Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Detecting malware's failover C&C strategies with squeeze
author:Matthias Neugschwandtner and
Paolo Milani Comparetti and
Christian Platzer
Detecting Malware’s Failover C&C Strategies with
SQUEEZE
Matthias Neugschwandtner1, Paolo Milani Comparetti1, and Christian Platzer1
1Vienna University of Technology, {mneug,pmilani,cplatzer}@seclab.tuwien.ac.at
ABSTRACT
The ability to remote-control infected PCs is a fundamental com-
ponent of modern malware campaigns. At the same time, the com-
mand and control (C&C) infrastructure that provides this capability
is an attractive target for mitigation. In recent years, more or less
successful takedown operations have been conducted against bot-
nets employing both client-server and peer-to-peer C&C architec-
tures. To improve their robustness against such disruptions of their
illegal business, botnet operators routinely deploy redundant C&C
infrastructure and implement failover C&C strategies.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose techniques based on multi-path ex-
ploration [1] to discover how malware behaves when faced with
the simulated take-down of some of the network endpoints it com-
municates with. We implement these techniques in a tool called
SQUEEZE, and show that it allows us to detect backup C&C servers,
increasing the coverage of an automatically generated C&C black-
list by 19.7%, and can trigger domain generation algorithms that
malware implements for disaster-recovery.
1
Malicious code, also known as malware, is an essential compo-
nent of criminal activity on the internet. Miscreants use a variety
of strategies to infect computers with malware and organize them
into networks of remote-controlled bots. These botnets can then
be used for a variety of harmful activities. These include identity
theft (such as stealing a user’s credit card number or online bank-
ing credentials), sending out unwanted email (SPAM), performing
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), tricking the user into
purchasing fak...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Detecting malware's failover C&C strategies with squeeze
author:Matthias Neugschwandtner and
Paolo Milani Comparetti and
Christian Platzer
Detecting Malware’s Failover C&C Strategies with
SQUEEZE
Matthias Neugschwandtner1, Paolo Milani Comparetti1, and Christian Platzer1
1Vienna University of Technology, {mneug,pmilani,cplatzer}@seclab.tuwien.ac.at
ABSTRACT
The ability to remote-control infected PCs is a fundamental com-
ponent of modern malware campaigns. At the same time, the com-
mand and control (C&C) infrastructure that provides this capability
is an attractive target for mitigation. In recent years, more or less
successful takedown operations have been conducted against bot-
nets employing both client-server and peer-to-peer C&C architec-
tures. To improve their robustness against such disruptions of their
illegal business, botnet operators routinely deploy redundant C&C
infrastructure and implement failover C&C strategies.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose techniques based on multi-path ex-
ploration [1] to discover how malware behaves when faced with
the simulated take-down of some of the network endpoints it com-
municates with. We implement these techniques in a tool called
SQUEEZE, and show that it allows us to detect backup C&C servers,
increasing the coverage of an automatically generated C&C black-
list by 19.7%, and can trigger domain generation algorithms that
malware implements for disaster-recovery.
1
Malicious code, also known as malware, is an essential compo-
nent of criminal activity on the internet. Miscreants use a variety
of strategies to infect computers with malware and organize them
into networks of remote-controlled bots. These botnets can then
be used for a variety of harmful activities. These include identity
theft (such as stealing a user’s credit card number or online bank-
ing credentials), sending out unwanted email (SPAM), performing
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), tricking the user into
purchasing fak...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
author:Marc Ju'arez and
Sadia Afroz and
Gunes Acar and
Claudia D'ıaz and
Rachel Greenstadt
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Marc Juarez1, Sadia Afroz2, Gunes Acar1, Claudia Diaz1, Rachel Greenstadt3
1KU Leuven, ESAT/COSIC and iMinds, Leuven, Belgium
{name.surname}@esat.kuleuven.be
2UC Berkeley
sadia.afroz@berkeley.edu
3Drexel University
greenie@cs.drexel.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to
have found highly eﬀective attacks on Tor. However, these
studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary ca-
pabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessar-
ily hold in practical scenarios. The following study criti-
cally evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack
where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain
variables, for example, user’s browsing habits, diﬀerences in
location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually
omitted from the current WF model have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the eﬃcacy of the attack. We also empirically show
how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the
open-world scenario. We address this problem by augment-
ing our classiﬁcation method with a veriﬁcation step. We
conclude that even though this approach reduces the num-
ber of false positives over 63%, it does not completely solve
the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection; K.4 [Computers and So-
ciety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Website ﬁngerprinting; Tor; privacy
1.
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication systems are designed to pro-
tect users from malicious websites and network eavesdrop-
pers by providing means to hide the content and metadata of
communications. The Onion Router (Tor), with about three
million daily users, is the most popular anonymous commu-
nication network.
It is s...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
author:Marc Ju'arez and
Sadia Afroz and
Gunes Acar and
Claudia D'ıaz and
Rachel Greenstadt
A Critical Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Marc Juarez1, Sadia Afroz2, Gunes Acar1, Claudia Diaz1, Rachel Greenstadt3
1KU Leuven, ESAT/COSIC and iMinds, Leuven, Belgium
{name.surname}@esat.kuleuven.be
2UC Berkeley
sadia.afroz@berkeley.edu
3Drexel University
greenie@cs.drexel.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent studies on Website Fingerprinting (WF) claim to
have found highly eﬀective attacks on Tor. However, these
studies make assumptions about user settings, adversary ca-
pabilities, and the nature of the Web that do not necessar-
ily hold in practical scenarios. The following study criti-
cally evaluates these assumptions by conducting the attack
where the assumptions do not hold. We show that certain
variables, for example, user’s browsing habits, diﬀerences in
location and version of Tor Browser Bundle, that are usually
omitted from the current WF model have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the eﬃcacy of the attack. We also empirically show
how prior work succumbs to the base rate fallacy in the
open-world scenario. We address this problem by augment-
ing our classiﬁcation method with a veriﬁcation step. We
conclude that even though this approach reduces the num-
ber of false positives over 63%, it does not completely solve
the problem, which remains an open issue for WF attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection; K.4 [Computers and So-
ciety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Website ﬁngerprinting; Tor; privacy
1.
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication systems are designed to pro-
tect users from malicious websites and network eavesdrop-
pers by providing means to hide the content and metadata of
communications. The Onion Router (Tor), with about three
million daily users, is the most popular anonymous commu-
nication network.
It is s...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
author:Rafael Pass and
Abhi Shelat
Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
∗
Rafael Pass
Cornell University
rafael@cs.cornell.com
†
abhi shelat
U of Virginia
abhi@virginia.edu
ABSTRACT
Electronic ﬁnancial transactions in the US, even those en-
abled by Bitcoin, have relatively high transaction costs. As
a result, it becomes infeasible to make micropayments, i.e.
payments that are pennies or fractions of a penny.
To circumvent the cost of recording all transactions, Wheeler
(1996) and Rivest (1997) suggested the notion of a prob-
abilistic payment, that is, one implements payments that
have expected value on the order of micro pennies by run-
ning an appropriately biased lottery for a larger payment.
While there have been quite a few proposed solutions to such
lottery-based micropayment schemes, all these solutions rely
on a trusted third party to coordinate the transactions; fur-
thermore, to implement these systems in today’s economy
would require a a global change to how either banks or elec-
tronic payment companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) han-
dle transactions.
We put forth a new lottery-based micropayment scheme
for any ledger-based transaction system, that can be used
today without any change to the current infrastructure. We
implement our scheme in a sample web application and show
how a single server can handle thousands of micropayment
requests per second. We analyze how the scheme can work
at Internet scale.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers methods for transacting very small
th to 1 penny. Traditional bank-based
amounts such as 1
10
transactions usually incur fees of between 21 to 25 cents
(in the US) plus a percentage of the transaction [16] and
thus transactions that are less than 1$ are rare because of
this ineﬃciency; credit-card based transactions can be more
expensive.
∗Supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1217821, NSF
†Supported by NSF Award CNS-0845811, TC-1111781, and
Award CCF-1214844 and ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
author:Rafael Pass and
Abhi Shelat
Micropayments for Decentralized Currencies
∗
Rafael Pass
Cornell University
rafael@cs.cornell.com
†
abhi shelat
U of Virginia
abhi@virginia.edu
ABSTRACT
Electronic ﬁnancial transactions in the US, even those en-
abled by Bitcoin, have relatively high transaction costs. As
a result, it becomes infeasible to make micropayments, i.e.
payments that are pennies or fractions of a penny.
To circumvent the cost of recording all transactions, Wheeler
(1996) and Rivest (1997) suggested the notion of a prob-
abilistic payment, that is, one implements payments that
have expected value on the order of micro pennies by run-
ning an appropriately biased lottery for a larger payment.
While there have been quite a few proposed solutions to such
lottery-based micropayment schemes, all these solutions rely
on a trusted third party to coordinate the transactions; fur-
thermore, to implement these systems in today’s economy
would require a a global change to how either banks or elec-
tronic payment companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) han-
dle transactions.
We put forth a new lottery-based micropayment scheme
for any ledger-based transaction system, that can be used
today without any change to the current infrastructure. We
implement our scheme in a sample web application and show
how a single server can handle thousands of micropayment
requests per second. We analyze how the scheme can work
at Internet scale.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers methods for transacting very small
th to 1 penny. Traditional bank-based
amounts such as 1
10
transactions usually incur fees of between 21 to 25 cents
(in the US) plus a percentage of the transaction [16] and
thus transactions that are less than 1$ are rare because of
this ineﬃciency; credit-card based transactions can be more
expensive.
∗Supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1217821, NSF
†Supported by NSF Award CNS-0845811, TC-1111781, and
Award CCF-1214844 and ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analysis of security data from a large computing organization
author:Aashish Sharma and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
James Barlow and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
Analysis of Security Data from a Large Computing Organization
A. Sharma, Z. Kalbarczyk, J. Barlow, and R. Iyer
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1308. Main St. Urbana, IL 61801, USA
 aashish@lbl.gov, {kalbarcz, jbarlow, rkiyer}@illinois.edu
Abstract  —  This  paper  presents  an  in-depth  study  of  the
forensic  data  on  security  incidents  that  have  occurred  over  a
period  of  5  years  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The  proposed
methodology  combines  automated  analysis  of  data  from
security  monitors  and  system  logs  with  human  expertise  to
extract and process relevant data in order to: (i) determine the
progression of an attack, (ii) establish incident categories and
characterize their severity, (iii) associate alerts with incidents,
and (iv) identify incidents missed by the monitoring tools and
examine  the  reasons  for  the  escapes.  The  analysis  conducted
provides  the  basis  for  incident  modeling  and  design  of  new
techniques for security monitoring.
Keywords - incident/attack data analysis, security monitoring,
alerts, large scale computing systems.
I.
INTRODUCTION
include
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  security  incidents  that  have
occurred  over  a  period  of  5  years  across  5000  machines
monitored  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  (NCSA)  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The
monitored  systems
i)  eight  high-performance
computational  clusters  (each  consisting  of  2k  –  12k
processors) participating in grid computing and accessed by
users  world-wide;
iii)
production  infrastructure  systems,  e.g.,  mail,  web,  domain
name, and authentication servers, certification authority; iv)
file servers (which include NFS, AFS, GPF...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analysis of security data from a large computing organization
author:Aashish Sharma and
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and
James Barlow and
Ravishankar K. Iyer
Analysis of Security Data from a Large Computing Organization
A. Sharma, Z. Kalbarczyk, J. Barlow, and R. Iyer
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1308. Main St. Urbana, IL 61801, USA
 aashish@lbl.gov, {kalbarcz, jbarlow, rkiyer}@illinois.edu
Abstract  —  This  paper  presents  an  in-depth  study  of  the
forensic  data  on  security  incidents  that  have  occurred  over  a
period  of  5  years  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The  proposed
methodology  combines  automated  analysis  of  data  from
security  monitors  and  system  logs  with  human  expertise  to
extract and process relevant data in order to: (i) determine the
progression of an attack, (ii) establish incident categories and
characterize their severity, (iii) associate alerts with incidents,
and (iv) identify incidents missed by the monitoring tools and
examine  the  reasons  for  the  escapes.  The  analysis  conducted
provides  the  basis  for  incident  modeling  and  design  of  new
techniques for security monitoring.
Keywords - incident/attack data analysis, security monitoring,
alerts, large scale computing systems.
I.
INTRODUCTION
include
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  security  incidents  that  have
occurred  over  a  period  of  5  years  across  5000  machines
monitored  at  the  National  Center  for  Supercomputing
Applications  (NCSA)  at  the  University  of  Illinois.  The
monitored  systems
i)  eight  high-performance
computational  clusters  (each  consisting  of  2k  –  12k
processors) participating in grid computing and accessed by
users  world-wide;
iii)
production  infrastructure  systems,  e.g.,  mail,  web,  domain
name, and authentication servers, certification authority; iv)
file servers (which include NFS, AFS, GPF...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Pinpointing delay and forwarding anomalies using large-scale traceroute
measurements
author:Romain Fontugne and
Cristel Pelsser and
Emile Aben and
Randy Bush
Pinpointing Delay and Forwarding Anomalies Using
Large-Scale Traceroute Measurements
Romain Fontugne
IIJ Research Lab
Emile Aben
RIPE NCC
Cristel Pelsser
University of Strasbourg / CNRS
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab
7
1
0
2
y
a
M
5
1
]
I
N
.
s
c
[
2
v
4
8
7
4
0
.
5
0
6
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
Understanding data plane health is essential to improving
Internet reliability and usability. For instance, detecting dis-
ruptions in peer and provider networks can identify repairable
connectivity problems. Currently this task is time consum-
ing as it involves a fair amount of manual observation, as an
operator has poor visibility beyond their network’s border.
In this paper we leverage existing public RIPE Atlas mea-
surement data to monitor and analyze network conditions;
creating no new measurements. We demonstrate a set of
complementary methods to detect network disruptions using
traceroute measurements, and to report problems in near real
time. A novel method of detecting changes in delay is used
to identify congested links, and a packet forwarding model
is employed to predict trafﬁc paths and to identify faulty
routers and links in cases of packet loss.
In addition, ag-
gregating results from each method allows us to easily mon-
itor a network and correlate related reports of signiﬁcant net-
work disruptions, reducing uninteresting alarms. Our contri-
butions consist of a statistical approach to providing robust
estimation of Internet delays and the study of hundreds of
thousands link delays. We present three cases demonstrat-
ing that the proposed methods detect real disruptions and
provide valuable insights, as well as surprising ﬁndings, on
the location and impact of the identiﬁed events.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s decentralized design allows disparate
networks to cooperate and provides resilience to fai...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Pinpointing delay and forwarding anomalies using large-scale traceroute
measurements
author:Romain Fontugne and
Cristel Pelsser and
Emile Aben and
Randy Bush
Pinpointing Delay and Forwarding Anomalies Using
Large-Scale Traceroute Measurements
Romain Fontugne
IIJ Research Lab
Emile Aben
RIPE NCC
Cristel Pelsser
University of Strasbourg / CNRS
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab
7
1
0
2
y
a
M
5
1
]
I
N
.
s
c
[
2
v
4
8
7
4
0
.
5
0
6
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
ABSTRACT
Understanding data plane health is essential to improving
Internet reliability and usability. For instance, detecting dis-
ruptions in peer and provider networks can identify repairable
connectivity problems. Currently this task is time consum-
ing as it involves a fair amount of manual observation, as an
operator has poor visibility beyond their network’s border.
In this paper we leverage existing public RIPE Atlas mea-
surement data to monitor and analyze network conditions;
creating no new measurements. We demonstrate a set of
complementary methods to detect network disruptions using
traceroute measurements, and to report problems in near real
time. A novel method of detecting changes in delay is used
to identify congested links, and a packet forwarding model
is employed to predict trafﬁc paths and to identify faulty
routers and links in cases of packet loss.
In addition, ag-
gregating results from each method allows us to easily mon-
itor a network and correlate related reports of signiﬁcant net-
work disruptions, reducing uninteresting alarms. Our contri-
butions consist of a statistical approach to providing robust
estimation of Internet delays and the study of hundreds of
thousands link delays. We present three cases demonstrat-
ing that the proposed methods detect real disruptions and
provide valuable insights, as well as surprising ﬁndings, on
the location and impact of the identiﬁed events.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s decentralized design allows disparate
networks to cooperate and provides resilience to fai...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Web Performance Pitfalls
author:Theresa Enghardt and
Thomas Zinner and
Anja Feldmann
Web Performance Pitfalls
Theresa Enghardt1(B), Thomas Zinner1, and Anja Feldmann2
1 TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany
{theresa,zinner}@inet.tu-berlin.de
2 Max-Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
anja@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract. Web performance is widely studied in terms of load times,
numbers of objects, object sizes, and total page sizes. However, for all
these metrics, there are various deﬁnitions, data sources, and measure-
ment tools. These often lead to diﬀerent results and almost all studies do
not provide suﬃcient details about the deﬁnition of metrics and the data
sources they use. This hinders reproducibility as well as comparability
of the results. This paper revisits the various deﬁnitions and quantiﬁes
their impact on performance results. To do so we assess Web metrics
across a large variety of Web pages.
Amazingly, even for such “obvious” metrics as load times, diﬀerences
can be huge. For example, for more than 50% of the pages, the load times
vary by more than 19.1% and for 10% by more than 47% depending on
the exact deﬁnition of load time. Among the main culprits for such dif-
ference are the in-/exclusion of initial redirects and the choice of data
source, e.g., Resource Timings API or HTTP Archive (HAR) ﬁles. Even
“simpler” metrics such as the number of objects per page have a huge
variance. For the Alexa 1000, we observed a diﬀerence of more than 67
objects for 10% of the pages with a median of 7 objects. This highlights
the importance of precisely specifying all metrics including how and from
which data source they are computed.
Keywords: Web performance · Measurement
1 Introduction
Web browsing is one of the most prevalent applications in today’s Internet.
Thus, understanding its performance is critical. Hereby, both metrics as well
as experiments have to realistically reﬂect possible performance improvements
for actual users. Moreover, they need ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Web Performance Pitfalls
author:Theresa Enghardt and
Thomas Zinner and
Anja Feldmann
Web Performance Pitfalls
Theresa Enghardt1(B), Thomas Zinner1, and Anja Feldmann2
1 TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany
{theresa,zinner}@inet.tu-berlin.de
2 Max-Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbr¨ucken, Germany
anja@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract. Web performance is widely studied in terms of load times,
numbers of objects, object sizes, and total page sizes. However, for all
these metrics, there are various deﬁnitions, data sources, and measure-
ment tools. These often lead to diﬀerent results and almost all studies do
not provide suﬃcient details about the deﬁnition of metrics and the data
sources they use. This hinders reproducibility as well as comparability
of the results. This paper revisits the various deﬁnitions and quantiﬁes
their impact on performance results. To do so we assess Web metrics
across a large variety of Web pages.
Amazingly, even for such “obvious” metrics as load times, diﬀerences
can be huge. For example, for more than 50% of the pages, the load times
vary by more than 19.1% and for 10% by more than 47% depending on
the exact deﬁnition of load time. Among the main culprits for such dif-
ference are the in-/exclusion of initial redirects and the choice of data
source, e.g., Resource Timings API or HTTP Archive (HAR) ﬁles. Even
“simpler” metrics such as the number of objects per page have a huge
variance. For the Alexa 1000, we observed a diﬀerence of more than 67
objects for 10% of the pages with a median of 7 objects. This highlights
the importance of precisely specifying all metrics including how and from
which data source they are computed.
Keywords: Web performance · Measurement
1 Introduction
Web browsing is one of the most prevalent applications in today’s Internet.
Thus, understanding its performance is critical. Hereby, both metrics as well
as experiments have to realistically reﬂect possible performance improvements
for actual users. Moreover, they need ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
author:Michael E. Locasto and
Ke Wang and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Salvatore J. Stolfo
FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
Michael E. Locasto, Ke Wang, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University,
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailcode 0401,
New York, NY 10027
{locasto, kewang, angelos, sal}@cs.columbia.edu
+1 212 939 7177
Abstract. Intrusion detection systems are fundamentally passive and
fail–open. Because their primary task is classiﬁcation, they do noth-
ing to prevent an attack from succeeding. An intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) adds protection mechanisms that provide fail–safe semantics,
automatic response capabilities, and adaptive enforcement. We present
FLIPS (Feedback Learning IPS), a hybrid approach to host security that
prevents binary code injection attacks. It incorporates three major com-
ponents: an anomaly-based classiﬁer, a signature-based ﬁltering scheme,
and a supervision framework that employs Instruction Set Randomiza-
tion (ISR). Since ISR prevents code injection attacks and can also pre-
cisely identify the injected code, we can tune the classiﬁer and the ﬁlter
via a learning mechanism based on this feedback. Capturing the injected
code allows FLIPS to construct signatures for zero-day exploits. The
ﬁlter can discard input that is anomalous or matches known malicious
input, eﬀectively protecting the application from additional instances of
an attack – even zero-day attacks or attacks that are metamorphic in
nature. FLIPS does not require a known user base and can be deployed
transparently to clients and with minimal impact on servers. We describe
a prototype that protects HTTP servers, but FLIPS can be applied to a
variety of server and client applications.
Keywords: Adaptive Response,
Tolerance.
Intrusion Prevention,
Intrusion
1 Introduction
One key problem for network defense systems is the inability to automatically
mount a reliable...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
author:Michael E. Locasto and
Ke Wang and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Salvatore J. Stolfo
FLIPS: Hybrid Adaptive Intrusion Prevention
Michael E. Locasto, Ke Wang, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University,
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailcode 0401,
New York, NY 10027
{locasto, kewang, angelos, sal}@cs.columbia.edu
+1 212 939 7177
Abstract. Intrusion detection systems are fundamentally passive and
fail–open. Because their primary task is classiﬁcation, they do noth-
ing to prevent an attack from succeeding. An intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) adds protection mechanisms that provide fail–safe semantics,
automatic response capabilities, and adaptive enforcement. We present
FLIPS (Feedback Learning IPS), a hybrid approach to host security that
prevents binary code injection attacks. It incorporates three major com-
ponents: an anomaly-based classiﬁer, a signature-based ﬁltering scheme,
and a supervision framework that employs Instruction Set Randomiza-
tion (ISR). Since ISR prevents code injection attacks and can also pre-
cisely identify the injected code, we can tune the classiﬁer and the ﬁlter
via a learning mechanism based on this feedback. Capturing the injected
code allows FLIPS to construct signatures for zero-day exploits. The
ﬁlter can discard input that is anomalous or matches known malicious
input, eﬀectively protecting the application from additional instances of
an attack – even zero-day attacks or attacks that are metamorphic in
nature. FLIPS does not require a known user base and can be deployed
transparently to clients and with minimal impact on servers. We describe
a prototype that protects HTTP servers, but FLIPS can be applied to a
variety of server and client applications.
Keywords: Adaptive Response,
Tolerance.
Intrusion Prevention,
Intrusion
1 Introduction
One key problem for network defense systems is the inability to automatically
mount a reliable...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
author:Fuyuan Zhang and
Limin Jia and
Cristina Basescu and
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim and
Yih-Chun Hu and
Adrian Perrig
Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
Fuyuan Zhang
CyLab, CMU
fuzh@andrew.cmu.edu
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim
CyLab, CMU
hyunjin@cmu.edu
Limin Jia
ECE & INI, CMU
liminjia@cmu.edu
Yih-Chun Hu
UIUC
yihchun@uiuc.edu
ETH Zürich
Cristina Basescu
cba@inf.ethz.ch
Adrian Perrig
CyLab, CMU/ETH Zürich
aperrig@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
A secure routing infrastructure is vital for secure and reliable Inter-
net services. Source authentication and path validation are two fun-
damental primitives for building a more secure and reliable Inter-
net. Although several protocols have been proposed to implement
these primitives, they have not been formally analyzed for their
security guarantees. In this paper, we apply proof techniques for
verifying cryptographic protocols (e.g., key exchange protocols) to
analyzing network protocols. We encode LS2, a program logic for
reasoning about programs that execute in an adversarial environ-
ment, in Coq. We also encode protocol-speciﬁc data structures,
predicates, and axioms. To analyze a source-routing protocol that
uses chained MACs to provide origin and path validation, we con-
struct Coq proofs to show that the protocol satisﬁes its desired prop-
erties. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to formalize
origin and path authenticity properties, and mechanize proofs that
chained MACs can provide the desired authenticity properties.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security and pro-
tection; C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Protocol veriﬁcation
Keywords
Origin authenticity, path authenticity, secrecy, formal methods, mech-
anized proofs
1.
INTRODUCTION
A secure routing infrastructure is central to providing secure and
reliable Internet services. The current Internet routing infrastruc-
ture has many known security issues...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
author:Fuyuan Zhang and
Limin Jia and
Cristina Basescu and
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim and
Yih-Chun Hu and
Adrian Perrig
Mechanized Network Origin and Path Authenticity Proofs
Fuyuan Zhang
CyLab, CMU
fuzh@andrew.cmu.edu
Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim
CyLab, CMU
hyunjin@cmu.edu
Limin Jia
ECE & INI, CMU
liminjia@cmu.edu
Yih-Chun Hu
UIUC
yihchun@uiuc.edu
ETH Zürich
Cristina Basescu
cba@inf.ethz.ch
Adrian Perrig
CyLab, CMU/ETH Zürich
aperrig@inf.ethz.ch
ABSTRACT
A secure routing infrastructure is vital for secure and reliable Inter-
net services. Source authentication and path validation are two fun-
damental primitives for building a more secure and reliable Inter-
net. Although several protocols have been proposed to implement
these primitives, they have not been formally analyzed for their
security guarantees. In this paper, we apply proof techniques for
verifying cryptographic protocols (e.g., key exchange protocols) to
analyzing network protocols. We encode LS2, a program logic for
reasoning about programs that execute in an adversarial environ-
ment, in Coq. We also encode protocol-speciﬁc data structures,
predicates, and axioms. To analyze a source-routing protocol that
uses chained MACs to provide origin and path validation, we con-
struct Coq proofs to show that the protocol satisﬁes its desired prop-
erties. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to formalize
origin and path authenticity properties, and mechanize proofs that
chained MACs can provide the desired authenticity properties.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security and pro-
tection; C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Protocol veriﬁcation
Keywords
Origin authenticity, path authenticity, secrecy, formal methods, mech-
anized proofs
1.
INTRODUCTION
A secure routing infrastructure is central to providing secure and
reliable Internet services. The current Internet routing infrastruc-
ture has many known security issues...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:In search of an anonymous and secure lookup: attacks on structured
peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
author:Qiyan Wang and
Prateek Mittal and
Nikita Borisov
In Search of an Anonymous and Secure Lookup
Attacks on Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
Qiyan Wang
UIUC
qwang26@illinois.edu
Prateek Mittal
UIUC
mittal2@illinois.edu
Nikita Borisov
UIUC
nikita@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The ability to locate random relays is a key challenge for
peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems. Ear-
lier attempts like Salsa and AP3 used distributed hash ta-
ble lookups to locate relays, but the lack of anonymity in
their lookup mechanisms enables an adversary to infer the
path structure and compromise user anonymity. NISAN
and Torsk are state-of-the-art systems for P2P anonymous
communication. Their designs include mechanisms that are
speciﬁcally tailored to mitigate information leak attacks.
NISAN proposes to add anonymity into the lookup mech-
anism itself, while Torsk proposes the use of secret buddy
nodes to anonymize the lookup initiator.
In this paper, we attack the key mechanisms that hide
the relationship between a lookup initiator and its selected
relays in NISAN and Torsk. We present passive attacks
on the NISAN lookup and show that it is not as anony-
mous as previously thought. We analyze three circuit con-
struction mechanisms for anonymous communication using
the NISAN lookup, and show that the information leaks in
the NISAN lookup lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in user
anonymity. We also propose active attacks on Torsk that
defeat its secret buddy mechanism and consequently com-
promise user anonymity. Our results are backed up by prob-
abilistic modeling and extensive simulations. Our study mo-
tivates the search for a DHT lookup mechanism that is both
secure and anonymous.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:In search of an anonymous and secure lookup: attacks on structured
peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
author:Qiyan Wang and
Prateek Mittal and
Nikita Borisov
In Search of an Anonymous and Secure Lookup
Attacks on Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
Qiyan Wang
UIUC
qwang26@illinois.edu
Prateek Mittal
UIUC
mittal2@illinois.edu
Nikita Borisov
UIUC
nikita@illinois.edu
ABSTRACT
The ability to locate random relays is a key challenge for
peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication systems. Ear-
lier attempts like Salsa and AP3 used distributed hash ta-
ble lookups to locate relays, but the lack of anonymity in
their lookup mechanisms enables an adversary to infer the
path structure and compromise user anonymity. NISAN
and Torsk are state-of-the-art systems for P2P anonymous
communication. Their designs include mechanisms that are
speciﬁcally tailored to mitigate information leak attacks.
NISAN proposes to add anonymity into the lookup mech-
anism itself, while Torsk proposes the use of secret buddy
nodes to anonymize the lookup initiator.
In this paper, we attack the key mechanisms that hide
the relationship between a lookup initiator and its selected
relays in NISAN and Torsk. We present passive attacks
on the NISAN lookup and show that it is not as anony-
mous as previously thought. We analyze three circuit con-
struction mechanisms for anonymous communication using
the NISAN lookup, and show that the information leaks in
the NISAN lookup lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in user
anonymity. We also propose active attacks on Torsk that
defeat its secret buddy mechanism and consequently com-
promise user anonymity. Our results are backed up by prob-
abilistic modeling and extensive simulations. Our study mo-
tivates the search for a DHT lookup mechanism that is both
secure and anonymous.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Noise*: A Library of Verified High-Performance Secure Channel Protocol
Implementations
author:Son Ho and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Abhishek Bichhawat and
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
1
2
6
3
3
8
9
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2
2
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2
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1
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/
2
2
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9
-
6
1
3
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4
5
6
6
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1
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8
7
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P
S
(
y
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a
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y
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o
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2
2
0
2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Noise*: A Library of Veriﬁed High-Performance
Secure Channel Protocol Implementations
Son Ho
Inria Paris
Jonathan Protzenko
Microsoft Research
Abhishek Bichhawat
IIT Gandhinagar
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Inria Paris
Abstract—The Noise protocol framework deﬁnes a succinct
notation and execution framework for a large class of 59+
secure channel protocols, some of which are used in popular
applications such as WhatsApp and WireGuard. We present a
veriﬁed implementation of a Noise protocol compiler that takes
any Noise protocol, and produces an optimized C implementation
with extensive correctness and security guarantees. To this end,
we formalize the complete Noise stack in F*, from the low-level
cryptographic library to a high-level API. We write our compiler
also in F*, prove that it meets our formal speciﬁcation once and
for all, and then specialize it on-demand for any given Noise
protocol, relying on a novel technique called hybrid embedding.
We thus establish functional correctness, memory safety and a
form of side-channel resistance for the generated C code for
each Noise protocol. We propagate these guarantees to the high-
level API, using defensive dynamic checks to prevent incorrect
uses of the protocol. Finally, we formally state and prove the
security of our Noise code, by building on a symbolic model of
cryptography in F*, and formally link high-level API security
goals stated in terms of security levels to low-level cryptographic
guarantees. Ours are the ﬁrst comprehensive veriﬁcation results
for a protocol compiler t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Noise*: A Library of Verified High-Performance Secure Channel Protocol
Implementations
author:Son Ho and
Jonathan Protzenko and
Abhishek Bichhawat and
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
1
2
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
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0
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:
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D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Noise*: A Library of Veriﬁed High-Performance
Secure Channel Protocol Implementations
Son Ho
Inria Paris
Jonathan Protzenko
Microsoft Research
Abhishek Bichhawat
IIT Gandhinagar
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Inria Paris
Abstract—The Noise protocol framework deﬁnes a succinct
notation and execution framework for a large class of 59+
secure channel protocols, some of which are used in popular
applications such as WhatsApp and WireGuard. We present a
veriﬁed implementation of a Noise protocol compiler that takes
any Noise protocol, and produces an optimized C implementation
with extensive correctness and security guarantees. To this end,
we formalize the complete Noise stack in F*, from the low-level
cryptographic library to a high-level API. We write our compiler
also in F*, prove that it meets our formal speciﬁcation once and
for all, and then specialize it on-demand for any given Noise
protocol, relying on a novel technique called hybrid embedding.
We thus establish functional correctness, memory safety and a
form of side-channel resistance for the generated C code for
each Noise protocol. We propagate these guarantees to the high-
level API, using defensive dynamic checks to prevent incorrect
uses of the protocol. Finally, we formally state and prove the
security of our Noise code, by building on a symbolic model of
cryptography in F*, and formally link high-level API security
goals stated in terms of security levels to low-level cryptographic
guarantees. Ours are the ﬁrst comprehensive veriﬁcation results
for a protocol compiler t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Enhancing Survivability of Security Services Using Redundanc
author:Matti A. Hiltunen and
Richard D. Schlichting and
Carlos A. Ugarte
Enhancing Survivability of Security Services using Redundancy*
Matti A. Hiltunen  Richard D. Schlichting
AT&T Shannon Laboratory
180 Park Avenue
Florham Park, NJ 07932
hiltunen/rick@research.att.com
Carlos A. Ugarte
Department of  Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
cau@cs.arizona.edu
Abstract
Traditional distributed system services that provide guaran-
tees related to conjidentiality, integrity, and authenticity en-
hance security, but ure not survivable since each attribute is
inipleniented by a single  method.  This paper advocates the
use  of  redundancy to increase  survivability  by using  mul-
tiple methods to implement each security attribute and do-
ing so in ways that can vary  unpredictably.  As a  concrete
exanzple, the design and iniplenzentution of u highly config-
urable secure coniniunication  service  called SecConim ure
presented.  The service has been implemented using Cactus,
a s)$steni for building highly conjigurable protocols and ser-
vices for distributed systems.  Initial petforniunce results for
a protoQpe iniplenierrtution on Linux are also given.
1  Introduction
Security  services  that  provide attributes  such  as  confi-
dentiality,  integrity,  and  authenticity  typically  implement
each  attribute  using  a  single  method.  For  example,  in  a
secure communication service, confidentiality may  be pro-
vided by  DES and integrity by keyed MD5. Although such
an  approach  may  be  secure  in  the  traditional  sense,  it  is
a  method  is  compromised, all  secu-
not  survivable-once
rity guarantees on the connection related to that attribute are
gone. Each method is, in essence, a single point of vulnera-
bility very much analogous to a single point of system fail-
ure when  considering fault-tolerance  attributes.  This prob-
lem is...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Enhancing Survivability of Security Services Using Redundanc
author:Matti A. Hiltunen and
Richard D. Schlichting and
Carlos A. Ugarte
Enhancing Survivability of Security Services using Redundancy*
Matti A. Hiltunen  Richard D. Schlichting
AT&T Shannon Laboratory
180 Park Avenue
Florham Park, NJ 07932
hiltunen/rick@research.att.com
Carlos A. Ugarte
Department of  Computer Science
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
cau@cs.arizona.edu
Abstract
Traditional distributed system services that provide guaran-
tees related to conjidentiality, integrity, and authenticity en-
hance security, but ure not survivable since each attribute is
inipleniented by a single  method.  This paper advocates the
use  of  redundancy to increase  survivability  by using  mul-
tiple methods to implement each security attribute and do-
ing so in ways that can vary  unpredictably.  As a  concrete
exanzple, the design and iniplenzentution of u highly config-
urable secure coniniunication  service  called SecConim ure
presented.  The service has been implemented using Cactus,
a s)$steni for building highly conjigurable protocols and ser-
vices for distributed systems.  Initial petforniunce results for
a protoQpe iniplenierrtution on Linux are also given.
1  Introduction
Security  services  that  provide attributes  such  as  confi-
dentiality,  integrity,  and  authenticity  typically  implement
each  attribute  using  a  single  method.  For  example,  in  a
secure communication service, confidentiality may  be pro-
vided by  DES and integrity by keyed MD5. Although such
an  approach  may  be  secure  in  the  traditional  sense,  it  is
a  method  is  compromised, all  secu-
not  survivable-once
rity guarantees on the connection related to that attribute are
gone. Each method is, in essence, a single point of vulnera-
bility very much analogous to a single point of system fail-
ure when  considering fault-tolerance  attributes.  This prob-
lem is...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty
World
author:Robert Schilling and
Mario Werner and
Pascal Nasahl and
Stefan Mangard
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a
Faulty World
Robert Schilling
Graz University of Technology
Know-Center GmbH
robert.schilling@iaik.tugraz.at
8
1
0
2
p
e
S
4
2
]
R
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s
c
[
1
v
1
1
8
8
0
.
9
0
8
1
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r
a
Pascal Nasahl
Graz University of Technology
pascal.nasahl@student.tugraz.at
ABSTRACT
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most
common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these
operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any
program. However, as soon as fault attacks are considered, assuming
that the hardware performs its memory operations as instructed is
not valid anymore. In particular, attackers may induce faults with
the goal of reading or writing incorrectly addressed memory, which
can have various critical safety and security implications.
In this work, we present a solution to this problem and propose
a new method for protecting every memory access inside a pro-
gram against address tampering. The countermeasure comprises
two building blocks. First, every pointer inside the program is re-
dundantly encoded using a multi-residue error detection code. The
redundancy information is stored in the unused upper bits of the
pointer with zero overhead in terms of storage. Second, load and
store instructions are extended to link data with the corresponding
encoded address from the pointer. Wrong memory accesses subse-
quently infect the data value allowing the software to detect the
error.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our countermeasure
into a RISC-V processor, tested it on a FPGA development board,
and evaluated the induced overhead. Furthermore, a LLVM-based
C compiler has been modified to automatically encode all data
pointers, to perform encoded pointer arithmetic, and to emit the
extended load/store instr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty
World
author:Robert Schilling and
Mario Werner and
Pascal Nasahl and
Stefan Mangard
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a
Faulty World
Robert Schilling
Graz University of Technology
Know-Center GmbH
robert.schilling@iaik.tugraz.at
8
1
0
2
p
e
S
4
2
]
R
C
.
s
c
[
1
v
1
1
8
8
0
.
9
0
8
1
:
v
i
X
r
a
Pascal Nasahl
Graz University of Technology
pascal.nasahl@student.tugraz.at
ABSTRACT
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most
common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these
operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any
program. However, as soon as fault attacks are considered, assuming
that the hardware performs its memory operations as instructed is
not valid anymore. In particular, attackers may induce faults with
the goal of reading or writing incorrectly addressed memory, which
can have various critical safety and security implications.
In this work, we present a solution to this problem and propose
a new method for protecting every memory access inside a pro-
gram against address tampering. The countermeasure comprises
two building blocks. First, every pointer inside the program is re-
dundantly encoded using a multi-residue error detection code. The
redundancy information is stored in the unused upper bits of the
pointer with zero overhead in terms of storage. Second, load and
store instructions are extended to link data with the corresponding
encoded address from the pointer. Wrong memory accesses subse-
quently infect the data value allowing the software to detect the
error.
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our countermeasure
into a RISC-V processor, tested it on a FPGA development board,
and evaluated the induced overhead. Furthermore, a LLVM-based
C compiler has been modified to automatically encode all data
pointers, to perform encoded pointer arithmetic, and to emit the
extended load/store instr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Portable and Efficient Continuous Data Protection for Network File
Servers
author:Ningning Zhu and
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Portable and Efﬁcient Continuous Data Protection for
Network File Servers
Ningning Zhu
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Computer Science Department
Stony Brook University
Abstract
Continuous data protection, which logs every update to
a ﬁle system, is an enabling technology to protect ﬁle sys-
tems against malicious attacks and/or user mistakes, be-
cause it allows each ﬁle update to be undoable. Existing
implementations of continuous data protection work either
at disk access interface or within the ﬁle system. Despite
the implementation complexity, their performance overhead
is signiﬁcant when compared with ﬁle systems that do not
support continuous data protection. Moreover, such kernel-
level ﬁle update logging implementation is complex and
cannot be easily ported to other operating systems. This
paper describes the design and implementation of four user-
level continuous data protection implementations for NFS
servers, all of which work on top of the NFS protocol and
thus can be easily ported to any operating systems that sup-
port NFS. Measurements obtained from running standard
benchmarks and real-world NFS traces on these user-level
continuous data protection systems demonstrate a surpris-
ing result: Performance of NFS servers protected by pure
user-level continuous data protection schemes is compara-
ble to that of unprotected vanilla NFS servers.
1
Introduction
Data in a ﬁle system could be lost or corrupted in the
face of natural disasters, hardware/software failures, human
mistakes or malicious attacks. While replication and mirror-
ing represent effective defenses against hardware and site
failures, they cannot protect ﬁle system data from human
mistakes, software failures and malicious attacks, against
which conventional data backup systems provide limited
protection. Advanced multi-snapshots backup systems [12]
decrease the amount of potential data...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Portable and Efficient Continuous Data Protection for Network File
Servers
author:Ningning Zhu and
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Portable and Efﬁcient Continuous Data Protection for
Network File Servers
Ningning Zhu
Tzi-cker Chiueh
Computer Science Department
Stony Brook University
Abstract
Continuous data protection, which logs every update to
a ﬁle system, is an enabling technology to protect ﬁle sys-
tems against malicious attacks and/or user mistakes, be-
cause it allows each ﬁle update to be undoable. Existing
implementations of continuous data protection work either
at disk access interface or within the ﬁle system. Despite
the implementation complexity, their performance overhead
is signiﬁcant when compared with ﬁle systems that do not
support continuous data protection. Moreover, such kernel-
level ﬁle update logging implementation is complex and
cannot be easily ported to other operating systems. This
paper describes the design and implementation of four user-
level continuous data protection implementations for NFS
servers, all of which work on top of the NFS protocol and
thus can be easily ported to any operating systems that sup-
port NFS. Measurements obtained from running standard
benchmarks and real-world NFS traces on these user-level
continuous data protection systems demonstrate a surpris-
ing result: Performance of NFS servers protected by pure
user-level continuous data protection schemes is compara-
ble to that of unprotected vanilla NFS servers.
1
Introduction
Data in a ﬁle system could be lost or corrupted in the
face of natural disasters, hardware/software failures, human
mistakes or malicious attacks. While replication and mirror-
ing represent effective defenses against hardware and site
failures, they cannot protect ﬁle system data from human
mistakes, software failures and malicious attacks, against
which conventional data backup systems provide limited
protection. Advanced multi-snapshots backup systems [12]
decrease the amount of potential data...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited
author:Michael Backes and
Tongbo Chen and
Markus D"urmuth and
Hendrik P. A. Lensch and
Martin Welk
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reﬂections Revisited
Michael Backes
∗†
‡
, Tongbo Chen
∗
∗
, Hendrik P. A. Lensch
§
, and Martin Welk
∗
, Markus Dürmuth
Saarland University, Germany
‡
§
MPI Informatik, Germany
Ulm University, Germany
†
MPI-SWS
Abstract
Reﬂecting objects such as tea pots and glasses, but also
diffusely reﬂecting objects such as a user’s shirt, can be used
to spy on conﬁdential data displayed on a monitor. First, we
show how reﬂections in the user’s eye can be exploited for
spying on conﬁdential data. Second, we investigate to what
extent monitor images can be reconstructed from the diffuse
reﬂections on a wall or the user’s clothes, and provide
information-theoretic bounds limiting this type of attack.
Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of several countermea-
sures. This substantially improves previous work (Backes et
al., IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2008).
1. Introduction
Emanations leaking potential conﬁdential
information,
from computers or similar devices, have been a topic of
concern for a long time. Although the military had prior
knowledge [34], [14], techniques to use the electromagnetic
emanation of CRT monitors to reconstruct a monitor’s
content were publicly known only by 1985 [31]. This
technique was further reﬁned and applied to similar types
of emanation, e.g., to capture the monitor’s content from
the emanations of the cable connecting the monitor and the
computer [15].
Prior work [3] presented a novel method to exploit the
optical, i.e., the unavoidable emanation of every monitor, not
just CRT monitors. It showed how to exploit tiny reﬂections
in a variety of objects to spy on conﬁdential data displayed
on a computer monitor. Appropriate objects are typically
located in most ofﬁces. This approach used astronom...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited
author:Michael Backes and
Tongbo Chen and
Markus D"urmuth and
Hendrik P. A. Lensch and
Martin Welk
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reﬂections Revisited
Michael Backes
∗†
‡
, Tongbo Chen
∗
∗
, Hendrik P. A. Lensch
§
, and Martin Welk
∗
, Markus Dürmuth
Saarland University, Germany
‡
§
MPI Informatik, Germany
Ulm University, Germany
†
MPI-SWS
Abstract
Reﬂecting objects such as tea pots and glasses, but also
diffusely reﬂecting objects such as a user’s shirt, can be used
to spy on conﬁdential data displayed on a monitor. First, we
show how reﬂections in the user’s eye can be exploited for
spying on conﬁdential data. Second, we investigate to what
extent monitor images can be reconstructed from the diffuse
reﬂections on a wall or the user’s clothes, and provide
information-theoretic bounds limiting this type of attack.
Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of several countermea-
sures. This substantially improves previous work (Backes et
al., IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2008).
1. Introduction
Emanations leaking potential conﬁdential
information,
from computers or similar devices, have been a topic of
concern for a long time. Although the military had prior
knowledge [34], [14], techniques to use the electromagnetic
emanation of CRT monitors to reconstruct a monitor’s
content were publicly known only by 1985 [31]. This
technique was further reﬁned and applied to similar types
of emanation, e.g., to capture the monitor’s content from
the emanations of the cable connecting the monitor and the
computer [15].
Prior work [3] presented a novel method to exploit the
optical, i.e., the unavoidable emanation of every monitor, not
just CRT monitors. It showed how to exploit tiny reﬂections
in a variety of objects to spy on conﬁdential data displayed
on a computer monitor. Appropriate objects are typically
located in most ofﬁces. This approach used astronom...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
author:Kimberly Ruth and
Tadayoshi Kohno and
Franziska Roesner
Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for
Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner, University of Washington
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/ruth
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth
kcr32@cs.washington.edu
Tadayoshi Kohno
yoshi@cs.washington.edu
Franziska Roesner
franzi@cs.washington.edu
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington
https://ar-sec.cs.washington.edu/
Abstract
Augmented reality (AR), which overlays virtual content on
top of the user’s perception of the real world, has now be-
gun to enter the consumer market. Besides smartphone plat-
forms, early-stage head-mounted displays such as the Mi-
crosoft HoloLens are under active development. Many com-
pelling uses of these technologies are multi-user: e.g., in-
person collaborative tools, multiplayer gaming, and telep-
resence. While prior work on AR security and privacy has
studied potential risks from AR applications, new risks will
also arise among multiple human users. In this work, we ex-
plore the challenges that arise in designing secure and private
content sharing for multi-user AR. We analyze representative
application case studies and systematize design goals for se-
curity and functionality that a multi-user AR platform should
support. We design an AR content sharing control module
that achieves these goals and build a prototype implementa-
tion (ShareAR) for the HoloLens. This work builds founda-
tions for secure and private multi-user AR interactions.
1 Introduction
Augmented real...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
author:Kimberly Ruth and
Tadayoshi Kohno and
Franziska Roesner
Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for
Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner, University of Washington
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/ruth
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium.August 14–16, 2019 • Santa Clara, CA, USA978-1-939133-06-9Open access to the Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Secure Multi-User Content Sharing for Augmented Reality Applications
Kimberly Ruth
kcr32@cs.washington.edu
Tadayoshi Kohno
yoshi@cs.washington.edu
Franziska Roesner
franzi@cs.washington.edu
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington
https://ar-sec.cs.washington.edu/
Abstract
Augmented reality (AR), which overlays virtual content on
top of the user’s perception of the real world, has now be-
gun to enter the consumer market. Besides smartphone plat-
forms, early-stage head-mounted displays such as the Mi-
crosoft HoloLens are under active development. Many com-
pelling uses of these technologies are multi-user: e.g., in-
person collaborative tools, multiplayer gaming, and telep-
resence. While prior work on AR security and privacy has
studied potential risks from AR applications, new risks will
also arise among multiple human users. In this work, we ex-
plore the challenges that arise in designing secure and private
content sharing for multi-user AR. We analyze representative
application case studies and systematize design goals for se-
curity and functionality that a multi-user AR platform should
support. We design an AR content sharing control module
that achieves these goals and build a prototype implementa-
tion (ShareAR) for the HoloLens. This work builds founda-
tions for secure and private multi-user AR interactions.
1 Introduction
Augmented real...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Deforestation of L2
author:James Murphy McCauley and
Mingjie Zhao and
Ethan J. Jackson and
Barath Raghavan and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker
The Deforestation of L2
James McCauley
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Mingjie Zhao
UESTC / ICSI
Ethan J. Jackson
UC Berkeley
Barath Raghavan
ICSI
Sylvia Ratnasamy
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Scott Shenker
UC Berkeley / ICSI
ABSTRACT
A major staple of layer 2 has long been the combination of
ﬂood-and-learn Ethernet switches with some variant of the
Spanning Tree Protocol. However, STP has signiﬁcant short-
comings – chieﬂy, that it throws away network capacity by
removing links, and that it can be relatively slow to recon-
verge after topology changes. In recent years, attempts to
rectify these shortcomings have been made by either making
L2 look more like L3 (notably TRILL and SPB, which both in-
corporate L3-like routing) or by replacing L2 switches with
“L3 switching” hardware and extending IP all the way to
the host. In this paper, we examine an alternate point in
the L2 design space, which is simple (in that it is a sin-
gle data plane mechanism with no separate control plane),
converges quickly, delivers packets during convergence, uti-
lizes all available links, and can be extended to support both
equal-cost multipath and efﬁcient multicast.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocol design; Link-layer proto-
cols;
Keywords
L2 routing, spanning tree
1 Introduction
Layer 2 was originally developed to provide local connectiv-
ity while requiring little conﬁguration. This plug-and-play
property ensures that when new hosts arrive (or move), there
is no need to (re)conﬁgure the host or manually (re)conﬁgure
switches with new routing state. This is in contrast to IP (L3)
where one must assign an IP address to a newly arriving host,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Deforestation of L2
author:James Murphy McCauley and
Mingjie Zhao and
Ethan J. Jackson and
Barath Raghavan and
Sylvia Ratnasamy and
Scott Shenker
The Deforestation of L2
James McCauley
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Mingjie Zhao
UESTC / ICSI
Ethan J. Jackson
UC Berkeley
Barath Raghavan
ICSI
Sylvia Ratnasamy
UC Berkeley / ICSI
Scott Shenker
UC Berkeley / ICSI
ABSTRACT
A major staple of layer 2 has long been the combination of
ﬂood-and-learn Ethernet switches with some variant of the
Spanning Tree Protocol. However, STP has signiﬁcant short-
comings – chieﬂy, that it throws away network capacity by
removing links, and that it can be relatively slow to recon-
verge after topology changes. In recent years, attempts to
rectify these shortcomings have been made by either making
L2 look more like L3 (notably TRILL and SPB, which both in-
corporate L3-like routing) or by replacing L2 switches with
“L3 switching” hardware and extending IP all the way to
the host. In this paper, we examine an alternate point in
the L2 design space, which is simple (in that it is a sin-
gle data plane mechanism with no separate control plane),
converges quickly, delivers packets during convergence, uti-
lizes all available links, and can be extended to support both
equal-cost multipath and efﬁcient multicast.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Network protocol design; Link-layer proto-
cols;
Keywords
L2 routing, spanning tree
1 Introduction
Layer 2 was originally developed to provide local connectiv-
ity while requiring little conﬁguration. This plug-and-play
property ensures that when new hosts arrive (or move), there
is no need to (re)conﬁgure the host or manually (re)conﬁgure
switches with new routing state. This is in contrast to IP (L3)
where one must assign an IP address to a newly arriving host,
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal
or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or
distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Predicting Users' Motivations behind Location Check-Ins and Utility
Implications of Privacy Protection Mechanisms
author:Igor Bilogrevic and
K'evin Huguenin and
Stefan Mihaila and
Reza Shokri and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Predicting Users’ Motivations behind Location
Check-Ins and Utility Implications of Privacy
Protection Mechanisms
Igor Bilogrevic*
K´evin Huguenin*
Stefan Mihaila
Google
Switzerland
LAAS-CNRS
France
EPFL
Switzerland
Reza Shokri†
University of Texas, Austin
USA
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
EPFL
Switzerland
ibilogrevic@google.com
huguenin@laas.fr
stefan.mihaila@epﬂ.ch
shokri@cs.utexas.edu
jean-pierre.hubaux@epﬂ.ch
Abstract—Location check-ins contain both geographical and
semantic information about the visited venues, in the form of
tags (e.g., “restaurant”). Such data might reveal some personal
information about users beyond what they actually want to
disclose, hence their privacy is threatened. In this paper, we study
users’ motivations behind location check-ins, and we quantify the
effect of a privacy-preserving technique (i.e., generalization) on
the perceived utility of check-ins. By means of a targeted user-
study on Foursquare (N = 77), we show that the motivation behind
Foursquare check-ins is a mediator of the loss of utility caused
by generalization. Using these ﬁndings, we propose a machine-
learning method for determining the motivation behind each
check-in, and we design a motivation-based predictive model for
utility. Our results show that the model accurately predicts the
loss of utility caused by semantic and geographical generalization;
this model enables the design of utility-aware, privacy-enhancing
mechanisms in location-based social networks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and
Foursquare, allow their users to share location information with
each other. Such a feature is quite popular, as 30% of users
attach locations to their posts [36]. The reason for sharing
locations include the desire to connect with...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Predicting Users' Motivations behind Location Check-Ins and Utility
Implications of Privacy Protection Mechanisms
author:Igor Bilogrevic and
K'evin Huguenin and
Stefan Mihaila and
Reza Shokri and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Predicting Users’ Motivations behind Location
Check-Ins and Utility Implications of Privacy
Protection Mechanisms
Igor Bilogrevic*
K´evin Huguenin*
Stefan Mihaila
Google
Switzerland
LAAS-CNRS
France
EPFL
Switzerland
Reza Shokri†
University of Texas, Austin
USA
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
EPFL
Switzerland
ibilogrevic@google.com
huguenin@laas.fr
stefan.mihaila@epﬂ.ch
shokri@cs.utexas.edu
jean-pierre.hubaux@epﬂ.ch
Abstract—Location check-ins contain both geographical and
semantic information about the visited venues, in the form of
tags (e.g., “restaurant”). Such data might reveal some personal
information about users beyond what they actually want to
disclose, hence their privacy is threatened. In this paper, we study
users’ motivations behind location check-ins, and we quantify the
effect of a privacy-preserving technique (i.e., generalization) on
the perceived utility of check-ins. By means of a targeted user-
study on Foursquare (N = 77), we show that the motivation behind
Foursquare check-ins is a mediator of the loss of utility caused
by generalization. Using these ﬁndings, we propose a machine-
learning method for determining the motivation behind each
check-in, and we design a motivation-based predictive model for
utility. Our results show that the model accurately predicts the
loss of utility caused by semantic and geographical generalization;
this model enables the design of utility-aware, privacy-enhancing
mechanisms in location-based social networks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and
Foursquare, allow their users to share location information with
each other. Such a feature is quite popular, as 30% of users
attach locations to their posts [36]. The reason for sharing
locations include the desire to connect with...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
author:Indranil Gupta and
Robbert van Renesse and
Kenneth P. Birman
Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
Indranil Gupta, Robbert van Renesse, Kenneth P. Birman
Dept. of Computer Science
Cornel1 University
Ithaca NY USA  14853
{gupta,rvr,ken}@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
This paper discusses fault-tolemnt, scalable solutions to
the problem  of  accurately and scalably calculating  global
aggregate functions  in  large process groups  communicat-
ing over unreliable networks. These groups could represent
sensors  or processes  comniunicating  over a  network  that
is either fixed (eg., the Internet) or dynamic (eg., niultihop
ad-hoc). Group members are prone to failures.  The ability
to evaluate global aggregate properties (eg., the average of
sensor temperature  readings) is important for higher-level
coordination activities in such large groups.  We first define
the  setting  and problem,  laying  down nietrics  to evaluate
direrent algorithms for the same.  We discuss why the usual
approaches  to solve  this problem are unviable and unscal-
able over an unreliable network prone to message delivery
failures and  crash jiiilures.  We then propose a  technique
to impose an abstract hierarchy on such  large groups, de-
scribittg how this hierarchy can be made to mirror the net-
work  topology.  We discuss several alternatives to use this
technique to solve the global aggregate function evaluation
problem.  FinulIy, we present a protocol based on gossiping
that uses this hierarchical technique. We present mathemat-
ical analysis and performance results to validate the robust-
ness, efJiciency and accuracy of the Hierarchical Gossiping
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Smart sensors networks, multihop ad-hoc networks and
process  groups  over  the  Internet  are  examples  of  large
groups of  processes  that  inherently  need  to communicate
and coordinate to ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
author:Indranil Gupta and
Robbert van Renesse and
Kenneth P. Birman
Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
Indranil Gupta, Robbert van Renesse, Kenneth P. Birman
Dept. of Computer Science
Cornel1 University
Ithaca NY USA  14853
{gupta,rvr,ken}@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
This paper discusses fault-tolemnt, scalable solutions to
the problem  of  accurately and scalably calculating  global
aggregate functions  in  large process groups  communicat-
ing over unreliable networks. These groups could represent
sensors  or processes  comniunicating  over a  network  that
is either fixed (eg., the Internet) or dynamic (eg., niultihop
ad-hoc). Group members are prone to failures.  The ability
to evaluate global aggregate properties (eg., the average of
sensor temperature  readings) is important for higher-level
coordination activities in such large groups.  We first define
the  setting  and problem,  laying  down nietrics  to evaluate
direrent algorithms for the same.  We discuss why the usual
approaches  to solve  this problem are unviable and unscal-
able over an unreliable network prone to message delivery
failures and  crash jiiilures.  We then propose a  technique
to impose an abstract hierarchy on such  large groups, de-
scribittg how this hierarchy can be made to mirror the net-
work  topology.  We discuss several alternatives to use this
technique to solve the global aggregate function evaluation
problem.  FinulIy, we present a protocol based on gossiping
that uses this hierarchical technique. We present mathemat-
ical analysis and performance results to validate the robust-
ness, efJiciency and accuracy of the Hierarchical Gossiping
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Smart sensors networks, multihop ad-hoc networks and
process  groups  over  the  Internet  are  examples  of  large
groups of  processes  that  inherently  need  to communicate
and coordinate to ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A general model of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback
author:Liming Lu and
Mun Choon Chan and
Ee-Chien Chang
A General Model of Probabilistic Packet Marking
for IP Traceback
Liming Lu
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Mun Choon Chan
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Ee-Chien Chang
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
luliming@comp.nus.edu.sg
chanmc@comp.nus.edu.sg
changec@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we model Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identiﬁcation prob-
lem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker
is associated with a distribution on tags, which are short
binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows its as-
sociated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP
header. Since there are a large number of (for example, over
4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples from
a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to
identify individual distribution contributing to the mixture.
Guided by this model, we propose Random Packet Marking
(RPM), a scheme that uses a simple but eﬀective approach.
RPM does not require sophisticated structure/relationship
among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction
similar to AMS [16]. Simulations show improved scalabil-
ity and traceback accuracy over prior works. For example,
in a large network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers in-
duce 63% of false positives in terms of edges identiﬁcation
using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to
2%. The eﬀectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior
knowledge of neighboring nodes, a simple and properly de-
signed marking scheme suﬃces in identifying large number
of markers with high accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: performance attributes
General...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A general model of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback
author:Liming Lu and
Mun Choon Chan and
Ee-Chien Chang
A General Model of Probabilistic Packet Marking
for IP Traceback
Liming Lu
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Mun Choon Chan
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Ee-Chien Chang
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
luliming@comp.nus.edu.sg
chanmc@comp.nus.edu.sg
changec@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we model Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identiﬁcation prob-
lem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker
is associated with a distribution on tags, which are short
binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows its as-
sociated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP
header. Since there are a large number of (for example, over
4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples from
a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to
identify individual distribution contributing to the mixture.
Guided by this model, we propose Random Packet Marking
(RPM), a scheme that uses a simple but eﬀective approach.
RPM does not require sophisticated structure/relationship
among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction
similar to AMS [16]. Simulations show improved scalabil-
ity and traceback accuracy over prior works. For example,
in a large network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers in-
duce 63% of false positives in terms of edges identiﬁcation
using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to
2%. The eﬀectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior
knowledge of neighboring nodes, a simple and properly de-
signed marking scheme suﬃces in identifying large number
of markers with high accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: performance attributes
General...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing Heterogeneous Distributed
Enclave Applications
author:Gianluca Scopelliti and
Sepideh Pouyanrad and
Job Noorman and
Fritz Alder and
Frank Piessens and
Jan Tobias M"uhlberg
POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing
Heterogeneous Distributed Enclave Applications
Job Noorman
Sepideh Pouyanrad
Gianluca Scopelliti
gianluca.scopelliti@ericsson.com
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
sepideh.pouyanrad@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Leuven, Belgium
Frank Piessens
frank.piessens@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
job.noorman@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
jantobias.muehlberg@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
ABSTRACT
We present an integrated open-source framework to develop, de-
ploy, and use event-driven distributed enclaved applications across
heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Our frame-
work strives for strong application authenticity and integrity guar-
antees, and optionally confidentiality and availability, while mini-
mizing the run-time Trusted Computing Base (TCB). For software
developers, our framework provides a high level of abstraction over
the platform-specific TEE layer that provides isolation, attestation
and secure communication amongst distributed application compo-
nents, allowing developers to focus of application logic. We provide
a notion of event-driven programming to develop distributed en-
clave applications in Rust and C for heterogeneous TEEs, including
Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone and the open-source Sancus. This het-
erogeneity makes our framework uniquely suitable for a broad
range of use cases which combine cloud processing, mobile and
edge devices, and lightweight sensing and actuation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Trusted computing; Distributed
systems security; • Computer systems organiza...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing Heterogeneous Distributed
Enclave Applications
author:Gianluca Scopelliti and
Sepideh Pouyanrad and
Job Noorman and
Fritz Alder and
Frank Piessens and
Jan Tobias M"uhlberg
POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing
Heterogeneous Distributed Enclave Applications
Job Noorman
Sepideh Pouyanrad
Gianluca Scopelliti
gianluca.scopelliti@ericsson.com
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
sepideh.pouyanrad@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Leuven, Belgium
Frank Piessens
frank.piessens@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
job.noorman@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
jantobias.muehlberg@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
ABSTRACT
We present an integrated open-source framework to develop, de-
ploy, and use event-driven distributed enclaved applications across
heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Our frame-
work strives for strong application authenticity and integrity guar-
antees, and optionally confidentiality and availability, while mini-
mizing the run-time Trusted Computing Base (TCB). For software
developers, our framework provides a high level of abstraction over
the platform-specific TEE layer that provides isolation, attestation
and secure communication amongst distributed application compo-
nents, allowing developers to focus of application logic. We provide
a notion of event-driven programming to develop distributed en-
clave applications in Rust and C for heterogeneous TEEs, including
Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone and the open-source Sancus. This het-
erogeneity makes our framework uniquely suitable for a broad
range of use cases which combine cloud processing, mobile and
edge devices, and lightweight sensing and actuation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Trusted computing; Distributed
systems security; • Computer systems organiza...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy
author:Radu-Ioan Paise and
Serge Vaudenay
Mutual Authentication in RFID
Security and Privacy
Radu-Ioan Paise
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
radu-ioan.paise@epﬂ.ch
Serge Vaudenay
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
serge.vaudenay@epﬂ.ch
ABSTRACT
In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate them-
selves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied se-
curity and privacy models for these protocols. We extend
this model to protocols which oﬀer reader authentication
to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that se-
cure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags
have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Un-
der this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich
a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication
RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseu-
dorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based
on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy
based on public-key cryptography.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
Keywords
identiﬁcation protocol, privacy, RFID
1. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
RFID refers to wireless protocols which make it possible
to identify mobile tags to readers in a given system. Typ-
ically, the reader together with the system is considered as
a single powerful and secure participant, but tags are tiny
inexpensive devices which are not secure, prone to corrup-
tion, and with little computational capabilities. RFID tags
become pervasive, thus lead us to privacy threats. For this,
the study for security and privacy of RFID protocols (while
preserving eﬃciency) has become a hot research topic.
RFID schemes are characterized by a three-fold quality.
Correctness ensures that legitimate tags interacting with the
reader are correctly identiﬁed or authenticated. Security
says that an a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy
author:Radu-Ioan Paise and
Serge Vaudenay
Mutual Authentication in RFID
Security and Privacy
Radu-Ioan Paise
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
radu-ioan.paise@epﬂ.ch
Serge Vaudenay
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
serge.vaudenay@epﬂ.ch
ABSTRACT
In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate them-
selves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied se-
curity and privacy models for these protocols. We extend
this model to protocols which oﬀer reader authentication
to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that se-
cure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags
have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Un-
der this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich
a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication
RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseu-
dorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based
on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy
based on public-key cryptography.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
Keywords
identiﬁcation protocol, privacy, RFID
1. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
RFID refers to wireless protocols which make it possible
to identify mobile tags to readers in a given system. Typ-
ically, the reader together with the system is considered as
a single powerful and secure participant, but tags are tiny
inexpensive devices which are not secure, prone to corrup-
tion, and with little computational capabilities. RFID tags
become pervasive, thus lead us to privacy threats. For this,
the study for security and privacy of RFID protocols (while
preserving eﬃciency) has become a hot research topic.
RFID schemes are characterized by a three-fold quality.
Correctness ensures that legitimate tags interacting with the
reader are correctly identiﬁed or authenticated. Security
says that an a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multiple Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates
author:Xinyu Li and
Jing Xu and
Zhenfeng Zhang and
Dengguo Feng and
Honggang Hu
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiple Handshakes Security
of TLS 1.3 Candidates
Xinyu Li∗†, Jing Xu∗, Zhenfeng Zhang∗, Dengguo Feng∗, Honggang Hu†
∗Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, SKLCS,
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
†CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
Email: {lixinyu, xujing, zfzhang, feng}@tca.iscas.ac.cn, hghu2005@ustc.edu.cn
Abstract—The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is by
far the most widely deployed protocol for securing communica-
tions and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently
developing TLS 1.3 as the next-generation TLS protocol. The
TLS standard features multiple modes of handshake protocols
and supports many combinational running of successive TLS
handshakes over multiple connections. Although each handshake
mode is now well-understood in isolation, their composition in
TLS 1.2 remains problematic, and yet it is critical to obtain
practical security guarantees for TLS.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst formal treatment of multiple
handshakes protocols of TLS 1.3 candidates. First, we introduce
a multi-level&stage security model, an adaptation of the Bellare-
Rogaway authenticated key exchange model, covering all kinds
of compositional interactions between different TLS handshake
modes and providing reasonably strong security guarantees. Next,
we prove that candidate handshakes of TLS 1.3 draft meet
our strong notion of multiple handshakes security. Our results
conﬁrm the soundness of TLS 1.3 security protection design.
Such a multi-level&stage approach is convenient for analyzing
the compositional design of the candidates with different session
modes, as they establish dependencies of multiple...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multiple Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates
author:Xinyu Li and
Jing Xu and
Zhenfeng Zhang and
Dengguo Feng and
Honggang Hu
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiple Handshakes Security
of TLS 1.3 Candidates
Xinyu Li∗†, Jing Xu∗, Zhenfeng Zhang∗, Dengguo Feng∗, Honggang Hu†
∗Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, SKLCS,
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
†CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
Email: {lixinyu, xujing, zfzhang, feng}@tca.iscas.ac.cn, hghu2005@ustc.edu.cn
Abstract—The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is by
far the most widely deployed protocol for securing communica-
tions and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently
developing TLS 1.3 as the next-generation TLS protocol. The
TLS standard features multiple modes of handshake protocols
and supports many combinational running of successive TLS
handshakes over multiple connections. Although each handshake
mode is now well-understood in isolation, their composition in
TLS 1.2 remains problematic, and yet it is critical to obtain
practical security guarantees for TLS.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst formal treatment of multiple
handshakes protocols of TLS 1.3 candidates. First, we introduce
a multi-level&stage security model, an adaptation of the Bellare-
Rogaway authenticated key exchange model, covering all kinds
of compositional interactions between different TLS handshake
modes and providing reasonably strong security guarantees. Next,
we prove that candidate handshakes of TLS 1.3 draft meet
our strong notion of multiple handshakes security. Our results
conﬁrm the soundness of TLS 1.3 security protection design.
Such a multi-level&stage approach is convenient for analyzing
the compositional design of the candidates with different session
modes, as they establish dependencies of multiple...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps? The Effect of Requirements and
Developer Practices on App Security
author:Charles Weir and
Ben Hermann and
Sascha Fahl
From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
The Effect of Requirements and Developer
Practices on App Security
Charles Weir, Lancaster University; Ben Hermann, Paderborn University;
Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/weir
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
 The Effect of Requirements and Developer Practices
 on App Security
Ben Hermann, Paderborn University     Sascha Fahl,  Leibniz University Hannover
Charles Weir, Lancaster University
 Abstract
Increasingly mobile device users are being hurt by security or
privacy issues with the apps they use. App developers can
help prevent this; inexpensive security assurance techniques
to  do  so  are  now  well  established,  but  do  developers  use
them? And if they do so, is that reflected in more secure apps?
From a survey of 335 successful app developers, we conclude
that less than a quarter of such professionals have access to
security  experts;  that  less  than  a  third  use  assurance  tech-
niques regularly; and that few have made more than cosmetic
changes as a result of the European GDPR legislation. Reas-
suringly, we found that app developers tend to use more as-
surance techniques and make more frequent security updates
when (1) they see more need for security, and (2) there is se-
curity expert or champion involvement.
In a second phase we downloaded the apps corresponding to
each  completed  survey  and  analyzed  them for  SSL  issues,
cryptographic API misuse and privacy leaks, finding only one
fifth defect-free as far as our tools could detect. We found ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps? The Effect of Requirements and
Developer Practices on App Security
author:Charles Weir and
Ben Hermann and
Sascha Fahl
From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
The Effect of Requirements and Developer
Practices on App Security
Charles Weir, Lancaster University; Ben Hermann, Paderborn University;
Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/weir
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
 The Effect of Requirements and Developer Practices
 on App Security
Ben Hermann, Paderborn University     Sascha Fahl,  Leibniz University Hannover
Charles Weir, Lancaster University
 Abstract
Increasingly mobile device users are being hurt by security or
privacy issues with the apps they use. App developers can
help prevent this; inexpensive security assurance techniques
to  do  so  are  now  well  established,  but  do  developers  use
them? And if they do so, is that reflected in more secure apps?
From a survey of 335 successful app developers, we conclude
that less than a quarter of such professionals have access to
security  experts;  that  less  than  a  third  use  assurance  tech-
niques regularly; and that few have made more than cosmetic
changes as a result of the European GDPR legislation. Reas-
suringly, we found that app developers tend to use more as-
surance techniques and make more frequent security updates
when (1) they see more need for security, and (2) there is se-
curity expert or champion involvement.
In a second phase we downloaded the apps corresponding to
each  completed  survey  and  analyzed  them for  SSL  issues,
cryptographic API misuse and privacy leaks, finding only one
fifth defect-free as far as our tools could detect. We found ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
author:Seth Hardy and
Masashi Crete-Nishihata and
Katharine Kleemola and
Adam Senft and
Byron Sonne and
Greg Wiseman and
Phillipa Gill and
Ronald J. Deibert
Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing
and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne,
and Greg Wiseman, The Citizen Lab; Phillipa Gill, Stony Brook University;
Ronald J. Deibert, The Citizen Lab
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/hardy
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium.August 20–22, 2014 • San Diego, CAISBN 978-1-931971-15-7Open access to the Proceedings of  the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXTargeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying
Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy§ Masashi Crete-Nishihata§ Katharine Kleemola§ Adam Senft§
Byron Sonne§ Greg Wiseman§ Phillipa Gill† Ronald J. Deibert§
§ The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada
† Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, USA
Abstract
Targeted attacks on civil society and non-governmental
organizations have gone underreported despite the fact
that these organizations have been shown to be frequent
targets of these attacks. In this paper, we shed light on
targeted malware attacks faced by these organizations by
studying malicious e-mails received by 10 civil society
organizations (the majority of which are from groups re-
lated to China and Tibet issues) over a period of 4 years.
Our study highlights important properties of malware
threats faced by these organizations with implications on
how these organizations defend themselves and how we
quantify these threats. We ﬁnd that the technical sophis-
tication of malware we observe is fairly low, with more
effort placed on socially engineering the e-mail...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
author:Seth Hardy and
Masashi Crete-Nishihata and
Katharine Kleemola and
Adam Senft and
Byron Sonne and
Greg Wiseman and
Phillipa Gill and
Ronald J. Deibert
Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing
and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne,
and Greg Wiseman, The Citizen Lab; Phillipa Gill, Stony Brook University;
Ronald J. Deibert, The Citizen Lab
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/hardy
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium.August 20–22, 2014 • San Diego, CAISBN 978-1-931971-15-7Open access to the Proceedings of  the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXTargeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying
Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy§ Masashi Crete-Nishihata§ Katharine Kleemola§ Adam Senft§
Byron Sonne§ Greg Wiseman§ Phillipa Gill† Ronald J. Deibert§
§ The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada
† Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, USA
Abstract
Targeted attacks on civil society and non-governmental
organizations have gone underreported despite the fact
that these organizations have been shown to be frequent
targets of these attacks. In this paper, we shed light on
targeted malware attacks faced by these organizations by
studying malicious e-mails received by 10 civil society
organizations (the majority of which are from groups re-
lated to China and Tibet issues) over a period of 4 years.
Our study highlights important properties of malware
threats faced by these organizations with implications on
how these organizations defend themselves and how we
quantify these threats. We ﬁnd that the technical sophis-
tication of malware we observe is fairly low, with more
effort placed on socially engineering the e-mail...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。