Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Krace: Data Race Fuzzing for Kernel File Systems
author:Meng Xu and
Sanidhya Kashyap and
Hanqing Zhao and
Taesoo Kim
KRACE: Data Race Fuzzing for Kernel File Systems
Meng Xu Sanidhya Kashyap Hanqing Zhao Taesoo Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract—Data races occur when two threads fail to use
proper synchronization when accessing shared data. In kernel file
systems, which are highly concurrent by design, data races are
common mistakes and often wreak havoc on the users, causing
inconsistent states or data losses. Prior fuzzing practices on file
systems have been effective in uncovering hundreds of bugs, but
they mostly focus on the sequential aspect of file system execution
and do not comprehensively explore the concurrency dimension
and hence, forgo the opportunity to catch data races.
In this paper, we bring coverage-guided fuzzing to the concur-
rency dimension with three new constructs: 1) a new coverage
tracking metric, alias coverage, specially designed to capture
the exploration progress in the concurrency dimension; 2) an
evolution algorithm for generating, mutating, and merging multi-
threaded syscall sequences as inputs for concurrency fuzzing;
and 3) a comprehensive lockset and happens-before modeling for
kernel synchronization primitives for precise data race detection.
These components are integrated into KRACE, an end-to-end
fuzzing framework that has discovered 23 data races in ext4,
btrfs, and the VFS layer so far, and 9 are confirmed to be harmful.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the current multi-core era, concurrency has been a major
thrust for performance improvements, especially for system
software. As is evident in kernel and file system evolutions [1–
4], a whole zoo of programming paradigms is introduced
to exploit multi-core computation, including but not limited
to asynchronous work queues, read-copy-update (RCU), and
optimistic locking such as sequence locks. However, alongside
performance improvements, concurrency bugs also find their
wa...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Faulty Point Unit: ABI Poisoning Attacks on Intel SGX
author:Fritz Alder and
Jo Van Bulck and
David F. Oswald and
Frank Piessens
Faulty Point Unit: ABI Poisoning Attacks on
Intel SGX
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
David Oswald
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
University of Birmingham, UK
d.f.oswald@bham.ac.uk
Jo Van Bulck
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
jo.vanbulck@cs.kuleuven.be
Frank Piessens
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
frank.piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a previously overlooked attack surface that al-
lows unprivileged adversaries to impact supposedly secure floating-
point computations in Intel SGX enclaves through the Application
Binary Interface (ABI). In a comprehensive study across 7 widely
used industry-standard and research enclave shielding runtimes, we
show that control and state registers of the x87 Floating-Point Unit
(FPU) and Intel Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) are not always
properly sanitized on enclave entry. First, we abuse the adversary’s
control over precision and rounding modes as a novel “ABI-level
fault injection” primitive to silently corrupt enclaved floating-point
operations, enabling a new class of stealthy, integrity-only attacks
that disturb the result of SGX enclave computations. Our analysis
reveals that this threat is especially relevant for applications that
use the older x87 FPU, which is still being used under certain con-
ditions for high-precision operations by modern compilers like gcc.
We exemplify the potential impact of ABI-level quality-degradation
attacks in a case study of an enclaved machine learning service
and in a larger analysis on the SPEC benchmark programs. Second,
we explore the impact on enclave confidentiality by showing that
the adversary’s control over floating-point exception masks can be
abused as an innovative controlled channel to detect FPU usage and
to recover enclaved multiplication operands in certain scenarios.
Our findings, affecting 5 out of the 7 studie...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Faulty Point Unit: ABI Poisoning Attacks on Intel SGX
author:Fritz Alder and
Jo Van Bulck and
David F. Oswald and
Frank Piessens
Faulty Point Unit: ABI Poisoning Attacks on
Intel SGX
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
David Oswald
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
University of Birmingham, UK
d.f.oswald@bham.ac.uk
Jo Van Bulck
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
jo.vanbulck@cs.kuleuven.be
Frank Piessens
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium
frank.piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a previously overlooked attack surface that al-
lows unprivileged adversaries to impact supposedly secure floating-
point computations in Intel SGX enclaves through the Application
Binary Interface (ABI). In a comprehensive study across 7 widely
used industry-standard and research enclave shielding runtimes, we
show that control and state registers of the x87 Floating-Point Unit
(FPU) and Intel Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) are not always
properly sanitized on enclave entry. First, we abuse the adversary’s
control over precision and rounding modes as a novel “ABI-level
fault injection” primitive to silently corrupt enclaved floating-point
operations, enabling a new class of stealthy, integrity-only attacks
that disturb the result of SGX enclave computations. Our analysis
reveals that this threat is especially relevant for applications that
use the older x87 FPU, which is still being used under certain con-
ditions for high-precision operations by modern compilers like gcc.
We exemplify the potential impact of ABI-level quality-degradation
attacks in a case study of an enclaved machine learning service
and in a larger analysis on the SPEC benchmark programs. Second,
we explore the impact on enclave confidentiality by showing that
the adversary’s control over floating-point exception masks can be
abused as an innovative controlled channel to detect FPU usage and
to recover enclaved multiplication operands in certain scenarios.
Our findings, affecting 5 out of the 7 studie...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of Phishing Detection and
Malware Warnings
author:Ajaya Neupane and
Md. Lutfor Rahman and
Nitesh Saxena and
Leanne M. Hirshfield
A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of
Phishing Detection and Malware Warnings
Ajaya Neupane
Department of Computer and
Information Sciences
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
aneupane@uab.edu
Nitesh Saxena
Department of Computer and
Information Sciences
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
saxena@uab.edu
Md. Lutfor Rahman∗
Aegis Foundry LLC
mdlutforrahman@csebuet.org
Leanne Hirshﬁeld
Newhouse School of Public
Communications
Syracuse University
lmhirshf@syr.edu
ABSTRACT
Detecting phishing attacks (identifying fake vs. real websites) and
heeding security warnings represent classical user-centered secu-
rity tasks subjected to a series of prior investigations. However, our
understanding of user behavior underlying these tasks is still not
fully mature, motivating further work concentrating at the neuro-
physiological level governing the human processing of such tasks.
We pursue a comprehensive three-dimensional study of phishing
detection and malware warnings, focusing not only on what users’
task performance is but also on how users process these tasks based
on: (1) neural activity captured using Electroencephalogram (EEG)
cognitive metrics, and (2) eye gaze patterns captured using an eye-
tracker. Our primary novelty lies in employing multi-modal neuro-
physiological measures in a single study and providing a near re-
alistic set-up (in contrast to a recent neuro-study conducted inside
an fMRI scanner). Our work serves to advance, extend and sup-
port prior knowledge in several signiﬁcant ways. Speciﬁcally, in
the context of phishing detection, we show that users do not spend
enough time analyzing key phishing indicators and often fail at de-
tecting these attacks, although they may be mentally engaged in
the task and subconsciously processing real sites differently from
fake sites. In the ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of Phishing Detection and
Malware Warnings
author:Ajaya Neupane and
Md. Lutfor Rahman and
Nitesh Saxena and
Leanne M. Hirshfield
A Multi-Modal Neuro-Physiological Study of
Phishing Detection and Malware Warnings
Ajaya Neupane
Department of Computer and
Information Sciences
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
aneupane@uab.edu
Nitesh Saxena
Department of Computer and
Information Sciences
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
saxena@uab.edu
Md. Lutfor Rahman∗
Aegis Foundry LLC
mdlutforrahman@csebuet.org
Leanne Hirshﬁeld
Newhouse School of Public
Communications
Syracuse University
lmhirshf@syr.edu
ABSTRACT
Detecting phishing attacks (identifying fake vs. real websites) and
heeding security warnings represent classical user-centered secu-
rity tasks subjected to a series of prior investigations. However, our
understanding of user behavior underlying these tasks is still not
fully mature, motivating further work concentrating at the neuro-
physiological level governing the human processing of such tasks.
We pursue a comprehensive three-dimensional study of phishing
detection and malware warnings, focusing not only on what users’
task performance is but also on how users process these tasks based
on: (1) neural activity captured using Electroencephalogram (EEG)
cognitive metrics, and (2) eye gaze patterns captured using an eye-
tracker. Our primary novelty lies in employing multi-modal neuro-
physiological measures in a single study and providing a near re-
alistic set-up (in contrast to a recent neuro-study conducted inside
an fMRI scanner). Our work serves to advance, extend and sup-
port prior knowledge in several signiﬁcant ways. Speciﬁcally, in
the context of phishing detection, we show that users do not spend
enough time analyzing key phishing indicators and often fail at de-
tecting these attacks, although they may be mentally engaged in
the task and subconsciously processing real sites differently from
fake sites. In the ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Data Recovery from "Scrubbed" NAND Flash Storage: Need for Analog
Sanitization
author:Md. Mehedi Hasan and
Biswajit Ray
Data Recovery from “Scrubbed” NAND Flash Storage:
Need for Analog Sanitization
Md Mehedi Hasan and Biswajit Ray, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/hasan
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Recovery from “Scrubbed” NAND Flash Storage: Need for Analog Sanitiza-
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Md Mehedi Hasan and Biswajit Ray
tion
Abstract
Digital sanitization of flash based non-volatile memory sys-
tem is a well-researched topic. Since flash memory cell holds
information  in  the  analog  threshold  voltage,  flash  cell  may
hold the imprints of previously written data even after digital
sanitization.  In  this  paper,  we  show  that  data  is  partially  or
completely recoverable from the flash  media sanitized  with
“scrubbing”  based  technique,  which  is  a  popular  technique
for page deletion in NAND flash. We find that adversary may
utilize the data retention property of the memory cells for re-
covering  the  deleted  data  using  standard  digital  interfaces
with the memory. We demonstrate data recovery from com-
mercial flash memory chip, sanitized with scrubbing, by us-
ing partial erase operation on the chip. Our results show that
analog scrubbing is needed to securely delete information in
flash  system.  We  propose  and  implement  analog  scrubbing
using  partial  program  operation  based  on  the  file  creation
time information.
1. Introduction
Secure deletion of obsolete data from the storage medium is
a  topic  of  paramount  importance  to  ensure  the  privacy  and
security of the data owner. Accor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Data Recovery from "Scrubbed" NAND Flash Storage: Need for Analog
Sanitization
author:Md. Mehedi Hasan and
Biswajit Ray
Data Recovery from “Scrubbed” NAND Flash Storage:
Need for Analog Sanitization
Md Mehedi Hasan and Biswajit Ray, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/hasan
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Data Recovery from “Scrubbed” NAND Flash Storage: Need for Analog Sanitiza-
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Md Mehedi Hasan and Biswajit Ray
tion
Abstract
Digital sanitization of flash based non-volatile memory sys-
tem is a well-researched topic. Since flash memory cell holds
information  in  the  analog  threshold  voltage,  flash  cell  may
hold the imprints of previously written data even after digital
sanitization.  In  this  paper,  we  show  that  data  is  partially  or
completely recoverable from the flash  media sanitized  with
“scrubbing”  based  technique,  which  is  a  popular  technique
for page deletion in NAND flash. We find that adversary may
utilize the data retention property of the memory cells for re-
covering  the  deleted  data  using  standard  digital  interfaces
with the memory. We demonstrate data recovery from com-
mercial flash memory chip, sanitized with scrubbing, by us-
ing partial erase operation on the chip. Our results show that
analog scrubbing is needed to securely delete information in
flash  system.  We  propose  and  implement  analog  scrubbing
using  partial  program  operation  based  on  the  file  creation
time information.
1. Introduction
Secure deletion of obsolete data from the storage medium is
a  topic  of  paramount  importance  to  ensure  the  privacy  and
security of the data owner. Accor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:How healthy are today's enterprise networks?
author:Saikat Guha and
Jaideep Chandrashekar and
Nina Taft and
Konstantina Papagiannaki
How Healthy are Today’s Enterprise Networks?
Saikat Guha
Cornell University
saikat@cs.cornell.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we take a look at the health of a typical enterprise
network via a new metric based on the fraction of useful ﬂows gen-
erated by endhosts. Flows considered non-useful are those that ex-
plicitly fail or else do not elicit a response from the intended desti-
nation. Examining traces collected from a large number of mobile
hosts in an enterprise network, we ﬁnd that about 34% of the ﬂows
are not useful. Through our study that combines data analysis and
ongoing interactions with our IT department, we learn that these
non-useful ﬂows arise from several causes. Our mobile hosts fre-
quently change environments, by either moving in and out of the
corporate environment, or by switching the point and means of at-
tachment to the corporate network. We ﬁnd that many of the fail-
ures occur due to the hosts’ lack of environment awareness, which
results in attempts to discover services that are not present in all
environments. Other causes include misconﬁguration, unnecessary
broadcast trafﬁc, and excessive connection retries. Understanding
this ever present noise in endhost communication is important for
a variety of reasons including the fact that it complicates anomaly
detection design and wastes resources, the latter of which is par-
ticularly crucial for wireless and mobile environments. Finally, we
discuss possible means to design applications and services that can
signiﬁcantly improve the health of the network.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer Communi-
cation Networks—Network Operations; C.4 [Computer Systems
Organization]: Performance of Systems
General Terms
Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Network Health, Enterprise, Mobility, Environment Awareness
Permission to...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:How healthy are today's enterprise networks?
author:Saikat Guha and
Jaideep Chandrashekar and
Nina Taft and
Konstantina Papagiannaki
How Healthy are Today’s Enterprise Networks?
Saikat Guha
Cornell University
saikat@cs.cornell.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we take a look at the health of a typical enterprise
network via a new metric based on the fraction of useful ﬂows gen-
erated by endhosts. Flows considered non-useful are those that ex-
plicitly fail or else do not elicit a response from the intended desti-
nation. Examining traces collected from a large number of mobile
hosts in an enterprise network, we ﬁnd that about 34% of the ﬂows
are not useful. Through our study that combines data analysis and
ongoing interactions with our IT department, we learn that these
non-useful ﬂows arise from several causes. Our mobile hosts fre-
quently change environments, by either moving in and out of the
corporate environment, or by switching the point and means of at-
tachment to the corporate network. We ﬁnd that many of the fail-
ures occur due to the hosts’ lack of environment awareness, which
results in attempts to discover services that are not present in all
environments. Other causes include misconﬁguration, unnecessary
broadcast trafﬁc, and excessive connection retries. Understanding
this ever present noise in endhost communication is important for
a variety of reasons including the fact that it complicates anomaly
detection design and wastes resources, the latter of which is par-
ticularly crucial for wireless and mobile environments. Finally, we
discuss possible means to design applications and services that can
signiﬁcantly improve the health of the network.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer Communi-
cation Networks—Network Operations; C.4 [Computer Systems
Organization]: Performance of Systems
General Terms
Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Network Health, Enterprise, Mobility, Environment Awareness
Permission to...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Beyond Stack Inspection: A Unified Access-Control and Information-Flow
Security Model
author:Marco Pistoia and
Anindya Banerjee and
David A. Naumann
A Uniﬁed Access-Control and Information-Flow Security Model
Beyond Stack Inspection:
Marco Pistoia
∗
Anindya Banerjee
†
David A. Naumann
IBM T. J. Watson Research Ctr.
Hawthorne, New York, USA
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas, USA
pistoia@us.ibm.com
ab@cis.ksu.edu
Stevens Institute of Technology
Hoboken, New Jersey, USA
naumann@cs.stevens.edu
Abstract
Modern component-based systems, such as Java and
Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR), have
adopted Stack-Based Access Control (SBAC). Its purpose is
to use stack inspection to verify that all the code respon-
sible for a security-sensitive action is sufﬁciently autho-
rized to perform that action. Previous literature has shown
that the security model enforced by SBAC is ﬂawed in that
stack inspection may allow unauthorized code no longer
on the stack to inﬂuence the execution of security-sensitive
code. A different approach, History-Based Access Control
(HBAC), is safe but may prevent authorized code from exe-
cuting a security-sensitive operation if less trusted code was
previously executed. In this paper, we formally introduce
Information-Based Access Control (IBAC), a novel security
model that veriﬁes that all and only the code responsible
for a security-sensitive operation is sufﬁciently authorized.
Given an access-control policy α, we present a mechanism
to extract from it an implicit integrity policy ι, and we prove
that IBAC enforces ι. Furthermore, we discuss large-scale
application code scenarios to which IBAC can be success-
fully applied.
1
Introduction
Modern component-based systems allow code from dif-
ferent sources and with different levels of trust to be exe-
cuted at the same time. From an integrity point of view,
it is important to verify that, any time a security-sensitive
action guarded by a permission q is attempted, all the
cod...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Beyond Stack Inspection: A Unified Access-Control and Information-Flow
Security Model
author:Marco Pistoia and
Anindya Banerjee and
David A. Naumann
A Uniﬁed Access-Control and Information-Flow Security Model
Beyond Stack Inspection:
Marco Pistoia
∗
Anindya Banerjee
†
David A. Naumann
IBM T. J. Watson Research Ctr.
Hawthorne, New York, USA
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas, USA
pistoia@us.ibm.com
ab@cis.ksu.edu
Stevens Institute of Technology
Hoboken, New Jersey, USA
naumann@cs.stevens.edu
Abstract
Modern component-based systems, such as Java and
Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR), have
adopted Stack-Based Access Control (SBAC). Its purpose is
to use stack inspection to verify that all the code respon-
sible for a security-sensitive action is sufﬁciently autho-
rized to perform that action. Previous literature has shown
that the security model enforced by SBAC is ﬂawed in that
stack inspection may allow unauthorized code no longer
on the stack to inﬂuence the execution of security-sensitive
code. A different approach, History-Based Access Control
(HBAC), is safe but may prevent authorized code from exe-
cuting a security-sensitive operation if less trusted code was
previously executed. In this paper, we formally introduce
Information-Based Access Control (IBAC), a novel security
model that veriﬁes that all and only the code responsible
for a security-sensitive operation is sufﬁciently authorized.
Given an access-control policy α, we present a mechanism
to extract from it an implicit integrity policy ι, and we prove
that IBAC enforces ι. Furthermore, we discuss large-scale
application code scenarios to which IBAC can be success-
fully applied.
1
Introduction
Modern component-based systems allow code from dif-
ferent sources and with different levels of trust to be exe-
cuted at the same time. From an integrity point of view,
it is important to verify that, any time a security-sensitive
action guarded by a permission q is attempted, all the
cod...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts
author:Petar Tsankov and
Andrei Marian Dan and
Dana Drachsler-Cohen and
Arthur Gervais and
Florian B"unzli and
Martin T. Vechev
Machine Learning Model for Smart Contracts
Security Analysis
Pouyan Momeni
Yu Wang
Reza Samavi
McMaster University, Canada
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
momenip@mcmaster.ca
wang873@mcmaster.ca
samavir@mcmaster.ca
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a machine learning
predictive model that detects patterns of security vulnerabilities
in smart contracts. We adapted two static code analyzers to label
more than 1000 smart contracts that were veriﬁed and used
on the Ethereum platform. Our model predicted a number of
major software vulnerabilities with the average accuracy of 95
percent. The model currently supports smart contracts developed
in Solidity, however, the approach described in this paper can be
applied to other languages and blockchain platforms.
Index Terms—blockchain, smart contract, security vulnerabil-
ity, machine learning, code analysis, software testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is a new decentralized data structure with a wide
range of applications. A crucial component of blockchain is
the smart contract which is an agreement written in computer
code and stored on the blockchain. It can encode a set of
rules or terms predeﬁned by the parties and execute them
automatically to enforce actions when certain events occur
without any need for a third party [1]. The algorithmic
structure of blockchain and lack of a central authority make
the platform an attractive target for attackers. Smart contracts
have a rapid developing process and this makes smart contracts
a more vulnerable target for adversarial attacks as, in general,
newly released software components are more susceptible to
programming errors and design defects [2]. Smart contracts
control the logic of transactions and the impact of an attack can
change the c...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts
author:Petar Tsankov and
Andrei Marian Dan and
Dana Drachsler-Cohen and
Arthur Gervais and
Florian B"unzli and
Martin T. Vechev
Machine Learning Model for Smart Contracts
Security Analysis
Pouyan Momeni
Yu Wang
Reza Samavi
McMaster University, Canada
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
momenip@mcmaster.ca
wang873@mcmaster.ca
samavir@mcmaster.ca
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a machine learning
predictive model that detects patterns of security vulnerabilities
in smart contracts. We adapted two static code analyzers to label
more than 1000 smart contracts that were veriﬁed and used
on the Ethereum platform. Our model predicted a number of
major software vulnerabilities with the average accuracy of 95
percent. The model currently supports smart contracts developed
in Solidity, however, the approach described in this paper can be
applied to other languages and blockchain platforms.
Index Terms—blockchain, smart contract, security vulnerabil-
ity, machine learning, code analysis, software testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is a new decentralized data structure with a wide
range of applications. A crucial component of blockchain is
the smart contract which is an agreement written in computer
code and stored on the blockchain. It can encode a set of
rules or terms predeﬁned by the parties and execute them
automatically to enforce actions when certain events occur
without any need for a third party [1]. The algorithmic
structure of blockchain and lack of a central authority make
the platform an attractive target for attackers. Smart contracts
have a rapid developing process and this makes smart contracts
a more vulnerable target for adversarial attacks as, in general,
newly released software components are more susceptible to
programming errors and design defects [2]. Smart contracts
control the logic of transactions and the impact of an attack can
change the c...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles
as A New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
author:Haohuang Wen and
Qi Alfred Chen and
Zhiqiang Lin
Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability
Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A New Over-the-Air
Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
Haohuang Wen, Ohio State University; Qi Alfred Chen, University of California, Irvine;
Zhiqiang Lin, Ohio State University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/wen
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A
New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
Haohuang Wen
Qi Alfred Chen
The Ohio State University
University of California, Irvine
wen.423@osu.edu
alfchen@uci.edu
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
Abstract
With the growing trend of the Internet of Things, a large
number of wireless OBD-II dongles are developed, which can
be simply plugged into vehicles to enable remote functions
such as sophisticated vehicle control and status monitoring.
However, since these dongles are directly connected with
in-vehicle networks, they may open a new over-the-air attack
surface for vehicles. In this paper, we conduct the ﬁrst com-
prehensive security analysis on all wireless OBD-II dongles
available on Amazon in the US in February 2019, which
were 77 in total. To systematically perform the analysis, we
design and implement an automated tool DONGLESCOPE
that dynamically tests these dongles from all possible attack
stages on a real automobile. With DONGLESCOPE, we have
identiﬁed 5 different types of vulnerabilities, with 4 being
newly discovered. Our results reveal that each of the 77
dongles exposes at least two types of these vulnerabilities,
which indicates a widespread vulne...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles
as A New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
author:Haohuang Wen and
Qi Alfred Chen and
Zhiqiang Lin
Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability
Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A New Over-the-Air
Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
Haohuang Wen, Ohio State University; Qi Alfred Chen, University of California, Irvine;
Zhiqiang Lin, Ohio State University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/wen
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A
New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT
Haohuang Wen
Qi Alfred Chen
The Ohio State University
University of California, Irvine
wen.423@osu.edu
alfchen@uci.edu
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
Abstract
With the growing trend of the Internet of Things, a large
number of wireless OBD-II dongles are developed, which can
be simply plugged into vehicles to enable remote functions
such as sophisticated vehicle control and status monitoring.
However, since these dongles are directly connected with
in-vehicle networks, they may open a new over-the-air attack
surface for vehicles. In this paper, we conduct the ﬁrst com-
prehensive security analysis on all wireless OBD-II dongles
available on Amazon in the US in February 2019, which
were 77 in total. To systematically perform the analysis, we
design and implement an automated tool DONGLESCOPE
that dynamically tests these dongles from all possible attack
stages on a real automobile. With DONGLESCOPE, we have
identiﬁed 5 different types of vulnerabilities, with 4 being
newly discovered. Our results reveal that each of the 77
dongles exposes at least two types of these vulnerabilities,
which indicates a widespread vulne...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fibbing in action: On-demand load-balancing for better video delivery
author:Olivier Tilmans and
Stefano Vissicchio and
Laurent Vanbever and
Jennifer Rexford
On-demand load-balancing for better video delivery
Fibbing in action:
Olivier Tilmans‡∗, Stefano Vissicchio‡†, Laurent Vanbever§, Jennifer Rexford¶
‡ Université catholique de Louvain, § ETH Zürich, ¶Princeton University
‡ name.surname@uclouvain.be, § lvanbever@ethz.ch, ¶ jrex@cs.princeton.edu
ABSTRACT
Video streaming, in conjunction with social networks,
have given birth to a new traﬃc pattern over the Inter-
net: transient, localized traﬃc surges, known as ﬂash
crowds. Traditional traﬃc-engineering methods can hardly
cope with these surges, as they are unpredictable by
nature. Consequently, networks either have to be over-
provisioned, which is expensive and wastes resources,
or risk to periodically incur congestion, which infuriates
customers. This demonstration shows how Fibbing [1]
can improve network performance and preserve users’
quality of experience when accessing video streams, by
implementing a ﬁne-grained load-balancing service. This
service leverages two unique features of Fibbing: pro-
gramming per destination load-balancing and imple-
menting uneven splitting ratios.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocols; Programmable
networks; Network management; Network archi-
tectures;
Keywords
Fibbing; traﬃc engineering; link-state routing
1.
INTRODUCTION
Interactive applications (e.g., video streaming) im-
pose hard constraints on the performance of networks
(e.g., on losses or delay) in order to ensure a good qual-
ity of experience for their users. To guarantee good
∗O. Tilmans is supported by a grant from F.R.S.-FNRS FRIA.
†S. Vissicchio is a postdoctoral researcher from F.R.S.-FNRS.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fibbing in action: On-demand load-balancing for better video delivery
author:Olivier Tilmans and
Stefano Vissicchio and
Laurent Vanbever and
Jennifer Rexford
On-demand load-balancing for better video delivery
Fibbing in action:
Olivier Tilmans‡∗, Stefano Vissicchio‡†, Laurent Vanbever§, Jennifer Rexford¶
‡ Université catholique de Louvain, § ETH Zürich, ¶Princeton University
‡ name.surname@uclouvain.be, § lvanbever@ethz.ch, ¶ jrex@cs.princeton.edu
ABSTRACT
Video streaming, in conjunction with social networks,
have given birth to a new traﬃc pattern over the Inter-
net: transient, localized traﬃc surges, known as ﬂash
crowds. Traditional traﬃc-engineering methods can hardly
cope with these surges, as they are unpredictable by
nature. Consequently, networks either have to be over-
provisioned, which is expensive and wastes resources,
or risk to periodically incur congestion, which infuriates
customers. This demonstration shows how Fibbing [1]
can improve network performance and preserve users’
quality of experience when accessing video streams, by
implementing a ﬁne-grained load-balancing service. This
service leverages two unique features of Fibbing: pro-
gramming per destination load-balancing and imple-
menting uneven splitting ratios.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocols; Programmable
networks; Network management; Network archi-
tectures;
Keywords
Fibbing; traﬃc engineering; link-state routing
1.
INTRODUCTION
Interactive applications (e.g., video streaming) im-
pose hard constraints on the performance of networks
(e.g., on losses or delay) in order to ensure a good qual-
ity of experience for their users. To guarantee good
∗O. Tilmans is supported by a grant from F.R.S.-FNRS FRIA.
†S. Vissicchio is a postdoctoral researcher from F.R.S.-FNRS.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Automatic error finding in access-control policies
author:Karthick Jayaraman and
Vijay Ganesh and
Mahesh V. Tripunitara and
Martin C. Rinard and
Steve J. Chapin
Automatic Error Finding in Access-Control Policies
∗
Karthick Jayaraman
karjay@microsoft.com
Microsoft
Vijay Ganesh
MIT
vganesh@csail.mit.edu
Mahesh Tripunitara
University of Waterloo
tripunit@uwaterloo.ca
Martin Rinard
MIT
rinard@csail.mit.edu
ABSTRACT
Verifying that access-control systems maintain desired se-
curity properties is recognized as an important problem
in security. Enterprise access-control systems have grown
to protect tens of thousands of resources, and there is a
need for veriﬁcation to scale commensurately. We present
a new abstraction-reﬁnement technique for automatically
ﬁnding errors in Administrative Role-Based Access Control
(ARBAC) security policies. ARBAC is the ﬁrst and most
comprehensive administrative scheme for Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) systems. Underlying our approach is a
change in mindset: we propose that error ﬁnding comple-
ments veriﬁcation, can be more scalable, and allows for the
use of a wider variety of techniques. In our approach, we use
an abstraction-reﬁnement technique to ﬁrst identify and dis-
card roles that are unlikely to be relevant to the veriﬁcation
question (the abstraction step), and then restore such ab-
stracted roles incrementally (the reﬁnement steps). Errors
are one-sided: if there is an error in the abstracted policy,
then there is an error in the original policy. If there is an
error in a policy whose role-dependency graph diameter is
smaller than a certain bound, then we ﬁnd the error. Our
abstraction-reﬁnement technique complements conventional
state-space exploration techniques such as model checking.
We have implemented our technique in an access-control pol-
icy analysis tool. We show empirically that our tool scales
well to realistic policies, and is orders of magnitude faster
than prior tools.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: K...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Automatic error finding in access-control policies
author:Karthick Jayaraman and
Vijay Ganesh and
Mahesh V. Tripunitara and
Martin C. Rinard and
Steve J. Chapin
Automatic Error Finding in Access-Control Policies
∗
Karthick Jayaraman
karjay@microsoft.com
Microsoft
Vijay Ganesh
MIT
vganesh@csail.mit.edu
Mahesh Tripunitara
University of Waterloo
tripunit@uwaterloo.ca
Martin Rinard
MIT
rinard@csail.mit.edu
ABSTRACT
Verifying that access-control systems maintain desired se-
curity properties is recognized as an important problem
in security. Enterprise access-control systems have grown
to protect tens of thousands of resources, and there is a
need for veriﬁcation to scale commensurately. We present
a new abstraction-reﬁnement technique for automatically
ﬁnding errors in Administrative Role-Based Access Control
(ARBAC) security policies. ARBAC is the ﬁrst and most
comprehensive administrative scheme for Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) systems. Underlying our approach is a
change in mindset: we propose that error ﬁnding comple-
ments veriﬁcation, can be more scalable, and allows for the
use of a wider variety of techniques. In our approach, we use
an abstraction-reﬁnement technique to ﬁrst identify and dis-
card roles that are unlikely to be relevant to the veriﬁcation
question (the abstraction step), and then restore such ab-
stracted roles incrementally (the reﬁnement steps). Errors
are one-sided: if there is an error in the abstracted policy,
then there is an error in the original policy. If there is an
error in a policy whose role-dependency graph diameter is
smaller than a certain bound, then we ﬁnd the error. Our
abstraction-reﬁnement technique complements conventional
state-space exploration techniques such as model checking.
We have implemented our technique in an access-control pol-
icy analysis tool. We show empirically that our tool scales
well to realistic policies, and is orders of magnitude faster
than prior tools.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: K...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Psychology of Security for the Home Computer User
author:Adele E. Howe and
Indrajit Ray and
Mark Roberts and
Malgorzata Urbanska and
Zinta S. Byrne
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The Psychology of Security for the Home Computer User
Adele E. Howe, Indrajit Ray, Mark Roberts, Malgorzata Urbanska
Computer Science Department
Colorado State University
Email: {howe, indrajit, mroberts, urbanska}@CS.ColoState.EDU
Fort Collins, CO 80523 U.S.A.
Zinta Byrne
Psychology Department
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523 U.S.A.
Email: Zinta.Byrne@ColoState.EDU
Abstract—The home computer user is often said to be the
weakest link in computer security. They do not always follow
security advice, and they take actions, as in phishing, that
compromise themselves. In general, we do not understand why
users do not always behave safely, which would seem to be in
their best interest. This paper reviews the literature of surveys
and studies of factors that inﬂuence security decisions for home
computer users. We organize the review in four sections: un-
derstanding of threats, perceptions of risky behavior, efforts to
avoid security breaches and attitudes to security interventions.
We ﬁnd that these studies reveal a lot of reasons why current
security measures may not match the needs or abilities of home
computer users and suggest future work needed to inform how
security is delivered to this user group.
Keywords-usability and security, home users
I. WHY STUDY THE HOME COMPUTER USER?
The home computer user is often said to be the weak-
est link in computer security. Security and privacy threats
such as Web cookies and phishing require some form of
user complicity or acquiescence. Adequate security does
not come with the purchase of the computer but requires
additional software, careful settings within applications, ap-
propriate choices of passwords, regular updating of patches,
etc. Moreover, as applications are becoming more inter-
esting/useful and busine...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Psychology of Security for the Home Computer User
author:Adele E. Howe and
Indrajit Ray and
Mark Roberts and
Malgorzata Urbanska and
Zinta S. Byrne
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The Psychology of Security for the Home Computer User
Adele E. Howe, Indrajit Ray, Mark Roberts, Malgorzata Urbanska
Computer Science Department
Colorado State University
Email: {howe, indrajit, mroberts, urbanska}@CS.ColoState.EDU
Fort Collins, CO 80523 U.S.A.
Zinta Byrne
Psychology Department
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523 U.S.A.
Email: Zinta.Byrne@ColoState.EDU
Abstract—The home computer user is often said to be the
weakest link in computer security. They do not always follow
security advice, and they take actions, as in phishing, that
compromise themselves. In general, we do not understand why
users do not always behave safely, which would seem to be in
their best interest. This paper reviews the literature of surveys
and studies of factors that inﬂuence security decisions for home
computer users. We organize the review in four sections: un-
derstanding of threats, perceptions of risky behavior, efforts to
avoid security breaches and attitudes to security interventions.
We ﬁnd that these studies reveal a lot of reasons why current
security measures may not match the needs or abilities of home
computer users and suggest future work needed to inform how
security is delivered to this user group.
Keywords-usability and security, home users
I. WHY STUDY THE HOME COMPUTER USER?
The home computer user is often said to be the weak-
est link in computer security. Security and privacy threats
such as Web cookies and phishing require some form of
user complicity or acquiescence. Adequate security does
not come with the purchase of the computer but requires
additional software, careful settings within applications, ap-
propriate choices of passwords, regular updating of patches,
etc. Moreover, as applications are becoming more inter-
esting/useful and busine...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Masquerade Detection Using Enriched Command Lines
author:Roy A. Maxion
Masquerade Detection Using Enriched Command Lines
Roy A. Maxion
maxion@cs.cmu.eduu
Dependable Systems Laboratory
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213 / USA
Abstract
A masquerade attack, in which one user impersonates
another,
is among the most serious forms of computer
abuse, largely because such attacks are often mounted by in-
siders, and can be very difﬁcult to detect. Automatic discov-
ery of masqueraders is sometimes undertaken by detecting
signiﬁcant departures from normal user behavior, as rep-
resented by user proﬁles based on users’ command histo-
ries. A series of experiments performed by Schonlau et al.
[12] achieved moderate success in masquerade detection
based on a data set comprised of truncated command lines,
i.e., single commands, stripped of any accompanying ﬂags,
arguments or elements of shell grammar such as pipes or
semi-colons. Using the same data, Maxion and Townsend
[8] improved on the Schonlau et al. results by 56%, raising
the detection rate from 39.4% to 61.5% at false-alarm rates
near 1%. The present paper extends this work by testing
the hypothesis that a limitation of these approaches is the
use of truncated command-line data, as opposed to com-
mand lines enriched with ﬂags, shell grammar, arguments
and information about aliases. Enriched command lines
were found to facilitate correct detection at the 82% level,
far exceeding previous results, with a corresponding 30%
reduction in the overall cost of errors, and only a small in-
crease in false alarms. Descriptions of pathological cases
illustrate strengths and limitations of both the data and the
detection algorithm.
1. Introduction
Colloquially, masquerading is the act of substituting one-
self for another. To masquerade is to disguise; to assume
the appearance of something one is not; to furnish with a
false appearance or an assumed identity; or to obscure th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Masquerade Detection Using Enriched Command Lines
author:Roy A. Maxion
Masquerade Detection Using Enriched Command Lines
Roy A. Maxion
maxion@cs.cmu.eduu
Dependable Systems Laboratory
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213 / USA
Abstract
A masquerade attack, in which one user impersonates
another,
is among the most serious forms of computer
abuse, largely because such attacks are often mounted by in-
siders, and can be very difﬁcult to detect. Automatic discov-
ery of masqueraders is sometimes undertaken by detecting
signiﬁcant departures from normal user behavior, as rep-
resented by user proﬁles based on users’ command histo-
ries. A series of experiments performed by Schonlau et al.
[12] achieved moderate success in masquerade detection
based on a data set comprised of truncated command lines,
i.e., single commands, stripped of any accompanying ﬂags,
arguments or elements of shell grammar such as pipes or
semi-colons. Using the same data, Maxion and Townsend
[8] improved on the Schonlau et al. results by 56%, raising
the detection rate from 39.4% to 61.5% at false-alarm rates
near 1%. The present paper extends this work by testing
the hypothesis that a limitation of these approaches is the
use of truncated command-line data, as opposed to com-
mand lines enriched with ﬂags, shell grammar, arguments
and information about aliases. Enriched command lines
were found to facilitate correct detection at the 82% level,
far exceeding previous results, with a corresponding 30%
reduction in the overall cost of errors, and only a small in-
crease in false alarms. Descriptions of pathological cases
illustrate strengths and limitations of both the data and the
detection algorithm.
1. Introduction
Colloquially, masquerading is the act of substituting one-
self for another. To masquerade is to disguise; to assume
the appearance of something one is not; to furnish with a
false appearance or an assumed identity; or to obscure th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices
author:Michael Brown and
Donny Cheung and
Darrel Hankerson and
Julio C'esar L'opez-Hern'andez and
Michael Kirkup and
Alfred Menezes
USENIX Association
Proceedings of the
9th USENIX Security Symposium
Denver, Colorado, USA
August 14 –17, 2000
THE ADVANCED COMPUTING SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION
© 2000 by The USENIX Association
Phone: 1 510 528 8649
FAX: 1 510 548 5738
All Rights Reserved
Email: office@usenix.org
For more information about the USENIX Association:
WWW: http://www.usenix.org
Rights to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer.
 Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes.
This copyright notice must be included in the reproduced paper. USENIX acknowledges all trademarks herein.
PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices
Michael Brown
(cid:3)
Donny Cheung
(cid:3)
Michael Kirkup
(cid:3)
Darrel Hankerson†
Alfred Menezes
Julio Lopez Hernandez‡
(cid:3)
Abstract
The market for Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) is
growing at a rapid pace. An increasing number of prod-
ucts, such as the PalmPilot, are adding wireless com-
munications capabilities. PDA users are now able to
send and receive email just as they would from their
networked desktop machines. Because of the inherent
insecurity of wireless environments, a system is needed
for secure email communications. The requirements for
the security system will likely be inﬂuenced by the con-
straints of the PDA, including limited memory, limited
processing power, limited bandwidth, and a limited user
interface.
This paper describes our experience with porting PGP
to the Research in Motion (RIM) two-way pager, and in-
corporating elliptic curve cryptography into PGP’s suite
of public-key ciphers. Our main conclusion is that PGP
is a viable solution for providing secure and interopera-
ble email communications between constrained wireless
devices and desktop machines.
1 Introduction
It is expec...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices
author:Michael Brown and
Donny Cheung and
Darrel Hankerson and
Julio C'esar L'opez-Hern'andez and
Michael Kirkup and
Alfred Menezes
USENIX Association
Proceedings of the
9th USENIX Security Symposium
Denver, Colorado, USA
August 14 –17, 2000
THE ADVANCED COMPUTING SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION
© 2000 by The USENIX Association
Phone: 1 510 528 8649
FAX: 1 510 548 5738
All Rights Reserved
Email: office@usenix.org
For more information about the USENIX Association:
WWW: http://www.usenix.org
Rights to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer.
 Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes.
This copyright notice must be included in the reproduced paper. USENIX acknowledges all trademarks herein.
PGP in Constrained Wireless Devices
Michael Brown
(cid:3)
Donny Cheung
(cid:3)
Michael Kirkup
(cid:3)
Darrel Hankerson†
Alfred Menezes
Julio Lopez Hernandez‡
(cid:3)
Abstract
The market for Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) is
growing at a rapid pace. An increasing number of prod-
ucts, such as the PalmPilot, are adding wireless com-
munications capabilities. PDA users are now able to
send and receive email just as they would from their
networked desktop machines. Because of the inherent
insecurity of wireless environments, a system is needed
for secure email communications. The requirements for
the security system will likely be inﬂuenced by the con-
straints of the PDA, including limited memory, limited
processing power, limited bandwidth, and a limited user
interface.
This paper describes our experience with porting PGP
to the Research in Motion (RIM) two-way pager, and in-
corporating elliptic curve cryptography into PGP’s suite
of public-key ciphers. Our main conclusion is that PGP
is a viable solution for providing secure and interopera-
ble email communications between constrained wireless
devices and desktop machines.
1 Introduction
It is expec...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Towards a Complete View of the Certificate Ecosystem
author:Benjamin VanderSloot and
Johanna Amann and
Matthew Bernhard and
Zakir Durumeric and
Michael Bailey and
J. Alex Halderman
Towards a Complete View of the
Certiﬁcate Ecosystem
Benjamin VanderSloot†
Johanna Amann‡
Matthew Bernhard†
Zakir Durumeric†‡
Michael Bailey§
J. Alex Halderman‡
†University of Michigan ‡International Computer Science Inst.
§ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
{benvds, matber, zakir, jhalderm}@umich.edu, johanna@icir.org, mdbailey@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The HTTPS certiﬁcate ecosystem has been of great inter-
est to the measurement and security communities. Without
any ground truth, researchers have attempted to study this
PKI from a variety of fragmented perspectives, including
passively monitored networks, scans of the popular domains
or the IPv4 address space, search engines such as Censys,
and Certiﬁcate Transparency (CT) logs. In this work, we
comparatively analyze all these perspectives. We ﬁnd that
aggregated CT logs and Censys snapshots have many prop-
erties that complement each other, and that together they
encompass over 99% of all certiﬁcates found by any of these
techniques. However, they still miss 1.5% of certiﬁcates ob-
served in a crawl of all domains in .com, .net, and .org.
We go on to illustrate how this combined perspective affects
results from previous studies. In light of these ﬁndings, we
have worked with the operators of Censys to incorporate CT
log data into its results going forward, and we recommend
that future HTTPS measurement adopt this new vantage.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly all secure web communication takes place over
HTTPS. Both the underlying TLS protocol and the sup-
porting certiﬁcate public key infrastructure (PKI) have been
studied extensively over the past ﬁve years, with questions
ranging from understanding the behavior of certiﬁcate au-
thorities [11, 14] to detecting server-side vulnerabilities and
tracking how quickly they are mitigated [7, 10, 2...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Towards a Complete View of the Certificate Ecosystem
author:Benjamin VanderSloot and
Johanna Amann and
Matthew Bernhard and
Zakir Durumeric and
Michael Bailey and
J. Alex Halderman
Towards a Complete View of the
Certiﬁcate Ecosystem
Benjamin VanderSloot†
Johanna Amann‡
Matthew Bernhard†
Zakir Durumeric†‡
Michael Bailey§
J. Alex Halderman‡
†University of Michigan ‡International Computer Science Inst.
§ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
{benvds, matber, zakir, jhalderm}@umich.edu, johanna@icir.org, mdbailey@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The HTTPS certiﬁcate ecosystem has been of great inter-
est to the measurement and security communities. Without
any ground truth, researchers have attempted to study this
PKI from a variety of fragmented perspectives, including
passively monitored networks, scans of the popular domains
or the IPv4 address space, search engines such as Censys,
and Certiﬁcate Transparency (CT) logs. In this work, we
comparatively analyze all these perspectives. We ﬁnd that
aggregated CT logs and Censys snapshots have many prop-
erties that complement each other, and that together they
encompass over 99% of all certiﬁcates found by any of these
techniques. However, they still miss 1.5% of certiﬁcates ob-
served in a crawl of all domains in .com, .net, and .org.
We go on to illustrate how this combined perspective affects
results from previous studies. In light of these ﬁndings, we
have worked with the operators of Censys to incorporate CT
log data into its results going forward, and we recommend
that future HTTPS measurement adopt this new vantage.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly all secure web communication takes place over
HTTPS. Both the underlying TLS protocol and the sup-
porting certiﬁcate public key infrastructure (PKI) have been
studied extensively over the past ﬁve years, with questions
ranging from understanding the behavior of certiﬁcate au-
thorities [11, 14] to detecting server-side vulnerabilities and
tracking how quickly they are mitigated [7, 10, 2...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An experimental study of home gateway characteristics
author:Seppo H"at"onen and
Aki Nyrhinen and
Lars Eggert and
Stephen D. Strowes and
Pasi Sarolahti and
Markku Kojo
An Experimental Study of Home Gateway Characteristics
Seppo Hätönen
University of Helsinki
shatonen@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
Stephen Strowes
University of Glasgow
sds@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Aki Nyrhinen
University of Helsinki
anyrhine@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
Lars Eggert
Nokia Research Center
lars.eggert@nokia.com
Pasi Sarolahti
HIIT / Aalto University
pasi.sarolahti@iki.ﬁ
Markku Kojo
University of Helsinki
kojo@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
ABSTRACT
Many residential and small business users connect to the Internet
via home gateways, such as DSL and cable modems. The charac-
teristics of these devices heavily inﬂuence the quality and perfor-
mance of the Internet service that these users receive. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that an extremely diverse set of behaviors ex-
ists in the deployed base, forcing application developers to design
for the lowest common denominator. This paper experimentally
analyzes some characteristics of a substantial number of differ-
ent home gateways: binding timeouts, queuing delays, throughput,
protocol support and others.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Performance Attributes; C.2.6
[Computer Communication Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms
Experimentation, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Home Gateways, Behavior, Characteristics, Measurements
1.
INTRODUCTION
Many residential and small business users connect to the Inter-
net through “home gateways” – a colloquial term for customer-
premises equipment (CPE) that includes DSL and cable modems,
WLAN access points and even some kinds of (wired) Ethernet
switches. The common deﬁning characteristic of home gateways
is that they do not just perform Ethernet switching or basic IP for-
warding over various link-layer technologies. They also perform
higher-layer operations, such as network address translation (NAT)
or, m...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An experimental study of home gateway characteristics
author:Seppo H"at"onen and
Aki Nyrhinen and
Lars Eggert and
Stephen D. Strowes and
Pasi Sarolahti and
Markku Kojo
An Experimental Study of Home Gateway Characteristics
Seppo Hätönen
University of Helsinki
shatonen@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
Stephen Strowes
University of Glasgow
sds@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Aki Nyrhinen
University of Helsinki
anyrhine@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
Lars Eggert
Nokia Research Center
lars.eggert@nokia.com
Pasi Sarolahti
HIIT / Aalto University
pasi.sarolahti@iki.ﬁ
Markku Kojo
University of Helsinki
kojo@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
ABSTRACT
Many residential and small business users connect to the Internet
via home gateways, such as DSL and cable modems. The charac-
teristics of these devices heavily inﬂuence the quality and perfor-
mance of the Internet service that these users receive. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that an extremely diverse set of behaviors ex-
ists in the deployed base, forcing application developers to design
for the lowest common denominator. This paper experimentally
analyzes some characteristics of a substantial number of differ-
ent home gateways: binding timeouts, queuing delays, throughput,
protocol support and others.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Performance Attributes; C.2.6
[Computer Communication Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms
Experimentation, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Home Gateways, Behavior, Characteristics, Measurements
1.
INTRODUCTION
Many residential and small business users connect to the Inter-
net through “home gateways” – a colloquial term for customer-
premises equipment (CPE) that includes DSL and cable modems,
WLAN access points and even some kinds of (wired) Ethernet
switches. The common deﬁning characteristic of home gateways
is that they do not just perform Ethernet switching or basic IP for-
warding over various link-layer technologies. They also perform
higher-layer operations, such as network address translation (NAT)
or, m...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analysis of DTLS Implementations Using Protocol State Fuzzing
author:Paul Fiterau-Brostean and
Bengt Jonsson and
Robert Merget and
Joeri de Ruiter and
Konstantinos Sagonas and
Juraj Somorovsky
Analysis of DTLS Implementations Using
Protocol State Fuzzing
Paul Fiterau-Brostean and Bengt Jonsson, Uppsala University; Robert Merget,
Ruhr-University Bochum; Joeri de Ruiter, SIDN Labs; Konstantinos Sagonas,
Uppsala University; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/fiterau-brostean
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Analysis of DTLS Implementations
Using Protocol State Fuzzing
Paul Fiter˘au-Bro¸stean
Uppsala University
Bengt Jonsson
Uppsala University
Robert Merget
Ruhr University Bochum
Joeri de Ruiter
SIDN Labs
Konstantinos Sagonas
Uppsala University
Juraj Somorovsky
Paderborn University
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of proto-
cols relying on UDP. Compared to TCP, UDP offers perfor-
mance advantages such as simplicity and lower latency. This
has motivated its adoption in Voice over IP, tunneling techno-
logies, IoT, and novel Web protocols. To protect sensitive data
exchange in these scenarios, the DTLS protocol has been de-
veloped as a cryptographic variation of TLS. DTLS’s main
challenge is to support the stateless and unreliable transport of
UDP. This has forced protocol designers to make choices that
affect the complexity of DTLS, and to incorporate features
that need not be addressed in the numerous TLS analyses.
We present the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of DTLS im-
plementations using protocol state fuzzing. To that end, we ex-
tend TLS-Attacker, an open source framework for analyzing
TLS implementations, with support for DTLS tailored to the
stateless and unreliable nature of the underlying U...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analysis of DTLS Implementations Using Protocol State Fuzzing
author:Paul Fiterau-Brostean and
Bengt Jonsson and
Robert Merget and
Joeri de Ruiter and
Konstantinos Sagonas and
Juraj Somorovsky
Analysis of DTLS Implementations Using
Protocol State Fuzzing
Paul Fiterau-Brostean and Bengt Jonsson, Uppsala University; Robert Merget,
Ruhr-University Bochum; Joeri de Ruiter, SIDN Labs; Konstantinos Sagonas,
Uppsala University; Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/fiterau-brostean
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Analysis of DTLS Implementations
Using Protocol State Fuzzing
Paul Fiter˘au-Bro¸stean
Uppsala University
Bengt Jonsson
Uppsala University
Robert Merget
Ruhr University Bochum
Joeri de Ruiter
SIDN Labs
Konstantinos Sagonas
Uppsala University
Juraj Somorovsky
Paderborn University
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of proto-
cols relying on UDP. Compared to TCP, UDP offers perfor-
mance advantages such as simplicity and lower latency. This
has motivated its adoption in Voice over IP, tunneling techno-
logies, IoT, and novel Web protocols. To protect sensitive data
exchange in these scenarios, the DTLS protocol has been de-
veloped as a cryptographic variation of TLS. DTLS’s main
challenge is to support the stateless and unreliable transport of
UDP. This has forced protocol designers to make choices that
affect the complexity of DTLS, and to incorporate features
that need not be addressed in the numerous TLS analyses.
We present the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of DTLS im-
plementations using protocol state fuzzing. To that end, we ex-
tend TLS-Attacker, an open source framework for analyzing
TLS implementations, with support for DTLS tailored to the
stateless and unreliable nature of the underlying U...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Poster: inference attacks against searchable encryption protocols
author:Mohammad Saiful Islam and
Mehmet Kuzu and
Murat Kantarcioglu
POSTER: Inference Attacks against Searchable Encryption
Protocols
Mohammad Saiful Islam
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
Mehmet Kuzu
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
Murat Kantarcioglu
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
saiful@utdallas.edu
mehmet.kuzu@utdallas.edu
muratk@utdallas.edu
ABSTRACT
The advent of cloud computing has ushered in an era of mass
data storage in remote servers. Remote data storage oﬀers
reduced data management overhead for data owners in a cost
eﬀective manner. Sensitive documents, however, need to be
stored in encrypted format due to security concerns. But,
encrypted storage makes it diﬃcult to search on the stored
documents. Therefore, this poses a major barrier towards
selective retrieval of encrypted documents from the remote
servers. Various protocols have been proposed for keyword
search over encrypted data (commonly referred to as search-
able encryption) to address this issue. Oblivious RAM type
protocols oﬀer secure search over encrypted data, but are
too expensive to be used in practical applications. Unfortu-
nately, all of the symmetric key based encryption protocols
leak data access patterns due to eﬃciency reasons. In this
poster, we are the ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀects of access pat-
tern disclosure. To that end, we introduce a novel attack
model that exploits access pattern leakage to disclose sig-
niﬁcant amount of sensitive information using a modicum
of prior knowledge. We also present a preliminary set of
empirical results on a real dataset to justify our claim.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized access;
H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]:...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Poster: inference attacks against searchable encryption protocols
author:Mohammad Saiful Islam and
Mehmet Kuzu and
Murat Kantarcioglu
POSTER: Inference Attacks against Searchable Encryption
Protocols
Mohammad Saiful Islam
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
Mehmet Kuzu
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
Murat Kantarcioglu
Jonsson School of
Engineering
and Computer Science
The University of Texas at
Dallas
saiful@utdallas.edu
mehmet.kuzu@utdallas.edu
muratk@utdallas.edu
ABSTRACT
The advent of cloud computing has ushered in an era of mass
data storage in remote servers. Remote data storage oﬀers
reduced data management overhead for data owners in a cost
eﬀective manner. Sensitive documents, however, need to be
stored in encrypted format due to security concerns. But,
encrypted storage makes it diﬃcult to search on the stored
documents. Therefore, this poses a major barrier towards
selective retrieval of encrypted documents from the remote
servers. Various protocols have been proposed for keyword
search over encrypted data (commonly referred to as search-
able encryption) to address this issue. Oblivious RAM type
protocols oﬀer secure search over encrypted data, but are
too expensive to be used in practical applications. Unfortu-
nately, all of the symmetric key based encryption protocols
leak data access patterns due to eﬃciency reasons. In this
poster, we are the ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀects of access pat-
tern disclosure. To that end, we introduce a novel attack
model that exploits access pattern leakage to disclose sig-
niﬁcant amount of sensitive information using a modicum
of prior knowledge. We also present a preliminary set of
empirical results on a real dataset to justify our claim.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized access;
H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]:...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate
Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
author:Chad Brubaker and
Suman Jana and
Baishakhi Ray and
Sarfraz Khurshid and
Vitaly Shmatikov
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial
Testing of Certiﬁcate Validation
in SSL/TLS Implementations
Chad Brubaker ∗ †
Suman Jana†
Sarfraz Khurshid†
Vitaly Shmatikov†
Baishakhi Ray‡
∗Google
†The University of Texas at Austin
‡University of California, Davis
Abstract—Modern network security rests on the Secure Sock-
ets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols.
Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded
devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection
against network attacks. This protection critically depends on
whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 certiﬁcates
presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol.
We design, implement, and apply the ﬁrst methodology for
large-scale testing of certiﬁcate validation logic in SSL/TLS
implementations. Our ﬁrst ingredient is “frankencerts,” synthetic
certiﬁcates that are randomly mutated from parts of real cer-
tiﬁcates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions
and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if
one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a certiﬁcate while another
rejects the same certiﬁcate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle
for ﬁnding ﬂaws in individual implementations.
Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 dis-
crepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as
OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc.
Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For
example, any server with a valid X.509 version 1 certiﬁcate can act
as a rogue certiﬁcate authority and issue fake certiﬁcates for any
domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL
and GnuTLS. Several
implementations also accept certiﬁcate
authorities cr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate
Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
author:Chad Brubaker and
Suman Jana and
Baishakhi Ray and
Sarfraz Khurshid and
Vitaly Shmatikov
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial
Testing of Certiﬁcate Validation
in SSL/TLS Implementations
Chad Brubaker ∗ †
Suman Jana†
Sarfraz Khurshid†
Vitaly Shmatikov†
Baishakhi Ray‡
∗Google
†The University of Texas at Austin
‡University of California, Davis
Abstract—Modern network security rests on the Secure Sock-
ets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols.
Distributed systems, mobile and desktop applications, embedded
devices, and all of secure Web rely on SSL/TLS for protection
against network attacks. This protection critically depends on
whether SSL/TLS clients correctly validate X.509 certiﬁcates
presented by servers during the SSL/TLS handshake protocol.
We design, implement, and apply the ﬁrst methodology for
large-scale testing of certiﬁcate validation logic in SSL/TLS
implementations. Our ﬁrst ingredient is “frankencerts,” synthetic
certiﬁcates that are randomly mutated from parts of real cer-
tiﬁcates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions
and constraints. Our second ingredient is differential testing: if
one SSL/TLS implementation accepts a certiﬁcate while another
rejects the same certiﬁcate, we use the discrepancy as an oracle
for ﬁnding ﬂaws in individual implementations.
Differential testing with frankencerts uncovered 208 dis-
crepancies between popular SSL/TLS implementations such as
OpenSSL, NSS, CyaSSL, GnuTLS, PolarSSL, MatrixSSL, etc.
Many of them are caused by serious security vulnerabilities. For
example, any server with a valid X.509 version 1 certiﬁcate can act
as a rogue certiﬁcate authority and issue fake certiﬁcates for any
domain, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against MatrixSSL
and GnuTLS. Several
implementations also accept certiﬁcate
authorities cr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Countering Persistent Kernel Rootkits through Systematic Hook Discovery
author:Zhi Wang and
Xuxian Jiang and
Weidong Cui and
Xinyuan Wang
Countering Persistent Kernel Rootkits through
Systematic Hook Discovery
Zhi Wang1, Xuxian Jiang1, Weidong Cui2, and Xinyuan Wang3
1 North Carolina State University
2 Microsoft Research
3 George Mason University
Abstract. Kernel rootkits, as one of the most elusive types of malware, pose
signiﬁcant challenges for investigation and defense. Among the most notable are
persistent kernel rootkits, a special type of kernel rootkits that implant persistent
kernel hooks to tamper with the kernel execution to hide their presence. To defend
against them, an effective approach is to ﬁrst identify those kernel hooks and then
protect them from being manipulated by these rootkits. In this paper, we focus on
the ﬁrst step by proposing a systematic approach to identify those kernel hooks.
Our approach is based on two key observations: First, rootkits by design will
attempt to hide its presence from all running rootkit-detection software includ-
ing various system utility programs (e.g., ps and ls). Second, to manipulate OS
kernel control-ﬂows, persistent kernel rootkits by their nature will implant kernel
hooks on the corresponding kernel-side execution paths invoked by the security
programs. In other words, for any persistent kernel rootkit, either it is detectable
by a security program or it has to tamper with one of the kernel hooks on the
corresponding kernel-side execution path(s) of the security program. As a result,
given an authentic security program, we only need to monitor and analyze its
kernel-side execution paths to identify the related set of kernel hooks that could be
potentially hijacked for evasion. We have built a proof-of-concept system called
HookMap and evaluated it with a number of Linux utility programs such as ls, ps,
and netstat in RedHat Fedora Core 5. Our system found that there exist 35 kernel
hooks in the kernel...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Countering Persistent Kernel Rootkits through Systematic Hook Discovery
author:Zhi Wang and
Xuxian Jiang and
Weidong Cui and
Xinyuan Wang
Countering Persistent Kernel Rootkits through
Systematic Hook Discovery
Zhi Wang1, Xuxian Jiang1, Weidong Cui2, and Xinyuan Wang3
1 North Carolina State University
2 Microsoft Research
3 George Mason University
Abstract. Kernel rootkits, as one of the most elusive types of malware, pose
signiﬁcant challenges for investigation and defense. Among the most notable are
persistent kernel rootkits, a special type of kernel rootkits that implant persistent
kernel hooks to tamper with the kernel execution to hide their presence. To defend
against them, an effective approach is to ﬁrst identify those kernel hooks and then
protect them from being manipulated by these rootkits. In this paper, we focus on
the ﬁrst step by proposing a systematic approach to identify those kernel hooks.
Our approach is based on two key observations: First, rootkits by design will
attempt to hide its presence from all running rootkit-detection software includ-
ing various system utility programs (e.g., ps and ls). Second, to manipulate OS
kernel control-ﬂows, persistent kernel rootkits by their nature will implant kernel
hooks on the corresponding kernel-side execution paths invoked by the security
programs. In other words, for any persistent kernel rootkit, either it is detectable
by a security program or it has to tamper with one of the kernel hooks on the
corresponding kernel-side execution path(s) of the security program. As a result,
given an authentic security program, we only need to monitor and analyze its
kernel-side execution paths to identify the related set of kernel hooks that could be
potentially hijacked for evasion. We have built a proof-of-concept system called
HookMap and evaluated it with a number of Linux utility programs such as ls, ps,
and netstat in RedHat Fedora Core 5. Our system found that there exist 35 kernel
hooks in the kernel...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:State Synchronization and Recovery for Strongly Consistent Replicated
CORBA Objects
author:Priya Narasimhan and
Louise E. Moser and
P. M. Melliar-Smith
State Synchronization and Recovery for
Strongly Consistent Replicated CORBA Objects *
P.  Narasimhan, L. E. Moser and P. M. Melliar-Smith
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University  of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93 106
priya@alpha.ece.ucsb.edu,  moser@ece.ucsb.edu, pmms@ece.ucsb.edu
Abstract
The  Eternal  systeni  provides  transparent  fault  tolerance  for
CORBA applications,  without requiring  the niodification  of  ei-
ther the  application  or the  ORB. Eternal  replicates  the  appli-
cation  objects, arid  erisitres strong  replica  consistency  by em-
ploying  reliable totally-ordered nuilticast niessages for convey-
ing the llOP niessages of the application.  To maintain  replica
consistency  even as replicas fail and are recovered, Eternal en-
sures  the  retrieval,  assignment  and  transfer  of  the  three  kinds
of stute  - application-level. ORB/POA-level and infrastructure-
level  state  - that  are  associated  with  each  replicated  object.
Eternal’s  rnechanisnis for recovety  include  the synclzronization
of the state retrieval and the state assignment messages, as well
as the logging and replay of messages arid checkpoints.
1  Introduction
Standards, such  as  the  Object  Management  Group’s Common
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [ 131, aim to sim-
plify  application  development  by  freeing  the  application  pro-
grammer from low-level  syslem details.  CORBA applications
consist of client  objects and  server objects,  with client objects
invoking server objects  that  return  responses  to  the  client  ob-
jects after performing the desired operations.  CORBAs Object
Rcquest Broker (ORB) acts as an intermediary between a client
object and a server object, allowing them to interact, transcend-
ing differences in their prog...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:State Synchronization and Recovery for Strongly Consistent Replicated
CORBA Objects
author:Priya Narasimhan and
Louise E. Moser and
P. M. Melliar-Smith
State Synchronization and Recovery for
Strongly Consistent Replicated CORBA Objects *
P.  Narasimhan, L. E. Moser and P. M. Melliar-Smith
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University  of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93 106
priya@alpha.ece.ucsb.edu,  moser@ece.ucsb.edu, pmms@ece.ucsb.edu
Abstract
The  Eternal  systeni  provides  transparent  fault  tolerance  for
CORBA applications,  without requiring  the niodification  of  ei-
ther the  application  or the  ORB. Eternal  replicates  the  appli-
cation  objects, arid  erisitres strong  replica  consistency  by em-
ploying  reliable totally-ordered nuilticast niessages for convey-
ing the llOP niessages of the application.  To maintain  replica
consistency  even as replicas fail and are recovered, Eternal en-
sures  the  retrieval,  assignment  and  transfer  of  the  three  kinds
of stute  - application-level. ORB/POA-level and infrastructure-
level  state  - that  are  associated  with  each  replicated  object.
Eternal’s  rnechanisnis for recovety  include  the synclzronization
of the state retrieval and the state assignment messages, as well
as the logging and replay of messages arid checkpoints.
1  Introduction
Standards, such  as  the  Object  Management  Group’s Common
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [ 131, aim to sim-
plify  application  development  by  freeing  the  application  pro-
grammer from low-level  syslem details.  CORBA applications
consist of client  objects and  server objects,  with client objects
invoking server objects  that  return  responses  to  the  client  ob-
jects after performing the desired operations.  CORBAs Object
Rcquest Broker (ORB) acts as an intermediary between a client
object and a server object, allowing them to interact, transcend-
ing differences in their prog...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Unicorn: two-factor attestation for data security
author:Mohammad Mannan and
Beom Heyn Kim and
Afshar Ganjali and
David Lie
Unicorn: Two-Factor Attestation for Data Security∗
Mohammad Mannan
Concordia Institute for
Information Systems
Engineering
Concordia University
Montreal, Canada
Beom Heyn Kim
Computer Science
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
Afshar Ganjali and David Lie
Electrical and Computer
Engineering
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
ABSTRACT
Malware and phishing are two major threats for users seek-
ing to perform security-sensitive tasks using computers to-
day. To mitigate these threats, we introduce Unicorn, which
combines the phishing protection of standard security to-
kens and malware protection of trusted computing hard-
ware. The Unicorn security token holds user authentication
credentials, but only releases them if it can verify an attesta-
tion that the user’s computer is free of malware. In this way,
the user is released from having to remember passwords, as
well as having to decide when it is safe to use them. The
user’s computer is further veriﬁed by either a TPM or a
remote server to produce a two-factor attestation scheme.
We have implemented a Unicorn prototype using com-
modity software and hardware, and two Unicorn example
applications (termed as uApps, short for Unicorn Applica-
tions), to secure access to both remote data services and
encrypted local data. Each uApp consists of a small, hard-
ened and immutable OS image, and a single application.
Our Unicorn prototype co-exists with a regular user OS, and
signiﬁcantly reduces the time to switch between the secure
environment and general purpose environment using a novel
mechanism that removes the BIOS from the switch time.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls, Au-
thentication
General Terms
Human Factors, Security
Keywords
Trusted Computing, Authentication, Attestation, Security
Token, Malware, Phishing
∗Contact: mmannan@cii...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Unicorn: two-factor attestation for data security
author:Mohammad Mannan and
Beom Heyn Kim and
Afshar Ganjali and
David Lie
Unicorn: Two-Factor Attestation for Data Security∗
Mohammad Mannan
Concordia Institute for
Information Systems
Engineering
Concordia University
Montreal, Canada
Beom Heyn Kim
Computer Science
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
Afshar Ganjali and David Lie
Electrical and Computer
Engineering
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
ABSTRACT
Malware and phishing are two major threats for users seek-
ing to perform security-sensitive tasks using computers to-
day. To mitigate these threats, we introduce Unicorn, which
combines the phishing protection of standard security to-
kens and malware protection of trusted computing hard-
ware. The Unicorn security token holds user authentication
credentials, but only releases them if it can verify an attesta-
tion that the user’s computer is free of malware. In this way,
the user is released from having to remember passwords, as
well as having to decide when it is safe to use them. The
user’s computer is further veriﬁed by either a TPM or a
remote server to produce a two-factor attestation scheme.
We have implemented a Unicorn prototype using com-
modity software and hardware, and two Unicorn example
applications (termed as uApps, short for Unicorn Applica-
tions), to secure access to both remote data services and
encrypted local data. Each uApp consists of a small, hard-
ened and immutable OS image, and a single application.
Our Unicorn prototype co-exists with a regular user OS, and
signiﬁcantly reduces the time to switch between the secure
environment and general purpose environment using a novel
mechanism that removes the BIOS from the switch time.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls, Au-
thentication
General Terms
Human Factors, Security
Keywords
Trusted Computing, Authentication, Attestation, Security
Token, Malware, Phishing
∗Contact: mmannan@cii...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Markov Decision Process Approach for Optimal Data Backup Scheduling
author:Ruofan Xia and
Fumio Machida and
Kishor S. Trivedi
2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
978-1-4799-2233-8/14 $31.00 © 2014 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/DSN.2014.100
660
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
661
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
662
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
663
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
664
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
665
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Markov Decision Process Approach for Optimal Data Backup Scheduling
author:Ruofan Xia and
Fumio Machida and
Kishor S. Trivedi
2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
978-1-4799-2233-8/14 $31.00 © 2014 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/DSN.2014.100
660
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
661
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
662
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
663
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
664
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
665
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 19,2021 at 08:31:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:ObliviStore: High Performance Oblivious Distributed Cloud Data Store
author:Emil Stefanov and
Elaine Shi
ObliviStore: High Performance Oblivious Distributed Cloud Data Store
Extended Abstract
Emil Stefanov (UC Berkeley)
Elaine Shi (UMD)
1 Introduction
It is well established that access patterns to encrypted data
can leak a considerable amount of sensitive information [13].
Oblivious RAM (or ORAM for short) [5–11, 14, 18–20, 26,
28], originally proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [8], is
a cryptographic construction that allows a client to access
encrypted data residing on an untrusted storage server, while
completely hiding the access patterns to storage.
Particularly, the sequence of physical addresses accessed
is independent of the actual data that the user is accessing. To
achieve this, existing ORAM constructions [5–11,14,18–20,
26,28] continuously re-encrypt and and reshufﬂe data blocks
on the storage server, to cryptographically conceal the logical
access pattern.
Aside from storage outsourcing applications, ORAM (in
combination with trusted hardware in the cloud) has also
been proposed to protect user privacy in a broad range of
online services such as behavioral advertising, location and
map services, web search, and so on [4, 15].
While the idea of relying on trusted hardware and obliv-
ious RAM to enable access privacy in cloud services is
promising, for such an approach to become practical, a key
challenge is the practical efﬁciency of ORAM. ORAM was
initially proposed and studied mostly as a theoretic con-
cept. However, several recent works demonstrated the po-
tential of making ORAM practical in real-world scenar-
ios [15, 25, 28, 29].
1.1 Our Contributions
We design and build ObliviStore, an efﬁcient ORAM-
based cloud data store, securing data and access patterns
against adversaries in the malicious model. To the best of
our knowledge, ObliviStore is the fastest ORAM implemen-
tation that has ever been built.
Our evaluation suggests that in a si...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:ObliviStore: High Performance Oblivious Distributed Cloud Data Store
author:Emil Stefanov and
Elaine Shi
ObliviStore: High Performance Oblivious Distributed Cloud Data Store
Extended Abstract
Emil Stefanov (UC Berkeley)
Elaine Shi (UMD)
1 Introduction
It is well established that access patterns to encrypted data
can leak a considerable amount of sensitive information [13].
Oblivious RAM (or ORAM for short) [5–11, 14, 18–20, 26,
28], originally proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [8], is
a cryptographic construction that allows a client to access
encrypted data residing on an untrusted storage server, while
completely hiding the access patterns to storage.
Particularly, the sequence of physical addresses accessed
is independent of the actual data that the user is accessing. To
achieve this, existing ORAM constructions [5–11,14,18–20,
26,28] continuously re-encrypt and and reshufﬂe data blocks
on the storage server, to cryptographically conceal the logical
access pattern.
Aside from storage outsourcing applications, ORAM (in
combination with trusted hardware in the cloud) has also
been proposed to protect user privacy in a broad range of
online services such as behavioral advertising, location and
map services, web search, and so on [4, 15].
While the idea of relying on trusted hardware and obliv-
ious RAM to enable access privacy in cloud services is
promising, for such an approach to become practical, a key
challenge is the practical efﬁciency of ORAM. ORAM was
initially proposed and studied mostly as a theoretic con-
cept. However, several recent works demonstrated the po-
tential of making ORAM practical in real-world scenar-
ios [15, 25, 28, 29].
1.1 Our Contributions
We design and build ObliviStore, an efﬁcient ORAM-
based cloud data store, securing data and access patterns
against adversaries in the malicious model. To the best of
our knowledge, ObliviStore is the fastest ORAM implemen-
tation that has ever been built.
Our evaluation suggests that in a si...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Revisiting Route Caching: The World Should Be Flat
author:Changhoon Kim and
Matthew Caesar and
Alexandre Gerber and
Jennifer Rexford
Revisiting Route Caching:
The World Should Be Flat
Changhoon Kim1, Matthew Caesar2, Alexandre Gerber3, and Jennifer Rexford1
1 Princeton University,
2 UIUC,
3 AT&T Labs–Research
Abstract. Internet routers’ forwarding tables (FIBs), which must be stored in
expensive fast memory for high-speed packet forwarding, are growing quickly in
size due to increased multihoming, ﬁner-grained trafﬁc engineering, and
deployment of IPv6 and VPNs. To address this problem, several Internet archi-
tectures have been proposed to reduce FIB size by returning to the earlier ap-
proach of route caching: storing only the working set of popular routes in the
FIB. This paper revisits route caching. We build upon previous work by study-
ing ﬂat, uni-class (/24) preﬁx caching, with modern trafﬁc traces from more than
60 routers in a tier-1 ISP. We ﬁrst characterize routers’ working sets and then
evaluate route-caching performance under different cache replacement strategies
and cache sizes. Surprisingly, despite the large number of deaggregated /24 sub-
nets, caching uni-class preﬁxes can effectively curb the increase of FIB sizes.
Moreover, uni-class preﬁxes substantially simplify a cache design by eliminating
longest-preﬁx matching, enabling FIB design with slower memory technologies.
Finally, by comparing our results with previous work, we show that the distri-
bution of trafﬁc across preﬁxes is becoming increasingly skewed, making route
caching more appealing.
1 Introduction
Packet forwarding on core Internet routers is an extremely challenging process. Upon
receiving an IP packet, routers have just a few nanoseconds to buffer the packet, select
the longest-matching preﬁx covering the packet’s destination, and forward the packet to
the corresponding outbound interface. To allow this process to happen quickly, routers
often make use of special-purpose h...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Revisiting Route Caching: The World Should Be Flat
author:Changhoon Kim and
Matthew Caesar and
Alexandre Gerber and
Jennifer Rexford
Revisiting Route Caching:
The World Should Be Flat
Changhoon Kim1, Matthew Caesar2, Alexandre Gerber3, and Jennifer Rexford1
1 Princeton University,
2 UIUC,
3 AT&T Labs–Research
Abstract. Internet routers’ forwarding tables (FIBs), which must be stored in
expensive fast memory for high-speed packet forwarding, are growing quickly in
size due to increased multihoming, ﬁner-grained trafﬁc engineering, and
deployment of IPv6 and VPNs. To address this problem, several Internet archi-
tectures have been proposed to reduce FIB size by returning to the earlier ap-
proach of route caching: storing only the working set of popular routes in the
FIB. This paper revisits route caching. We build upon previous work by study-
ing ﬂat, uni-class (/24) preﬁx caching, with modern trafﬁc traces from more than
60 routers in a tier-1 ISP. We ﬁrst characterize routers’ working sets and then
evaluate route-caching performance under different cache replacement strategies
and cache sizes. Surprisingly, despite the large number of deaggregated /24 sub-
nets, caching uni-class preﬁxes can effectively curb the increase of FIB sizes.
Moreover, uni-class preﬁxes substantially simplify a cache design by eliminating
longest-preﬁx matching, enabling FIB design with slower memory technologies.
Finally, by comparing our results with previous work, we show that the distri-
bution of trafﬁc across preﬁxes is becoming increasingly skewed, making route
caching more appealing.
1 Introduction
Packet forwarding on core Internet routers is an extremely challenging process. Upon
receiving an IP packet, routers have just a few nanoseconds to buffer the packet, select
the longest-matching preﬁx covering the packet’s destination, and forward the packet to
the corresponding outbound interface. To allow this process to happen quickly, routers
often make use of special-purpose h...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FP-STALKER: Tracking Browser Fingerprint Evolutions
author:Antoine Vastel and
Pierre Laperdrix and
Walter Rudametkin and
Romain Rouvoy
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
FP-STALKER:
Tracking Browser Fingerprint Evolutions
Antoine Vastel
Univ. Lille / Inria
Pierre Laperdrix
INSA / Inria
Walter Rudametkin
Univ. Lille / Inria
Romain Rouvoy
Univ. Lille / Inria / IUF
antoine.vastel@univ-lille.fr
pierre.laperdrix@inria.fr
walter.rudametkin@univ-lille.fr
romain.rouvoy@univ-lille.fr
Abstract—Browser ﬁngerprinting has emerged as a technique
to track users without their consent. Unlike cookies, ﬁngerprint-
ing is a stateless technique that does not store any information
on devices, but instead exploits unique combinations of attributes
handed over freely by browsers. The uniqueness of ﬁngerprints
allows them to be used for identiﬁcation. However, browser
ﬁngerprints change over time and the effectiveness of tracking
users over longer durations has not been properly addressed.
In this paper, we show that browser ﬁngerprints tend to
change frequently—from every few hours to days—due to, for
example, software updates or conﬁguration changes. Yet, despite
these frequent changes, we show that browser ﬁngerprints can
still be linked, thus enabling long-term tracking.
FP-STALKER is an approach to link browser ﬁngerprint
evolutions. It compares ﬁngerprints to determine if they originate
from the same browser. We created two variants of FP-STALKER,
a rule-based variant that is faster, and a hybrid variant that
exploits machine learning to boost accuracy. To evaluate FP-
STALKER, we conduct an empirical study using 98, 598 ﬁnger-
prints we collected from 1, 905 distinct browser instances. We
compare our algorithm with the state of the art and show that,
on average, we can track browsers for 54.48 days, and 26 % of
browsers can be tracked for more than 100 days.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Websites track their users for different reasons, including
targeted advertising, content perso...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FP-STALKER: Tracking Browser Fingerprint Evolutions
author:Antoine Vastel and
Pierre Laperdrix and
Walter Rudametkin and
Romain Rouvoy
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
FP-STALKER:
Tracking Browser Fingerprint Evolutions
Antoine Vastel
Univ. Lille / Inria
Pierre Laperdrix
INSA / Inria
Walter Rudametkin
Univ. Lille / Inria
Romain Rouvoy
Univ. Lille / Inria / IUF
antoine.vastel@univ-lille.fr
pierre.laperdrix@inria.fr
walter.rudametkin@univ-lille.fr
romain.rouvoy@univ-lille.fr
Abstract—Browser ﬁngerprinting has emerged as a technique
to track users without their consent. Unlike cookies, ﬁngerprint-
ing is a stateless technique that does not store any information
on devices, but instead exploits unique combinations of attributes
handed over freely by browsers. The uniqueness of ﬁngerprints
allows them to be used for identiﬁcation. However, browser
ﬁngerprints change over time and the effectiveness of tracking
users over longer durations has not been properly addressed.
In this paper, we show that browser ﬁngerprints tend to
change frequently—from every few hours to days—due to, for
example, software updates or conﬁguration changes. Yet, despite
these frequent changes, we show that browser ﬁngerprints can
still be linked, thus enabling long-term tracking.
FP-STALKER is an approach to link browser ﬁngerprint
evolutions. It compares ﬁngerprints to determine if they originate
from the same browser. We created two variants of FP-STALKER,
a rule-based variant that is faster, and a hybrid variant that
exploits machine learning to boost accuracy. To evaluate FP-
STALKER, we conduct an empirical study using 98, 598 ﬁnger-
prints we collected from 1, 905 distinct browser instances. We
compare our algorithm with the state of the art and show that,
on average, we can track browsers for 54.48 days, and 26 % of
browsers can be tracked for more than 100 days.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Websites track their users for different reasons, including
targeted advertising, content perso...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。