Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio
Transceivers
author:Giovanni Camurati and
Sebastian Poeplau and
Marius Muench and
Tom Hayes and
Aur'elien Francillon
When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio Transceivers
Screaming Channels:
Giovanni Camurati, Sebastian Poeplau, Marius Muench, Tom Hayes, Aurélien Francillon
EURECOM
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new side channel that affects mixed-signal
chips used in widespread wireless communication protocols, such
as Bluetooth and WiFi. This increasingly common type of chip
includes the radio transceiver along with digital logic on the same
integrated circuit. In such systems, the radio transmitter may unin-
tentionally broadcast sensitive information from hardware crypto-
graphic components or software executing on the CPU. The well-
known electromagnetic (EM) leakage from digital logic is inadver-
tently mixed with the radio carrier, which is amplified and then
transmitted by the antenna. We call the resulting leak “screaming
channels”. Attacks exploiting such a side channel may succeed
over a much longer distance than attacks exploiting usual EM side
channels.
The root of the problem is that mixed-signal chips include both
digital circuits and analog circuits on the same silicon die in close
physical proximity. While processing data, the digital circuits on
these chips generate noise, which can be picked up by noise-sensitive
analog radio components, ultimately leading to leakage of sensitive
information. We investigate the physical reasons behind the chan-
nel, we measure it on several popular devices from different ven-
dors (including Nordic Semiconductor nRF52832, and Qualcomm
Atheros AR9271), and we demonstrate a complete key recovery
attack against the nRF52832 chip. In particular, we retrieve the full
key from the AES-128 implementation in tinyAES at a distance of
10 m using template attacks. Additionally, we recover the key used
by the AES-128 implementation in mbedTLS at...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio
Transceivers
author:Giovanni Camurati and
Sebastian Poeplau and
Marius Muench and
Tom Hayes and
Aur'elien Francillon
When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio Transceivers
Screaming Channels:
Giovanni Camurati, Sebastian Poeplau, Marius Muench, Tom Hayes, Aurélien Francillon
EURECOM
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new side channel that affects mixed-signal
chips used in widespread wireless communication protocols, such
as Bluetooth and WiFi. This increasingly common type of chip
includes the radio transceiver along with digital logic on the same
integrated circuit. In such systems, the radio transmitter may unin-
tentionally broadcast sensitive information from hardware crypto-
graphic components or software executing on the CPU. The well-
known electromagnetic (EM) leakage from digital logic is inadver-
tently mixed with the radio carrier, which is amplified and then
transmitted by the antenna. We call the resulting leak “screaming
channels”. Attacks exploiting such a side channel may succeed
over a much longer distance than attacks exploiting usual EM side
channels.
The root of the problem is that mixed-signal chips include both
digital circuits and analog circuits on the same silicon die in close
physical proximity. While processing data, the digital circuits on
these chips generate noise, which can be picked up by noise-sensitive
analog radio components, ultimately leading to leakage of sensitive
information. We investigate the physical reasons behind the chan-
nel, we measure it on several popular devices from different ven-
dors (including Nordic Semiconductor nRF52832, and Qualcomm
Atheros AR9271), and we demonstrate a complete key recovery
attack against the nRF52832 chip. In particular, we retrieve the full
key from the AES-128 implementation in tinyAES at a distance of
10 m using template attacks. Additionally, we recover the key used
by the AES-128 implementation in mbedTLS at...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Running Language Interpreters Inside SGX: A Lightweight, Legacy-Compatible
Script Code Hardening Approach
author:Huibo Wang and
Erick Bauman and
Vishal Karande and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Yueqiang Cheng and
Yinqian Zhang
Running Language Interpreters Inside SGX: A Lightweight,
Legacy-Compatible Script Code Hardening Approach
Huibo Wang1, Erick Bauman1, Vishal Karande1, Zhiqiang Lin2, Yueqiang Cheng3, Yinqian Zhang2
1The University of Texas at Dallas, 2The Ohio State University, and 3Baidu USA
the execution of the application cannot be trusted. Therefore,
Intel introduced its software guard extensions (SGX) [16], a new
hardware feature that provides secure enclaves in which user level
applications do not have to trust any software outside the enclave,
thereby significantly reducing the attack surface.
From a software development perspective, SGX is merely a set of
new instructions. To really use SGX, it is suggested that application
developers create new applications by using abstractions (e.g.,
APIs) provided by the SGX SDK, partitioning applications into
trusted and untrusted components, and building bridge functions
between enclave and non-enclave code. However, this is tedious,
time consuming, and error prone. By forcing developers to manually
port software to SGX or create new applications from scratch, tons
of legacy software cannot enjoy the benefit provided by SGX.
ABSTRACT
Recent advances in trusted execution environments, specifically
with Intel’s introduction of SGX on consumer processors, have
provided unprecedented opportunities to create secure applications
with a small TCB. While a large number of SGX solutions have
been proposed, nearly all of them focus on protecting native
code applications, leaving scripting languages unprotected. To fill
this gap, this paper presents ScriptShield, a framework capable
of running legacy script code while simultaneously providing
confidentiality and integrity for scripting code and data. In contrast
to the existing sc...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Running Language Interpreters Inside SGX: A Lightweight, Legacy-Compatible
Script Code Hardening Approach
author:Huibo Wang and
Erick Bauman and
Vishal Karande and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Yueqiang Cheng and
Yinqian Zhang
Running Language Interpreters Inside SGX: A Lightweight,
Legacy-Compatible Script Code Hardening Approach
Huibo Wang1, Erick Bauman1, Vishal Karande1, Zhiqiang Lin2, Yueqiang Cheng3, Yinqian Zhang2
1The University of Texas at Dallas, 2The Ohio State University, and 3Baidu USA
the execution of the application cannot be trusted. Therefore,
Intel introduced its software guard extensions (SGX) [16], a new
hardware feature that provides secure enclaves in which user level
applications do not have to trust any software outside the enclave,
thereby significantly reducing the attack surface.
From a software development perspective, SGX is merely a set of
new instructions. To really use SGX, it is suggested that application
developers create new applications by using abstractions (e.g.,
APIs) provided by the SGX SDK, partitioning applications into
trusted and untrusted components, and building bridge functions
between enclave and non-enclave code. However, this is tedious,
time consuming, and error prone. By forcing developers to manually
port software to SGX or create new applications from scratch, tons
of legacy software cannot enjoy the benefit provided by SGX.
ABSTRACT
Recent advances in trusted execution environments, specifically
with Intel’s introduction of SGX on consumer processors, have
provided unprecedented opportunities to create secure applications
with a small TCB. While a large number of SGX solutions have
been proposed, nearly all of them focus on protecting native
code applications, leaving scripting languages unprotected. To fill
this gap, this paper presents ScriptShield, a framework capable
of running legacy script code while simultaneously providing
confidentiality and integrity for scripting code and data. In contrast
to the existing sc...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FirmUSB: Vetting USB Device Firmware using Domain Informed Symbolic
Execution
author:Grant Hernandez and
Farhaan Fowze and
Dave (Jing) Tian and
Tuba Yavuz and
Kevin R. B. Butler
FirmUSB: Vetting USB Device Firmware using Domain Informed
Symbolic Execution
Grant Hernandez∗
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
grant.hernandez@ufl.edu
Farhaan Fowze∗
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
farhaan104@ufl.edu
Dave (Jing) Tian
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
daveti@ufl.edu
7
1
0
2
g
u
A
0
3
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
1
v
4
1
1
9
0
.
8
0
7
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
Tuba Yavuz
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
tuba@ece.ufl.edu
ABSTRACT
The USB protocol has become ubiquitous, supporting devices from
high-powered computing devices to small embedded devices and
control systems. USB’s greatest feature, its openness and expand-
ability, is also its weakness, and attacks such as BadUSB exploit the
unconstrained functionality afforded to these devices as a vector
for compromise. Fundamentally, it is virtually impossible to know
whether a USB device is benign or malicious. This work introduces
FirmUSB, a USB-specific firmware analysis framework that uses
domain knowledge of the USB protocol to examine firmware im-
ages and determine the activity that they can produce. Embedded
USB devices use microcontrollers that have not been well studied
by the binary analysis community, and our work demonstrates how
lifters into popular intermediate representations for analysis can
be built, as well as the challenges of doing so. We develop targeting
algorithms and use domain knowledge to speed up these processes
by a factor of 7 compared to unconstrained fully symbolic exe-
cution. We also successfully find malicious activity in embedded
8051 firmwares without the use of source code. Finally, we pro-
vide insights into the challenges of symbolic analysis on embedded
architectures and provide guidance on improving tools to better
handle this important class of devices.
CCS CONCEPTS
• ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FirmUSB: Vetting USB Device Firmware using Domain Informed Symbolic
Execution
author:Grant Hernandez and
Farhaan Fowze and
Dave (Jing) Tian and
Tuba Yavuz and
Kevin R. B. Butler
FirmUSB: Vetting USB Device Firmware using Domain Informed
Symbolic Execution
Grant Hernandez∗
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
grant.hernandez@ufl.edu
Farhaan Fowze∗
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
farhaan104@ufl.edu
Dave (Jing) Tian
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
daveti@ufl.edu
7
1
0
2
g
u
A
0
3
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
1
v
4
1
1
9
0
.
8
0
7
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
Tuba Yavuz
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA
tuba@ece.ufl.edu
ABSTRACT
The USB protocol has become ubiquitous, supporting devices from
high-powered computing devices to small embedded devices and
control systems. USB’s greatest feature, its openness and expand-
ability, is also its weakness, and attacks such as BadUSB exploit the
unconstrained functionality afforded to these devices as a vector
for compromise. Fundamentally, it is virtually impossible to know
whether a USB device is benign or malicious. This work introduces
FirmUSB, a USB-specific firmware analysis framework that uses
domain knowledge of the USB protocol to examine firmware im-
ages and determine the activity that they can produce. Embedded
USB devices use microcontrollers that have not been well studied
by the binary analysis community, and our work demonstrates how
lifters into popular intermediate representations for analysis can
be built, as well as the challenges of doing so. We develop targeting
algorithms and use domain knowledge to speed up these processes
by a factor of 7 compared to unconstrained fully symbolic exe-
cution. We also successfully find malicious activity in embedded
8051 firmwares without the use of source code. Finally, we pro-
vide insights into the challenges of symbolic analysis on embedded
architectures and provide guidance on improving tools to better
handle this important class of devices.
CCS CONCEPTS
• ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Snout: An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool
author:John Mikulskis and
Johannes K. Becker and
Stefan Gvozdenovic and
David Starobinski
Poster: Snout - An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool
John Mikulskis
jkulskis@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
Stefan Gvozdenovic
tesla@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
Johannes K Becker
jkbecker@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
David Starobinski
staro@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
ABSTRACT
Network mapping tools designed for IP-based networks generally
do not provide access to non-IP based wireless protocols used by
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as Zigbee and Bluetooth LE.
We present Snout, a versatile and extensible software defined radio-
based tool for IoT network mapping and penetration testing. Snout
is geared towards the various IoT protocols that are not accessible
with traditional network enumeration tools, such as Nmap. The tool
allows for device enumeration, vulnerability assessment, as well
as more offensive techniques such as packet replay and spoofing,
which we demonstrate for the Zigbee protocol. Snout is built on an
open-source stack, and is designed for extensibility towards other
IoT protocols and capabilities.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Penetration testing; Vulnerability
scanners; Mobile and wireless security; • Networks → Cross-
layer protocols; Network performance analysis; Mobile and wireless se-
curity; Wireless local area networks; • Hardware → Analog, mixed-
signal and radio frequency test; • Applied computing → Forecast-
ing.
KEYWORDS
Internet of Things, Device Enumeration, Vulnerability Assessment,
Fuzzing
ACM Reference Format:
John Mikulskis, Johannes K Becker, Stefan Gvozdenovic, and David Starobin-
ski. 2019. Poster: Snout - An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool. In 2019 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’19),
November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM, New York, NY, USA,
3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.33...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Snout: An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool
author:John Mikulskis and
Johannes K. Becker and
Stefan Gvozdenovic and
David Starobinski
Poster: Snout - An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool
John Mikulskis
jkulskis@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
Stefan Gvozdenovic
tesla@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
Johannes K Becker
jkbecker@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
David Starobinski
staro@bu.edu
Boston University
Boston, MA, USA
ABSTRACT
Network mapping tools designed for IP-based networks generally
do not provide access to non-IP based wireless protocols used by
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as Zigbee and Bluetooth LE.
We present Snout, a versatile and extensible software defined radio-
based tool for IoT network mapping and penetration testing. Snout
is geared towards the various IoT protocols that are not accessible
with traditional network enumeration tools, such as Nmap. The tool
allows for device enumeration, vulnerability assessment, as well
as more offensive techniques such as packet replay and spoofing,
which we demonstrate for the Zigbee protocol. Snout is built on an
open-source stack, and is designed for extensibility towards other
IoT protocols and capabilities.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Penetration testing; Vulnerability
scanners; Mobile and wireless security; • Networks → Cross-
layer protocols; Network performance analysis; Mobile and wireless se-
curity; Wireless local area networks; • Hardware → Analog, mixed-
signal and radio frequency test; • Applied computing → Forecast-
ing.
KEYWORDS
Internet of Things, Device Enumeration, Vulnerability Assessment,
Fuzzing
ACM Reference Format:
John Mikulskis, Johannes K Becker, Stefan Gvozdenovic, and David Starobin-
ski. 2019. Poster: Snout - An Extensible IoT Pen-Testing Tool. In 2019 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’19),
November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM, New York, NY, USA,
3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.33...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:POSTER: UAFChecker: Scalable Static Detection of Use-After-Free
Vulnerabilities
author:Jiayi Ye and
Chao Zhang and
Xinhui Han
Received March 3, 2020, accepted April 19, 2020, date of publication April 24, 2020, date of current version May 11, 2020.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2990197
Scalable Static Detection of Use-After-Free
Vulnerabilities in Binary Code
KAILONG ZHU , YULIANG LU , AND HUI HUANG
College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Hefei 230037, China
Corresponding author: Yuliang Lu (cee401_nudt@126.com)
This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Project of China under Grant 2017YFB0802900.
ABSTRACT The number of use-after-free vulnerabilities has been increasing rapidly in recent years, which
is a serious threat to computer systems. However, few effective mitigations exist for large-scale binary code.
In this study, the authors propose a scalable static approach for detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities in
binary code. First, the use-after-free feature model is proposed to provide guidance for detection. Then,
the binary code of the target program is converted to an intermediate representation, and CFGs (control
ﬂow graphs) are constructed. Finally, lightweight pointer tracking is performed to identify the use-after-free
vulnerable point. Compared with state-of-the-art approaches, this approach uses function summaries rather
than naive in-lining technique for the inter-procedural analysis in the vulnerability detection. Therefore, our
approach has the ability to avoid redundant repeat analysis caused by the in-lining technique in the existing
approaches and reduce the unnecessary performance overhead. The authors have implemented a prototype
called UAFDetector and evaluated it using standard benchmarks and real-world programs. The experimental
results show that this approach is effective in detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities in binary code and is
more efﬁc...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:POSTER: UAFChecker: Scalable Static Detection of Use-After-Free
Vulnerabilities
author:Jiayi Ye and
Chao Zhang and
Xinhui Han
Received March 3, 2020, accepted April 19, 2020, date of publication April 24, 2020, date of current version May 11, 2020.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2990197
Scalable Static Detection of Use-After-Free
Vulnerabilities in Binary Code
KAILONG ZHU , YULIANG LU , AND HUI HUANG
College of Electronic Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Hefei 230037, China
Corresponding author: Yuliang Lu (cee401_nudt@126.com)
This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Project of China under Grant 2017YFB0802900.
ABSTRACT The number of use-after-free vulnerabilities has been increasing rapidly in recent years, which
is a serious threat to computer systems. However, few effective mitigations exist for large-scale binary code.
In this study, the authors propose a scalable static approach for detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities in
binary code. First, the use-after-free feature model is proposed to provide guidance for detection. Then,
the binary code of the target program is converted to an intermediate representation, and CFGs (control
ﬂow graphs) are constructed. Finally, lightweight pointer tracking is performed to identify the use-after-free
vulnerable point. Compared with state-of-the-art approaches, this approach uses function summaries rather
than naive in-lining technique for the inter-procedural analysis in the vulnerability detection. Therefore, our
approach has the ability to avoid redundant repeat analysis caused by the in-lining technique in the existing
approaches and reduce the unnecessary performance overhead. The authors have implemented a prototype
called UAFDetector and evaluated it using standard benchmarks and real-world programs. The experimental
results show that this approach is effective in detecting use-after-free vulnerabilities in binary code and is
more efﬁc...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Copyright
author:
Copyright © 2005 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Copyright and  Reprint  Permissions: Abstracting  is  permitted  with  credit  to  the  source.  Libraries  may  photocopy
beyond the limits of US copyright law, for private use of patrons, those articles in this volume that carry a code at
the  bottom  of  the  first  page,  provided  that  the  per-copy  fee  indicated  in  the  code  is  paid  through  the  Copyright
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA  01923.
Other copying, reprint, or republication requests should be addressed to: IEEE Copyrights Manager, IEEE Service
Center, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 133, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.
The papers in this book comprise the proceedings of the meeting mentioned on the cover and title page. They reflect
the authors’ opinions and, in the interests of timely dissemination, are published as presented and without change.
Their inclusion in this publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement by the editors, the IEEE Computer
Society, or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IEEE Computer Society Order Number P2461
ISBN 0-7695-2461-3
ISSN 1063-9527
Additional copies may be ordered from:
IEEE Computer Society
Customer Service Center
10662 Los Vaqueros Circle
P.O. Box 3014
Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314
Tel: + 1 800 272 6657
Fax: + 1 714 821 4641
http://computer.org/cspress
csbooks@computer.org
IEEE Service Center
445 Hoes Lane
P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331
Tel: + 1 732 981 0060
Fax: + 1 732 981 9667
http://shop.ieee.org/store/
customer-service@ieee.org
IEEE Computer Society
Asia/Pacific Office
Watanabe Bldg., 1-4-2
Minami-Aoyama
Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0062
JAPAN
Tel:  + 81 3 3408 3118
Fax: + 81 3 3408 3553
tokyo.ofc@computer.org
Individual paper REPRINTS may be ordered at: reprints@computer.org
..........................................................................................................


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Copyright
author:
Copyright © 2005 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Copyright and  Reprint  Permissions: Abstracting  is  permitted  with  credit  to  the  source.  Libraries  may  photocopy
beyond the limits of US copyright law, for private use of patrons, those articles in this volume that carry a code at
the  bottom  of  the  first  page,  provided  that  the  per-copy  fee  indicated  in  the  code  is  paid  through  the  Copyright
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA  01923.
Other copying, reprint, or republication requests should be addressed to: IEEE Copyrights Manager, IEEE Service
Center, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 133, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.
The papers in this book comprise the proceedings of the meeting mentioned on the cover and title page. They reflect
the authors’ opinions and, in the interests of timely dissemination, are published as presented and without change.
Their inclusion in this publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement by the editors, the IEEE Computer
Society, or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IEEE Computer Society Order Number P2461
ISBN 0-7695-2461-3
ISSN 1063-9527
Additional copies may be ordered from:
IEEE Computer Society
Customer Service Center
10662 Los Vaqueros Circle
P.O. Box 3014
Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314
Tel: + 1 800 272 6657
Fax: + 1 714 821 4641
http://computer.org/cspress
csbooks@computer.org
IEEE Service Center
445 Hoes Lane
P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331
Tel: + 1 732 981 0060
Fax: + 1 732 981 9667
http://shop.ieee.org/store/
customer-service@ieee.org
IEEE Computer Society
Asia/Pacific Office
Watanabe Bldg., 1-4-2
Minami-Aoyama
Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0062
JAPAN
Tel:  + 81 3 3408 3118
Fax: + 81 3 3408 3553
tokyo.ofc@computer.org
Individual paper REPRINTS may be ordered at: reprints@computer.org
..........................................................................................................

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Cyber Insurance - Technical Challenges and a System Security
Roadmap
author:Savino Dambra and
Leyla Bilge and
Davide Balzarotti
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Cyber Insurance – Technical
Challenges and a System Security Roadmap
Savino Dambra
Eurecom
Leyla Bilge
Symantec Research Labs
Davide Balzarotti
Eurecom
Abstract—Cyber attacks have increased in number and complexity
in recent years, and companies and organizations have accordingly
raised their investments in more robust infrastructure to preserve
their data, assets and reputation. However, the full protection against
these countless and constantly evolving threats is unattainable by
the sole use of preventive measures. Therefore, to handle residual
risks and contain business losses in case of an incident, firms are
increasingly adopting a cyber insurance as part of their corporate
risk management strategy.
As a result, the cyber insurance sector – which offers to transfer
the financial risks related to network and computer incidents to a
third party – is rapidly growing, with recent claims that already
reached a $100M dollars. However, while other insurance sectors rely
on consolidated methodologies to accurately predict risks, the many
peculiarities of the cyber domain resulted in carriers to often resort
to qualitative approaches based on experts opinions.
This paper looks at past research conducted in the area of
cyber insurance and classifies previous studies in four different
areas, focused respectively on studying the economical aspects, the
mathematical models, the risk management methodologies, and the
predictions of cyber events. We then identify, for each insurance
phase, a group of practical research problems where security experts
can help develop new data-driven methodologies and automated tools
to replace the existing qualitative approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern society is highly dependent on Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT). However, despite it...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Cyber Insurance - Technical Challenges and a System Security
Roadmap
author:Savino Dambra and
Leyla Bilge and
Davide Balzarotti
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Cyber Insurance – Technical
Challenges and a System Security Roadmap
Savino Dambra
Eurecom
Leyla Bilge
Symantec Research Labs
Davide Balzarotti
Eurecom
Abstract—Cyber attacks have increased in number and complexity
in recent years, and companies and organizations have accordingly
raised their investments in more robust infrastructure to preserve
their data, assets and reputation. However, the full protection against
these countless and constantly evolving threats is unattainable by
the sole use of preventive measures. Therefore, to handle residual
risks and contain business losses in case of an incident, firms are
increasingly adopting a cyber insurance as part of their corporate
risk management strategy.
As a result, the cyber insurance sector – which offers to transfer
the financial risks related to network and computer incidents to a
third party – is rapidly growing, with recent claims that already
reached a $100M dollars. However, while other insurance sectors rely
on consolidated methodologies to accurately predict risks, the many
peculiarities of the cyber domain resulted in carriers to often resort
to qualitative approaches based on experts opinions.
This paper looks at past research conducted in the area of
cyber insurance and classifies previous studies in four different
areas, focused respectively on studying the economical aspects, the
mathematical models, the risk management methodologies, and the
predictions of cyber events. We then identify, for each insurance
phase, a group of practical research problems where security experts
can help develop new data-driven methodologies and automated tools
to replace the existing qualitative approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern society is highly dependent on Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT). However, despite it...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Principled Approach for ROP Defense
author:Rui Qiao and
Mingwei Zhang and
R. Sekar
A Principled Approach for ROP Defense
Rui Qiao
Stony Brook University
ruqiao@cs.stonybrook.edu
∗
Mingwei Zhang
Intel Labs
mingwei.zhang@intel.com
R. Sekar
Stony Brook University
sekar@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is an eﬀective attack
technique that can escape modern defenses such as DEP.
ROP is based on repeated abuse of existing code snippets
ending with return instructions (called gadgets), as com-
pared to using injected code. Several defense mechanisms
have been proposed to counter ROP by enforcing policies
on the targets of return instructions, and/or their frequency.
However, these policies have been repeatedly bypassed by
more advanced ROP attacks. While stricter policies have
the potential to thwart ROP, they lead to incompatibilities
which discourage their deployment.
In this work, we ad-
dress this challenge by presenting a principled approach for
ROP defense on COTS binaries. Our experimental evalu-
ation shows that our approach enforces a stronger policy,
while oﬀering better compatibility and performance as com-
pared to previous research. Our prototype is compatible
with many real-world and low-level programs. On SPEC
2006 benchmark program, it adds just 4% overhead above
the base overhead of 13% imposed by PSI, the platform used
in our implementation.
1.
Introduction
Programs written in C/C++ are not memory safe. Vul-
nerabilities such as buﬀer overﬂow, heap overﬂow and use-
after-free can be exploited by attackers to execute code of
their choice. Traditionally, attackers inject payload (called
shellcode) into the address space of a victim process, and
redirect control to this code. However, with widespread
deployment of Data Execution Prevention (DEP), injected
code is no longer executable, so attackers have come to
rely on code reuse attacks. Return-Oriented Programming
(ROP), which chains together a sequence of “gadgets” (code...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Principled Approach for ROP Defense
author:Rui Qiao and
Mingwei Zhang and
R. Sekar
A Principled Approach for ROP Defense
Rui Qiao
Stony Brook University
ruqiao@cs.stonybrook.edu
∗
Mingwei Zhang
Intel Labs
mingwei.zhang@intel.com
R. Sekar
Stony Brook University
sekar@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is an eﬀective attack
technique that can escape modern defenses such as DEP.
ROP is based on repeated abuse of existing code snippets
ending with return instructions (called gadgets), as com-
pared to using injected code. Several defense mechanisms
have been proposed to counter ROP by enforcing policies
on the targets of return instructions, and/or their frequency.
However, these policies have been repeatedly bypassed by
more advanced ROP attacks. While stricter policies have
the potential to thwart ROP, they lead to incompatibilities
which discourage their deployment.
In this work, we ad-
dress this challenge by presenting a principled approach for
ROP defense on COTS binaries. Our experimental evalu-
ation shows that our approach enforces a stronger policy,
while oﬀering better compatibility and performance as com-
pared to previous research. Our prototype is compatible
with many real-world and low-level programs. On SPEC
2006 benchmark program, it adds just 4% overhead above
the base overhead of 13% imposed by PSI, the platform used
in our implementation.
1.
Introduction
Programs written in C/C++ are not memory safe. Vul-
nerabilities such as buﬀer overﬂow, heap overﬂow and use-
after-free can be exploited by attackers to execute code of
their choice. Traditionally, attackers inject payload (called
shellcode) into the address space of a victim process, and
redirect control to this code. However, with widespread
deployment of Data Execution Prevention (DEP), injected
code is no longer executable, so attackers have come to
rely on code reuse attacks. Return-Oriented Programming
(ROP), which chains together a sequence of “gadgets” (code...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PeerAccess: a logic for distributed authorization
author:Marianne Winslett and
Charles C. Zhang and
Piero A. Bonatti
PeerAccess: A Logic for Distributed Authorization
Marianne Winslett
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801, USA
winslett@cs.uiuc.edu
Charles C. Zhang
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801, USA
cczhang@cs.uiuc.edu
Piero A. Bonatti
Universit`a di Napoli
FEDERICO II
Napoli, Italy
bonatti@na.infn.it
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the PeerAccess framework for reasoning about
authorization in open distributed systems, and shows how a param-
eterization of the framework can be used to reason about access
to computational resources in a grid environment. The PeerAc-
cess framework supports a declarative description of the behavior
of peers that selectively push and/or pull information from certain
other peers. PeerAccess local knowledge bases encode the basic
knowledge of each peer (e.g., Alice’s group memberships), its poli-
cies governing the release of each possible piece of information to
other peers, and information that guides and limits its search pro-
cess when trying to obtain particular pieces of information from
other peers. PeerAccess proofs of authorization are veriﬁable and
nonrepudiable, and their construction relies only on the local infor-
mation possessed by peers and their parameterized behavior with
respect to query answering, information push/pull, and informa-
tion release policies (i.e., no omniscient viewpoint is required). We
present the PeerAccess language and peer knowledge base struc-
ture, the associated formal semantics and proof theory, and exam-
ples of the use of PeerAccess in constructing proofs of authoriza-
tion to access computational resources.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:
Security and Protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and
Protection - Access Control
General Terms
Security, Languages, Theory
Keywor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PeerAccess: a logic for distributed authorization
author:Marianne Winslett and
Charles C. Zhang and
Piero A. Bonatti
PeerAccess: A Logic for Distributed Authorization
Marianne Winslett
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801, USA
winslett@cs.uiuc.edu
Charles C. Zhang
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801, USA
cczhang@cs.uiuc.edu
Piero A. Bonatti
Universit`a di Napoli
FEDERICO II
Napoli, Italy
bonatti@na.infn.it
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the PeerAccess framework for reasoning about
authorization in open distributed systems, and shows how a param-
eterization of the framework can be used to reason about access
to computational resources in a grid environment. The PeerAc-
cess framework supports a declarative description of the behavior
of peers that selectively push and/or pull information from certain
other peers. PeerAccess local knowledge bases encode the basic
knowledge of each peer (e.g., Alice’s group memberships), its poli-
cies governing the release of each possible piece of information to
other peers, and information that guides and limits its search pro-
cess when trying to obtain particular pieces of information from
other peers. PeerAccess proofs of authorization are veriﬁable and
nonrepudiable, and their construction relies only on the local infor-
mation possessed by peers and their parameterized behavior with
respect to query answering, information push/pull, and informa-
tion release policies (i.e., no omniscient viewpoint is required). We
present the PeerAccess language and peer knowledge base struc-
ture, the associated formal semantics and proof theory, and exam-
ples of the use of PeerAccess in constructing proofs of authoriza-
tion to access computational resources.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:
Security and Protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and
Protection - Access Control
General Terms
Security, Languages, Theory
Keywor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:\(τ\)CFI: Type-Assisted Control Flow Integrity for x86-64 Binaries
author:Paul Muntean and
Matthias Fischer and
Gang Tan and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Jens Grossklags and
Claudia Eckert
τ CFI: Type-Assisted Control Flow
Integrity for x86-64 Binaries
Paul Muntean1(B)
Jens Grossklags1
, and Claudia Eckert1
, Matthias Fischer1, Gang Tan3
, Zhiqiang Lin2
,
1 Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany
{paul.muntean,matthias.fischer,claudia.eckert}@sec.in.tum.de,
jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
2 The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
3 The Pennsylvania State University, State College, USA
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
gtan@cse.psu.edu
Abstract. Programs aiming for low runtime overhead and high avail-
ability draw on several object-oriented features available in the C/C++
programming language, such as dynamic object dispatch. However, there
is an alarmingly high number of object dispatch (i.e., forward-edge) cor-
ruption vulnerabilities, which undercut security in signiﬁcant ways and
are in need of a thorough solution. In this paper, we propose τ CFI, an
extended control ﬂow integrity (CFI) model that uses both the types and
numbers of function parameters to enforce forward- and backward-edge
control ﬂow transfers. At a high level, it improves the precision of existing
forward-edge recognition approaches by considering the type information
of function parameters, which are directly extracted from the application
binaries. Therefore, τ CFI can be used to harden legacy applications for
which source code may not be available. We have evaluated τ CFI on
real-world binaries including Nginx, NodeJS, Lighttpd, MySql and the
SPEC CPU2006 benchmark and demonstrate that τ CFI is able to eﬀec-
tively protect these applications from forward- and backward-edge cor-
ruptions with low runtime overhead. In direct comparison with state-of-
the-art tools, τ CFI achieves higher forward-edge caller-callee matching
precision.
Keywords: C++ object dispatch · Indirect control ﬂow transfer
Code-reuse at...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:\(τ\)CFI: Type-Assisted Control Flow Integrity for x86-64 Binaries
author:Paul Muntean and
Matthias Fischer and
Gang Tan and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Jens Grossklags and
Claudia Eckert
τ CFI: Type-Assisted Control Flow
Integrity for x86-64 Binaries
Paul Muntean1(B)
Jens Grossklags1
, and Claudia Eckert1
, Matthias Fischer1, Gang Tan3
, Zhiqiang Lin2
,
1 Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany
{paul.muntean,matthias.fischer,claudia.eckert}@sec.in.tum.de,
jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
2 The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
3 The Pennsylvania State University, State College, USA
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
gtan@cse.psu.edu
Abstract. Programs aiming for low runtime overhead and high avail-
ability draw on several object-oriented features available in the C/C++
programming language, such as dynamic object dispatch. However, there
is an alarmingly high number of object dispatch (i.e., forward-edge) cor-
ruption vulnerabilities, which undercut security in signiﬁcant ways and
are in need of a thorough solution. In this paper, we propose τ CFI, an
extended control ﬂow integrity (CFI) model that uses both the types and
numbers of function parameters to enforce forward- and backward-edge
control ﬂow transfers. At a high level, it improves the precision of existing
forward-edge recognition approaches by considering the type information
of function parameters, which are directly extracted from the application
binaries. Therefore, τ CFI can be used to harden legacy applications for
which source code may not be available. We have evaluated τ CFI on
real-world binaries including Nginx, NodeJS, Lighttpd, MySql and the
SPEC CPU2006 benchmark and demonstrate that τ CFI is able to eﬀec-
tively protect these applications from forward- and backward-edge cor-
ruptions with low runtime overhead. In direct comparison with state-of-
the-art tools, τ CFI achieves higher forward-edge caller-callee matching
precision.
Keywords: C++ object dispatch · Indirect control ﬂow transfer
Code-reuse at...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Characterizing Eve: Analysing Cybercrime Actors in a Large Underground
Forum
author:Sergio Pastrana and
Alice Hutchings and
Andrew Caines and
Paula Buttery
Characterizing Eve: Analysing
Cybercrime Actors in a Large
Underground Forum
Sergio Pastrana1(B)
, Alice Hutchings1
and Paula Buttery3
, Andrew Caines2
,
1 Cambridge Cybercrime Centre, Department of Computer Science and Technology,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
{Sergio.Pastrana,Alice.Hutchings}@cl.cam.ac.uk
2 Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
apc38@cam.ac.uk
3 Natural Language and Information Processing, Department of Computer Science
and Technology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
pjb48@cam.ac.uk
Abstract. Underground forums contain many thousands of active users,
but the vast majority will be involved, at most,
in minor levels of
deviance. The number who engage in serious criminal activity is small.
That being said, underground forums have played a signiﬁcant role in
several recent high-proﬁle cybercrime activities. In this work we apply
data science approaches to understand criminal pathways and character-
ize key actors related to illegal activity in one of the largest and longest-
running underground forums. We combine the results of a logistic regres-
sion model with k-means clustering and social network analysis, verifying
the ﬁndings using topic analysis. We identify variables relating to forum
activity that predict the likelihood a user will become an actor of interest
to law enforcement, and would therefore beneﬁt the most from interven-
tion. This work provides the ﬁrst step towards identifying ways to deter
the involvement of young people away from a career in cybercrime.
Keywords: Cybercrime · Underground forums · Social behaviour
Criminal pathways
1 Introduction
Cybercrimes carried out by organized groups using custom tools with political or
military motivations capture the public imagination. H...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Characterizing Eve: Analysing Cybercrime Actors in a Large Underground
Forum
author:Sergio Pastrana and
Alice Hutchings and
Andrew Caines and
Paula Buttery
Characterizing Eve: Analysing
Cybercrime Actors in a Large
Underground Forum
Sergio Pastrana1(B)
, Alice Hutchings1
and Paula Buttery3
, Andrew Caines2
,
1 Cambridge Cybercrime Centre, Department of Computer Science and Technology,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
{Sergio.Pastrana,Alice.Hutchings}@cl.cam.ac.uk
2 Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
apc38@cam.ac.uk
3 Natural Language and Information Processing, Department of Computer Science
and Technology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
pjb48@cam.ac.uk
Abstract. Underground forums contain many thousands of active users,
but the vast majority will be involved, at most,
in minor levels of
deviance. The number who engage in serious criminal activity is small.
That being said, underground forums have played a signiﬁcant role in
several recent high-proﬁle cybercrime activities. In this work we apply
data science approaches to understand criminal pathways and character-
ize key actors related to illegal activity in one of the largest and longest-
running underground forums. We combine the results of a logistic regres-
sion model with k-means clustering and social network analysis, verifying
the ﬁndings using topic analysis. We identify variables relating to forum
activity that predict the likelihood a user will become an actor of interest
to law enforcement, and would therefore beneﬁt the most from interven-
tion. This work provides the ﬁrst step towards identifying ways to deter
the involvement of young people away from a career in cybercrime.
Keywords: Cybercrime · Underground forums · Social behaviour
Criminal pathways
1 Introduction
Cybercrimes carried out by organized groups using custom tools with political or
military motivations capture the public imagination. H...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Techniques for Estimation of Design Diversity for Combinational Logic
Circuits
author:Subhasish Mitra and
Nirmal R. Saxena and
Edward J. McCluskey
TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATION OF DESIGN DIVERSITY FOR COMBINATIONAL
LOGIC CIRCUITS
Subhasish Mitra, Nirmal R. Saxena and Edward J. McCluskey
Center for Reliable Computing
Departments of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Stanford University, Stanford, California
http://crc.stanford.edu
Abstract
Design  diversity  has  long  been  used  to  protect
redundunt  systems  against  common-mode  failures.  The
conventional  notion  of diversity  relies on  “independent”
generation  of  “different”  implementations  of  the  same
logic jimction.  This concept  is qualitative  and  does not
provide  a basis to compcire the reliabilities of two diverse
In  a  recent  paper,  we  presented  a  metric  to
systems.
quantiSy diversity  among several designs.  The problem of
calculuting  the  diversity  metric  is NP-complete  and  ccin
be  of  exponential  complexity.
In  this paper,  we  present
techniques  to  estinuite  the  value  of  the  design  diversitv
metric.  For  datupcith designs,  we  have formulated  very
fcist  techniques  to  calculate  the  value  of  the  metric  by
exploiting  the regularity  in the datcipath structures.  For
logic  circuits,  we  present  cin
genercil  combinational
adaptive Monte-Ccirlo simulation technique for estimuting
bounds on the  value  of  the  metric.  The  adaptive  Monte-
Curlo simulation technique provides accurate estimates of
the  design  diversity  metric;  the  number  of  simulations
used  to  reach  this  estimate  is  polynomial  (instead  of
exponentid) in  the  number  of  circuit  inputs.  Moreover,
the number of simulations ccin be tuned depending  on the
desired accurricy.
1.  Introduction
Concurrent  Error  Detection  (CED)  techniques  are
widely  used  for  designing  systems  with  high  data
integrity.  A duplex system is...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Techniques for Estimation of Design Diversity for Combinational Logic
Circuits
author:Subhasish Mitra and
Nirmal R. Saxena and
Edward J. McCluskey
TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATION OF DESIGN DIVERSITY FOR COMBINATIONAL
LOGIC CIRCUITS
Subhasish Mitra, Nirmal R. Saxena and Edward J. McCluskey
Center for Reliable Computing
Departments of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Stanford University, Stanford, California
http://crc.stanford.edu
Abstract
Design  diversity  has  long  been  used  to  protect
redundunt  systems  against  common-mode  failures.  The
conventional  notion  of diversity  relies on  “independent”
generation  of  “different”  implementations  of  the  same
logic jimction.  This concept  is qualitative  and  does not
provide  a basis to compcire the reliabilities of two diverse
In  a  recent  paper,  we  presented  a  metric  to
systems.
quantiSy diversity  among several designs.  The problem of
calculuting  the  diversity  metric  is NP-complete  and  ccin
be  of  exponential  complexity.
In  this paper,  we  present
techniques  to  estinuite  the  value  of  the  design  diversitv
metric.  For  datupcith designs,  we  have formulated  very
fcist  techniques  to  calculate  the  value  of  the  metric  by
exploiting  the regularity  in the datcipath structures.  For
logic  circuits,  we  present  cin
genercil  combinational
adaptive Monte-Ccirlo simulation technique for estimuting
bounds on the  value  of  the  metric.  The  adaptive  Monte-
Curlo simulation technique provides accurate estimates of
the  design  diversity  metric;  the  number  of  simulations
used  to  reach  this  estimate  is  polynomial  (instead  of
exponentid) in  the  number  of  circuit  inputs.  Moreover,
the number of simulations ccin be tuned depending  on the
desired accurricy.
1.  Introduction
Concurrent  Error  Detection  (CED)  techniques  are
widely  used  for  designing  systems  with  high  data
integrity.  A duplex system is...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Last Mile: An Empirical Study of Timing Channels on seL4
author:David Cock and
Qian Ge and
Toby C. Murray and
Gernot Heiser
The Last Mile
An Empirical Study of Timing Channels on seL4
David Cock, Qian Ge, Toby Murray, Gernot Heiser
david.cock@nicta.com.au, qian.ge@nicta.com.au, toby.murray@nicta.com.au, gernot@nicta.com.au
NICTA and UNSW, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Storage channels can be provably eliminated in well-designed, high-
assurance kernels. Timing channels remain the last mile for conﬁ-
dentiality and are still beyond the reach of formal analysis, so must
be dealt with empirically. We perform such an analysis, collecting
a large data set (2,000 hours of observations) for two representative
timing channels, the locally-exploitable cache channel and a remote
exploit of OpenSSL execution timing, on the veriﬁed seL4 micro-
kernel. We also evaluate the effectiveness, in bandwidth reduction,
of a number of black-box mitigation techniques (cache colouring,
instruction-based scheduling and deterministic delivery of server
responses) across a number of hardware platforms. Our (somewhat
unexpected) results show that while these defences were highly ef-
fective a few processor generations ago, the trend towards impre-
cise events in modern microarchitectures weakens the defences and
introduces new channels. This demonstrates the necessity of care-
ful empirical analysis of timing channels.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—Informa-
tion Flow Controls
General Terms
Security, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Conﬁdentiality; covert channels; side channels; mitigation; micro-
kernels; cache coloring; seL4
1.
INTRODUCTION
Unanticipated information leaks are one of the oldest problems
in computer security, with documented cases from as early as the
1940s [NSA, 1972]. Such leaks are traditionally classiﬁed as either
storage or timing channels, depending on whether time is used to
exploit them [Wray, 1991].
Permi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Last Mile: An Empirical Study of Timing Channels on seL4
author:David Cock and
Qian Ge and
Toby C. Murray and
Gernot Heiser
The Last Mile
An Empirical Study of Timing Channels on seL4
David Cock, Qian Ge, Toby Murray, Gernot Heiser
david.cock@nicta.com.au, qian.ge@nicta.com.au, toby.murray@nicta.com.au, gernot@nicta.com.au
NICTA and UNSW, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Storage channels can be provably eliminated in well-designed, high-
assurance kernels. Timing channels remain the last mile for conﬁ-
dentiality and are still beyond the reach of formal analysis, so must
be dealt with empirically. We perform such an analysis, collecting
a large data set (2,000 hours of observations) for two representative
timing channels, the locally-exploitable cache channel and a remote
exploit of OpenSSL execution timing, on the veriﬁed seL4 micro-
kernel. We also evaluate the effectiveness, in bandwidth reduction,
of a number of black-box mitigation techniques (cache colouring,
instruction-based scheduling and deterministic delivery of server
responses) across a number of hardware platforms. Our (somewhat
unexpected) results show that while these defences were highly ef-
fective a few processor generations ago, the trend towards impre-
cise events in modern microarchitectures weakens the defences and
introduces new channels. This demonstrates the necessity of care-
ful empirical analysis of timing channels.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—Informa-
tion Flow Controls
General Terms
Security, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
Conﬁdentiality; covert channels; side channels; mitigation; micro-
kernels; cache coloring; seL4
1.
INTRODUCTION
Unanticipated information leaks are one of the oldest problems
in computer security, with documented cases from as early as the
1940s [NSA, 1972]. Such leaks are traditionally classiﬁed as either
storage or timing channels, depending on whether time is used to
exploit them [Wray, 1991].
Permi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Re-evaluation of Intrusion Detection Accuracy: Alternative Evaluation
Strategy
author:Said Al-Riyami and
Frans Coenen and
Alexei Lisitsa
POSTER: A Re-evaluation of Intrusion Detection Accuracy: an
Alternative Evaluation Strategy
Said Al-Riyami
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
alriyami@liverpool.ac.uk
Frans Coenen
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
coenen@liverpool.ac.uk
Alexei Lisitsa
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
lisitsa@liverpool.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
This work tries to evaluate the existing approaches used to bench-
mark the performance of machine learning models applied to network-
based intrusion detection systems (NIDS). First, we demonstrate
that we can reach a very high accuracy with most of the traditional
machine learning and deep learning models by using the existing
performance evaluation strategy. It just requires the right hyper-
parameter tuning to outperform the existing reported accuracy
results in deep learning models. We further question the value of
the existing evaluation methods in which the same datasets are
used for training and testing the models. We are proposing the
use of an alternative strategy that aims to evaluate the practicality
and the performance of the models and datasets as well. In this
approach, different datasets with compatible sets of features are
used for training and testing. When we evaluate the models that
we created with the proposed strategy, we demonstrate that the
performance is very bad. Thus, models have no practical usage, and
it performs based on a pure randomness. This research is important
for security-based machine learning applications to re-think about
the datasets and the model’s quality.
KEYWORDS
Intrusion detection system, Network Security, Security and Privacy,
Domain Adaptation, Machine Learning, Deep Learning
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of malware and intrusion attacks has
escalated dramatically. Symantec claims that it detected more than
357 millions new variants of malware in 2...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Re-evaluation of Intrusion Detection Accuracy: Alternative Evaluation
Strategy
author:Said Al-Riyami and
Frans Coenen and
Alexei Lisitsa
POSTER: A Re-evaluation of Intrusion Detection Accuracy: an
Alternative Evaluation Strategy
Said Al-Riyami
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
alriyami@liverpool.ac.uk
Frans Coenen
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
coenen@liverpool.ac.uk
Alexei Lisitsa
Liverpool University
Liverpool, UK
lisitsa@liverpool.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
This work tries to evaluate the existing approaches used to bench-
mark the performance of machine learning models applied to network-
based intrusion detection systems (NIDS). First, we demonstrate
that we can reach a very high accuracy with most of the traditional
machine learning and deep learning models by using the existing
performance evaluation strategy. It just requires the right hyper-
parameter tuning to outperform the existing reported accuracy
results in deep learning models. We further question the value of
the existing evaluation methods in which the same datasets are
used for training and testing the models. We are proposing the
use of an alternative strategy that aims to evaluate the practicality
and the performance of the models and datasets as well. In this
approach, different datasets with compatible sets of features are
used for training and testing. When we evaluate the models that
we created with the proposed strategy, we demonstrate that the
performance is very bad. Thus, models have no practical usage, and
it performs based on a pure randomness. This research is important
for security-based machine learning applications to re-think about
the datasets and the model’s quality.
KEYWORDS
Intrusion detection system, Network Security, Security and Privacy,
Domain Adaptation, Machine Learning, Deep Learning
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of malware and intrusion attacks has
escalated dramatically. Symantec claims that it detected more than
357 millions new variants of malware in 2...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Back to the future part 4: the internet
author:Simon S. Lam
SIGCOMM Award Winner
Simon S. Lam
University of Texas at Austin
lam@cs.utexas.edu
Back to the Future Part 4: The Internet
Keynote Talk
The award to Simon Lam is in recognition of his vision, breadth, and rigor in contributing
to,  among  other  areas:  secure  network  communication,  the  analysis  of  network  and
multiaccess protocols, the analysis of queueing networks, and the design of mechanisms
for quality of service.
Biography
Simon S. Lam is Professor and Regents Chair in Computer Sciences at the University of
Texas at Austin. He received the BSEE degree with Distinction from Washington State
University, Pullman, in 1969, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in engineering from UCLA
in 1970 and 1974, respectively.
From  1971  to  1974,  he  was  a  Postgraduate  Research  Engineer  at  the  ARPA  Network
Measurement  Center,  UCLA,  where  he  worked  on  satellite  and  radio packet  switching
networks. From 1974 to 1977, he was a Research Staff Member at the IBM T.J. Watson
Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York.  Since 1977, he has been on the faculty
of the University of Texas at Austin. He served as Department Chair from 1992 to 1994.
His  current  research  interests  are  in  network  protocol  design  and  analysis,  distributed
multimedia, and Internet security services.
Simon served on the editorial boards of IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE
Transactions  on  Software  Engineering,  IEEE  Transactions  on  Communications,
Proceedings  of  the  IEEE,  and  Performance  Evaluation.  He  was  Editor-in-Chief  of
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking from 1995 to 1999. He currently serves on the
editorial  board  of  Computer  Networks.  He  organized,  as  Program  Chair,  the  inaugural
ACM SIGCOMM Symposium held at the University of Texas at Austin in 1983. He is a
founding Steering Committee member of the IEEE International Conference on Network
P...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Back to the future part 4: the internet
author:Simon S. Lam
SIGCOMM Award Winner
Simon S. Lam
University of Texas at Austin
lam@cs.utexas.edu
Back to the Future Part 4: The Internet
Keynote Talk
The award to Simon Lam is in recognition of his vision, breadth, and rigor in contributing
to,  among  other  areas:  secure  network  communication,  the  analysis  of  network  and
multiaccess protocols, the analysis of queueing networks, and the design of mechanisms
for quality of service.
Biography
Simon S. Lam is Professor and Regents Chair in Computer Sciences at the University of
Texas at Austin. He received the BSEE degree with Distinction from Washington State
University, Pullman, in 1969, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in engineering from UCLA
in 1970 and 1974, respectively.
From  1971  to  1974,  he  was  a  Postgraduate  Research  Engineer  at  the  ARPA  Network
Measurement  Center,  UCLA,  where  he  worked  on  satellite  and  radio packet  switching
networks. From 1974 to 1977, he was a Research Staff Member at the IBM T.J. Watson
Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York.  Since 1977, he has been on the faculty
of the University of Texas at Austin. He served as Department Chair from 1992 to 1994.
His  current  research  interests  are  in  network  protocol  design  and  analysis,  distributed
multimedia, and Internet security services.
Simon served on the editorial boards of IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE
Transactions  on  Software  Engineering,  IEEE  Transactions  on  Communications,
Proceedings  of  the  IEEE,  and  Performance  Evaluation.  He  was  Editor-in-Chief  of
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking from 1995 to 1999. He currently serves on the
editorial  board  of  Computer  Networks.  He  organized,  as  Program  Chair,  the  inaugural
ACM SIGCOMM Symposium held at the University of Texas at Austin in 1983. He is a
founding Steering Committee member of the IEEE International Conference on Network
P...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:TACK: Improving Wireless Transport Performance by Taming Acknowledgments
author:Tong Li and
Kai Zheng and
Ke Xu and
Rahul Arvind Jadhav and
Tao Xiong and
Keith Winstein and
Kun Tan
TACK: Improving Wireless Transport Performance by Taming
Acknowledgments
Tong Li
Huawei
Kai Zheng
Huawei
Ke Xu
Rahul Arvind Jadhav
Tsinghua University &
Huawei
li.tong@huawei.com
kai.zheng@huawei.com
BNRist & PCL
nyrahul@gmail.com
xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn
Tao Xiong
Huawei
Keith Winstein
Stanford University
Kun Tan
Huawei
yahz81@gmail.com
keithw@cs.stanford.edu
kun.tan@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
High-throughput transport over wireless local area network
(WLAN) becomes a demanding requirement with the emer-
gence of 4K wireless projection, VR/AR-based interactive
gaming, and more. However, the shared nature of the wireless
medium induces contention between data transport and back-
ward signaling, such as acknowledgement. The current way
of TCP acknowledgment induces control overhead which is
counter-productive for TCP performance especially in WLAN
scenarios.
In this paper, we present a new acknowledgement called
TACK (“Tame ACK”), as well as its TCP implementation
TCP-TACK. TCP-TACK works on top of commodity WLAN,
delivering high wireless transport goodput with minimal con-
trol overhead in the form of ACKs, without any hardware
modification. To minimize ACK frequency, TACK abandons
the legacy received-packet-driven ACK. Instead, it balances
byte-counting ACK and periodic ACK so as to achieve a
controlled ACK frequency. Evaluation results show that TCP-
TACK achieves significant advantages over legacy TCP in
WLAN scenarios due to less contention between data packets
and ACKs. Specifically, TCP-TACK reduces over 90% of
ACKs and also obtains an improvement of ∼ 28% on good-
put. We further find it performs equally well as high-speed
TCP variants in wide area network (WAN) scenarios, this is
attributed to the advancements of the TACK-based proto-
col design in loss recovery, round-trip timing, and...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:TACK: Improving Wireless Transport Performance by Taming Acknowledgments
author:Tong Li and
Kai Zheng and
Ke Xu and
Rahul Arvind Jadhav and
Tao Xiong and
Keith Winstein and
Kun Tan
TACK: Improving Wireless Transport Performance by Taming
Acknowledgments
Tong Li
Huawei
Kai Zheng
Huawei
Ke Xu
Rahul Arvind Jadhav
Tsinghua University &
Huawei
li.tong@huawei.com
kai.zheng@huawei.com
BNRist & PCL
nyrahul@gmail.com
xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn
Tao Xiong
Huawei
Keith Winstein
Stanford University
Kun Tan
Huawei
yahz81@gmail.com
keithw@cs.stanford.edu
kun.tan@huawei.com
ABSTRACT
High-throughput transport over wireless local area network
(WLAN) becomes a demanding requirement with the emer-
gence of 4K wireless projection, VR/AR-based interactive
gaming, and more. However, the shared nature of the wireless
medium induces contention between data transport and back-
ward signaling, such as acknowledgement. The current way
of TCP acknowledgment induces control overhead which is
counter-productive for TCP performance especially in WLAN
scenarios.
In this paper, we present a new acknowledgement called
TACK (“Tame ACK”), as well as its TCP implementation
TCP-TACK. TCP-TACK works on top of commodity WLAN,
delivering high wireless transport goodput with minimal con-
trol overhead in the form of ACKs, without any hardware
modification. To minimize ACK frequency, TACK abandons
the legacy received-packet-driven ACK. Instead, it balances
byte-counting ACK and periodic ACK so as to achieve a
controlled ACK frequency. Evaluation results show that TCP-
TACK achieves significant advantages over legacy TCP in
WLAN scenarios due to less contention between data packets
and ACKs. Specifically, TCP-TACK reduces over 90% of
ACKs and also obtains an improvement of ∼ 28% on good-
put. We further find it performs equally well as high-speed
TCP variants in wide area network (WAN) scenarios, this is
attributed to the advancements of the TACK-based proto-
col design in loss recovery, round-trip timing, and...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:WiMAC: Rapid Implementation Platform for User Definable MAC Protocols
Through Separation
author:Simon Yau and
Liang Ge and
Ping-Chun Hsieh and
I-Hong Hou and
Shuguang Cui and
P. R. Kumar and
Amal Ekbal and
Nikhil Kundargi
WiMAC: Rapid Implementation Platform for User Deﬁnable
MAC Protocols Through Separation
Simon Yau†, Liang Ge†, Ping-Chun Hsieh†, I-Hong Hou†, Shuguang Cui†, P. R. Kumar†,
Amal Ekbal*, and Nikhil Kundargi*
†Texas A&M University
†{symoyau, geliang87, lleyfede, ihou, cui, prk}@tamu.edu
*National Instruments
*{amal.ekbal, nikhil.kundargi}@ni.com
ABSTRACT
This demo presents WiMAC, a general-purpose wireless testbed for
researchers to quickly prototype a wide variety of real-time MAC
protocols for wireless networks. As the interface between the link
layer and the physical layer, MAC protocols are often tightly cou-
pled with the underlying physical layer, and need to have extremely
small latencies. Implementing a new MAC requires a long time. In
fact, very few MACs have ever been implemented, even though
dozens of new MAC protocols have been proposed. To enable
quick prototyping, we employ the mechanism vs. policy separa-
tion to decompose the functionality in the MAC layer and the PHY
layer. Built on the separation framework, WiMAC achieves the in-
dependence of the software from the hardware, offering a high de-
gree of function reuse and design ﬂexibility. Hence, our platform
not only supports easy cross-layer design but also allows protocol
changes on the ﬂy. Following the 802.11-like reference design, we
demonstrate that deploying a new MAC protocol is quick and sim-
ple on the proposed platform through the implementation of the
CSMA/CA and CHAIN protocols.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network experimentation;
Keywords
Wireless testbed; MAC; software-deﬁned radio
1.
INTRODUCTION
Driven by the emerging applications such as multimedia stream-
ing and VoIP, a wide variety of wireless protocols have been pro-
posed to meet the increasingly stringent r...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:WiMAC: Rapid Implementation Platform for User Definable MAC Protocols
Through Separation
author:Simon Yau and
Liang Ge and
Ping-Chun Hsieh and
I-Hong Hou and
Shuguang Cui and
P. R. Kumar and
Amal Ekbal and
Nikhil Kundargi
WiMAC: Rapid Implementation Platform for User Deﬁnable
MAC Protocols Through Separation
Simon Yau†, Liang Ge†, Ping-Chun Hsieh†, I-Hong Hou†, Shuguang Cui†, P. R. Kumar†,
Amal Ekbal*, and Nikhil Kundargi*
†Texas A&M University
†{symoyau, geliang87, lleyfede, ihou, cui, prk}@tamu.edu
*National Instruments
*{amal.ekbal, nikhil.kundargi}@ni.com
ABSTRACT
This demo presents WiMAC, a general-purpose wireless testbed for
researchers to quickly prototype a wide variety of real-time MAC
protocols for wireless networks. As the interface between the link
layer and the physical layer, MAC protocols are often tightly cou-
pled with the underlying physical layer, and need to have extremely
small latencies. Implementing a new MAC requires a long time. In
fact, very few MACs have ever been implemented, even though
dozens of new MAC protocols have been proposed. To enable
quick prototyping, we employ the mechanism vs. policy separa-
tion to decompose the functionality in the MAC layer and the PHY
layer. Built on the separation framework, WiMAC achieves the in-
dependence of the software from the hardware, offering a high de-
gree of function reuse and design ﬂexibility. Hence, our platform
not only supports easy cross-layer design but also allows protocol
changes on the ﬂy. Following the 802.11-like reference design, we
demonstrate that deploying a new MAC protocol is quick and sim-
ple on the proposed platform through the implementation of the
CSMA/CA and CHAIN protocols.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network experimentation;
Keywords
Wireless testbed; MAC; software-deﬁned radio
1.
INTRODUCTION
Driven by the emerging applications such as multimedia stream-
ing and VoIP, a wide variety of wireless protocols have been pro-
posed to meet the increasingly stringent r...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Enpublic Apps: Security Threats Using iOS Enterprise and Developer
Certificates
author:Min Zheng and
Hui Xue and
Yulong Zhang and
Tao Wei and
John C. S. Lui
Enpublic Apps: Security Threats Using iOS Enterprise and
Developer Certiﬁcates
Min Zheng
x
y
, Hui Xue
y
The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
, Yulong Zhang
x
x
, Tao Wei
x
and John C.S. Lui
y
FireEye Inc.
ABSTRACT
Compared with Android, the conventional wisdom is that
iOS is more secure. However, both jailbroken and non-
jailbroken iOS devices have number of vulnerabilities. For
iOS, apps need to interact with the underlying system using
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Some of these
APIs remain undocumented and Apple forbids apps in App
Store from using them. These APIs, also known as “private
APIs”, provide powerful features to developers and yet they
may have serious security consequences if misused. Further-
more, apps which use private APIs can bypass the App Store
and use the “Apple’s Enterprise/Developer Certi(cid:12)cates” for
distribution. This poses a signiﬁcant threat to the iOS e-
cosystem. So far, there is no formal study to understand
these apps and how private APIs are being encapsulated.
We call these iOS apps which distribute to the public using
enterprise certiﬁcates as “enpublic” apps. In this paper, we
present the design and implementation of iAnalytics, which
can automatically analyze “enpublic” apps’ private API us-
ages and vulnerabilities. Using iAnalytics, we crawled and
analyzed 1,408 enpublic iOS apps. We discovered that: 844
(60%) out of the 1408 apps do use private APIs, 14 (1%) app-
s contain URL scheme vulnerabilities, 901 (64%) enpublic
apps transport sensitive information through unencrypted
channel or store the information in plaintext on the phone.
In addition, we summarized 25 private APIs which are cru-
cial and security sensitive on iOS 6/7/8, and we have ﬁled
one CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) for iOS
devices.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As of the end of 20...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Enpublic Apps: Security Threats Using iOS Enterprise and Developer
Certificates
author:Min Zheng and
Hui Xue and
Yulong Zhang and
Tao Wei and
John C. S. Lui
Enpublic Apps: Security Threats Using iOS Enterprise and
Developer Certiﬁcates
Min Zheng
x
y
, Hui Xue
y
The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
, Yulong Zhang
x
x
, Tao Wei
x
and John C.S. Lui
y
FireEye Inc.
ABSTRACT
Compared with Android, the conventional wisdom is that
iOS is more secure. However, both jailbroken and non-
jailbroken iOS devices have number of vulnerabilities. For
iOS, apps need to interact with the underlying system using
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Some of these
APIs remain undocumented and Apple forbids apps in App
Store from using them. These APIs, also known as “private
APIs”, provide powerful features to developers and yet they
may have serious security consequences if misused. Further-
more, apps which use private APIs can bypass the App Store
and use the “Apple’s Enterprise/Developer Certi(cid:12)cates” for
distribution. This poses a signiﬁcant threat to the iOS e-
cosystem. So far, there is no formal study to understand
these apps and how private APIs are being encapsulated.
We call these iOS apps which distribute to the public using
enterprise certiﬁcates as “enpublic” apps. In this paper, we
present the design and implementation of iAnalytics, which
can automatically analyze “enpublic” apps’ private API us-
ages and vulnerabilities. Using iAnalytics, we crawled and
analyzed 1,408 enpublic iOS apps. We discovered that: 844
(60%) out of the 1408 apps do use private APIs, 14 (1%) app-
s contain URL scheme vulnerabilities, 901 (64%) enpublic
apps transport sensitive information through unencrypted
channel or store the information in plaintext on the phone.
In addition, we summarized 25 private APIs which are cru-
cial and security sensitive on iOS 6/7/8, and we have ﬁled
one CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) for iOS
devices.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As of the end of 20...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS Software Libraries
author:Martin S"ußkraut and
Christof Fetzer
Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS Software Libraries
Martin S¨ußkraut
Christof Fetzer
Department of Computer Science
Technische Universit¨at Dresden, Germany
{martin.suesskraut,christof.fetzer}@tu-dresden.de
Abstract
COTS components, like software libraries, can be used to
reduce the development effort. Unfortunately, many COTS
components have been developed without a focus on robust-
ness and security. We propose a novel approach to harden
software libraries to improve their robustness and security.
Our approach is automated, general and extensible and
consists of the following stages. First, we use a static anal-
ysis to prepare and guide the following fault injection. In
the dynamic analysis stage, fault injection experiments exe-
cute the library functions with both usual and extreme input
values. The experiments are used to derive and verify one
protection hypothesis per function (for instance, function
foo fails if argument 1 is a NULL pointer). In the hard-
ening stage, a protection wrapper is generated from these
hypothesis to reject unrobust input values of library func-
tions. We evaluate our approach by hardening a library
used by Apache (a web server).
1 Introduction
When building dependable systems, one can rarely af-
ford to built everything from scratch. This means that one
needs to build systems using software components imple-
mented by third parties. These software components might
have been designed and implemented for less critical appli-
cation domains. The use of such components without fur-
ther hardening is therefore not recommended for depend-
able systems.
Third party software components are often provided in
form of libraries. Experience with our previous library
hardening tool [8] has shown that tools like HEALERS can
help developers to harden libraries. The idea of HEALERS
was to use automated fault injection experi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS Software Libraries
author:Martin S"ußkraut and
Christof Fetzer
Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS Software Libraries
Martin S¨ußkraut
Christof Fetzer
Department of Computer Science
Technische Universit¨at Dresden, Germany
{martin.suesskraut,christof.fetzer}@tu-dresden.de
Abstract
COTS components, like software libraries, can be used to
reduce the development effort. Unfortunately, many COTS
components have been developed without a focus on robust-
ness and security. We propose a novel approach to harden
software libraries to improve their robustness and security.
Our approach is automated, general and extensible and
consists of the following stages. First, we use a static anal-
ysis to prepare and guide the following fault injection. In
the dynamic analysis stage, fault injection experiments exe-
cute the library functions with both usual and extreme input
values. The experiments are used to derive and verify one
protection hypothesis per function (for instance, function
foo fails if argument 1 is a NULL pointer). In the hard-
ening stage, a protection wrapper is generated from these
hypothesis to reject unrobust input values of library func-
tions. We evaluate our approach by hardening a library
used by Apache (a web server).
1 Introduction
When building dependable systems, one can rarely af-
ford to built everything from scratch. This means that one
needs to build systems using software components imple-
mented by third parties. These software components might
have been designed and implemented for less critical appli-
cation domains. The use of such components without fur-
ther hardening is therefore not recommended for depend-
able systems.
Third party software components are often provided in
form of libraries. Experience with our previous library
hardening tool [8] has shown that tools like HEALERS can
help developers to harden libraries. The idea of HEALERS
was to use automated fault injection experi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fault Tolerant Energy Aware Data Dissemination Protocol in Sensor
Networks
author:Gunjan Khanna and
Saurabh Bagchi and
Yu-Sung Wu
Fault Tolerant Energy Aware Data Dissemination Protocol in Sensor Networks
Gunjan Khanna, Saurabh Bagchi, Yu-Sung Wu
Dependable Computing Systems Lab
School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Purdue University
465 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
Email: {gkhanna, sbagchi, yswu}@purdue.edu
Abstract
In  this  paper  we  present  a  data  dissemination
protocol  for  efficiently  distributing  data  through  a
sensor network in the face of node and link failures. Our
work  is  motivated  by  the  SPIN  protocol  which  uses
metadata  negotiation  to  minimize  data  transmissions.
We  propose  a  protocol  called  Shortest  Path  Minded
SPIN (SPMS) in which every node has a zone defined by
its  maximum  transmission  radius.  A  data  source  node
advertises the availability of data to all the nodes in its
zone. Any interested node requests the data and gets sent
the data using multi-hop communication via the shortest
path. The failure of any node in the path is detected and
recovered  using  backup  routes.  We  build  simulation
models to compare SPMS against SPIN. The simulation
results show that SPMS reduces the delay over 10 times
and consumes 30% less energy in the static failure free
scenario.  Even  with  the  addition  of  mobility,  SPMS
outperforms  SPIN  by  energy  gains  between  5%  and
21%.  An  analytical  model  is  also  constructed  to
compare the two protocols under a simplified topology.
Keywords:  Sensor  network,  Energy  efficient  data
distribution,  FT  Communication,  Modeling,  FT  Mobile
Computing/Networking.
1. Introduction
Sensor  networks  are  a  particular  class  of  wireless  ad
hoc  networks  in  which  the  nodes  have  micro-electro-
mechanical  (MEMS)  components,  including  sensors,
actuators  and  RF  communication  components.  Sensor
nodes ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fault Tolerant Energy Aware Data Dissemination Protocol in Sensor
Networks
author:Gunjan Khanna and
Saurabh Bagchi and
Yu-Sung Wu
Fault Tolerant Energy Aware Data Dissemination Protocol in Sensor Networks
Gunjan Khanna, Saurabh Bagchi, Yu-Sung Wu
Dependable Computing Systems Lab
School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Purdue University
465 Northwestern Avenue, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
Email: {gkhanna, sbagchi, yswu}@purdue.edu
Abstract
In  this  paper  we  present  a  data  dissemination
protocol  for  efficiently  distributing  data  through  a
sensor network in the face of node and link failures. Our
work  is  motivated  by  the  SPIN  protocol  which  uses
metadata  negotiation  to  minimize  data  transmissions.
We  propose  a  protocol  called  Shortest  Path  Minded
SPIN (SPMS) in which every node has a zone defined by
its  maximum  transmission  radius.  A  data  source  node
advertises the availability of data to all the nodes in its
zone. Any interested node requests the data and gets sent
the data using multi-hop communication via the shortest
path. The failure of any node in the path is detected and
recovered  using  backup  routes.  We  build  simulation
models to compare SPMS against SPIN. The simulation
results show that SPMS reduces the delay over 10 times
and consumes 30% less energy in the static failure free
scenario.  Even  with  the  addition  of  mobility,  SPMS
outperforms  SPIN  by  energy  gains  between  5%  and
21%.  An  analytical  model  is  also  constructed  to
compare the two protocols under a simplified topology.
Keywords:  Sensor  network,  Energy  efficient  data
distribution,  FT  Communication,  Modeling,  FT  Mobile
Computing/Networking.
1. Introduction
Sensor  networks  are  a  particular  class  of  wireless  ad
hoc  networks  in  which  the  nodes  have  micro-electro-
mechanical  (MEMS)  components,  including  sensors,
actuators  and  RF  communication  components.  Sensor
nodes ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Does Certificate Transparency Break the Web? Measuring Adoption and
Error Rate
author:Emily Stark and
Ryan Sleevi and
Rijad Muminovic and
Devon O'Brien and
Eran Messeri and
Adrienne Porter Felt and
Brendan McMillion and
Parisa Tabriz
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Does Certiﬁcate Transparency Break the Web?
Measuring Adoption and Error Rate
Emily Stark1, Ryan Sleevi1, Rijad Muminovi´c2, Devon O’Brien1, Eran Messeri1,
Adrienne Porter Felt1, Brendan McMillion3, Parisa Tabriz1
1Google, 2University of Sarajevo, 3Cloudﬂare
1estark,rsleevi,asymmetric,eranm,felt,parisa@chromium.org, 2rmuminovic1@etf.unsa.ba, 3brendan@cloudﬂare.com
Abstract—Certiﬁcate Transparency (CT) is an emerging system
for enabling the rapid discovery of malicious or misissued
certiﬁcates. Initially standardized in 2013, CT is now ﬁnally
beginning to see widespread support. Although CT provides
desirable security beneﬁts, web browsers cannot begin requiring
all websites to support CT at once, due to the risk of breaking
large numbers of websites. We discuss challenges for deployment,
analyze the adoption of CT on the web, and measure the error
rates experienced by users of the Google Chrome web browser.
We ﬁnd that CT has so far been widely adopted with minimal
breakage and warnings.
Security researchers often struggle with the tradeoff between
security and user frustration: rolling out new security require-
ments often causes breakage. We view CT as a case study for
deploying ecosystem-wide change while trying to minimize end
user impact. We discuss the design properties of CT that made its
success possible, as well as draw lessons from its risks and pitfalls
that could be avoided in future la...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Does Certificate Transparency Break the Web? Measuring Adoption and
Error Rate
author:Emily Stark and
Ryan Sleevi and
Rijad Muminovic and
Devon O'Brien and
Eran Messeri and
Adrienne Porter Felt and
Brendan McMillion and
Parisa Tabriz
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Does Certiﬁcate Transparency Break the Web?
Measuring Adoption and Error Rate
Emily Stark1, Ryan Sleevi1, Rijad Muminovi´c2, Devon O’Brien1, Eran Messeri1,
Adrienne Porter Felt1, Brendan McMillion3, Parisa Tabriz1
1Google, 2University of Sarajevo, 3Cloudﬂare
1estark,rsleevi,asymmetric,eranm,felt,parisa@chromium.org, 2rmuminovic1@etf.unsa.ba, 3brendan@cloudﬂare.com
Abstract—Certiﬁcate Transparency (CT) is an emerging system
for enabling the rapid discovery of malicious or misissued
certiﬁcates. Initially standardized in 2013, CT is now ﬁnally
beginning to see widespread support. Although CT provides
desirable security beneﬁts, web browsers cannot begin requiring
all websites to support CT at once, due to the risk of breaking
large numbers of websites. We discuss challenges for deployment,
analyze the adoption of CT on the web, and measure the error
rates experienced by users of the Google Chrome web browser.
We ﬁnd that CT has so far been widely adopted with minimal
breakage and warnings.
Security researchers often struggle with the tradeoff between
security and user frustration: rolling out new security require-
ments often causes breakage. We view CT as a case study for
deploying ecosystem-wide change while trying to minimize end
user impact. We discuss the design properties of CT that made its
success possible, as well as draw lessons from its risks and pitfalls
that could be avoided in future la...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Tempest: Soft state replication in the service tier
author:Tudor Marian and
Mahesh Balakrishnan and
Ken Birman and
Robbert van Renesse
International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
Tempest: Soft State Replication in the Service Tier*
Tudor Marian, Mahesh Balakrishnan, Ken Birman, Robbert van Renesse
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
{tudorm,mahesh,ken,rvr}@cs.comell.edu
Abstract
Soft state in the middle tier is key to enabling scalable
and responsive three tier service architectures. While soft(cid:173)
state can be reconstructed upon failure, replicating it across
multiple service instances is critical for rapid fail-over and
high availability. Current techniques for storing and man(cid:173)
aging replicated soft state require mapping data structures
to different abstractions such as database records, which
can be difficult and introduce inefficiencies. Tempest is a
system that provides programmers with data structures that
look very similar to conventional Java Collections but are
automatically replicated. We evaluate Tempest against al(cid:173)
ternatives such as in-memory databases and we show that
Tempest does scale well in real world service architectures.
1 Introduction
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) have emerged as
the paradigm of choice for structuring large datacenter(cid:173)
hosted systems. Most contemporary large-scale applica(cid:173)
tions are built as SOAs: online stores, search engines, en(cid:173)
terprise software and financial infrastructure are some ex(cid:173)
amples. The canonical design for such systems is a three(cid:173)
tier architecture: a first tier load-balancing proxies sends
requests to a second tier of state-less service logic which in
tum accesses and updates a third tier of durable databases
or filesystems.
Soft state in the service tier is key to building highly re(cid:173)
sponsive and scalable SOAs. Soft state is characterized as
data ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Tempest: Soft state replication in the service tier
author:Tudor Marian and
Mahesh Balakrishnan and
Ken Birman and
Robbert van Renesse
International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks: Anchorage, Alaska, June 24-27 2008
Tempest: Soft State Replication in the Service Tier*
Tudor Marian, Mahesh Balakrishnan, Ken Birman, Robbert van Renesse
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
{tudorm,mahesh,ken,rvr}@cs.comell.edu
Abstract
Soft state in the middle tier is key to enabling scalable
and responsive three tier service architectures. While soft(cid:173)
state can be reconstructed upon failure, replicating it across
multiple service instances is critical for rapid fail-over and
high availability. Current techniques for storing and man(cid:173)
aging replicated soft state require mapping data structures
to different abstractions such as database records, which
can be difficult and introduce inefficiencies. Tempest is a
system that provides programmers with data structures that
look very similar to conventional Java Collections but are
automatically replicated. We evaluate Tempest against al(cid:173)
ternatives such as in-memory databases and we show that
Tempest does scale well in real world service architectures.
1 Introduction
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) have emerged as
the paradigm of choice for structuring large datacenter(cid:173)
hosted systems. Most contemporary large-scale applica(cid:173)
tions are built as SOAs: online stores, search engines, en(cid:173)
terprise software and financial infrastructure are some ex(cid:173)
amples. The canonical design for such systems is a three(cid:173)
tier architecture: a first tier load-balancing proxies sends
requests to a second tier of state-less service logic which in
tum accesses and updates a third tier of durable databases
or filesystems.
Soft state in the service tier is key to building highly re(cid:173)
sponsive and scalable SOAs. Soft state is characterized as
data ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Mitigating DNS DoS attacks
author:Hitesh Ballani and
Paul Francis
Mitigating DNS DoS Attacks
Hitesh Ballani
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
hitesh@cs.cornell.edu
Paul Francis
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
francis@cs.cornell.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper considers DoS attacks on DNS wherein attackers ﬂood
the nameservers of a zone to disrupt resolution of resource records
belonging to the zone and consequently, any of its sub-zones. We
propose a minor change in the caching behavior of DNS resolvers
that can significantly alleviate the impact of such attacks. In our
proposal, DNS resolvers do not completely evict cached records
whose TTL has expired; rather, such records are stored in a sepa-
rate “stale cache”. If, during the resolution of a query, a resolver
does not receive any response from the nameservers that are re-
sponsible for authoritatively answering the query, it can use the
information stored in the stale cache to answer the query.
In effect, the stale cache is the part of the global DNS database
that has been accessed by the resolver and represents an insurance
policy that the resolver uses only when the relevant DNS servers are
unavailable. We analyze a 65-day DNS trace to quantify the bene-
fits of a stale cache under different attack scenarios. Further, while
the proposed change to DNS resolvers also changes DNS seman-
tics, we argue that it does not adversely impact any of the funda-
mental DNS characteristics such as the autonomy of zone operators
and hence, is a very simple and practical candidate for mitigating
the impact of DoS attacks on DNS.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: Reliability, Availability.
General Terms: Reliability, Security.
Keywords: DNS, Denial of Service, stale cache.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, there have been many instances of ﬂooding
attacks on the Domain Name System (DNS) aimed at preventing
clients from resolving resource records belonging to the zone un-
der attack [26-29]. While t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Mitigating DNS DoS attacks
author:Hitesh Ballani and
Paul Francis
Mitigating DNS DoS Attacks
Hitesh Ballani
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
hitesh@cs.cornell.edu
Paul Francis
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
francis@cs.cornell.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper considers DoS attacks on DNS wherein attackers ﬂood
the nameservers of a zone to disrupt resolution of resource records
belonging to the zone and consequently, any of its sub-zones. We
propose a minor change in the caching behavior of DNS resolvers
that can significantly alleviate the impact of such attacks. In our
proposal, DNS resolvers do not completely evict cached records
whose TTL has expired; rather, such records are stored in a sepa-
rate “stale cache”. If, during the resolution of a query, a resolver
does not receive any response from the nameservers that are re-
sponsible for authoritatively answering the query, it can use the
information stored in the stale cache to answer the query.
In effect, the stale cache is the part of the global DNS database
that has been accessed by the resolver and represents an insurance
policy that the resolver uses only when the relevant DNS servers are
unavailable. We analyze a 65-day DNS trace to quantify the bene-
fits of a stale cache under different attack scenarios. Further, while
the proposed change to DNS resolvers also changes DNS seman-
tics, we argue that it does not adversely impact any of the funda-
mental DNS characteristics such as the autonomy of zone operators
and hence, is a very simple and practical candidate for mitigating
the impact of DoS attacks on DNS.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: Reliability, Availability.
General Terms: Reliability, Security.
Keywords: DNS, Denial of Service, stale cache.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, there have been many instances of ﬂooding
attacks on the Domain Name System (DNS) aimed at preventing
clients from resolving resource records belonging to the zone un-
der attack [26-29]. While t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the DANE Ecosystem in
Email
author:Hyeonmin Lee and
Aniketh Gireesh and
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij and
Taekyoung Kwon and
Taejoong Chung
A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the
DANE Ecosystem in Email
Hyeonmin Lee, Seoul National University; Aniketh Gireesh, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham;
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, University of Twente & NLnet Labs; Taekyoung “Ted” Kwon,
Seoul National University; Taejoong Chung, Rochester Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/lee-hyeonmin
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the DANE Ecosystem in Email
Hyeonmin Lee∗
Seoul National University
Aniketh Girish∗
Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij
University of Twente & NLnet Labs
Taekyoung “Ted” Kwon
Seoul National University
Taejoong Chung
Rochester Institute of Technology
Abstract
1
Introduction
The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
standard allows clients and servers to establish a TLS connec-
tion without relying on trusted third parties like CAs by pub-
lishing TLSA records. DANE uses the Domain Name System
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) PKI to achieve integrity and
authenticity. However, DANE can only work correctly if each
principal in its PKI properly performs its duty: through their
DNSSEC-aware DNS servers, DANE servers (e.g., SMTP
servers) must publish their TLSA records, which are consistent
with their certiﬁcates. Similarly, DANE clients (e.g., SMTP
clients) must verify the DANE servers’ TLSA records, which
are also used to validate the fetched certiﬁcates.
DANE is rapidly gaining popularity in the email ecosystem,
to help improve transport security between mail servers. Yet
its security beneﬁts hinge on deploying DANE correctly. In
th...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the DANE Ecosystem in
Email
author:Hyeonmin Lee and
Aniketh Gireesh and
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij and
Taekyoung Kwon and
Taejoong Chung
A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the
DANE Ecosystem in Email
Hyeonmin Lee, Seoul National University; Aniketh Gireesh, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham;
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, University of Twente & NLnet Labs; Taekyoung “Ted” Kwon,
Seoul National University; Taejoong Chung, Rochester Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/lee-hyeonmin
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Study of the DANE Ecosystem in Email
Hyeonmin Lee∗
Seoul National University
Aniketh Girish∗
Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij
University of Twente & NLnet Labs
Taekyoung “Ted” Kwon
Seoul National University
Taejoong Chung
Rochester Institute of Technology
Abstract
1
Introduction
The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
standard allows clients and servers to establish a TLS connec-
tion without relying on trusted third parties like CAs by pub-
lishing TLSA records. DANE uses the Domain Name System
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) PKI to achieve integrity and
authenticity. However, DANE can only work correctly if each
principal in its PKI properly performs its duty: through their
DNSSEC-aware DNS servers, DANE servers (e.g., SMTP
servers) must publish their TLSA records, which are consistent
with their certiﬁcates. Similarly, DANE clients (e.g., SMTP
clients) must verify the DANE servers’ TLSA records, which
are also used to validate the fetched certiﬁcates.
DANE is rapidly gaining popularity in the email ecosystem,
to help improve transport security between mail servers. Yet
its security beneﬁts hinge on deploying DANE correctly. In
th...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。