Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:eu-21 A Deep Dive into Privacy Dashboard of Top Android Vendors
Most android vendors designed privacy dashboards before Android 12 to allow users to monitor sensitive behaviors of their installed apps, such as clipboard access, location collection, file operation, etc. However, we conducted comprehensive research about them and found that it is not accurate and complete for most privacy dashboards. Many design or development flaws allow malicious apps to bypass their monitor or report a false alarm for a benign App.Our research dive deep into the implementation of the privacy protection mechanism includes five top vendors and explains the difference of design in the aspect of sensitivity level, operation frequency, and behavior status, etc. We will discuss the flaws of these vendor's coarse-grained behavior control and how a malicious app performs sensitive operations without invoking the dashboard. For example, collecting your location leaving no trace, deleting your album silently, etc. Besides, we also found some vendor's over-designed monitoring strategies will generate a false positive report or alarm under some extreme conditions.Finally, we will present our method of how to extract sensitive APIs from custom android ROMs and our test process to verify the privacy dashboard report. By our presentation, we want to improve the privacy protection mechanism of vendors and better protect billions of users' privacy.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files.[20][21]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can use XOR, AES, and DES to encrypt loader shellcode.[110]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[138][139][140][141]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-21 Wideshears: Investigating and Breaking Widevine on QTEE
Widevine is a DRM solution, and QTEE is the TrustZone implement of Qualcomm, both running on billions of devices. In this presentation, we will share our latest study of Widevine on QTEE. We will first explain why QTEE and Widevine are high-value targets and share the basics about them in brief. After the opening, we will show how to locate the command handling logic and get the logic explained to show how we found a vulnerability.With the vulnerability in hand, we need the following in order to achieve the exploit:1. We need to know the memory model of a QTEE TA, especially how commands are delivered and how buffers are shared between the two worlds. Another vulnerability is put forward to do information leak with the model.2. We need to know where the TA is loaded and find a way to break ASLR.3. We need to find a memory layout to access TA from the user-controlled location.After the above is resolved, we will put them together to exploit the Widevine TA and extract data from SFS, the trusted storage of QTEE.Prior knowledge is not mandatory but is recommended.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host.[8]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp creates a user account as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised machine.[13]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used the NtQueueApcThread syscall to inject code into svchost.exe.[11]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1574.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.[27]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from %SYSTEM32%.[19]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of certutil, onto a compromised host .[218][442]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) from victim networks.[34]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 No Royal Road … Notes on Dangerous Game
Attribution fatigue is real. We are 20 years past Moonlight Maze, 15 years past Titan Rain, and a decade past the formation of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre in Estonia. These recent ten years have seen the public dumping of stolen nation-state toolchains, a worm renaissance, and increasingly adventurous forays by states far beyond the limits of espionage, into active operations. Small wonder we’re tired… but what have we learned about technical and contextual analysis as nation-state threats roll into their third decade? What are we missing? Does any of this even matter?Network defenders and threat intelligence analysts tend to be sharply divided on this question of nation-state threat attribution. Reasonable network defenders may decide ‘How?’ is all that matters (observables || GTFO); reasonable threat intel analysts may feel similarly about ‘Who?’ (APT1 || GTFO). This talk addresses each of these reasonable extremes, and further advocates for the neglected value of ‘Why?’ in surfacing adversary requirements, targeting, and constraints. We will look at how nation-states have used malware as a form of geopolitical signalling, the myth of vendor neutrality in the nation-state threat ecosystem, and opportunistic distortion of technical analysis. Words and PE headers are hard, nation-states are weird, but more perfect nation-state threat analysis is possible within – and beyond – the binary.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a VisualBasic script named MicrosoftUpdator.vbs for execution of a PowerShell keylogger.[64]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used keylogging tools in their operations.[176]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can remotely read the OCP UA structure from devices.[4]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can display popups over running applications.[15]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape has decrypted the password of the C2 server with a simple byte by byte XOR. Siloscape also writes both an archive of Tor and the unzip binary to disk from data embedded within the payload using Visual Studio’s Resource Manager.[214]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-18 Video Killed the Text Star: OSINT Approach
In 1979 The Buggles launched the hit song "Video Killed the Radio Star." Nowadays The Buggles could write a new song titled "Video Killed the Text Star." Social networks are growing around video content. This means that if OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) wants to stay alive needs to start getting value from video content. Video analysis, and person recognition in particular, is a very interesting task to security managers, CISOs, and analysts with responsibilities in physical security. However, video and image processing is gaining prominence. Internet content grows exponentially and there is a trend of publishing content in a video format. It's time to focus on this kind of information and start to move OSINT techniques and technologies to be able to process this type of information. Human face recognition is one of the Machine Learning applications which has had more advances in recent years. This advances and the actual power of hardware make it possible to implement this kind of service at a very low cost.We can use Open Source components to implement a fast and scalable infrastructure that allows you to analyze hundreds of hours of video in a simple way. The work that will be shown in this presentation will allow people to be identified and compared with a series of images of people to determine if these people appear or not in the recorded video images.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-22 Talent Need Not Apply: Tradecraft and Objectives of Job-themed APT Social Engineering
When a job offer looks too good to be true… it probably is. As the COVID-19 pandemic has led workers to rethink their careers and long-term goals, threat actors have exploited it as an opportunity to fulfill strategic objectives. Over the past two years, PwC's Global Threat Intelligence team has tracked nation state threat actors as they socially engineered employees at high-profile companies over email, social media and beyond, enticing them with promising job opportunities - only to infect them with malware and disappear.In this talk, we unmask how ongoing operations by advanced persistent threats based in different countries (North Korea and Iran) are using recruitment themes to compromise victims. We draw the profiles of three different threat actors that conduct such operations: North Korea-based Lazarus Group and Black Alicanto; an emerging Iran-based intrusion set which we call Yellow Dev 13; and a threat actor targeting former intelligence officers. Phishing is the oldest trick in the book, but this presentation holds the mirror up to threat actors' faces: the ways they use job themes for phishing, from fake career websites to recruiter personae, become the CV we read to learn their capabilities (their tools, techniques, and procedures); the targets they choose become their cover letters, revealing their intelligence requirements and strategic objectives, from counterintelligence to cryptocurrency theft.Ultimately, this talk will leave attendees with different insights depending on their role. Business executives will get an overview of the threat landscape and why their organization might be targeted. Defenders will gain actionable intelligence on how to recognize and defend from, activity by advanced persistent adversaries. Ethical hackers might encounter a few tricks to try - and mistakes to avoid! - in phishing exercises and adversary emulation. As ...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu has included encoded shell scripts to potentially aid in the rooting process.[1]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-20 All You Ever Wanted to Know about the AMD Platform Security Processor and were Afraid to Emulate - Inside a Deeply Embedded Security Processor
AMDs Zen (and later) CPUs contain the "(Platform) Secure Processor" (PSP) which is an embedded ARM core inside your x86 CPU responsible for initial system bootstrapping. The PSP is running even before the main x86 cores and has full access to the main memory. During system runtime it serves as a trust anchor for features like AMDs "Secure Encrypted Virtualization" feature and recently a generic TEE interface for which there are Linux kernel patches pending currently. The firmware running on the PSP is completely proprietary and there is almost no public documentation available. These are more than enough reasons for us to have a closer look at this system.During the last two years, we reverse engineered several components of the PSP firmware and hardware in order to gain an understanding of the capabilities of this critical component looking for possible security issues. We found multiple security issues that allow us to gain code execution on the PSP.Lately, we developed an emulator for the PSP which enables us to trace the execution of the firmware and to make it easier to develop and test our own code which will later run on the PSP by exploiting found security issues. The emulator is able to run the on-chip and off-chip bootloader that are used to bootstrap the systems. In the emulated setup, it is also possible to put the firmware into a debug mode where signature verifications are disabled, and additional debug output is generated.We'll also present a mode where a stub is running on the physical PSP and takes commands from the emulator to forward hardware accesses from the firmware in order to bootstrap the real system using the firmware running inside the emulator.The emulator and all other developed tools are open source and available on github: https://github.com/PSPReverse


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed enumerating system drives and partitions.[142]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.[183]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can check for the number of devices plugged into an infected host.[43]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1543.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Service
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[11]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer registers the broadcast receiver to listen for events related to device boot-up.[14]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has registered to receive the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent to activate on device startup.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.[71][72]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP variants have harvested credentials from browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge.[85]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use various API calls to see if it is running in a sandbox.[71]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect the username on a compromised host.[26]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT operators have used dynamic DNS to mask the true location of their C2 behind rapidly changing IP addresses.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can conduct command and control over protocols like HTTP and HTTPS.[113]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest obtains a list of running processes using the function kill_unwanted.[256]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can detect the victim's file or folder list.[306]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used process hollowing to inject itself into legitimate Windows process.[24][25]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure least privilege principles are applied to Identity and Access Management (IAM) security policies.[1]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has used contact forms on victim websites to generate phishing e-mails.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can obtain credentials from databases, mail, and WiFi across multiple platforms.[12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can collect the username from the victim's machine.[75]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[57][55]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu collects the username from the victim.[124]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems.By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate local admin accounts.[51]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used a malicious shim database to maintain persistence.[4]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has Gzipped information and saved it to a random temp file before exfil.[61]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.[80]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's kerberos module can create golden tickets.[7][8]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
The IceApple OWA credential logger can monitor for OWA authentication requests and log the credentials.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as .txt files.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.[28][29]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[77]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[176]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has removed the com.apple.quarantineattribute from the dropped file, $TMPDIR/airportpaird.[8]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. [7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.[28]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1222
ATT&CK Technique Name:File and Directory Permissions Modification
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[1]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:asia-21 The B-MAD Approach to Threat Modeling
Threat modeling is a family of techniques for discovering what can go wrong with a system and improve its security. Threat modeling techniques often aim to be structured, systematic and comprehensive and have to intersect with the organization's systems for delivering products.In many ways, threat modeling is very easy, as long as you avoid the many traps that await the unwary. This talk is about one particular set of traps in the way that threat modeling is deployed across an organization.The B-MAD approach to threat modeling is an anti-pattern for threat modeling. It starts with the words "Bring me a diagram" and ends with escalations between security and operations, security and development, and security and the world. Why is that? How can we predict that it's all going to go downhill from those 4 little words? Why do they make up an anti-pattern?


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques.[6]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to delete local files.[56]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca adopted Cloudflare as a proxy for compromised servers.[13]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 None of My Pixel is Your Business: Active Watermarking Cancellation Against Video Streaming Service
Live video streaming services are getting more and more popular in China. In order to ensure their own interests, various service providers have added visible watermarks, which have become increasingly fierce and vicious. Users (originators and viewers) are fed up with those ugly watermarks which are taking up more and more of the screen.
We have found that some of the service providers' watermarks can be actively eliminated, that is, originators can place a reverse watermark in their own video stream beforehand to cancel the service provider's watermark. Although the idea is intuitive, there are some problems in implementation, such as size, position, and shadow. After we theoretically provided an estimation of the achievable limits with computer graphics theory, we did a PoC against one of the largest video streaming service providers in China, which is also listed on the NYSE. The results were very good. After solving some problems related to the parameters related to color management and color space conversion, we can achieve nearly 100% active cancellation of watermarks.
To automate this process, we also build a ffmpeg filter as well as an OBS plugin, which can be helpful to do real-time adjusting with very short training sequence of frames during live broadcasting, so as to achieve a better watermark cancellation effect.
In addition, we propose several existential risks for watermarks that cannot be actively canceled: a) Transform Attack: to transform one watermark into another provider's.  b) Code Rate Jitter Attack: adding high-frequency components to force video codec to reduce the code rate near watermark. c) Frame Squeezing Attack: sacrificing some resolution by squeezing screen, then restoring with user-defined javascript to bypass watermark. Corresponding examples and security countermeasures are also provided.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.[25][26][27]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can be used to create SAML tokens using the AD Federated Services token signing certificate.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can determine the system architecture it is running on to choose which version of the DLL to use.[250]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda searches for specific directories on the victim’s machine.[339]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe" to establish persistence.[119][120]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can inject its modules into various processes using reflective DLL loading.[49]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-21 Stuxnet-in-a-Box: In-Field Emulation and Fuzzing of PLCs to Uncover the Next Zero-Day Threat in Industrial Control Systems
Recent years have been pivotal in the field of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security, with a large number of high-profile attacks exposing the lack of a design-for-security initiative in ICS, as well as a substantial number of research works that try to proactively uncover underlying vulnerabilities. The main focus on both sides, though, has been the first and obvious choices when it comes to exploitation, namely the network level as the main gateway to an ICS and the control operation performed by it. As ICS evolve abstracting the control logic to a purely software level hosted on a generic OS, software level evaluation of multiple levels of an ICS is a straightforward choice. In this work, we will present a new tool for the cybersecurity assessment of ICS such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) for in-field security evaluation with no disruption to the actual process.More specifically, we will deploy system emulation to eliminate the need for experiments directly on the actual hardware device, massively improve scalability and compatibility for easy deployment on a multitude of platforms. On the emulated platform, we will apply fuzzing across software levels of the device, the system itself, the hosted PLC abstracting platform as well as the application performing the control logic. Through fuzzing we expose vulnerabilities existing on the system either by poor maintenance or sloppy programming. The PLC platform of choice is the Codesys runtime, an industry-leading solution existing in a quarter of the currently deployed PLC.Furthermore, we will combine the knowledge of the uncovered vulnerabilities with a custom reverse engineering tool to dynamically synthesize a new cyber threat that integrates operational manipulation, system exploitation and stealth to become a Stuxnet-level threat to an ICS.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to unpack itself into memory using XOR.[22][23]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.[38]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[80]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.[118]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has set up and operated websites to gather information and deliver malware.[16]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:asia-23 Fireside Chat: Jeff Moss and Gaurav Keerthi
In this fireside chat, Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss sits down with Gaurav Keerthi, Former Deputy Chief Executive, CSA to discuss the ongoing tension between regulating emerging technologies and the drive for innovation in cybersecurity. They also examine the role of government vs the private sector in fostering innovation while also protecting against security threats and addressing privacy concerns. Join this session to learn if government technology regulations save humanity or kill innovation.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.[67][68]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL can delete files and directories.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has gathered credentials from the Windows Credential Manager tool.[17]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can collect Microsoft Word documents from the target's file system, as well as .txt, .doc, and .xls files from the Internet Explorer cache.[153][154]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky can delete files it creates from the infected system.[60]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can open a dialog box to ask the user for passwords.[13]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[111]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 InfoSec Philosophies for the Corrupt Economy
The majority of systematic approaches to information security are created by contributors from stable nation states, where the design assumes that the originator is wholesome and true, the playing field is lush and green and the children frolic care-free making daisy-chain bracelets. This talk discusses the realities of corruption, with real-life anecdotes from interviews conducted with real criminals and victims. This talk also explains the challenges and differences between trying to 'do' information security in developed and developing countries, where often corruption can derail security efforts and the people put in place to run the show are working against you. I also discuss typical challenges of working in difficult climates, how this can impact us (as security warriors), with first-hand accounts from those involved and some of the things we can do to combat corruption.
A basic understanding of threat modelling and a slightly dark sense of humour are advantageous in getting the most out of this talk.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.[6]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can communicate with C2 over TCP and UDP.[26]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[56][17][53]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the ~/Library/ folder.[27]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to identify the OS version, OS bit information and computer name.[145][15]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta had added data prior to the Portable Executable (PE) header to prevent automatic scanners from identifying the payload.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to discover processes.[35]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-20 Quantum Security and Cryptography: You Are (Probably) Doing it Wrong
Quantum Cryptography is not just Alice and Bob exchanging qubits: There is a whole world of exotic applications that use quantum effects for securing information and that are just impossible to achieve with traditional cryptography. But why should we care given that most of these applications are still at a far research stage?In this talk, we will face an uncomfortable fact about quantum computing (QC) and cryptography: all the recent attention brought to quantum-resistant cryptography (fueled by the advancement in QC research and the NIST standardization process) leads only to a short-term security solution once QC becomes available. The reason: quantum-resistant cryptography (often dubbed "post-quantum") can only protect classical digital (binary) information. But given the very peculiar characteristics of quantum information (such as the impossibility of copying data and the destructive action of observation), new encryption systems able to cope with quantum data and quantum networks have to be designed with a completely different approach, and show surprising behaviors. Not to be confused with currently existing "quantum key distribution" (QKD), which is a very specific and limited branch of it, quantum cryptography is designed to be run natively on a QC device proper, and able to act on quantum data.In this talk (that does not assume expertise in quantum mechanics) we will dive into quantum cryptography and we will see:How many classical cryptographic tasks (one-time pad, block ciphers, public-key encryption, etc.) have a quantum counterpart;How some other ones are very hard to translate quantumly (e.g., authentication) or simply impossible (digital ...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites.[19]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reg
Reg may be used to find credentials in the Windows Registry.[1]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0592
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteUtilities
RemoteUtilities can take screenshots on a compromised host.[141]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can use encrypted string blocks for obfuscation.[324]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.[18]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials from Windows vault credential objects.[11][12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has set an Office 365 tenant level mail transport rule to send all mail in and out of the targeted organization to the newly created account.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform can use Windows admin shares to move laterally.[44]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to delete files from a compromised host.[210]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[62][63][64][65] OilRig has also used tool named PICKPOCKET to dump passwords from web browsers.[65]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can collect information related to a compromised host, including OS version and a list of drives.[335]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[40]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can collect the time zone information from the system.[10][11]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot downloads several additional files and saves them to the victim's machine.[446][447]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[10]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-21 Practical Attacks Against Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) implements fine-grained access control on data where the ability to decrypt a ciphertext is determined by the attributes owned by a user of the system. Hence, data can be stored by an entity that is not necessarily trusted to enforce access control. Moreover, multi-authority variants of ABE extend these capabilities to multiple-domain settings and remove the requirement of having a trusted third party. ABE is typically exemplified in the healthcare setting, where all "nurses" of the hospital "A" can only decrypt certain records whereas "doctors" of the same hospital have access to additional information about the patients. Further, ABE has been proposed to secure the Internet of Things and enforce authorization in cloud systems.At the CT-RSA 2021 conference, Venema and Alpár presented attacks against 11 ABE and MA-ABE schemes, including the highly cited DAC-MACS scheme with applications to the cloud. In this work, we demonstrate the practicality of the attacks. We have implemented three different types of attacks: a decryption attack against DAC-MACS, where a single user is able to decrypt ciphertexts with policies she cannot satisfy. This user does not even need to collude with other users or corrupt an authority. Second, a decryption attack with corruption of one of the authorities against the YJ14-MA-ABE scheme. And third, a decryption attack against the YCT14 scheme where two users collude in order to obtain a decryption key based on the work of Tan et al. and Herranz (2019). We implement the attacks in the CHARM cryptographic library and show that the implementations of DAC-MACS, YJ14-MA-ABE and YCT14 schemes provided by this particular library are vulnerable to decryption attacks. Finally, we provide a library implementing the cryptanalytic attacks of Venema and Alpár against the aforementioned ABE schemes and Juypter notebooks, where ABE and the practical...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[15]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Inside the Apple T2
Apple's T2 Security Chip promised to bring "a new level of integration and security" to new generation Mac systems. The T2 chip provides systems with a secure enclave coprocessor that is leveraged to protect Touch ID data, enable encrypted storage and provide secure boot capabilities. In this presentation we will share a deep dive into the inner workings of the T2 going way beyond the limited technical details Apple have made public up to now. In addition, we will share our methodology along with the tooling we developed and subsequently released in an effort to enable the audience to learn about our process of tackling complex security research tasks as well as being able to build on top of our initial research.
Our goal was to assess the current security posture of the T2 chip as well as build tools to enable future research into the platform. Two specific areas of interest for us were Apple's secure boot process as well as how the T2 chip communicates with macOS. Our research of Secure Boot functionality outlines how the process works, what attacks may be mitigated and what attack surface remains.  In addition we will cover how Apple implemented eSPI and what this means from an attacker's perspective. Attendees will obtain an understanding of how the T2 chip has been implemented and what services it exposes to both the OS and application layers.
In exploring the T2's communication, we reverse engineered Apple's proprietary XPC protocol, which previously had near-zero third-party documentation. In addition to decoding the messaging format, we demonstrate the ability to interface directly with the T2 chip from unprivileged userspace code by writing our own client application. Our talk will present methods and tooling to query the T2's exposed services as well as decode and encode valid messages.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used HTTP to download payloads for CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-10189 exploits.[26]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can collect data on running and parent processes.[71]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has been distributed in obfuscated and packed form.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.[34]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi uses BITSAdmin to communicate with the C2 server over HTTP.[276]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used voStro.exe, a compiled pypykatz (Python version of Mimikatz), to steal credentials.[72]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-19 Hacking Your Non-Compete
Nearly everyone in the cybersecurity community found themselves contemplating leaving an employer, been offered an opportunity to really stretch their wings as part of a start-up or just become fed-up with their current work environment. While many of us are masters of technology few of us have a good understanding of what comes next when planning to leave one company and move to the next. Does your employment agreement allow you to take the next job or jump on that great opportunity? Are you going to be able to go to a company that your employer sees as a competitor or live that startup dream?We'll present real cases involving competing with a former employer, soliciting work from a current client at your new company and how to protect intellectual property you bring to a new employer. You'll hear from a computer forensics investigator on where people typically go wrong when transitioning from one employer to the next and from a technology and intellectual property attorney on the real legal outcomes of those cases.Commonly misunderstood concepts like "work for hire" and "right to work" will be explained. We'll talk attendees through the working details of non-compete agreements, operating agreements between tech company founders and what to do when it all goes wrong. Finally, we'll discuss what you should do after having left a previous employer and you receive an angry letter saying that you've violate multiple agreements and are about to be sued down to your socks. You'll leave the session better understanding of the details of your non-compete or employment agreement and what is enforceable versus hot air.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[74]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:eu-20 Story of Jailbreaking iOS 13
Jailbreaking refers to obtaining the kernel privilege of iOS, by means of the development of vulnerabilities. Usually, at least one kernel vulnerability is used. By overwriting the sensitive data structure in the kernel, the jailbreaker could run unauthorized code on the device without restrictions. It could then be used for performing code injection and data interception upon any process on the device. Thus, sometimes, a jailbreaker may not be the owner of the device, but an intruder who wants to steal or manipulate information, and that includes spreading misinformation.This talk will cover in detail how a series of iOS vulnerabilities are exploited to achieve Jailbreak on iOS 13.7. I'll be talking about their root cause, techniques used during the exploit development to bypass the mitigations that are unique to iOS, ultimately get the privilege of reading and writing kernel memory and demonstrate the potential malicious impact of the attack. The rest of my talk will be related to how these vulnerabilities were discovered, tips for reverse engineering. As an independent researcher, I hope to give some inspiration to the audience.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type may create a temporary user on the system named Lost_{Unique Identifier}.[19]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of ScriptModification modules that compress and encode scripts and payloads.[68][69]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control to mitigate installation and use of unapproved software that can be used for remote access.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-22 Whip the Whisperer: Simulating Side Channel Leakage
Cryptographic side channels are well-understood from a mathematical perspective, and many countermeasures exist that reduce leakage. Yet, there are many implementations in the field that leak. This is caused by a combination of lack of security experts, the fact that upon implementation countermeasures can become leaky, and the absence of good pre-silicon side channel analysis tools. In this presentation, we show how common hardware design tools can be used to perform pre-silicon power simulations, and how that can be used to detect leaky implementations. We show a case study of how countermeasure implementations that look fine in source are actually leaky, and how simulation can help pinpoint individual leaky elements, both in software and hardware. There are surprising results where non-related software instructions leak, caused by microarchitectural interactions in the CPU pipeline. Armed with all this knowledge, those issues can be fixed. This talk is interesting for hardware and software designers to see how tools can be used to pinpoint leakage down to the gate or code level, and for researchers in finding new side channels due to processor design.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1595.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has downloaded additional files and programs from its C2 server.[25][26]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can download and execute additional files.[190][358][359]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.[75][76]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Credential Editor
Windows Credential Editor can dump credentials.[87]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS can use an embedded NTRU public key to encrypt data for ransom.[41][47][48]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER can download or upload files from its C2 server.[73]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.[141][142][143][144]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba loaded the payload into memory using PowerShell.[10]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.[6]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to install itself as a Windows service.[45]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[20]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark binaries have been named audioddg.pdb and Winlangdb.pdb in order to appear legitimate.[44]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Administrators can block end-user consent to OAuth applications, disabling users from authorizing third-party apps through OAuth 2.0 and forcing administrative consent for all requests. They can also block end-user registration of applications by their users, to reduce risk. A Cloud Access Security Broker can also be used to ban applications.Azure offers a couple of enterprise policy settings in the Azure Management Portal that may help:"Users -> User settings -> App registrations: Users can register applications" can be set to "no" to prevent users from registering new applications. "Enterprise applications -> User settings -> Enterprise applications: Users can consent to apps accessing company data on their behalf" can be set to "no" to prevent users from consenting to allow third-party multi-tenant applications


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware can list a victim's logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices. Other malware can list a directory's contents.[189]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-18 Under the SEA - A Look at the Syrian Electronic Army's Mobile Tooling
This briefing will highlight the most recent expansion of the tools of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), which are now known to include an entire mobile surveillanceware family (SilverHawk). This is the first time a family of mobile surveillanceware has been directly attributed to the SEA with high certainty, highlighting a new stage in the group's technical evolution. To date, SilverHawk has been identified in over 30 trojanized versions of many well known apps, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Microsoft Word, YouTube, and the Guardian Project's Chat Secure app. We'll take a look at the SEA's past notable activities, but primarily dive into SilverHawk's capabilities, as well as the significance of the group's ability to develop this toolset. Additionally, we'll explain how we attributed and tied infrastructure to one of the SEA's most high profile hackers, known as th3pro, who is currently on the FBI Cyber's Most Wanted list.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create new instances.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leveraged the TriStation protocol to download programs onto Triconex Safety Instrumented System. [5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Managing for Success: Maintaining a Healthy Bug Bounty Program Long Term
Your bounty program has launched and is clicking along… but are you getting optimal results once the initial excitement wanes?  How do you measure and report on program success?  How can you build gamification and incentive models that lead to high value vulnerability reports, while discouraging low impact reports that distract your engineers from issues that put customers at risk?  And while everyone hopes to never need it, what’s the playbook for handling conflict or vulnerability disclosure situations?


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1626
ATT&CK Technique Name:Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that are designated as higher risk. An adversary can use several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[38][39]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 Software Attacks on Hardware Wallets
Almost all security research has a question often left unanswered: what would be the financial consequence, if a discovered vulnerability is maliciously exploited? The security community almost never knows, unless a real attack takes place and the damage becomes known to the public. Development of the cryptocurrencies made it even more difficult to control the impact of an attack since all the security relies on a single wallet's private key which needs to stay secure. Multiple breaches of private wallets and public currency exchange services are well-known, and to address the issue a few companies have come up with secure hardware storage devices to preserve the wallet's secrets at all costs.But, how secure are they? In this research, we show how software attacks can be used to break in the most protected part of the hardware wallet, the Secure Element, and how it can be exploited by an attacker. The number of identified vulnerabilities in the hardware wallet show how software vulnerabilities in the TEE operating system can lead to a compromise of the memory isolation and a reveal of secrets of the OS and other user applications. Finally, based on the identified vulnerabilities an attack is proposed which allows anyone with only physical access to the hardware wallet to retrieve secret keys and data from the device. Additionally, a supply chain attack on a device allowing an attacker to bypass security features of the device and have full control of the installed wallets on the device.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:botconf2022 Remote Threat Reconnaissance
This workshop aims to share knowledge of live triage and analysis of remote compromised systems to assist incident response, digital forensics, or malware discovery and in-place analysis. There are many other applications of the techniques and tools that the participants are encouraged to explore on their own.Although the knowledge shared during the workshop can be applied independently of the tools proposed, it starts with the attendees building their own toolkit for remote threat reconnaissance. It features bitscout, a project based on a collection of free open-source software for linux, that is extendable with any set of tools the analyst wants to embed before or in the middle of the operation.incident response to live cyberattacks requires silent navigation through compromised assets, sometimes in large distributed networks. The popular approach relies on edr or other live agent-based solutions. However, the activation of security agents and obvious activities on live compromised systems may trigger alerts of advanced threat actors. Once alerted, a clean-up operation and destruction of evidence can happen. Moreover, offline system analysis may not be easy due to the physical distance to the compromised system or scale of the network. This is where remote stealthy threat discovery with “scoutware”, software for threat hunting and instant system analysis, becomes incredibly useful. Bitscout, used for the workshop is just one such toolkit.in addition to working with local virtual machines during the workshop, the attendees will be provided with access to 60+ live servers to be analysed simultaneously to simulate large-scale compromise – online access will therefore be required.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call EnumWindows, and checking for Qemu guest agent.[27]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap checks the Android version to determine which system library to patch.[14]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-18 Attacking Hardware Systems Using Resonance and the Laws of Physics
Everything has a resonant frequency. By finding the resonant frequency of certain electronic sensors, programmable logic, and other devices, it is possible to subvert certain systems that are supposedly secured by the electronic components targeted in this research. From ultrasonic attacks on MEM's microphones in most voice enabled IoT and mobile equipment to high frequency electrical resonance inside certain programmable logic, these resonance attacks are all about leveraging physical properties of the target device and by chaining both these attacks and other hardware attacks together can allow software to bypass quite complex hardware security sub systems.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[183]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.[72]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to use the command line to control execution on compromised hosts.[30][31]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo accesses databases from WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Line.[17]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can upload files.[351]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Practical Approach to Automate the Discovery and Eradication of Open-Source Software Vulnerabilities at Scale
Over the last decade, there has been steady growth in the adoption of open-source components in modern web applications. Although this is generally a good trend for the industry, there are potential risks stemming from this practice that requires careful attention. In this talk, we will describe a simple but pragmatic approach to identifying and eliminating open-source vulnerabilities in Netflix applications at scale.Our solution at Netflix is focused on identifying, triaging, and eliminating vulnerabilities in common software packages and their transitive dependencies.This talk will cover the following topics:A brief history of open source security and vulnerabilitiesReasons why this attack surface is still a problem in modern open-source librariesMethods that attackers use to exploit vulnerabilities in open-source librariesReasons why it is easy to carry out attacks against any organizationWe will then explore how the Netflix AppSec team has worked to solve the problem at scale, describing the various stages in our automation strategy and the tools that we are using to help us achieve our goals.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:eu-20 Hacking Government Cybersecurity
This session delivered by Pete Cooper, the Deputy Director for Cyber Defence at the Cabinet Office will focus on his perspectives and the latest developments in cyber security across government and beyond. From understanding and managing risk at government scale, to collaborating with industry partners and the hacker community, this session will explore how we can view and work through our cyber challenges to reduce risks to our societies.  As hostile actors seek to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic for their strategic advantage, confidence in the security of our digital lives becomes ever more important. Pete will talk about cyber security across government and utilising his diverse military, private sector and government background to drive cutting edge thinking, collaboration and change.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE allows adversaries to enumerate and modify the infected host's file system. It supports searching for directories, creating directories, listing directory contents, reading and writing to files, retrieving file attributes, and retrieving volume information.[34]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to discover drive information on the infected host.[307]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [235][236]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can find the presence of a specific security software.[112]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-22 Pwning Cloud Vendors with Untraditional PostgreSQL Vulnerabilities
Cloud service providers often provide popular and beloved open-source solutions as multi-tenant managed services. This is a significant power of the cloud - to offer anything as a scalable, managed service. However, these projects were not built with multi-tenancy in mind, and therefore, their adoption relies on multiple modifications and adjustments by the cloud vendor.Our team explored PostgreSQL-as-a-Service offered by multiple cloud providers and found a series of vulnerabilities related to its implementation as a multi-tenant service, including severe isolation issues. The impact of these vulnerabilities can be wide-reaching as they may become the starting point for a cross-account access attack; as we recently demonstrated in the “ExtraReplica” vulnerability, a Postgres vulnerability leads to cross-account access of customer databases in Azure Postgres Flexible server service. This is the first-of-a-kind cloud implementation vulnerability in a platform-as-a-service offering, affecting multiple cloud providers simultaneously. In this session, we will explain the Postgres vulnerabilities and how they lead us to find cloud isolation vulnerabilities. We will also peek at the services' internals, which we were privileged to see after executing our code on the platform. We will explain how we used these vulnerabilities as a first step within a vulnerability chain and performed lateral movement within the internal cloud network, finally achieving cross-account access to other customers' databases.We will discuss the learnings and implications of this research for cloud providers and customers using database-as-a-service. We will provide advice for future Postgres-as-a-Service implementations as well as other adaptations of open-source projects to PaaS and review critical design considerations to avoid similar issues. Finally, we will provide customers with risk mitigation strategie...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.[72]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[15]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
The C2 server used by XTunnel provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port.[11]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to capture webcam video.[46]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-20 About Directed Fuzzing and Use-After-Free: How to Find Complex & Silent Bugs?
Fuzzing is a popular and effective automated approach to vulnerability detection. Directed fuzzing focuses on automatically testing specific parts of the code by taking advantage of additional information such as bug stack traces or patches. Key applications include bug reproduction and patch-oriented testing. While very successful, recent fuzzing techniques (directed or not) are not well suited for Use-After-Free vulnerabilities (UAF), where some deallocated memory is reused through a dangling pointer (UAF represent only 1% of issues found by OSS-Fuzz in 2017). This is unfortunate as UAF possibly lead to data corruption, information leaks, or denial of service. Fuzzing UAF is hard for two reasons: (1) UAF bugs are complex – need to find input covering three events (alloc, free, use) in sequence; (2) UAF bugs are silent – they often do not crash immediately. The obvious solution is to pair fuzzing with memory sanitizaters such as Valgrind, however the induced runtime overhead is terrible for fuzzing. We propose UAFuzz, the first (binary-level) directed greybox fuzzer dedicated to UAF bugs. The technique features a fuzzing engine tailored to UAF specifics (adapting standard fuzzing components: seed selection, distance metric and power schedule), a lightweight code instrumentation and an efficient bug triage step allowing to send only a fraction of the generated input to the sanitizer for bug confirmation. Our technique is implemented on top of AFL-QEMU and Valgrind. UAFuzz outperforms state-of-the-art directed fuzzers (AFLGO and Hawkeye) on bug reproduction (detection rate, time-to-exposure). UAFuzz has also been proven effective in patch-oriented testing, leading to the discovery of 30 new bugs, 7 CVEs and 4 buggy patches. Several fuzzing talks have already been given to Black Hat. Our proposal is the first to focus on directed fuzzing and use-after-free.Finally, we wil...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture and store keystrokes.[61]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.[107][108]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has signed Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.[32][33]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.[179]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being sent over unencrypted protocols.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[75]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.[5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.[35]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay has used names to mimic legitimate software including "vmtoolsd.exe" to spoof Vmtools.[106]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.[68]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can generate fake notifications and launch overlay attacks against attacker-specified applications.[12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can check if the explorer.exe process is responsible for calling its install function.[273]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Detecting Deep Fakes with Mice
Neural networks can generate increasingly realistic, human-like speech. These so-called "deep fakes" can be used in social engineering attacks. Bad actors can now impersonate any person's voice merely by gathering a few samples of spoken audio and then synthesizing new speech, utilizing off-the-shelf tools. But how convincing are these "deep fakes"? Can we train humans or artificial intelligence to spot the tell-tale signs of audio manipulation? In this work, we assessed the relative abilities of biology and machines, in a task which required discriminating real vs. fake speech. For machines, we looked at two approaches based on machine learning: one based on game theory, called generative adversarial networks (GAN) and one based on mathematical depth-wise convolutional neural networks (Xception).For biological systems, we gathered a broad range of human subjects, but also we also used mice. Recent work has shown that the auditory system of mice resembles closely that of humans in the ability to recognize many complex sound groups. Mice do not understand the words, but respond to the stimulus of sounds and can be trained to recognize real vs. fake phonetic construction. We theorize that this may be advantageous in detecting the subtle signals of improper audio manipulation, without being swayed by the semantic content of the speech.We evaluated the relative performance of all 4 discriminator groups (GAN, Xception, humans, and mice). We used a "deep fakes" data set recently published in Google's "Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge" and we will report the results here.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:botconf2013 Malware Calling
Zitmo (ZeuS in the MObile) is a mutation of ZeuS that appeared for the first time in early 2011, targeting bank customers in Poland and Spain, infecting unknown numbers of users. Zitmo consists of two parts: spyware installed od PC and an application installed on mobile device. At the time the PC app is capable to run on all modern Windows systems (2000-8) both 32 and 64 bits, while the mobile part runs on Android, (although it’s prepered for Symbian and Blackbery as well).We have recently discoverd that the banker used in malware is a strange mixture of ZeuS and Spy-Eye, served as a module, and it’s only one of functionalities offered by malware. It also incorporates a sophisticated communication schema used to trasport stolen data from mobile phones which we are still investigating. We will show how malware operates on both PCs and mobiles to stealing money. In addition, we will release tools that aid analysis.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/11-MaciejKotowicz-MalwareCalling.pdf


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can execute ipconfig on the victim’s machine.[34][35][36]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[39]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use net group "domain admins" /domain to display accounts in the "domain admins" permissions group and net localgroup "administrators" to list local system administrator group membership.[47]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Configuration data used by Rising Sun has been encrypted using an RC4 stream algorithm.[280]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has collected the IOPlatformUUID, session UID, and the OS version using the command sw_vers -productVersion.[266][267]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used netstat -oan to obtain information about the victim network connections.[37]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1059.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Python
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum can deploy additional components or tools as needed.[169]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect files and information from a compromised host.[112]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file. Mustang Panda has also used reg save on the SYSTEM file Registry location to help extract the NTDS.dit file.[20]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal collected file listings of all default Windows directories.[96]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[1]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon has a command to inject code into a process.[12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Built-in browser sandboxes and application isolation may be used to contain web-based malware.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff abuses accessibility features to intercept all interactions between a user and the device.[9]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise executes net user after initial communication is made to the remote server.[13]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can receive and load executables from remote C2 servers.[468]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim’s machine.[186]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can collect information about the device including device type, OS version, language, free storage space, battery status, device root, and if developer mode is enabled.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT has gained execution on targeted systems through luring users to click on links to malicious URLs.[66][67]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to discover the computer name and Windows product name/version.[210]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to set the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key to execute logon scripts.[8]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can exploit multiple vulnerabilities including EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0144).[24]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1078.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management systems, such as Windows Active Directory.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.[166][167]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
The "tDiscoverer" variant of HAMMERTOSS establishes a C2 channel by downloading resources from Web services like Twitter and GitHub. HAMMERTOSS binaries contain an algorithm that generates a different Twitter handle for the malware to check for instructions every day.[2]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can search a list of running processes.[191]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[178][179][180][181]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can capture photos and videos from the device’s camera.[21]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1596.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS/Passive DNS
Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter is believed to have initially infected devices using internet traffic hijacking to generate abnormal popups.[4]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.[208][209]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can establish persistence via a Launch Daemon.[11][12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used PowerShell for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for dumping credentials stored on compromised machines.[104]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-18 Holding on for Tonight: Addiction in InfoSec
Substance abuse is present in and affects all communities, even information security. This session will detail the relationship between stress, addiction, and relapse. Additionally, the speaker will discuss her experience with alcohol use disorder while maintaining a career in information security and share advice on how people and companies can be inclusive and supportive for those living a clean and/or sober life. Attendees will gain perspective and a greater understanding of their peers and employees in recovery.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-21 Bridging Security Infrastructure Between the Data Center and AWS Lambda
While serverless is all the rage, creating secure infrastructure that integrates serverless technology with existing Data Center (DC) services remains a challenge. Square's DC uses a microservice architecture. Services communicate over an envoy service mesh with short-lived mTLS certificates using SPIFFE identity for zero-trust based authentication. To achieve higher flexibility and scalability we have been migrating to the cloud, a gradual process that is still in progress.Why bother? Workloads have different characteristics, while a payment system might be required to be available all the time and have predictable traffic, other applications might have unpredictable bursts of use but otherwise receive no traffic. This flexibility draws developers to Lambda. Applications can scale up immediately, but also scale down when demand is low. However, these characteristics also make security engineering challenging. In this talk we will explain what challenges we were confronted with and how we solved them, bridging security properties we require in the DC to be compatible with AWS Lambda.How is this challenging? Complications with AWS Lambda fall broadly into two categories. One, operational requirements for Lambda that make developers choose it in the first place, such as near immediate response time. Two, providing parity with our DC security infrastructure so developers can engineer in a fashion they are used to while observing security best practices. Simply reimplementing the systems we use in the DC was not possible, but using native cloud functionality alone wasn't possible either.How did we solve this? This talk will cover how we architected workload identity in AWS Lambda, sharing identity between DC and the cloud. We built a custom certificate issuance on top of AWS Private CA that is compatible with the SPIFFE standard, but issues certificates ahead of time to not block...


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [11] [12] [10] [13]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can silently intercept and manipulate notifications. S.O.V.A. can also inject cookies via push notifications.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used regsvr32 to execute scripts.[37][38]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has Base64 encoded the RSA public key used for encrypting files.[100]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used a Base64 key to decode its components.[142]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevated privileges.[15]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron gathers the victim computer name using the Win32 API call GetComputerName.[207]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can scan the network for open ports and vulnerable instances of RDP and SMB protocols.[34]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.[89]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has sent emails to intended victims with malicious MS Word and Excel attachments.[241]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.[64][65]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate. As our company began to explore cloud transformation broadly, we in Security began investigating competitive options for our event collection and analysis platform. We wanted to know if we could roll our own cloud-native SIEM more efficiently while providing greater access to our data, and be as effective as the vendor's solution.To figure that out, we asked:1. Does the vendor SIEM product cover enough of our threat landscape to make it worth the cost? 2. If not, has our organization made strategic investments in alternate platforms which could be leveraged instead? 3. If yes, does our team have the skills required to implement and mold these platforms to our needs?The answers led us to roll our own SIEM. In our presentation, we'll dig into these questions and decisions in-depth, as well as describe our architecture and several use cases. At the end of the day, we've been running our GCP SIEM for over a year and have moved off the vendor platform. To get started, we wrote less than 6,000 lines of code across a handful of simple tools. We ingest 5TB of data per day and have over 2PB of historical data stored and instantly searchable. In the end, we spent ~$500,000 to build our own SIEM that would have cost us $4 million if we used our third-party vendor. We're also saving an estimated $600,000 year over year in maintenance and subscription fees, plus reducing hardware capital expenditure.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.[12]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.[26]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.[29]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has gained execution through victims clicking on malicious LNK files contained within ISO files, which can execute hidden DLLs within the ISO.[83][49]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-19 The Next Arms Race
The Internet is not supposed to have borders, but it does. Countries fight and spy on each other on the Internet every day. So, borders still exist on the Internet, and almost all countries are investing into offensive use of cyber power. The new weapons they are developing are different from any other kind of weapon we've ever seen, and we are now seeing the very beginning of the next arms race.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

title:botconf2015 Inside DarkComet: a wild case-study
This research discusses the application of a framework for the automated analysis of malware samples, specifically botnet binaries, which automates the collection, analysis, and infiltration of botnets. Due to the increased number of samples released daily, such frameworks have become a necessity for anti-malware organisations and product vendors. Some academic research has recently been concluded into their design and development. a case-study was conducted which resulted in the collection of 83,175 DarkComet RAT samples, of which 48.85% were successfully analysed and their configuration information extracted, leading to the infiltration of 751 Command and Control servers which provided information on 109,535 unique victim computers. The collection of the DarkComet bot binaries occurred between August of 2013 and June 2014, with CNC infiltration commencing on 10 May 2014 and concluding on 6 June 2014. A refined exploit for the QUICKUP vulnerability, previously document, which prevents detection by botmasters and supports the downloading of large files is provided. The document presents an analysis of the configuration data extracted from the collected malware samples.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.[365]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.[48][49]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter to establish persistence.[32]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used ipconfig /all to obtain information about the victim network configuration. The group also ran a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.[91]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly trojanized legitimate ICS equipment providers software packages available for download on their websites.[3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has been bundled with legitimate software installation files for disguise.[127]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.[83]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's backdoor deletes files after they have been successfully uploaded to C2 servers.[164]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a global service provider's IP as a proxy for C2 traffic from a victim.[13][14]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. [7]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used regsvr32.exe to launch malicious DLLs.[41][40]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[105]