Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening in Neural Networks
for Better Security
author:Guanhong Tao and
Yingqi Liu and
Guangyu Shen and
Qiuling Xu and
Shengwei An and
Zhuo Zhang and
Xiangyu Zhang
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2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening
in Neural Networks for Better Security
Guanhong Tao, Yingqi Liu, Guangyu Shen, Qiuling Xu, Shengwei An, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang
Email: {taog, liu1751, shen447, xu1230, an93, zhan3299, xyzhang}@cs.purdue.edu
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Abstract—The distance between two classes for a deep learning
classifier can be measured by the level of difficulty in flipping
all (or majority of) samples in a class to the other. The class
distances of many pre-trained models in the wild are very
small and do not align well with humans’ intuition (e.g., classes
turtle and bird have smaller distance than classes cat and
dog), making the models vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which
aim to cause misclassification by stamping a specific pattern to
inputs. We propose a novel model hardening technique called
model orthogonalization which is an add-on training step to
pretrained models,
including clean models, poisoned models,
and adversarially trained models. It can substantially enlarge
class distances with reasonable training cost and without much
accuracy degradation. Our evaluation on 5 datasets with 22
model structures show that our technique can enlarge class
distances by 177.63% on average with less than 1% accuracy loss,
outperforming existing hardening techniques such as adversarial
training, universal adversarial perturbation, and directly using
generated backdoors. It reduces 80% false positives for a state-
of-the-art backdoor scan...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An Analysis of Rogue AV Campaigns
author:Marco Cova and
Corrado Leita and
Olivier Thonnard and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Marc Dacier
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
6307
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Alfred Kobsa
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
TU Dortmund University, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbruecken, Germany
Somesh Jha Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich (Eds.)
Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection
13th International Symposium, RAID 2010
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, September 15-17, 2010
Proceedings
1 3
Volume Editors
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
Computer Sciences Department
Madison, WI 53706, USA
E-mail: jha@cs.wisc.edu
Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA
E-mail: {robin, christian}@icir.org
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010933245
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): C.2, K.6.5, D.4.6, E.3, H.4, I.2
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-642-15511-1 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-642-15511-6 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An Analysis of Rogue AV Campaigns
author:Marco Cova and
Corrado Leita and
Olivier Thonnard and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Marc Dacier
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
6307
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Alfred Kobsa
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
TU Dortmund University, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbruecken, Germany
Somesh Jha Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich (Eds.)
Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection
13th International Symposium, RAID 2010
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, September 15-17, 2010
Proceedings
1 3
Volume Editors
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
Computer Sciences Department
Madison, WI 53706, USA
E-mail: jha@cs.wisc.edu
Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA
E-mail: {robin, christian}@icir.org
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010933245
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): C.2, K.6.5, D.4.6, E.3, H.4, I.2
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-642-15511-1 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-642-15511-6 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CloudCmp: comparing public cloud providers
author:Ang Li and
Xiaowei Yang and
Srikanth Kandula and
Ming Zhang
CloudCmp: Comparing Public Cloud Providers
Ang Li
Xiaowei Yang
Duke University
{angl, xwy}@cs.duke.edu
Srikanth Kandula
Ming Zhang
Microsoft Research
{srikanth, mzh}@microsoft.com
ABSTRACT
While many public cloud providers offer pay-as-you-go comput-
ing, their varying approaches to infrastructure, virtualization, and
software services lead to a problem of plenty. To help customers
pick a cloud that ﬁts their needs, we develop CloudCmp, a system-
atic comparator of the performance and cost of cloud providers.
CloudCmp measures the elastic computing, persistent storage, and
networking services offered by a cloud along metrics that directly
reﬂect their impact on the performance of customer applications.
CloudCmp strives to ensure fairness, representativeness, and com-
pliance of these measurements while limiting measurement cost.
Applying CloudCmp to four cloud providers that together account
for most of the cloud customers today, we ﬁnd that their offered ser-
vices vary widely in performance and costs, underscoring the need
for thoughtful provider selection. From case studies on three rep-
resentative cloud applications, we show that CloudCmp can guide
customers in selecting the best-performing provider for their appli-
cations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: General—measurement techniques,
performance attributes; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: Network Operations—network monitoring, public networks;
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—distributed applications, distributed databases
General Terms
Measurement, Design, Performance, Economics.
Keywords
Cloud computing, comparison, performace, cost.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-based cloud computing has gained tremendous momen-
tum in recent years. Cloud customers outsource their computation
and storage to public providers and pay for the...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CloudCmp: comparing public cloud providers
author:Ang Li and
Xiaowei Yang and
Srikanth Kandula and
Ming Zhang
CloudCmp: Comparing Public Cloud Providers
Ang Li
Xiaowei Yang
Duke University
{angl, xwy}@cs.duke.edu
Srikanth Kandula
Ming Zhang
Microsoft Research
{srikanth, mzh}@microsoft.com
ABSTRACT
While many public cloud providers offer pay-as-you-go comput-
ing, their varying approaches to infrastructure, virtualization, and
software services lead to a problem of plenty. To help customers
pick a cloud that ﬁts their needs, we develop CloudCmp, a system-
atic comparator of the performance and cost of cloud providers.
CloudCmp measures the elastic computing, persistent storage, and
networking services offered by a cloud along metrics that directly
reﬂect their impact on the performance of customer applications.
CloudCmp strives to ensure fairness, representativeness, and com-
pliance of these measurements while limiting measurement cost.
Applying CloudCmp to four cloud providers that together account
for most of the cloud customers today, we ﬁnd that their offered ser-
vices vary widely in performance and costs, underscoring the need
for thoughtful provider selection. From case studies on three rep-
resentative cloud applications, we show that CloudCmp can guide
customers in selecting the best-performing provider for their appli-
cations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: General—measurement techniques,
performance attributes; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: Network Operations—network monitoring, public networks;
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—distributed applications, distributed databases
General Terms
Measurement, Design, Performance, Economics.
Keywords
Cloud computing, comparison, performace, cost.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-based cloud computing has gained tremendous momen-
tum in recent years. Cloud customers outsource their computation
and storage to public providers and pay for the...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
author:Jonathan Fuller and
Ranjita Pai Kasturi and
Amit Sikder and
Haichuan Xu and
Berat Arik and
Vivek Verma and
Ehsan Asdar and
Brendan Saltaformaggio
C3PO: Large-Scale Study of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
Jonathan Fuller, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Amit Sikder, Haichuan Xu, Berat Arik
Vivek Verma, Ehsan Asdar, Brendan Saltaformaggio
Georgia Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Current techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or take-
down are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the
botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and
scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware
that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing
privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to
detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots
toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k
malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned
bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with
a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last
15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though
over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the
efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them
prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents
C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident
responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols,
infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C
monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltra-
tion. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weak-
ness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers,
which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and take-
downs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and pr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
author:Jonathan Fuller and
Ranjita Pai Kasturi and
Amit Sikder and
Haichuan Xu and
Berat Arik and
Vivek Verma and
Ehsan Asdar and
Brendan Saltaformaggio
C3PO: Large-Scale Study of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
Jonathan Fuller, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Amit Sikder, Haichuan Xu, Berat Arik
Vivek Verma, Ehsan Asdar, Brendan Saltaformaggio
Georgia Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Current techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or take-
down are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the
botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and
scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware
that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing
privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to
detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots
toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k
malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned
bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with
a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last
15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though
over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the
efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them
prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents
C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident
responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols,
infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C
monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltra-
tion. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weak-
ness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers,
which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and take-
downs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and pr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using Write-Only Oblivious RAM
author:Erik-Oliver Blass and
Travis Mayberry and
Guevara Noubir and
Kaan Onarlioglu
Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using
Write-Only Oblivious RAM
Erik-Oliver Blass Travis Mayberry Guevara Noubir Kaan Onarlioglu
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University, Boston MA
Email: {blass|travism|noubir|onarliog}@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
With sensitive data being increasingly stored on mobile devices and
laptops, hard disk encryption is more important than ever. In partic-
ular, being able to plausibly deny that a hard disk contains certain
information is a very useful and interesting research goal. However,
it has been known for some time that existing “hidden volume” so-
lutions, like TrueCrypt, fail in the face of an adversary who is able
to observe the contents of a disk on multiple, separate occasions.
In this work, we explore more robust constructions for hidden vol-
umes and present HIVE, which is resistant to more powerful ad-
versaries with multiple-snapshot capabilities. In pursuit of this, we
propose the ﬁrst security deﬁnitions for hidden volumes, and prove
HIVE secure under these deﬁnitions. At the core of HIVE, we de-
sign a new write-only Oblivious RAM. We show that, when only
hiding writes, it is possible to achieve ORAM with optimal O(1)
communication complexity and only poly-logarithmic user mem-
ory. This is a signiﬁcant improvement over existing work and an
independently interesting result. We go on to show that our write-
only ORAM is specially equipped to provide hidden volume func-
tionality with low overhead and signiﬁcantly increased security. Fi-
nally, we implement HIVE as a Linux kernel block device to show
both its practicality and usefulness on existing platforms.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Disk encryption is an important security technology that is in-
creasingly being used by individuals and businesses alike. All ma-
jor operating systems now support basic encrypted volume...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using Write-Only Oblivious RAM
author:Erik-Oliver Blass and
Travis Mayberry and
Guevara Noubir and
Kaan Onarlioglu
Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using
Write-Only Oblivious RAM
Erik-Oliver Blass Travis Mayberry Guevara Noubir Kaan Onarlioglu
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University, Boston MA
Email: {blass|travism|noubir|onarliog}@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
With sensitive data being increasingly stored on mobile devices and
laptops, hard disk encryption is more important than ever. In partic-
ular, being able to plausibly deny that a hard disk contains certain
information is a very useful and interesting research goal. However,
it has been known for some time that existing “hidden volume” so-
lutions, like TrueCrypt, fail in the face of an adversary who is able
to observe the contents of a disk on multiple, separate occasions.
In this work, we explore more robust constructions for hidden vol-
umes and present HIVE, which is resistant to more powerful ad-
versaries with multiple-snapshot capabilities. In pursuit of this, we
propose the ﬁrst security deﬁnitions for hidden volumes, and prove
HIVE secure under these deﬁnitions. At the core of HIVE, we de-
sign a new write-only Oblivious RAM. We show that, when only
hiding writes, it is possible to achieve ORAM with optimal O(1)
communication complexity and only poly-logarithmic user mem-
ory. This is a signiﬁcant improvement over existing work and an
independently interesting result. We go on to show that our write-
only ORAM is specially equipped to provide hidden volume func-
tionality with low overhead and signiﬁcantly increased security. Fi-
nally, we implement HIVE as a Linux kernel block device to show
both its practicality and usefulness on existing platforms.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Disk encryption is an important security technology that is in-
creasingly being used by individuals and businesses alike. All ma-
jor operating systems now support basic encrypted volume...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP
author:Ali Kalakech and
Karama Kanoun and
Yves Crouzet and
Jean Arlat
Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP*
Ali Kalakech, Karama Kanoun, Yves Crouzet and Jean Arlat
LAAS-CNRS, 7, Avenue Colonel Roche 31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France
{kalakech, kanoun, crouzet, arlat}@laas.fr
Abstract
The aim of this paper  is  to  compare the  dependability
of  three  operating  systems  (Windows  NT4,  Windows
2000  and  Windows  XP)  with  respect  to  erroneous
behavior  of  the  application  layer.  The  results  show  a
similar  behavior  of  the  three  OSs  with  respect  to
robustness  and  a  noticeable  difference  in  OS  reaction
and  restart  times.  They  also  show  that  the  application
state  (mainly  the  hang  and  abort  states)  significantly
impacts the restart time for the three OSs
1. Introduction
System  developers  are  increasingly  resorting  to  off-
the-shelf operating systems  (commercial or  open  source),
even  in  critical  application  domains.  However,  any
malfunction  of  the  Operating  System  (OS)  may  have  a
strong impact  on  the  dependability of  the  global  system.
Therefore, it  is  important  to  make information  about  the
OS  dependability  available,  despite
lack  of
information  issued  from  its  development.  The  current
trend is to use dependability benchmarks [1-3].
the
The  aim  of  an  OS  dependability  benchmark  is  to
objectively  characterize  the  OS  behavior  in  presence  of
faults.  A  dependability  benchmark
is  based  on
experimentation on  the OS.  Its  results  are  intended  i) to
characterize  qualitatively  and  quantitatively
the  OS
behavior  in  the  presence  of  faults  and  ii) to  evaluate
performance-related  measures  in  the  presence  of  faults.
These results  can help  in  selecting  the  most  appropriate
OS,  based  on  the  benchmark  measures  evaluated,  in
to
complement
(e.g., performance,
ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP
author:Ali Kalakech and
Karama Kanoun and
Yves Crouzet and
Jean Arlat
Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP*
Ali Kalakech, Karama Kanoun, Yves Crouzet and Jean Arlat
LAAS-CNRS, 7, Avenue Colonel Roche 31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France
{kalakech, kanoun, crouzet, arlat}@laas.fr
Abstract
The aim of this paper  is  to  compare the  dependability
of  three  operating  systems  (Windows  NT4,  Windows
2000  and  Windows  XP)  with  respect  to  erroneous
behavior  of  the  application  layer.  The  results  show  a
similar  behavior  of  the  three  OSs  with  respect  to
robustness  and  a  noticeable  difference  in  OS  reaction
and  restart  times.  They  also  show  that  the  application
state  (mainly  the  hang  and  abort  states)  significantly
impacts the restart time for the three OSs
1. Introduction
System  developers  are  increasingly  resorting  to  off-
the-shelf operating systems  (commercial or  open  source),
even  in  critical  application  domains.  However,  any
malfunction  of  the  Operating  System  (OS)  may  have  a
strong impact  on  the  dependability of  the  global  system.
Therefore, it  is  important  to  make information  about  the
OS  dependability  available,  despite
lack  of
information  issued  from  its  development.  The  current
trend is to use dependability benchmarks [1-3].
the
The  aim  of  an  OS  dependability  benchmark  is  to
objectively  characterize  the  OS  behavior  in  presence  of
faults.  A  dependability  benchmark
is  based  on
experimentation on  the OS.  Its  results  are  intended  i) to
characterize  qualitatively  and  quantitatively
the  OS
behavior  in  the  presence  of  faults  and  ii) to  evaluate
performance-related  measures  in  the  presence  of  faults.
These results  can help  in  selecting  the  most  appropriate
OS,  based  on  the  benchmark  measures  evaluated,  in
to
complement
(e.g., performance,
ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities
in Mobile Applications
author:Shangcheng Shi and
Xianbo Wang and
Wing Cheong Lau
MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for
Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities in Mobile Applications
Shangcheng Shi
Wing Cheong Lau
Xianbo Wang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
ss016@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wx017@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wclau@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
ABSTRACT
Mobile applications today increasingly integrate Single Sign-On
(SSO) into their account management mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the involved multi-party protocol, i.e., OAuth 2.0, was originally
designed to serve websites for authorization purpose. Due to the
complexity of the adapted protocol, a large number of insecure
SSO implementations still exist in the wild. Although the security
testing for real-world SSO deployments has attracted considerable
attention in recent years , existing work either focuses on websites
or relies on the manual discovery of specific and previously-known
vulnerabilities. In the paper, we design and implement MoSSOT
(Mobile SSO Tester), an automated blackbox security testing tool
for Android applications utilizing the SSO services from three main-
stream service providers. The tool detects the vulnerabilities within
the practical SSO implementations by fuzzing related network mes-
sages. We used MoSSOT to examine over 500 first-tier third-party
Android applications from US and Chinese app markets. According
to the test result, around 72% of the tested applications incorrectly
implement SSO and are thus vulnerable. Besides, our test identifies
an unknown vulnerability as well as a new variant, in addition to
four known ones. The vulnerabilities enable the attacker to illegally
log into the mobile applications as the victims or gain access to the
protected resources. MoSSOT has been released as an open-source
project.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and app...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities
in Mobile Applications
author:Shangcheng Shi and
Xianbo Wang and
Wing Cheong Lau
MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for
Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities in Mobile Applications
Shangcheng Shi
Wing Cheong Lau
Xianbo Wang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
ss016@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wx017@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wclau@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
ABSTRACT
Mobile applications today increasingly integrate Single Sign-On
(SSO) into their account management mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the involved multi-party protocol, i.e., OAuth 2.0, was originally
designed to serve websites for authorization purpose. Due to the
complexity of the adapted protocol, a large number of insecure
SSO implementations still exist in the wild. Although the security
testing for real-world SSO deployments has attracted considerable
attention in recent years , existing work either focuses on websites
or relies on the manual discovery of specific and previously-known
vulnerabilities. In the paper, we design and implement MoSSOT
(Mobile SSO Tester), an automated blackbox security testing tool
for Android applications utilizing the SSO services from three main-
stream service providers. The tool detects the vulnerabilities within
the practical SSO implementations by fuzzing related network mes-
sages. We used MoSSOT to examine over 500 first-tier third-party
Android applications from US and Chinese app markets. According
to the test result, around 72% of the tested applications incorrectly
implement SSO and are thus vulnerable. Besides, our test identifies
an unknown vulnerability as well as a new variant, in addition to
four known ones. The vulnerabilities enable the attacker to illegally
log into the mobile applications as the victims or gain access to the
protected resources. MoSSOT has been released as an open-source
project.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and app...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information
Leakage
author:Young-joo Shin and
Hyung Chan Kim and
Dokeun Kwon and
Ji-Hoon Jeong and
Junbeom Hur
Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of
Information Leakage
Youngjoo Shin
Kwangwoon University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
yjshin@kw.ac.kr
Hyung Chan Kim
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kimhc@nsr.re.kr
Dokeun Kwon
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kwondk@nsr.re.kr
Ji Hoon Jeong
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
binoopang@nsr.re.kr
ABSTRACT
Data prefetching is a hardware-based optimization mechanism used
in most of the modern microprocessors. It fetches data to the cache
before it is needed. In this paper, we present a novel microarchitec-
tural attack that exploits the prefetching mechanism. Our attack
targets Instruction pointer (IP)-based stride prefetching in Intel
processors. Stride prefetcher detects memory access patterns with
a regular stride, which are likely to be found in lookup table-based
cryptographic implementations. By monitoring the prefetching
activities near the lookup table, attackers can extract sensitive in-
formation such as secret keys from victim applications. This kind of
leakage from prefetching has never been considered in the design
of constant time algorithm to prevent side-channel attacks. We
show the potential of the proposed attack by applying it against
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm built upon the
latest version of OpenSSL library. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first microarchitectural side-channel attack exploiting
the hardware prefetching of modern microprocessors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
KEYWORDS
Hardware prefetching, microarchitectural side-channel attacks,
OpenSSL, ECDH algorithm
ACM Reference Format:
Youngjoo Shin, Hyung Chan Kim, Dokeun Kwon, Ji Hoon Jeong, and Jun-
beom Hur. 2...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information
Leakage
author:Young-joo Shin and
Hyung Chan Kim and
Dokeun Kwon and
Ji-Hoon Jeong and
Junbeom Hur
Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of
Information Leakage
Youngjoo Shin
Kwangwoon University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
yjshin@kw.ac.kr
Hyung Chan Kim
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kimhc@nsr.re.kr
Dokeun Kwon
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kwondk@nsr.re.kr
Ji Hoon Jeong
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
binoopang@nsr.re.kr
ABSTRACT
Data prefetching is a hardware-based optimization mechanism used
in most of the modern microprocessors. It fetches data to the cache
before it is needed. In this paper, we present a novel microarchitec-
tural attack that exploits the prefetching mechanism. Our attack
targets Instruction pointer (IP)-based stride prefetching in Intel
processors. Stride prefetcher detects memory access patterns with
a regular stride, which are likely to be found in lookup table-based
cryptographic implementations. By monitoring the prefetching
activities near the lookup table, attackers can extract sensitive in-
formation such as secret keys from victim applications. This kind of
leakage from prefetching has never been considered in the design
of constant time algorithm to prevent side-channel attacks. We
show the potential of the proposed attack by applying it against
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm built upon the
latest version of OpenSSL library. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first microarchitectural side-channel attack exploiting
the hardware prefetching of modern microprocessors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
KEYWORDS
Hardware prefetching, microarchitectural side-channel attacks,
OpenSSL, ECDH algorithm
ACM Reference Format:
Youngjoo Shin, Hyung Chan Kim, Dokeun Kwon, Ji Hoon Jeong, and Jun-
beom Hur. 2...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques Against Telephone
Spam
author:Huahong Tu and
Adam Doup'e and
Ziming Zhao and
Gail-Joon Ahn
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques against Telephone Spam
Huahong Tu, Adam Doupé, Ziming Zhao, and Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University
{tu, doupe, zzhao30, gahn}@asu.edu
Abstract—Telephone spam costs United States consumers
$8.6 billion annually. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission
has received over 22 million complaints of illegal and wanted
calls. Telephone spammers today are leveraging recent techni-
cal advances in the telephony ecosystem to distribute massive
automated spam calls known as robocalls. Given that anti-spam
techniques and approaches are effective in the email domain,
the question we address is: what are the effective defenses
against spam calls?
In this paper, we ﬁrst describe the telephone spam ecosys-
tem, speciﬁcally focusing on the differences between email
and telephone spam. Then, we survey the existing telephone
spam solutions and, by analyzing the failings of the current
techniques, derive evaluation criteria that are critical to an
acceptable solution. We believe that this work will help guide
the development of effective telephone spam defenses, as well
as provide a framework to evaluate future defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The national and global telephony system is a critical
component of our modern infrastructure and economy. In
the United States (US), the mobile telephone subscribership
penetration rate has already surpassed 100% [1]. According
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, each day more than
240 million hours are spent on telephone calls in the United
States, equating to more than 88 trillion hours each year [2].
However, with the pervasiveness of telephone service
subscribership, telephone spam has also become an increas-
ingly prevalent issue in the US. Recent te...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques Against Telephone
Spam
author:Huahong Tu and
Adam Doup'e and
Ziming Zhao and
Gail-Joon Ahn
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques against Telephone Spam
Huahong Tu, Adam Doupé, Ziming Zhao, and Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University
{tu, doupe, zzhao30, gahn}@asu.edu
Abstract—Telephone spam costs United States consumers
$8.6 billion annually. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission
has received over 22 million complaints of illegal and wanted
calls. Telephone spammers today are leveraging recent techni-
cal advances in the telephony ecosystem to distribute massive
automated spam calls known as robocalls. Given that anti-spam
techniques and approaches are effective in the email domain,
the question we address is: what are the effective defenses
against spam calls?
In this paper, we ﬁrst describe the telephone spam ecosys-
tem, speciﬁcally focusing on the differences between email
and telephone spam. Then, we survey the existing telephone
spam solutions and, by analyzing the failings of the current
techniques, derive evaluation criteria that are critical to an
acceptable solution. We believe that this work will help guide
the development of effective telephone spam defenses, as well
as provide a framework to evaluate future defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The national and global telephony system is a critical
component of our modern infrastructure and economy. In
the United States (US), the mobile telephone subscribership
penetration rate has already surpassed 100% [1]. According
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, each day more than
240 million hours are spent on telephone calls in the United
States, equating to more than 88 trillion hours each year [2].
However, with the pervasiveness of telephone service
subscribership, telephone spam has also become an increas-
ingly prevalent issue in the US. Recent te...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Design space and analysis of worm defense strategies
author:David Brumley and
Li-Hao Liu and
Pongsin Poosankam and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Design Space and Analysis of Worm Defense Strategies
David Brumley
Li-Hao Liu Pongsin Poosankam Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
{dbrumley,lhliu,ppoosank,dawnsong}@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
We give the ﬁrst systematic investigation of the design space
of worm defense system strategies. We accomplish this by
providing a taxonomy of defense strategies by abstracting
away implementation-dependent and approach-speciﬁc de-
tails and concentrating on the fundamental properties of
each defense category. Our taxonomy and analysis reveals
the key parameters for each strategy that determine its ef-
fectiveness. We provide a theoretical foundation for under-
standing how these parameters interact, as well as simulation-
based analysis of how these strategies compare as worm
defense systems. Finally, we oﬀer recommendations based
upon our taxonomy and analysis on which worm defense
strategies are most likely to succeed. In particular, we show
that a hybrid approach combining Proactive Protection and
Reactive Antibody Defense is the most promising approach
and can be eﬀective even against the fastest worms such as
hitlist worms. Thus, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate with
theoretic and empirical models which defense strategies will
work against the fastest worms such as hitlist worms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Se-
curity and Protection—Invasive software; I.6.6 [Simulation
and Modeling]: Simulation Output Analysis
General Terms
Security, Measurement
Keywords
worms, worm propagation, worm taxonomy, defense strat-
egy analysis, proactive protection, blacklisting, antibody, lo-
cal containment
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grant...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Design space and analysis of worm defense strategies
author:David Brumley and
Li-Hao Liu and
Pongsin Poosankam and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Design Space and Analysis of Worm Defense Strategies
David Brumley
Li-Hao Liu Pongsin Poosankam Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
{dbrumley,lhliu,ppoosank,dawnsong}@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
We give the ﬁrst systematic investigation of the design space
of worm defense system strategies. We accomplish this by
providing a taxonomy of defense strategies by abstracting
away implementation-dependent and approach-speciﬁc de-
tails and concentrating on the fundamental properties of
each defense category. Our taxonomy and analysis reveals
the key parameters for each strategy that determine its ef-
fectiveness. We provide a theoretical foundation for under-
standing how these parameters interact, as well as simulation-
based analysis of how these strategies compare as worm
defense systems. Finally, we oﬀer recommendations based
upon our taxonomy and analysis on which worm defense
strategies are most likely to succeed. In particular, we show
that a hybrid approach combining Proactive Protection and
Reactive Antibody Defense is the most promising approach
and can be eﬀective even against the fastest worms such as
hitlist worms. Thus, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate with
theoretic and empirical models which defense strategies will
work against the fastest worms such as hitlist worms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Se-
curity and Protection—Invasive software; I.6.6 [Simulation
and Modeling]: Simulation Output Analysis
General Terms
Security, Measurement
Keywords
worms, worm propagation, worm taxonomy, defense strat-
egy analysis, proactive protection, blacklisting, antibody, lo-
cal containment
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grant...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Learning Unknown Attacks - A Start
author:James E. Just and
James C. Reynolds and
Larry A. Clough and
Melissa Danforth and
Karl N. Levitt and
Ryan Maglich and
Jeff Rowe
Learning Unknown Attacks – A Start
James E. Just1, James C. Reynolds1, Larry A. Clough1, Melissa Danforth2,
Karl N. Levitt2, Ryan Maglich1, and Jeff Rowe2
1 Teknowledge Corporation, 3900 Jermantown Road,  Suite 100
Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
{jjust, reynolds, lclough, rmaglich}@teknowledge.com
2 University of California, 3061 Engineering II, One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616 USA
{danforth, levitt, rowe}@cs.ucdavis.edu
Abstract. Since it is essentially impossible to write large-scale software without
errors,  any  intrusion  tolerant  system  must  be  able  to  tolerate  rapid,  repeated
unknown  attacks  without  exhausting  its  redundancy.  Our  system  provides
continued application services to critical users while under attack with a goal of
less  than  25%  degradation  of  productivity.  Initial  experimental  results  are
promising.  It  is  not  yet  a  general  open  solution.  Specification-based  behavior
sensors (allowable actions, objects, and QoS) detect attacks. The system learns
unknown  attacks  by  relying  on  two  characteristics  of  network-accessible
software  faults:  attacks  that  exploit  them  must  be  repeatable  (at  least  in  a
probabilistic  sense)  and,  if  known,  attacks  can  be  stopped  at  component
boundaries.  Random  rejuvenation  limits  the  scope  of  undetected  errors.  The
current  system  learns  and  blocks  single-stage  unknown  attacks  against  a
protected web server by searching and testing service history logs in a Sandbox
after  a  successful  attack.  We  also  have  an
initial  class-based  attack
generalization technique that stops web-server buffer overflow attacks. We are
working to extend both techniques.
1   Introduction
Designing secure systems to survive cyber-attacks is both hard and complex. Initially
designers built stronge...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Learning Unknown Attacks - A Start
author:James E. Just and
James C. Reynolds and
Larry A. Clough and
Melissa Danforth and
Karl N. Levitt and
Ryan Maglich and
Jeff Rowe
Learning Unknown Attacks – A Start
James E. Just1, James C. Reynolds1, Larry A. Clough1, Melissa Danforth2,
Karl N. Levitt2, Ryan Maglich1, and Jeff Rowe2
1 Teknowledge Corporation, 3900 Jermantown Road,  Suite 100
Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
{jjust, reynolds, lclough, rmaglich}@teknowledge.com
2 University of California, 3061 Engineering II, One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616 USA
{danforth, levitt, rowe}@cs.ucdavis.edu
Abstract. Since it is essentially impossible to write large-scale software without
errors,  any  intrusion  tolerant  system  must  be  able  to  tolerate  rapid,  repeated
unknown  attacks  without  exhausting  its  redundancy.  Our  system  provides
continued application services to critical users while under attack with a goal of
less  than  25%  degradation  of  productivity.  Initial  experimental  results  are
promising.  It  is  not  yet  a  general  open  solution.  Specification-based  behavior
sensors (allowable actions, objects, and QoS) detect attacks. The system learns
unknown  attacks  by  relying  on  two  characteristics  of  network-accessible
software  faults:  attacks  that  exploit  them  must  be  repeatable  (at  least  in  a
probabilistic  sense)  and,  if  known,  attacks  can  be  stopped  at  component
boundaries.  Random  rejuvenation  limits  the  scope  of  undetected  errors.  The
current  system  learns  and  blocks  single-stage  unknown  attacks  against  a
protected web server by searching and testing service history logs in a Sandbox
after  a  successful  attack.  We  also  have  an
initial  class-based  attack
generalization technique that stops web-server buffer overflow attacks. We are
working to extend both techniques.
1   Introduction
Designing secure systems to survive cyber-attacks is both hard and complex. Initially
designers built stronge...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:VulPecker: an automated vulnerability detection system based on code
similarity analysis
author:Zhen Li and
Deqing Zou and
Shouhuai Xu and
Hai Jin and
Hanchao Qi and
Jie Hu
VulPecker: An Automated Vulnerability Detection System
Based on Code Similarity Analysis
Zhen Li†§, Deqing Zou†∗ , Shouhuai Xu‡, Hai Jin†, Hanchao Qi†, Jie Hu†
† Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Big Data Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid
Computing Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
§School of Computer Science and Technology, Hebei University, Baoding, 071002, China
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA
deqingzou@hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Software vulnerabilities are the fundamental cause of many
attacks. Even with rapid vulnerability patching, the prob-
lem is more complicated than it looks. One reason is that
instances of the same vulnerability may exist in multiple
software copies that are diﬃcult to track in real life (e.g.,
diﬀerent versions of libraries and applications). This calls
for tools that can automatically search for vulnerable soft-
ware with respect to a given vulnerability. In this paper, we
move a step forward in this direction by presenting Vulnera-
bility Pecker (VulPecker), a system for automatically detect-
ing whether a piece of software source code contains a given
vulnerability or not. The key insight underlying VulPecker
is to leverage (i) a set of features that we deﬁne to charac-
terize patches, and (ii) code-similarity algorithms that have
been proposed for various purposes, while noting that no
single code-similarity algorithm is eﬀective for all kinds of
vulnerabilities. Experiments show that VulPecker detects 40
vulnerabilities that are not published in the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD). Among these vulnerabilities, 18 are
not known for their existence and have yet to be conﬁrmed
by vendors at t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:VulPecker: an automated vulnerability detection system based on code
similarity analysis
author:Zhen Li and
Deqing Zou and
Shouhuai Xu and
Hai Jin and
Hanchao Qi and
Jie Hu
VulPecker: An Automated Vulnerability Detection System
Based on Code Similarity Analysis
Zhen Li†§, Deqing Zou†∗ , Shouhuai Xu‡, Hai Jin†, Hanchao Qi†, Jie Hu†
† Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Big Data Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid
Computing Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
§School of Computer Science and Technology, Hebei University, Baoding, 071002, China
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA
deqingzou@hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Software vulnerabilities are the fundamental cause of many
attacks. Even with rapid vulnerability patching, the prob-
lem is more complicated than it looks. One reason is that
instances of the same vulnerability may exist in multiple
software copies that are diﬃcult to track in real life (e.g.,
diﬀerent versions of libraries and applications). This calls
for tools that can automatically search for vulnerable soft-
ware with respect to a given vulnerability. In this paper, we
move a step forward in this direction by presenting Vulnera-
bility Pecker (VulPecker), a system for automatically detect-
ing whether a piece of software source code contains a given
vulnerability or not. The key insight underlying VulPecker
is to leverage (i) a set of features that we deﬁne to charac-
terize patches, and (ii) code-similarity algorithms that have
been proposed for various purposes, while noting that no
single code-similarity algorithm is eﬀective for all kinds of
vulnerabilities. Experiments show that VulPecker detects 40
vulnerabilities that are not published in the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD). Among these vulnerabilities, 18 are
not known for their existence and have yet to be conﬁrmed
by vendors at t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
author:Maximilian von Tschirschnitz and
Ludwig Peuckert and
Fabian Franzen and
Jens Grossklags
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
Maximilian von Tschirschnitz, Ludwig Peuckert, Fabian Franzen, and Jens Grossklags
Email: {maximilian.tschirschnitz,ludwig.peuckert}@tum.de, franzen@sec.in.tum.de, jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
Technical University of Munich
3
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S
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9
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I
1
2
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1
3
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2
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5
-
4
3
9
8
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1
8
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8
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Abstract—Bluetooth provides encryption, authentication, and
integrity protection of its connections. These protection mech-
anisms require that Bluetooth devices initially establish trust
on ﬁrst use through a process called pairing. Throughout this
process, multiple alternative pairing methods are supported.
In this paper, we describe a design ﬂaw in the pairing mech-
anism of Bluetooth. This ﬂaw permits two devices to perform
pairing using differing methods. While successfully interacting
with each other, the devices are not aware of the Method
Confusion. We explain how an attacker can cause and abuse
this Method Confusion to mount a Method Confusion Attack. In
contrast to other attacks targeting the pairing method, our attack
applies even in Bluetooth’s highest security mode and cannot be
mitigated in the protocol. Through the Method Confusion Attack,
an adversary can inﬁltrate the secured connection between the
victims and intercept all trafﬁc.
Our attack is successful in practically relevant scenarios. We
implemented it as an end-to-end Proof of Concept for Bluetooth
Low Energy and tested it with off-the-shelf smartphones, a
smartwatch and a banking device. Furthermore, we performed a
user study where none of the 40 participants noticed the ongoing
attack, and 37 (92.5%) of the users completed t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
author:Maximilian von Tschirschnitz and
Ludwig Peuckert and
Fabian Franzen and
Jens Grossklags
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
Maximilian von Tschirschnitz, Ludwig Peuckert, Fabian Franzen, and Jens Grossklags
Email: {maximilian.tschirschnitz,ludwig.peuckert}@tum.de, franzen@sec.in.tum.de, jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
Technical University of Munich
3
1
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
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|
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I
1
2
0
2
©
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1
3
$
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1
2
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5
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4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
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P
S
(
y
c
a
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1
2
0
2
Abstract—Bluetooth provides encryption, authentication, and
integrity protection of its connections. These protection mech-
anisms require that Bluetooth devices initially establish trust
on ﬁrst use through a process called pairing. Throughout this
process, multiple alternative pairing methods are supported.
In this paper, we describe a design ﬂaw in the pairing mech-
anism of Bluetooth. This ﬂaw permits two devices to perform
pairing using differing methods. While successfully interacting
with each other, the devices are not aware of the Method
Confusion. We explain how an attacker can cause and abuse
this Method Confusion to mount a Method Confusion Attack. In
contrast to other attacks targeting the pairing method, our attack
applies even in Bluetooth’s highest security mode and cannot be
mitigated in the protocol. Through the Method Confusion Attack,
an adversary can inﬁltrate the secured connection between the
victims and intercept all trafﬁc.
Our attack is successful in practically relevant scenarios. We
implemented it as an end-to-end Proof of Concept for Bluetooth
Low Energy and tested it with off-the-shelf smartphones, a
smartwatch and a banking device. Furthermore, we performed a
user study where none of the 40 participants noticed the ongoing
attack, and 37 (92.5%) of the users completed t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn into Adversarial Motion
Sensors
author:Yanzi Zhu and
Zhujun Xiao and
Yuxin Chen and
Zhijing Li and
Max Liu and
Ben Y. Zhao and
Heather Zheng
Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn
into Adversarial Motion Sensors
Yanzi Zhu†, Zhujun Xiao∗, Yuxin Chen∗, Zhijing Li†, Max Liu∗, Ben Y. Zhao∗, Haitao Zheng∗
†University of California, Santa Barbara: {yanzi, zhijing}@cs.ucsb.edu
∗University of Chicago: {zhujunxiao, yxchen, maxliu, ravenben, htzheng}@cs.uchicago.edu
Abstract—Our work demonstrates a new set of silent recon-
naissance attacks, which leverages the presence of commodity
WiFi devices to track users inside private homes and ofﬁces,
without compromising any WiFi network, data packets, or
devices. We show that just by snifﬁng existing WiFi signals, an
adversary can accurately detect and track movements of users
inside a building. This is made possible by our new signal model
that links together human motion near WiFi transmitters and
variance of multipath signal propagation seen by the attacker
sniffer outside of the property. The resulting attacks are cheap,
highly effective, and yet difﬁcult to detect. We implement the
attack using a single commodity smartphone, deploy it in 11 real-
world ofﬁces and residential apartments, and show it is highly
effective. Finally, we evaluate potential defenses, and propose a
practical and effective defense based on AP signal obfuscation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
With near-ubiquitous deployment of WiFi-enabled smart
devices (e.g., security cameras, voice assistants, and smart
appliances), our homes and ofﬁces are ﬁlled with many WiFi
devices1. The ubiquity of these devices and their sheer density
means that they will ﬁll the air around us with radio frequency
(RF) signals, wherever we go.
Unfortunately, the RF signals emitted by these devices pose
a real security and privacy risk to all of us. They are constantly
interacting with (e.g., reﬂecting off) our bodies, carrying infor-
ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn into Adversarial Motion
Sensors
author:Yanzi Zhu and
Zhujun Xiao and
Yuxin Chen and
Zhijing Li and
Max Liu and
Ben Y. Zhao and
Heather Zheng
Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn
into Adversarial Motion Sensors
Yanzi Zhu†, Zhujun Xiao∗, Yuxin Chen∗, Zhijing Li†, Max Liu∗, Ben Y. Zhao∗, Haitao Zheng∗
†University of California, Santa Barbara: {yanzi, zhijing}@cs.ucsb.edu
∗University of Chicago: {zhujunxiao, yxchen, maxliu, ravenben, htzheng}@cs.uchicago.edu
Abstract—Our work demonstrates a new set of silent recon-
naissance attacks, which leverages the presence of commodity
WiFi devices to track users inside private homes and ofﬁces,
without compromising any WiFi network, data packets, or
devices. We show that just by snifﬁng existing WiFi signals, an
adversary can accurately detect and track movements of users
inside a building. This is made possible by our new signal model
that links together human motion near WiFi transmitters and
variance of multipath signal propagation seen by the attacker
sniffer outside of the property. The resulting attacks are cheap,
highly effective, and yet difﬁcult to detect. We implement the
attack using a single commodity smartphone, deploy it in 11 real-
world ofﬁces and residential apartments, and show it is highly
effective. Finally, we evaluate potential defenses, and propose a
practical and effective defense based on AP signal obfuscation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
With near-ubiquitous deployment of WiFi-enabled smart
devices (e.g., security cameras, voice assistants, and smart
appliances), our homes and ofﬁces are ﬁlled with many WiFi
devices1. The ubiquity of these devices and their sheer density
means that they will ﬁll the air around us with radio frequency
(RF) signals, wherever we go.
Unfortunately, the RF signals emitted by these devices pose
a real security and privacy risk to all of us. They are constantly
interacting with (e.g., reﬂecting off) our bodies, carrying infor-
ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static Use-After-Free
Detection
author:Hua Yan and
Yulei Sui and
Shiping Chen and
Jingling Xue
Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static
Use-After-Free Detection
Hua Yan
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
Data61, CSIRO, Australia
Yulei Sui
CAI and School of Software
University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Shiping Chen
Data61
CSIRO, Australia
Jingling Xue
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
ABSTRACT
Typestate analysis relies on pointer analysis for detecting temporal
memory safety errors, such as use-after-free (UAF). For large pro-
grams, scalable pointer analysis is usually imprecise in analyzing
their hard “corner cases”, such as infeasible paths, recursion cycles,
loops, arrays, and linked lists. Due to a sound over-approximation
of the points-to information, a large number of spurious aliases
will be reported conservatively, causing the corresponding type-
state analysis to report a large number of false alarms. Thus, the
usefulness of typestate analysis for heap-intensive clients, like UAF
detection, becomes rather limited, in practice.
We introduce Tac, a static UAF detector that bridges the gap
between typestate and pointer analyses by machine learning. Tac
learns the correlations between program features and UAF-related
aliases by using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and applies this
knowledge to further disambiguate the UAF-related aliases reported
imprecisely by the pointer analysis so that only the ones validated
by its SVM classifier are further investigated by the typestate anal-
ysis. Despite its unsoundness, Tac represents a practical typestate
analysis approach for UAF detection. We have implemented Tac
in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated it using a set of eight open-source
C/C++ programs. The results show that Tac is effective (in terms of
finding 5 known CVE vulnerabilities, 1 known bug, and 8 ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static Use-After-Free
Detection
author:Hua Yan and
Yulei Sui and
Shiping Chen and
Jingling Xue
Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static
Use-After-Free Detection
Hua Yan
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
Data61, CSIRO, Australia
Yulei Sui
CAI and School of Software
University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Shiping Chen
Data61
CSIRO, Australia
Jingling Xue
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
ABSTRACT
Typestate analysis relies on pointer analysis for detecting temporal
memory safety errors, such as use-after-free (UAF). For large pro-
grams, scalable pointer analysis is usually imprecise in analyzing
their hard “corner cases”, such as infeasible paths, recursion cycles,
loops, arrays, and linked lists. Due to a sound over-approximation
of the points-to information, a large number of spurious aliases
will be reported conservatively, causing the corresponding type-
state analysis to report a large number of false alarms. Thus, the
usefulness of typestate analysis for heap-intensive clients, like UAF
detection, becomes rather limited, in practice.
We introduce Tac, a static UAF detector that bridges the gap
between typestate and pointer analyses by machine learning. Tac
learns the correlations between program features and UAF-related
aliases by using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and applies this
knowledge to further disambiguate the UAF-related aliases reported
imprecisely by the pointer analysis so that only the ones validated
by its SVM classifier are further investigated by the typestate anal-
ysis. Despite its unsoundness, Tac represents a practical typestate
analysis approach for UAF detection. We have implemented Tac
in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated it using a set of eight open-source
C/C++ programs. The results show that Tac is effective (in terms of
finding 5 known CVE vulnerabilities, 1 known bug, and 8 ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SybilInfer: Detecting Sybil Nodes using Social Networks
author:George Danezis and
Prateek Mittal
SybilInfer: Detecting Sybil Nodes using Social Networks
George Danezis
Microsoft Research,
Cambridge, UK.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Prateek Mittal
Illinois, USA.
gdane@microsoft.com
mittal2@uiuc.edu
Abstract
SybilInfer is an algorithm for labelling nodes in a so-
cial network as honest users or Sybils controlled by an
adversary. At the heart of SybilInfer lies a probabilis-
tic model of honest social networks, and an inference
engine that returns potential regions of dishonest nodes.
The Bayesian inference approach to Sybil detection comes
with the advantage label has an assigned probability, indi-
cating its degree of certainty. We prove through analytical
results as well as experiments on simulated and real-world
network topologies that, given standard constraints on the
adversary, SybilInfer is secure, in that it successfully dis-
tinguishes between honest and dishonest nodes and is not
susceptible to manipulation by the adversary. Further-
more, our results show that SybilInfer outperforms state
of the art algorithms, both in being more widely applica-
ble, as well as providing vastly more accurate results.
1
Introduction
The Peer-to-peer paradigm allows cooperating users to
enjoy a service with little or no need for any centralised
infrastructure. While communication [24] and storage [4]
systems employing this design philosophy have been pro-
posed, the lack of any centralised control over identities
opens such systems to Sybil attacks [8]: a few malicious
nodes can simulate the presence of a very large number
of nodes, to take over or disrupt key functions of the
distributed or peer-to-peer system. Any attempt to build
fault-tolerance mechanisms is doomed since adversaries
can control arbitrary fractions of the system nodes. This
Sybil attack is further made practical through the use of
the existing large number of compromised networked ma-
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point Attacks on Differential
Privacy Systems
author:Jiankai Jin and
Eleanor McMurtry and
Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein and
Olga Ohrimenko
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point
Attacks on Differential Privacy Systems
Jiankai Jin∗, Eleanor McMurtry†‡, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein∗, Olga Ohrimenko∗
∗School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne
†Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich
2
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Abstract—Differential privacy is a de facto privacy framework
that has seen adoption in practice via a number of mature
software platforms. Implementation of differentially private (DP)
mechanisms has to be done carefully to ensure end-to-end
security guarantees. In this paper we study two implementation
ﬂaws in the noise generation commonly used in DP systems. First
we examine the Gaussian mechanism’s susceptibility to a ﬂoating-
point representation attack. The premise of this ﬁrst vulnerability
is similar to the one carried out by Mironov in 2011 against the
Laplace mechanism. Our experiments show the attack’s success
against DP algorithms, including deep learning models trained
using differentially-private stochastic gradient descent.
In the second part of the paper we study discrete counterparts
of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that were previously
proposed to alleviate the shortcomings of ﬂoating-point repre-
sentation of real numbers. We show that such implementations
unfortunately suffer from another side channel: a novel timing
attack. An observer that can measure the time to draw (discrete)
Laplace or Gaussian noise can predict the noise magnitude,
which can then be used to recover sensitive attributes. This
attack invalidates differe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point Attacks on Differential
Privacy Systems
author:Jiankai Jin and
Eleanor McMurtry and
Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein and
Olga Ohrimenko
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point
Attacks on Differential Privacy Systems
Jiankai Jin∗, Eleanor McMurtry†‡, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein∗, Olga Ohrimenko∗
∗School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne
†Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich
2
7
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
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|
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E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
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P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
Abstract—Differential privacy is a de facto privacy framework
that has seen adoption in practice via a number of mature
software platforms. Implementation of differentially private (DP)
mechanisms has to be done carefully to ensure end-to-end
security guarantees. In this paper we study two implementation
ﬂaws in the noise generation commonly used in DP systems. First
we examine the Gaussian mechanism’s susceptibility to a ﬂoating-
point representation attack. The premise of this ﬁrst vulnerability
is similar to the one carried out by Mironov in 2011 against the
Laplace mechanism. Our experiments show the attack’s success
against DP algorithms, including deep learning models trained
using differentially-private stochastic gradient descent.
In the second part of the paper we study discrete counterparts
of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that were previously
proposed to alleviate the shortcomings of ﬂoating-point repre-
sentation of real numbers. We show that such implementations
unfortunately suffer from another side channel: a novel timing
attack. An observer that can measure the time to draw (discrete)
Laplace or Gaussian noise can predict the noise magnitude,
which can then be used to recover sensitive attributes. This
attack invalidates differe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Source flow: handling millions of flows on flow-based nodes
author:Yasunobu Chiba and
Yusuke Shinohara and
Hideyuki Shimonishi
Source Flow: Handling Millions of Flows
on Flow-based Nodes
Yasunobu Chiba, Yusuke Shinohara and Hideyuki Shimonishi
System Platforms Research Laboratories, NEC Corporation
1753 Shimonumabe, Nakahara, Kawasaki, 211-8666, Japan
{y-chiba@bq, y-shinohara@cb, h-shimonishi@cd}.jp.nec.com
ABSTRACT
Flow-based  networks  such  as  OpenFlow-based  networks
have difficulty handling a large  number  of  flows  in  a  node
due to the capacity limitation of search engine devices such
as ternary content-addressable memory (TCAM). One typical
solution  of  this  problem  would  be  to  use  MPLS-like
tunneling, but this approach spoils the advantage of flow-by-
flow  path  selection  for
load-balancing  or  QoS.  We
demonstrate a method named “Source Flow” that allows us to
handle  a  huge  amount  of  flows  without  changing  the
granularity  of  flows.  By  using  our  method,  expensive  and
power  consuming  search  engine  devices  can  be  removed
from  the  core  nodes,  and  the  network  can  grow  pretty
scalable.  In  our  demo,  we  construct  a  small  network  that
consists  of  small  number  of  OpenFlow  switches,  a  single
OpenFlow controller, and end-hosts. The hosts generate more
than  one  million  flows  simultaneously  and  the  flows  are
controlled on a per-flow-basis. All active flows are monitored
and  visualized  on  a  user  interface  and  the  user  interface
allows  audiences  to  confirm  if  our  method  is  feasible  and
deployable.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design C.2.6 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Performance
1.  INTRODUCTION
Flow-based networks allow us to control traffic on a per-flow
basis.  In  flow-based  networks,  a  network ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Source flow: handling millions of flows on flow-based nodes
author:Yasunobu Chiba and
Yusuke Shinohara and
Hideyuki Shimonishi
Source Flow: Handling Millions of Flows
on Flow-based Nodes
Yasunobu Chiba, Yusuke Shinohara and Hideyuki Shimonishi
System Platforms Research Laboratories, NEC Corporation
1753 Shimonumabe, Nakahara, Kawasaki, 211-8666, Japan
{y-chiba@bq, y-shinohara@cb, h-shimonishi@cd}.jp.nec.com
ABSTRACT
Flow-based  networks  such  as  OpenFlow-based  networks
have difficulty handling a large  number  of  flows  in  a  node
due to the capacity limitation of search engine devices such
as ternary content-addressable memory (TCAM). One typical
solution  of  this  problem  would  be  to  use  MPLS-like
tunneling, but this approach spoils the advantage of flow-by-
flow  path  selection  for
load-balancing  or  QoS.  We
demonstrate a method named “Source Flow” that allows us to
handle  a  huge  amount  of  flows  without  changing  the
granularity  of  flows.  By  using  our  method,  expensive  and
power  consuming  search  engine  devices  can  be  removed
from  the  core  nodes,  and  the  network  can  grow  pretty
scalable.  In  our  demo,  we  construct  a  small  network  that
consists  of  small  number  of  OpenFlow  switches,  a  single
OpenFlow controller, and end-hosts. The hosts generate more
than  one  million  flows  simultaneously  and  the  flows  are
controlled on a per-flow-basis. All active flows are monitored
and  visualized  on  a  user  interface  and  the  user  interface
allows  audiences  to  confirm  if  our  method  is  feasible  and
deployable.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design C.2.6 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Performance
1.  INTRODUCTION
Flow-based networks allow us to control traffic on a per-flow
basis.  In  flow-based  networks,  a  network ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:NeXUS: Practical and Secure Access Control on Untrusted Storage Platforms
using Client-Side SGX
author:Judicael Briand Djoko and
Jack Lange and
Adam J. Lee
NEXUS: Practical and Secure Access Control on
Untrusted Storage Platforms using Client-side SGX
Judicael B. Djoko
University of Pittsburgh
jbriand@cs.pitt.edu
Jack Lange
University of Pittsburgh
jacklange@cs.pitt.edu
Adam J. Lee
University of Pittsburgh
adamlee@cs.pitt.edu
Abstract—With the rising popularity of ﬁle-sharing services
such as Google Drive and Dropbox in the workﬂows of individuals
and corporations alike, the protection of client-outsourced data
from unauthorized access or tampering remains a major secu-
rity concern. Existing cryptographic solutions to this problem
typically require server-side support,
involve non-trivial key
management on the part of users, and suffer from severe re-
encryption penalties upon access revocations. This combination
of performance overheads and management burdens makes this
class of solutions undesirable in situations where performant,
platform-agnostic, dynamic sharing of user content is required.
We present NEXUS, a stackable ﬁlesystem that leverages
trusted hardware to provide conﬁdentiality and integrity for user
ﬁles stored on untrusted platforms. NEXUS is explicitly designed
to balance security, portability, and performance: it supports
dynamic sharing of protected volumes on any platform exposing
a ﬁle access API without requiring server-side support, enables
the use of ﬁne-grained access control policies to allow for selective
sharing, and avoids the key revocation and ﬁle re-encryption
overheads associated with other cryptographic approaches to
access control. This combination of features is made possible
by the use of a client-side Intel SGX enclave that is used to
protect and share NEXUS volumes, ensuring that cryptographic
keys never leave enclave memory and obviating the need to re-
encrypt ﬁles upon revocation of access rights. We implemented
a NEX...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:NeXUS: Practical and Secure Access Control on Untrusted Storage Platforms
using Client-Side SGX
author:Judicael Briand Djoko and
Jack Lange and
Adam J. Lee
NEXUS: Practical and Secure Access Control on
Untrusted Storage Platforms using Client-side SGX
Judicael B. Djoko
University of Pittsburgh
jbriand@cs.pitt.edu
Jack Lange
University of Pittsburgh
jacklange@cs.pitt.edu
Adam J. Lee
University of Pittsburgh
adamlee@cs.pitt.edu
Abstract—With the rising popularity of ﬁle-sharing services
such as Google Drive and Dropbox in the workﬂows of individuals
and corporations alike, the protection of client-outsourced data
from unauthorized access or tampering remains a major secu-
rity concern. Existing cryptographic solutions to this problem
typically require server-side support,
involve non-trivial key
management on the part of users, and suffer from severe re-
encryption penalties upon access revocations. This combination
of performance overheads and management burdens makes this
class of solutions undesirable in situations where performant,
platform-agnostic, dynamic sharing of user content is required.
We present NEXUS, a stackable ﬁlesystem that leverages
trusted hardware to provide conﬁdentiality and integrity for user
ﬁles stored on untrusted platforms. NEXUS is explicitly designed
to balance security, portability, and performance: it supports
dynamic sharing of protected volumes on any platform exposing
a ﬁle access API without requiring server-side support, enables
the use of ﬁne-grained access control policies to allow for selective
sharing, and avoids the key revocation and ﬁle re-encryption
overheads associated with other cryptographic approaches to
access control. This combination of features is made possible
by the use of a client-side Intel SGX enclave that is used to
protect and share NEXUS volumes, ensuring that cryptographic
keys never leave enclave memory and obviating the need to re-
encrypt ﬁles upon revocation of access rights. We implemented
a NEX...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SmartWalk: Enhancing Social Network Security via Adaptive Random Walks
author:Yushan Liu and
Shouling Ji and
Prateek Mittal
SmartWalk: Enhancing Social Network Security via
Adaptive Random Walks
Yushan Liu
Princeton University
yushan@princeton.edu
Shouling Ji
Zhejiang University / Georgia
Tech
sji@gatech.edu
Prateek Mittal
Princeton University
pmittal@princeton.edu
ABSTRACT
Random walks form a critical foundation in many social net-
work based security systems and applications. Currently,
the design of such social security mechanisms is limited to
the classical paradigm of using ﬁxed-length random walks
for all nodes on a social graph. However, the ﬁxed-length
walk paradigm induces a poor trade-oﬀ between security and
other desirable properties.
In this paper, we propose SmartWalk, a security enhanc-
ing system which incorporates adaptive random walks in so-
cial network security applications. We utilize a set of su-
pervised machine learning techniques to predict the neces-
sary random walk length based on the structural charac-
teristics of a social graph. Using experiments on multiple
real world topologies, we show that the desired walk length
starting from a speciﬁc node can be well predicted given the
local features of the node, and limited knowledge for a small
set of training nodes. We describe node-adaptive and path-
adaptive random walk usage models, where the walk length
adaptively changes based on the starting node and the inter-
mediate nodes on the path, respectively. We experimentally
demonstrate the applicability of adaptive random walks on
a number of social network based security and privacy sys-
tems, including Sybil defenses, anonymous communication
and link privacy preserving systems, and show up to two
orders of magnitude improvement in performance.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Random walks in security applications. Nowadays,
many applications leverage the trust relationships in social
networks to improve their system security and privacy, such
as Sybi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SmartWalk: Enhancing Social Network Security via Adaptive Random Walks
author:Yushan Liu and
Shouling Ji and
Prateek Mittal
SmartWalk: Enhancing Social Network Security via
Adaptive Random Walks
Yushan Liu
Princeton University
yushan@princeton.edu
Shouling Ji
Zhejiang University / Georgia
Tech
sji@gatech.edu
Prateek Mittal
Princeton University
pmittal@princeton.edu
ABSTRACT
Random walks form a critical foundation in many social net-
work based security systems and applications. Currently,
the design of such social security mechanisms is limited to
the classical paradigm of using ﬁxed-length random walks
for all nodes on a social graph. However, the ﬁxed-length
walk paradigm induces a poor trade-oﬀ between security and
other desirable properties.
In this paper, we propose SmartWalk, a security enhanc-
ing system which incorporates adaptive random walks in so-
cial network security applications. We utilize a set of su-
pervised machine learning techniques to predict the neces-
sary random walk length based on the structural charac-
teristics of a social graph. Using experiments on multiple
real world topologies, we show that the desired walk length
starting from a speciﬁc node can be well predicted given the
local features of the node, and limited knowledge for a small
set of training nodes. We describe node-adaptive and path-
adaptive random walk usage models, where the walk length
adaptively changes based on the starting node and the inter-
mediate nodes on the path, respectively. We experimentally
demonstrate the applicability of adaptive random walks on
a number of social network based security and privacy sys-
tems, including Sybil defenses, anonymous communication
and link privacy preserving systems, and show up to two
orders of magnitude improvement in performance.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Random walks in security applications. Nowadays,
many applications leverage the trust relationships in social
networks to improve their system security and privacy, such
as Sybi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
author:Sudhakar Govindavajhala and
Andrew W. Appel
Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
Sudhakar Govindavajhala
Andrew W. Appel
Princeton University
fsudhakar,appelg@cs.princeton.edu
Abstract
We present an experimental study showing that soft
memory errors can lead to serious security vulnerabilities
in Java and .NET virtual machines, or in any system that
relies on type-checking of untrusted programs as a protec-
tion mechanism. Our attack works by sending to the JVM
a Java program that is designed so that almost any mem-
ory error in its address space will allow it to take control
of the JVM. All conventional Java and .NET virtual ma-
chines are vulnerable to this attack. The technique of the
attack is broadly applicable against other language-based
security schemes such as proof-carrying code.
We measured the attack on two commercial Java Vir-
tual Machines: Sun’s and IBM’s. We show that a single-
bit error in the Java program’s data space can be ex-
ploited to execute arbitrary code with a probability of
about 70%, and multiple-bit errors with a lower proba-
bility.
Our attack is particularly relevant against smart cards
or tamper-resistant computers, where the user has phys-
ical access (to the outside of the computer) and can use
various means to induce faults; we have successfully used
heat. Fortunately, there are some straightforward de-
fenses against this attack.
1 Introduction
Almost any secure computer system needs basic pro-
tection mechanisms that isolate trusted components (such
as the implementation and enforcement of security poli-
cies) from the less trusted components.
In many sys-
tems, the basic protection mechanism is hardware virtual
memory managed by operating system software. In the
This research was supported in part by DARPA award F30602-99-
1-0519.
Java Virtual Machine (and in the similar Microsoft .NET
virtual machine), the basic protection mechanism is type
checking, do...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
author:Sudhakar Govindavajhala and
Andrew W. Appel
Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
Sudhakar Govindavajhala
Andrew W. Appel
Princeton University
fsudhakar,appelg@cs.princeton.edu
Abstract
We present an experimental study showing that soft
memory errors can lead to serious security vulnerabilities
in Java and .NET virtual machines, or in any system that
relies on type-checking of untrusted programs as a protec-
tion mechanism. Our attack works by sending to the JVM
a Java program that is designed so that almost any mem-
ory error in its address space will allow it to take control
of the JVM. All conventional Java and .NET virtual ma-
chines are vulnerable to this attack. The technique of the
attack is broadly applicable against other language-based
security schemes such as proof-carrying code.
We measured the attack on two commercial Java Vir-
tual Machines: Sun’s and IBM’s. We show that a single-
bit error in the Java program’s data space can be ex-
ploited to execute arbitrary code with a probability of
about 70%, and multiple-bit errors with a lower proba-
bility.
Our attack is particularly relevant against smart cards
or tamper-resistant computers, where the user has phys-
ical access (to the outside of the computer) and can use
various means to induce faults; we have successfully used
heat. Fortunately, there are some straightforward de-
fenses against this attack.
1 Introduction
Almost any secure computer system needs basic pro-
tection mechanisms that isolate trusted components (such
as the implementation and enforcement of security poli-
cies) from the less trusted components.
In many sys-
tems, the basic protection mechanism is hardware virtual
memory managed by operating system software. In the
This research was supported in part by DARPA award F30602-99-
1-0519.
Java Virtual Machine (and in the similar Microsoft .NET
virtual machine), the basic protection mechanism is type
checking, do...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:To Catch a Predator: A Natural Language Approach for Eliciting Malicious
Payloads
author:Sam Small and
Joshua Mason and
Fabian Monrose and
Niels Provos and
Adam Stubblefield
A Natural Language Approach for Eliciting Malicious Payloads
To Catch a Predator:
Sam Small
Johns Hopkins University
Joshua Mason
Johns Hopkins University
Fabian Monrose
Johns Hopkins University
Niels Provos
Google Inc.
Adam Stubbleﬁeld
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
We present an automated, scalable, method for craft-
ing dynamic responses to real-time network requests.
Speciﬁcally, we provide a ﬂexible technique based on
natural language processing and string alignment tech-
niques for intelligently interacting with protocols trained
directly from raw network trafﬁc. We demonstrate the
utility of our approach by creating a low-interaction web-
based honeypot capable of luring attacks from search
worms targeting hundreds of different web applications.
In just over two months, we witnessed over 368, 000
attacks from more than 5, 600 botnets targeting several
hundred distinct webapps. The observed attacks included
several exploits detected the same day the vulnerabilities
were publicly disclosed. Our analysis of the payloads of
these attacks reveals the state of the art in search-worm
based botnets, packed with surprisingly modular and di-
verse functionality.
1
Introduction
Automated network attacks by malware pose a signif-
icant threat to the security of the Internet. Nowadays,
web servers are quickly becoming a popular target for
exploitation, primarily because once compromised, they
open new avenues for infecting vulnerable clients that
subsequently visit these sites. Moreover, because web
servers are generally hosted on machines with signiﬁ-
cant system resources and network connectivity, they can
serve as reliable platforms for hosting malware (particu-
larly in the case of server farms), and as such, are entic-
ing targets for attackers [25]. Indeed, lately we have wit-
nessed a ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:To Catch a Predator: A Natural Language Approach for Eliciting Malicious
Payloads
author:Sam Small and
Joshua Mason and
Fabian Monrose and
Niels Provos and
Adam Stubblefield
A Natural Language Approach for Eliciting Malicious Payloads
To Catch a Predator:
Sam Small
Johns Hopkins University
Joshua Mason
Johns Hopkins University
Fabian Monrose
Johns Hopkins University
Niels Provos
Google Inc.
Adam Stubbleﬁeld
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
We present an automated, scalable, method for craft-
ing dynamic responses to real-time network requests.
Speciﬁcally, we provide a ﬂexible technique based on
natural language processing and string alignment tech-
niques for intelligently interacting with protocols trained
directly from raw network trafﬁc. We demonstrate the
utility of our approach by creating a low-interaction web-
based honeypot capable of luring attacks from search
worms targeting hundreds of different web applications.
In just over two months, we witnessed over 368, 000
attacks from more than 5, 600 botnets targeting several
hundred distinct webapps. The observed attacks included
several exploits detected the same day the vulnerabilities
were publicly disclosed. Our analysis of the payloads of
these attacks reveals the state of the art in search-worm
based botnets, packed with surprisingly modular and di-
verse functionality.
1
Introduction
Automated network attacks by malware pose a signif-
icant threat to the security of the Internet. Nowadays,
web servers are quickly becoming a popular target for
exploitation, primarily because once compromised, they
open new avenues for infecting vulnerable clients that
subsequently visit these sites. Moreover, because web
servers are generally hosted on machines with signiﬁ-
cant system resources and network connectivity, they can
serve as reliable platforms for hosting malware (particu-
larly in the case of server farms), and as such, are entic-
ing targets for attackers [25]. Indeed, lately we have wit-
nessed a ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C++ Binaries
author:Mohamed Elsabagh and
Dan Fleck and
Angelos Stavrou
Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C++ Binaries
Mohamed Elsabagh
melsabag@gmu.edu
Dan Fleck
dﬂeck@gmu.edu
Angelos Stavrou
astavrou@gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
ABSTRACT
Modern operating systems are equipped with defenses that
render legacy code injection attacks inoperable. However,
attackers can bypass these defenses by crafting attacks that
reuse existing code in a program’s memory. One of the most
common classes of attacks manipulates memory data used
indirectly to execute code, such as function pointers. This is
especially prevalent in C++ programs, since tables of func-
tion pointers (vtables) are used by all major compilers to
support polymorphism. In this paper, we propose VCI, a
binary rewriting system that secures C++ binaries against
vtable attacks. VCI works directly on stripped binary ﬁles.
It identiﬁes and reconstructs various C++ semantics from
the binary, and constructs a strict CFI policy by resolving
and pairing virtual function calls (vcalls) with precise sets
of target classes. The policy is enforced by instrumenting
checks into the binary at vcall sites. Experimental results
on SPEC CPU2006 and Firefox show that VCI is signiﬁ-
cantly more precise than state-of-the-art binary solutions.
Testing against the ground truth from the source-based de-
fense GCC VTV, VCI achieved greater than 60% precision
in most cases, accounting for at least 48% to 99% additional
reduction in the attack surface compared to the state-of-
the-art binary defenses. VCI incurs a 7.79% average run-
time overhead which is comparable to the state-of-the-art.
In addition, we discuss how VCI defends against real-world
attacks, and how it impacts advanced vtable reuse attacks
such as COOP.
Keywords
Virtual table attacks; C++; Control ﬂow integrity; Type-call
pairing; Static binary analysis
1.
INTRO...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C++ Binaries
author:Mohamed Elsabagh and
Dan Fleck and
Angelos Stavrou
Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C++ Binaries
Mohamed Elsabagh
melsabag@gmu.edu
Dan Fleck
dﬂeck@gmu.edu
Angelos Stavrou
astavrou@gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
ABSTRACT
Modern operating systems are equipped with defenses that
render legacy code injection attacks inoperable. However,
attackers can bypass these defenses by crafting attacks that
reuse existing code in a program’s memory. One of the most
common classes of attacks manipulates memory data used
indirectly to execute code, such as function pointers. This is
especially prevalent in C++ programs, since tables of func-
tion pointers (vtables) are used by all major compilers to
support polymorphism. In this paper, we propose VCI, a
binary rewriting system that secures C++ binaries against
vtable attacks. VCI works directly on stripped binary ﬁles.
It identiﬁes and reconstructs various C++ semantics from
the binary, and constructs a strict CFI policy by resolving
and pairing virtual function calls (vcalls) with precise sets
of target classes. The policy is enforced by instrumenting
checks into the binary at vcall sites. Experimental results
on SPEC CPU2006 and Firefox show that VCI is signiﬁ-
cantly more precise than state-of-the-art binary solutions.
Testing against the ground truth from the source-based de-
fense GCC VTV, VCI achieved greater than 60% precision
in most cases, accounting for at least 48% to 99% additional
reduction in the attack surface compared to the state-of-
the-art binary defenses. VCI incurs a 7.79% average run-
time overhead which is comparable to the state-of-the-art.
In addition, we discuss how VCI defends against real-world
attacks, and how it impacts advanced vtable reuse attacks
such as COOP.
Keywords
Virtual table attacks; C++; Control ﬂow integrity; Type-call
pairing; Static binary analysis
1.
INTRO...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Transys: Leveraging Common Security Properties Across Hardware Designs
author:Rui Zhang and
Cynthia Sturton
Transys: Leveraging Common Security Properties
Across Hardware Designs
Rui Zhang, Cynthia Sturton
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
{rzhang, csturton}@cs.unc.edu
Abstract—This paper presents Transys, a tool for translating
security critical properties written for one hardware design
to analogous properties suitable for a second design. Transys
works in three passes adjusting the variable names, arithmetic
expressions, logical preconditions, and timing constraints of the
original property to retain the intended semantics of the property
while making it valid for the second design. We evaluate Transys
by translating 27 assertions written in a temporal
logic and
9 properties written for use with gate level information ﬂow
tracking across 38 AES designs, 3 RSA designs, and 5 RISC
processor designs. Transys successfully translates 96% of the
properties. Among these, the translation of 23 (64%) of the
properties achieved a semantic equivalence rate of above 60%.
The average translation time per property is about 70 seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spectre [1] and Meltdown [2] attacks, along with
their variants [3], [4], have demonstrated the importance of
validating the security of a processor design. To do so,
one needs a comprehensive set of properties describing the
security requirements of the design. Developing such a set
is challenging. The high-level goals of conﬁdentiality and
integrity of a particular security domain—and availability of
a machine in general—may be well understood, but mapping
these goals to the cycle-by-cycle behavior of speciﬁc registers,
signals, and ports in a design is difﬁcult, and a matter of art as
much as science. In practice this effort must be repeated for
each new design, even for new generations of existing designs.
We present Transys, a tool that takes in a set of security
critical properties developed for one hardw...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Transys: Leveraging Common Security Properties Across Hardware Designs
author:Rui Zhang and
Cynthia Sturton
Transys: Leveraging Common Security Properties
Across Hardware Designs
Rui Zhang, Cynthia Sturton
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
{rzhang, csturton}@cs.unc.edu
Abstract—This paper presents Transys, a tool for translating
security critical properties written for one hardware design
to analogous properties suitable for a second design. Transys
works in three passes adjusting the variable names, arithmetic
expressions, logical preconditions, and timing constraints of the
original property to retain the intended semantics of the property
while making it valid for the second design. We evaluate Transys
by translating 27 assertions written in a temporal
logic and
9 properties written for use with gate level information ﬂow
tracking across 38 AES designs, 3 RSA designs, and 5 RISC
processor designs. Transys successfully translates 96% of the
properties. Among these, the translation of 23 (64%) of the
properties achieved a semantic equivalence rate of above 60%.
The average translation time per property is about 70 seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spectre [1] and Meltdown [2] attacks, along with
their variants [3], [4], have demonstrated the importance of
validating the security of a processor design. To do so,
one needs a comprehensive set of properties describing the
security requirements of the design. Developing such a set
is challenging. The high-level goals of conﬁdentiality and
integrity of a particular security domain—and availability of
a machine in general—may be well understood, but mapping
these goals to the cycle-by-cycle behavior of speciﬁc registers,
signals, and ports in a design is difﬁcult, and a matter of art as
much as science. In practice this effort must be repeated for
each new design, even for new generations of existing designs.
We present Transys, a tool that takes in a set of security
critical properties developed for one hardw...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fs-PGBR: a scalable and delay sensitive cloud routing protocol
author:Julien Mineraud and
Sasitharan Balasubramaniam and
Jussi Kangasharju and
William Donnelly
fs-PGBR: A Scalable and Delay Sensitive Cloud Routing
Protocol
Julien Mineraud, William Donnelly
Sasitharan Balasubramaniam
Telecommunications Software & Systems Group
Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland
{jmineraud, wdonnelly, sasib}@tssg.org
Jussi Kangasharju
Department of Computer Science
University of Helsinki, Finland
Jussi.Kangasharju@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an improved version of a fully dis-
tributed routing protocol, that is applicable for cloud com-
puting infrastructure. Simulation results shows the protocol
is ideal for discovering cloud services in a scalable manner
with minimum latency.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Routing Protocols
General Terms
Performance
Keywords
Scalable route discovery, Cloud computing infrastructure
1. MOTIVATION
Cloud computing is recognized as the next generation in-
frastructure that would revolutionize the way users access
services [3]. The driving force behind the concept of cloud
computing has been fueled by the growth of computing de-
vices (in particular mobile devices) as well as rich services
which execute on power and memory constrained devices.
The vision of cloud computing will enable users to oﬄoad
these services into high powered storage facilities, where
users will be able to access infrastructures, platforms, as
well as software within the cloud. In essence, the cloud will
represent a network of high powered data centers [2] that
provides a multitude of services to end users based on a pay
as you go model (Figure 1). Although the cloud will en-
able users to elastically consume resources, this will bring
along new challenges for the underlying infrastructure. One
of these challenges include a dynamic traﬃc pattern in the
underlying network, which will require more scalable, eﬃ-
cient, and ada...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fs-PGBR: a scalable and delay sensitive cloud routing protocol
author:Julien Mineraud and
Sasitharan Balasubramaniam and
Jussi Kangasharju and
William Donnelly
fs-PGBR: A Scalable and Delay Sensitive Cloud Routing
Protocol
Julien Mineraud, William Donnelly
Sasitharan Balasubramaniam
Telecommunications Software & Systems Group
Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland
{jmineraud, wdonnelly, sasib}@tssg.org
Jussi Kangasharju
Department of Computer Science
University of Helsinki, Finland
Jussi.Kangasharju@cs.helsinki.ﬁ
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an improved version of a fully dis-
tributed routing protocol, that is applicable for cloud com-
puting infrastructure. Simulation results shows the protocol
is ideal for discovering cloud services in a scalable manner
with minimum latency.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Routing Protocols
General Terms
Performance
Keywords
Scalable route discovery, Cloud computing infrastructure
1. MOTIVATION
Cloud computing is recognized as the next generation in-
frastructure that would revolutionize the way users access
services [3]. The driving force behind the concept of cloud
computing has been fueled by the growth of computing de-
vices (in particular mobile devices) as well as rich services
which execute on power and memory constrained devices.
The vision of cloud computing will enable users to oﬄoad
these services into high powered storage facilities, where
users will be able to access infrastructures, platforms, as
well as software within the cloud. In essence, the cloud will
represent a network of high powered data centers [2] that
provides a multitude of services to end users based on a pay
as you go model (Figure 1). Although the cloud will en-
able users to elastically consume resources, this will bring
along new challenges for the underlying infrastructure. One
of these challenges include a dynamic traﬃc pattern in the
underlying network, which will require more scalable, eﬃ-
cient, and ada...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。