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titleblackhat:us-22 Pwning Cloud Vendors with Untraditional PostgreSQL Vulnerabilities
Cloud service providers often provide popular and beloved open-source solutions as multi-tenant managed services. This is a significant power of the cloud - to offer anything as a scalable, managed service. However, these projects were not built with multi-tenancy in mind, and therefore, their adoption relies on multiple modifications and adjustments by the cloud vendor.Our team explored PostgreSQL-as-a-Service offered by multiple cloud providers and found a series of vulnerabilities related to its implementation as a multi-tenant service, including severe isolation issues. The impact of these vulnerabilities can be wide-reaching as they may become the starting point for a cross-account access attack; as we recently demonstrated in the “ExtraReplica” vulnerability, a Postgres vulnerability leads to cross-account access of customer databases in Azure Postgres Flexible server service. This is the first-of-a-kind cloud implementation vulnerability in a platform-as-a-service offering, affecting multiple cloud providers simultaneously. In this session, we will explain the Postgres vulnerabilities and how they lead us to find cloud isolation vulnerabilities. We will also peek at the services' internals, which we were privileged to see after executing our code on the platform. We will explain how we used these vulnerabilities as a first step within a vulnerability chain and performed lateral movement within the internal cloud network, finally achieving cross-account access to other customers' databases.We will discuss the learnings and implications of this research for cloud providers and customers using database-as-a-service. We will provide advice for future Postgres-as-a-Service implementations as well as other adaptations of open-source projects to PaaS and review critical design considerations to avoid similar issues. Finally, we will provide customers with risk mitigation strategie...


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ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.[72]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
The C2 server used by XTunnel provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port.[11]


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ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to capture webcam video.[46]


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titleblackhat:us-20 About Directed Fuzzing and Use-After-Free: How to Find Complex & Silent Bugs?
Fuzzing is a popular and effective automated approach to vulnerability detection. Directed fuzzing focuses on automatically testing specific parts of the code by taking advantage of additional information such as bug stack traces or patches. Key applications include bug reproduction and patch-oriented testing. While very successful, recent fuzzing techniques (directed or not) are not well suited for Use-After-Free vulnerabilities (UAF), where some deallocated memory is reused through a dangling pointer (UAF represent only 1% of issues found by OSS-Fuzz in 2017). This is unfortunate as UAF possibly lead to data corruption, information leaks, or denial of service. Fuzzing UAF is hard for two reasons: (1) UAF bugs are complex – need to find input covering three events (alloc, free, use) in sequence; (2) UAF bugs are silent – they often do not crash immediately. The obvious solution is to pair fuzzing with memory sanitizaters such as Valgrind, however the induced runtime overhead is terrible for fuzzing. We propose UAFuzz, the first (binary-level) directed greybox fuzzer dedicated to UAF bugs. The technique features a fuzzing engine tailored to UAF specifics (adapting standard fuzzing components: seed selection, distance metric and power schedule), a lightweight code instrumentation and an efficient bug triage step allowing to send only a fraction of the generated input to the sanitizer for bug confirmation. Our technique is implemented on top of AFL-QEMU and Valgrind. UAFuzz outperforms state-of-the-art directed fuzzers (AFLGO and Hawkeye) on bug reproduction (detection rate, time-to-exposure). UAFuzz has also been proven effective in patch-oriented testing, leading to the discovery of 30 new bugs, 7 CVEs and 4 buggy patches. Several fuzzing talks have already been given to Black Hat. Our proposal is the first to focus on directed fuzzing and use-after-free.Finally, we wil...


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ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture and store keystrokes.[61]


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ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.[107][108]


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ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has signed Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.[32][33]


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ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.[179]


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ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being sent over unencrypted protocols.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[75]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.[5]


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ATT&CK ID:S0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.[35]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay has used names to mimic legitimate software including "vmtoolsd.exe" to spoof Vmtools.[106]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.[68]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can generate fake notifications and launch overlay attacks against attacker-specified applications.[12]


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ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can check if the explorer.exe process is responsible for calling its install function.[273]


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title:blackhat:us-19 Detecting Deep Fakes with Mice
Neural networks can generate increasingly realistic, human-like speech. These so-called "deep fakes" can be used in social engineering attacks. Bad actors can now impersonate any person's voice merely by gathering a few samples of spoken audio and then synthesizing new speech, utilizing off-the-shelf tools. But how convincing are these "deep fakes"? Can we train humans or artificial intelligence to spot the tell-tale signs of audio manipulation? In this work, we assessed the relative abilities of biology and machines, in a task which required discriminating real vs. fake speech. For machines, we looked at two approaches based on machine learning: one based on game theory, called generative adversarial networks (GAN) and one based on mathematical depth-wise convolutional neural networks (Xception).For biological systems, we gathered a broad range of human subjects, but also we also used mice. Recent work has shown that the auditory system of mice resembles closely that of humans in the ability to recognize many complex sound groups. Mice do not understand the words, but respond to the stimulus of sounds and can be trained to recognize real vs. fake phonetic construction. We theorize that this may be advantageous in detecting the subtle signals of improper audio manipulation, without being swayed by the semantic content of the speech.We evaluated the relative performance of all 4 discriminator groups (GAN, Xception, humans, and mice). We used a "deep fakes" data set recently published in Google's "Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge" and we will report the results here.


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title:botconf2013 Malware Calling
Zitmo (ZeuS in the MObile) is a mutation of ZeuS that appeared for the first time in early 2011, targeting bank customers in Poland and Spain, infecting unknown numbers of users. Zitmo consists of two parts: spyware installed od PC and an application installed on mobile device. At the time the PC app is capable to run on all modern Windows systems (2000-8) both 32 and 64 bits, while the mobile part runs on Android, (although it’s prepered for Symbian and Blackbery as well).We have recently discoverd that the banker used in malware is a strange mixture of ZeuS and Spy-Eye, served as a module, and it’s only one of functionalities offered by malware. It also incorporates a sophisticated communication schema used to trasport stolen data from mobile phones which we are still investigating. We will show how malware operates on both PCs and mobiles to stealing money. In addition, we will release tools that aid analysis.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/11-MaciejKotowicz-MalwareCalling.pdf


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ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can execute ipconfig on the victim’s machine.[34][35][36]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use net group "domain admins" /domain to display accounts in the "domain admins" permissions group and net localgroup "administrators" to list local system administrator group membership.[47]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Configuration data used by Rising Sun has been encrypted using an RC4 stream algorithm.[280]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has collected the IOPlatformUUID, session UID, and the OS version using the command sw_vers -productVersion.[266][267]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used netstat -oan to obtain information about the victim network connections.[37]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1059.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Python
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum can deploy additional components or tools as needed.[169]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect files and information from a compromised host.[112]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file. Mustang Panda has also used reg save on the SYSTEM file Registry location to help extract the NTDS.dit file.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal collected file listings of all default Windows directories.[96]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon has a command to inject code into a process.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Built-in browser sandboxes and application isolation may be used to contain web-based malware.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff abuses accessibility features to intercept all interactions between a user and the device.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise executes net user after initial communication is made to the remote server.[13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can receive and load executables from remote C2 servers.[468]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim’s machine.[186]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can collect information about the device including device type, OS version, language, free storage space, battery status, device root, and if developer mode is enabled.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT has gained execution on targeted systems through luring users to click on links to malicious URLs.[66][67]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to discover the computer name and Windows product name/version.[210]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to set the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key to execute logon scripts.[8]


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ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.[7]


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ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can exploit multiple vulnerabilities including EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0144).[24]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1078.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management systems, such as Windows Active Directory.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.[166][167]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
The "tDiscoverer" variant of HAMMERTOSS establishes a C2 channel by downloading resources from Web services like Twitter and GitHub. HAMMERTOSS binaries contain an algorithm that generates a different Twitter handle for the malware to check for instructions every day.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can search a list of running processes.[191]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[178][179][180][181]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can capture photos and videos from the device’s camera.[21]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1596.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS/Passive DNS
Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter is believed to have initially infected devices using internet traffic hijacking to generate abnormal popups.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.[208][209]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can establish persistence via a Launch Daemon.[11][12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used PowerShell for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for dumping credentials stored on compromised machines.[104]


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titleblackhat:us-18 Holding on for Tonight: Addiction in InfoSec
Substance abuse is present in and affects all communities, even information security. This session will detail the relationship between stress, addiction, and relapse. Additionally, the speaker will discuss her experience with alcohol use disorder while maintaining a career in information security and share advice on how people and companies can be inclusive and supportive for those living a clean and/or sober life. Attendees will gain perspective and a greater understanding of their peers and employees in recovery.


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titleblackhat:us-21 Bridging Security Infrastructure Between the Data Center and AWS Lambda
While serverless is all the rage, creating secure infrastructure that integrates serverless technology with existing Data Center (DC) services remains a challenge. Square's DC uses a microservice architecture. Services communicate over an envoy service mesh with short-lived mTLS certificates using SPIFFE identity for zero-trust based authentication. To achieve higher flexibility and scalability we have been migrating to the cloud, a gradual process that is still in progress.Why bother? Workloads have different characteristics, while a payment system might be required to be available all the time and have predictable traffic, other applications might have unpredictable bursts of use but otherwise receive no traffic. This flexibility draws developers to Lambda. Applications can scale up immediately, but also scale down when demand is low. However, these characteristics also make security engineering challenging. In this talk we will explain what challenges we were confronted with and how we solved them, bridging security properties we require in the DC to be compatible with AWS Lambda.How is this challenging? Complications with AWS Lambda fall broadly into two categories. One, operational requirements for Lambda that make developers choose it in the first place, such as near immediate response time. Two, providing parity with our DC security infrastructure so developers can engineer in a fashion they are used to while observing security best practices. Simply reimplementing the systems we use in the DC was not possible, but using native cloud functionality alone wasn't possible either.How did we solve this? This talk will cover how we architected workload identity in AWS Lambda, sharing identity between DC and the cloud. We built a custom certificate issuance on top of AWS Private CA that is compatible with the SPIFFE standard, but issues certificates ahead of time to not block...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [11] [12] [10] [13]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can silently intercept and manipulate notifications. S.O.V.A. can also inject cookies via push notifications.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used regsvr32 to execute scripts.[37][38]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has Base64 encoded the RSA public key used for encrypting files.[100]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used a Base64 key to decode its components.[142]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevated privileges.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron gathers the victim computer name using the Win32 API call GetComputerName.[207]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can scan the network for open ports and vulnerable instances of RDP and SMB protocols.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.[89]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has sent emails to intended victims with malicious MS Word and Excel attachments.[241]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.[64][65]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate. As our company began to explore cloud transformation broadly, we in Security began investigating competitive options for our event collection and analysis platform. We wanted to know if we could roll our own cloud-native SIEM more efficiently while providing greater access to our data, and be as effective as the vendor's solution.To figure that out, we asked:1. Does the vendor SIEM product cover enough of our threat landscape to make it worth the cost? 2. If not, has our organization made strategic investments in alternate platforms which could be leveraged instead? 3. If yes, does our team have the skills required to implement and mold these platforms to our needs?The answers led us to roll our own SIEM. In our presentation, we'll dig into these questions and decisions in-depth, as well as describe our architecture and several use cases. At the end of the day, we've been running our GCP SIEM for over a year and have moved off the vendor platform. To get started, we wrote less than 6,000 lines of code across a handful of simple tools. We ingest 5TB of data per day and have over 2PB of historical data stored and instantly searchable. In the end, we spent ~$500,000 to build our own SIEM that would have cost us $4 million if we used our third-party vendor. We're also saving an estimated $600,000 year over year in maintenance and subscription fees, plus reducing hardware capital expenditure.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.[26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.[29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has gained execution through victims clicking on malicious LNK files contained within ISO files, which can execute hidden DLLs within the ISO.[83][49]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-19 The Next Arms Race
The Internet is not supposed to have borders, but it does. Countries fight and spy on each other on the Internet every day. So, borders still exist on the Internet, and almost all countries are investing into offensive use of cyber power. The new weapons they are developing are different from any other kind of weapon we've ever seen, and we are now seeing the very beginning of the next arms race.


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title:botconf2015 Inside DarkComet: a wild case-study
This research discusses the application of a framework for the automated analysis of malware samples, specifically botnet binaries, which automates the collection, analysis, and infiltration of botnets. Due to the increased number of samples released daily, such frameworks have become a necessity for anti-malware organisations and product vendors. Some academic research has recently been concluded into their design and development. a case-study was conducted which resulted in the collection of 83,175 DarkComet RAT samples, of which 48.85% were successfully analysed and their configuration information extracted, leading to the infiltration of 751 Command and Control servers which provided information on 109,535 unique victim computers. The collection of the DarkComet bot binaries occurred between August of 2013 and June 2014, with CNC infiltration commencing on 10 May 2014 and concluding on 6 June 2014. A refined exploit for the QUICKUP vulnerability, previously document, which prevents detection by botmasters and supports the downloading of large files is provided. The document presents an analysis of the configuration data extracted from the collected malware samples.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.[365]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.[48][49]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter to establish persistence.[32]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used ipconfig /all to obtain information about the victim network configuration. The group also ran a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly trojanized legitimate ICS equipment providers software packages available for download on their websites.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has been bundled with legitimate software installation files for disguise.[127]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.[83]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's backdoor deletes files after they have been successfully uploaded to C2 servers.[164]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a global service provider's IP as a proxy for C2 traffic from a victim.[13][14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. [7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used regsvr32.exe to launch malicious DLLs.[41][40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[105]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Scan images before deployment, and block those that are not in compliance with security policies. In Kubernetes environments, the admission controller can be used to validate images after a container deployment request is authenticated but before the container is deployed.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.[88][2][89]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls. Implement strict IAM controls to prevent access to systems except for the applications, users, and services that require access. Implement user accounts for each individual for enforcement and non-repudiation of actions.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot can decrypt data received from a C2 and save to a file.[98]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has hijacked normal application’s launch routines to display ads.[1]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-19 Bypassing the Maginot Line: Remotely Exploit the Hardware Decoder on Smartphone
Though researchers have found lots of vulnerabilities in Stagefright framework for audio/video codecs on Android smartphones, all these vulnerabilities are in the software implementation of the AOSP. However, almost all smartphone chip manufacturers utilize the hardware implementation decoders to improve the performance and reduce battery consuming. For example, a complex video format, such as h264 or h265, will be given priority to decode by the hardware decoders.Therefore, lots of questions about hardware decoder remain unanswered. How does it work? What's the security status and overall impact to the whole system? What about the attack surface and mitigation? Can we find any vulnerabilities and exploit it? Our research will answer these questions.We focus on the hardware decoder named Venus on Qualcomm based smartphone. Venus is the dedicated video hardware decoder, which is a subsystem like Baseband, WLAN. This presentation will describe the architecture, the work principle, and the attack surface of Venus. Then we'll describe how to defeat the secure boot and setup the live debugger. Finally, we'll describe the vulnerabilities we found and how to exploit Venus remotely.Nowadays, there are plenty of security features and mitigations on the application processor of Android. For a real attack from the browser, we should gain arbitrary code execution first, escape from the sandbox, then break down the userspace application isolation. Finally, if we are lucky enough, we could escalate privilege into a process that can touch something like the device node exposed by the Kernel. The whole process can be a long journey. However, by attacking the hardware decoder, we can bypass all these defenses directly. In the hardware decoder, we have DMA, IO Port, shared memory with other processor, and messages with Kernel. There are plenty of attack surfaces into the Kernel and lef...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.[108][109]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0637
ATT&CK Technique Name:NativeZone
NativeZone can check for the presence of KM.EkeyAlmaz1C.dll and will halt execution unless it is in the same directory as the rest of the malware's components.[5][7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[38][39]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug identified and extracted all Word documents on a server by using a command containing * .doc and *.docx. The actors also searched for documents based on a specific date range and attempted to identify all installed software on a victim.[285]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-19 How to Break PDF Encryption
PDF is among the most widely used document formats worldwide. To ensure confidentiality, PDF supports document encryption. In this talk, we analyze PDF encryption and show two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate encrypted content. The only requirement is one single block of known plaintext, which we show is fulfilled by design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of encrypted documents by using exfiltration channels, based on standard compliant PDF properties.
We evaluated our attacks on 27 widely used PDF viewers and found all of them to be vulnerable. We responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities and supported the vendors mitigating the issues.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has used WinHTTP, CreateProcess, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.[172]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 leverages a hardcoded list of remote-station IP addresses to iteratively initiate communications and collect information across multiple priority IEC-104 priority levels.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to discover processes, including Bka.exe and BkavUtil.exe.[108]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[231]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's OPC and IEC 61850 protocol modules include the ability to send stVal requests to read the status of operational variables. [1]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to download, unpack, and decrypt tar.gz files .[215]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS stops processes related to security and management software.[32][33]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can monitor processes for open browsers and custom banking applications.[135]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has been downloaded and executed from malicious Excel files.[40][41]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports for that particular network segment.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can edit system environment variables.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to gather information from the compromrised asset, including the computer version, computer name, IIS version, and more.[83]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can use a second channel for C2 when the primary channel is in upload mode.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.[265]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1590.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Topology
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[155][156]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest hides a copy of itself in the user's ~/Library directory by using a . at the beginning of the file name followed by 9 random characters.[47]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0101
ATT&CK Technique Name:ifconfig
ifconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.[66]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:asia-23 Dilemma in IoT Access Control: Revealing Novel Attacks and Design Challenges in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoT
From Bluetooth smart locks to item trackers, Mobile-as-a-Gateway (MaaG) IoT devices are everywhere. MaaG IoT devices use mobile devices as gateways to connect to the internet for management. They allow for remote access sharing and revocation, while also providing "offline availability" for enhanced usability. However, in order for these functionalities to be realized, secure cooperation among the cloud service, the companion app, and the IoT device is necessary. In practice, it is common for cloud services to use access model translation (AMT) to convert complex cloud-side access policies into simpler device-side policies. At the same time, ad-hoc protocols are often developed to support access policy synchronization, using both HTTPS and Bluetooth. Unfortunately, current MaaG IoT systems fail to recognize the potential security risks associated with this process of access model translation and synchronization. An analysis of ten top-of-the-line MaaG IoT devices revealed that all of them have significant vulnerabilities, such as allowing irrevocable and permanent access for temporary users. Finally, we will propose a secure protocol design to defend against all identified attacks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner connects to a C2 server using port 51640.[32]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can encrypt HTTP POST data using RC6 and a dynamically generated AES key encrypted with a hard coded RSA public key.[143][144][145]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-21 ProxyLogon is Just the Tip of the Iceberg: A New Attack Surface on Microsoft Exchange Server!
Microsoft Exchange Server is an email solution widely deployed within government and enterprises, and it is an integral part of both their daily operations and security. Needless to say, vulnerabilities in Exchange have long been the Holy Grail for attackers, hence our security research on Exchange. Surprisingly, we've found not only critical vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, but a whole new attack surface of Exchange.This new attack surface is based on a significant change in Exchange Server 2013, where the fundamental protocol handler, Client Access Service (CAS), splits into frontend and backend. In this fundamental change of architecture, quite an amount of design debt was incurred, and, even worse, it introduced inconsistencies between contexts, leading us to discover this new attack surface.To unveil the beauty of this attack surface and our novel exploitation, we'll start by analyzing this architecture, followed by 7 vulnerabilities that consist of server-side bugs, client-side bugs, and crypto bugs found via this attack surface. In the end, these vulnerabilities are chained into 3 attack vectors that shine in different attack scenarios: ProxyLogon, ProxyShell, and ProxyOracle. These attack vectors enable any unauthenticated attacker to uncover plaintext passwords and even execute arbitrary code on Microsoft Exchange Servers through port 443, which is exposed to the Internet by ~400K Exchange Servers.This attack surface has its unparalleled impact for a reason: security researchers tend to find vulnerabilities from a certain perspective, such as digging for memory bugs, injections, or logic flaws, but we took a different approach by looking at Exchange from a high-level architectural view and captured this architecture-level attack surface, which yielded multiple vulnerabilities. We hope this brings a new paradigm to vulnerability research and i...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.[15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application controls to mitigate installation and use of payloads that may be utilized to spoof security alerting.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used the AES256 algorithm with a SHA1 derived key to decrypt exploit code.[267]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create "SysUpdate" binpath= "cmd /c start "[file path]""&&sc config "SysUpdate" start= auto&&netstart SysUpdate for persistence.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0111
ATT&CK Technique Name:schtasks
schtasks is used to schedule tasks on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[155]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash. Monokle can also capture the user’s dictionary, user-defined shortcuts, and browser history, enabling profiling of the user and their activities.[23]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[26][27][28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters[28]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the command net localgroup administrators to list all administrators part of a local group.[20]


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ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can modify the timestamp of an executable so that it can be identified and restored by the decryption tool.[10]


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ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy obtains a list of running processes.[101]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has created registry keys for persistence, including HKCU\Software\dnimtsoleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\snimtsOleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\Backtsaleht\StubPath, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed. Components\{3bf41072-b2b1-21c8-b5c1-bd56d32fbda7}, and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3ef41072-a2f1-21c8-c5c1-70c2c3bc7905}.[8]


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title:blackhat:eu-21 Picking Lockfiles:  Attacking & Defending Your Supply Chain
An advantage of open source software (OSS) development is that it enables contributions from the public, adding new features and improvements. This also makes OSS projects a target of supply chain attacks. We present both an offensive and defensive perspective of an attack technique that hides malicious code in open source contributions and that reduce the likelihood of the modifications being caught during review.Our technique leverages lockfiles commonly used by modern package managers to allow deterministic resolution of dependencies necessary to run an application. Our technique is based on the observation that 1) package managers do not sufficiently verify the integrity of lockfiles, 2) lockfiles are machine-generated and small modifications are easily missed during code review due to the mass of changes included, and 3) the prevalent use of third-party packages and package managers in open source software projects.For blue teams, we provide a light-weight tool that verifies the integrity of a lockfile well suited to be executed in CI pipelines. For red teams, we demonstrate both manual and automated approaches for choosing targets and tampering lockfiles, share Mitre Att&ck TTPs, and offer advice on what to look for when both defending and perpetuating this technique, making it easier to simulate this type of supply chain attack.Our work builds on previous work by Liran Tal [1]. We expand on their work by presenting more methods for tampering lockfiles, applying it to additional programming ecosystems (Ruby on Rails and Go in addition to Node.js), and providing tools that verify the integrity of a lockfile as well as automate the tasks of targeting suitable dependencies and tampering a lockfile.[1] https://snyk.io/blog/why-npm-lockfiles-can-be-a-security-blindspot-for-injecting-malicious-modules/


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Recent OS versions have made it more difficult for applications to register as VPN providers.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [4] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [5] Technologies such as Intel Boot Guard can assist with this. [6]


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title:blackhat:asia-21 How I Can Unlock Your Smart Door: Security Pitfalls in Cross-Vendor IoT Access Control
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly managed through the clouds, which mediate the users' access to devices, e.g., only authorized users can unlock a door. These clouds are operated by device vendors (Philips Hue, LIFX, Tuya, etc.) or cloud providers (Google Home, Amazon Alexa, IFTTT, etc.). Of particular interest here is the emerging capability, advocated by mainstream IoT vendors, to delegate device access across different clouds and users: for example, Philips Hue, August Lock, etc., allow Google Home to control devices mediated under their clouds, so the user can manage multiple devices from different vendors all through the single console at Google Home. On Google Home, then, an Airbnb host may temporarily delegate the access to their smart lock to a guest during their stay. Such a capability can lead to a convoluted delegation chain, whose authorization operations could easily go wrong. Specifically, access delegation across IoT clouds is distributed, heterogeneous, and unverified: each vendor customizes its delegation protocol with ad-hoc, implicit security assumption; further, we found the complicated delegation service is often coupled across clouds, with one cloud unwittingly violating the other's security operations and assumptions.We report the first systematic study on cross-cloud IoT delegation, based upon a verification tool we developed. We investigated 10 mainstream IoT clouds (Google Home, SmartThings, IFTTT, Philips Hue, LIFX, August, etc.), and discovered 5 serious vulnerabilities that endanger millions of users and hundreds of vendors. Exploiting the vulnerabilities, the adversary (e.g., former employee, Airbnb tenant) can gain unauthorized access to IoT devices (e.g., smart locks, switches, safety sensors). We implemented end-to-end attacks for all vulnerabilities and reported to affected vendors, which have deployed or sch...


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.[29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used implants capable of collecting the signed-in username.[87]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Set a browser extension allow or deny list as appropriate for your security policy. [17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0805
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mechanical Protection Layers
Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc. [6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0155
ATT&CK Technique Name:WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD C2 traffic can communicate via TCP raw sockets.[49]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect information and files from a compromised host.[180]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed the MaoCheng dropper with a stolen Adobe Systems digital signature.[56]


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title:blackhat:us-18 Unpacking the Packed Unpacker: Reverse Engineering an Android Anti-Analysis Native Library
Malware authors implement many different techniques to frustrate analysis and make reverse engineering malware more difficult. Many of these anti-analysis and anti-reverse engineering techniques attempt to send a reverse engineer down an incorrect investigation path or require them to invest large amounts of time reversing simple code. This talk analyzes one of the most robust anti-analysis native libraries we've seen in the Android ecosystem.
I will discuss each of the techniques the malware author used in order to prevent reverse engineering of their Android native library including manipulating the Java Native Interface, encryption, run-time environment checks, and more. This talk discusses not only the techniques the malware author implemented to prevent analysis, but also the steps and process for a reverse engineer to proceed through the anti-analysis traps. This talk will give you the tools to expose what Android malware authors are trying to hide.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.[77]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote file transmission.[111]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[227]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses various API to perform behaviors such as executing payloads and performing local enumeration.[171]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can delete copies of itself if additional APKs are downloaded to external storage.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[23][24][25][26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [150]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands  to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages.


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title:blackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a few foundation topics, such as methods of identifying native M1 code (which will aid us when hunting for M1 malware), as well as introductory arm64 reversing concepts. With an uncovered corpus of malware compiled to natively run on M1 (and in some cases notarized by Apple!), we'll spend the remainder of the talk demonstrating effective analysis techniques, including many specific to the analysis of arm64 code on macOS. Armed with this information and analysis techniques, you'll leave a proficient macOS M1 malware analyst!


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can decrypt its payload using RC4, AES, or one-byte XORing.[231]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE has the ability to embed payloads inside of a compiled binary.[11]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.[167][168][169][170][171][172]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. [1] [2]


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titleblackhat:us-21 Let's Attack Let's Encrypt
Following the recent off-path attacks against PKI, Let’sEncrypt deployed in 2020 domain validation from multiple vantage points to ensure security even against the stronger on-path MitM adversaries. The idea behind such distributed domain validation is that even if the adversary can hijack traffic of some vantage points, it will not be able to intercept traffic of all the vantage points to all the nameservers in a domain. In this work we show that two central design issues of the distributed domain validation of Let’sEncrypt make it vulnerable to downgrade attacks: (1) the vantage points are selected from a small fixed set of vantage points, and (2) the way the vantage points select the nameservers in target domains can be manipulated by a remote adversary. We develop off-path methodologies, based on these observations, to launch downgrade attacks against Let’sEncrypt. The downgrade attacks reduce the validation with `multiple vantage points to multiple nameservers', to validation with `multiple vantage points to a single attacker-selected nameserver'. Through experimental evaluations with Let’sEncrypt and the 1M-Let’sEncrypt-certified domains, we find that our off-path attacker can successfully launch downgrade attacks against more than 24.53% of the domains, rendering Let’sEncrypt to use a single nameserver for validation with them. We then develop an automated off-path attack against the `single-server'-domain validation for these 24.53% domains, to obtain fraudulent certificates for more than 107K domains, which constitute 10% of the 1M domains in our dataset.We also evaluate our attacks against other major CAs and compare the security and efforts needed to launch the attacks, to those needed to launch the attacks against Let’sEncrypt. The conclusion from the evaluations is that our downgrade attacks remove any security benefits that Let’sEncrypt has over other CAs.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY conducted an e-mail thread-hijacking campaign with malicious ISO attachments.[89][50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has executed HTA files via cmd.exe, and used batch scripts for collection.[228][229]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.[25][26][27][28][29][30]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with its C2 server to receive commands.[315]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using ping, including attempts to contact google[.]com.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[33]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.[3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.[239]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.[49]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1055.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asynchronous Procedure Call
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.[45][46]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Boundary Bridging
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has used collected lists of names and e-mail accounts to use in password spraying attacks against private sector targets.[19]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [8] [9] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [10]Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying protected components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[5]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeM
FakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.[5]


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titleblackhat:eu-18 BLEEDINGBIT: Your APs Belong to Us
Enterprise Wi-Fi access points featuring BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) chips have become increasingly common in recent years. While these chips provide new features, they also introduce risks that create a new network attack surface. In this talk, we will demonstrate BLEEDINGBIT, two zero-day vulnerabilities in Texas Instruments' (TI) BLE chips used in Cisco, Meraki, and Aruba wireless access points, that allow an unauthenticated attacker to penetrate an enterprise network over the air. The first BLEEDINGBIT vulnerability was discovered in the BLE stack embedded on TI chips in Cisco and Meraki Wi-Fi access points. The second vulnerability was discovered in TI's OAD (over-the-air firmware download) feature used by nearly every Aruba Wi-Fi access point currently for sale. Combined, these vendors represent 80% of all wireless access points sold each year to enterprises.Using BLEEDINGBIT, an attacker first achieves RCE on the BLE chip, and then can use the BLE chip to compromise the main OS of the access point and gain full control over it. Once an access point has been compromised, an attacker can read all traffic going through the access point, distribute malware, and even move laterally between network segments.Although first discovered in wireless access points, BLEEDINGBIT vulnerabilities may exist in many types of devices and equipment used across many different industries. For example, medical centers use BLE to track the location of beacons on valuable assets like resuscitation carts. Retailers use BLE for mobile credit card readers and indoor navigation applications. A BLEEDINGBIT attack against any of these devices would come out of thin air, bypassing existing security controls, and catching these organizations unprotected.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using MimikatzLite to perform credential dumping.[68]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer has the ability to collect information about installed AV products from an infected host.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
A variant of Zebrocy captures screenshots of the victim’s machine in JPEG and BMP format.[31][181][182][183][184][185]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures.[12]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[5][6] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.[64]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.[129][130]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has the ability to take a screenshot of the infected host desktop using Windows GDI+.[178]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.[254]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Systems and devices should restrict access to any data with potential confidentiality concerns, including point and tag information.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has dropped DCSrv under the svchost.exe name to disk.[131]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has established persistence by running in the background as an autostart service.[59]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 accessed victims' internal knowledge repositories (wikis) to view sensitive corporate information on products, services, and internal business operations.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[8]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 APIC's Adventures in Wonderland
Software-defined networking (SDN) along-side with micro-segmentation has been proposed as a new paradigm to deploy applications faster and, simultaneously, protect the individual workloads against lateral movement. Its implementation usually follows an application-centric view where the underlying network specifics are abstracted away from the management layers. Hence, an application developer only defines how similar parts of his application can communicate (e.g. web servers can connect to database servers on the following port) without considering the details of the network communication (e.g. IP addresses/subnets and routing tables).A prominent solution in this area is the Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) by Cisco. ACI is based on Nexus switches in a spine-leaf configuration and one (or preferably more) Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC). APICs are ACI's brain controlling the configuration of the switches to provide SDN and micro-segmentation capabilities for connected endpoints. Endpoints can then be aggregated into so-called endpoint groups (EPGs), which serve as the basic entities to apply filtering rules.In this talk, we will demystify the magic that surrounds the ACI wonderland and follow the APIC on its journey down the rabbit hole from when it gets first connected to the leaf switches till its configuration with EPGs and filtering rules. Along this journey we will participate in a crazy tea party. Here, the Mad Hatter will introduce us to the components involved in setting up the ACI fabric (including their background communication and used protocols), the March Hare will demonstrate what things can go wrong, and the Dormouse, before finally drifting to sleep, will release exploits for identified vulnerabilities.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[3][16][17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson has the ability to execute commands with the COMSPEC environment variable.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.[290]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution. Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise enumerates processes via the tasklist command.[91]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK can extract a malicious Portable Executable (PE) from a photo.[3]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-22 Human or Not: Can You Really Detect the Fake Voices?
Voice is an essential medium for humans to transfer information and build trust, and the trustworthiness of voice is of great importance to humans. With the development of deep learning technologies, attackers have started to use AI techniques to synthesize and even clone human voices. To combat the misuse of such techniques, researchers have proposed a series of AI-synthesized speech detection approaches and achieved very promising detection results in laboratory environments. Can these approaches really be as effective in the real world as they claim to be? This study provides an in-depth analysis of these works, identifies a set of potential problems, and designs a novel voice clone attack framework, SiF-DeepVC, based on these problems. This study first proposes the idea "bypass fake voice detection using speaker-irrelative features" and proves that detecting AI-synthesized speeches is still highly challenging, and existing approaches are not applicable in the real world. In a word, the Red is still far ahead of the Blue.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
A gh0st RAT variant has used rundll32 for execution.[50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has used Windows API functions to install the service and shim.[153]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.[39][40]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.[66]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
After decrypting itself in memory, RARSTONE downloads a DLL file from its C2 server and loads it in the memory space of a hidden Internet Explorer process. This "downloaded" file is actually not dropped onto the system.[58]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE can use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and port number pair to connect to for C2.[9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.[28][29]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used VBScript to conduct reconnaissance on targeted systems.[114]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has downloaded additional Lua scripts from the C2.[168]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch collects files from the local system that have the following extensions, then prepares them for exfiltration: .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .mdb, .rar, .zip, .doc, .docx.[22]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.[343][9]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[33]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[17]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET has used a zero-day exploit in the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges and bypass SIP.[38]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:asia-23 Dilemma in IoT Access Control: Revealing Novel Attacks and Design Challenges in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoT
From Bluetooth smart locks to item trackers, Mobile-as-a-Gateway (MaaG) IoT devices are everywhere. MaaG IoT devices use mobile devices as gateways to connect to the internet for management. They allow for remote access sharing and revocation, while also providing "offline availability" for enhanced usability. However, in order for these functionalities to be realized, secure cooperation among the cloud service, the companion app, and the IoT device is necessary. In practice, it is common for cloud services to use access model translation (AMT) to convert complex cloud-side access policies into simpler device-side policies. At the same time, ad-hoc protocols are often developed to support access policy synchronization, using both HTTPS and Bluetooth. Unfortunately, current MaaG IoT systems fail to recognize the potential security risks associated with this process of access model translation and synchronization. An analysis of ten top-of-the-line MaaG IoT devices revealed that all of them have significant vulnerabilities, such as allowing irrevocable and permanent access for temporary users. Finally, we will propose a secure protocol design to defend against all identified attacks.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Find-AVSignature AntivirusBypass module can be used to locate single byte anti-virus signatures.[14][15]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu's purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities such as industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers, amongst others not in the industrial sector, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party.[4]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by WMI commands from running. Note: many legitimate tools and applications utilize WMI for command execution. [138]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.[16]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.[477]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used macros in Excel documents to download and deploy the malware on the user’s machine.[334]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use spoof arguments in spawned processes that execute beacon commands.[6]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.[48]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used PowerShell profiles to maintain persistence on an infected machine.[2]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has queued an APC routine to explorer.exe by calling ZwQueueApcThread.[7]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[178][179][112][180]


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安全文本分析：

title:botconf2014 Splicing and Dicing 2014: Examining this Year’s Botnet Attack Trends
This presentation will discuss the various types of distributed denial of service attacks launched by botnets in 2014, worldwide. From DNS to Layer7 attacks, attendees will hear expert analysis of botnet breakdowns by-the-numbers including where the majority of botnets came from regionally, what attack trends were most popular, and when these attacks occurred. Join Nick Sullivan, Software Engineer and Security Architect at CloudFlare, to learn about his team’s findings after examining botnet activity in 2014. Nick will present this year’s major findings–and surprises–and his predictions for 2015.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/formidable/2/2014-1.6-Splicing-and-Dicing-2014-Examining-this-Years-Botnet-Attack-Trends1.pdf


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has established domains that impersonate legitimate entities to use for targeting efforts. [43][44]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-19 Lessons and Lulz: The 5th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure the network, and what changes we've made over the past year to try and keep doing things better. Of course, we'll be sharing some of the more humorous network activity and what it helps us learn about the way security professionals conduct themselves on an open WiFi network. Spoiler Alert: It's poorly. We conduct ourselves poorly.


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:us-20 Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation in GCP; Compromise any Organization without Dropping an Implant
Google Cloud's security model in many ways is quite different from AWS. Spark jobs, Cloud Functions, Jupyter Notebooks, and more default to having administrative capabilities over cloud API's. Instead of defaulting to no capabilities, permissions are granted to default identities. One default permission these identities have is called actAs, which allows a service by default to assume the identity of every service account in its project; many of which typically have role bindings into other projects and across an organization's resources. This means by default many API's and identities can compromise large swaths of an organization by moving laterally by impersonating or gaining access to other identities. This can all be done without dropping a single implant on a machine.In this talk, we'll demonstrate several techniques to perform identity compromise via the ActAs permission, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and widespread project compromise in Google Cloud. We will also release tools for exploitation.Next, we'll show what detection capabilities are possible in the Google Cloud ecosystem, by showing Stackdriver logs that correspond with our exploitation techniques, and showing limitations in what's available. We'll also release tools and queries that can be used for detection as well as insight to how we have attempted to tackle this problem at scale.Lastly, we'll go over remediation efforts you can take as a Google cloud customer, and show how difficult it can be to secure yourself against these attacks. We will release tools that can be used to harden your organization, and walk through user stories and anecdotes of what this process looks at scale within our organization.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function GET.WORKSPACE to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.[20]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information and to spawn processes for code injection.[20][21][22]


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安全文本分析：

titleblackhat:eu-20 It's not FINished: The Evolving Maturity in Ransomware Operations
Ransom demands are becoming larger, attackers smarter, and intrusions longer. Ransomware threat actors are hitting European companies hard with more effective ransomware deployment resulting in devastating impacts to victim organisations. When they strike, their ransomware deployments are more complete, more effective, and they are crippling many organisations to the point where there is often no clear path back to business.We will be sharing tradecraft we've seen ransomware threat actors employ across Europe in 2020. We cover how we're seeing ransomware crews leverage high-profile critical vulnerabilities to gain footholds in as many victims networks as possible, only to come back weeks or even months later to leverage those footholds into full-scale ransomware deployments.Not only are intrusion tactics improving, but attackers are also transitioning and developing sleek ransomware-as-a-service platforms. Threat actors are professionalising and streamlining their platforms. These platforms are being used by threat actors to generate malware, to communicate and negotiate with victims, and in some cases, for payment processing and decryption utility delivery.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1218.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mshta
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0936
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability. [8]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has pretended to be the xmlProv Network Provisioning service.[42]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens digitally signed an executable with a stolen certificate from legitimate company AI Squared.[22]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:us-22 I Am Whoever I Say I Am: Infiltrating Identity Providers Using a 0Click Exploit
Single Sign On (SSO) has become the dominant authentication scheme to login to several related, yet independent, software systems. At the core of this are the identity providers (IdP). Their role is to perform credential verification and to supply a signed token that service providers (SP) can consume for access control.On the other hand, when an application requests resources on behalf of a user and they're granted, then an authorization request is made to an authorization server (AS). The AS exchanges a code for a token which is presented to a resource server (RS) and the requested resources are consumed by the requesting application.Whilst OAuth2 handles authorization, and SAML handles authentication and as such Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions have become very popular in the enterprise environment to handle both use cases. What if IAM solutions are vulnerable to critical remote attacks? They need to be exposed on the internet, trusted to guard identities and facilitate access to hundreds if not thousands of users and applications.To begin with, I will cover the foundational use-case for IAM solutions and some past in the wild attacks (ITW) attacks with the extent of their impact.Continuing, I will present the approach I took with the audit including the challenges and pitfalls that I was faced with and how I overcame them. The result concluding with an unauthenticated remote code execution as root by chaining multiple vulnerabilities on a very popular IAM solution used by several Fortune 500 companies and government organizations.The vulnerabilities will be discussed in detail including novel exploitation strategies for bypassing strict outbound network access. Finally, a live demo will be presented with a release of functional exploit code so that penetration testers and network administrators can validate and remediate these critical findings.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.[34]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet leverages the Admin$ share for lateral movement once the local admin password has been brute forced. [26]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1560.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive via Library
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile , libzip , and zlib . Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.[2][3]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult.[184]


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安全文本分析：

title:blackhat:eu-22 Dirty Vanity: A New Approach to Code Injection & EDR Bypass
This talk showcases yet another new code injection technique (I know, bear with me), nicknamed "Dirty Vanity". This technique challenges current injection detection and prevention means while opening a wider spectrum of attacks that challenges common concepts of EDR TTPs.This technique abuses the lesser-known forking mechanism which is built in Windows operating systems.In the talk, we will cover the forking mechanism's internals, and common means to activate it. We will discuss legitimate usage of it, and mention a known malicious usage for LSASS credential dumping. Finally, we will present Dirty Vanity and the research behind it, how it works, and its implications on current detection methods.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm.[45]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.[27]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can archive files on the compromised host.[50]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.[12][13][14]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1098.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Device Registration
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:T1406.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steganography
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.[255]


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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has been delivered via malicious Word documents and archive files.[244]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has extracted password hashes from ntds.dit to crack offline.[7]