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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Scan images before deployment, and block those that are not in compliance with security policies. In Kubernetes environments, the admission controller can be used to validate images after a container deployment request is authenticated but before the container is deployed.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.[88][2][89]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls. Implement strict IAM controls to prevent access to systems except for the applications, users, and services that require access. Implement user accounts for each individual for enforcement and non-repudiation of actions.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot can decrypt data received from a C2 and save to a file.[98]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has hijacked normal application’s launch routines to display ads.[1]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-19 Bypassing the Maginot Line: Remotely Exploit the Hardware Decoder on Smartphone
Though researchers have found lots of vulnerabilities in Stagefright framework for audio/video codecs on Android smartphones, all these vulnerabilities are in the software implementation of the AOSP. However, almost all smartphone chip manufacturers utilize the hardware implementation decoders to improve the performance and reduce battery consuming. For example, a complex video format, such as h264 or h265, will be given priority to decode by the hardware decoders.Therefore, lots of questions about hardware decoder remain unanswered. How does it work? What's the security status and overall impact to the whole system? What about the attack surface and mitigation? Can we find any vulnerabilities and exploit it? Our research will answer these questions.We focus on the hardware decoder named Venus on Qualcomm based smartphone. Venus is the dedicated video hardware decoder, which is a subsystem like Baseband, WLAN. This presentation will describe the architecture, the work principle, and the attack surface of Venus. Then we'll describe how to defeat the secure boot and setup the live debugger. Finally, we'll describe the vulnerabilities we found and how to exploit Venus remotely.Nowadays, there are plenty of security features and mitigations on the application processor of Android. For a real attack from the browser, we should gain arbitrary code execution first, escape from the sandbox, then break down the userspace application isolation. Finally, if we are lucky enough, we could escalate privilege into a process that can touch something like the device node exposed by the Kernel. The whole process can be a long journey. However, by attacking the hardware decoder, we can bypass all these defenses directly. In the hardware decoder, we have DMA, IO Port, shared memory with other processor, and messages with Kernel. There are plenty of attack surfaces into the Kernel and lef...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.[108][109]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0637
ATT&CK Technique Name:NativeZone
NativeZone can check for the presence of KM.EkeyAlmaz1C.dll and will halt execution unless it is in the same directory as the rest of the malware's components.[5][7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[38][39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug identified and extracted all Word documents on a server by using a command containing * .doc and *.docx. The actors also searched for documents based on a specific date range and attempted to identify all installed software on a victim.[285]


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titleblackhat:eu-19 How to Break PDF Encryption
PDF is among the most widely used document formats worldwide. To ensure confidentiality, PDF supports document encryption. In this talk, we analyze PDF encryption and show two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate encrypted content. The only requirement is one single block of known plaintext, which we show is fulfilled by design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of encrypted documents by using exfiltration channels, based on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities and supported the vendors mitigating the issues.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has used WinHTTP, CreateProcess, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.[172]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 leverages a hardcoded list of remote-station IP addresses to iteratively initiate communications and collect information across multiple priority IEC-104 priority levels.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to discover processes, including Bka.exe and BkavUtil.exe.[108]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[231]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's OPC and IEC 61850 protocol modules include the ability to send stVal requests to read the status of operational variables. [1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to download, unpack, and decrypt tar.gz files .[215]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS stops processes related to security and management software.[32][33]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can monitor processes for open browsers and custom banking applications.[135]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has been downloaded and executed from malicious Excel files.[40][41]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports for that particular network segment.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can edit system environment variables.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to gather information from the compromrised asset, including the computer version, computer name, IIS version, and more.[83]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can use a second channel for C2 when the primary channel is in upload mode.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.[265]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1590.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Topology
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[155][156]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest hides a copy of itself in the user's ~/Library directory by using a . at the beginning of the file name followed by 9 random characters.[47]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0101
ATT&CK Technique Name:ifconfig
ifconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.[66]


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titleblackhat:asia-23 Dilemma in IoT Access Control: Revealing Novel Attacks and Design Challenges in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoT
From Bluetooth smart locks to item trackers, Mobile-as-a-Gateway (MaaG) IoT devices are everywhere. MaaG IoT devices use mobile devices as gateways to connect to the internet for management. They allow for remote access sharing and revocation, while also providing "offline availability" for enhanced usability. However, in order for these functionalities to be realized, secure cooperation among the cloud service, the companion app, and the IoT device is necessary. In practice, it is common for cloud services to use access model translation (AMT) to convert complex cloud-side access policies into simpler device-side policies. At the same time, ad-hoc protocols are often developed to support access policy synchronization, using both HTTPS and Bluetooth. Unfortunately, current MaaG IoT systems fail to recognize the potential security risks associated with this process of access model translation and synchronization. An analysis of ten top-of-the-line MaaG IoT devices revealed that all of them have significant vulnerabilities, such as allowing irrevocable and permanent access for temporary users. Finally, we will propose a secure protocol design to defend against all identified attacks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner connects to a C2 server using port 51640.[32]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can encrypt HTTP POST data using RC6 and a dynamically generated AES key encrypted with a hard coded RSA public key.[143][144][145]


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titleblackhat:us-21 ProxyLogon is Just the Tip of the Iceberg: A New Attack Surface on Microsoft Exchange Server!
Microsoft Exchange Server is an email solution widely deployed within government and enterprises, and it is an integral part of both their daily operations and security. Needless to say, vulnerabilities in Exchange have long been the Holy Grail for attackers, hence our security research on Exchange. Surprisingly, we've found not only critical vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, but a whole new attack surface of Exchange.This new attack surface is based on a significant change in Exchange Server 2013, where the fundamental protocol handler, Client Access Service (CAS), splits into frontend and backend. In this fundamental change of architecture, quite an amount of design debt was incurred, and, even worse, it introduced inconsistencies between contexts, leading us to discover this new attack surface.To unveil the beauty of this attack surface and our novel exploitation, we'll start by analyzing this architecture, followed by 7 vulnerabilities that consist of server-side bugs, client-side bugs, and crypto bugs found via this attack surface. In the end, these vulnerabilities are chained into 3 attack vectors that shine in different attack scenarios: ProxyLogon, ProxyShell, and ProxyOracle. These attack vectors enable any unauthenticated attacker to uncover plaintext passwords and even execute arbitrary code on Microsoft Exchange Servers through port 443, which is exposed to the Internet by ~400K Exchange Servers.This attack surface has its unparalleled impact for a reason: security researchers tend to find vulnerabilities from a certain perspective, such as digging for memory bugs, injections, or logic flaws, but we took a different approach by looking at Exchange from a high-level architectural view and captured this architecture-level attack surface, which yielded multiple vulnerabilities. We hope this brings a new paradigm to vulnerability research and i...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application controls to mitigate installation and use of payloads that may be utilized to spoof security alerting.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used the AES256 algorithm with a SHA1 derived key to decrypt exploit code.[267]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create "SysUpdate" binpath= "cmd /c start "[file path]""&&sc config "SysUpdate" start= auto&&netstart SysUpdate for persistence.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0111
ATT&CK Technique Name:schtasks
schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[155]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash. Monokle can also capture the user’s dictionary, user-defined shortcuts, and browser history, enabling profiling of the user and their activities.[23]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[26][27][28]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the command net localgroup administrators to list all administrators part of a local group.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can modify the timestamp of an executable so that it can be identified and restored by the decryption tool.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy obtains a list of running processes.[101]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has created registry keys for persistence, including HKCU\Software\dnimtsoleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\snimtsOleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\Backtsaleht\StubPath, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed. Components\{3bf41072-b2b1-21c8-b5c1-bd56d32fbda7}, and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3ef41072-a2f1-21c8-c5c1-70c2c3bc7905}.[8]


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title:blackhat:eu-21 Picking Lockfiles:  Attacking & Defending Your Supply Chain
An advantage of open source software (OSS) development is that it enables contributions from the public, adding new features and improvements. This also makes OSS projects a target of supply chain attacks. We present both an offensive and defensive perspective of an attack technique that hides malicious code in open source contributions and that reduce the likelihood of the modifications being caught during review.Our technique leverages lockfiles commonly used by modern package managers to allow deterministic resolution of dependencies necessary to run an application. Our technique is based on the observation that 1) package managers do not sufficiently verify the integrity of lockfiles, 2) lockfiles are machine-generated and small modifications are easily missed during code review due to the mass of changes included, and 3) the prevalent use of third-party packages and package managers in open source software projects.For blue teams, we provide a light-weight tool that verifies the integrity of a lockfile well suited to be executed in CI pipelines. For red teams, we demonstrate both manual and automated approaches for choosing targets and tampering lockfiles, share Mitre Att&ck TTPs, and offer advice on what to look for when both defending and perpetuating this technique, making it easier to simulate this type of supply chain attack.Our work builds on previous work by Liran Tal [1]. We expand on their work by presenting more methods for tampering lockfiles, applying it to additional programming ecosystems (Ruby on Rails and Go in addition to Node.js), and providing tools that verify the integrity of a lockfile as well as automate the tasks of targeting suitable dependencies and tampering a lockfile.[1] https://snyk.io/blog/why-npm-lockfiles-can-be-a-security-blindspot-for-injecting-malicious-modules/


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Recent OS versions have made it more difficult for applications to register as VPN providers.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [4] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [5] Technologies such as Intel Boot Guard can assist with this. [6]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-21 How I Can Unlock Your Smart Door: Security Pitfalls in Cross-Vendor IoT Access Control
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly managed through the clouds, which mediate the users' access to devices, e.g., only authorized users can unlock a door. These clouds are operated by device vendors (Philips Hue, LIFX, Tuya, etc.) or cloud providers (Google Home, Amazon Alexa, IFTTT, etc.). Of particular interest here is the emerging capability, advocated by mainstream IoT vendors, to delegate device access across different clouds and users: for example, Philips Hue, August Lock, etc., allow Google Home to control devices mediated under their clouds, so the user can manage multiple devices from different vendors all through the single console at Google Home. On Google Home, then, an Airbnb host may temporarily delegate the access to their smart lock to a guest during their stay. Such a capability can lead to a convoluted delegation chain, whose authorization operations could easily go wrong. Specifically, access delegation across IoT clouds is distributed, heterogeneous, and unverified: each vendor customizes its delegation protocol with ad-hoc, implicit security assumption; further, we found the complicated delegation service is often coupled across clouds, with one cloud unwittingly violating the other's security operations and assumptions.We report the first systematic study on cross-cloud IoT delegation, based upon a verification tool we developed. We investigated 10 mainstream IoT clouds (Google Home, SmartThings, IFTTT, Philips Hue, LIFX, August, etc.), and discovered 5 serious vulnerabilities that endanger millions of users and hundreds of vendors. Exploiting the vulnerabilities, the adversary (e.g., former employee, Airbnb tenant) can gain unauthorized access to IoT devices (e.g., smart locks, switches, safety sensors). We implemented end-to-end attacks for all vulnerabilities and reported to affected vendors, which have deployed or sch...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.[29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used implants capable of collecting the signed-in username.[87]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Set a browser extension allow or deny list as appropriate for your security policy. [17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0805
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mechanical Protection Layers
Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc. [6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0155
ATT&CK Technique Name:WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD C2 traffic can communicate via TCP raw sockets.[49]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect information and files from a compromised host.[180]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed the MaoCheng dropper with a stolen Adobe Systems digital signature.[56]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-18 Unpacking the Packed Unpacker: Reverse Engineering an Android Anti-Analysis Native Library
Malware authors implement many different techniques to frustrate analysis and make reverse engineering malware more difficult. Many of these anti-analysis and anti-reverse engineering techniques attempt to send a reverse engineer down an incorrect investigation path or require them to invest large amounts of time reversing simple code. This talk analyzes one of the most robust anti-analysis native libraries we've seen in the Android ecosystem.
I will discuss each of the techniques the malware author used in order to prevent reverse engineering of their Android native library including manipulating the Java Native Interface, encryption, run-time environment checks, and more. This talk discusses not only the techniques the malware author implemented to prevent analysis, but also the steps and process for a reverse engineer to proceed through the anti-analysis traps. This talk will give you the tools to expose what Android malware authors are trying to hide.


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ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.[17]


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ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.[77]


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ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote file transmission.[111]


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ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[227]


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ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses various API to perform behaviors such as executing payloads and performing local enumeration.[171]


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ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can delete copies of itself if additional APKs are downloaded to external storage.[4]


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ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[23][24][25][26]


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ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [150]


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ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands  to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages.


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title:blackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a few foundation topics, such as methods of identifying native M1 code (which will aid us when hunting for M1 malware), as well as introductory arm64 reversing concepts. With an uncovered corpus of malware compiled to natively run on M1 (and in some cases notarized by Apple!), we'll spend the remainder of the talk demonstrating effective analysis techniques, including many specific to the analysis of arm64 code on macOS. Armed with this information and analysis techniques, you'll leave a proficient macOS M1 malware analyst!


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ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can decrypt its payload using RC4, AES, or one-byte XORing.[231]


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ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE has the ability to embed payloads inside of a compiled binary.[11]


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ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.[167][168][169][170][171][172]


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ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[4]


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ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. [1] [2]


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titleblackhat:us-21 Let's Attack Let's Encrypt
Following the recent off-path attacks against PKI, Let’sEncrypt deployed in 2020 domain validation from multiple vantage points to ensure security even against the stronger on-path MitM adversaries. The idea behind such distributed domain validation is that even if the adversary can hijack traffic of some vantage points, it will not be able to intercept traffic of all the vantage points to all the nameservers in a domain. In this work we show that two central design issues of the distributed domain validation of Let’sEncrypt make it vulnerable to downgrade attacks: (1) the vantage points are selected from a small fixed set of vantage points, and (2) the way the vantage points select the nameservers in target domains can be manipulated by a remote adversary. We develop off-path methodologies, based on these observations, to launch downgrade attacks against Let’sEncrypt. The downgrade attacks reduce the validation with `multiple vantage points to multiple nameservers', to validation with `multiple vantage points to a single attacker-selected nameserver'. Through experimental evaluations with Let’sEncrypt and the 1M-Let’sEncrypt-certified domains, we find that our off-path attacker can successfully launch downgrade attacks against more than 24.53% of the domains, rendering Let’sEncrypt to use a single nameserver for validation with them. We then develop an automated off-path attack against the `single-server'-domain validation for these 24.53% domains, to obtain fraudulent certificates for more than 107K domains, which constitute 10% of the 1M domains in our dataset.We also evaluate our attacks against other major CAs and compare the security and efforts needed to launch the attacks, to those needed to launch the attacks against Let’sEncrypt. The conclusion from the evaluations is that our downgrade attacks remove any security benefits that Let’sEncrypt has over other CAs.


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ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.


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ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY conducted an e-mail thread-hijacking campaign with malicious ISO attachments.[89][50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has executed HTA files via cmd.exe, and used batch scripts for collection.[228][229]


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ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.[25][26][27][28][29][30]


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ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with its C2 server to receive commands.[315]


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ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using ping, including attempts to contact google[.]com.[4]


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ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[33]


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ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead.


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ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.[3]


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ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.[239]


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ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.[49]


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ATT&CK ID:T1055.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asynchronous Procedure Call
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.


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ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.[45][46]


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ATT&CK ID:T1599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Boundary Bridging
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.


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ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has used collected lists of names and e-mail accounts to use in password spraying attacks against private sector targets.[19]


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ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [8] [9] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [10]Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying protected components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[5]


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ATT&CK ID:S0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeM
FakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.[5]


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titleblackhat:eu-18 BLEEDINGBIT: Your APs Belong to Us
Enterprise Wi-Fi access points featuring BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) chips have become increasingly common in recent years. While these chips provide new features, they also introduce risks that create a new network attack surface. In this talk, we will demonstrate BLEEDINGBIT, two zero-day vulnerabilities in Texas Instruments' (TI) BLE chips used in Cisco, Meraki, and Aruba wireless access points, that allow an unauthenticated attacker to penetrate an enterprise network over the air. The first BLEEDINGBIT vulnerability was discovered in the BLE stack embedded on TI chips in Cisco and Meraki Wi-Fi access points. The second vulnerability was discovered in TI's OAD (over-the-air firmware download) feature used by nearly every Aruba Wi-Fi access point currently for sale. Combined, these vendors represent 80% of all wireless access points sold each year to enterprises.Using BLEEDINGBIT, an attacker first achieves RCE on the BLE chip, and then can use the BLE chip to compromise the main OS of the access point and gain full control over it. Once an access point has been compromised, an attacker can read all traffic going through the access point, distribute malware, and even move laterally between network segments.Although first discovered in wireless access points, BLEEDINGBIT vulnerabilities may exist in many types of devices and equipment used across many different industries. For example, medical centers use BLE to track the location of beacons on valuable assets like resuscitation carts. Retailers use BLE for mobile credit card readers and indoor navigation applications. A BLEEDINGBIT attack against any of these devices would come out of thin air, bypassing existing security controls, and catching these organizations unprotected.


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ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using MimikatzLite to perform credential dumping.[68]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer has the ability to collect information about installed AV products from an infected host.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
A variant of Zebrocy captures screenshots of the victim’s machine in JPEG and BMP format.[31][181][182][183][184][185]


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ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[5][6] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.[64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.[129][130]


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ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has the ability to take a screenshot of the infected host desktop using Windows GDI+.[178]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.[254]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Systems and devices should restrict access to any data with potential confidentiality concerns, including point and tag information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has dropped DCSrv under the svchost.exe name to disk.[131]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has established persistence by running in the background as an autostart service.[59]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 accessed victims' internal knowledge repositories (wikis) to view sensitive corporate information on products, services, and internal business operations.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[8]


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title:blackhat:us-19 APIC's Adventures in Wonderland
Software-defined networking (SDN) along-side with micro-segmentation has been proposed as a new paradigm to deploy applications faster and, simultaneously, protect the individual workloads against lateral movement. Its implementation usually follows an application-centric view where the underlying network specifics are abstracted away from the management layers. Hence, an application developer only defines how similar parts of his application can communicate (e.g. web servers can connect to database servers on the following port) without considering the details of the network communication (e.g. IP addresses/subnets and routing tables).A prominent solution in this area is the Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) by Cisco. ACI is based on Nexus switches in a spine-leaf configuration and one (or preferably more) Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC). APICs are ACI's brain controlling the configuration of the switches to provide SDN and micro-segmentation capabilities for connected endpoints. Endpoints can then be aggregated into so-called endpoint groups (EPGs), which serve as the basic entities to apply filtering rules.In this talk, we will demystify the magic that surrounds the ACI wonderland and follow the APIC on its journey down the rabbit hole from when it gets first connected to the leaf switches till its configuration with EPGs and filtering rules. Along this journey we will participate in a crazy tea party. Here, the Mad Hatter will introduce us to the components involved in setting up the ACI fabric (including their background communication and used protocols), the March Hare will demonstrate what things can go wrong, and the Dormouse, before finally drifting to sleep, will release exploits for identified vulnerabilities.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[3][16][17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson has the ability to execute commands with the COMSPEC environment variable.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.[290]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution. Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise enumerates processes via the tasklist command.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK can extract a malicious Portable Executable (PE) from a photo.[3]


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title:blackhat:us-22 Human or Not: Can You Really Detect the Fake Voices?
Voice is an essential medium for humans to transfer information and build trust, and the trustworthiness of voice is of great importance to humans. With the development of deep learning technologies, attackers have started to use AI techniques to synthesize and even clone human voices. To combat the misuse of such techniques, researchers have proposed a series of AI-synthesized speech detection approaches and achieved very promising detection results in laboratory environments. Can these approaches really be as effective in the real world as they claim to be? This study provides an in-depth analysis of these works, identifies a set of potential problems, and designs a novel voice clone attack framework, SiF-DeepVC, based on these problems. This study first proposes the idea "bypass fake voice detection using speaker-irrelative features" and proves that detecting AI-synthesized speeches is still highly challenging, and existing approaches are not applicable in the real world. In a word, the Red is still far ahead of the Blue.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
A gh0st RAT variant has used rundll32 for execution.[50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has used Windows API functions to install the service and shim.[153]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.[39][40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.[66]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
After decrypting itself in memory, RARSTONE downloads a DLL file from its C2 server and loads it in the memory space of a hidden Internet Explorer process. This "downloaded" file is actually not dropped onto the system.[58]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE can use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and port number pair to connect to for C2.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.[28][29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used VBScript to conduct reconnaissance on targeted systems.[114]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has downloaded additional Lua scripts from the C2.[168]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch collects files from the local system that have the following extensions, then prepares them for exfiltration: .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .mdb, .rar, .zip, .doc, .docx.[22]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.[343][9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[33]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET has used a zero-day exploit in the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges and bypass SIP.[38]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-23 Dilemma in IoT Access Control: Revealing Novel Attacks and Design Challenges in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoT
From Bluetooth smart locks to item trackers, Mobile-as-a-Gateway (MaaG) IoT devices are everywhere. MaaG IoT devices use mobile devices as gateways to connect to the internet for management. They allow for remote access sharing and revocation, while also providing "offline availability" for enhanced usability. However, in order for these functionalities to be realized, secure cooperation among the cloud service, the companion app, and the IoT device is necessary. In practice, it is common for cloud services to use access model translation (AMT) to convert complex cloud-side access policies into simpler device-side policies. At the same time, ad-hoc protocols are often developed to support access policy synchronization, using both HTTPS and Bluetooth. Unfortunately, current MaaG IoT systems fail to recognize the potential security risks associated with this process of access model translation and synchronization. An analysis of ten top-of-the-line MaaG IoT devices revealed that all of them have significant vulnerabilities, such as allowing irrevocable and permanent access for temporary users. Finally, we will propose a secure protocol design to defend against all identified attacks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Find-AVSignature AntivirusBypass module can be used to locate single byte anti-virus signatures.[14][15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu's purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities such as industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers, amongst others not in the industrial sector, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by WMI commands from running. Note: many legitimate tools and applications utilize WMI for command execution. [138]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.[477]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used macros in Excel documents to download and deploy the malware on the user’s machine.[334]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use spoof arguments in spawned processes that execute beacon commands.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.[48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used PowerShell profiles to maintain persistence on an infected machine.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has queued an APC routine to explorer.exe by calling ZwQueueApcThread.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[178][179][112][180]


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安全文本分析：

title:botconf2014 Splicing and Dicing 2014: Examining this Year’s Botnet Attack Trends
This presentation will discuss the various types of distributed denial of service attacks launched by botnets in 2014, worldwide. From DNS to Layer7 attacks, attendees will hear expert analysis of botnet breakdowns by-the-numbers including where the majority of botnets came from regionally, what attack trends were most popular, and when these attacks occurred. Join Nick Sullivan, Software Engineer and Security Architect at CloudFlare, to learn about his team’s findings after examining botnet activity in 2014. Nick will present this year’s major findings–and surprises–and his predictions for 2015.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/2014-1.6-Splicing-and-Dicing-2014-Examining-this-Years-Botnet-Attack-Trends1.pdf


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has established domains that impersonate legitimate entities to use for targeting efforts. [43][44]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Lessons and Lulz: The 5th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure the network, and what changes we've made over the past year to try and keep doing things better. Of course, we'll be sharing some of the more humorous network activity and what it helps us learn about the way security professionals conduct themselves on an open WiFi network. Spoiler Alert: It's poorly. We conduct ourselves poorly.


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titleblackhat:us-20 Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation in GCP; Compromise any Organization without Dropping an Implant
Google Cloud's security model in many ways is quite different from AWS. Spark jobs, Cloud Functions, Jupyter Notebooks, and more default to having administrative capabilities over cloud API's. Instead of defaulting to no capabilities, permissions are granted to default identities. One default permission these identities have is called actAs, which allows a service by default to assume the identity of every service account in its project; many of which typically have role bindings into other projects and across an organization's resources. This means by default many API's and identities can compromise large swaths of an organization by moving laterally by impersonating or gaining access to other identities. This can all be done without dropping a single implant on a machine.In this talk, we'll demonstrate several techniques to perform identity compromise via the ActAs permission, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and widespread project compromise in Google Cloud. We will also release tools for exploitation.Next, we'll show what detection capabilities are possible in the Google Cloud ecosystem, by showing Stackdriver logs that correspond with our exploitation techniques, and showing limitations in what's available. We'll also release tools and queries that can be used for detection as well as insight to how we have attempted to tackle this problem at scale.Lastly, we'll go over remediation efforts you can take as a Google cloud customer, and show how difficult it can be to secure yourself against these attacks. We will release tools that can be used to harden your organization, and walk through user stories and anecdotes of what this process looks at scale within our organization.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function GET.WORKSPACE to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information and to spawn processes for code injection.[20][21][22]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-20 It's not FINished: The Evolving Maturity in Ransomware Operations
Ransom demands are becoming larger, attackers smarter, and intrusions longer. Ransomware threat actors are hitting European companies hard with more effective ransomware deployment resulting in devastating impacts to victim organisations. When they strike, their ransomware deployments are more complete, more effective, and they are crippling many organisations to the point where there is often no clear path back to business.We will be sharing tradecraft we've seen ransomware threat actors employ across Europe in 2020. We cover how we're seeing ransomware crews leverage high-profile critical vulnerabilities to gain footholds in as many victims networks as possible, only to come back weeks or even months later to leverage those footholds into full-scale ransomware deployments.Not only are intrusion tactics improving, but attackers are also transitioning and developing sleek ransomware-as-a-service platforms. Threat actors are professionalising and streamlining their platforms. These platforms are being used by threat actors to generate malware, to communicate and negotiate with victims, and in some cases, for payment processing and decryption utility delivery.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1218.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mshta
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0936
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability. [8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has pretended to be the xmlProv Network Provisioning service.[42]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens digitally signed an executable with a stolen certificate from legitimate company AI Squared.[22]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-22 I Am Whoever I Say I Am: Infiltrating Identity Providers Using a 0Click Exploit
Single Sign On (SSO) has become the dominant authentication scheme to login to several related, yet independent, software systems. At the core of this are the identity providers (IdP). Their role is to perform credential verification and to supply a signed token that service providers (SP) can consume for access control.On the other hand, when an application requests resources on behalf of a user and they're granted, then an authorization request is made to an authorization server (AS). The AS exchanges a code for a token which is presented to a resource server (RS) and the requested resources are consumed by the requesting application.Whilst OAuth2 handles authorization, and SAML handles authentication and as such Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions have become very popular in the enterprise environment to handle both use cases. What if IAM solutions are vulnerable to critical remote attacks? They need to be exposed on the internet, trusted to guard identities and facilitate access to hundreds if not thousands of users and applications.To begin with, I will cover the foundational use-case for IAM solutions and some past in the wild attacks (ITW) attacks with the extent of their impact.Continuing, I will present the approach I took with the audit including the challenges and pitfalls that I was faced with and how I overcame them. The result concluding with an unauthenticated remote code execution as root by chaining multiple vulnerabilities on a very popular IAM solution used by several Fortune 500 companies and government organizations.The vulnerabilities will be discussed in detail including novel exploitation strategies for bypassing strict outbound network access. Finally, a live demo will be presented with a release of functional exploit code so that penetration testers and network administrators can validate and remediate these critical findings.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet leverages the Admin$ share for lateral movement once the local admin password has been brute forced. [26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1560.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive via Library
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile , libzip , and zlib . Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.[2][3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult.[184]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:eu-22 Dirty Vanity: A New Approach to Code Injection & EDR Bypass
This talk showcases yet another new code injection technique (I know, bear with me), nicknamed "Dirty Vanity". This technique challenges current injection detection and prevention means while opening a wider spectrum of attacks that challenges common concepts of EDR TTPs.This technique abuses the lesser-known forking mechanism which is built in Windows operating systems.In the talk, we will cover the forking mechanism's internals, and common means to activate it. We will discuss legitimate usage of it, and mention a known malicious usage for LSASS credential dumping. Finally, we will present Dirty Vanity and the research behind it, how it works, and its implications on current detection methods.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can archive files on the compromised host.[50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.[12][13][14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1098.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Device Registration
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1406.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steganography
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.[255]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has been delivered via malicious Word documents and archive files.[244]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has extracted password hashes from ntds.dit to crack offline.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T0852
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screen Capture
Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information.  Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate administrators and users in the domain.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.[169]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY's amsiPatch.py module can disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.[80]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[151][152][153]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Authentication Process
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise is capable of launching a remote shell on the host to delete itself.[62]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has extracted messages from chat programs, such as WeChat.[3]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-21 TeamTNT: Explosive Cryptomining
Since the introduction of Amazon Web Services (AWS) there has been a steady migration from on-premise to cloud deployments. Misconfigured cloud services can be low-hanging fruit for an attacker. Palo Alto Networks found that Docker services were attacked about every 90 minutes during the Spring of 2021. Of these attacks, around 76% were by cryptojacking threat actors, one of the most active in this field being TeamTNT.TeamTNT is one of the predominant cryptojacking threat actors currently targeting Linux servers. This session will present the threat actor's activity and their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) throughout their different campaigns. The first public report on TeamTNT was published in May 2020 by Trend Micro and covered attacks against servers running exposed Docker instances. While this is early activity, it is not the earliest that can be attributed to the threat actor. Based on our findings, we can conclude that they have been active since the Fall of 2019, which was six months before the initial report on the threat actor's activity. While TeamTNT is mainly known for compromising Kubernetes clusters and servers running Docker, this session will also highlight campaigns against servers running Redis and Windows.The threat actor maintains a public persona on Twitter. In addition to some of the technical details, this session will present the threat actor's social media activity and how they are uniquely interacting with the security research community.The session and the accompanying whitepaper will provide defenders with all information needed to better protect and detect attacks by this threat actor. The whole toolset will be presented, including: scripts, DDoS malware, backdoors, and rootkits.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has used compromised websites and Google Ads to bait victims into downloading its installer.[29][30]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the username of the victim system.[166]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0110
ATT&CK Technique Name:at
at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.[4][1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has used rundll32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.[84]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has used a custom encryption algorithm to encrypt collected data.[25]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.[35]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can execute PowerShell commands and scripts with the use of .NET DLL, WoodyPowerSession.[248]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote command execution.[11][12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with Bandook's payload.[9][10][11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has encrypted drives using the core encryption mechanism from DiskCryptor.[40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use AdjustTokenPrivileges() to elevate privileges.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need.


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can intercept two-factor authentication codes transmitted via SMS.[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can copy itself to and launch itself from hidden folders.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[80]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-18 Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)
With a 19 year old vulnerability, we were able to sign a message with the private key of Facebook. We'll show how we found one of the oldest TLS vulnerabilities in products of 10 different vendors and how we practically exploited it on famous sites. We'll also discuss how the countermeasures introduced back in TLS 1.0 and expanded over the years failed to prevent this and why RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption should be deprecated. Finally, we'll present what related problems are still present and unfixed in many popular TLS libraries.


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ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has hidden the C2 server address using base-64 encoding. [3]


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ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations by changing the top-level domain (TLD) to ".us", ".co" or ".biz".[24]


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ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt has been delivered via spearphishing emails with Microsoft Office attachments.[166]


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ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[13]


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ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. [29][30][31]


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title:blackhat:us-21 Windows Heap-backed Pool: The Good, the Bad, and the Encoded
For decades, the Windows kernel pool remained the same, using simple structures that were easy to read, parse and search for, but recently this all changed, with a new and complex design that breaks assumptions and exploits, and of course, tools and debugger extensions.This new design modernizes the kernel pool and makes it significantly more efficient. Additionally, it has significant security implications - both good and bad. Major code changes break a lot of existing code and might make future pool-related exploits more difficult, or in some cases nearly impossible to write.But could this open up a whole new attack surface as well?


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ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used Trojans from underground hacker websites.[13]


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ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been embedded in documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2017-8570.[71][72]


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ATT&CK ID:T1546.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trap
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d.


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ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has compromised social media accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.[4]


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ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.[6]


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ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[123]


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ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.[206]


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ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2]


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ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer will attempt to enumerate mapped network shares to later attempt to wipe all files on those shares.[39]


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ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[59]


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ATT&CK ID:T1541
ATT&CK Technique Name:Foreground Persistence
Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope. Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s startForeground() API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.


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titleblackhat:eu-18 When Everyone's Dog is Named Fluffy: Abusing the Brand New Security Questions in Windows 10 to Gain Domain-Wide Persistence
In Windows domain environments most attacks involve obtaining domain admin privileges. But that's not enough - once an attacker gets them, he has to make sure he doesn't lose his grip in the domain. That's why, in recent years, new levels of innovation are being focused on means of establishing domain persistence. New ideas are emerging, such as DCShadow and DACL-based methods. In this session we will present an effective approach for creating such persistence, exploiting new opportunities offered by the Win 10 security questions feature.The new feature, introduced this April, is a good example of how a well-intended idea can become a security nightmare. It allows a user to provide security questions and answers which he can later use to regain access to a local account. Yep, questions like "What was the name of your first pet?" are now safe-guarding your domain.We dug into the implementation of this feature and discovered that it can be abused to create a very durable, low profile backdoor. Once an attacker compromises a network, this backdoor can be remotely distributed to any Win 10 machine in the network - without even executing code on the targeted machine. We'll present this method and the challenges we faced while implementing it, including:How to remotely set the security questions featureHow to get remote access to the "Password Reset" screenHow to revert back to the user's original password after password reset, to avoid leaving traces (using Mimikatz existing features)We'll also share methods of mitigating this attack, including an open source tool we've developed that can control or disable the security questions feature, thus preventing security questions being used as a backdoor.


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ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has deleted itself after creating a service as well as deleted a temporary file when the system reboots.[262]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.[3]


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title:blackhat:asia-20 First Contact - Vulnerabilities in Contactless Payments
Introduced in 2007, contactless (NFC) payments have been used widely for a decade. Accounting for more than 40% of transactions globally, contactless payments are fast replacing cash and CHIP. Yet, contactless makes use of protocols much older than the technology itself. So, how safe and secure are contactless payments? In this talk we discuss how the EMV protocols and magstripe modes used for contactless are equally flawed. For the first time we show how to bypass the UK £30 limit for contactless payments made using physical cards. Then how to circumvent limits for mobile wallets using locked mobile phones. What's more, we cover flaws in the generation keys values, the unpredictable number (UN) and application transaction counter (ATC). Another first, we perform a pre-play attack using EMV without downgrading to legacy modes.


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ATT&CK ID:T1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rootkit
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.[41]


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ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android listens for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent in order to maintain persistence and activate its functionality at device boot time.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore changes the permissions of a payload using the command chmod -R 755.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.[7]


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ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass application control. [44] Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through regsvr32 functionality by using application control [45] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[46], AppLocker, [47] [48] or Software Restriction Policies [49] where appropriate. [50]


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titleblackhat:us-18 Applied Self-Driving Car Security
In the not too distant future, we'll live in a world where computers are driving our cars.  Soon, cars may not even have steering wheels or brake pedals.  But, in this scenario, should we be worried about cyber attack of these vehicles?  In this talk, two researchers who have headed self-driving car security teams for multiple companies will discuss how self driving cars work, how they might be attacked, and how they can ultimately be secured.


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ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.[7]


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ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork collected the victim username and whether it was running as admin, then sent the information to its C2 server.[139][127]


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ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has the ability to download files from its C2 server.[160][161]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox has the ability to execute an LDAP query to enumerate the distinguished name, SAM account name, and display name for all domain users.[11]


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ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie appends a total of 64MB of garbage data to a file to deter any security products in place that may be scanning files on disk.[10]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can decrypt the payload into memory, create a new suspended process of itself, then inject a decrypted payload to the new process and resume new process execution.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[98]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1651
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Administration Command
Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines or hybrid-joined devices. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. Similarly, in Azure AD environments, Microsoft Endpoint Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to the Azure AD.


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ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[8][9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.[9] This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cherry Picker
Some variants of Cherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows "AppInit_DLLs"="pserver32.dll"[5]


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title:blackhat:asia-23 firmWar: An Imminent Threat to the Foundation of Computing
The global IT supply chain is under a heavy spotlight, amidst covid-impacted production shortages, work-from-home policies, geopolitical tensions, and an overall re-balkanization of technology design and production. The 2020 SolarWinds attacks brought the real-world risk of a supply chain attack to the forefront. More commonly overlooked, however, is the risk posed by enterprise devices and the firmware which controls them. These systems exist in highly privileged areas of the computing industry, and due to both their mission criticality and difficulty in patching are mostly forgotten - but not to attackers. We'll reveal new research which began with a ransomware group and ended with a significant coordinated disclosure effort to remediate vulnerabilities discovered at the top of the firmware supply chain. The vulnerabilities we found are in an industry-standard management API, easily exploitable but well-hidden, and it took a data exposure before they were discovered. The access afforded by the exploitation of these flaws can provide an attacker with permanent administrative access to millions of servers worldwide. We will discuss how low-level attacks, once relegated only to nation-states, are being added to the arsenal of cybercriminals and ransomware groups. The talk will also highlight the challenges posed to organizations in assessing their firmware risk and the importance of accountability for the modern technology supply chain.Please note that this will be a remote (virtual) presentation.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.[45]


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titleblackhat:us-22 Déjà Vu: Uncovering Stolen Algorithms in Commercial Products
In an ideal world, members of a community work together towards a common goal or greater good. Unfortunately, we do not (yet) live in such a world. In this talk, we discuss what appears to be a systemic issue impacting our cyber-security community: the theft and unauthorized use of algorithms by corporate entities. Entities who themselves may be part of the community.First, we’ll present a variety of search techniques that can automatically point to unauthorized code in commercial products. Then we’ll show how reverse-engineering and binary comparison techniques can confirm such findings. Next, we will apply these approaches in a real-world case study. Specifically, we’ll focus on a popular tool from a non-profit organization that was reverse-engineered by multiple entities such that its core algorithm could be recovered and used (unauthorized), in multiple commercial products.The talk will end with actionable takeaways and recommendations, as who knows, this may happen to you too! For one, we'll present strategic approaches (and the challenges) of confronting culpable commercial entities (and their legal teams). Moreover, we’ll provide recommendations for corporations to ensure this doesn’t happen in the first place, thus ensuring that our community can remain cohesively focused on its mutual goals.


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ATT&CK ID:T1481.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bidirectional Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR, named "WinUpdate" [66]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used LinkedIn to send spearphishing links.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1568
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Resolution
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.[346]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox has collected all outgoing phone numbers that start with "86".[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has used VBA macros to execute shellcode.[152]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.[62]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with "wallet" in their name using find.[83]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.[293]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[44]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.[36]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can collect the username from a compromised host.[163]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to discover the hostname of a compromised host.[226]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can capture files and photos from the compromised device.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can identify the IP and port numbers for all remote connections from the compromised host.[47]