checks.
We found that due to a lack ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for Hardware Security Tokens
author:Katharina Pfeffer and
Alexandra Mai and
Adrian Dabrowski and
Matthias Gusenbauer and
Philipp Schindler and
Edgar R. Weippl and
Michael Franz and
Katharina Krombholz
On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for
Hardware Security Tokens
Katharina Pfeffer and Alexandra Mai, SBA Research; Adrian Dabrowski,
University of California, Irvine; Matthias Gusenbauer, Tokyo Institute of Technology
& SBA Research; Philipp Schindler, SBA Research; Edgar Weippl, University of Vienna;
Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine; Katharina Krombholz,
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/pfeffer
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.On the Usability of Authenticity Checks for Hardware Security Tokens
Katharina Pfeffer
SBA Research
Alexandra Mai
SBA Research
Adrian Dabrowski
University of California, Irvine
Matthias Gusenbauer
Tokyo Institute of Technology & SBA Research
Philipp Schindler
SBA Research
Edgar Weippl
University of Vienna, Austria
Michael Franz
University of California, Irvine
Katharina Krombholz
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Abstract
The ﬁnal responsibility to verify whether a newly purchased
hardware security token (HST) is authentic and unmodiﬁed
lies with the end user. However, recently reported attacks
on such tokens suggest that users cannot take the security
guarantees of their HSTs for granted, even despite widely
deployed authenticity checks. We present the ﬁrst comprehen-
sive market review evaluating the effectiveness and usability
of authenticity checks for the most commonly used HSTs.
Furthermore, we conducted a survey (n = 194) to examine
users’ perceptions and usage of these checks.
We found that due to a lack ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Security of GPS/INS Based On-road Location Tracking Systems
author:Sashank Narain and
Aanjhan Ranganathan and
Guevara Noubir
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Security of GPS/INS based On-road Location
Tracking Systems
Sashank Narain, Aanjhan Ranganathan, and Guevara Noubir
Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Abstract—Location information is critical to a wide variety
of navigation and tracking applications. GPS, today’s de-facto
outdoor localization system has been shown to be vulnerable to
signal spooﬁng attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are
emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road
transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and
tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spooﬁng
and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security
guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road
transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to
travel from a source location to a destination and monitored by
an INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to
alternate locations without being detected. We develop and eval-
uate algorithms that achieve this goal, providing the adversary
signiﬁcant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for a
given road network and enable us to derive potential destinations
an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the
INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms
render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they
generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths
(both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also
design, build and demonstrate that the magnetometer can...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Security of GPS/INS Based On-road Location Tracking Systems
author:Sashank Narain and
Aanjhan Ranganathan and
Guevara Noubir
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Security of GPS/INS based On-road Location
Tracking Systems
Sashank Narain, Aanjhan Ranganathan, and Guevara Noubir
Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Abstract—Location information is critical to a wide variety
of navigation and tracking applications. GPS, today’s de-facto
outdoor localization system has been shown to be vulnerable to
signal spooﬁng attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are
emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road
transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and
tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spooﬁng
and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security
guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road
transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to
travel from a source location to a destination and monitored by
an INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to
alternate locations without being detected. We develop and eval-
uate algorithms that achieve this goal, providing the adversary
signiﬁcant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for a
given road network and enable us to derive potential destinations
an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the
INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms
render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they
generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths
(both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also
design, build and demonstrate that the magnetometer can...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:OpenDHT: a public DHT service and its uses
author:Sean C. Rhea and
Brighten Godfrey and
Brad Karp and
John Kubiatowicz and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker and
Ion Stoica and
Harlan Yu
OpenDHT: A Public DHT Service and Its Uses
Sean Rhea, Brighten Godfrey, Brad Karp, John Kubiatowicz,
Sylvia Ratnasamy, Scott Shenker, Ion Stoica, and Harlan Yu
UC Berkeley and Intel Research
opendht@opendht.org
ABSTRACT
Large-scale distributed systems are hard to deploy, and distributed
hash tables (DHTs) are no exception. To lower the barriers fac-
ing DHT-based applications, we have created a public DHT service
called OpenDHT. Designing a DHT that can be widely shared, both
among mutually untrusting clients and among a variety of applica-
tions, poses two distinct challenges. First, there must be adequate
control over storage allocation so that greedy or malicious clients
do not use more than their fair share. Second, the interface to the
DHT should make it easy to write simple clients, yet be sufﬁciently
general to meet a broad spectrum of application requirements. In
this paper we describe our solutions to these design challenges. We
also report our early deployment experience with OpenDHT and
describe the variety of applications already using the system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Performance, Reliability
Keywords
Peer-to-peer, distributed hash table, resource allocation
1. MOTIVATION
Large-scale distributed systems are notoriously difﬁcult to de-
sign, implement, and debug. Consequently, there is a long history
of research that aims to ease the construction of such systems by
providing simple primitives on which more sophisticated function-
ality can be built. One such primitive is provided by distributed
hash tables, or DHTs, which support a traditional hash table’s sim-
ple put/get interface, but offer increased capacity and availability
by partitioning...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:OpenDHT: a public DHT service and its uses
author:Sean C. Rhea and
Brighten Godfrey and
Brad Karp and
John Kubiatowicz and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker and
Ion Stoica and
Harlan Yu
OpenDHT: A Public DHT Service and Its Uses
Sean Rhea, Brighten Godfrey, Brad Karp, John Kubiatowicz,
Sylvia Ratnasamy, Scott Shenker, Ion Stoica, and Harlan Yu
UC Berkeley and Intel Research
opendht@opendht.org
ABSTRACT
Large-scale distributed systems are hard to deploy, and distributed
hash tables (DHTs) are no exception. To lower the barriers fac-
ing DHT-based applications, we have created a public DHT service
called OpenDHT. Designing a DHT that can be widely shared, both
among mutually untrusting clients and among a variety of applica-
tions, poses two distinct challenges. First, there must be adequate
control over storage allocation so that greedy or malicious clients
do not use more than their fair share. Second, the interface to the
DHT should make it easy to write simple clients, yet be sufﬁciently
general to meet a broad spectrum of application requirements. In
this paper we describe our solutions to these design challenges. We
also report our early deployment experience with OpenDHT and
describe the variety of applications already using the system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Performance, Reliability
Keywords
Peer-to-peer, distributed hash table, resource allocation
1. MOTIVATION
Large-scale distributed systems are notoriously difﬁcult to de-
sign, implement, and debug. Consequently, there is a long history
of research that aims to ease the construction of such systems by
providing simple primitives on which more sophisticated function-
ality can be built. One such primitive is provided by distributed
hash tables, or DHTs, which support a traditional hash table’s sim-
ple put/get interface, but offer increased capacity and availability
by partitioning...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Coracle: Evaluating Consensus at the Internet Edge
author:Heidi Howard and
Jon Crowcroft
Coracle: Evaluating Consensus at the Internet Edge
Heidi Howard
University of Cambridge
heidi.howard@cl.cam.ac.uk
Jon Crowcroft
University of Cambridge
jon.crowcroft@cl.cam.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Distributed consensus is fundamental in distributed systems
for achieving fault-tolerance. The Paxos algorithm has long
dominated this domain, although it has been recently chal-
lenged by algorithms such as Raft and Viewstamped Repli-
cation Revisited.
These algorithms rely on Paxos’s original assumptions,
unfortunately these assumptions are now at odds with the
reality of the modern internet. Our insight is that cur-
rent consensus algorithms have signiﬁcant availability issues
when deployed outside the well deﬁned context of the data-
center.
To illustrate this problem, we developed Coracle, a tool for
evaluating distributed consensus algorithms in settings that
more accurately represent realistic deployments. We have
used Coracle to test two examples of network conﬁgurations
that contradict the liveness claims of the Raft algorithm.
Through the process of exercising these algorithms under
more realistic assumptions, we demonstrate wider availabil-
ity issues faced by consensus algorithms when deployed on
real world networks.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization → Availability; Re-
dundancy;
Keywords
Distributed consensus; Fault-tolerance; Dependable systems
1.
INTRODUCTION
Modern distributed systems depend on the centralised
cloud rather than deal with the complexity of the internet
edge. In the wake of censorship concerns, mass-surveillance
and data breaches, users are demanding viable alternatives
to third-party centralised systems. Building distributed sys-
tems across hosts on the internet edge is one such alterna-
tive. Such systems have the potential to provide low latency
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Coracle: Evaluating Consensus at the Internet Edge
author:Heidi Howard and
Jon Crowcroft
Coracle: Evaluating Consensus at the Internet Edge
Heidi Howard
University of Cambridge
heidi.howard@cl.cam.ac.uk
Jon Crowcroft
University of Cambridge
jon.crowcroft@cl.cam.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Distributed consensus is fundamental in distributed systems
for achieving fault-tolerance. The Paxos algorithm has long
dominated this domain, although it has been recently chal-
lenged by algorithms such as Raft and Viewstamped Repli-
cation Revisited.
These algorithms rely on Paxos’s original assumptions,
unfortunately these assumptions are now at odds with the
reality of the modern internet. Our insight is that cur-
rent consensus algorithms have signiﬁcant availability issues
when deployed outside the well deﬁned context of the data-
center.
To illustrate this problem, we developed Coracle, a tool for
evaluating distributed consensus algorithms in settings that
more accurately represent realistic deployments. We have
used Coracle to test two examples of network conﬁgurations
that contradict the liveness claims of the Raft algorithm.
Through the process of exercising these algorithms under
more realistic assumptions, we demonstrate wider availabil-
ity issues faced by consensus algorithms when deployed on
real world networks.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization → Availability; Re-
dundancy;
Keywords
Distributed consensus; Fault-tolerance; Dependable systems
1.
INTRODUCTION
Modern distributed systems depend on the centralised
cloud rather than deal with the complexity of the internet
edge. In the wake of censorship concerns, mass-surveillance
and data breaches, users are demanding viable alternatives
to third-party centralised systems. Building distributed sys-
tems across hosts on the internet edge is one such alterna-
tive. Such systems have the potential to provide low latency
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Synthesis of Probabilistic Privacy Enforcement
author:Martin Kucera and
Petar Tsankov and
Timon Gehr and
Marco Guarnieri and
Martin T. Vechev
Synthesis of Probabilistic Privacy Enforcement
Martin Kučera, Petar Tsankov, Timon Gehr, Marco Guarnieri, Martin Vechev
ETH Zurich
firstname.lastname@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
Existing probabilistic privacy enforcement approaches permit the
execution of a program that processes sensitive data only if the
information it leaks is within the bounds specified by a given policy.
Thus, to extract any information, users must manually design a
program that satisfies the policy.
In this work, we present a novel synthesis approach that auto-
matically transforms a program into one that complies with a given
policy. Our approach consists of two ingredients. First, we phrase
the problem of determining the amount of leaked information as
Bayesian inference, which enables us to leverage existing proba-
bilistic programming engines. Second, we present two synthesis
procedures that add uncertainty to the program’s outputs as a way
of reducing the amount of leaked information: an optimal one based
on SMT solving and a greedy one with quadratic running time.
We implemented and evaluated our approach on 10 representa-
tive programs from multiple application domains. We show that
our system can successfully synthesize a permissive enforcement
mechanism for all examples.
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy enforcement systems, i.e. systems that protect the privacy
of sensitive data with respect to policies, must be both permissive
and secure. That is, users should be permitted to process sensitive
data while making sure they cannot learn too much information
about the sensitive data, thereby violating privacy policies. In the
context of genomic privacy, for instance, it is important to allow
medical researchers to process and aggregate genomic data as this
can be extremely valuable for their work; however, it is also critical
to preserve the privacy of the pa...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Synthesis of Probabilistic Privacy Enforcement
author:Martin Kucera and
Petar Tsankov and
Timon Gehr and
Marco Guarnieri and
Martin T. Vechev
Synthesis of Probabilistic Privacy Enforcement
Martin Kučera, Petar Tsankov, Timon Gehr, Marco Guarnieri, Martin Vechev
ETH Zurich
firstname.lastname@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
Existing probabilistic privacy enforcement approaches permit the
execution of a program that processes sensitive data only if the
information it leaks is within the bounds specified by a given policy.
Thus, to extract any information, users must manually design a
program that satisfies the policy.
In this work, we present a novel synthesis approach that auto-
matically transforms a program into one that complies with a given
policy. Our approach consists of two ingredients. First, we phrase
the problem of determining the amount of leaked information as
Bayesian inference, which enables us to leverage existing proba-
bilistic programming engines. Second, we present two synthesis
procedures that add uncertainty to the program’s outputs as a way
of reducing the amount of leaked information: an optimal one based
on SMT solving and a greedy one with quadratic running time.
We implemented and evaluated our approach on 10 representa-
tive programs from multiple application domains. We show that
our system can successfully synthesize a permissive enforcement
mechanism for all examples.
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy enforcement systems, i.e. systems that protect the privacy
of sensitive data with respect to policies, must be both permissive
and secure. That is, users should be permitted to process sensitive
data while making sure they cannot learn too much information
about the sensitive data, thereby violating privacy policies. In the
context of genomic privacy, for instance, it is important to allow
medical researchers to process and aggregate genomic data as this
can be extremely valuable for their work; however, it is also critical
to preserve the privacy of the pa...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Privacy-preserving matrix factorization
author:Valeria Nikolaenko and
Stratis Ioannidis and
Udi Weinsberg and
Marc Joye and
Nina Taft and
Dan Boneh
Privacy-Preserving Matrix Factorization
Stratis Ioannidis
Technicolor
Udi Weinsberg
Technicolor
Valeria Nikolaenko
Stanford University
valerini@cs.stanford.edu
stratis.ioannidis@technicolor.com
udi.weinsberg@technicolor.com
Marc Joye
Technicolor
marc.joye@technicolor.com
Nina Taft
Technicolor
nina.taft@technicolor.com
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
dabo@cs.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT
Recommender systems typically require users to reveal their
ratings to a recommender service, which subsequently uses
them to provide relevant recommendations. Revealing ra-
tings has been shown to make users susceptible to a broad
set of inference attacks, allowing the recommender to learn
private user attributes, such as gender, age, etc.
In this
work, we show that a recommender can proﬁle items with-
out ever learning the ratings users provide, or even which
items they have rated. We show this by designing a system
that performs matrix factorization, a popular method used
in a variety of modern recommendation systems, through
a cryptographic technique known as garbled circuits. Our
design uses oblivious sorting networks in a novel way to
leverage sparsity in the data. This yields an eﬃcient im-
plementation, whose running time is Θ(M log2 M ) in the
number of ratings M . Crucially, our design is also highly
parallelizable, giving a linear speedup with the number of
available processors. We further fully implement our sys-
tem, and demonstrate that even on commodity hardware
with 16 cores, our privacy-preserving implementation can
factorize a matrix with 10K ratings within a few hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—pri-
vacy; H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
data mining, algorithms, design, performance; G.1.6 [Numerical
Analysis]: Optimization—gradient methods
Keywo...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Privacy-preserving matrix factorization
author:Valeria Nikolaenko and
Stratis Ioannidis and
Udi Weinsberg and
Marc Joye and
Nina Taft and
Dan Boneh
Privacy-Preserving Matrix Factorization
Stratis Ioannidis
Technicolor
Udi Weinsberg
Technicolor
Valeria Nikolaenko
Stanford University
valerini@cs.stanford.edu
stratis.ioannidis@technicolor.com
udi.weinsberg@technicolor.com
Marc Joye
Technicolor
marc.joye@technicolor.com
Nina Taft
Technicolor
nina.taft@technicolor.com
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
dabo@cs.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT
Recommender systems typically require users to reveal their
ratings to a recommender service, which subsequently uses
them to provide relevant recommendations. Revealing ra-
tings has been shown to make users susceptible to a broad
set of inference attacks, allowing the recommender to learn
private user attributes, such as gender, age, etc.
In this
work, we show that a recommender can proﬁle items with-
out ever learning the ratings users provide, or even which
items they have rated. We show this by designing a system
that performs matrix factorization, a popular method used
in a variety of modern recommendation systems, through
a cryptographic technique known as garbled circuits. Our
design uses oblivious sorting networks in a novel way to
leverage sparsity in the data. This yields an eﬃcient im-
plementation, whose running time is Θ(M log2 M ) in the
number of ratings M . Crucially, our design is also highly
parallelizable, giving a linear speedup with the number of
available processors. We further fully implement our sys-
tem, and demonstrate that even on commodity hardware
with 16 cores, our privacy-preserving implementation can
factorize a matrix with 10K ratings within a few hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—pri-
vacy; H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
data mining, algorithms, design, performance; G.1.6 [Numerical
Analysis]: Optimization—gradient methods
Keywo...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond
author:Tong Meng and
Neta Rozen Schiff and
Philip Brighten Godfrey and
Michael Schapira
PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond
P. Brighten Godfrey1 Michael Schapira2
Tong Meng1 Neta Rozen Schiff2
1UIUC
2Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT
Many Internet applications need high bandwidth but are not time
sensitive. This motivates a congestion control “scavenger” that
voluntarily yields to higher-priority applications, thus improving
overall user experience. However, the existing scavenger protocol,
LEDBAT, often fails to yield, has performance shortcomings, and
requires a codebase separate from other transport protocols.
We present PCC Proteus, a new congestion controller that can
behave as an effective scavenger or primary protocol. Proteus incor-
porates several novel ideas to ensure that it yields to primary flows
while still obtaining high performance, including using latency devi-
ation as a signal of competition, and techniques for noise tolerance
in dynamic environments. By extending the existing PCC utility
framework, Proteus also allows applications to specify a flexible
utility function that, in addition to scavenger and primary modes,
allows choice of hybrid modes between the two, better capturing
application needs. Extensive emulation and real-world evaluation
show that Proteus is capable of both being a much more effec-
tive scavenger than LEDBAT, and of acting as a high performance
primary protocol. Application-level experiments show Proteus sig-
nificantly improves page load time and DASH video delivery, and
its hybrid mode significantly reduces rebuffering in a bandwidth-
constrained environment.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols.
KEYWORDS
Congestion Control; Scavenger
ACM Reference Format:
Tong Meng, Neta Rozen Schiff, P. Brighten Godfrey, Michael Schapira. 2020.
PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond. In Annual conference of
the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond
author:Tong Meng and
Neta Rozen Schiff and
Philip Brighten Godfrey and
Michael Schapira
PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond
P. Brighten Godfrey1 Michael Schapira2
Tong Meng1 Neta Rozen Schiff2
1UIUC
2Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ABSTRACT
Many Internet applications need high bandwidth but are not time
sensitive. This motivates a congestion control “scavenger” that
voluntarily yields to higher-priority applications, thus improving
overall user experience. However, the existing scavenger protocol,
LEDBAT, often fails to yield, has performance shortcomings, and
requires a codebase separate from other transport protocols.
We present PCC Proteus, a new congestion controller that can
behave as an effective scavenger or primary protocol. Proteus incor-
porates several novel ideas to ensure that it yields to primary flows
while still obtaining high performance, including using latency devi-
ation as a signal of competition, and techniques for noise tolerance
in dynamic environments. By extending the existing PCC utility
framework, Proteus also allows applications to specify a flexible
utility function that, in addition to scavenger and primary modes,
allows choice of hybrid modes between the two, better capturing
application needs. Extensive emulation and real-world evaluation
show that Proteus is capable of both being a much more effec-
tive scavenger than LEDBAT, and of acting as a high performance
primary protocol. Application-level experiments show Proteus sig-
nificantly improves page load time and DASH video delivery, and
its hybrid mode significantly reduces rebuffering in a bandwidth-
constrained environment.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols.
KEYWORDS
Congestion Control; Scavenger
ACM Reference Format:
Tong Meng, Neta Rozen Schiff, P. Brighten Godfrey, Michael Schapira. 2020.
PCC Proteus: Scavenger Transport And Beyond. In Annual conference of
the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking for Microservice Deployments
author:Xutong Chen and
Hassaan Irshad and
Yan Chen and
Ashish Gehani and
Vinod Yegneswaran
CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking
for Microservice Deployments
Xutong Chen, Northwestern University; Hassaan Irshad, SRI International;
Yan Chen, Northwestern University; Ashish Gehani and Vinod Yegneswaran,
SRI International
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/chen-xutong
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking for Microservice Deployments
Xutong Chen
Northwestern University
Hassaan Irshad
SRI International
Yan Chen
Northwestern University
Ashish Gehani
SRI International
Vinod Yegneswaran
SRI International
Abstract
Linux container-based microservices have emerged as an
attractive alternative to virtualization as they reduce appli-
cation footprints and facilitate more efﬁcient resource uti-
lization. Their popularity has also led to increased scrutiny
of the underlying security properties and attack surface of
container technology. Provenance-based analysis techniques
have been proposed as an effective means toward compre-
hensive and high-assurance security control as they provide
ﬁne-grained mechanisms to track data ﬂows across the system
and detect unwanted or unexpected changes to data objects.
However, existing provenance tracking techniques are limited
in their ability to build sound and clear provenance in con-
tainer network environments due to complexities introduced
by namespace virtualization.
We describe a namespace- and container-aware prove-
nance tracking solution, called CLARION, that addresses
the unique soundness and clarity challenges introduced by
traditional provenance tracking solutions. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁrst describe fragment...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking for Microservice Deployments
author:Xutong Chen and
Hassaan Irshad and
Yan Chen and
Ashish Gehani and
Vinod Yegneswaran
CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking
for Microservice Deployments
Xutong Chen, Northwestern University; Hassaan Irshad, SRI International;
Yan Chen, Northwestern University; Ashish Gehani and Vinod Yegneswaran,
SRI International
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/chen-xutong
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.CLARION: Sound and Clear Provenance Tracking for Microservice Deployments
Xutong Chen
Northwestern University
Hassaan Irshad
SRI International
Yan Chen
Northwestern University
Ashish Gehani
SRI International
Vinod Yegneswaran
SRI International
Abstract
Linux container-based microservices have emerged as an
attractive alternative to virtualization as they reduce appli-
cation footprints and facilitate more efﬁcient resource uti-
lization. Their popularity has also led to increased scrutiny
of the underlying security properties and attack surface of
container technology. Provenance-based analysis techniques
have been proposed as an effective means toward compre-
hensive and high-assurance security control as they provide
ﬁne-grained mechanisms to track data ﬂows across the system
and detect unwanted or unexpected changes to data objects.
However, existing provenance tracking techniques are limited
in their ability to build sound and clear provenance in con-
tainer network environments due to complexities introduced
by namespace virtualization.
We describe a namespace- and container-aware prove-
nance tracking solution, called CLARION, that addresses
the unique soundness and clarity challenges introduced by
traditional provenance tracking solutions. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁrst describe fragment...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse Attack Detection
author:Pinghai Yuan and
Qingkai Zeng and
Xuhua Ding
Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse
Attack Detection
Pinghai Yuan1,2(B), Qingkai Zeng1,2, and Xuhua Ding3
1 State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology,
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
2 Department of Computer Science and Technology,
pinghaiyuan@gmail.com
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
3 School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University,
zqk@nju.edu.cn
Singapore, Singapore
xhding@smu.edu.sg
Abstract. Code-reuse attacks have become the primary exploitation
technique for system compromise despite of the recently introduced Data
Execution Prevention technique in modern platforms. Diﬀerent from
code injection attacks, they result in unintended control-ﬂow transfer
to victim programs without adding malicious code. This paper proposes
a practical scheme named as CFIGuard to detect code-reuse attacks
on user space applications. CFIGuard traces every branch execution by
leveraging hardware features of commodity processors, and then vali-
dates the traces based on ﬁne-grained control ﬂow graphs. We have
implemented a prototype of CFIGuard on Linux and the experiments
show that it only incurs around 2.9 % runtime overhead for a set of typ-
ical server applications.
Keywords: Code-reuse attack · Control ﬂow integrity · Indirect branch
tracing
1 Introduction
There are abundant schemes focusing on software vulnerability mitigation. Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) [4,34], Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) [12] and
coarse-grained Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [33] have been
widely adopted in commodity platforms. For instance, DEP marks a memory
page either non-executable or non-writable such that it can eﬀectively defend
against code injection attacks. However, DEP and the other two mechanisms
fall short of defending against advanced code-reuse attacks, such as Return-
oriented Programming (ROP) [30] and just-in-time ROP [32...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse Attack Detection
author:Pinghai Yuan and
Qingkai Zeng and
Xuhua Ding
Hardware-Assisted Fine-Grained Code-Reuse
Attack Detection
Pinghai Yuan1,2(B), Qingkai Zeng1,2, and Xuhua Ding3
1 State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology,
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
2 Department of Computer Science and Technology,
pinghaiyuan@gmail.com
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
3 School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University,
zqk@nju.edu.cn
Singapore, Singapore
xhding@smu.edu.sg
Abstract. Code-reuse attacks have become the primary exploitation
technique for system compromise despite of the recently introduced Data
Execution Prevention technique in modern platforms. Diﬀerent from
code injection attacks, they result in unintended control-ﬂow transfer
to victim programs without adding malicious code. This paper proposes
a practical scheme named as CFIGuard to detect code-reuse attacks
on user space applications. CFIGuard traces every branch execution by
leveraging hardware features of commodity processors, and then vali-
dates the traces based on ﬁne-grained control ﬂow graphs. We have
implemented a prototype of CFIGuard on Linux and the experiments
show that it only incurs around 2.9 % runtime overhead for a set of typ-
ical server applications.
Keywords: Code-reuse attack · Control ﬂow integrity · Indirect branch
tracing
1 Introduction
There are abundant schemes focusing on software vulnerability mitigation. Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) [4,34], Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) [12] and
coarse-grained Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [33] have been
widely adopted in commodity platforms. For instance, DEP marks a memory
page either non-executable or non-writable such that it can eﬀectively defend
against code injection attacks. However, DEP and the other two mechanisms
fall short of defending against advanced code-reuse attacks, such as Return-
oriented Programming (ROP) [30] and just-in-time ROP [32...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multi-Version Attack Recovery for Workflow System
author:Meng Yu and
Peng Liu and
Wanyu Zang
Multi-Version Attack Recovery for Workﬂow Systems
School of Information Sciences and Technology, Pennsylvania State University, 16801
Meng Yu, Peng Liu, Wanyu Zang
yumeng@psu.edu
Abstract
Workﬂow systems are popular in daily business process-
ing. Since vulnerabilities cannot be totally removed from a
system, recovery from successful attacks is unavoidable. In
this paper, we focus on attacks that inject malicious tasks
into workﬂow management systems. We introduce practi-
cal techniques for on-line attack recovery, which include
rules for locating damage and rules for execution order.
In our system, an independent Intrusion Detection System
reports identiﬁed malicious tasks periodically. The recov-
ery system detects all damage caused by the malicious tasks
and automatically repairs the damage according to depen-
dency relations. Without multiple versions of data objects,
recovery tasks may be corrupted by executing normal tasks
when we try to run damage analysis and normal tasks con-
currently. This paper addresses the problem by introduc-
ing multi-version data objects to reduce unnecessary block-
ing of normal task execution and improve the performance
of the whole system. We analyze the integrity level and per-
formance of our system. The analytic results demonstrate
guidelines for designing such kinds of systems.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, workﬂow management systems are being
used as the primary technology for organizations to per-
form their daily business processes (workﬂows). A work-
ﬂow consists of a set of tasks that are related to each other
in terms of the semantics of a business process. Each task
represents a speciﬁc unit of work that the business needs to
do (e.g., a speciﬁc application program, a database trans-
action). A consistent and reliable execution of workﬂow is
crucial for all organizations. However, it is well known that
system vulnerabilit...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multi-Version Attack Recovery for Workflow System
author:Meng Yu and
Peng Liu and
Wanyu Zang
Multi-Version Attack Recovery for Workﬂow Systems
School of Information Sciences and Technology, Pennsylvania State University, 16801
Meng Yu, Peng Liu, Wanyu Zang
yumeng@psu.edu
Abstract
Workﬂow systems are popular in daily business process-
ing. Since vulnerabilities cannot be totally removed from a
system, recovery from successful attacks is unavoidable. In
this paper, we focus on attacks that inject malicious tasks
into workﬂow management systems. We introduce practi-
cal techniques for on-line attack recovery, which include
rules for locating damage and rules for execution order.
In our system, an independent Intrusion Detection System
reports identiﬁed malicious tasks periodically. The recov-
ery system detects all damage caused by the malicious tasks
and automatically repairs the damage according to depen-
dency relations. Without multiple versions of data objects,
recovery tasks may be corrupted by executing normal tasks
when we try to run damage analysis and normal tasks con-
currently. This paper addresses the problem by introduc-
ing multi-version data objects to reduce unnecessary block-
ing of normal task execution and improve the performance
of the whole system. We analyze the integrity level and per-
formance of our system. The analytic results demonstrate
guidelines for designing such kinds of systems.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, workﬂow management systems are being
used as the primary technology for organizations to per-
form their daily business processes (workﬂows). A work-
ﬂow consists of a set of tasks that are related to each other
in terms of the semantics of a business process. Each task
represents a speciﬁc unit of work that the business needs to
do (e.g., a speciﬁc application program, a database trans-
action). A consistent and reliable execution of workﬂow is
crucial for all organizations. However, it is well known that
system vulnerabilit...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:All your face are belong to us: breaking Facebook's social authentication
author:Iasonas Polakis and
Marco Lancini and
Georgios Kontaxis and
Federico Maggi and
Sotiris Ioannidis and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Stefano Zanero
All Your Face Are Belong to Us:
Breaking Facebook’s Social Authentication
∗
Iasonas Polakis
FORTH-ICS, Greece
polakis@ics.forth.gr
Marco Lancini
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
marco.lancini@mail.polimi.it
Georgios Kontaxis
Columbia University, USA
kontaxis@cs.columbia.edu
Federico Maggi
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
fmaggi@elet.polimi.it
Sotiris Ioannidis
FORTH-ICS, Greece
sotiris@ics.forth.gr
Angelos D. Keromytis
Columbia University, USA
angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
zanero@elet.polimi.it
ABSTRACT
Two-factor authentication is widely used by high-value services
to prevent adversaries from compromising accounts using stolen
credentials. Facebook has recently released a two-factor authenti-
cation mechanism, referred to as Social Authentication, which re-
quires users to identify some of their friends in randomly selected
photos. A recent study has provided a formal analysis of social au-
thentication weaknesses against attackers inside the victim’s social
circles.
In this paper, we extend the threat model and study the
attack surface of social authentication in practice, and show how
any attacker can obtain the information needed to solve the chal-
lenges presented by Facebook. We implement a proof-of-concept
system that utilizes widely available face recognition software and
cloud services, and evaluate it using real public data collected from
Facebook. Under the assumptions of Facebook’s threat model, our
results show that an attacker can obtain access to (sensitive) infor-
mation for at least 42% of a user’s friends that Facebook uses to
generate social authentication challenges. By relying solely on pub-
licly accessible information, a casual attacker can solve 22% of the
social authentication tests in...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:All your face are belong to us: breaking Facebook's social authentication
author:Iasonas Polakis and
Marco Lancini and
Georgios Kontaxis and
Federico Maggi and
Sotiris Ioannidis and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Stefano Zanero
All Your Face Are Belong to Us:
Breaking Facebook’s Social Authentication
∗
Iasonas Polakis
FORTH-ICS, Greece
polakis@ics.forth.gr
Marco Lancini
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
marco.lancini@mail.polimi.it
Georgios Kontaxis
Columbia University, USA
kontaxis@cs.columbia.edu
Federico Maggi
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
fmaggi@elet.polimi.it
Sotiris Ioannidis
FORTH-ICS, Greece
sotiris@ics.forth.gr
Angelos D. Keromytis
Columbia University, USA
angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano, Italia
zanero@elet.polimi.it
ABSTRACT
Two-factor authentication is widely used by high-value services
to prevent adversaries from compromising accounts using stolen
credentials. Facebook has recently released a two-factor authenti-
cation mechanism, referred to as Social Authentication, which re-
quires users to identify some of their friends in randomly selected
photos. A recent study has provided a formal analysis of social au-
thentication weaknesses against attackers inside the victim’s social
circles.
In this paper, we extend the threat model and study the
attack surface of social authentication in practice, and show how
any attacker can obtain the information needed to solve the chal-
lenges presented by Facebook. We implement a proof-of-concept
system that utilizes widely available face recognition software and
cloud services, and evaluate it using real public data collected from
Facebook. Under the assumptions of Facebook’s threat model, our
results show that an attacker can obtain access to (sensitive) infor-
mation for at least 42% of a user’s friends that Facebook uses to
generate social authentication challenges. By relying solely on pub-
licly accessible information, a casual attacker can solve 22% of the
social authentication tests in...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Attack on the GridCode one-time password
author:Ian Molloy and
Ninghui Li
Attack on the GridCode One-Time Password
∗
Ian Molloy
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Hawthorne, NY USA
molloyim@us.ibm.com
Ninghui Li
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN USA
ninghui@cs.purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
SyferLock presents a one-time password system, GridCode,
that allows an unaided human to authenticate, reducing the
cost of deployment. The one-time password system is a
human computable challenge-response protocol which they
claim defends against key-logging, replay, and brute force
attacks, among others. We evaluate the security of the Grid-
Code one-time password system and challenge these claims.
We identify weak preimage resistance and character inde-
pendence as key weaknesses of the GridCode system, leading
to a variety of attacks. Our analysis indicates their scheme
is akin to providing an adversary the ability to perform a
brute force attack on a user’s password in parallel without
signiﬁcant eﬀort, lowering the eﬀort required to recover a
strong user password. Given a small number of challenge-
response pairs, an adversary can recover a user’s password
(e.g., 2–4 pairs), and additional secret (e.g., 1 pair).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—
Authentication; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and
Information Systems]: Security and Protection—Unau-
thorized access
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
one-time password, human authentication, attack
1.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords are a ubiquitous and familiar method of user
authentication, however they are vulnerable to a variety of
attacks. Human memorable passwords are often low in en-
tropy [20, 22], making brute force and dictionary attacks
∗
Work performed while at Purdue University.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comme...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Attack on the GridCode one-time password
author:Ian Molloy and
Ninghui Li
Attack on the GridCode One-Time Password
∗
Ian Molloy
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Hawthorne, NY USA
molloyim@us.ibm.com
Ninghui Li
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN USA
ninghui@cs.purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
SyferLock presents a one-time password system, GridCode,
that allows an unaided human to authenticate, reducing the
cost of deployment. The one-time password system is a
human computable challenge-response protocol which they
claim defends against key-logging, replay, and brute force
attacks, among others. We evaluate the security of the Grid-
Code one-time password system and challenge these claims.
We identify weak preimage resistance and character inde-
pendence as key weaknesses of the GridCode system, leading
to a variety of attacks. Our analysis indicates their scheme
is akin to providing an adversary the ability to perform a
brute force attack on a user’s password in parallel without
signiﬁcant eﬀort, lowering the eﬀort required to recover a
strong user password. Given a small number of challenge-
response pairs, an adversary can recover a user’s password
(e.g., 2–4 pairs), and additional secret (e.g., 1 pair).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—
Authentication; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and
Information Systems]: Security and Protection—Unau-
thorized access
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
one-time password, human authentication, attack
1.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords are a ubiquitous and familiar method of user
authentication, however they are vulnerable to a variety of
attacks. Human memorable passwords are often low in en-
tropy [20, 22], making brute force and dictionary attacks
∗
Work performed while at Purdue University.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comme...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fast and automated generation of attack signatures: a basis for building
self-protecting servers
author:Zhenkai Liang and
R. Sekar
Fast and Automated Generation of Attack Signatures:
A Basis for Building Self-Protecting Servers (cid:3)
Zhenkai Liang and R. Sekar
Dept. of Computer Science, Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, NY, USA
fzliang, sekarg@cs.sunysb.edu
ABSTRACT
Large-scale attacks, such as those launched by worms and zombie
farms, pose a serious threat to our network-centric society. Exist-
ing approaches such as software patches are simply unable to cope
with the volume and speed with which new vulnerabilities are being
discovered. In this paper, we develop a new approach that can pro-
vide effective protection against a vast majority of these attacks that
exploit memory errors in C/C++ programs. Our approach, called
COVERS, uses a forensic analysis of a victim server’s memory to
correlate attacks to inputs received over the network, and automati-
cally develop a signature that characterizes inputs that carry attacks.
The signatures tend to capture characteristics of the underlying vul-
nerability (e.g., a message ﬁeld being too long) rather than the char-
acteristics of an attack, which makes them effective against variants
of attacks. Our approach introduces low overheads (under 10%),
does not require access to source code of the protected server, and
has successfully generated signatures for the attacks studied in our
experiments, without producing false positives. Since the signa-
tures are generated in tens of milliseconds, they can potentially be
distributed quickly over the Internet to ﬁlter out (and thus stop) fast-
spreading worms. Another interesting aspect of our approach is that
it can defeat guessing attacks reported against address-space ran-
domization and instruction set randomization techniques. Finally,
it increases the capacity of servers to withstand repeated attacks by
a factor of 10 or more.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fast and automated generation of attack signatures: a basis for building
self-protecting servers
author:Zhenkai Liang and
R. Sekar
Fast and Automated Generation of Attack Signatures:
A Basis for Building Self-Protecting Servers (cid:3)
Zhenkai Liang and R. Sekar
Dept. of Computer Science, Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, NY, USA
fzliang, sekarg@cs.sunysb.edu
ABSTRACT
Large-scale attacks, such as those launched by worms and zombie
farms, pose a serious threat to our network-centric society. Exist-
ing approaches such as software patches are simply unable to cope
with the volume and speed with which new vulnerabilities are being
discovered. In this paper, we develop a new approach that can pro-
vide effective protection against a vast majority of these attacks that
exploit memory errors in C/C++ programs. Our approach, called
COVERS, uses a forensic analysis of a victim server’s memory to
correlate attacks to inputs received over the network, and automati-
cally develop a signature that characterizes inputs that carry attacks.
The signatures tend to capture characteristics of the underlying vul-
nerability (e.g., a message ﬁeld being too long) rather than the char-
acteristics of an attack, which makes them effective against variants
of attacks. Our approach introduces low overheads (under 10%),
does not require access to source code of the protected server, and
has successfully generated signatures for the attacks studied in our
experiments, without producing false positives. Since the signa-
tures are generated in tens of milliseconds, they can potentially be
distributed quickly over the Internet to ﬁlter out (and thus stop) fast-
spreading worms. Another interesting aspect of our approach is that
it can defeat guessing attacks reported against address-space ran-
domization and instruction set randomization techniques. Finally,
it increases the capacity of servers to withstand repeated attacks by
a factor of 10 or more.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Malware Slums: Measurement and Analysis of Malware on Traffic Exchanges
author:Salman Yousaf and
Umar Iqbal and
Shehroze Farooqi and
Raza Ahmad and
Muhammad Zubair Shafiq and
Fareed Zaffar
2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Malware Slums: Measurement and Analysis
Salman Yousaf∗
of Malware on Trafﬁc Exchanges
Zubair Shaﬁq‡
Umar Iqbal∗
∗Lahore University of Management Sciences
‡The University of Iowa
Shehroze Farooqi‡
Raza Ahmad∗
Fareed Zaffar∗
Abstract—Auto-surf and manual-surf trafﬁc exchanges are an
increasingly popular way of artiﬁcially generating website trafﬁc.
Previous research in this area has focused on the makeup, usage,
and monetization of underground trafﬁc exchanges. In this paper,
we analyze the role of trafﬁc exchanges as a vector for malware
propagation. We conduct a measurement study of nine auto-
surf and manual-surf trafﬁc exchanges over several months. We
present a ﬁrst of its kind analysis of the different types of malware
that are propagated through these trafﬁc exchanges. We ﬁnd that
more than 26% of the URLs surfed on trafﬁc exchanges contain
malicious content. We further analyze different categories of
malware encountered on trafﬁc exchanges, including blacklisted
domains, malicious JavaScript, malicious Flash, and malicious
shortened URLs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has largely fueled the World Wide
Web since its inception. Since publishers get paid on a
per-impression or per-click basis, increasing website trafﬁc
or “hits” is a key part of any web monetization strategy.
More trafﬁc to a website directly translates to an increase
in impressions and/or clicks, which in turn generates more
revenue through advertisements. Since users typically rely on
search engines to ﬁnd relevant content, a large fraction of any
website’s trafﬁc comes via search engines. Content publishers
heavily invest in search-engine-optimization (SEO) techniques
to improve their rankings on search engines....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Malware Slums: Measurement and Analysis of Malware on Traffic Exchanges
author:Salman Yousaf and
Umar Iqbal and
Shehroze Farooqi and
Raza Ahmad and
Muhammad Zubair Shafiq and
Fareed Zaffar
2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Malware Slums: Measurement and Analysis
Salman Yousaf∗
of Malware on Trafﬁc Exchanges
Zubair Shaﬁq‡
Umar Iqbal∗
∗Lahore University of Management Sciences
‡The University of Iowa
Shehroze Farooqi‡
Raza Ahmad∗
Fareed Zaffar∗
Abstract—Auto-surf and manual-surf trafﬁc exchanges are an
increasingly popular way of artiﬁcially generating website trafﬁc.
Previous research in this area has focused on the makeup, usage,
and monetization of underground trafﬁc exchanges. In this paper,
we analyze the role of trafﬁc exchanges as a vector for malware
propagation. We conduct a measurement study of nine auto-
surf and manual-surf trafﬁc exchanges over several months. We
present a ﬁrst of its kind analysis of the different types of malware
that are propagated through these trafﬁc exchanges. We ﬁnd that
more than 26% of the URLs surfed on trafﬁc exchanges contain
malicious content. We further analyze different categories of
malware encountered on trafﬁc exchanges, including blacklisted
domains, malicious JavaScript, malicious Flash, and malicious
shortened URLs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has largely fueled the World Wide
Web since its inception. Since publishers get paid on a
per-impression or per-click basis, increasing website trafﬁc
or “hits” is a key part of any web monetization strategy.
More trafﬁc to a website directly translates to an increase
in impressions and/or clicks, which in turn generates more
revenue through advertisements. Since users typically rely on
search engines to ﬁnd relevant content, a large fraction of any
website’s trafﬁc comes via search engines. Content publishers
heavily invest in search-engine-optimization (SEO) techniques
to improve their rankings on search engines....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within the Linux Kernel
author:Dave Jing Tian and
Grant Hernandez and
Joseph I. Choi and
Vanessa Frost and
Peter C. Johnson and
Kevin R. B. Butler
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within
the Linux Kernel
Dave (Jing) Tian
∗
∗
, Grant Hernandez
∗
∗
, Vanessa Frost
†
, Peter C. Johnson
∗
, Kevin R. B. Butler
{daveti, grant.hernandez, choijoseph007, vfrost, butler}@uﬂ.edu
, Joseph I. Choi
∗
University of Florida
†
Middlebury College
pete@middlebury.edu
Abstract—Modern computer peripherals are diverse in their
capabilities and functionality, ranging from keyboards and print-
ers to smartphones and external GPUs. In recent years, periph-
erals increasingly connect over a small number of standardized
communication protocols, including USB, Bluetooth, and NFC.
The host operating system is responsible for managing these
devices; however, malicious peripherals can request additional
functionality from the OS resulting in system compromise, or
can craft data packets to exploit vulnerabilities within OS
software stacks. Defenses against malicious peripherals to date
only partially cover the peripheral attack surface and are limited
to speciﬁc protocols (e.g., USB). In this paper, we propose
Linux (e)BPF Modules (LBM), a general security framework
that provides a uniﬁed API for enforcing protection against
malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel. LBM leverages
the eBPF packet ﬁltering mechanism for performance and
extensibility and we provide a high-level language to facilitate the
development of powerful ﬁltering functionality. We demonstrate
how LBM can provide host protection again...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within the Linux Kernel
author:Dave Jing Tian and
Grant Hernandez and
Joseph I. Choi and
Vanessa Frost and
Peter C. Johnson and
Kevin R. B. Butler
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
LBM: A Security Framework for Peripherals within
the Linux Kernel
Dave (Jing) Tian
∗
∗
, Grant Hernandez
∗
∗
, Vanessa Frost
†
, Peter C. Johnson
∗
, Kevin R. B. Butler
{daveti, grant.hernandez, choijoseph007, vfrost, butler}@uﬂ.edu
, Joseph I. Choi
∗
University of Florida
†
Middlebury College
pete@middlebury.edu
Abstract—Modern computer peripherals are diverse in their
capabilities and functionality, ranging from keyboards and print-
ers to smartphones and external GPUs. In recent years, periph-
erals increasingly connect over a small number of standardized
communication protocols, including USB, Bluetooth, and NFC.
The host operating system is responsible for managing these
devices; however, malicious peripherals can request additional
functionality from the OS resulting in system compromise, or
can craft data packets to exploit vulnerabilities within OS
software stacks. Defenses against malicious peripherals to date
only partially cover the peripheral attack surface and are limited
to speciﬁc protocols (e.g., USB). In this paper, we propose
Linux (e)BPF Modules (LBM), a general security framework
that provides a uniﬁed API for enforcing protection against
malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel. LBM leverages
the eBPF packet ﬁltering mechanism for performance and
extensibility and we provide a high-level language to facilitate the
development of powerful ﬁltering functionality. We demonstrate
how LBM can provide host protection again...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。