Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among
Cryptographic Clouds
author:Peng Xu and
Jun Xu and
Wei Wang and
Hai Jin and
Willy Susilo and
Deqing Zou
Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data
Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds
Peng Xu†, Jun Xu†, Wei Wang‡, Hai Jin†, Willy Susilo§, Deqing Zou†
†Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab, School of
Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074,
‡Cyber-Physical-Social Systems Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong
§Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
China
Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
xupeng@mail.hust.edu.cn, cs_xujun@mail.hust.edu.cn, viviawangww@gmail.com,
hjin@mail.hust.edu.cn, wsusilo@uow.edu.au, deqingzou@mail.hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to real-
ize a cryptographic cloud with secure and ﬂexible data shar-
ing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile ca-
pabilities have been proposed for diﬀerent applications. The
secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE
scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data
sharing among diﬀerent PRE schemes in a general manner.
Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge
diﬀerences among the existing PRE schemes in their alge-
braic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem
more generally, this paper uniforms the deﬁnitions of the
existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes,
and further uniforms their security deﬁnitions. Then tak-
ing any uniformly deﬁned PRE scheme and any uniformly
deﬁned PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper con-
structs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE)
scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys
to achieve secure data sharing betwe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among
Cryptographic Clouds
author:Peng Xu and
Jun Xu and
Wei Wang and
Hai Jin and
Willy Susilo and
Deqing Zou
Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data
Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds
Peng Xu†, Jun Xu†, Wei Wang‡, Hai Jin†, Willy Susilo§, Deqing Zou†
†Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab, School of
Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074,
‡Cyber-Physical-Social Systems Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong
§Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
China
Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
xupeng@mail.hust.edu.cn, cs_xujun@mail.hust.edu.cn, viviawangww@gmail.com,
hjin@mail.hust.edu.cn, wsusilo@uow.edu.au, deqingzou@mail.hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to real-
ize a cryptographic cloud with secure and ﬂexible data shar-
ing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile ca-
pabilities have been proposed for diﬀerent applications. The
secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE
scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data
sharing among diﬀerent PRE schemes in a general manner.
Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge
diﬀerences among the existing PRE schemes in their alge-
braic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem
more generally, this paper uniforms the deﬁnitions of the
existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes,
and further uniforms their security deﬁnitions. Then tak-
ing any uniformly deﬁned PRE scheme and any uniformly
deﬁned PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper con-
structs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE)
scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys
to achieve secure data sharing betwe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
author:Daniel W. Woods and
Rainer B"ohme
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2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
Daniel W. Woods
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
daniel.woods@uibk.ac.at
Rainer B¨ohme
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at
Abstract—This paper introduces a causal model inspired by
structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes
in terms of latent factors measured using reﬂexive indicators.
First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies.
We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical
or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches
is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are
becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone
breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating
the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple
statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more
security spending or applying updates are associated with greater
rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure,
indicators of security are shown to be important factors in
explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when
the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.
Index Terms—cyber risk, security metrics, cyber harm, con-
trol effectiveness, science of security, causal model, structural
equation modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
Unsupported claims about
the increasing risk of cyber
attacks pervade introductions to security talks and papers. Or-
ganisations are expected to invest more in security even though
research has inconsistently demonstrated how interventions
reduce risk. This state of affairs leads to perceptions that ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
author:Daniel W. Woods and
Rainer B"ohme
3
5
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
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S
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m
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1
2
0
2
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk
Daniel W. Woods
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
daniel.woods@uibk.ac.at
Rainer B¨ohme
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria
rainer.boehme@uibk.ac.at
Abstract—This paper introduces a causal model inspired by
structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes
in terms of latent factors measured using reﬂexive indicators.
First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies.
We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical
or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches
is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are
becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone
breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating
the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple
statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more
security spending or applying updates are associated with greater
rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure,
indicators of security are shown to be important factors in
explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when
the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.
Index Terms—cyber risk, security metrics, cyber harm, con-
trol effectiveness, science of security, causal model, structural
equation modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
Unsupported claims about
the increasing risk of cyber
attacks pervade introductions to security talks and papers. Or-
ganisations are expected to invest more in security even though
research has inconsistently demonstrated how interventions
reduce risk. This state of affairs leads to perceptions that ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fuzzification: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
author:Jinho Jung and
Hong Hu and
David Solodukhin and
Daniel Pagan and
Kyu Hyung Lee and
Taesoo Kim
FuzziFication: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, and Daniel Pagan, Georgia Institute of Technology;
Kyu Hyung Lee, University of Georgia; Taesoo Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/jung
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FUZZIFICATION: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, Daniel Pagan, Kyu Hyung Lee†, Taesoo Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
† University of Georgia
Abstract
Fuzzing is a software testing technique that quickly and
automatically explores the input space of a program without
knowing its internals. Therefore, developers commonly use
fuzzing as part of test integration throughout the software
development process. Unfortunately, it also means that such a
blackbox and the automatic natures of fuzzing are appealing
to adversaries who are looking for zero-day vulnerabilities.
To solve this problem, we propose a new mitigation ap-
proach, called FUZZIFICATION, that helps developers protect
the released, binary-only software from attackers who are ca-
pable of applying state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques. Given a
performance budget, this approach aims to hinder the fuzzing
process from adversaries as much as possible. We propose
three FUZZIFICATION techniques: 1) SpeedBump, which am-
plifies the slowdown in normal executions by hundreds of
times to the fuzzed execution, 2) BranchTrap, interfering with
feedback logic by hiding paths and polluting coverage maps,
and 3) AntiHybrid, hindering taint-analysis and symbolic exe-
cution. Each technique is designed with best-effort, defensive
measures that attempt...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fuzzification: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
author:Jinho Jung and
Hong Hu and
David Solodukhin and
Daniel Pagan and
Kyu Hyung Lee and
Taesoo Kim
FuzziFication: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, and Daniel Pagan, Georgia Institute of Technology;
Kyu Hyung Lee, University of Georgia; Taesoo Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/jung
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.FUZZIFICATION: Anti-Fuzzing Techniques
Jinho Jung, Hong Hu, David Solodukhin, Daniel Pagan, Kyu Hyung Lee†, Taesoo Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
† University of Georgia
Abstract
Fuzzing is a software testing technique that quickly and
automatically explores the input space of a program without
knowing its internals. Therefore, developers commonly use
fuzzing as part of test integration throughout the software
development process. Unfortunately, it also means that such a
blackbox and the automatic natures of fuzzing are appealing
to adversaries who are looking for zero-day vulnerabilities.
To solve this problem, we propose a new mitigation ap-
proach, called FUZZIFICATION, that helps developers protect
the released, binary-only software from attackers who are ca-
pable of applying state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques. Given a
performance budget, this approach aims to hinder the fuzzing
process from adversaries as much as possible. We propose
three FUZZIFICATION techniques: 1) SpeedBump, which am-
plifies the slowdown in normal executions by hundreds of
times to the fuzzed execution, 2) BranchTrap, interfering with
feedback logic by hiding paths and polluting coverage maps,
and 3) AntiHybrid, hindering taint-analysis and symbolic exe-
cution. Each technique is designed with best-effort, defensive
measures that attempt...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL-\textgreaterFile-\textgreaterMachine
Graph Mining
author:Babak Rahbarinia and
Marco Balduzzi and
Roberto Perdisci
Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via
Large-Scale URL→File→Machine Graph Mining
Babak Rahbarinia
Auburn University at
Montgomery
Montgomery, AL 36117, USA
brahbari@aum.edu
Marco Balduzzi
Trend Micro Research, Italy
marco_balduzzi@trendmicro.com
Roberto Perdisci
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602, USA
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system
to detect malware download events. A download event is a
3-tuple that identiﬁes the action of downloading a ﬁle from
a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino
utilizes global situation awareness and continuously moni-
tors various network- and system-level events of the clients’
machines across the Internet and provides real time clas-
siﬁcation of both ﬁles and URLs to the clients upon sub-
mission of a new, unknown ﬁle or URL to the system. To
enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a
large download graph that captures the subtle relationships
among the entities of download events, i.e. ﬁles, URLs, and
machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino
and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our
experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately
classify malware download events with an average of 95.5%
true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false pos-
itives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify
a new download event as either benign or malware in just a
fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time
defense system.
Keywords
Graph Mining; Malware Detection; Machine Learning
1.
INTRODUCTION
Remote malware downloads, e.g., via drive-by exploits, so-
cial engineering attacks, second-stage malware drops, etc.,
currently represent one of the most eﬀective infection vec-
tors. Unfortunately, existing de...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL-\textgreaterFile-\textgreaterMachine
Graph Mining
author:Babak Rahbarinia and
Marco Balduzzi and
Roberto Perdisci
Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via
Large-Scale URL→File→Machine Graph Mining
Babak Rahbarinia
Auburn University at
Montgomery
Montgomery, AL 36117, USA
brahbari@aum.edu
Marco Balduzzi
Trend Micro Research, Italy
marco_balduzzi@trendmicro.com
Roberto Perdisci
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602, USA
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system
to detect malware download events. A download event is a
3-tuple that identiﬁes the action of downloading a ﬁle from
a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino
utilizes global situation awareness and continuously moni-
tors various network- and system-level events of the clients’
machines across the Internet and provides real time clas-
siﬁcation of both ﬁles and URLs to the clients upon sub-
mission of a new, unknown ﬁle or URL to the system. To
enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a
large download graph that captures the subtle relationships
among the entities of download events, i.e. ﬁles, URLs, and
machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino
and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our
experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately
classify malware download events with an average of 95.5%
true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false pos-
itives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify
a new download event as either benign or malware in just a
fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time
defense system.
Keywords
Graph Mining; Malware Detection; Machine Learning
1.
INTRODUCTION
Remote malware downloads, e.g., via drive-by exploits, so-
cial engineering attacks, second-stage malware drops, etc.,
currently represent one of the most eﬀective infection vec-
tors. Unfortunately, existing de...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Authenticated System Calls
author:Mohan Rajagopalan and
Matti A. Hiltunen and
Trevor Jim and
Richard D. Schlichting
Authenticated System Calls
Mohan Rajagopalan
Matti Hiltunen Trevor Jim Richard Schlichting
Department of Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
Email: mohan@cs.arizona.edu
AT&T Labs-Research
180 Park Avenue
Email: {hiltunen,trevor,rick}@research.att.com
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Abstract
System call monitoring is a technique for detecting and
controlling compromised applications by checking at run-
time that each system call conforms to a policy that speciﬁes
the program’s normal behavior. Here, a new approach to
system call monitoring based on authenticated system calls
is introduced. An authenticated system call is a system call
augmented with extra arguments that specify the policy for
that call and a cryptographic message authentication code
(MAC) that guarantees the integrity of the policy and the
system call arguments. This extra information is used by the
kernel to verify the system call. The version of the applica-
tion in which regular system calls have been replaced by au-
thenticated calls is generated automatically by an installer
program that reads the application binary, uses static anal-
ysis to generate policies, and then rewrites the binary with
the authenticated calls. This paper presents the approach,
describes a prototype implementation based on Linux and
the PLTO binary rewriting system, and gives experimental
results suggesting that the approach is effective in protect-
ing against compromised applications at modest cost.
Keywords: Intrusion tolerance, operating systems, security
policy, sandboxing, compiler techniques
1. Introduction
System call monitoring is a widely used technique for
detecting compromised applications and for sandboxing ap-
plications to minimize the damage they can cause if they
become compromised [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,
22, 24]. The intuition is that a compromised appl...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Authenticated System Calls
author:Mohan Rajagopalan and
Matti A. Hiltunen and
Trevor Jim and
Richard D. Schlichting
Authenticated System Calls
Mohan Rajagopalan
Matti Hiltunen Trevor Jim Richard Schlichting
Department of Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
Email: mohan@cs.arizona.edu
AT&T Labs-Research
180 Park Avenue
Email: {hiltunen,trevor,rick}@research.att.com
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Abstract
System call monitoring is a technique for detecting and
controlling compromised applications by checking at run-
time that each system call conforms to a policy that speciﬁes
the program’s normal behavior. Here, a new approach to
system call monitoring based on authenticated system calls
is introduced. An authenticated system call is a system call
augmented with extra arguments that specify the policy for
that call and a cryptographic message authentication code
(MAC) that guarantees the integrity of the policy and the
system call arguments. This extra information is used by the
kernel to verify the system call. The version of the applica-
tion in which regular system calls have been replaced by au-
thenticated calls is generated automatically by an installer
program that reads the application binary, uses static anal-
ysis to generate policies, and then rewrites the binary with
the authenticated calls. This paper presents the approach,
describes a prototype implementation based on Linux and
the PLTO binary rewriting system, and gives experimental
results suggesting that the approach is effective in protect-
ing against compromised applications at modest cost.
Keywords: Intrusion tolerance, operating systems, security
policy, sandboxing, compiler techniques
1. Introduction
System call monitoring is a widely used technique for
detecting compromised applications and for sandboxing ap-
plications to minimize the damage they can cause if they
become compromised [2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,
22, 24]. The intuition is that a compromised appl...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Scamper: a scalable and extensible packet prober for active measurement
of the internet
author:Matthew J. Luckie
Scamper: a Scalable and Extensible Packet Prober for
Active Measurement of the Internet
Matthew Luckie
Department of Computer Science
University of Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
mjl@wand.net.nz
ABSTRACT
Large scale active measurement of the Internet requires ap-
propriate software support. The better tools that we have
for executing consistent and systematic measurements, the
more conﬁdence we can have in the results. This paper
presents scamper, a powerful open-source packet-prober for
active measurement of the Internet designed to stand alone
from coordination mechanisms. We built scamper and pop-
ulated it with speciﬁc measurement techniques, making de-
sign decisions aimed at allowing Internet researchers to focus
on scientiﬁc experiments rather than building accurate in-
strumentation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Active measurement, Software, Tools
1.
INTRODUCTION
Packet probing experiments capture relatively simple mea-
surements – typically delay, loss, reordering, and topology
– that yield surprising insights into the structure and be-
haviour of the Internet. An early measurement experiment
investigating the eﬀect of packet size on delay suggested that
TCP implementers should reﬁne the algorithm used to com-
pute the TCP RTO value [1]. The massive scale and contin-
uing growth of the Internet has increased the complexity of
measuring it, both technically and methodologically. In the
past decade, researchers have built and operated many large-
scale active Internet measurement platforms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] where each typically reproduces a tremendous amount
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comm...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Scamper: a scalable and extensible packet prober for active measurement
of the internet
author:Matthew J. Luckie
Scamper: a Scalable and Extensible Packet Prober for
Active Measurement of the Internet
Matthew Luckie
Department of Computer Science
University of Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
mjl@wand.net.nz
ABSTRACT
Large scale active measurement of the Internet requires ap-
propriate software support. The better tools that we have
for executing consistent and systematic measurements, the
more conﬁdence we can have in the results. This paper
presents scamper, a powerful open-source packet-prober for
active measurement of the Internet designed to stand alone
from coordination mechanisms. We built scamper and pop-
ulated it with speciﬁc measurement techniques, making de-
sign decisions aimed at allowing Internet researchers to focus
on scientiﬁc experiments rather than building accurate in-
strumentation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Active measurement, Software, Tools
1.
INTRODUCTION
Packet probing experiments capture relatively simple mea-
surements – typically delay, loss, reordering, and topology
– that yield surprising insights into the structure and be-
haviour of the Internet. An early measurement experiment
investigating the eﬀect of packet size on delay suggested that
TCP implementers should reﬁne the algorithm used to com-
pute the TCP RTO value [1]. The massive scale and contin-
uing growth of the Internet has increased the complexity of
measuring it, both technically and methodologically. In the
past decade, researchers have built and operated many large-
scale active Internet measurement platforms [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] where each typically reproduces a tremendous amount
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or comm...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
author:Achour Most'efaoui and
Eric Mourgaya and
Michel Raynal
Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
Achour MOSTEFAOUI, Eric MOURGAYA, Michel RAYNAL
IRISA, Universit´e de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
{achour|emourgay|raynal}@irisa.fr
Abstract
1
Introduction
Unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and
Toueg are abstract mechanisms that provide information on
process failures. On the one hand, failure detectors allow to
state the minimal requirements on process failures that al-
low to solve problems that cannot be solved in purely asyn-
chronous systems. But, on the other hand, they cannot be
implemented in such systems: their implementation requires
that the underlying distributed system be enriched with ad-
ditional assumptions. The usual failure detector implemen-
tations rely on additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., par-
tial synchrony).
This paper proposes a new look at the implementation of
failure detectors and more speciﬁcally at Chandra-Toueg’s
failure detectors. The proposed approach does not rely on
synchrony assumptions (e.g., it allows the communication
delays to always increase). It is based on a query-response
mechanism and assumes that the query/response messages
exchanged obey a pattern where the responses from some
processes to a query arrive among the (n − f) ﬁrst ones
(n being the total number of processes, f the maximum
number of them that can crash, with 1 ≤ f < n). When we
consider the particular case f = 1, and the implementation
of a failure detector of the class denoted 3S (the weakest
class that allows to solve the consensus problem),
the
additional assumption the underlying system has to satisfy
boils down to a simple channel property, namely, there is
eventually a pair of processes (pi, pj) such that the channel
connecting them is never the slowest among the channels
connecting pi or pj to the other processes. A probabilistic
ana...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
author:Achour Most'efaoui and
Eric Mourgaya and
Michel Raynal
Asynchronous Implementation of Failure Detectors
Achour MOSTEFAOUI, Eric MOURGAYA, Michel RAYNAL
IRISA, Universit´e de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
{achour|emourgay|raynal}@irisa.fr
Abstract
1
Introduction
Unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and
Toueg are abstract mechanisms that provide information on
process failures. On the one hand, failure detectors allow to
state the minimal requirements on process failures that al-
low to solve problems that cannot be solved in purely asyn-
chronous systems. But, on the other hand, they cannot be
implemented in such systems: their implementation requires
that the underlying distributed system be enriched with ad-
ditional assumptions. The usual failure detector implemen-
tations rely on additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., par-
tial synchrony).
This paper proposes a new look at the implementation of
failure detectors and more speciﬁcally at Chandra-Toueg’s
failure detectors. The proposed approach does not rely on
synchrony assumptions (e.g., it allows the communication
delays to always increase). It is based on a query-response
mechanism and assumes that the query/response messages
exchanged obey a pattern where the responses from some
processes to a query arrive among the (n − f) ﬁrst ones
(n being the total number of processes, f the maximum
number of them that can crash, with 1 ≤ f < n). When we
consider the particular case f = 1, and the implementation
of a failure detector of the class denoted 3S (the weakest
class that allows to solve the consensus problem),
the
additional assumption the underlying system has to satisfy
boils down to a simple channel property, namely, there is
eventually a pair of processes (pi, pj) such that the channel
connecting them is never the slowest among the channels
connecting pi or pj to the other processes. A probabilistic
ana...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
author:Boniface Hicks and
Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and
Patrick D. McDaniel
From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
Boniface Hicks, Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and Patrick McDaniel
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS)
Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University
{phicks,ahmadiza,mcdaniel}@cse.psu.edu
Abstract
Security-typed languages are an evolving tool for imple-
menting systems with provable security guarantees. How-
ever, to date, these tools have only been used to build simple
“toy” programs. As described in this paper, we have devel-
oped the ﬁrst real-world, security-typed application: a se-
cure email system written in the Java language variant Jif.
Real-world policies are mapped onto the information ﬂows
controlled by the language primitives, and we consider the
process and tractability of broadly enforcing security policy
in commodity applications. We ﬁnd that while the language
provided the rudimentary tools to achieve low-level secu-
rity goals, additional tools, services, and language exten-
sions were necessary to formulate and enforce application
policy. We detail the design and use of these tools. We also
show how the strong guarantees of Jif in conjunction with
our policy tools can be used to evaluate security. This work
serves as a starting point–we have demonstrated that it is
possible to implement real-world systems and policy using
security-typed languages. However, further investigation of
the developer tools and supporting policy infrastructure is
necessary before they can fulﬁll their considerable promise
of enabling more secure systems.
1
Introduction
The exposure of private data is an increasingly critical
concern of online organizations [7, 8]. The huge costs
of exposure can be measured both in ﬁnancial and in hu-
man terms. The central cause i...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
author:Boniface Hicks and
Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and
Patrick D. McDaniel
From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development
in Security-typed Languages
Boniface Hicks, Kiyan Ahmadizadeh and Patrick McDaniel
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS)
Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University
{phicks,ahmadiza,mcdaniel}@cse.psu.edu
Abstract
Security-typed languages are an evolving tool for imple-
menting systems with provable security guarantees. How-
ever, to date, these tools have only been used to build simple
“toy” programs. As described in this paper, we have devel-
oped the ﬁrst real-world, security-typed application: a se-
cure email system written in the Java language variant Jif.
Real-world policies are mapped onto the information ﬂows
controlled by the language primitives, and we consider the
process and tractability of broadly enforcing security policy
in commodity applications. We ﬁnd that while the language
provided the rudimentary tools to achieve low-level secu-
rity goals, additional tools, services, and language exten-
sions were necessary to formulate and enforce application
policy. We detail the design and use of these tools. We also
show how the strong guarantees of Jif in conjunction with
our policy tools can be used to evaluate security. This work
serves as a starting point–we have demonstrated that it is
possible to implement real-world systems and policy using
security-typed languages. However, further investigation of
the developer tools and supporting policy infrastructure is
necessary before they can fulﬁll their considerable promise
of enabling more secure systems.
1
Introduction
The exposure of private data is an increasingly critical
concern of online organizations [7, 8]. The huge costs
of exposure can be measured both in ﬁnancial and in hu-
man terms. The central cause i...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis and evaluation
study
author:Yi Cao and
Arpit Jain and
Kriti Sharma and
Aruna Balasubramanian and
Anshul Gandhi
When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study
Yi Cao
Stony Brook University
yicao1@cs.stonybrook.edu
Arpit Jain
Stony Brook University
arjain@cs.stonybrook.edu
Kriti Sharma
Stony Brook University
krisharma@cs.stonybrook.edu
Aruna Balasubramanian
Stony Brook University
arunab@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
This short paper presents a detailed empirical study of BBR’s per-
formance under different real-world and emulated testbeds across a
range of network operating conditions. Our empirical results help
to identify network conditions under which BBR outperforms, in
terms of goodput, contemporary TCP congestion control algorithms.
We find that BBR is well suited for networks with shallow buffers,
despite its high retransmissions, whereas existing loss-based algo-
rithms are better suited for deep buffers.
To identify the root causes of BBR’s limitations, we carefully
analyze our empirical results. Our analysis reveals that, contrary
to BBR’s design goal, BBR often exhibits large queue sizes. Further,
the regimes where BBR performs well are often the same regimes
where BBR is unfair to competing flows. Finally, we demonstrate the
existence of a loss rate “cliff point” beyond which BBR’s goodput
drops abruptly. Our empirical investigation identifies the likely
culprits in each of these cases as specific design options in BBR’s
source code.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols; Network performance
analysis; Network measurement.
ACM Reference Format:
Yi Cao, Arpit Jain, Kriti Sharma, Aruna Balasubramanian, and Anshul
Gandhi. 2019. When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study. In Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’19), October
21–23, 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/335536...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis and evaluation
study
author:Yi Cao and
Arpit Jain and
Kriti Sharma and
Aruna Balasubramanian and
Anshul Gandhi
When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study
Yi Cao
Stony Brook University
yicao1@cs.stonybrook.edu
Arpit Jain
Stony Brook University
arjain@cs.stonybrook.edu
Kriti Sharma
Stony Brook University
krisharma@cs.stonybrook.edu
Aruna Balasubramanian
Stony Brook University
arunab@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
This short paper presents a detailed empirical study of BBR’s per-
formance under different real-world and emulated testbeds across a
range of network operating conditions. Our empirical results help
to identify network conditions under which BBR outperforms, in
terms of goodput, contemporary TCP congestion control algorithms.
We find that BBR is well suited for networks with shallow buffers,
despite its high retransmissions, whereas existing loss-based algo-
rithms are better suited for deep buffers.
To identify the root causes of BBR’s limitations, we carefully
analyze our empirical results. Our analysis reveals that, contrary
to BBR’s design goal, BBR often exhibits large queue sizes. Further,
the regimes where BBR performs well are often the same regimes
where BBR is unfair to competing flows. Finally, we demonstrate the
existence of a loss rate “cliff point” beyond which BBR’s goodput
drops abruptly. Our empirical investigation identifies the likely
culprits in each of these cases as specific design options in BBR’s
source code.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Transport protocols; Network performance
analysis; Network measurement.
ACM Reference Format:
Yi Cao, Arpit Jain, Kriti Sharma, Aruna Balasubramanian, and Anshul
Gandhi. 2019. When to use and when not to use BBR: An empirical analysis
and evaluation study. In Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’19), October
21–23, 2019, Amsterdam, Netherlands. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/335536...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation
author:Frederik Armknecht and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Steffen Schulz and
Christian Wachsmann
A Security Framework for the Analysis and Design
of Software Attestation
Frederik Armknecht
Universität Mannheim,
Germany
armknecht@uni-mannheim.de
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Technische Universität
Darmstadt (CASED),
Germany
ahmad.sadeghi@cased.de
Christian Wachsmann
Intel CRI-SC at TU Darmstadt,
Germany
christian.wachsmann@cased.de
∗
Steffen Schulz
Intel Corporation
steffen.schulz@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Software attestation has become a popular and challenging
research topic at many established security conferences with
an expected strong impact in practice. It aims at verifying
the software integrity of (typically) resource-constrained em-
bedded devices. However, for practical reasons, software at-
testation cannot rely on stored cryptographic secrets or ded-
icated trusted hardware. Instead, it exploits side-channel in-
formation, such as the time that the underlying device needs
for a speciﬁc computation. As traditional cryptographic so-
lutions and arguments are not applicable, novel approaches
for the design and analysis are necessary. This is certainly
one of the main reasons why the security goals, properties
and underlying assumptions of existing software attestation
schemes have been only vaguely discussed so far, limiting
the conﬁdence in their security claims. Thus, putting soft-
ware attestation on a solid ground and having a founded
approach for designing secure software attestation schemes
is still an important open problem.
We provide the ﬁrst steps towards closing this gap. Our
ﬁrst contribution is a security framework that formally cap-
tures security goals, attacker models and various system and
design parameters. Moreover, we present a generic software
attestation scheme that covers most existing schemes in the
literature. Finally, we analyze its security within our frame-
work, yielding s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation
author:Frederik Armknecht and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and
Steffen Schulz and
Christian Wachsmann
A Security Framework for the Analysis and Design
of Software Attestation
Frederik Armknecht
Universität Mannheim,
Germany
armknecht@uni-mannheim.de
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Technische Universität
Darmstadt (CASED),
Germany
ahmad.sadeghi@cased.de
Christian Wachsmann
Intel CRI-SC at TU Darmstadt,
Germany
christian.wachsmann@cased.de
∗
Steffen Schulz
Intel Corporation
steffen.schulz@intel.com
ABSTRACT
Software attestation has become a popular and challenging
research topic at many established security conferences with
an expected strong impact in practice. It aims at verifying
the software integrity of (typically) resource-constrained em-
bedded devices. However, for practical reasons, software at-
testation cannot rely on stored cryptographic secrets or ded-
icated trusted hardware. Instead, it exploits side-channel in-
formation, such as the time that the underlying device needs
for a speciﬁc computation. As traditional cryptographic so-
lutions and arguments are not applicable, novel approaches
for the design and analysis are necessary. This is certainly
one of the main reasons why the security goals, properties
and underlying assumptions of existing software attestation
schemes have been only vaguely discussed so far, limiting
the conﬁdence in their security claims. Thus, putting soft-
ware attestation on a solid ground and having a founded
approach for designing secure software attestation schemes
is still an important open problem.
We provide the ﬁrst steps towards closing this gap. Our
ﬁrst contribution is a security framework that formally cap-
tures security goals, attacker models and various system and
design parameters. Moreover, we present a generic software
attestation scheme that covers most existing schemes in the
literature. Finally, we analyze its security within our frame-
work, yielding s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:AI3: application-independent information infrastructure
author:Bo Zhang and
Jinfan Wang and
Xinyu Wang and
Tracy Yingying Cheng and
Xiaohua Jia and
Jianfei He
AI3: Application-Independent Information Infrastructure
Bo Zhang1, Jinfan Wang1, Xinyu Wang1, Yingying Cheng1, Xiaohua Jia1, Jianfei He2
1{bo.zhang, jfwang4, xinywang, yincheng, csjia}@cityu.edu.hk
1City University of Hong Kong
2Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
2jeffrey.he@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
In the current Internet architecture, application service pro-
viders (ASPs) own users’ data and social groups informa-
tion, which made a handful of ASP companies growing big-
ger and bigger and denied small and medium companies
from entering this business. We propose a new architecture,
called Application Independent Information Infrastructure
(AI3). The design goals of AI3 are: 1) Decoupling user-
s’ data from ASPs and users’ social relations from ASPs,
such that ASPs become independent from users’ data and
social relations. 2) Open architecture, such that diﬀeren-
t ASPs can interoperate with each other. This demo is to
show a prototype of AI3. The demo has four parts: 1) ASP-
independent data management in AI3; 2) ASP-independent
management of users’ social relations in AI3; 3) inter-domain
data transport and user roaming; 4) real-time communica-
tions by using AI3. The demo video can be watched at:
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/~jia/AI3_DemoVideo.mp4
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network com-
munications
Keywords
Internet architecture, network infrastructure, storage sys-
tem
1.
INTRODUCTION
Fueled up by the explosive growth of social networks in re-
cent years, User Generated Contents (UGC), such as videos,
photos, and blogs, have become a dominant source of Inter-
net traﬃc. The constant eﬀorts of developing new Inter-
net architectures have led to several projects for informa-
tion dissemination, sharing and networking. The well-known
projects [1, 2, 3, 4] include Infor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:AI3: application-independent information infrastructure
author:Bo Zhang and
Jinfan Wang and
Xinyu Wang and
Tracy Yingying Cheng and
Xiaohua Jia and
Jianfei He
AI3: Application-Independent Information Infrastructure
Bo Zhang1, Jinfan Wang1, Xinyu Wang1, Yingying Cheng1, Xiaohua Jia1, Jianfei He2
1{bo.zhang, jfwang4, xinywang, yincheng, csjia}@cityu.edu.hk
1City University of Hong Kong
2Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
2jeffrey.he@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
In the current Internet architecture, application service pro-
viders (ASPs) own users’ data and social groups informa-
tion, which made a handful of ASP companies growing big-
ger and bigger and denied small and medium companies
from entering this business. We propose a new architecture,
called Application Independent Information Infrastructure
(AI3). The design goals of AI3 are: 1) Decoupling user-
s’ data from ASPs and users’ social relations from ASPs,
such that ASPs become independent from users’ data and
social relations. 2) Open architecture, such that diﬀeren-
t ASPs can interoperate with each other. This demo is to
show a prototype of AI3. The demo has four parts: 1) ASP-
independent data management in AI3; 2) ASP-independent
management of users’ social relations in AI3; 3) inter-domain
data transport and user roaming; 4) real-time communica-
tions by using AI3. The demo video can be watched at:
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/~jia/AI3_DemoVideo.mp4
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network com-
munications
Keywords
Internet architecture, network infrastructure, storage sys-
tem
1.
INTRODUCTION
Fueled up by the explosive growth of social networks in re-
cent years, User Generated Contents (UGC), such as videos,
photos, and blogs, have become a dominant source of Inter-
net traﬃc. The constant eﬀorts of developing new Inter-
net architectures have led to several projects for informa-
tion dissemination, sharing and networking. The well-known
projects [1, 2, 3, 4] include Infor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real
author:Hany Ragab and
Alyssa Milburn and
Kaveh Razavi and
Herbert Bos and
Cristiano Giuffrida
0
2
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1
:
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1
2
0
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©
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3
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2
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5
-
4
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9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
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8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
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1
2
0
2
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
CROSSTALK: Speculative Data Leaks
Across Cores Are Real
Hany Ragab∗†, Alyssa Milburn∗†, Kaveh Razavi§, Herbert Bos∗, and Cristiano Giuffrida∗
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
∗Department of Computer Science
{hany.ragab, a.a.milburn}@vu.nl
{herbertb, giuffrida}@cs.vu.nl
§D-ITET
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
kaveh@ethz.ch
†Equal contribution joint ﬁrst authors
Abstract—Recent
transient execution attacks have demon-
strated that attackers may leak sensitive information across
security boundaries on a shared CPU core. Up until now, it
seemed possible to prevent this by isolating potential victims and
attackers on separate cores. In this paper, we show that the
situation is more serious, as transient execution attacks can leak
data across different cores on many modern Intel CPUs.
We do so by investigating the behavior of x86 instructions,
and in particular, we focus on complex microcoded instructions
which perform offcore requests. Combined with transient execu-
tion vulnerabilities such as Micro-architectural Data Sampling
(MDS), these operations can reveal internal CPU state. Using
performance counters, we build a proﬁler, CROSSTALK,
to
examine the number and nature of such operations for many
x86 instructions, and ﬁnd that some instructions read data from
a staging buffer which is shared between all CPU cores.
To demonstrate the security impact of this behavior, we present
the ﬁrst cross-core attack using transient execution, showing that
even the seemingly-innocuous CPUID instruction can be used by
attackers to sample the entire staging buffer ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real
author:Hany Ragab and
Alyssa Milburn and
Kaveh Razavi and
Herbert Bos and
Cristiano Giuffrida
0
2
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
CROSSTALK: Speculative Data Leaks
Across Cores Are Real
Hany Ragab∗†, Alyssa Milburn∗†, Kaveh Razavi§, Herbert Bos∗, and Cristiano Giuffrida∗
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
∗Department of Computer Science
{hany.ragab, a.a.milburn}@vu.nl
{herbertb, giuffrida}@cs.vu.nl
§D-ITET
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
kaveh@ethz.ch
†Equal contribution joint ﬁrst authors
Abstract—Recent
transient execution attacks have demon-
strated that attackers may leak sensitive information across
security boundaries on a shared CPU core. Up until now, it
seemed possible to prevent this by isolating potential victims and
attackers on separate cores. In this paper, we show that the
situation is more serious, as transient execution attacks can leak
data across different cores on many modern Intel CPUs.
We do so by investigating the behavior of x86 instructions,
and in particular, we focus on complex microcoded instructions
which perform offcore requests. Combined with transient execu-
tion vulnerabilities such as Micro-architectural Data Sampling
(MDS), these operations can reveal internal CPU state. Using
performance counters, we build a proﬁler, CROSSTALK,
to
examine the number and nature of such operations for many
x86 instructions, and ﬁnd that some instructions read data from
a staging buffer which is shared between all CPU cores.
To demonstrate the security impact of this behavior, we present
the ﬁrst cross-core attack using transient execution, showing that
even the seemingly-innocuous CPUID instruction can be used by
attackers to sample the entire staging buffer ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:WebJail: least-privilege integration of third-party components in
web mashups
author:Steven Van Acker and
Philippe De Ryck and
Lieven Desmet and
Frank Piessens and
Wouter Joosen
WebJail: Least-privilege Integration of Third-party
Components in Web Mashups
Steven Van Acker, Philippe De Ryck, Lieven Desmet, Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen
IBBT-Distrinet, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
Steven.VanAcker@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Internet landscape has transformed
from a mostly static world into Web 2.0, where the use of
web applications and mashups has become a daily routine
for many Internet users. Web mashups are web applications
that combine data and functionality from several sources
or components.
Ideally, these components contain benign
code from trusted sources. Unfortunately, the reality is very
diﬀerent. Web mashup components can misbehave and per-
form unwanted actions on behalf of the web mashup’s user.
Current mashup integration techniques either impose no
restrictions on the execution of a third-party component, or
simply rely on the Same-Origin Policy. A least-privilege
approach,
in which a mashup integrator can restrict the
functionality available to each component, can not be im-
plemented using the current integration techniques, without
ownership over the component’s code.
We propose WebJail, a novel client-side security architec-
ture to enable least-privilege integration of components into
a web mashup, based on high-level policies that restrict the
available functionality in each individual component. The
policy language was synthesized from a study and catego-
rization of sensitive operations in the upcoming HTML 5
JavaScript APIs, and full mediation is achieved via the use
of deep aspects in the browser.
We have implemented a prototype of WebJail in Mozilla
Firefox 4.0, and applied it successfully to mainstream plat-
forms such as iGoogle and Facebook.
In addition, micro-
benchmarks registered a negli...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:WebJail: least-privilege integration of third-party components in
web mashups
author:Steven Van Acker and
Philippe De Ryck and
Lieven Desmet and
Frank Piessens and
Wouter Joosen
WebJail: Least-privilege Integration of Third-party
Components in Web Mashups
Steven Van Acker, Philippe De Ryck, Lieven Desmet, Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen
IBBT-Distrinet, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
Steven.VanAcker@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Internet landscape has transformed
from a mostly static world into Web 2.0, where the use of
web applications and mashups has become a daily routine
for many Internet users. Web mashups are web applications
that combine data and functionality from several sources
or components.
Ideally, these components contain benign
code from trusted sources. Unfortunately, the reality is very
diﬀerent. Web mashup components can misbehave and per-
form unwanted actions on behalf of the web mashup’s user.
Current mashup integration techniques either impose no
restrictions on the execution of a third-party component, or
simply rely on the Same-Origin Policy. A least-privilege
approach,
in which a mashup integrator can restrict the
functionality available to each component, can not be im-
plemented using the current integration techniques, without
ownership over the component’s code.
We propose WebJail, a novel client-side security architec-
ture to enable least-privilege integration of components into
a web mashup, based on high-level policies that restrict the
available functionality in each individual component. The
policy language was synthesized from a study and catego-
rization of sensitive operations in the upcoming HTML 5
JavaScript APIs, and full mediation is achieved via the use
of deep aspects in the browser.
We have implemented a prototype of WebJail in Mozilla
Firefox 4.0, and applied it successfully to mainstream plat-
forms such as iGoogle and Facebook.
In addition, micro-
benchmarks registered a negli...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
author:Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Data Poisoning Attacks to
Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/cao-xiaoyu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Duke University
{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols enable an un-
trusted data collector to perform privacy-preserving data an-
alytics. In particular, each user locally perturbs its data to
preserve privacy before sending it to the data collector, who
aggregates the perturbed data to obtain statistics of interest. In
the past several years, researchers from multiple communities–
such as security, database, and theoretical computer science–
have proposed many LDP protocols. These studies mainly fo-
cused on improving the utility of the LDP protocols. However,
the security of LDP protocols is largely unexplored.
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. We focus on LDP
protocols for frequency estimation and heavy hitter identiﬁ-
cation, which are two basic data analytics tasks. Speciﬁcally,
we show that an attacker can inject fake users into an LDP
protocol and the fake users send carefully crafted data to the
data collector such that the LDP protocol estimates high fre-
quencies for arbitrary attacker-chosen items or identiﬁes them
as heavy hitters. We call our attacks data poisoning attacks.
We theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness of
our attacks. We also explore three countermeasures against
our attacks. Our experimental results show that they can eff...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
author:Xiaoyu Cao and
Jinyuan Jia and
Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Data Poisoning Attacks to
Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Duke University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/cao-xiaoyu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols
Xiaoyu Cao, Jinyuan Jia, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Duke University
{xiaoyu.cao, jinyuan.jia, neil.gong}@duke.edu
Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols enable an un-
trusted data collector to perform privacy-preserving data an-
alytics. In particular, each user locally perturbs its data to
preserve privacy before sending it to the data collector, who
aggregates the perturbed data to obtain statistics of interest. In
the past several years, researchers from multiple communities–
such as security, database, and theoretical computer science–
have proposed many LDP protocols. These studies mainly fo-
cused on improving the utility of the LDP protocols. However,
the security of LDP protocols is largely unexplored.
In this work, we aim to bridge this gap. We focus on LDP
protocols for frequency estimation and heavy hitter identiﬁ-
cation, which are two basic data analytics tasks. Speciﬁcally,
we show that an attacker can inject fake users into an LDP
protocol and the fake users send carefully crafted data to the
data collector such that the LDP protocol estimates high fre-
quencies for arbitrary attacker-chosen items or identiﬁes them
as heavy hitters. We call our attacks data poisoning attacks.
We theoretically and/or empirically show the effectiveness of
our attacks. We also explore three countermeasures against
our attacks. Our experimental results show that they can eff...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness Detection
for Face Authentication
author:Yan Li and
Zilong Wang and
Yingjiu Li and
Robert H. Deng and
Binbin Chen and
Weizhi Meng and
Hui Li
A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness
Detection for Face Authentication
Yan Li
Xidian University
Zilong Wang
Xidian University
Yingjiu Li
Singapore Management University
Advanced Digital Science Center
zlwang@xidian.edu.cn
yjli@smu.edu.sg
li.yan@adsc-create.edu.sg
Robert Deng
Binbin Chen
Weizhi Meng
Singapore Management University
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Advanced Digital Science Center
binbin.chen@adsc-create.edu.sg
Technical University of Denmark
weme@dtu.dk
Hui Li
Xidian University
lihui@xidian.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Face authentication is vulnerable to media-based virtual face
forgery (MVFF) where adversaries display photos/videos or
3D virtual face models of victims to spoof face authentication
systems. In this paper, we propose a liveness detection mech-
anism, called FaceCloseup, to protect the face authentication
on mobile devices. FaceCloseup detects MVFF-based attacks
by analyzing the distortion of face regions in a user’s closeup
facial videos captured by built-in camera on mobile device. It
can detect MVFF-based attacks with an accuracy of 99.48%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Biometrics; Usability in secu-
rity and privacy.
KEYWORDS
Liveness detection, perspective distortion, face authentication
ACM Reference Format:
Yan Li, Zilong Wang, Yingjiu Li, Robert Deng, Binbin Chen,
Weizhi Meng, and Hui Li. 2019. A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial
Distortion Based Liveness Detection for Face Authentication. In
ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(AsiaCCS ’19), July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3321705.
3329850
INTRODUCTION
1
Most of existing face authentication systems are vulnerable to
media-based virtual face forgery (MVFF) where an adversary
Permis...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness Detection
for Face Authentication
author:Yan Li and
Zilong Wang and
Yingjiu Li and
Robert H. Deng and
Binbin Chen and
Weizhi Meng and
Hui Li
A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial Distortion Based Liveness
Detection for Face Authentication
Yan Li
Xidian University
Zilong Wang
Xidian University
Yingjiu Li
Singapore Management University
Advanced Digital Science Center
zlwang@xidian.edu.cn
yjli@smu.edu.sg
li.yan@adsc-create.edu.sg
Robert Deng
Binbin Chen
Weizhi Meng
Singapore Management University
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Advanced Digital Science Center
binbin.chen@adsc-create.edu.sg
Technical University of Denmark
weme@dtu.dk
Hui Li
Xidian University
lihui@xidian.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Face authentication is vulnerable to media-based virtual face
forgery (MVFF) where adversaries display photos/videos or
3D virtual face models of victims to spoof face authentication
systems. In this paper, we propose a liveness detection mech-
anism, called FaceCloseup, to protect the face authentication
on mobile devices. FaceCloseup detects MVFF-based attacks
by analyzing the distortion of face regions in a user’s closeup
facial videos captured by built-in camera on mobile device. It
can detect MVFF-based attacks with an accuracy of 99.48%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Biometrics; Usability in secu-
rity and privacy.
KEYWORDS
Liveness detection, perspective distortion, face authentication
ACM Reference Format:
Yan Li, Zilong Wang, Yingjiu Li, Robert Deng, Binbin Chen,
Weizhi Meng, and Hui Li. 2019. A Closer Look Tells More: A Facial
Distortion Based Liveness Detection for Face Authentication. In
ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(AsiaCCS ’19), July 9–12, 2019, Auckland, New Zealand. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3321705.
3329850
INTRODUCTION
1
Most of existing face authentication systems are vulnerable to
media-based virtual face forgery (MVFF) where an adversary
Permis...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them
author:Andrew Kwong and
Daniel Genkin and
Daniel Gruss and
Yuval Yarom
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without
Accessing Them
Andrew Kwong
University of Michigan
ankwong@umich.edu
Daniel Genkin
Daniel Gruss
Yuval Yarom
University of Michigan
Graz University of Technology
University of Adelaide and Data61
genkin@umich.edu
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract—The Rowhammer bug is a reliability issue in DRAM
cells that can enable an unprivileged adversary to ﬂip the values
of bits in neighboring rows on the memory module. Previous
work has exploited this for various types of fault attacks across
security boundaries, where the attacker ﬂips inaccessible bits,
often resulting in privilege escalation. It is widely assumed
however, that bit ﬂips within the adversary’s own private memory
have no security implications, as the attacker can already modify
its private memory via regular write operations.
We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect, by em-
ploying Rowhammer as a read side channel. More speciﬁcally,
we show how an unprivileged attacker can exploit the data
dependence between Rowhammer induced bit ﬂips and the bits
in nearby rows to deduce these bits, including values belonging to
other processes and the kernel. Thus, the primary contribution
of this work is to show that Rowhammer is a threat to not only
integrity, but to conﬁdentiality as well.
Furthermore, in contrast to Rowhammer write side channels,
which require persistent bit ﬂips, our read channel succeeds even
when ECC memory detects and corrects every bit ﬂip. Thus,
we demonstrate the ﬁrst security implication of successfully-
corrected bit ﬂips, which were previously considered benign.
To demonstrate the implications of this read side channel, we
present an end-to-end attack on OpenSSH 7.9 that extracts an
RSA-2048 key from the root level SSH daemon. To accomplish
this, ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them
author:Andrew Kwong and
Daniel Genkin and
Daniel Gruss and
Yuval Yarom
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without
Accessing Them
Andrew Kwong
University of Michigan
ankwong@umich.edu
Daniel Genkin
Daniel Gruss
Yuval Yarom
University of Michigan
Graz University of Technology
University of Adelaide and Data61
genkin@umich.edu
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au
Abstract—The Rowhammer bug is a reliability issue in DRAM
cells that can enable an unprivileged adversary to ﬂip the values
of bits in neighboring rows on the memory module. Previous
work has exploited this for various types of fault attacks across
security boundaries, where the attacker ﬂips inaccessible bits,
often resulting in privilege escalation. It is widely assumed
however, that bit ﬂips within the adversary’s own private memory
have no security implications, as the attacker can already modify
its private memory via regular write operations.
We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect, by em-
ploying Rowhammer as a read side channel. More speciﬁcally,
we show how an unprivileged attacker can exploit the data
dependence between Rowhammer induced bit ﬂips and the bits
in nearby rows to deduce these bits, including values belonging to
other processes and the kernel. Thus, the primary contribution
of this work is to show that Rowhammer is a threat to not only
integrity, but to conﬁdentiality as well.
Furthermore, in contrast to Rowhammer write side channels,
which require persistent bit ﬂips, our read channel succeeds even
when ECC memory detects and corrects every bit ﬂip. Thus,
we demonstrate the ﬁrst security implication of successfully-
corrected bit ﬂips, which were previously considered benign.
To demonstrate the implications of this read side channel, we
present an end-to-end attack on OpenSSH 7.9 that extracts an
RSA-2048 key from the root level SSH daemon. To accomplish
this, ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multi-module vulnerability analysis of web-based applications
author:Davide Balzarotti and
Marco Cova and
Viktoria Felmetsger and
Giovanni Vigna
Multi-Module Vulnerability Analysis of Web-based
Applications
Davide Balzarotti, Marco Cova, Viktoria V. Felmetsger, and Giovanni Vigna
Computer Security Group
University of California, Santa Barbara
{balzarot, marco, rusvika, vigna}@cs.ucsb.edu
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
In recent years, web applications have become tremendously pop-
ular, and nowadays they are routinely used in security-critical envi-
ronments, such as medical, ﬁnancial, and military systems. As the
use of web applications for critical services has increased, the num-
ber and sophistication of attacks against these applications have
grown as well. Current approaches to securing web applications
focus either on detecting and blocking web-based attacks using
application-level ﬁrewalls, or on using vulnerability analysis tech-
niques to identify security problems before deployment.
The vulnerability analysis of web applications is made difﬁcult
by a number of factors, such as the use of scripting languages, the
structuring of the application logic into separate pages and code
modules, and the interaction with back-end databases. So far, ap-
proaches to web application vulnerability analysis have focused on
single application modules to identify insecure uses of informa-
tion provided as input to the application. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are limited in scope, and, therefore, they cannot detect
multi-step attacks that exploit the interaction among multiple mod-
ules of an application.
We have developed a novel vulnerability analysis approach that
characterizes both the extended state and the intended workﬂow of
a web application. By doing this, our analysis approach is able to
take into account inter-module relationships as well as the interac-
tion of an application’s modules with back-end databases. As a re-
sult, our vulnerability analys...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multi-module vulnerability analysis of web-based applications
author:Davide Balzarotti and
Marco Cova and
Viktoria Felmetsger and
Giovanni Vigna
Multi-Module Vulnerability Analysis of Web-based
Applications
Davide Balzarotti, Marco Cova, Viktoria V. Felmetsger, and Giovanni Vigna
Computer Security Group
University of California, Santa Barbara
{balzarot, marco, rusvika, vigna}@cs.ucsb.edu
Santa Barbara, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
In recent years, web applications have become tremendously pop-
ular, and nowadays they are routinely used in security-critical envi-
ronments, such as medical, ﬁnancial, and military systems. As the
use of web applications for critical services has increased, the num-
ber and sophistication of attacks against these applications have
grown as well. Current approaches to securing web applications
focus either on detecting and blocking web-based attacks using
application-level ﬁrewalls, or on using vulnerability analysis tech-
niques to identify security problems before deployment.
The vulnerability analysis of web applications is made difﬁcult
by a number of factors, such as the use of scripting languages, the
structuring of the application logic into separate pages and code
modules, and the interaction with back-end databases. So far, ap-
proaches to web application vulnerability analysis have focused on
single application modules to identify insecure uses of informa-
tion provided as input to the application. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are limited in scope, and, therefore, they cannot detect
multi-step attacks that exploit the interaction among multiple mod-
ules of an application.
We have developed a novel vulnerability analysis approach that
characterizes both the extended state and the intended workﬂow of
a web application. By doing this, our analysis approach is able to
take into account inter-module relationships as well as the interac-
tion of an application’s modules with back-end databases. As a re-
sult, our vulnerability analys...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Memory Safety for Embedded Devices with nesCheck
author:Daniele Midi and
Mathias Payer and
Elisa Bertino
Memory Safety for Embedded Devices with nesCheck
Daniele Midi
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
dmidi@purdue.edu
Mathias Payer
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
mpayer@purdue.edu
Elisa Bertino
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
bertino@purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
Applications for TinyOS, a popular operating system for em-
bedded systems and wireless sensor networks, are written
in nesC, a C dialect prone to the same type and memory
safety vulnerabilities as C. While availability and integrity
are critical requirements, the distributed and concurrent na-
ture of such applications, combined with the intrinsic un-
safety of the language, makes those security goals hard to
achieve. Traditional memory safety techniques cannot be
applied, due to the strict platform constraints and hardware
diﬀerences of embedded systems.
We design nesCheck, an approach that combines static
analysis and dynamic checking to automatically enforce mem-
ory safety on nesC programs without requiring source mod-
iﬁcations. nesCheck analyzes the source code, identiﬁes the
minimal conservative set of vulnerable pointers, ﬁnds static
memory bugs, and instruments the code with the required
dynamic runtime checks. Our prototype extends the existing
TinyOS compiler toolchain with LLVM-based passes. Our
evaluation shows that nesCheck eﬀectively and eﬃciently en-
forces memory protection, catching all memory errors with
an overhead of 0.84% on energy, 5.3% on code size, up to
8.4% on performance, and 16.7% on RAM.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are deployed in criti-
cal, real-time applications, where availability and integrity
are of paramount importance. WSN nodes are embedded
systems that often manage conﬁdential information, such
as private keys and aggregated data, making conﬁdenti...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Memory Safety for Embedded Devices with nesCheck
author:Daniele Midi and
Mathias Payer and
Elisa Bertino
Memory Safety for Embedded Devices with nesCheck
Daniele Midi
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
dmidi@purdue.edu
Mathias Payer
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
mpayer@purdue.edu
Elisa Bertino
Dept. of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
bertino@purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
Applications for TinyOS, a popular operating system for em-
bedded systems and wireless sensor networks, are written
in nesC, a C dialect prone to the same type and memory
safety vulnerabilities as C. While availability and integrity
are critical requirements, the distributed and concurrent na-
ture of such applications, combined with the intrinsic un-
safety of the language, makes those security goals hard to
achieve. Traditional memory safety techniques cannot be
applied, due to the strict platform constraints and hardware
diﬀerences of embedded systems.
We design nesCheck, an approach that combines static
analysis and dynamic checking to automatically enforce mem-
ory safety on nesC programs without requiring source mod-
iﬁcations. nesCheck analyzes the source code, identiﬁes the
minimal conservative set of vulnerable pointers, ﬁnds static
memory bugs, and instruments the code with the required
dynamic runtime checks. Our prototype extends the existing
TinyOS compiler toolchain with LLVM-based passes. Our
evaluation shows that nesCheck eﬀectively and eﬃciently en-
forces memory protection, catching all memory errors with
an overhead of 0.84% on energy, 5.3% on code size, up to
8.4% on performance, and 16.7% on RAM.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are deployed in criti-
cal, real-time applications, where availability and integrity
are of paramount importance. WSN nodes are embedded
systems that often manage conﬁdential information, such
as private keys and aggregated data, making conﬁdenti...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving
Smart Contracts
author:Ahmed E. Kosba and
Andrew Miller and
Elaine Shi and
Zikai Wen and
Charalampos Papamanthou
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and
Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Ahmed Kosba∗, Andrew Miller∗, Elaine Shi†, Zikai Wen†, Charalampos Papamanthou∗
∗University of Maryland and †Cornell University
{akosba, amiller}@cs.umd.edu, {rs2358, zw385}@cornell.edu, cpap@umd.edu
Abstract—Emerging smart contract systems over decentralized
cryptocurrencies allow mutually distrustful parties to transact
safely without trusted third parties. In the event of contrac-
tual breaches or aborts, the decentralized blockchain ensures
that honest parties obtain commensurate compensation. Existing
systems, however, lack transactional privacy. All transactions,
including ﬂow of money between pseudonyms and amount
transacted, are exposed on the blockchain.
We present Hawk, a decentralized smart contract system that
does not store ﬁnancial transactions in the clear on the block-
chain, thus retaining transactional privacy from the public’s view.
A Hawk programmer can write a private smart contract in an
intuitive manner without having to implement cryptography, and
our compiler automatically generates an efﬁcient cryptographic
protocol where contractual parties interact with the blockchain,
using cryptographic primitives such as zero-knowledge proofs.
To formally deﬁne and reason about the security of our
protocols, we are the ﬁrst to formalize the blockchain model
of cryptography. The formal modeling is of independent interest.
We advocate the community to adopt such a formal model when
designing applications atop decentralized blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [48] and alt-
coins [20] have rapidly gained popularity, and are often quoted
as a glimpse into our future [5]...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving
Smart Contracts
author:Ahmed E. Kosba and
Andrew Miller and
Elaine Shi and
Zikai Wen and
Charalampos Papamanthou
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and
Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Ahmed Kosba∗, Andrew Miller∗, Elaine Shi†, Zikai Wen†, Charalampos Papamanthou∗
∗University of Maryland and †Cornell University
{akosba, amiller}@cs.umd.edu, {rs2358, zw385}@cornell.edu, cpap@umd.edu
Abstract—Emerging smart contract systems over decentralized
cryptocurrencies allow mutually distrustful parties to transact
safely without trusted third parties. In the event of contrac-
tual breaches or aborts, the decentralized blockchain ensures
that honest parties obtain commensurate compensation. Existing
systems, however, lack transactional privacy. All transactions,
including ﬂow of money between pseudonyms and amount
transacted, are exposed on the blockchain.
We present Hawk, a decentralized smart contract system that
does not store ﬁnancial transactions in the clear on the block-
chain, thus retaining transactional privacy from the public’s view.
A Hawk programmer can write a private smart contract in an
intuitive manner without having to implement cryptography, and
our compiler automatically generates an efﬁcient cryptographic
protocol where contractual parties interact with the blockchain,
using cryptographic primitives such as zero-knowledge proofs.
To formally deﬁne and reason about the security of our
protocols, we are the ﬁrst to formalize the blockchain model
of cryptography. The formal modeling is of independent interest.
We advocate the community to adopt such a formal model when
designing applications atop decentralized blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [48] and alt-
coins [20] have rapidly gained popularity, and are often quoted
as a glimpse into our future [5]...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:discovRE: Efficient Cross-Architecture Identification of Bugs in Binary
Code
author:Sebastian Eschweiler and
Khaled Yakdan and
Elmar Gerhards-Padilla
discovRE: Efﬁcient Cross-Architecture Identiﬁcation
of Bugs in Binary Code
Sebastian Eschweiler∗†, Khaled Yakdan∗†, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla†,
∗University of Bonn, Germany
{yakdan, eschweil}@cs.uni-bonn.de
Abstract—The identiﬁcation of security-critical vulnerabilities
is a key for protecting computer systems. Being able to perform
this process at the binary level
is very important given that
many software projects are closed-source. Even if the source
code is available, compilation may create a mismatch between
the source code and the binary code that is executed by the
processor, causing analyses that are performed on source code to
fail at detecting certain bugs and thus potential vulnerabilities.
Existing approaches to ﬁnd bugs in binary code 1) use dynamic
analysis, which is difﬁcult for ﬁrmware; 2) handle only a single
architecture; or 3) use semantic similarity, which is very slow
when analyzing large code bases.
In this paper, we present a new approach to efﬁciently
search for similar functions in binary code. We use this method
to identify known bugs in binaries as follows: starting with
a vulnerable binary function, we identify similar functions in
other binaries across different compilers, optimization levels,
operating systems, and CPU architectures. The main idea is to
compute similarity between functions based on the structure of
the corresponding control ﬂow graphs. To minimize this costly
computation, we employ an efﬁcient pre-ﬁlter based on numeric
features to quickly identify a small set of candidate functions.
This allows us to efﬁciently search for similar functions in large
code bases.
We have designed and implemented a prototype of our
approach, called discovRE, that supports four instruction set
architectures (x86, x64, ARM, MIPS). We show that discovRE is
four orders of magnitude faster than...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:discovRE: Efficient Cross-Architecture Identification of Bugs in Binary
Code
author:Sebastian Eschweiler and
Khaled Yakdan and
Elmar Gerhards-Padilla
discovRE: Efﬁcient Cross-Architecture Identiﬁcation
of Bugs in Binary Code
Sebastian Eschweiler∗†, Khaled Yakdan∗†, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla†,
∗University of Bonn, Germany
{yakdan, eschweil}@cs.uni-bonn.de
Abstract—The identiﬁcation of security-critical vulnerabilities
is a key for protecting computer systems. Being able to perform
this process at the binary level
is very important given that
many software projects are closed-source. Even if the source
code is available, compilation may create a mismatch between
the source code and the binary code that is executed by the
processor, causing analyses that are performed on source code to
fail at detecting certain bugs and thus potential vulnerabilities.
Existing approaches to ﬁnd bugs in binary code 1) use dynamic
analysis, which is difﬁcult for ﬁrmware; 2) handle only a single
architecture; or 3) use semantic similarity, which is very slow
when analyzing large code bases.
In this paper, we present a new approach to efﬁciently
search for similar functions in binary code. We use this method
to identify known bugs in binaries as follows: starting with
a vulnerable binary function, we identify similar functions in
other binaries across different compilers, optimization levels,
operating systems, and CPU architectures. The main idea is to
compute similarity between functions based on the structure of
the corresponding control ﬂow graphs. To minimize this costly
computation, we employ an efﬁcient pre-ﬁlter based on numeric
features to quickly identify a small set of candidate functions.
This allows us to efﬁciently search for similar functions in large
code bases.
We have designed and implemented a prototype of our
approach, called discovRE, that supports four instruction set
architectures (x86, x64, ARM, MIPS). We show that discovRE is
four orders of magnitude faster than...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:MobiPluto: File System Friendly Deniable Storage for Mobile Devices
author:Bing Chang and
Zhan Wang and
Bo Chen and
Fengwei Zhang
MobiPluto: File System Friendly Deniable Storage for
Mobile Devices
Bing Chang1,2,3, Zhan Wang1,2
, Bo Chen4, Fengwei Zhang5
1 State Key Laboratory of Information Security,
∗
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
2 Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
3 University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
4 College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University, USA
5 Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, USA
{changbing,wangzhan}@iie.ac.cn, bxc30@psu.edu, fengwei@wayne.edu
ABSTRACT
Mobile devices are prevalently used for processing personal
private data and sometimes collecting evidence of social in-
justice or political oppression. The device owners may al-
ways feel reluctant to expose this type of data to undesired
observers or inspectors. This usually can be achieved by
encryption. However, the traditional encryption may not
work when an adversary is able to coerce device owners into
revealing their encrypted content. Plausibly Deniable En-
cryption (PDE) is thus designed to protect sensitive data
against this type of powerful adversaries.
In this paper, we present MobiPluto, a ﬁle system friendly
PDE scheme for denying the existence of sensitive data stored
on mobile devices. MobiPluto achieves deniability feature as
nothing but a “side-eﬀect” of combining thin provisioning, a
well-established tool in Linux kernel, with encryption. This
feature makes MobiPluto more plausible for users to have
such software on their mobile devices. A salient diﬀerence
between MobiPluto and the existing PDE schemes is that
MobiPluto is “ﬁle system friendly”, i.e., any block-based ﬁle
systems can be deployed on top of it. Thus, it is possible
to deploy MobiPluto on most mobile devices. We provide
a proof-of-concept i...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MobiPluto: File System Friendly Deniable Storage for Mobile Devices
author:Bing Chang and
Zhan Wang and
Bo Chen and
Fengwei Zhang
MobiPluto: File System Friendly Deniable Storage for
Mobile Devices
Bing Chang1,2,3, Zhan Wang1,2
, Bo Chen4, Fengwei Zhang5
1 State Key Laboratory of Information Security,
∗
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
2 Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
3 University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
4 College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University, USA
5 Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, USA
{changbing,wangzhan}@iie.ac.cn, bxc30@psu.edu, fengwei@wayne.edu
ABSTRACT
Mobile devices are prevalently used for processing personal
private data and sometimes collecting evidence of social in-
justice or political oppression. The device owners may al-
ways feel reluctant to expose this type of data to undesired
observers or inspectors. This usually can be achieved by
encryption. However, the traditional encryption may not
work when an adversary is able to coerce device owners into
revealing their encrypted content. Plausibly Deniable En-
cryption (PDE) is thus designed to protect sensitive data
against this type of powerful adversaries.
In this paper, we present MobiPluto, a ﬁle system friendly
PDE scheme for denying the existence of sensitive data stored
on mobile devices. MobiPluto achieves deniability feature as
nothing but a “side-eﬀect” of combining thin provisioning, a
well-established tool in Linux kernel, with encryption. This
feature makes MobiPluto more plausible for users to have
such software on their mobile devices. A salient diﬀerence
between MobiPluto and the existing PDE schemes is that
MobiPluto is “ﬁle system friendly”, i.e., any block-based ﬁle
systems can be deployed on top of it. Thus, it is possible
to deploy MobiPluto on most mobile devices. We provide
a proof-of-concept i...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Preventing accidental data disclosure in modern operating systems
author:Adwait Nadkarni and
William Enck
Preventing Accidental Data Disclosure in
Modern Operating Systems
Adwait Nadkarni
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA
anadkarni@ncsu.edu
William Enck
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA
enck@cs.ncsu.edu
ABSTRACT
Modern OSes such as Android, iOS, and Windows 8 have
changed the way consumers interact with computing devices.
Tasks are often completed by stringing together a collec-
tion of purpose-speciﬁc user applications (e.g., a barcode
reader, a social networking app, a document viewer). As
users direct this workﬂow between applications, it is di-
cult to predict the consequence of each step. Poor selection
may result in accidental information disclosure when the
target application unknowingly uses cloud services. This
paper presents Aquifer as a policy framework and system
for preventing accidental information disclosure in modern
operating systems.
In Aquifer, application developers de-
ﬁne secrecy restrictions that protect the entire user interface
workﬂow deﬁning the user task. In doing so, Aquifer pro-
vides protection beyond simple permission checks and allows
applications to retain control of data even after it is shared.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—ac-
cess controls, information ﬂow controls
Keywords
OS security; access control; information ﬂow control
1.
INTRODUCTION
Operating system security architectures are currently un-
dergoing a fundamental change. Modern OSes [32, 42], such
as Android, iOS, and Windows 8, take the suggestion of
decades of security research [45, 22, 35, 14] and run each ap-
plication as a unique security principal. While having ﬁner-
grained security principals prevents many obvious attacks,
complete sandboxing [19] is inadequate.
Applications share data with one another, perhaps more
so now than in the past. Conside...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Preventing accidental data disclosure in modern operating systems
author:Adwait Nadkarni and
William Enck
Preventing Accidental Data Disclosure in
Modern Operating Systems
Adwait Nadkarni
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA
anadkarni@ncsu.edu
William Enck
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA
enck@cs.ncsu.edu
ABSTRACT
Modern OSes such as Android, iOS, and Windows 8 have
changed the way consumers interact with computing devices.
Tasks are often completed by stringing together a collec-
tion of purpose-speciﬁc user applications (e.g., a barcode
reader, a social networking app, a document viewer). As
users direct this workﬂow between applications, it is di-
cult to predict the consequence of each step. Poor selection
may result in accidental information disclosure when the
target application unknowingly uses cloud services. This
paper presents Aquifer as a policy framework and system
for preventing accidental information disclosure in modern
operating systems.
In Aquifer, application developers de-
ﬁne secrecy restrictions that protect the entire user interface
workﬂow deﬁning the user task. In doing so, Aquifer pro-
vides protection beyond simple permission checks and allows
applications to retain control of data even after it is shared.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—ac-
cess controls, information ﬂow controls
Keywords
OS security; access control; information ﬂow control
1.
INTRODUCTION
Operating system security architectures are currently un-
dergoing a fundamental change. Modern OSes [32, 42], such
as Android, iOS, and Windows 8, take the suggestion of
decades of security research [45, 22, 35, 14] and run each ap-
plication as a unique security principal. While having ﬁner-
grained security principals prevents many obvious attacks,
complete sandboxing [19] is inadequate.
Applications share data with one another, perhaps more
so now than in the past. Conside...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:EPISODE: Efficient Privacy-PreservIng Similar Sequence Queries on
Outsourced Genomic DatabasEs
author:Thomas Schneider and
Oleksandr Tkachenko
EPISODE: Efficient Privacy-PreservIng Similar Sequence
Queries on Outsourced Genomic DatabasEs∗
Thomas Schneider
TU Darmstadt
schneider@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de
Oleksandr Tkachenko
TU Darmstadt
tkachenko@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de
ABSTRACT
Nowadays, genomic sequencing has become much more affordable
for many people and, thus, many people own their genomic data in
a digital format. Having paid for genomic sequencing, they want to
make use of their data for different tasks that are possible only using
genomics, and they share their data with third parties to achieve
these tasks, e.g., to find their relatives in a genomic database. As
a consequence, more genomic data get collected worldwide. The
upside of the data collection is that unique analyses on these data
become possible. However, this raises privacy concerns because the
genomic data uniquely identify their owner, contain sensitive data
about his/her risk for getting particular diseases, and even sensitive
information about his/her family members.
In this paper, we introduce EPISODE — a highly efficient privacy-
preserving protocol for Similar Sequence Queries (SSQs), which can
be used for finding genetically similar individuals in an outsourced
genomic database, i.e., securely aggregated from data of multiple
institutions. Our SSQ protocol is based on the edit distance approx-
imation by Asharov et al. (PETS’18), which we further optimize
and extend to the outsourcing scenario. We improve their protocol
by using more efficient building blocks and achieve a 5–6× run-
time improvement compared to their work in the same two-party
scenario.
Recently, Cheng et al. (ASIACCS’18) introduced protocols for
outsourced SSQs that rely on homomorphic encryption. Our new
protocol outperforms theirs by more than factor 24 000× in terms
of run-time in the same setting and guara...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:EPISODE: Efficient Privacy-PreservIng Similar Sequence Queries on
Outsourced Genomic DatabasEs
author:Thomas Schneider and
Oleksandr Tkachenko
EPISODE: Efficient Privacy-PreservIng Similar Sequence
Queries on Outsourced Genomic DatabasEs∗
Thomas Schneider
TU Darmstadt
schneider@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de
Oleksandr Tkachenko
TU Darmstadt
tkachenko@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de
ABSTRACT
Nowadays, genomic sequencing has become much more affordable
for many people and, thus, many people own their genomic data in
a digital format. Having paid for genomic sequencing, they want to
make use of their data for different tasks that are possible only using
genomics, and they share their data with third parties to achieve
these tasks, e.g., to find their relatives in a genomic database. As
a consequence, more genomic data get collected worldwide. The
upside of the data collection is that unique analyses on these data
become possible. However, this raises privacy concerns because the
genomic data uniquely identify their owner, contain sensitive data
about his/her risk for getting particular diseases, and even sensitive
information about his/her family members.
In this paper, we introduce EPISODE — a highly efficient privacy-
preserving protocol for Similar Sequence Queries (SSQs), which can
be used for finding genetically similar individuals in an outsourced
genomic database, i.e., securely aggregated from data of multiple
institutions. Our SSQ protocol is based on the edit distance approx-
imation by Asharov et al. (PETS’18), which we further optimize
and extend to the outsourcing scenario. We improve their protocol
by using more efficient building blocks and achieve a 5–6× run-
time improvement compared to their work in the same two-party
scenario.
Recently, Cheng et al. (ASIACCS’18) introduced protocols for
outsourced SSQs that rely on homomorphic encryption. Our new
protocol outperforms theirs by more than factor 24 000× in terms
of run-time in the same setting and guara...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android
author:Jaebaek Seo and
Daehyeok Kim and
Donghyun Cho and
Insik Shin and
Taesoo Kim
FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android
Jaebaek Seo∗, Daehyeok Kim∗, Donghyun Cho∗, Taesoo Kim†, Insik Shin∗‡
∗School of Computing, KAIST
†College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
{jaebaek, dhkim7, bigeyeguy, ishin}@kaist.ac.kr, taesoo@gatech.edu
Abstract—Mobile applications are increasingly integrating
third-party libraries to provide various features, such as ad-
vertising, analytics, social networking, and more. Unfortunately,
such integration with third-party libraries comes with the cost
of potential privacy violations of users, because Android always
grants a full set of permissions to third-party libraries as
their host applications. Unintended accesses to users’ private
data are underestimated threats to users’ privacy, as complex
and often obfuscated third-party libraries make it hard for
application developers to estimate the correct behaviors of third-
party libraries. More critically, a wide adoption of native code
(JNI) and dynamic code executions such as Java reﬂection or
dynamic code reloading, makes it even harder to apply state-of-
the-art security analysis.
In this work, we propose FLEXDROID, a new Android
security model and isolation mechanism,
that provides dy-
namic, ﬁne-grained access control for third-party libraries. With
FLEXDROID, application developers not only can gain a full
control of third-party libraries (e.g., which permissions to grant
or not), but also can specify how to make them behave after
detecting a privacy violation (e.g., providing a mock user’s
information or kill). To achieve such goals, we deﬁne a new
notion of principals for third-party libraries, and develop a novel
security mechanism, called inter-process stack inspection that is
effective to JNI as well as dynamic code execution. Our usability
study shows that developers can easily adopt ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android
author:Jaebaek Seo and
Daehyeok Kim and
Donghyun Cho and
Insik Shin and
Taesoo Kim
FLEXDROID: Enforcing In-App Privilege Separation in Android
Jaebaek Seo∗, Daehyeok Kim∗, Donghyun Cho∗, Taesoo Kim†, Insik Shin∗‡
∗School of Computing, KAIST
†College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
{jaebaek, dhkim7, bigeyeguy, ishin}@kaist.ac.kr, taesoo@gatech.edu
Abstract—Mobile applications are increasingly integrating
third-party libraries to provide various features, such as ad-
vertising, analytics, social networking, and more. Unfortunately,
such integration with third-party libraries comes with the cost
of potential privacy violations of users, because Android always
grants a full set of permissions to third-party libraries as
their host applications. Unintended accesses to users’ private
data are underestimated threats to users’ privacy, as complex
and often obfuscated third-party libraries make it hard for
application developers to estimate the correct behaviors of third-
party libraries. More critically, a wide adoption of native code
(JNI) and dynamic code executions such as Java reﬂection or
dynamic code reloading, makes it even harder to apply state-of-
the-art security analysis.
In this work, we propose FLEXDROID, a new Android
security model and isolation mechanism,
that provides dy-
namic, ﬁne-grained access control for third-party libraries. With
FLEXDROID, application developers not only can gain a full
control of third-party libraries (e.g., which permissions to grant
or not), but also can specify how to make them behave after
detecting a privacy violation (e.g., providing a mock user’s
information or kill). To achieve such goals, we deﬁne a new
notion of principals for third-party libraries, and develop a novel
security mechanism, called inter-process stack inspection that is
effective to JNI as well as dynamic code execution. Our usability
study shows that developers can easily adopt ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。