Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MulVAL: A Logic-based Network Security Analyzer
author:Xinming Ou and
Sudhakar Govindavajhala and
Andrew W. Appel
MulVAL: A Logic-based Network Security Analyzer ∗
Xinming Ou
Sudhakar Govindavajhala Andrew W. Appel
Princeton University
{xou, sudhakar, appel}@cs.princeton.edu
Abstract
To determine the security impact software vulnerabilities
have on a particular network, one must consider interac-
tions among multiple network elements. For a vulnera-
bility analysis tool to be useful in practice, two features
are crucial. First, the model used in the analysis must be
able to automatically integrate formal vulnerability spec-
iﬁcations from the bug-reporting community. Second,
the analysis must be able to scale to networks with thou-
sands of machines.
We show how to achieve these two goals by present-
ing MulVAL, an end-to-end framework and reasoning
system that conducts multihost, multistage vulnerability
analysis on a network. MulVAL adopts Datalog as the
modeling language for the elements in the analysis (bug
speciﬁcation, conﬁguration description, reasoning rules,
operating-system permission and privilege model, etc.).
We easily leverage existing vulnerability-database and
scanning tools by expressing their output in Datalog and
feeding it to our MulVAL reasoning engine. Once the in-
formation is collected, the analysis can be performed in
seconds for networks with thousands of machines.
We implemented our framework on the Red Hat Linux
platform. Our framework can reason about 84% of the
Red Hat bugs reported in OVAL, a formal vulnerability
deﬁnition language. We tested our tool on a real network
with hundreds of users. The tool detected a policy vio-
lation caused by software vulnerabilities and the system
administrators took remediation measures.
1 Introduction
the number of vulnerabilities discovered each year grow-
ing rapidly, it is impossible for system administrators
to keep the software running on their network machines
free of security bugs. One of...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analyzing the MAC-level behavior of wireless networks in the wild
author:Ratul Mahajan and
Maya Rodrig and
David Wetherall and
John Zahorjan
Analyzing the MAC-level Behavior of Wireless Networks
in the Wild
Ratul Mahajan
Microsoft Research
Maya Rodrig
University of Washington
David Wetherall
University of Washington
John Zahorjan
University of Washington
ABSTRACT
We present Wit, a non-intrusive tool that builds on passive moni-
toring to analyze the detailed MAC-level behavior of operational
wireless networks. Wit uses three processing steps to construct an
enhanced trace of system activity. First, a robust merging proce-
dure combines the necessarily incomplete views from multiple, in-
dependent monitors into a single, more complete trace of wireless
activity. Next, a novel inference engine based on formal language
methods reconstructs packets that were not captured by any moni-
tor and determines whether each packet was received by its destina-
tion. Finally, Wit derives network performance measures from this
enhanced trace; we show how to estimate the number of stations
competing for the medium. We assess Wit with a mix of real traces
and simulation tests. We ﬁnd that merging and inference both sig-
niﬁcantly enhance the originally captured trace. We apply Wit to
multi-monitor traces from a live network to show how it facilitates
802.11 MAC analyses that would otherwise be difﬁcult or rely on
less accurate heuristics.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement, performance
Keywords
Passive monitoring, measurement tool, 802.11 MAC
1.
INTRODUCTION
Measurement-driven analysis of live networks is critical to un-
derstanding and improving their operation (e.g., [3, 28, 13, 18, 22,
24]). In the case of wireless, however, very little detailed informa-
tion is currently available on the performance of real deployments,
even though wireless protocols are a subject of intense research and
standard...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analyzing the MAC-level behavior of wireless networks in the wild
author:Ratul Mahajan and
Maya Rodrig and
David Wetherall and
John Zahorjan
Analyzing the MAC-level Behavior of Wireless Networks
in the Wild
Ratul Mahajan
Microsoft Research
Maya Rodrig
University of Washington
David Wetherall
University of Washington
John Zahorjan
University of Washington
ABSTRACT
We present Wit, a non-intrusive tool that builds on passive moni-
toring to analyze the detailed MAC-level behavior of operational
wireless networks. Wit uses three processing steps to construct an
enhanced trace of system activity. First, a robust merging proce-
dure combines the necessarily incomplete views from multiple, in-
dependent monitors into a single, more complete trace of wireless
activity. Next, a novel inference engine based on formal language
methods reconstructs packets that were not captured by any moni-
tor and determines whether each packet was received by its destina-
tion. Finally, Wit derives network performance measures from this
enhanced trace; we show how to estimate the number of stations
competing for the medium. We assess Wit with a mix of real traces
and simulation tests. We ﬁnd that merging and inference both sig-
niﬁcantly enhance the originally captured trace. We apply Wit to
multi-monitor traces from a live network to show how it facilitates
802.11 MAC analyses that would otherwise be difﬁcult or rely on
less accurate heuristics.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of systems]: Measurement techniques
General Terms
Measurement, performance
Keywords
Passive monitoring, measurement tool, 802.11 MAC
1.
INTRODUCTION
Measurement-driven analysis of live networks is critical to un-
derstanding and improving their operation (e.g., [3, 28, 13, 18, 22,
24]). In the case of wireless, however, very little detailed informa-
tion is currently available on the performance of real deployments,
even though wireless protocols are a subject of intense research and
standard...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint?: A Large-scale Measurement Study
and Classification of Fingerprint Dynamics
author:Song Li and
Yinzhi Cao
Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint?
A Large-scale Measurement Study and Classification of
Fingerprint Dynamics
Song Li
Johns Hopkins University
lsong18@jhu.edu
Yinzhi Cao
Johns Hopkins University
yinzhi.cao@jhu.edu
ABSTRACT
Browser fingerprints are dynamic, evolving with feature values
changed over time. Previous fingerprinting datasets are either small-
scale with only thousands of browser instances or without con-
sidering fingerprint dynamics. Thus, it remains unclear how an
evolution-aware fingerprinting tool behaves in a real-world setting,
e.g., on a website with millions of browser instances, let alone how
fingerprint dynamics implicate privacy and security.
In this paper, we perform the first, large-scale study of millions of
fingerprints to analyze fingerprint dynamics in a real-world website.
Our measurement study answers the question of how and why
fingerprints change over time by classifying fingerprint dynamics
into three categories based on their causes. We also observed several
insights from our measurement, e.g., we show that state-of-the-
art fingerprinting tool performs poorly in terms of F1-Score and
matching speed in this real-world setting.
ACM Reference Format:
Song Li and Yinzhi Cao. 2020. Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint? A
Large-scale Measurement Study and Classification of Fingerprint Dynamics.
In ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27–November
29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 16 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423614
1 INTRODUCTION
Browser fingerprinting, an alternative to browser cookies when
being disabled or cleared, is that a website extracts a list of browser
features at the client side and then constructs an identifier, called
a fingerprint, based on these extracted features to identify or au-
thenticate the browser. Browser fingerprintin...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint?: A Large-scale Measurement Study
and Classification of Fingerprint Dynamics
author:Song Li and
Yinzhi Cao
Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint?
A Large-scale Measurement Study and Classification of
Fingerprint Dynamics
Song Li
Johns Hopkins University
lsong18@jhu.edu
Yinzhi Cao
Johns Hopkins University
yinzhi.cao@jhu.edu
ABSTRACT
Browser fingerprints are dynamic, evolving with feature values
changed over time. Previous fingerprinting datasets are either small-
scale with only thousands of browser instances or without con-
sidering fingerprint dynamics. Thus, it remains unclear how an
evolution-aware fingerprinting tool behaves in a real-world setting,
e.g., on a website with millions of browser instances, let alone how
fingerprint dynamics implicate privacy and security.
In this paper, we perform the first, large-scale study of millions of
fingerprints to analyze fingerprint dynamics in a real-world website.
Our measurement study answers the question of how and why
fingerprints change over time by classifying fingerprint dynamics
into three categories based on their causes. We also observed several
insights from our measurement, e.g., we show that state-of-the-
art fingerprinting tool performs poorly in terms of F1-Score and
matching speed in this real-world setting.
ACM Reference Format:
Song Li and Yinzhi Cao. 2020. Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint? A
Large-scale Measurement Study and Classification of Fingerprint Dynamics.
In ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27–November
29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 16 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423614
1 INTRODUCTION
Browser fingerprinting, an alternative to browser cookies when
being disabled or cleared, is that a website extracts a list of browser
features at the client side and then constructs an identifier, called
a fingerprint, based on these extracted features to identify or au-
thenticate the browser. Browser fingerprintin...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SecLaaS: secure logging-as-a-service for cloud forensics
author:Shams Zawoad and
Amit Kumar Dutta and
Ragib Hasan
SecLaaS: Secure Logging-as-a-Service for Cloud
Forensics
Shams Zawoad
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
35294-1170
zawoad@cis.uab.edu
Amit Kumar Dutta
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
adutta@cis.uab.edu
35294-1170
Ragib Hasan
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
ragib@cis.uab.edu
35294-1170
ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has emerged as a popular computing paradigm
in recent years. However, today’s cloud computing architectures
often lack support for computer forensic investigations. Analyzing
various logs (e.g., process logs, network logs) plays a vital role in
computer forensics. Unfortunately, collecting logs from a cloud is
very hard given the black-box nature of clouds and the multi-tenant
cloud models, where many users share the same processing and
network resources. Researchers have proposed using log API or
cloud management console to mitigate the challenges of collecting
logs from cloud infrastructure. However, there has been no concrete
work, which shows how to provide cloud logs to investigator while
preserving users’ privacy and integrity of the logs. In this paper,
we introduce Secure-Logging-as-a-Service (SecLaaS), which stores
virtual machines’ logs and provides access to forensic investigators
ensuring the conﬁdentiality of the cloud users. Additionally, SeclaaS
preserves proofs of past log and thus protects the integrity of the
logs from dishonest investigators or cloud providers. Finally, we
evaluate the feasibility of the scheme by implementing SecLaaS for
network access logs in OpenStack – a popular open source cloud
platform.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—Cloud Computing; K.6.m [Management of Computing
and Information Systems]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Cloud Forensics, Forensic Invest...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SecLaaS: secure logging-as-a-service for cloud forensics
author:Shams Zawoad and
Amit Kumar Dutta and
Ragib Hasan
SecLaaS: Secure Logging-as-a-Service for Cloud
Forensics
Shams Zawoad
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
35294-1170
zawoad@cis.uab.edu
Amit Kumar Dutta
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
adutta@cis.uab.edu
35294-1170
Ragib Hasan
University of Alabama at
Birmingham
Birmingham, Alabama
ragib@cis.uab.edu
35294-1170
ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has emerged as a popular computing paradigm
in recent years. However, today’s cloud computing architectures
often lack support for computer forensic investigations. Analyzing
various logs (e.g., process logs, network logs) plays a vital role in
computer forensics. Unfortunately, collecting logs from a cloud is
very hard given the black-box nature of clouds and the multi-tenant
cloud models, where many users share the same processing and
network resources. Researchers have proposed using log API or
cloud management console to mitigate the challenges of collecting
logs from cloud infrastructure. However, there has been no concrete
work, which shows how to provide cloud logs to investigator while
preserving users’ privacy and integrity of the logs. In this paper,
we introduce Secure-Logging-as-a-Service (SecLaaS), which stores
virtual machines’ logs and provides access to forensic investigators
ensuring the conﬁdentiality of the cloud users. Additionally, SeclaaS
preserves proofs of past log and thus protects the integrity of the
logs from dishonest investigators or cloud providers. Finally, we
evaluate the feasibility of the scheme by implementing SecLaaS for
network access logs in OpenStack – a popular open source cloud
platform.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—Cloud Computing; K.6.m [Management of Computing
and Information Systems]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Cloud Forensics, Forensic Invest...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Automatic placement of authorization hooks in the linux security modules
framework
author:Vinod Ganapathy and
Trent Jaeger and
Somesh Jha
Automatic Placement of Authorization Hooks
in the Linux Security Modules Framework
Vinod Ganapathy
University of Wisconsin
vg@cs.wisc.edu
Trent Jaeger
Pennsylvania State University
tjaeger@cse.psu.edu
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
jha@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
We present a technique for automatic placement of authorization
hooks, and apply it to the Linux security modules (LSM) frame-
work. LSM is a generic framework which allows diverse autho-
rization policies to be enforced by the Linux kernel. It consists of
a kernel module which encapsulates an authorization policy, and
hooks into the kernel module placed at appropriate locations in the
Linux kernel. The kernel enforces the authorization policy using
hook calls. In current practice, hooks are placed manually in the
kernel. This approach is tedious, and as prior work has shown, is
prone to security holes.
Our technique uses static analysis of the Linux kernel and the
kernel module to automate hook placement. Given a non-hook-
placed version of the Linux kernel, and a kernel module that imple-
ments an authorization policy, our technique infers the set of opera-
tions authorized by each hook, and the set of operations performed
by each function in the kernel. It uses this information to infer the
set of hooks that must guard each kernel function. We describe the
design and implementation of a prototype tool called TAHOE (Tool
for Authorization Hook Placement) that uses this technique. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of TAHOE by using it with the LSM
implementation of security-enhanced Linux (SELinux). While our
exposition in this paper focuses on hook placement for LSM, our
technique can be used to place hooks in other LSM-like architec-
tures as well.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection—Access Controls
General Terms: Al...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Automatic placement of authorization hooks in the linux security modules
framework
author:Vinod Ganapathy and
Trent Jaeger and
Somesh Jha
Automatic Placement of Authorization Hooks
in the Linux Security Modules Framework
Vinod Ganapathy
University of Wisconsin
vg@cs.wisc.edu
Trent Jaeger
Pennsylvania State University
tjaeger@cse.psu.edu
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
jha@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
We present a technique for automatic placement of authorization
hooks, and apply it to the Linux security modules (LSM) frame-
work. LSM is a generic framework which allows diverse autho-
rization policies to be enforced by the Linux kernel. It consists of
a kernel module which encapsulates an authorization policy, and
hooks into the kernel module placed at appropriate locations in the
Linux kernel. The kernel enforces the authorization policy using
hook calls. In current practice, hooks are placed manually in the
kernel. This approach is tedious, and as prior work has shown, is
prone to security holes.
Our technique uses static analysis of the Linux kernel and the
kernel module to automate hook placement. Given a non-hook-
placed version of the Linux kernel, and a kernel module that imple-
ments an authorization policy, our technique infers the set of opera-
tions authorized by each hook, and the set of operations performed
by each function in the kernel. It uses this information to infer the
set of hooks that must guard each kernel function. We describe the
design and implementation of a prototype tool called TAHOE (Tool
for Authorization Hook Placement) that uses this technique. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of TAHOE by using it with the LSM
implementation of security-enhanced Linux (SELinux). While our
exposition in this paper focuses on hook placement for LSM, our
technique can be used to place hooks in other LSM-like architec-
tures as well.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection—Access Controls
General Terms: Al...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:New time-memory-data trade-off attack on the estream finalists and
modes of operation of block ciphers
author:Khoongming Khoo and
Chik How Tan
New Time-Memory-Data Trade-Off Attack on the Estream
Finalists and Modes of Operation of Block Ciphers
[Extended Abstract]
Khoongming Khoo
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
S118230, Singapore.
kkhoongm@dso.org.sg
Chik How Tan
NUS Temasek Laboratories
Singapore
tsltch@nus.edu.sg
cannot both be faster than exhaustive search if and only if
the IV length is at least as long as the key length.
For the sake of comparison, we prove the following propo-
sition. From here, we see that our attack, which allows
for faster pre-processing, is more eﬀective than the
HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks. It also imposes a
more stringent constraint on the length of the IV
for adequate security.
Proposition 1.
1. In the BS-TMD attack [1] on a
stream cipher, if the state size is at least 3/2 times
the key length, then the pre-processing and online at-
tack complexity cannot both be faster than exhaustive
search.
2. In the HS-TMD attack [8] on a stream cipher, if the IV
length v is at least half the key length k, then the pre-
processing and online attack complexity cannot both be
faster than exhaustive search.
3. In the DK-TMD attack [5] on a stream cipher, the pre-
processing complexity is at least the exhaustive search
complexity irrespective of the IV length.
Remark 1. Although the authors of [8] recommended the
IV to be at least as long as the key, that is because they allow
the precomputation time to be worse than exhaustive search
in their estimation.
2. APPLICATIONS OF OUR ATTACK
2.1 Attack on Grain v1
68
76
online attack complexity.
We apply our attack to the Estream ﬁnalist Grain-v1 [6]
pre-processing and
with 80-bit key and break it with 2
In comparison, the current
2
known attacks on Grain-v1 cannot break it with both pre-
processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaus-
tive search. For example, the conditional ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:New time-memory-data trade-off attack on the estream finalists and
modes of operation of block ciphers
author:Khoongming Khoo and
Chik How Tan
New Time-Memory-Data Trade-Off Attack on the Estream
Finalists and Modes of Operation of Block Ciphers
[Extended Abstract]
Khoongming Khoo
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
S118230, Singapore.
kkhoongm@dso.org.sg
Chik How Tan
NUS Temasek Laboratories
Singapore
tsltch@nus.edu.sg
cannot both be faster than exhaustive search if and only if
the IV length is at least as long as the key length.
For the sake of comparison, we prove the following propo-
sition. From here, we see that our attack, which allows
for faster pre-processing, is more eﬀective than the
HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks. It also imposes a
more stringent constraint on the length of the IV
for adequate security.
Proposition 1.
1. In the BS-TMD attack [1] on a
stream cipher, if the state size is at least 3/2 times
the key length, then the pre-processing and online at-
tack complexity cannot both be faster than exhaustive
search.
2. In the HS-TMD attack [8] on a stream cipher, if the IV
length v is at least half the key length k, then the pre-
processing and online attack complexity cannot both be
faster than exhaustive search.
3. In the DK-TMD attack [5] on a stream cipher, the pre-
processing complexity is at least the exhaustive search
complexity irrespective of the IV length.
Remark 1. Although the authors of [8] recommended the
IV to be at least as long as the key, that is because they allow
the precomputation time to be worse than exhaustive search
in their estimation.
2. APPLICATIONS OF OUR ATTACK
2.1 Attack on Grain v1
68
76
online attack complexity.
We apply our attack to the Estream ﬁnalist Grain-v1 [6]
pre-processing and
with 80-bit key and break it with 2
In comparison, the current
2
known attacks on Grain-v1 cannot break it with both pre-
processing and online attack complexity faster than exhaus-
tive search. For example, the conditional ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Limits of Composable Crypto with Transferable Setup Devices
author:Ioana Boureanu and
Miyako Ohkubo and
Serge Vaudenay
Composable Security in the Tamper Proof Hardware Model
under Minimal Complexity
Carmit Hazay(cid:3)
Antigoni Polychroniadouy
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniamz
Abstract
We put forth a new formulation of tamper-proof hardware in the Global Universal Composable
(GUC) framework introduced by Canetti et al.
in TCC 2007. Almost all of the previous works rely
on the formulation by Katz in Eurocrypt 2007 and this formulation does not fully capture tokens in a
concurrent setting. We address these shortcomings by relying on the GUC framework where we make
the following contributions:
1. We construct secure Two-Party Computation (2PC) protocols for general functionalities with opti-
mal round complexity and computational assumptions using stateless tokens. More precisely, we
show how to realize arbitrary functionalities with GUC security in two rounds under the minimal
assumption of One-Way Functions (OWFs). Moreover, our construction relies on the underlying
function in a black-box way. As a corollary, we obtain feasibility of Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) with GUC-security under the minimal assumption of OWFs. As an independent contri-
bution, we identify an issue with a claim in a previous work by Goyal, Ishai, Sahai, Venkatesan
and Wadia in TCC 2010 regarding the feasibility of UC-secure computation with stateless tokens
assuming collision-resistant hash-functions (and the extension based only on one-way functions).
2. We then construct a 3-round MPC protocol to securely realize arbitrary functionalities with GUC-
security starting from any semi-honest secure MPC protocol. For this construction, we require
the so-called one-many commit-and-prove primitive introduced in the original work of Canetti,
Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai in STOC 2002 that is round-efﬁcient and black-box in the underlying
commitment. Using specially designed “input-delay...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Limits of Composable Crypto with Transferable Setup Devices
author:Ioana Boureanu and
Miyako Ohkubo and
Serge Vaudenay
Composable Security in the Tamper Proof Hardware Model
under Minimal Complexity
Carmit Hazay(cid:3)
Antigoni Polychroniadouy
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniamz
Abstract
We put forth a new formulation of tamper-proof hardware in the Global Universal Composable
(GUC) framework introduced by Canetti et al.
in TCC 2007. Almost all of the previous works rely
on the formulation by Katz in Eurocrypt 2007 and this formulation does not fully capture tokens in a
concurrent setting. We address these shortcomings by relying on the GUC framework where we make
the following contributions:
1. We construct secure Two-Party Computation (2PC) protocols for general functionalities with opti-
mal round complexity and computational assumptions using stateless tokens. More precisely, we
show how to realize arbitrary functionalities with GUC security in two rounds under the minimal
assumption of One-Way Functions (OWFs). Moreover, our construction relies on the underlying
function in a black-box way. As a corollary, we obtain feasibility of Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) with GUC-security under the minimal assumption of OWFs. As an independent contri-
bution, we identify an issue with a claim in a previous work by Goyal, Ishai, Sahai, Venkatesan
and Wadia in TCC 2010 regarding the feasibility of UC-secure computation with stateless tokens
assuming collision-resistant hash-functions (and the extension based only on one-way functions).
2. We then construct a 3-round MPC protocol to securely realize arbitrary functionalities with GUC-
security starting from any semi-honest secure MPC protocol. For this construction, we require
the so-called one-many commit-and-prove primitive introduced in the original work of Canetti,
Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai in STOC 2002 that is round-efﬁcient and black-box in the underlying
commitment. Using specially designed “input-delay...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 8th International Symposium,
RAID 2005, Seattle, WA, USA, September 7-9, 2005, Revised Papers
author:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
3858
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
University of Dortmund, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
New York University, NY, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Moshe Y. Vardi
Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbruecken, Germany
Alfonso Valdes Diego Zamboni (Eds.)
Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection
8th International Symposium, RAID 2005
Seattle, WA, USA, September 7-9, 2005
Revised Papers
1 3
Volume Editors
Alfonso Valdes
SRI International
333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA
E-mail: alfonso.valdes@sri.com
Diego Zamboni
IBM Research GmbH
Zurich Research Laboratory
Säumerstr. 4, Postfach, 8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland
E-mail: dza@zurich.ibm.com
Library of Congress Control Number: 2005939042
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): K.6.5, K.4, E.3, C.2, D.4.6
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-540-31778-3 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-540-31778-4 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, speciﬁcally the rights of transl...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 8th International Symposium,
RAID 2005, Seattle, WA, USA, September 7-9, 2005, Revised Papers
author:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
3858
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
University of Dortmund, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
New York University, NY, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Moshe Y. Vardi
Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbruecken, Germany
Alfonso Valdes Diego Zamboni (Eds.)
Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection
8th International Symposium, RAID 2005
Seattle, WA, USA, September 7-9, 2005
Revised Papers
1 3
Volume Editors
Alfonso Valdes
SRI International
333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA
E-mail: alfonso.valdes@sri.com
Diego Zamboni
IBM Research GmbH
Zurich Research Laboratory
Säumerstr. 4, Postfach, 8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland
E-mail: dza@zurich.ibm.com
Library of Congress Control Number: 2005939042
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): K.6.5, K.4, E.3, C.2, D.4.6
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-540-31778-3 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-540-31778-4 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, speciﬁcally the rights of transl...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
author:Costas Iordanou and
Georgios Smaragdakis and
Ingmar Poese and
Nikolaos Laoutaris
Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
Costas Iordanou
TU Berlin / UC3M
costas@ima.tu-berlin.de
Ingmar Poese
BENOCS
ipoese@benocs.com
Georgios Smaragdakis
TU Berlin
georgios@ima.tu-berlin.de
Nikolaos Laoutaris
Data Transparency Lab / Eurecat
nikos@datatransparencylab.org
ABSTRACT
A tracking flow is a flow between an end user and a Web track-
ing service. We develop an extensive measurement methodology
for quantifying at scale the amount of tracking flows that cross
data protection borders, be it national or international, such as the
EU28 border within which the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) applies. Our methodology uses a browser extension to fully
render advertising and tracking code, various lists and heuristics to
extract well known trackers, passive DNS replication to get all the
IP ranges of trackers, and state-of-the art geolocation. We employ
our methodology on a dataset from 350 real users of the browser
extension over a period of more than four months, and then gener-
alize our results by analyzing billions of web tracking flows from
more than 60 million broadband and mobile users from 4 large
European ISPs. We show that the majority of tracking flows cross
national borders in Europe but, unlike popular belief, are pretty
well confined within the larger GDPR jurisdiction. Simple DNS
redirection and PoP mirroring can increase national confinement
while sealing almost all tracking flows within Europe. Last, we
show that cross boarder tracking is prevalent even in sensitive and
hence protected data categories and groups including health, sexual
orientation, minors, and others.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Online advertising; • Security and
privacy → Privacy protections; • Networks → Network mea-
surement; Location based services; • Applied computing → Law;
ACM Reference Format:
Costas Iordanou, Georgios Smaragdakis, In...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
author:Costas Iordanou and
Georgios Smaragdakis and
Ingmar Poese and
Nikolaos Laoutaris
Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
Costas Iordanou
TU Berlin / UC3M
costas@ima.tu-berlin.de
Ingmar Poese
BENOCS
ipoese@benocs.com
Georgios Smaragdakis
TU Berlin
georgios@ima.tu-berlin.de
Nikolaos Laoutaris
Data Transparency Lab / Eurecat
nikos@datatransparencylab.org
ABSTRACT
A tracking flow is a flow between an end user and a Web track-
ing service. We develop an extensive measurement methodology
for quantifying at scale the amount of tracking flows that cross
data protection borders, be it national or international, such as the
EU28 border within which the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) applies. Our methodology uses a browser extension to fully
render advertising and tracking code, various lists and heuristics to
extract well known trackers, passive DNS replication to get all the
IP ranges of trackers, and state-of-the art geolocation. We employ
our methodology on a dataset from 350 real users of the browser
extension over a period of more than four months, and then gener-
alize our results by analyzing billions of web tracking flows from
more than 60 million broadband and mobile users from 4 large
European ISPs. We show that the majority of tracking flows cross
national borders in Europe but, unlike popular belief, are pretty
well confined within the larger GDPR jurisdiction. Simple DNS
redirection and PoP mirroring can increase national confinement
while sealing almost all tracking flows within Europe. Last, we
show that cross boarder tracking is prevalent even in sensitive and
hence protected data categories and groups including health, sexual
orientation, minors, and others.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Online advertising; • Security and
privacy → Privacy protections; • Networks → Network mea-
surement; Location based services; • Applied computing → Law;
ACM Reference Format:
Costas Iordanou, Georgios Smaragdakis, In...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:On Design Inference from Binaries Compiled using Modern C++ Defenses
author:Rukayat Ayomide Erinfolami and
Anh Quach and
Aravind Prakash
On Design Inference from Binaries Compiled using Modern C++ Defenses
Rukayat Ayomide Erinfolami
Binghamton University
Anh Quach
Binghamton University
Aravind Prakash
Binghamton University
{rerinfo1,aquach1,aprakash}@binghamton.edu
Abstract
Due to the use of code pointers, polymorphism in C++ has
been targeted by attackers and defenders alike. Vulnerable pro-
grams that violate the runtime object type integrity have been
successfully exploited. Particularly, virtual dispatch mecha-
nism and type confusion during casting have been targeted.
As a consequence, multiple defenses have been proposed
in recent years to defend against attacks that target poly-
morphism. Particularly, compiler-based defenses incorpo-
rate design information—speciﬁcally class-hierarchy-related
information—into the binary, and enforce runtime security
policies to assert type integrity.
In this paper, we perform a systematic evaluation of the
side-effects and unintended consequences of compiler-based
security. Speciﬁcally, we show that application of modern
defenses makes reverse engineering and semantic recovery
easy. In particular, we show that modern defenses “leak" class
hierarchy information, i.e., design information, thereby deter
adoption in closed-source software. We consider a compre-
hensive set of 10 modern C++ defenses and show that 9 out
of the 10 at least partially reveal design information as an
unintended consequence of the defense. We argue a necessity
for design-leakage-sensitive defenses that are preferable for
closed-source use.
1
Introduction
The beneﬁts of C++ as an object-oriented language have
prompted its wide use in commercial software. As a con-
sequence, the under-the-hood mechanisms of the language
implementation (e.g., virtual dispatch) have come under strict
scrutiny from both the attackers and defenders. Particularly,
pract...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:On Design Inference from Binaries Compiled using Modern C++ Defenses
author:Rukayat Ayomide Erinfolami and
Anh Quach and
Aravind Prakash
On Design Inference from Binaries Compiled using Modern C++ Defenses
Rukayat Ayomide Erinfolami
Binghamton University
Anh Quach
Binghamton University
Aravind Prakash
Binghamton University
{rerinfo1,aquach1,aprakash}@binghamton.edu
Abstract
Due to the use of code pointers, polymorphism in C++ has
been targeted by attackers and defenders alike. Vulnerable pro-
grams that violate the runtime object type integrity have been
successfully exploited. Particularly, virtual dispatch mecha-
nism and type confusion during casting have been targeted.
As a consequence, multiple defenses have been proposed
in recent years to defend against attacks that target poly-
morphism. Particularly, compiler-based defenses incorpo-
rate design information—speciﬁcally class-hierarchy-related
information—into the binary, and enforce runtime security
policies to assert type integrity.
In this paper, we perform a systematic evaluation of the
side-effects and unintended consequences of compiler-based
security. Speciﬁcally, we show that application of modern
defenses makes reverse engineering and semantic recovery
easy. In particular, we show that modern defenses “leak" class
hierarchy information, i.e., design information, thereby deter
adoption in closed-source software. We consider a compre-
hensive set of 10 modern C++ defenses and show that 9 out
of the 10 at least partially reveal design information as an
unintended consequence of the defense. We argue a necessity
for design-leakage-sensitive defenses that are preferable for
closed-source use.
1
Introduction
The beneﬁts of C++ as an object-oriented language have
prompted its wide use in commercial software. As a con-
sequence, the under-the-hood mechanisms of the language
implementation (e.g., virtual dispatch) have come under strict
scrutiny from both the attackers and defenders. Particularly,
pract...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Security Analysis of PHP Bytecode Protection Mechanisms
author:Dario Weißer and
Johannes Dahse and
Thorsten Holz
Security Analysis
of PHP Bytecode Protection Mechanisms
Dario Weißer, Johannes Dahse(B), and Thorsten Holz
Horst G¨ortz Institute for IT-Security (HGI), Ruhr-University Bochum,
{dario.weisser,johannes.dahse,thorsten.holz}@rub.de
Bochum, Germany
Abstract. PHP is the most popular scripting language for web appli-
cations. Because no native solution to compile or protect PHP scripts
exists, PHP applications are usually shipped as plain source code which
is easily understood or copied by an adversary. In order to prevent such
attacks, commercial products such as ionCube, Zend Guard, and Source
Guardian promise a source code protection.
In this paper, we analyze the inner working and security of these
tools and propose a method to recover the source code by leveraging sta-
tic and dynamic analysis techniques. We introduce a generic approach
for decompilation of obfuscated bytecode and show that it is possible to
automatically recover the original source code of protected software. As a
result, we discovered previously unknown vulnerabilities and backdoors
in 1 million lines of recovered source code of 10 protected applications.
Keywords: Security · Reverse engineering · Obfuscation · PHP ·
Bytecode
1 Introduction
Protecting intellectual property (IP) in software systems, such as algorithms,
cryptographic keys, serial numbers, or copyright banners, is a challenging prob-
lem: an adversary can study the program with static or dynamic analysis meth-
ods [7,13,19] and attempt to deduce the sensitive information. To impede such
an analysis, many diﬀerent types of obfuscation techniques for binary executa-
bles were developed (e.g., [3,11,15,21]). Although the semantics of the pro-
gram can be reconstructed with diﬀerent (automated) reverse engineering meth-
ods [4,16,20,29], obfuscation provides at least some protection of the source code
and hampers an adver...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Security Analysis of PHP Bytecode Protection Mechanisms
author:Dario Weißer and
Johannes Dahse and
Thorsten Holz
Security Analysis
of PHP Bytecode Protection Mechanisms
Dario Weißer, Johannes Dahse(B), and Thorsten Holz
Horst G¨ortz Institute for IT-Security (HGI), Ruhr-University Bochum,
{dario.weisser,johannes.dahse,thorsten.holz}@rub.de
Bochum, Germany
Abstract. PHP is the most popular scripting language for web appli-
cations. Because no native solution to compile or protect PHP scripts
exists, PHP applications are usually shipped as plain source code which
is easily understood or copied by an adversary. In order to prevent such
attacks, commercial products such as ionCube, Zend Guard, and Source
Guardian promise a source code protection.
In this paper, we analyze the inner working and security of these
tools and propose a method to recover the source code by leveraging sta-
tic and dynamic analysis techniques. We introduce a generic approach
for decompilation of obfuscated bytecode and show that it is possible to
automatically recover the original source code of protected software. As a
result, we discovered previously unknown vulnerabilities and backdoors
in 1 million lines of recovered source code of 10 protected applications.
Keywords: Security · Reverse engineering · Obfuscation · PHP ·
Bytecode
1 Introduction
Protecting intellectual property (IP) in software systems, such as algorithms,
cryptographic keys, serial numbers, or copyright banners, is a challenging prob-
lem: an adversary can study the program with static or dynamic analysis meth-
ods [7,13,19] and attempt to deduce the sensitive information. To impede such
an analysis, many diﬀerent types of obfuscation techniques for binary executa-
bles were developed (e.g., [3,11,15,21]). Although the semantics of the pro-
gram can be reconstructed with diﬀerent (automated) reverse engineering meth-
ods [4,16,20,29], obfuscation provides at least some protection of the source code
and hampers an adver...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Uncovering network tarpits with degreaser
author:Lance Alt and
Robert Beverly and
Alberto Dainotti
Uncovering Network Tarpits with Degreaser
Lance Alt
Naval Postgraduate School
laalt@cmand.org
Robert Beverly
Naval Postgraduate School
rbeverly@nps.edu
Alberto Dainotti
CAIDA, UC San Diego
alberto@caida.org
ABSTRACT
Network tarpits, whereby a single host or appliance can mas-
querade as many fake hosts on a network and slow network
scanners, are a form of defensive cyber-deception.
In this
work, we develop degreaser , an ecient ﬁngerprinting tool
to remotely detect tarpits. In addition to validating our tool
in a controlled environment, we use degreaser to perform an
Internet-wide scan. We discover tarpits of non-trivial size in
the wild (preﬁxes as large as /16), and characterize their dis-
tribution and behavior. We then show how tarpits pollute
existing network measurement surveys that are tarpit-na¨ıve,
e.g. Internet census data, and how degreaser can improve the
accuracy of such surveys. Lastly, our ﬁndings suggest sev-
eral ways in which to advance the realism of current network
tarpits, thereby raising the bar on tarpits as an operational
security mechanism.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]:
Measurement techniques
Keywords
Tarpits; Internet Census; Sticky Honeypot; Deception
1.
INTRODUCTION
Networks face a continual barrage of abusive and mali-
cious attacks. Among available network security defenses
is the class of deceptive network strategies. The high-level
idea is simple: provide to adversaries the illusion of vulnera-
ble targets, or promote an appearance of greater complexity
than actually exists. For example, network honeypots [31]
have long been used to attract abusive trac and attacks.
Trac that arrives at the honeypot can then be analyzed
in order to build databases of e.g. IP reputation [19, 34],
malware signatures [6, 37], and to provide...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Uncovering network tarpits with degreaser
author:Lance Alt and
Robert Beverly and
Alberto Dainotti
Uncovering Network Tarpits with Degreaser
Lance Alt
Naval Postgraduate School
laalt@cmand.org
Robert Beverly
Naval Postgraduate School
rbeverly@nps.edu
Alberto Dainotti
CAIDA, UC San Diego
alberto@caida.org
ABSTRACT
Network tarpits, whereby a single host or appliance can mas-
querade as many fake hosts on a network and slow network
scanners, are a form of defensive cyber-deception.
In this
work, we develop degreaser , an ecient ﬁngerprinting tool
to remotely detect tarpits. In addition to validating our tool
in a controlled environment, we use degreaser to perform an
Internet-wide scan. We discover tarpits of non-trivial size in
the wild (preﬁxes as large as /16), and characterize their dis-
tribution and behavior. We then show how tarpits pollute
existing network measurement surveys that are tarpit-na¨ıve,
e.g. Internet census data, and how degreaser can improve the
accuracy of such surveys. Lastly, our ﬁndings suggest sev-
eral ways in which to advance the realism of current network
tarpits, thereby raising the bar on tarpits as an operational
security mechanism.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]:
Measurement techniques
Keywords
Tarpits; Internet Census; Sticky Honeypot; Deception
1.
INTRODUCTION
Networks face a continual barrage of abusive and mali-
cious attacks. Among available network security defenses
is the class of deceptive network strategies. The high-level
idea is simple: provide to adversaries the illusion of vulnera-
ble targets, or promote an appearance of greater complexity
than actually exists. For example, network honeypots [31]
have long been used to attract abusive trac and attacks.
Trac that arrives at the honeypot can then be analyzed
in order to build databases of e.g. IP reputation [19, 34],
malware signatures [6, 37], and to provide...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Accurately Measuring Global Risk of Amplification Attacks using AmpMap
author:Soo-Jin Moon and
Yucheng Yin and
Rahul Anand Sharma and
Yifei Yuan and
Jonathan M. Spring and
Vyas Sekar
Accurately Measuring Global Risk of
Ampliﬁcation Attacks using AmpMap
Soo-Jin Moon†, Yucheng Yin†, Rahul Anand Sharma†, Yifei Yuan§∗, Jonathan M. Spring⋄, Vyas Sekar†
†Carnegie Mellon University, §Alibaba Group, ⋄CERT/CC®, SEI, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
Many recent DDoS attacks rely on ampliﬁcation, where an
attacker induces public servers to generate a large volume
of network trafﬁc to a victim. In this paper, we argue for
a low-footprint Internet health monitoring service that can
systematically and continuously quantify this risk to inform
mitigation efforts. Unfortunately, the problem is challenging
because ampliﬁcation is a complex function of query (header)
values and server instances. As such, existing techniques that
enumerate the total number of servers or focus on a speciﬁc
ampliﬁcation-inducing query are fundamentally imprecise. In
designing AmpMap, we leverage key structural insights to
develop an efﬁcient approach that searches across the space
of protocol headers and servers. Using AmpMap, we scanned
thousands of servers for 6 UDP-based protocols. We ﬁnd
that relying on prior recommendations to block or rate-limit
speciﬁc queries still leaves open substantial residual risk as
they miss many other ampliﬁcation-inducing query patterns.
We also observe signiﬁcant variability across servers and
protocols, and thus prior approaches that rely on server census
can substantially misestimate ampliﬁcation risk.
1 Introduction
Many recent high-proﬁle Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks rely on ampliﬁcation [54, 57]. In an ampliﬁca-
tion attack, an attacker spoofs the victim’s source IP address
and sends queries to a public server (e.g., DNS, NTP, Mem-
cached), which in turn sends large responses to the victim. If
a source IP address can be spoofed, any statel...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Accurately Measuring Global Risk of Amplification Attacks using AmpMap
author:Soo-Jin Moon and
Yucheng Yin and
Rahul Anand Sharma and
Yifei Yuan and
Jonathan M. Spring and
Vyas Sekar
Accurately Measuring Global Risk of
Ampliﬁcation Attacks using AmpMap
Soo-Jin Moon†, Yucheng Yin†, Rahul Anand Sharma†, Yifei Yuan§∗, Jonathan M. Spring⋄, Vyas Sekar†
†Carnegie Mellon University, §Alibaba Group, ⋄CERT/CC®, SEI, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
Many recent DDoS attacks rely on ampliﬁcation, where an
attacker induces public servers to generate a large volume
of network trafﬁc to a victim. In this paper, we argue for
a low-footprint Internet health monitoring service that can
systematically and continuously quantify this risk to inform
mitigation efforts. Unfortunately, the problem is challenging
because ampliﬁcation is a complex function of query (header)
values and server instances. As such, existing techniques that
enumerate the total number of servers or focus on a speciﬁc
ampliﬁcation-inducing query are fundamentally imprecise. In
designing AmpMap, we leverage key structural insights to
develop an efﬁcient approach that searches across the space
of protocol headers and servers. Using AmpMap, we scanned
thousands of servers for 6 UDP-based protocols. We ﬁnd
that relying on prior recommendations to block or rate-limit
speciﬁc queries still leaves open substantial residual risk as
they miss many other ampliﬁcation-inducing query patterns.
We also observe signiﬁcant variability across servers and
protocols, and thus prior approaches that rely on server census
can substantially misestimate ampliﬁcation risk.
1 Introduction
Many recent high-proﬁle Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks rely on ampliﬁcation [54, 57]. In an ampliﬁca-
tion attack, an attacker spoofs the victim’s source IP address
and sends queries to a public server (e.g., DNS, NTP, Mem-
cached), which in turn sends large responses to the victim. If
a source IP address can be spoofed, any statel...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks in the Illicit
Online Prescription Drug Trade
author:Nektarios Leontiadis and
Tyler Moore and
Nicolas Christin
Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks
in the Illicit Online Prescription Drug Trade
Nektarios Leontiadis
Carnegie Mellon University
Tyler Moore
Harvard University
Nicolas Christin
Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
We investigate the manipulation of web search re-
sults to promote the unauthorized sale of prescription
drugs. We focus on search-redirection attacks, where
miscreants compromise high-ranking websites and dy-
namically redirect trafﬁc to different pharmacies based
upon the particular search terms issued by the consumer.
We constructed a representative list of 218 drug-related
queries and automatically gathered the search results
on a daily basis over nine months in 2010-2011. We
ﬁnd that about one third of all search results are one
of over 7 000 infected hosts triggered to redirect to a
few hundred pharmacy websites. Legitimate pharmacies
and health resources have been largely crowded out by
search-redirection attacks and blog spam. Infections per-
sist longest on websites with high PageRank and from
.edu domains. 96% of infected domains are connected
through trafﬁc redirection chains, and network analysis
reveals that a few concentrated communities link many
otherwise disparate pharmacies together. We calculate
that the conversion rate of web searches into sales lies
between 0.3% and 3%, and that more illegal drugs sales
are facilitated by search-redirection attacks than by email
spam. Finally, we observe that concentration in both the
source infections and redirectors presents an opportunity
for defenders to disrupt online pharmacy sales.
1
Prescription drugs sold illicitly on the Internet arguably
constitute the most dangerous online criminal activity.
While resale of counterfeit luxury goods or software are
obvious frauds, counterfeit medicines actually endanger
public s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:ReCFA: Resilient Control-Flow Attestation
author:Yumei Zhang and
Xinzhi Liu and
Cong Sun and
Dongrui Zeng and
Gang Tan and
Xiao Kan and
Siqi Ma
ReCFA: Resilient Control-Flow Attestation
Yumei Zhang∗
Xinzhi Liu∗
zhangyumei319@163.com
1144518670@qq.com
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Gang Tan
gtan@psu.edu
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, USA
Cong Sun†
suncong@xidian.edu.cn
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Dongrui Zeng
dxz16@psu.edu
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, USA
Xiao Kan
814091656@qq.com
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Siqi Ma
slivia.ma@uq.edu.au
The University of Queensland
Brisbane, Australia
ABSTRACT
Recent IoT applications gradually adapt more complicated end sys-
tems with commodity software. Ensuring the runtime integrity of
these software is a challenging task for the remote controller or
cloud services. Popular enforcement is the runtime remote attesta-
tion which requires the end system (prover) to generate evidence
for its runtime behavior and a remote trusted verifier to attest the
evidence. Control-flow attestation is a kind of runtime attestation
that provides diagnoses towards the remote control-flow hijacking
at the prover. Most of these attestation approaches focus on small
or embedded software. The recent advance to attesting complicated
software depends on the source code and CFG traversing to measure
the checkpoint-separated subpaths, which may be unavailable for
commodity software and cause possible context missing between
consecutive subpaths in the measurements.
In this work, we propose a resilient control-flow attestation
(ReCFA), which does not need the offline measurement of all le-
gitimate control-flow paths, thus scalable to be used on compli-
cated commodity software. Our main contribution is a multi-phase
approach to condensing the runtime control-flow events; as a re-
sult, the vast amount of control-flow events are abstracted into
a deliverable size. The condensing approach consists of filteri...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:ReCFA: Resilient Control-Flow Attestation
author:Yumei Zhang and
Xinzhi Liu and
Cong Sun and
Dongrui Zeng and
Gang Tan and
Xiao Kan and
Siqi Ma
ReCFA: Resilient Control-Flow Attestation
Yumei Zhang∗
Xinzhi Liu∗
zhangyumei319@163.com
1144518670@qq.com
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Gang Tan
gtan@psu.edu
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, USA
Cong Sun†
suncong@xidian.edu.cn
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Dongrui Zeng
dxz16@psu.edu
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, USA
Xiao Kan
814091656@qq.com
Xidian University
Xi’an, China
Siqi Ma
slivia.ma@uq.edu.au
The University of Queensland
Brisbane, Australia
ABSTRACT
Recent IoT applications gradually adapt more complicated end sys-
tems with commodity software. Ensuring the runtime integrity of
these software is a challenging task for the remote controller or
cloud services. Popular enforcement is the runtime remote attesta-
tion which requires the end system (prover) to generate evidence
for its runtime behavior and a remote trusted verifier to attest the
evidence. Control-flow attestation is a kind of runtime attestation
that provides diagnoses towards the remote control-flow hijacking
at the prover. Most of these attestation approaches focus on small
or embedded software. The recent advance to attesting complicated
software depends on the source code and CFG traversing to measure
the checkpoint-separated subpaths, which may be unavailable for
commodity software and cause possible context missing between
consecutive subpaths in the measurements.
In this work, we propose a resilient control-flow attestation
(ReCFA), which does not need the offline measurement of all le-
gitimate control-flow paths, thus scalable to be used on compli-
cated commodity software. Our main contribution is a multi-phase
approach to condensing the runtime control-flow events; as a re-
sult, the vast amount of control-flow events are abstracted into
a deliverable size. The condensing approach consists of filteri...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:High-resolution measurement of data center microbursts
author:Qiao Zhang and
Vincent Liu and
Hongyi Zeng and
Arvind Krishnamurthy
High-Resolution Measurement of Data Center Microbursts∗
Qiao Zhang
University of Washington
qiao@cs.washington.edu
Vincent Liu
University of Pennsylvania
liuv@cis.upenn.edu
Hongyi Zeng
Facebook, Inc.
zeng@fb.com
Arvind
Krishnamurthy
University of Washington
arvind@cs.washington.edu
ABSTRACT
Data centers house some of the largest, fastest networks in the
world. In contrast to and as a result of their speed, these networks
operate on very small timescales—a 100 Gbps port processes a sin-
gle packet in at most 500 ns with end-to-end network latencies
of under a millisecond. In this study, we explore the fine-grained
behaviors of a large production data center using extremely high-
resolution measurements (10s to 100s of microsecond) of rack-level
traffic. Our results show that characterizing network events like
congestion and synchronized behavior in data centers does indeed
require the use of such measurements. In fact, we observe that more
than 70% of bursts on the racks we measured are sustained for at
most tens of microseconds: a range that is orders of magnitude
higher-resolution than most deployed measurement frameworks.
Congestion events observed by less granular measurements are
likely collections of smaller µbursts. Thus, we find that traffic at
the edge is significantly less balanced than other metrics might
suggest. Beyond the implications for measurement granularity, we
hope these results will inform future data center load balancing
and congestion control protocols.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network measurement; Data center networks;
Network performance analysis; Network monitoring; Social media
networks;
KEYWORDS
Data center traffic, microbursts
ACM Reference Format:
Qiao Zhang, Vincent Liu, Hongyi Zeng, and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2017.
High-Resolution Measurement of Data Center Microbursts. In Proceedings
of IMC ’17, Lond...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:High-resolution measurement of data center microbursts
author:Qiao Zhang and
Vincent Liu and
Hongyi Zeng and
Arvind Krishnamurthy
High-Resolution Measurement of Data Center Microbursts∗
Qiao Zhang
University of Washington
qiao@cs.washington.edu
Vincent Liu
University of Pennsylvania
liuv@cis.upenn.edu
Hongyi Zeng
Facebook, Inc.
zeng@fb.com
Arvind
Krishnamurthy
University of Washington
arvind@cs.washington.edu
ABSTRACT
Data centers house some of the largest, fastest networks in the
world. In contrast to and as a result of their speed, these networks
operate on very small timescales—a 100 Gbps port processes a sin-
gle packet in at most 500 ns with end-to-end network latencies
of under a millisecond. In this study, we explore the fine-grained
behaviors of a large production data center using extremely high-
resolution measurements (10s to 100s of microsecond) of rack-level
traffic. Our results show that characterizing network events like
congestion and synchronized behavior in data centers does indeed
require the use of such measurements. In fact, we observe that more
than 70% of bursts on the racks we measured are sustained for at
most tens of microseconds: a range that is orders of magnitude
higher-resolution than most deployed measurement frameworks.
Congestion events observed by less granular measurements are
likely collections of smaller µbursts. Thus, we find that traffic at
the edge is significantly less balanced than other metrics might
suggest. Beyond the implications for measurement granularity, we
hope these results will inform future data center load balancing
and congestion control protocols.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network measurement; Data center networks;
Network performance analysis; Network monitoring; Social media
networks;
KEYWORDS
Data center traffic, microbursts
ACM Reference Format:
Qiao Zhang, Vincent Liu, Hongyi Zeng, and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2017.
High-Resolution Measurement of Data Center Microbursts. In Proceedings
of IMC ’17, Lond...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Unicorn: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent
Threats
author:Xueyuan Han and
Thomas F. J.-M. Pasquier and
Adam Bates and
James Mickens and
Margo I. Seltzer
UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for
Advanced Persistent Threats
Xueyuan Han∗, Thomas Pasquier†, Adam Bates‡, James Mickens∗ and Margo Seltzer§
{hanx,mickens}@g.harvard.edu
∗Harvard University
†University of Bristol
thomas.pasquier@bristol.ac.uk
‡University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
batesa@illinois.edu
§University of British Columbia
mseltzer@cs.ubc.ca
Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difﬁcult to
detect due to their “low-and-slow” attack patterns and frequent
use of zero-day exploits. We present UNICORN, an anomaly-
based APT detector that effectively leverages data provenance
analysis. From modeling to detection, UNICORN tailors its design
speciﬁcally for the unique characteristics of APTs. Through
extensive yet time-efﬁcient graph analysis, UNICORN explores
provenance graphs that provide rich contextual and historical
information to identify stealthy anomalous activities without pre-
deﬁned attack signatures. Using a graph sketching technique, it
summarizes long-running system execution with space efﬁciency
to combat slow-acting attacks that take place over a long time
span. UNICORN further improves its detection capability using a
novel modeling approach to understand long-term behavior as the
system evolves. Our evaluation shows that UNICORN outperforms
an existing state-of-the-art APT detection system and detects real-
life APT scenarios with high accuracy.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are becoming increas-
ingly common [9]. The long timescale over which such attacks
take place makes them fundamentally different from more
conventional attacks. In an APT, the adversary’s goal is to gain
control of a speciﬁc (network of) system(s) while remaining
undetected for an extended period of time [116]. The adversary
often relies on zero-day...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Unicorn: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent
Threats
author:Xueyuan Han and
Thomas F. J.-M. Pasquier and
Adam Bates and
James Mickens and
Margo I. Seltzer
UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for
Advanced Persistent Threats
Xueyuan Han∗, Thomas Pasquier†, Adam Bates‡, James Mickens∗ and Margo Seltzer§
{hanx,mickens}@g.harvard.edu
∗Harvard University
†University of Bristol
thomas.pasquier@bristol.ac.uk
‡University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
batesa@illinois.edu
§University of British Columbia
mseltzer@cs.ubc.ca
Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difﬁcult to
detect due to their “low-and-slow” attack patterns and frequent
use of zero-day exploits. We present UNICORN, an anomaly-
based APT detector that effectively leverages data provenance
analysis. From modeling to detection, UNICORN tailors its design
speciﬁcally for the unique characteristics of APTs. Through
extensive yet time-efﬁcient graph analysis, UNICORN explores
provenance graphs that provide rich contextual and historical
information to identify stealthy anomalous activities without pre-
deﬁned attack signatures. Using a graph sketching technique, it
summarizes long-running system execution with space efﬁciency
to combat slow-acting attacks that take place over a long time
span. UNICORN further improves its detection capability using a
novel modeling approach to understand long-term behavior as the
system evolves. Our evaluation shows that UNICORN outperforms
an existing state-of-the-art APT detection system and detects real-
life APT scenarios with high accuracy.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are becoming increas-
ingly common [9]. The long timescale over which such attacks
take place makes them fundamentally different from more
conventional attacks. In an APT, the adversary’s goal is to gain
control of a speciﬁc (network of) system(s) while remaining
undetected for an extended period of time [116]. The adversary
often relies on zero-day...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Security (And How You
May Get Caught Red Handed)
author:Daniele Cono D'Elia and
Emilio Coppa and
Simone Nicchi and
Federico Palmaro and
Lorenzo Cavallaro
SoK: Using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Security
(And How You May Get Caught Red Handed)
Daniele Cono D’Elia
Sapienza University of Rome
delia@diag.uniroma1.it
Emilio Coppa
Sapienza University of Rome
coppa@diag.uniroma1.it
Simone Nicchi
Sapienza University of Rome
nicchi@diag.uniroma1.it
Federico Palmaro
Prisma
f.palmaro@prismaprogetti.it
ABSTRACT
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) techniques allow for moni-
toring and possibly altering the execution of a running program up
to the instruction level granularity. The ease of use and flexibility of
DBI primitives has made them popular in a large body of research in
different domains, including software security. Lately, the suitabil-
ity of DBI for security has been questioned in light of transparency
concerns from artifacts that popular frameworks introduce in the
execution: while they do not perturb benign programs, a dedicated
adversary may detect their presence and defeat the analysis.
The contributions we provide are two-fold. We first present the
abstraction and inner workings of DBI frameworks, how DBI as-
sisted prominent security research works, and alternative solutions.
We then dive into the DBI evasion and escape problems, discussing
attack surfaces, transparency concerns, and possible mitigations.
We make available to the community a library of detection pat-
terns and stopgap measures that could be of interest to DBI users.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Systems security; Intrusion/anomaly
detection and malware mitigation; Software reverse engineering; Soft-
ware security engineering.
KEYWORDS
Dynamic binary instrumentation, dynamic binary translation, in-
terposition, transparent monitoring, evasion, escape
ACM Reference Format:
Daniele Cono D’Elia, Emilio Coppa, Simone Nicchi, Federico...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Security (And How You
May Get Caught Red Handed)
author:Daniele Cono D'Elia and
Emilio Coppa and
Simone Nicchi and
Federico Palmaro and
Lorenzo Cavallaro
SoK: Using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Security
(And How You May Get Caught Red Handed)
Daniele Cono D’Elia
Sapienza University of Rome
delia@diag.uniroma1.it
Emilio Coppa
Sapienza University of Rome
coppa@diag.uniroma1.it
Simone Nicchi
Sapienza University of Rome
nicchi@diag.uniroma1.it
Federico Palmaro
Prisma
f.palmaro@prismaprogetti.it
ABSTRACT
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) techniques allow for moni-
toring and possibly altering the execution of a running program up
to the instruction level granularity. The ease of use and flexibility of
DBI primitives has made them popular in a large body of research in
different domains, including software security. Lately, the suitabil-
ity of DBI for security has been questioned in light of transparency
concerns from artifacts that popular frameworks introduce in the
execution: while they do not perturb benign programs, a dedicated
adversary may detect their presence and defeat the analysis.
The contributions we provide are two-fold. We first present the
abstraction and inner workings of DBI frameworks, how DBI as-
sisted prominent security research works, and alternative solutions.
We then dive into the DBI evasion and escape problems, discussing
attack surfaces, transparency concerns, and possible mitigations.
We make available to the community a library of detection pat-
terns and stopgap measures that could be of interest to DBI users.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Systems security; Intrusion/anomaly
detection and malware mitigation; Software reverse engineering; Soft-
ware security engineering.
KEYWORDS
Dynamic binary instrumentation, dynamic binary translation, in-
terposition, transparent monitoring, evasion, escape
ACM Reference Format:
Daniele Cono D’Elia, Emilio Coppa, Simone Nicchi, Federico...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Timeouts: Beware Surprisingly High Delay
author:Ramakrishna Padmanabhan and
Patrick Owen and
Aaron Schulman and
Neil Spring
Timeouts: Beware Surprisingly High Delay
Ramakrishna
Padmanabhan
University of Maryland
ramapad@cs.umd.edu
Patrick Owen
University of Maryland
powen@cs.umd.edu
Aaron Schulman
Stanford University
aschulm@stanford.edu
Neil Spring
University of Maryland
nspring@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Active probing techniques, such as ping, have been used to
detect outages. When a previously responsive end host fails
to respond to a probe, studies sometimes attempt to conﬁrm
the outage by retrying the ping or attempt to identify the
location of the outage by using other tools such as tracer-
oute. The latent problem, however, is, how long should one
wait for a response to the ping? Too short a timeout risks
confusing congestion or other delay with an outage. Too
long a timeout may slow the process and prevent observ-
ing and diagnosing short-duration events, depending on the
experiment’s design.
We believe that conventional timeouts for active probes
are underestimates, and analyze data collected by Heide-
mann et al.
in 2006–2015. We ﬁnd that 5% of pings from
5% of addresses take more than 5 seconds. Put another way,
for 5% of the responsive IP addresses probed by Heidemann,
a false 5% loss rate would be inferred if using a timeout of 5
seconds. To arrive at this observation, we ﬁltered artifacts
of the data that could occur with too-long a timeout, includ-
ing responses to probes sent to broadcast addresses. We also
analyze ICMP data collected by Zmap in 2015 to ﬁnd that
around 5% of all responsive addresses observe a greater than
one second round-trip time consistently. Further, the preva-
lence of high round trip time has been increasing and it is
often associated with the ﬁrst ping, perhaps due to negotiat-
ing a wireless connection. In addition, we ﬁnd that the Au-
tonomous Systems with the most high-latency addresses are
typically cellular. This paper de...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Timeouts: Beware Surprisingly High Delay
author:Ramakrishna Padmanabhan and
Patrick Owen and
Aaron Schulman and
Neil Spring
Timeouts: Beware Surprisingly High Delay
Ramakrishna
Padmanabhan
University of Maryland
ramapad@cs.umd.edu
Patrick Owen
University of Maryland
powen@cs.umd.edu
Aaron Schulman
Stanford University
aschulm@stanford.edu
Neil Spring
University of Maryland
nspring@cs.umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Active probing techniques, such as ping, have been used to
detect outages. When a previously responsive end host fails
to respond to a probe, studies sometimes attempt to conﬁrm
the outage by retrying the ping or attempt to identify the
location of the outage by using other tools such as tracer-
oute. The latent problem, however, is, how long should one
wait for a response to the ping? Too short a timeout risks
confusing congestion or other delay with an outage. Too
long a timeout may slow the process and prevent observ-
ing and diagnosing short-duration events, depending on the
experiment’s design.
We believe that conventional timeouts for active probes
are underestimates, and analyze data collected by Heide-
mann et al.
in 2006–2015. We ﬁnd that 5% of pings from
5% of addresses take more than 5 seconds. Put another way,
for 5% of the responsive IP addresses probed by Heidemann,
a false 5% loss rate would be inferred if using a timeout of 5
seconds. To arrive at this observation, we ﬁltered artifacts
of the data that could occur with too-long a timeout, includ-
ing responses to probes sent to broadcast addresses. We also
analyze ICMP data collected by Zmap in 2015 to ﬁnd that
around 5% of all responsive addresses observe a greater than
one second round-trip time consistently. Further, the preva-
lence of high round trip time has been increasing and it is
often associated with the ﬁrst ping, perhaps due to negotiat-
ing a wireless connection. In addition, we ﬁnd that the Au-
tonomous Systems with the most high-latency addresses are
typically cellular. This paper de...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions, Applications, and Lower
Bounds
author:Kevin Lewi and
David J. Wu
Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions,
Applications, and Lower Bounds
(Extended Version)
Kevin Lewi
Stanford University
David J. Wu
Stanford University
klewi@cs.stanford.edu
dwu4@cs.stanford.edu
Abstract
In the last few years, there has been signiﬁcant interest in developing methods to search over
encrypted data. In the case of range queries, a simple solution is to encrypt the contents of
the database using an order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme (i.e., an encryption scheme
that supports comparisons over encrypted values). However, Naveed et al. (CCS 2015) recently
showed that OPE-encrypted databases are extremely vulnerable to “inference attacks.”
In this work, we consider a related primitive called order-revealing encryption (ORE), which
is a generalization of OPE that allows for stronger security. We begin by constructing a new ORE
scheme for small message spaces which achieves the “best-possible” notion of security for ORE.
Next, we introduce a “domain-extension” technique and apply it to our small-message-space
ORE. While our domain-extension technique does incur a loss in security, the resulting ORE
scheme we obtain is more secure than all existing (stateless and non-interactive) OPE and ORE
schemes which are practical. All of our constructions rely only on symmetric primitives. As
part of our analysis, we also give a tight lower bound for OPE and show that no eﬃcient OPE
scheme can satisfy best-possible security if the message space contains just three messages. Thus,
achieving strong notions of security for even small message spaces requires moving beyond OPE.
Finally, we examine the properties of our new ORE scheme and show how to use it to
construct an eﬃcient range query protocol that is robust against the inference attacks of Naveed
et al. We also give a full implementation of our new ORE scheme, and show that not only is
our...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions, Applications, and Lower
Bounds
author:Kevin Lewi and
David J. Wu
Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions,
Applications, and Lower Bounds
(Extended Version)
Kevin Lewi
Stanford University
David J. Wu
Stanford University
klewi@cs.stanford.edu
dwu4@cs.stanford.edu
Abstract
In the last few years, there has been signiﬁcant interest in developing methods to search over
encrypted data. In the case of range queries, a simple solution is to encrypt the contents of
the database using an order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme (i.e., an encryption scheme
that supports comparisons over encrypted values). However, Naveed et al. (CCS 2015) recently
showed that OPE-encrypted databases are extremely vulnerable to “inference attacks.”
In this work, we consider a related primitive called order-revealing encryption (ORE), which
is a generalization of OPE that allows for stronger security. We begin by constructing a new ORE
scheme for small message spaces which achieves the “best-possible” notion of security for ORE.
Next, we introduce a “domain-extension” technique and apply it to our small-message-space
ORE. While our domain-extension technique does incur a loss in security, the resulting ORE
scheme we obtain is more secure than all existing (stateless and non-interactive) OPE and ORE
schemes which are practical. All of our constructions rely only on symmetric primitives. As
part of our analysis, we also give a tight lower bound for OPE and show that no eﬃcient OPE
scheme can satisfy best-possible security if the message space contains just three messages. Thus,
achieving strong notions of security for even small message spaces requires moving beyond OPE.
Finally, we examine the properties of our new ORE scheme and show how to use it to
construct an eﬃcient range query protocol that is robust against the inference attacks of Naveed
et al. We also give a full implementation of our new ORE scheme, and show that not only is
our...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Issues and etiquette concerning use of shared measurement data
author:Mark Allman and
Vern Paxson
Issues and Etiquette
Concerning Use of Shared Measurement Data
Mark Allman
ICSI
Berkeley, CA, USA
mallman@icir.org
ABSTRACT
In this note we discuss issues surrounding how to provide and use
network measurement data made available for sharing among re-
searchers. While previous work has focused on the technical de-
tails of enabling sharing via trafﬁc anonymization, we focus on
higher-level aspects of the process such as potential harm to the
provider (e.g., by de-anonymizing a shared dataset) or interactions
to strengthen subsequent research (e.g., helping to establish ground
truth). We believe the community would beneﬁt from a dialog
regarding expectations and responsibilities of data providers, and
the etiquette involved with using others’ measurement data. To
this end, we provide a set of guidelines that aim to aid the pro-
cess of sharing measurement data. We present these not as speciﬁc
rules, but rather a framework under which providers and users can
better attain a mutual understanding about how to treat particular
datasets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General; C.2.3
[Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Operations;
C.2.m [Computer-Communication Networks]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Measurement,Experimentation
Keywords
Data Sharing,Anonymization
1.
INTRODUCTION
Collecting a substantive set of network measurements gener-
ally requires both favorable circumstances and hard work. The
circumstances regard having the right opportunity: administrative
and legal permission (particularly for passive measurements), op-
erational support (e.g., installation of the measurement apparatus,
subsequent access to it for maintenance), and access to sufﬁcient
resources (e.g., disk space, network taps, kernel mods, smart stu-
dents). The hard work spans developing and debugging associated
Permission to make digital or hard...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Issues and etiquette concerning use of shared measurement data
author:Mark Allman and
Vern Paxson
Issues and Etiquette
Concerning Use of Shared Measurement Data
Mark Allman
ICSI
Berkeley, CA, USA
mallman@icir.org
ABSTRACT
In this note we discuss issues surrounding how to provide and use
network measurement data made available for sharing among re-
searchers. While previous work has focused on the technical de-
tails of enabling sharing via trafﬁc anonymization, we focus on
higher-level aspects of the process such as potential harm to the
provider (e.g., by de-anonymizing a shared dataset) or interactions
to strengthen subsequent research (e.g., helping to establish ground
truth). We believe the community would beneﬁt from a dialog
regarding expectations and responsibilities of data providers, and
the etiquette involved with using others’ measurement data. To
this end, we provide a set of guidelines that aim to aid the pro-
cess of sharing measurement data. We present these not as speciﬁc
rules, but rather a framework under which providers and users can
better attain a mutual understanding about how to treat particular
datasets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General; C.2.3
[Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Operations;
C.2.m [Computer-Communication Networks]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Measurement,Experimentation
Keywords
Data Sharing,Anonymization
1.
INTRODUCTION
Collecting a substantive set of network measurements gener-
ally requires both favorable circumstances and hard work. The
circumstances regard having the right opportunity: administrative
and legal permission (particularly for passive measurements), op-
erational support (e.g., installation of the measurement apparatus,
subsequent access to it for maintenance), and access to sufﬁcient
resources (e.g., disk space, network taps, kernel mods, smart stu-
dents). The hard work spans developing and debugging associated
Permission to make digital or hard...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Human-Seeded Attacks and Exploiting Hot-Spots in Graphical Passwords
author:Julie Thorpe and
Paul C. van Oorschot
Human-Seeded Attacks and
Exploiting Hot-Spots in Graphical Passwords1
Julie Thorpe and P.C. van Oorschot
School of Computer Science, Carleton University
{jthorpe, paulv}@scs.carleton.ca
Abstract
Although motivated by both usability and security con-
cerns, the existing literature on click-based graphical
password schemes using a single background image
(e.g., PassPoints) has focused largely on usability. We
examine the security of such schemes, including the im-
pact of different background images, and strategies for
guessing user passwords. We report on both short- and
long-term user studies: one lab-controlled, involving 43
users and 17 diverse images, and the other a ﬁeld test of
223 user accounts. We provide empirical evidence that
popular points (hot-spots) do exist for many images, and
explore two different types of attack to exploit this hot-
spotting: (1) a “human-seeded” attack based on harvest-
ing click-points from a small set of users, and (2) an en-
tirely automated attack based on image processing tech-
niques. Our most effective attacks are generated by har-
vesting password data from a small set of users to attack
other targets. These attacks can guess 36% of user pass-
words within 231 guesses (or 12% within 216 guesses)
in one instance, and 20% within 233 guesses (or 10%
within 218 guesses) in a second instance. We perform
an image-processing attack by implementing and adapt-
ing a bottom-up model of visual attention, resulting in a
purely automated tool that can guess up to 30% of user
passwords in 235 guesses for some instances, but under
3% on others. Our results suggest that these graphical
password schemes appear to be at least as susceptible to
ofﬂine attack as the traditional text passwords they were
proposed to replace.
1
Introduction
The bane of password authentication using text-based
passwords is that users choose passw...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Human-Seeded Attacks and Exploiting Hot-Spots in Graphical Passwords
author:Julie Thorpe and
Paul C. van Oorschot
Human-Seeded Attacks and
Exploiting Hot-Spots in Graphical Passwords1
Julie Thorpe and P.C. van Oorschot
School of Computer Science, Carleton University
{jthorpe, paulv}@scs.carleton.ca
Abstract
Although motivated by both usability and security con-
cerns, the existing literature on click-based graphical
password schemes using a single background image
(e.g., PassPoints) has focused largely on usability. We
examine the security of such schemes, including the im-
pact of different background images, and strategies for
guessing user passwords. We report on both short- and
long-term user studies: one lab-controlled, involving 43
users and 17 diverse images, and the other a ﬁeld test of
223 user accounts. We provide empirical evidence that
popular points (hot-spots) do exist for many images, and
explore two different types of attack to exploit this hot-
spotting: (1) a “human-seeded” attack based on harvest-
ing click-points from a small set of users, and (2) an en-
tirely automated attack based on image processing tech-
niques. Our most effective attacks are generated by har-
vesting password data from a small set of users to attack
other targets. These attacks can guess 36% of user pass-
words within 231 guesses (or 12% within 216 guesses)
in one instance, and 20% within 233 guesses (or 10%
within 218 guesses) in a second instance. We perform
an image-processing attack by implementing and adapt-
ing a bottom-up model of visual attention, resulting in a
purely automated tool that can guess up to 30% of user
passwords in 235 guesses for some instances, but under
3% on others. Our results suggest that these graphical
password schemes appear to be at least as susceptible to
ofﬂine attack as the traditional text passwords they were
proposed to replace.
1
Introduction
The bane of password authentication using text-based
passwords is that users choose passw...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks
author:Weilin Xu and
David Evans and
Yanjun Qi
Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks
Feature Squeezing:
Weilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun Qi
University of Virginia
evadeML.org
Abstract—Although deep neural networks
(DNNs) have
achieved great success in many tasks, recent studies have shown
they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Such examples,
typically generated by adding small but purposeful distortions,
can frequently fool DNN models. Previous studies to defend
against adversarial examples mostly focused on reﬁning the
DNN models, but have either shown limited success or suﬀered
from expensive computation. We propose a new strategy, feature
squeezing, that can be used to harden DNN models by detecting
adversarial examples. Feature squeezing reduces the search space
available to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond
to many diﬀerent feature vectors in the original space into a single
sample. By comparing a DNN model’s prediction on the original
input with that on squeezed inputs, feature squeezing detects
adversarial examples with high accuracy and few false positives.
This paper explores two types of feature squeezing: reducing
the color bit depth of each pixel and spatial smoothing. These
strategies are inexpensive and complementary to other defenses,
and can be combined in a joint detection framework to achieve
high detection rates against state-of-the-art attacks.
I.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) perform exceptionally
well on many artiﬁcial intelligence tasks, including security-
sensitive applications like malware classiﬁcation [26], [8] and
face recognition [35]. Unlike when machine learning is used
in other ﬁelds, security applications involve intelligent and
adaptive adversaries responding to the deployed systems. Re-
cent studies have shown that attackers can force deep learning
object classiﬁcation models to mis-classify images by ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks
author:Weilin Xu and
David Evans and
Yanjun Qi
Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks
Feature Squeezing:
Weilin Xu, David Evans, Yanjun Qi
University of Virginia
evadeML.org
Abstract—Although deep neural networks
(DNNs) have
achieved great success in many tasks, recent studies have shown
they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Such examples,
typically generated by adding small but purposeful distortions,
can frequently fool DNN models. Previous studies to defend
against adversarial examples mostly focused on reﬁning the
DNN models, but have either shown limited success or suﬀered
from expensive computation. We propose a new strategy, feature
squeezing, that can be used to harden DNN models by detecting
adversarial examples. Feature squeezing reduces the search space
available to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond
to many diﬀerent feature vectors in the original space into a single
sample. By comparing a DNN model’s prediction on the original
input with that on squeezed inputs, feature squeezing detects
adversarial examples with high accuracy and few false positives.
This paper explores two types of feature squeezing: reducing
the color bit depth of each pixel and spatial smoothing. These
strategies are inexpensive and complementary to other defenses,
and can be combined in a joint detection framework to achieve
high detection rates against state-of-the-art attacks.
I.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) perform exceptionally
well on many artiﬁcial intelligence tasks, including security-
sensitive applications like malware classiﬁcation [26], [8] and
face recognition [35]. Unlike when machine learning is used
in other ﬁelds, security applications involve intelligent and
adaptive adversaries responding to the deployed systems. Re-
cent studies have shown that attackers can force deep learning
object classiﬁcation models to mis-classify images by ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A new framework against privilege escalation attacks on android
author:Wenming Zhou and
Yuqing Zhang and
Xuefeng Liu
POSTER: A New Framework against Privilege
Escalation Attacks on Android
Wenming Zhou
State Key Lab of Integrated Service
Network, Xidian University
Xi’an, China, 710126
wmzhou@stu.xidian.edu.cn
Yuqing Zhang
National Computer Network Instrusion
Protection Center, UCAS
Beijing, China, 100048
zhangyq@nipc.org.cn
Xuefeng Liu
State Key Lab of Integrated Service
Network, Xidian University
Xi’an, China, 710071
liuxf@mail.xidian.edu.cn
from
previous
schemes,
policy-centered
the  permissions.  Specially,  we  allow
ABSTRACT
The Android provides a permission-based security model to restrict
the  operations  that  each  application  can  perform;  however,  it  has
been  shown  to  be  vulnerable  to  privilege  escalation  attacks.
Applications can cooperate to perform operations that forbidden to
perform  separately  which  may  lead  to  privacy  leakage.  In  this
poster,  we  present  the  design  of  a  new  policy-centered  security
framework against the application-level privilege escalation attacks.
Different
the
communication  content  is  also  considered  into  the  inspection
besides
the  privacy
information selectively to be passed in the middleware and deploy a
mandatory access control at the kernel based on the dynamical taint
tracking.  Test  results  show  that  it  can  prevent  known  confused
deputy  attacks  and  is  also  flexible  to  prevent  the  unknowns;
furthermore it can reduce the false positives of preventing colluding
attacks compared to the previous work.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection
General Terms: Security
Keywords
 Privilege Escalation Attacks, Taint Tracking, Privacy Protection
1.  INTRODUCTION
In the Android’s permission-based security model, applications are
only granted permissions that they really need and ea...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A new framework against privilege escalation attacks on android
author:Wenming Zhou and
Yuqing Zhang and
Xuefeng Liu
POSTER: A New Framework against Privilege
Escalation Attacks on Android
Wenming Zhou
State Key Lab of Integrated Service
Network, Xidian University
Xi’an, China, 710126
wmzhou@stu.xidian.edu.cn
Yuqing Zhang
National Computer Network Instrusion
Protection Center, UCAS
Beijing, China, 100048
zhangyq@nipc.org.cn
Xuefeng Liu
State Key Lab of Integrated Service
Network, Xidian University
Xi’an, China, 710071
liuxf@mail.xidian.edu.cn
from
previous
schemes,
policy-centered
the  permissions.  Specially,  we  allow
ABSTRACT
The Android provides a permission-based security model to restrict
the  operations  that  each  application  can  perform;  however,  it  has
been  shown  to  be  vulnerable  to  privilege  escalation  attacks.
Applications can cooperate to perform operations that forbidden to
perform  separately  which  may  lead  to  privacy  leakage.  In  this
poster,  we  present  the  design  of  a  new  policy-centered  security
framework against the application-level privilege escalation attacks.
Different
the
communication  content  is  also  considered  into  the  inspection
besides
the  privacy
information selectively to be passed in the middleware and deploy a
mandatory access control at the kernel based on the dynamical taint
tracking.  Test  results  show  that  it  can  prevent  known  confused
deputy  attacks  and  is  also  flexible  to  prevent  the  unknowns;
furthermore it can reduce the false positives of preventing colluding
attacks compared to the previous work.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection
General Terms: Security
Keywords
 Privilege Escalation Attacks, Taint Tracking, Privacy Protection
1.  INTRODUCTION
In the Android’s permission-based security model, applications are
only granted permissions that they really need and ea...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:GAN-Leaks: A Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks against Generative
Models
author:Dingfan Chen and
Ning Yu and
Yang Zhang and
Mario Fritz
GAN-Leaks: A Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks
against Generative Models
Dingfan Chen
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Ning Yu
University of Maryland, College Park
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Yang Zhang
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Mario Fritz
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
ABSTRACT
Deep learning has achieved overwhelming success, spanning from
discriminative models to generative models. In particular, deep
generative models have facilitated a new level of performance in
a myriad of areas, ranging from media manipulation to sanitized
dataset generation. Despite the great success, the potential risks of
privacy breach caused by generative models have not been analyzed
systematically. In this paper, we focus on membership inference at-
tack against deep generative models that reveals information about
the training data used for victim models. Specifically, we present
the first taxonomy of membership inference attacks, encompassing
not only existing attacks but also our novel ones. In addition, we
propose the first generic attack model that can be instantiated in a
large range of settings and is applicable to various kinds of deep
generative models. Moreover, we provide a theoretically grounded
attack calibration technique, which consistently boosts the attack
performance in all cases, across different attack settings, data modal-
ities, and training configurations. We complement the systematic
analysis of attack performance by a comprehensive experimental
study, that investigates the effectiveness of various attacks w.r.t.
model type and training configurations, over three diverse applica-
tion scenarios (i.e., images, medical data, and location data).
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Machine learning; • Security
and privacy;
KEYWORDS
Membership in...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:GAN-Leaks: A Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks against Generative
Models
author:Dingfan Chen and
Ning Yu and
Yang Zhang and
Mario Fritz
GAN-Leaks: A Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks
against Generative Models
Dingfan Chen
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Ning Yu
University of Maryland, College Park
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Yang Zhang
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Mario Fritz
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
ABSTRACT
Deep learning has achieved overwhelming success, spanning from
discriminative models to generative models. In particular, deep
generative models have facilitated a new level of performance in
a myriad of areas, ranging from media manipulation to sanitized
dataset generation. Despite the great success, the potential risks of
privacy breach caused by generative models have not been analyzed
systematically. In this paper, we focus on membership inference at-
tack against deep generative models that reveals information about
the training data used for victim models. Specifically, we present
the first taxonomy of membership inference attacks, encompassing
not only existing attacks but also our novel ones. In addition, we
propose the first generic attack model that can be instantiated in a
large range of settings and is applicable to various kinds of deep
generative models. Moreover, we provide a theoretically grounded
attack calibration technique, which consistently boosts the attack
performance in all cases, across different attack settings, data modal-
ities, and training configurations. We complement the systematic
analysis of attack performance by a comprehensive experimental
study, that investigates the effectiveness of various attacks w.r.t.
model type and training configurations, over three diverse applica-
tion scenarios (i.e., images, medical data, and location data).
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Machine learning; • Security
and privacy;
KEYWORDS
Membership in...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。