Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
author:Bryan D. Payne and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
Bryan D. Payne Martim D. P. de A. Carbone Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{bdpayne,mcarbone,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
The monitoring of virtual machines has many applica-
tions in areas such as security and systems management. A
monitoring technique known as introspection has received
signiﬁcant discussion in the research literature, but these
prior works have focused on the applications of introspec-
tion rather than how to properly build a monitoring archi-
tecture. In this paper we propose a set of requirements that
should guide the development of virtual machine monitor-
ing solutions. To illustrate the viability of these require-
ments, we describe the design of XenAccess, a monitoring
library for operating systems running on Xen. XenAccess
incorporates virtual memory introspection and virtual disk
monitoring capabilities, allowing monitor applications to
safely and efﬁciently access the memory state and disk ac-
tivity of a target operating system. XenAccess’ efﬁciency
and functionality are illustrated through a series of perfor-
mance tests and practical examples.
1 Introduction
On the wave of its renewed popularity, researchers are
identifying many new applications that leverage the abstrac-
tions and isolation provided by virtualization. One area that
has received signiﬁcant attention is security. Security ap-
plications beneﬁt from virtualization by running in isolated
virtual machines (VMs) and building smaller trusted com-
puting bases (TCBs). This technique has been used in a
variety of research projects [21, 9, 10, 18, 7, 15, 2].
Among the security research that uses virtualization, an
increasingly common practice is to setup a secure VM that
is used to monitor the other VMs running on the s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
author:Bryan D. Payne and
Wenke Lee
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
23rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Secure and Flexible Monitoring of Virtual Machines
Bryan D. Payne Martim D. P. de A. Carbone Wenke Lee
Georgia Institute of Technology
{bdpayne,mcarbone,wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
The monitoring of virtual machines has many applica-
tions in areas such as security and systems management. A
monitoring technique known as introspection has received
signiﬁcant discussion in the research literature, but these
prior works have focused on the applications of introspec-
tion rather than how to properly build a monitoring archi-
tecture. In this paper we propose a set of requirements that
should guide the development of virtual machine monitor-
ing solutions. To illustrate the viability of these require-
ments, we describe the design of XenAccess, a monitoring
library for operating systems running on Xen. XenAccess
incorporates virtual memory introspection and virtual disk
monitoring capabilities, allowing monitor applications to
safely and efﬁciently access the memory state and disk ac-
tivity of a target operating system. XenAccess’ efﬁciency
and functionality are illustrated through a series of perfor-
mance tests and practical examples.
1 Introduction
On the wave of its renewed popularity, researchers are
identifying many new applications that leverage the abstrac-
tions and isolation provided by virtualization. One area that
has received signiﬁcant attention is security. Security ap-
plications beneﬁt from virtualization by running in isolated
virtual machines (VMs) and building smaller trusted com-
puting bases (TCBs). This technique has been used in a
variety of research projects [21, 9, 10, 18, 7, 15, 2].
Among the security research that uses virtualization, an
increasingly common practice is to setup a secure VM that
is used to monitor the other VMs running on the s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Triangle inequality variations in the internet
author:Cristian Lumezanu and
Randolph Baden and
Neil Spring and
Bobby Bhattacharjee
Triangle Inequality Variations in the Internet
Cristian Lumezanu, Randy Baden, Neil Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee
Department of Computer Science
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
{lume, randofu, nspring, bobby}@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Triangle inequality violations (TIVs) are important for latency sen-
sitive distributed applications. On one hand, they can expose op-
portunities to improve network routing by ﬁnding shorter paths be-
tween nodes. On the other hand, TIVs can frustrate network em-
bedding or positioning systems that treat the Internet as a metric
space where the triangle inequality holds. Even though triangle
inequality violations are both signiﬁcant and curious, their study
has been limited to aggregate data sets that combine measurements
taken over long periods of time.
The limitations of these data sets open crucial questions in the
design of systems that exploit (or avoid) TIVs: are TIVs stable or
transient? Or are they illusions caused by aggregating measure-
ments taken at different times? We collect latency matrices at vary-
ing sizes and time granularities and study dynamic properties of tri-
angle inequality violations in the Internet. We show that TIVs are
not results of measurement error and that their number varies with
time. We examine how latency aggregates of data measured over
longer periods of time preserve TIVs. Using medians to compute
violations eliminates most of the TIVs that appear sporadically dur-
ing the measurement but it misses many of the ones that are present
for more than ﬁve hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication networks]: Data communica-
tions; C.2.4 [Computer-communication networks]: Distributed
systems; C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques;
H.4.3 [Information systems applications]: Communications ap-
plications
General Terms
Mea...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Triangle inequality variations in the internet
author:Cristian Lumezanu and
Randolph Baden and
Neil Spring and
Bobby Bhattacharjee
Triangle Inequality Variations in the Internet
Cristian Lumezanu, Randy Baden, Neil Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee
Department of Computer Science
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
{lume, randofu, nspring, bobby}@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Triangle inequality violations (TIVs) are important for latency sen-
sitive distributed applications. On one hand, they can expose op-
portunities to improve network routing by ﬁnding shorter paths be-
tween nodes. On the other hand, TIVs can frustrate network em-
bedding or positioning systems that treat the Internet as a metric
space where the triangle inequality holds. Even though triangle
inequality violations are both signiﬁcant and curious, their study
has been limited to aggregate data sets that combine measurements
taken over long periods of time.
The limitations of these data sets open crucial questions in the
design of systems that exploit (or avoid) TIVs: are TIVs stable or
transient? Or are they illusions caused by aggregating measure-
ments taken at different times? We collect latency matrices at vary-
ing sizes and time granularities and study dynamic properties of tri-
angle inequality violations in the Internet. We show that TIVs are
not results of measurement error and that their number varies with
time. We examine how latency aggregates of data measured over
longer periods of time preserve TIVs. Using medians to compute
violations eliminates most of the TIVs that appear sporadically dur-
ing the measurement but it misses many of the ones that are present
for more than ﬁve hours.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication networks]: Data communica-
tions; C.2.4 [Computer-communication networks]: Distributed
systems; C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques;
H.4.3 [Information systems applications]: Communications ap-
plications
General Terms
Mea...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Comb for Decompiled C Code
author:Andrea Gussoni and
Alessandro Di Federico and
Pietro Fezzardi and
Giovanni Agosta
A Comb for Decompiled C Code
Andrea Gussoni
Politecnico di Milano
andrea1.gussoni@polimi.it
Pietro Fezzardi
rev.ng Srls
pietro@rev.ng
Alessandro Di Federico
rev.ng Srls
ale@rev.ng
Giovanni Agosta
Politecnico di Milano
agosta@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Decompilers are fundamental tools to perform security assessments
of third-party software. The quality of decompiled code can be a
game changer in order to reduce the time and effort required for
analysis. This paper proposes a novel approach to restructure the
control flow graph recovered from binary programs in a semantics-
preserving fashion. The algorithm is designed from the ground up
with the goal of producing C code that is both goto-free and dras-
tically reducing the mental load required for an analyst to under-
stand it. As a result, the code generated with this technique is well-
structured, idiomatic, readable, easy to understand and fully exploits
the expressiveness of C language. The algorithm has been imple-
mented on top of the rev.ng [11] static binary analysis framework.
The resulting decompiler, revng-c, is compared on real-world bi-
naries with state-of-the-art commercial and open source tools. The
results show that our decompilation process introduces between
40% and 50% less extra cyclomatic complexity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; Security requirements.
KEYWORDS
decompilation, reverse engineering, goto, control flow restructuring
ACM Reference Format:
Andrea Gussoni, Alessandro Di Federico, Pietro Fezzardi, and Giovanni
Agosta. 2020. A Comb for Decompiled C Code. In 15th ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS’20), Octo-
ber 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3384766
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, software has steadily b...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Comb for Decompiled C Code
author:Andrea Gussoni and
Alessandro Di Federico and
Pietro Fezzardi and
Giovanni Agosta
A Comb for Decompiled C Code
Andrea Gussoni
Politecnico di Milano
andrea1.gussoni@polimi.it
Pietro Fezzardi
rev.ng Srls
pietro@rev.ng
Alessandro Di Federico
rev.ng Srls
ale@rev.ng
Giovanni Agosta
Politecnico di Milano
agosta@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Decompilers are fundamental tools to perform security assessments
of third-party software. The quality of decompiled code can be a
game changer in order to reduce the time and effort required for
analysis. This paper proposes a novel approach to restructure the
control flow graph recovered from binary programs in a semantics-
preserving fashion. The algorithm is designed from the ground up
with the goal of producing C code that is both goto-free and dras-
tically reducing the mental load required for an analyst to under-
stand it. As a result, the code generated with this technique is well-
structured, idiomatic, readable, easy to understand and fully exploits
the expressiveness of C language. The algorithm has been imple-
mented on top of the rev.ng [11] static binary analysis framework.
The resulting decompiler, revng-c, is compared on real-world bi-
naries with state-of-the-art commercial and open source tools. The
results show that our decompilation process introduces between
40% and 50% less extra cyclomatic complexity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; Security requirements.
KEYWORDS
decompilation, reverse engineering, goto, control flow restructuring
ACM Reference Format:
Andrea Gussoni, Alessandro Di Federico, Pietro Fezzardi, and Giovanni
Agosta. 2020. A Comb for Decompiled C Code. In 15th ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS’20), Octo-
ber 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3384766
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, software has steadily b...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies, and Zone Size Detection
author:Jonathan Demke and
Casey T. Deccio
On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies,
and Zone Size Detection
Jonathan Demke
and Casey Deccio(B)
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA
{jpd0057,casey}@byu.edu
https://cs.byu.edu/
Abstract. The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) introduced additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records)
into negative DNS responses, which records can prove there is no trans-
lation for a queried domain name. We introduce a novel technique to
estimate the size of a DNS zone by analyzing the NSEC3 records returned
by only a small number of DNS queries issued. We survey the prevalence
of the deployment of diﬀerent variants of DNSSEC negative responses
across a large set of DNSSEC-signed zones in the wild, and identify
over 50% as applicable to our measurement technique. Of the applicable
zones, we show that 99% are composed of fewer than 40 names.
Keywords: DNS · DNSSEC · Privacy
1 Introduction
Since its inception over thirty years ago, the Domain Name System (DNS) [19,20]
has included provisions for so-called negative responses, which indicate that there
is no translation for a queried domain name. While the essential characteristic of
a negative response has always been the lack of an answer (i.e., translation), the
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [8,19,20,23] introduced the requirement
that additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records) be included in a negative
DNS response, which records can prove the non-translation of the domain name.
A side eﬀect of including these extra records is that additional information is
revealed about a domain—such as names that do exist. While this side eﬀect is
innocuous to some, to others it can be undesirable. In an attempt to reduce or
eliminate unwanted disclosure of information via DNSSEC negative responses,
new approaches have been introduced into the DNSSEC ecosystem. However,
each comes with its own caveats.
In t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies, and Zone Size Detection
author:Jonathan Demke and
Casey T. Deccio
On DNSSEC Negative Responses, Lies,
and Zone Size Detection
Jonathan Demke
and Casey Deccio(B)
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA
{jpd0057,casey}@byu.edu
https://cs.byu.edu/
Abstract. The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) introduced additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records)
into negative DNS responses, which records can prove there is no trans-
lation for a queried domain name. We introduce a novel technique to
estimate the size of a DNS zone by analyzing the NSEC3 records returned
by only a small number of DNS queries issued. We survey the prevalence
of the deployment of diﬀerent variants of DNSSEC negative responses
across a large set of DNSSEC-signed zones in the wild, and identify
over 50% as applicable to our measurement technique. Of the applicable
zones, we show that 99% are composed of fewer than 40 names.
Keywords: DNS · DNSSEC · Privacy
1 Introduction
Since its inception over thirty years ago, the Domain Name System (DNS) [19,20]
has included provisions for so-called negative responses, which indicate that there
is no translation for a queried domain name. While the essential characteristic of
a negative response has always been the lack of an answer (i.e., translation), the
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [8,19,20,23] introduced the requirement
that additional DNS records (NSEC or NSEC3 records) be included in a negative
DNS response, which records can prove the non-translation of the domain name.
A side eﬀect of including these extra records is that additional information is
revealed about a domain—such as names that do exist. While this side eﬀect is
innocuous to some, to others it can be undesirable. In an attempt to reduce or
eliminate unwanted disclosure of information via DNSSEC negative responses,
new approaches have been introduced into the DNSSEC ecosystem. However,
each comes with its own caveats.
In t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Protecting Cryptographic Keys from Memory Disclosure Attacks
author:Keith Harrison and
Shouhuai Xu
Protecting Cryptographic Keys From Memory Disclosure Attacks
Keith Harrison and Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio
{kharriso,shxu}@cs.utsa.edu
Abstract
Cryptography has become an indispensable mechanism
for securing systems, communications and applications.
While offering strong protection, cryptography makes the
assumption that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely se-
cret. In general this assumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee
in real life because computers may be compromised rela-
tively easily. In this paper we investigate a class of attacks,
which exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities to expose
cryptographic keys. We demonstrate that the threat is real
by formulating an attack that exposed the private key of an
OpenSSH server within 1 minute, and exposed the private
key of an Apache HTTP server within 5 minutes. We pro-
pose a set of techniques to address such attacks. Experi-
mental results show that our techniques are efﬁcient (i.e.,
imposing no performance penalty) and effective — unless a
large portion of allocated memory is disclosed.
Keywords: cryptographic key security, memory disclosure.
1 Introduction
The utility of cryptography is based on the assumption
that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely secret. This as-
sumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee in real-life systems
due to various software bugs in operating systems and ap-
plications. In this paper we focus on a class of attacks that
exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities, called memory
disclosure attacks. Such an attack can expose the content
of (a portion of) computer memory, and thus cryptographic
keys in the disclosed memory.
Our contributions. First, we thoroughly assess (Section 2)
the damage of memory disclosure attacks against the pri-
vate keys of OpenSSH servers and Apache HTTP servers.
The attacks exploit two reported vulnerab...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Protecting Cryptographic Keys from Memory Disclosure Attacks
author:Keith Harrison and
Shouhuai Xu
Protecting Cryptographic Keys From Memory Disclosure Attacks
Keith Harrison and Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio
{kharriso,shxu}@cs.utsa.edu
Abstract
Cryptography has become an indispensable mechanism
for securing systems, communications and applications.
While offering strong protection, cryptography makes the
assumption that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely se-
cret. In general this assumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee
in real life because computers may be compromised rela-
tively easily. In this paper we investigate a class of attacks,
which exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities to expose
cryptographic keys. We demonstrate that the threat is real
by formulating an attack that exposed the private key of an
OpenSSH server within 1 minute, and exposed the private
key of an Apache HTTP server within 5 minutes. We pro-
pose a set of techniques to address such attacks. Experi-
mental results show that our techniques are efﬁcient (i.e.,
imposing no performance penalty) and effective — unless a
large portion of allocated memory is disclosed.
Keywords: cryptographic key security, memory disclosure.
1 Introduction
The utility of cryptography is based on the assumption
that cryptographic keys are kept absolutely secret. This as-
sumption is very difﬁcult to guarantee in real-life systems
due to various software bugs in operating systems and ap-
plications. In this paper we focus on a class of attacks that
exploit memory disclosure vulnerabilities, called memory
disclosure attacks. Such an attack can expose the content
of (a portion of) computer memory, and thus cryptographic
keys in the disclosed memory.
Our contributions. First, we thoroughly assess (Section 2)
the damage of memory disclosure attacks against the pri-
vate keys of OpenSSH servers and Apache HTTP servers.
The attacks exploit two reported vulnerab...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Internet optometry: assessing the broken glasses in internet reachability
author:Randy Bush and
Olaf Maennel and
Matthew Roughan and
Steve Uhlig
Assessing the Broken Glasses in Internet Reachability
Internet Optometry:
Randy Bush
IIJ
Tokyo, Japan
Olaf Maennel
Loughborough
University, UK
randy@psg.com olaf@maennel.net
ABSTRACT
Reachability is thought of as the most basic service provided by
today’s Internet. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the com-
munity has a deep understanding of it. Researchers and operators
rely on two views of reachability: control/routing- and data-plane
measurements, but both types of measurements suffer from biases
and limitations. In this paper, we illustrate some of these biases,
and show how to design controlled experiments which allow us to
"see" through the limitations of previous measurement techniques.
For example, we discover the extent of default routing and its im-
pact on reachability. This explains some of the previous unexpected
results from studies that compared control- and data-plane mea-
surements.
However, not all limitations of visibility given by routing and
probing tools can be compensated for by methodological improve-
ments. We will show in this paper, that some of the limitations can
be carefully addressed when designing an experiment, e.g. not see-
ing the reverse path taken by a probe can be partly compensated for
by our methodology, called dual probing. However, compensating
for other biases through more measurements may not always be
possible. Therefore, calibration of expectations and checks of as-
sumptions are critical when conducting measurements that aim at
making conclusions about topological properties of the Internet.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Internet]: Measurement
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Routing, Data-Plane, Control-Plane, Reachability, Limitation of
data, Default-Routing
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classro...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Internet optometry: assessing the broken glasses in internet reachability
author:Randy Bush and
Olaf Maennel and
Matthew Roughan and
Steve Uhlig
Assessing the Broken Glasses in Internet Reachability
Internet Optometry:
Randy Bush
IIJ
Tokyo, Japan
Olaf Maennel
Loughborough
University, UK
randy@psg.com olaf@maennel.net
ABSTRACT
Reachability is thought of as the most basic service provided by
today’s Internet. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the com-
munity has a deep understanding of it. Researchers and operators
rely on two views of reachability: control/routing- and data-plane
measurements, but both types of measurements suffer from biases
and limitations. In this paper, we illustrate some of these biases,
and show how to design controlled experiments which allow us to
"see" through the limitations of previous measurement techniques.
For example, we discover the extent of default routing and its im-
pact on reachability. This explains some of the previous unexpected
results from studies that compared control- and data-plane mea-
surements.
However, not all limitations of visibility given by routing and
probing tools can be compensated for by methodological improve-
ments. We will show in this paper, that some of the limitations can
be carefully addressed when designing an experiment, e.g. not see-
ing the reverse path taken by a probe can be partly compensated for
by our methodology, called dual probing. However, compensating
for other biases through more measurements may not always be
possible. Therefore, calibration of expectations and checks of as-
sumptions are critical when conducting measurements that aim at
making conclusions about topological properties of the Internet.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Internet]: Measurement
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Routing, Data-Plane, Control-Plane, Reachability, Limitation of
data, Default-Routing
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classro...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
author:Jens M"uller and
Fabian Ising and
Vladislav Mladenov and
Christian Mainka and
Sebastian Schinzel and
J"org Schwenk
Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
Jens Müller
jens.a.mueller@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Fabian Ising
f.ising@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Christian Mainka
christian.mainka@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Sebastian Schinzel
schinzel@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Vladislav Mladenov
vladislav.mladenov@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Jörg Schwenk
joerg.schwenk@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
ABSTRACT
The Portable Document Format, better known as PDF, is one of the
most widely used document formats worldwide, and in order to en-
sure information confidentiality, this file format supports document
encryption. In this paper, we analyze PDF encryption and show
two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted
documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted
documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within
attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext
once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse
a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate
encrypted content. The only requirement is that a single block of
known plaintext is needed, and we show that this is fulfilled by
design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of en-
crypted documents by using exfiltration channels which are based
on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and
found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the
vulnerabilities and supported the vendors in fixing the issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privac...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
author:Jens M"uller and
Fabian Ising and
Vladislav Mladenov and
Christian Mainka and
Sebastian Schinzel and
J"org Schwenk
Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption
Jens Müller
jens.a.mueller@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Fabian Ising
f.ising@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Christian Mainka
christian.mainka@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Sebastian Schinzel
schinzel@fh-muenster.de
Münster University of Applied
Sciences
Vladislav Mladenov
vladislav.mladenov@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
Jörg Schwenk
joerg.schwenk@rub.de
Ruhr University Bochum, Chair for
Network and Data Security
ABSTRACT
The Portable Document Format, better known as PDF, is one of the
most widely used document formats worldwide, and in order to en-
sure information confidentiality, this file format supports document
encryption. In this paper, we analyze PDF encryption and show
two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted
documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted
documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within
attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext
once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse
a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate
encrypted content. The only requirement is that a single block of
known plaintext is needed, and we show that this is fulfilled by
design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of en-
crypted documents by using exfiltration channels which are based
on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and
found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the
vulnerabilities and supported the vendors in fixing the issues.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privac...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics on Social Relationships
author:Changchang Liu and
Prateek Mittal
LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics
on Social Relationships
Changchang Liu, Prateek Mittal
Email: cl12@princeton.edu, pmittal@princeton.edu
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
Abstract—Social relationships present a critical
foundation
for many real-world applications. However, both users and
online social network (OSN) providers are hesitant to share
social relationships with untrusted external applications due to
privacy concerns. In this work, we design LinkMirage, a system
that mediates privacy-preserving access to social relationships.
LinkMirage takes users’ social relationship graph as an input,
obfuscates the social graph topology, and provides untrusted
external applications with an obfuscated view of
the social
relationship graph while preserving graph utility.
Our key contributions are (1) a novel algorithm for obfus-
cating social relationship graph while preserving graph utility,
(2) theoretical and experimental analysis of privacy and utility
using real-world social network topologies, including a large-scale
Google+ dataset with 940 million links. Our experimental results
demonstrate that LinkMirage provides up to 10x improvement in
privacy guarantees compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Overall, LinkMirage enables the design of real-world applications
such as recommendation systems, graph analytics, anonymous
communications, and Sybil defenses while protecting the privacy
of social relationships.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have revolutionized the way
our society interacts and communicates with each other. Under
the hood, OSNs can be viewed as a special graph structure
composed of individuals (or organizations) and connections
between these entities. These social relationships represent
sensitive relationships between entities, for example, trusted
friendships or import...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics on Social Relationships
author:Changchang Liu and
Prateek Mittal
LinkMirage: Enabling Privacy-preserving Analytics
on Social Relationships
Changchang Liu, Prateek Mittal
Email: cl12@princeton.edu, pmittal@princeton.edu
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
Abstract—Social relationships present a critical
foundation
for many real-world applications. However, both users and
online social network (OSN) providers are hesitant to share
social relationships with untrusted external applications due to
privacy concerns. In this work, we design LinkMirage, a system
that mediates privacy-preserving access to social relationships.
LinkMirage takes users’ social relationship graph as an input,
obfuscates the social graph topology, and provides untrusted
external applications with an obfuscated view of
the social
relationship graph while preserving graph utility.
Our key contributions are (1) a novel algorithm for obfus-
cating social relationship graph while preserving graph utility,
(2) theoretical and experimental analysis of privacy and utility
using real-world social network topologies, including a large-scale
Google+ dataset with 940 million links. Our experimental results
demonstrate that LinkMirage provides up to 10x improvement in
privacy guarantees compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Overall, LinkMirage enables the design of real-world applications
such as recommendation systems, graph analytics, anonymous
communications, and Sybil defenses while protecting the privacy
of social relationships.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have revolutionized the way
our society interacts and communicates with each other. Under
the hood, OSNs can be viewed as a special graph structure
composed of individuals (or organizations) and connections
between these entities. These social relationships represent
sensitive relationships between entities, for example, trusted
friendships or import...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting spammers on social networks
author:Gianluca Stringhini and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara
26th ACSAC(December, 2010)
Presented by
Alankrit Chona 2009CS10176
Nikita Gupta 2009CS50248
 Motivation
 The Popular Social Networks
 Data Collection
 Analysis of Collected Data
 Spam Profile Detection
 Our Proposals
SIL 765
2
 To conduct a comprehensive survey of
existing and potential attack behaviors in
social network sites
 Identify patterns in such attack behaviors
 Detect Spammers in a real-world social
network
 Review existing solutions, measurement as
well as defense mechanisms
 “Unsolicited usually commercial e-mail sent
to a large number of addresses” – Merriam
Webster Online
 As the Internet has supported new
applications, many other forms are
common, requiring a much broader
definition
Capturing user attention unjustifiably in Internet
enabled applications (e-mail, Web, Social Media
etc..)
INTERNET SPAM
[Forms]
DIRECT
INDIRECT
E-Mail Spam
IM Spam (SPIM)
Social Network Spam
Spam Blogs (Splogs)
General Web Spam
[Mechanisms]
Social Media Spam
Spamdexing
Auto-generated and/or
Plagiarized Content
Advertisements in
Profitable Contexts
Link Farms to promote
other spam pages
 Sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are
consistently among the top 20 most-viewed web
sites of the Internet
 In 2008, 83% of the users of social networks have
received at least one unwanted friend request or
message
 A previous study showed that 45% of users on a
social networking site readily click on links
posted by their “friend” accounts, even if they do
not know that person in real life
SIL 765
7
SIL 765
8
◦ Facebook administrators claim to have more than
400 million active users all over the world
◦ Most Facebook users were grouped in networks,
where people coming from a certain...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting spammers on social networks
author:Gianluca Stringhini and
Christopher Kruegel and
Giovanni Vigna
Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara
26th ACSAC(December, 2010)
Presented by
Alankrit Chona 2009CS10176
Nikita Gupta 2009CS50248
 Motivation
 The Popular Social Networks
 Data Collection
 Analysis of Collected Data
 Spam Profile Detection
 Our Proposals
SIL 765
2
 To conduct a comprehensive survey of
existing and potential attack behaviors in
social network sites
 Identify patterns in such attack behaviors
 Detect Spammers in a real-world social
network
 Review existing solutions, measurement as
well as defense mechanisms
 “Unsolicited usually commercial e-mail sent
to a large number of addresses” – Merriam
Webster Online
 As the Internet has supported new
applications, many other forms are
common, requiring a much broader
definition
Capturing user attention unjustifiably in Internet
enabled applications (e-mail, Web, Social Media
etc..)
INTERNET SPAM
[Forms]
DIRECT
INDIRECT
E-Mail Spam
IM Spam (SPIM)
Social Network Spam
Spam Blogs (Splogs)
General Web Spam
[Mechanisms]
Social Media Spam
Spamdexing
Auto-generated and/or
Plagiarized Content
Advertisements in
Profitable Contexts
Link Farms to promote
other spam pages
 Sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are
consistently among the top 20 most-viewed web
sites of the Internet
 In 2008, 83% of the users of social networks have
received at least one unwanted friend request or
message
 A previous study showed that 45% of users on a
social networking site readily click on links
posted by their “friend” accounts, even if they do
not know that person in real life
SIL 765
7
SIL 765
8
◦ Facebook administrators claim to have more than
400 million active users all over the world
◦ Most Facebook users were grouped in networks,
where people coming from a certain...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on Behavior Profiles
author:Vanessa Fr'ıas-Mart'ınez and
Joseph Sherrick and
Salvatore J. Stolfo and
Angelos D. Keromytis
2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on
Behavior Proﬁles
Vanessa Frias-Martinez
∗
[1], Joseph Sherrick
†
, Salvatore J. Stolfo
†
, Angelos D. Keromytis
†
∗
†
Telefonica Research
Madrid,Spain
vanessa@tid.es
Columbia University
New York, USA
js2778,sal,angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract—Current Network Access Control (NAC) technolo-
gies manage the access of new devices into a network to prevent
rogue devices from attacking network hosts or services. Typically,
new devices are checked against a set of manually deﬁned
policies (rules) before being granted access by the NAC enforcer.
The main difﬁculty with this approach lies in the generation
and update of new policies manually as time elapses and all
devices have to reestablish their access rights. The BB-NAC
mechanism was the ﬁrst to introduce a novel Behavior-Based
Network Access Control architecture based on behavior proﬁles
and not rules, where behavior-based access control policies were
automatically generated. As originally presented, BB-NAC relied
on manually pre-determined clusters of behavior which required
human intervention and prevented the fully automation of the
mechanism. In this paper, we present an enhanced BB-NAC
mechanism that fully automatizes the creation of clusters of
behavior. The access control is enhanced with the incorporation
of automatic behavior clustering, which improves the intrusion
detection capabilities by allowing for a more ﬁne-grained def-
inition of normal behavior. Apart from the lack of automatic
clustering, the original BB-NAC overlooked the evolution of the
mechanism as new behavior proﬁles were computed over time.
As part of our enhancements, we also present an incremental-
learning algorithm that automatically updates the behavior-based
access...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on Behavior Profiles
author:Vanessa Fr'ıas-Mart'ınez and
Joseph Sherrick and
Salvatore J. Stolfo and
Angelos D. Keromytis
2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Network Access Control Mechanism Based on
Behavior Proﬁles
Vanessa Frias-Martinez
∗
[1], Joseph Sherrick
†
, Salvatore J. Stolfo
†
, Angelos D. Keromytis
†
∗
†
Telefonica Research
Madrid,Spain
vanessa@tid.es
Columbia University
New York, USA
js2778,sal,angelos@cs.columbia.edu
Abstract—Current Network Access Control (NAC) technolo-
gies manage the access of new devices into a network to prevent
rogue devices from attacking network hosts or services. Typically,
new devices are checked against a set of manually deﬁned
policies (rules) before being granted access by the NAC enforcer.
The main difﬁculty with this approach lies in the generation
and update of new policies manually as time elapses and all
devices have to reestablish their access rights. The BB-NAC
mechanism was the ﬁrst to introduce a novel Behavior-Based
Network Access Control architecture based on behavior proﬁles
and not rules, where behavior-based access control policies were
automatically generated. As originally presented, BB-NAC relied
on manually pre-determined clusters of behavior which required
human intervention and prevented the fully automation of the
mechanism. In this paper, we present an enhanced BB-NAC
mechanism that fully automatizes the creation of clusters of
behavior. The access control is enhanced with the incorporation
of automatic behavior clustering, which improves the intrusion
detection capabilities by allowing for a more ﬁne-grained def-
inition of normal behavior. Apart from the lack of automatic
clustering, the original BB-NAC overlooked the evolution of the
mechanism as new behavior proﬁles were computed over time.
As part of our enhancements, we also present an incremental-
learning algorithm that automatically updates the behavior-based
access...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:NodeSentry: least-privilege library integration for server-side JavaScript
author:Willem De Groef and
Fabio Massacci and
Frank Piessens
NodeSentry: Least-privilege Library Integration for
Server-Side JavaScript
Willem De Groef
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Willem.DeGroef@cs.kuleuven.be
Fabio Massacci
University of Trento
Fabio.Massacci@unitn.it
Frank Piessens
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Frank.Piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
Node.js is a popular JavaScript server-side framework with an
eﬃcient runtime for cloud-based event-driven architectures.
Its strength is the presence of thousands of third-party
libraries which allow developers to quickly build and deploy
applications. These very libraries are a source of security
threats as a vulnerability in one library can (and in some
cases did) compromise one’s entire server.
In order to support the least-privilege integration of li-
braries, we developed NodeSentry, the ﬁrst security archi-
tecture for server-side JavaScript. Our policy enforcement
infrastructure supports an easy deployment of web-hardening
techniques and access control policies on interactions between
libraries and their environment, including any dependent
library.
We discuss the implementation of NodeSentry, and
present its practical evaluation. For hundreds of concurrent
clients, NodeSentry has the same capacity and throughput
as plain Node.js. Only on a large scale, when Node.js
itself yields to a heavy load, NodeSentry shows a limited
overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.3.5 [Information
Storage and Retrieval]: Web-based services
Keywords
Web security, JavaScript
1.
INTRODUCTION
Services oﬀered on the web have a standard conceptual
architecture: a client (or tenant) accesses a web application
which talks to one or more databases [8]. In order to serve
multiple clients, the traditional approach (represented by e.g.,
Apache and IIS) has been...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:NodeSentry: least-privilege library integration for server-side JavaScript
author:Willem De Groef and
Fabio Massacci and
Frank Piessens
NodeSentry: Least-privilege Library Integration for
Server-Side JavaScript
Willem De Groef
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Willem.DeGroef@cs.kuleuven.be
Fabio Massacci
University of Trento
Fabio.Massacci@unitn.it
Frank Piessens
iMinds–DistriNet
KU Leuven, Belgium
Frank.Piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
Node.js is a popular JavaScript server-side framework with an
eﬃcient runtime for cloud-based event-driven architectures.
Its strength is the presence of thousands of third-party
libraries which allow developers to quickly build and deploy
applications. These very libraries are a source of security
threats as a vulnerability in one library can (and in some
cases did) compromise one’s entire server.
In order to support the least-privilege integration of li-
braries, we developed NodeSentry, the ﬁrst security archi-
tecture for server-side JavaScript. Our policy enforcement
infrastructure supports an easy deployment of web-hardening
techniques and access control policies on interactions between
libraries and their environment, including any dependent
library.
We discuss the implementation of NodeSentry, and
present its practical evaluation. For hundreds of concurrent
clients, NodeSentry has the same capacity and throughput
as plain Node.js. Only on a large scale, when Node.js
itself yields to a heavy load, NodeSentry shows a limited
overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; H.3.5 [Information
Storage and Retrieval]: Web-based services
Keywords
Web security, JavaScript
1.
INTRODUCTION
Services oﬀered on the web have a standard conceptual
architecture: a client (or tenant) accesses a web application
which talks to one or more databases [8]. In order to serve
multiple clients, the traditional approach (represented by e.g.,
Apache and IIS) has been...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against AMD's
Secure Encrypted Virtualization
author:Robert Buhren and
Hans Niklas Jacob and
Thilo Krachenfels and
Jean-Pierre Seifert
One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Robert Buhren
robert.buhren@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Hans Niklas Jacob
hnj@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Thilo Krachenfels
tkrachenfels@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Jean-Pierre Seifert
jpseifert@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Fraunhofer SIT
ABSTRACT
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers protection mech-
anisms for virtual machines in untrusted environments through
memory and register encryption. To separate security-sensitive op-
erations from software executing on the main x86 cores, SEV lever-
ages the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP). This paper introduces
a new approach to attack SEV-protected virtual machines (VMs) by
targeting the AMD-SP. We present a voltage glitching attack that
allows an attacker to execute custom payloads on the AMD-SPs
of all microarchitectures that support SEV currently on the mar-
ket (Zen 1, Zen 2, and Zen 3). The presented methods allow us
to deploy a custom SEV firmware on the AMD-SP, which enables
an adversary to decrypt a VM’s memory. Furthermore, using our
approach, we can extract endorsement keys of SEV-enabled CPUs,
which allows us to fake attestation reports or to pose as a valid
target for VM migration without requiring physical access to the
target host. Moreover, we reverse-engineered the Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK) mechanism introduced with SEV Secure
Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). The VCEK binds the endorsement keys
to the firmware version of TCB components relevant for SEV. Build-
ing on the ability to extract the endorsement keys, we show how
to derive valid VCEKs for arbitrary firmware versions. With our
findings, we ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against AMD's
Secure Encrypted Virtualization
author:Robert Buhren and
Hans Niklas Jacob and
Thilo Krachenfels and
Jean-Pierre Seifert
One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization
Robert Buhren
robert.buhren@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Hans Niklas Jacob
hnj@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Thilo Krachenfels
tkrachenfels@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Jean-Pierre Seifert
jpseifert@sect.tu-berlin.de
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT
Fraunhofer SIT
ABSTRACT
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers protection mech-
anisms for virtual machines in untrusted environments through
memory and register encryption. To separate security-sensitive op-
erations from software executing on the main x86 cores, SEV lever-
ages the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP). This paper introduces
a new approach to attack SEV-protected virtual machines (VMs) by
targeting the AMD-SP. We present a voltage glitching attack that
allows an attacker to execute custom payloads on the AMD-SPs
of all microarchitectures that support SEV currently on the mar-
ket (Zen 1, Zen 2, and Zen 3). The presented methods allow us
to deploy a custom SEV firmware on the AMD-SP, which enables
an adversary to decrypt a VM’s memory. Furthermore, using our
approach, we can extract endorsement keys of SEV-enabled CPUs,
which allows us to fake attestation reports or to pose as a valid
target for VM migration without requiring physical access to the
target host. Moreover, we reverse-engineered the Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK) mechanism introduced with SEV Secure
Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). The VCEK binds the endorsement keys
to the firmware version of TCB components relevant for SEV. Build-
ing on the ability to extract the endorsement keys, we show how
to derive valid VCEKs for arbitrary firmware versions. With our
findings, we ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On Ends-to-Ends Encryption: Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong
Security Guarantees
author:Katriel Cohn-Gordon and
Cas Cremers and
Luke Garratt and
Jon Millican and
Kevin Milner
On Ends-to-Ends Encryption:
Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees
Katriel Cohn-Gordon∗1, Cas Cremers2, Luke Garratt1, Jon Millican3, and Kevin Milner1
1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
2CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
3Facebook
Version 2.3, March 2nd, 2020†
Abstract
In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion
active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides
a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that
many of its implementations provide, without notiﬁcation, a weaker property for group
messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject
messages indeﬁnitely.
We show for the ﬁrst time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic,
asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratchet-
ing Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of
users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time.
ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable
security guarantees. It has seen signiﬁcant interest from industry, and forms the basis
for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong
security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
∗K.C-G. thanks Merton College and the Oxford CDT in Cyber Security for their support.
†An extended abstract of this paper appears at ACM CCS 2018 [15]; this is the full version. A summary of
changes is given in Appendix F.
1
forward
secrecy (FS)
post-compromise
security (PCS)
communications
under a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On Ends-to-Ends Encryption: Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong
Security Guarantees
author:Katriel Cohn-Gordon and
Cas Cremers and
Luke Garratt and
Jon Millican and
Kevin Milner
On Ends-to-Ends Encryption:
Asynchronous Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees
Katriel Cohn-Gordon∗1, Cas Cremers2, Luke Garratt1, Jon Millican3, and Kevin Milner1
1Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
2CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
3Facebook
Version 2.3, March 2nd, 2020†
Abstract
In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion
active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides
a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that
many of its implementations provide, without notiﬁcation, a weaker property for group
messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject
messages indeﬁnitely.
We show for the ﬁrst time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic,
asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratchet-
ing Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of
users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time.
ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable
security guarantees. It has seen signiﬁcant interest from industry, and forms the basis
for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong
security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
∗K.C-G. thanks Merton College and the Oxford CDT in Cyber Security for their support.
†An extended abstract of this paper appears at ACM CCS 2018 [15]; this is the full version. A summary of
changes is given in Appendix F.
1
forward
secrecy (FS)
post-compromise
security (PCS)
communications
under a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:DynaMiner: Leveraging Offline Infection Analytics for On-the-Wire
Malware Detection
author:Birhanu Eshete and
V. N. Venkatakrishnan
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
DYNAMINER: Leveraging Ofﬂine Infection
Analytics for On-the-Wire Malware Detection
Birhanu Eshete and V.N. Venkatakrishnan
University of Illinois at Chicago
{eshete5, venkat}@uic.edu
Abstract—Web-borne malware continues to be a major threat
on the Web. At the core of malware infection are for-crime
toolkits that exploit vulnerabilities in browsers and their exten-
sions. When a victim host gets infected, the infection dynamics is
often buried in benign trafﬁc, which makes the task of inferring
malicious behavior a non-trivial exercise.
In this paper, we leverage web conversation graph analytics to
tap into the rich dynamics of the interaction between a victim and
malicious host(s) without the need for analyzing exploit payload.
Based on insights derived from infection graph analytics, we
formulate the malware detection challenge as a graph-analytics
based learning problem. The key insight of our approach is
the payload-agnostic abstraction and comprehensive analytics of
malware infection dynamics pre-, during-, and post- infection.
Our technique leverages 3 years of infection intelligence spanning
9 popular exploit kit families.
Our approach is implemented in a tool called DYNAMINER and
evaluated on infection and benign HTTP trafﬁc. DYNAMINER
achieves a 97.3% true positive rate with false positive rate of
1.5%. Our forensic and live case studies suggest the effectiveness
of comprehensive graph abstraction malware infection. In some
instances, DYNAMINER detected unknown malware 11 days
earlier than existing AV engines.
Index Terms— malware detection, graph analytics, machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware infection via drive-by-downloads has become a
day-to-day encounter in the current state of the Web. As
cybercriminals step up their evasion ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:DynaMiner: Leveraging Offline Infection Analytics for On-the-Wire
Malware Detection
author:Birhanu Eshete and
V. N. Venkatakrishnan
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
DYNAMINER: Leveraging Ofﬂine Infection
Analytics for On-the-Wire Malware Detection
Birhanu Eshete and V.N. Venkatakrishnan
University of Illinois at Chicago
{eshete5, venkat}@uic.edu
Abstract—Web-borne malware continues to be a major threat
on the Web. At the core of malware infection are for-crime
toolkits that exploit vulnerabilities in browsers and their exten-
sions. When a victim host gets infected, the infection dynamics is
often buried in benign trafﬁc, which makes the task of inferring
malicious behavior a non-trivial exercise.
In this paper, we leverage web conversation graph analytics to
tap into the rich dynamics of the interaction between a victim and
malicious host(s) without the need for analyzing exploit payload.
Based on insights derived from infection graph analytics, we
formulate the malware detection challenge as a graph-analytics
based learning problem. The key insight of our approach is
the payload-agnostic abstraction and comprehensive analytics of
malware infection dynamics pre-, during-, and post- infection.
Our technique leverages 3 years of infection intelligence spanning
9 popular exploit kit families.
Our approach is implemented in a tool called DYNAMINER and
evaluated on infection and benign HTTP trafﬁc. DYNAMINER
achieves a 97.3% true positive rate with false positive rate of
1.5%. Our forensic and live case studies suggest the effectiveness
of comprehensive graph abstraction malware infection. In some
instances, DYNAMINER detected unknown malware 11 days
earlier than existing AV engines.
Index Terms— malware detection, graph analytics, machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware infection via drive-by-downloads has become a
day-to-day encounter in the current state of the Web. As
cybercriminals step up their evasion ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
author:Frank Li and
Vern Paxson
A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
Frank Li
Vern Paxson
{frankli, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley and International Computer Science Institute
the patch development process and the characteristics of the result-
ing fixes. Illuminating the nature of security patch development
can inform us of shortcomings in existing remediation processes
and provide insights for improving current practices.
Seeking such understanding has motivated several studies ex-
ploring various aspects of vulnerability and patching life cycles.
Some have analyzed public documentation about vulnerabilities,
such as security advisories, to shed light on the vulnerability dis-
closure process [14, 32]. These studies, however, did not include
analyses of the corresponding code bases and the patch develop-
ment process itself. Others have tracked the development of specific
projects to better understand patching dynamics [18, 28, 41]. While
providing insights on the responsiveness of particular projects to
security issues, these investigations have been limited to a smaller
scale across a few (often one) projects.
ABSTRACT
Given how the “patching treadmill” plays a central role for enabling
sites to counter emergent security concerns, it behooves the secu-
rity community to understand the patch development process and
characteristics of the resulting fixes. Illumination of the nature of se-
curity patch development can inform us of shortcomings in existing
remediation processes and provide insights for improving current
practices. In this work we conduct a large-scale empirical study of
security patches, investigating more than 4,000 bug fixes for over
3,000 vulnerabilities that affected a diverse set of 682 open-source
software projects. For our analysis we draw upon the National
Vulnerability Database, information scraped from relevant external
references, affected softw...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
author:Frank Li and
Vern Paxson
A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches
Frank Li
Vern Paxson
{frankli, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley and International Computer Science Institute
the patch development process and the characteristics of the result-
ing fixes. Illuminating the nature of security patch development
can inform us of shortcomings in existing remediation processes
and provide insights for improving current practices.
Seeking such understanding has motivated several studies ex-
ploring various aspects of vulnerability and patching life cycles.
Some have analyzed public documentation about vulnerabilities,
such as security advisories, to shed light on the vulnerability dis-
closure process [14, 32]. These studies, however, did not include
analyses of the corresponding code bases and the patch develop-
ment process itself. Others have tracked the development of specific
projects to better understand patching dynamics [18, 28, 41]. While
providing insights on the responsiveness of particular projects to
security issues, these investigations have been limited to a smaller
scale across a few (often one) projects.
ABSTRACT
Given how the “patching treadmill” plays a central role for enabling
sites to counter emergent security concerns, it behooves the secu-
rity community to understand the patch development process and
characteristics of the resulting fixes. Illumination of the nature of se-
curity patch development can inform us of shortcomings in existing
remediation processes and provide insights for improving current
practices. In this work we conduct a large-scale empirical study of
security patches, investigating more than 4,000 bug fixes for over
3,000 vulnerabilities that affected a diverse set of 682 open-source
software projects. For our analysis we draw upon the National
Vulnerability Database, information scraped from relevant external
references, affected softw...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently
Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
author:Jianting Ning and
Xinyi Huang and
Geong Sen Poh and
Jiaming Yuan and
Yingjiu Li and
Jian Weng and
Robert H. Deng
LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable,
Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
Jianting Ning∗
Fujian Normal University &
Singapore Management University
Fuzhou, China
jtning88@gmail.com
Jiaming Yuan
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
jiamingy@uoregon.edu
Geong Sen Poh
S-Lab for Advanced Intelligence,
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
geongsen.poh@ntu.edu.sg
Jian Weng
Jinan University
Guangzhou, China
cryptjweng@gmail.com
Xinyi Huang†
Fujian Normal University
Fuzhou, China
xyhuang81@gmail.com
Yingjiu Li
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
yingjiul@uoregon.edu
Robert H. Deng
Singapore Management University
Singapore
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables private queries on encrypted doc-
uments. Most existing SE schemes focus on constructing industrial-
ready, practical solutions at the expense of information leakages
that are considered acceptable. In particular, ShadowCrypt utilizes
a cryptographic approach named “efficiently deployable, efficiently
searchable encryption” (EDESE) that reveals the encrypted dataset
and the query tokens among other information. However, recent
attacks showed that such leakages can be exploited to (partially)
recover the underlying keywords of query tokens under certain
assumptions on the attacker’s background knowledge.
We continue this line of work by presenting LEAP, a new leakage-
abuse attack on EDESE schemes that can accurately recover the
underlying keywords of query tokens based on partially known
documents and the L2 leakage as per defined by Cash et al. (CCS
’15). As an auxiliary function, our attack supports document re-
covery in the similar setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently
Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
author:Jianting Ning and
Xinyi Huang and
Geong Sen Poh and
Jiaming Yuan and
Yingjiu Li and
Jian Weng and
Robert H. Deng
LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable,
Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
Jianting Ning∗
Fujian Normal University &
Singapore Management University
Fuzhou, China
jtning88@gmail.com
Jiaming Yuan
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
jiamingy@uoregon.edu
Geong Sen Poh
S-Lab for Advanced Intelligence,
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
geongsen.poh@ntu.edu.sg
Jian Weng
Jinan University
Guangzhou, China
cryptjweng@gmail.com
Xinyi Huang†
Fujian Normal University
Fuzhou, China
xyhuang81@gmail.com
Yingjiu Li
University of Oregon
Oregon, United States
yingjiul@uoregon.edu
Robert H. Deng
Singapore Management University
Singapore
robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables private queries on encrypted doc-
uments. Most existing SE schemes focus on constructing industrial-
ready, practical solutions at the expense of information leakages
that are considered acceptable. In particular, ShadowCrypt utilizes
a cryptographic approach named “efficiently deployable, efficiently
searchable encryption” (EDESE) that reveals the encrypted dataset
and the query tokens among other information. However, recent
attacks showed that such leakages can be exploited to (partially)
recover the underlying keywords of query tokens under certain
assumptions on the attacker’s background knowledge.
We continue this line of work by presenting LEAP, a new leakage-
abuse attack on EDESE schemes that can accurately recover the
underlying keywords of query tokens based on partially known
documents and the L2 leakage as per defined by Cash et al. (CCS
’15). As an auxiliary function, our attack supports document re-
covery in the similar setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
author:Platon Kotzias and
Abbas Razaghpanah and
Johanna Amann and
Kenneth G. Paterson and
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez and
Juan Caballero
Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
Platon Kotzias
IMDEA Software Institute
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Abbas Razaghpanah
Stony Brook University
Johanna Amann
ICSI/Corelight/LBNL
Kenneth G. Paterson
Royal Holloway, University of London
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
IMDEA Networks Institute
ICSI
Juan Caballero
IMDEA Software Institue
ABSTRACT
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the de-facto standard
for encrypted communication on the Internet. However, it has been
plagued by a number of different attacks and security issues over
the last years. Addressing these attacks requires changes to the
protocol, to server- or client-software, or to all of them. In this
paper we conduct the first large-scale longitudinal study examining
the evolution of the TLS ecosystem over the last six years. We
place a special focus on the ecosystem’s evolution in response to
high-profile attacks.
For our analysis, we use a passive measurement dataset with
more than 319.3B connections since February 2012, and an active
dataset that contains TLS and SSL scans of the entire IPv4 address
space since August 2015. To identify the evolution of specific clients
we also create the—to our knowledge—largest TLS client fingerprint
database to date, consisting of 1,684 fingerprints.
We observe that the ecosystem has shifted significantly since
2012, with major changes in which cipher suites and TLS extensions
are offered by clients and accepted by servers having taken place.
Where possible, we correlate these with the timing of specific at-
tacks on TLS. At the same time, our results show that while clients,
especially browsers, are quick to adopt new algorithms, they are
also slow to drop support for older ones. We also encounter signif-
icant amounts of client software that probab...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
author:Platon Kotzias and
Abbas Razaghpanah and
Johanna Amann and
Kenneth G. Paterson and
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez and
Juan Caballero
Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
Platon Kotzias
IMDEA Software Institute
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Abbas Razaghpanah
Stony Brook University
Johanna Amann
ICSI/Corelight/LBNL
Kenneth G. Paterson
Royal Holloway, University of London
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
IMDEA Networks Institute
ICSI
Juan Caballero
IMDEA Software Institue
ABSTRACT
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the de-facto standard
for encrypted communication on the Internet. However, it has been
plagued by a number of different attacks and security issues over
the last years. Addressing these attacks requires changes to the
protocol, to server- or client-software, or to all of them. In this
paper we conduct the first large-scale longitudinal study examining
the evolution of the TLS ecosystem over the last six years. We
place a special focus on the ecosystem’s evolution in response to
high-profile attacks.
For our analysis, we use a passive measurement dataset with
more than 319.3B connections since February 2012, and an active
dataset that contains TLS and SSL scans of the entire IPv4 address
space since August 2015. To identify the evolution of specific clients
we also create the—to our knowledge—largest TLS client fingerprint
database to date, consisting of 1,684 fingerprints.
We observe that the ecosystem has shifted significantly since
2012, with major changes in which cipher suites and TLS extensions
are offered by clients and accepted by servers having taken place.
Where possible, we correlate these with the timing of specific at-
tacks on TLS. At the same time, our results show that while clients,
especially browsers, are quick to adopt new algorithms, they are
also slow to drop support for older ones. We also encounter signif-
icant amounts of client software that probab...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Attribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model: Automated Proofs
and New Constructions
author:Miguel Ambrona and
Gilles Barthe and
Romain Gay and
Hoeteck Wee
A(cid:130)ribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model:
Automated Proofs and New Constructions
Miguel Ambrona
Gilles Barthe
IMDEA So(cid:137)ware Institute, Madrid, Spain
Universidad Polit´ecnica de Madrid, Spain
IMDEA So(cid:137)ware Institute, Madrid, Spain
Romain Gay
ENS, Paris, France
Hoeteck Wee
CNRS, France
ENS, Paris, France
ABSTRACT
A(cid:139)ribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive which
supports (cid:128)ne-grained access control on encrypted data, making
it an appealing building block for many applications. In this pa-
per, we propose, implement, and evaluate fully automated methods
for proving security of ABE in the Generic Bilinear Group Model
(Boneh, Boyen, and Goh, 2005, Boyen, 2008), an idealized model
which admits simpler and more e(cid:129)cient constructions, and can
also be used to (cid:128)nd a(cid:139)acks. Our method is applicable to Rational-
Fraction Induced ABE, a large class of ABE that contains most of the
schemes from the literature, and relies on a Master (cid:145)eorem, which
reduces security in the GGM to a (new) notion of symbolic security,
which is amenable to automated veri(cid:128)cation using constraint-based
techniques. We relate our notion of symbolic security for Rational-
Fraction Induced ABE to prior notions for Pair Encodings. Finally,
we present several applications, including automated proofs for
new schemes.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Mathematical foundations of cryp-
tography; Formal security models; Logic and veri(cid:128)cation;
KEYWORDS
automated proofs, symbolic security, a(cid:139)ribute-based encryption,
generic group model
1 INTRODUCTION
Computer-aided cryptography [18] is an emerging approach that
advocates using automated tools based on formal methods for ana-
lyzing the security of cryptographic schemes and t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Attribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model: Automated Proofs
and New Constructions
author:Miguel Ambrona and
Gilles Barthe and
Romain Gay and
Hoeteck Wee
A(cid:130)ribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model:
Automated Proofs and New Constructions
Miguel Ambrona
Gilles Barthe
IMDEA So(cid:137)ware Institute, Madrid, Spain
Universidad Polit´ecnica de Madrid, Spain
IMDEA So(cid:137)ware Institute, Madrid, Spain
Romain Gay
ENS, Paris, France
Hoeteck Wee
CNRS, France
ENS, Paris, France
ABSTRACT
A(cid:139)ribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive which
supports (cid:128)ne-grained access control on encrypted data, making
it an appealing building block for many applications. In this pa-
per, we propose, implement, and evaluate fully automated methods
for proving security of ABE in the Generic Bilinear Group Model
(Boneh, Boyen, and Goh, 2005, Boyen, 2008), an idealized model
which admits simpler and more e(cid:129)cient constructions, and can
also be used to (cid:128)nd a(cid:139)acks. Our method is applicable to Rational-
Fraction Induced ABE, a large class of ABE that contains most of the
schemes from the literature, and relies on a Master (cid:145)eorem, which
reduces security in the GGM to a (new) notion of symbolic security,
which is amenable to automated veri(cid:128)cation using constraint-based
techniques. We relate our notion of symbolic security for Rational-
Fraction Induced ABE to prior notions for Pair Encodings. Finally,
we present several applications, including automated proofs for
new schemes.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Mathematical foundations of cryp-
tography; Formal security models; Logic and veri(cid:128)cation;
KEYWORDS
automated proofs, symbolic security, a(cid:139)ribute-based encryption,
generic group model
1 INTRODUCTION
Computer-aided cryptography [18] is an emerging approach that
advocates using automated tools based on formal methods for ana-
lyzing the security of cryptographic schemes and t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SymPLFIED: Symbolic program-level fault injection and error detection
framework
author:Karthik Pattabiraman and
Nithin Nakka and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
SymPLFIED: Symbolic Program-Level Fault Injection
and Error Detection Framework
Karthik Pattabiraman, Nithin Nakka, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, and Ravishanka~ Iyer
Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaIgn
{pattabir, nakka, kalbarcz, rkiyer}@uiuc.edu
Abstract
This paper introduces SymPLFIED, a program(cid:173)
level framework that allows specification of arbitrary
error detectors and the verification of their efficacy
SymPLFIED comprehen(cid:173)
against hardware errors.
sively enumerates all
transient hardware errors in
registers, memory, and computation (expressed as
value errors)
that potentially evade detection and
cause program failure. The framework uses symbolic
execution to abstract the state of erroneous values in
the program and model checking to comprehensively
find all errors that evade detection. We demonstrate
the use of SymPLFIED on a widely deployed aircraft
collision avoidance application, tcas. Our results show
that the SymPLFIED framework can be used to un(cid:173)
cover hard-to-detect corner cases caused by transient
errors in programs that may not be exposed by ran(cid:173)
dom fault-injection based validation.
Keywords: Dependability validation, Fault injection,
Symbolic execution, Error detectors, Model checking.
1
Introduction
Error detection mechanisms are vital for building
highly reliable systems. There has been significant
work on efficiently placing and deriving error detec(cid:173)
tors for programs [1]. An important challenge is to
enumerate the set of errors the mechanism fails to
detect, from either a known set or an unknown set.
Typically, verification techniques target the defin~d
set of errors the detector is supposed to detect. WhIle
t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SymPLFIED: Symbolic program-level fault injection and error detection
framework
author:Karthik Pattabiraman and
Nithin Nakka and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
SymPLFIED: Symbolic Program-Level Fault Injection
and Error Detection Framework
Karthik Pattabiraman, Nithin Nakka, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, and Ravishanka~ Iyer
Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaIgn
{pattabir, nakka, kalbarcz, rkiyer}@uiuc.edu
Abstract
This paper introduces SymPLFIED, a program(cid:173)
level framework that allows specification of arbitrary
error detectors and the verification of their efficacy
SymPLFIED comprehen(cid:173)
against hardware errors.
sively enumerates all
transient hardware errors in
registers, memory, and computation (expressed as
value errors)
that potentially evade detection and
cause program failure. The framework uses symbolic
execution to abstract the state of erroneous values in
the program and model checking to comprehensively
find all errors that evade detection. We demonstrate
the use of SymPLFIED on a widely deployed aircraft
collision avoidance application, tcas. Our results show
that the SymPLFIED framework can be used to un(cid:173)
cover hard-to-detect corner cases caused by transient
errors in programs that may not be exposed by ran(cid:173)
dom fault-injection based validation.
Keywords: Dependability validation, Fault injection,
Symbolic execution, Error detectors, Model checking.
1
Introduction
Error detection mechanisms are vital for building
highly reliable systems. There has been significant
work on efficiently placing and deriving error detec(cid:173)
tors for programs [1]. An important challenge is to
enumerate the set of errors the mechanism fails to
detect, from either a known set or an unknown set.
Typically, verification techniques target the defin~d
set of errors the detector is supposed to detect. WhIle
t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Neutral Net Neutrality
author:Yiannis Yiakoumis and
Sachin Katti and
Nick McKeown
Neutral Net Neutrality
Yiannis Yiakoumis, Sachin Katti, and Nick McKeown
Stanford University
ABSTRACT
Should applications receive special treatment from the
network? And if so, who decides which applications
are preferred? This discussion, known as net neutral-
ity, goes beyond technology and is a hot political topic.
In this paper we approach net neutrality from a user’s
perspective. Through user studies, we demonstrate that
users do indeed want some services to receive preferen-
tial treatment; and their preferences have a heavy-tail:
a one-size-ﬁts-all approach is unlikely to work. This
suggests that users should be able to decide how their
trac is treated. A crucial part to enable user prefer-
ences, is the mechanism to express them. To this end,
we present network cookies, a general mechanism to ex-
press user preferences to the network. Using cookies,
we prototype Boost, a user-deﬁned fast-lane and deploy
it in 161 homes.
CCS Concepts
•Social and professional topics ! Net neutrality;
•Networks ! Network architectures; Network proto-
cols; Cross-layer protocols; Middle boxes / network ap-
pliances; Network economics; Network manageability;
Home networks;
1.
INTRODUCTION
Net neutrality is currently a charged debate. The core
of the argument is about which applications should re-
ceive special treatment from the network, and whether
special treatment is in the best interest of users. Several
examples of special treatment already exist, for exam-
ple Facebook Zero [3] and T-Mobile’s Music Freedom [8]
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice
and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. Copyrights for components of this work
owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting w...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Neutral Net Neutrality
author:Yiannis Yiakoumis and
Sachin Katti and
Nick McKeown
Neutral Net Neutrality
Yiannis Yiakoumis, Sachin Katti, and Nick McKeown
Stanford University
ABSTRACT
Should applications receive special treatment from the
network? And if so, who decides which applications
are preferred? This discussion, known as net neutral-
ity, goes beyond technology and is a hot political topic.
In this paper we approach net neutrality from a user’s
perspective. Through user studies, we demonstrate that
users do indeed want some services to receive preferen-
tial treatment; and their preferences have a heavy-tail:
a one-size-ﬁts-all approach is unlikely to work. This
suggests that users should be able to decide how their
trac is treated. A crucial part to enable user prefer-
ences, is the mechanism to express them. To this end,
we present network cookies, a general mechanism to ex-
press user preferences to the network. Using cookies,
we prototype Boost, a user-deﬁned fast-lane and deploy
it in 161 homes.
CCS Concepts
•Social and professional topics ! Net neutrality;
•Networks ! Network architectures; Network proto-
cols; Cross-layer protocols; Middle boxes / network ap-
pliances; Network economics; Network manageability;
Home networks;
1.
INTRODUCTION
Net neutrality is currently a charged debate. The core
of the argument is about which applications should re-
ceive special treatment from the network, and whether
special treatment is in the best interest of users. Several
examples of special treatment already exist, for exam-
ple Facebook Zero [3] and T-Mobile’s Music Freedom [8]
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice
and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. Copyrights for components of this work
owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting w...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:RedPlane: enabling fault-tolerant stateful in-switch applications
author:Daehyeok Kim and
Jacob Nelson and
Dan R. K. Ports and
Vyas Sekar and
Srinivasan Seshan
RedPlane: Enabling Fault-Tolerant Stateful In-Switch
Applications
Daehyeok Kim★†, Jacob Nelson†, Dan R. K. Ports†, Vyas Sekar★, Srinivasan Seshan★
★Carnegie Mellon University, †Microsoft
Abstract
Many recent efforts have demonstrated the performance benefits
of running datacenter functions (e.g., NATs, load balancers, moni-
toring) on programmable switches. However, a key missing piece
remains: fault tolerance. This is especially critical as the network is
no longer stateless and pure endpoint recovery does not suffice. In
this paper, we design and implement RedPlane, a fault-tolerant state
store for stateful in-switch applications. This provides in-switch
applications consistent access to their state, even if the switch they
run on fails or traffic is rerouted to an alternative switch. We address
key challenges in devising a practical, provably correct replication
protocol and implementing it in the switch data plane. Our evalua-
tions show that RedPlane incurs negligible overhead and enables
end-to-end applications to rapidly recover from switch failures.
CCS Concepts
• Networks → Programmable networks; In-network process-
ing; • Hardware → Emerging technologies; • Computer sys-
tems organization → Availability.
Keywords
Programmable switches, Programmable networks, Fault tolerance,
State replication
ACM Reference Format:
Daehyeok Kim, Jacob Nelson, Dan R. K. Ports, Vyas Sekar, Srinivasan Seshan
. 2021. RedPlane: Enabling Fault-Tolerant Stateful In-Switch Applications.
In ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference (SIGCOMM ’21), August 23–27, 2021,
Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 22 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3452296.3472905
1
Today’s data center switches are no longer simple stateless packet
forwarders. They implement sophisticated network functions, such
as NATs, firewalls, and load balancers...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:RedPlane: enabling fault-tolerant stateful in-switch applications
author:Daehyeok Kim and
Jacob Nelson and
Dan R. K. Ports and
Vyas Sekar and
Srinivasan Seshan
RedPlane: Enabling Fault-Tolerant Stateful In-Switch
Applications
Daehyeok Kim★†, Jacob Nelson†, Dan R. K. Ports†, Vyas Sekar★, Srinivasan Seshan★
★Carnegie Mellon University, †Microsoft
Abstract
Many recent efforts have demonstrated the performance benefits
of running datacenter functions (e.g., NATs, load balancers, moni-
toring) on programmable switches. However, a key missing piece
remains: fault tolerance. This is especially critical as the network is
no longer stateless and pure endpoint recovery does not suffice. In
this paper, we design and implement RedPlane, a fault-tolerant state
store for stateful in-switch applications. This provides in-switch
applications consistent access to their state, even if the switch they
run on fails or traffic is rerouted to an alternative switch. We address
key challenges in devising a practical, provably correct replication
protocol and implementing it in the switch data plane. Our evalua-
tions show that RedPlane incurs negligible overhead and enables
end-to-end applications to rapidly recover from switch failures.
CCS Concepts
• Networks → Programmable networks; In-network process-
ing; • Hardware → Emerging technologies; • Computer sys-
tems organization → Availability.
Keywords
Programmable switches, Programmable networks, Fault tolerance,
State replication
ACM Reference Format:
Daehyeok Kim, Jacob Nelson, Dan R. K. Ports, Vyas Sekar, Srinivasan Seshan
. 2021. RedPlane: Enabling Fault-Tolerant Stateful In-Switch Applications.
In ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference (SIGCOMM ’21), August 23–27, 2021,
Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 22 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3452296.3472905
1
Today’s data center switches are no longer simple stateless packet
forwarders. They implement sophisticated network functions, such
as NATs, firewalls, and load balancers...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:BLOCK: a black-box approach for detection of state violation attacks
towards web applications
author:Xiaowei Li and
Yuan Xue
BLOCK: A Black-box Approach for Detection of State
Violation Attacks Towards Web Applications
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Xiaowei Li
Computer Science
Vanderbilt University
xiaowei.li@vanderbilt.edu
Yuan Xue
Computer Science
Vanderbilt University
yuan.xue@vanderbilt.edu
ABSTRACT
State violation attacks towards web applications exploit logic
ﬂaws and allow restrictive functions and sensitive informa-
tion to be accessed at inappropriate states. Since application
logic ﬂaws are speciﬁc to the intended functionality of a par-
ticular web application, it is diﬃcult to develop a general
approach that addresses state violation attacks. To date,
existing approaches all require web application source code
for analysis or instrumentation in order to detect state vio-
lations.
In this paper, we present BLOCK, a BLack-bOx approach
for detecting state violation attaCKs. We regard the web
application as a stateless system and infer the intended web
application behavior model by observing the interactions be-
tween the clients and the web application. We extract a set
of invariants from the web request/response sequences and
their associated session variable values during its attack-free
execution. The set of invariants is then used for evaluating
web requests and responses at runtime. Any web request or
response that violates the associated invariants is identiﬁed
as a potential state violation attack. We develop a system
prototype based on the WebScarab proxy and evaluate our
detection system using a set of real-world web applications.
The experiment results demonstrate that our approach is
eﬀective at detecting state violation attacks and incurs ac-
ceptable performance overhead. Our approach is valuable
in that it is independent of the web application source code
and can easily scale up.
Keyword...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:BLOCK: a black-box approach for detection of state violation attacks
towards web applications
author:Xiaowei Li and
Yuan Xue
BLOCK: A Black-box Approach for Detection of State
Violation Attacks Towards Web Applications
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Xiaowei Li
Computer Science
Vanderbilt University
xiaowei.li@vanderbilt.edu
Yuan Xue
Computer Science
Vanderbilt University
yuan.xue@vanderbilt.edu
ABSTRACT
State violation attacks towards web applications exploit logic
ﬂaws and allow restrictive functions and sensitive informa-
tion to be accessed at inappropriate states. Since application
logic ﬂaws are speciﬁc to the intended functionality of a par-
ticular web application, it is diﬃcult to develop a general
approach that addresses state violation attacks. To date,
existing approaches all require web application source code
for analysis or instrumentation in order to detect state vio-
lations.
In this paper, we present BLOCK, a BLack-bOx approach
for detecting state violation attaCKs. We regard the web
application as a stateless system and infer the intended web
application behavior model by observing the interactions be-
tween the clients and the web application. We extract a set
of invariants from the web request/response sequences and
their associated session variable values during its attack-free
execution. The set of invariants is then used for evaluating
web requests and responses at runtime. Any web request or
response that violates the associated invariants is identiﬁed
as a potential state violation attack. We develop a system
prototype based on the WebScarab proxy and evaluate our
detection system using a set of real-world web applications.
The experiment results demonstrate that our approach is
eﬀective at detecting state violation attacks and incurs ac-
ceptable performance overhead. Our approach is valuable
in that it is independent of the web application source code
and can easily scale up.
Keyword...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Join Problem in Dynamic Network Algorithms
author:Kishori M. Konwar and
Dariusz R. Kowalski and
Alexander A. Shvartsman
The Join Problem in Dynamic Network Algorithms∗
Kishori M. Konwar 1
kishori@cse.uconn.edu
Dariusz R. Kowalski 2,3
darek@duch.mimuw.edu.pl
Alexander A. Shvartsman 1,4
alex@theory.csail.mit.edu
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut, Unit 2155, Storrs, CT 06269, USA
2 Max-Planck-Institut f¨ur Informatik, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 85, Saarbr¨ucken, 66123, Germany
3 Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Poland
4 MIT Computer Science and Artiﬁcial Intelligence Laboratory, The Stata Center, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Abstract
1. Introduction
Distributed algorithms in dynamic networks often em-
ploy communication patterns whose purpose is to dissemi-
nate information among the participants. Gossiping is one
form of such communication pattern. In dynamic settings
the set of participants can change substantially as new par-
ticipants join, and as failures and voluntary departures re-
move those who have joined previously. A natural question
for such settings is: how soon can newly joined nodes dis-
cover each other by means of gossiping? This paper ab-
stracts and studies the Join Problem for dynamic systems
that use all-to-all gossip. The problem is studied in terms of
join-connectivity graphs where vertices represent the par-
ticipants and where each edge represents one participant’s
knowledge about another. Ideally, such a graph has diam-
eter one, i.e., all participants know each other. The diam-
eter can grow as new participants join, and as failures re-
move edges from the graph. Gossip helps participants dis-
cover one another, decreasing the diameter. The results de-
scribe the lower and upper bounds on the number of com-
munication rounds such that the participants who have pre-
viously joined discover one another, under a variety of as-
sumptions about the joining and failur...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Join Problem in Dynamic Network Algorithms
author:Kishori M. Konwar and
Dariusz R. Kowalski and
Alexander A. Shvartsman
The Join Problem in Dynamic Network Algorithms∗
Kishori M. Konwar 1
kishori@cse.uconn.edu
Dariusz R. Kowalski 2,3
darek@duch.mimuw.edu.pl
Alexander A. Shvartsman 1,4
alex@theory.csail.mit.edu
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut, Unit 2155, Storrs, CT 06269, USA
2 Max-Planck-Institut f¨ur Informatik, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 85, Saarbr¨ucken, 66123, Germany
3 Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Poland
4 MIT Computer Science and Artiﬁcial Intelligence Laboratory, The Stata Center, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Abstract
1. Introduction
Distributed algorithms in dynamic networks often em-
ploy communication patterns whose purpose is to dissemi-
nate information among the participants. Gossiping is one
form of such communication pattern. In dynamic settings
the set of participants can change substantially as new par-
ticipants join, and as failures and voluntary departures re-
move those who have joined previously. A natural question
for such settings is: how soon can newly joined nodes dis-
cover each other by means of gossiping? This paper ab-
stracts and studies the Join Problem for dynamic systems
that use all-to-all gossip. The problem is studied in terms of
join-connectivity graphs where vertices represent the par-
ticipants and where each edge represents one participant’s
knowledge about another. Ideally, such a graph has diam-
eter one, i.e., all participants know each other. The diam-
eter can grow as new participants join, and as failures re-
move edges from the graph. Gossip helps participants dis-
cover one another, decreasing the diameter. The results de-
scribe the lower and upper bounds on the number of com-
munication rounds such that the participants who have pre-
viously joined discover one another, under a variety of as-
sumptions about the joining and failur...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PTrix: Efficient Hardware-Assisted Fuzzing for COTS Binary
author:Yaohui Chen and
Dongliang Mu and
Jun Xu and
Zhichuang Sun and
Wenbo Shen and
Xinyu Xing and
Long Lu and
Bing Mao
PTrix: Efficient Hardware-Assisted Fuzzing for COTS Binary
Yaohui Chen*
Northeastern University
Zhichuang Sun
Northeastern University
Dongliang Mu*
Penn State University
Wenbo Shen
Zhejiang University
Jun Xu
Stevens Institute of Technology
Xinyu Xing
Penn State University
Long Lu
Northeastern University
Bing Mao
Nanjing University
ABSTRACT
Despite its effectiveness in uncovering software defects, American
Fuzzy Lop (AFL), one of the best grey-box fuzzers, is inefficient
when fuzz-testing source-unavailable programs. AFL’s binary-only
fuzzing mode, QEMU-AFL, is typically 2-5× slower than its source-
available fuzzing mode. The slowdown is largely caused by the
heavy dynamic instrumentation.
Recent fuzzing techniques use Intel Processor Tracing (PT), a
light-weight tracing feature supported by recent Intel CPUs, to re-
move the need of dynamic instrumentation. However, we found that
these PT-based fuzzing techniques are even slower than QEMU-AFL
when fuzzing real-world programs, making them less effective than
QEMU-AFL. This poor performance is caused by the slow extraction
of code coverage information from highly compressed PT traces.
In this work, we present the design and implementation of PTrix,
which fully unleashes the benefits of PT for fuzzing via three novel
techniques. First, PTrix introduces a scheme to highly parallel the
processing of PT trace and target program execution. Second, it
directly takes decoded PT trace as feedback for fuzzing, avoiding
the expensive reconstruction of code coverage information. Third,
PTrix maintains the new feedback with stronger feedback than
edge-based code coverage, which helps reach new code space and
defects that AFL may not.
We evaluated PTrix by comparing its performance with the state-
of-the-art fuzzers. Our results show that, given th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PTrix: Efficient Hardware-Assisted Fuzzing for COTS Binary
author:Yaohui Chen and
Dongliang Mu and
Jun Xu and
Zhichuang Sun and
Wenbo Shen and
Xinyu Xing and
Long Lu and
Bing Mao
PTrix: Efficient Hardware-Assisted Fuzzing for COTS Binary
Yaohui Chen*
Northeastern University
Zhichuang Sun
Northeastern University
Dongliang Mu*
Penn State University
Wenbo Shen
Zhejiang University
Jun Xu
Stevens Institute of Technology
Xinyu Xing
Penn State University
Long Lu
Northeastern University
Bing Mao
Nanjing University
ABSTRACT
Despite its effectiveness in uncovering software defects, American
Fuzzy Lop (AFL), one of the best grey-box fuzzers, is inefficient
when fuzz-testing source-unavailable programs. AFL’s binary-only
fuzzing mode, QEMU-AFL, is typically 2-5× slower than its source-
available fuzzing mode. The slowdown is largely caused by the
heavy dynamic instrumentation.
Recent fuzzing techniques use Intel Processor Tracing (PT), a
light-weight tracing feature supported by recent Intel CPUs, to re-
move the need of dynamic instrumentation. However, we found that
these PT-based fuzzing techniques are even slower than QEMU-AFL
when fuzzing real-world programs, making them less effective than
QEMU-AFL. This poor performance is caused by the slow extraction
of code coverage information from highly compressed PT traces.
In this work, we present the design and implementation of PTrix,
which fully unleashes the benefits of PT for fuzzing via three novel
techniques. First, PTrix introduces a scheme to highly parallel the
processing of PT trace and target program execution. Second, it
directly takes decoded PT trace as feedback for fuzzing, avoiding
the expensive reconstruction of code coverage information. Third,
PTrix maintains the new feedback with stronger feedback than
edge-based code coverage, which helps reach new code space and
defects that AFL may not.
We evaluated PTrix by comparing its performance with the state-
of-the-art fuzzers. Our results show that, given th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。