Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism
author:Michael Carl Tschantz and
Sadia Afroz and
anonymous and
Vern Paxson
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship
Circumvention in Empiricism
Michael Carl Tschantz∗, Sadia Afroz∗, Anonymous‡, and Vern Paxson∗†
∗International Computer Science Institute
†University of California, Berkeley
Abstract—Eﬀective evaluations of approaches to circumventing
government Internet censorship require incorporating perspec-
tives of how censors operate in practice. We undertake an
extensive examination of real censors by surveying prior mea-
surement studies and analyzing ﬁeld reports and bug tickets from
practitioners. We assess both deployed circumvention approaches
and research proposals to consider the criteria employed in their
evaluations and compare these to the observed behaviors of real
censors, identifying areas where evaluations could more faithfully
and eﬀectively incorporate the practices of modern censors. These
observations lead to an agenda realigning research with the
predominant problems of today.
I. Introduction
Censorship circumvention research seeks to develop ap-
proaches for facilitating access to banned Internet resources, a
domain with a fundamentally adversarial nature arising from
the ongoing interactions between circumventors and censors.
Both parties ﬁnd themselves locked in an arms race where each
side must manage tradeoﬀs between eﬃcacy and expenditure.
These tradeoﬀs continually evolve in subtle ways as new
technologies change the costs of various approaches.
Given this complexity, undertaking sound evaluation of
potential circumvention approaches proves both crucial and
diﬃcult. Sound evaluation is crucial since, due to limited
resources, the developers of circumvention approaches cannot
implement and deploy every prospective approach; they need
criteria for selecting the most promising. It is diﬃcult,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Time-Window Based Group-Behavior Supported Method for Accurate Detection
of Anomalous Users
author:Lun-Pin Yuan and
Euijin Choo and
Ting Yu and
Issa Khalil and
Sencun Zhu
8
3
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
7
8
9
8
4
N
S
D
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
7
-
2
7
5
3
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
N
S
D
(
s
k
r
o
w
t
e
N
d
n
a
s
m
e
t
s
y
S
e
l
b
a
d
n
e
p
e
D
n
o
e
c
n
e
r
e
f
n
o
C
l
a
n
o
i
t
a
n
r
e
t
n
I
P
I
F
I
/
E
E
E
I
l
a
u
n
n
A
t
s
1
5
1
2
0
2
2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)
Time-Window Based Group-Behavior Supported Method for Accurate Detection of
Anomalous Users
Lun-Pin Yuan
Euijin Choo
Ting Yu
Pennsylvania State University
Qatar Computing Research Institute
Qatar Computing Research Institute
lunpin@psu.edu
echoo@hbku.edu.qa
tyu@hbku.edu.qa
Issa Khalil
Qatar Computing Research Institute
ikhalil@hbku.edu.qa
Sencun Zhu
Pennsylvania State University
sxz16@psu.edu
Abstract—Autoencoder-based anomaly detection methods
have been used in identifying anomalous users from large-
scale enterprise logs with the assumption that adversarial
activities do not follow past habitual patterns. Most existing
approaches typically build models by reconstructing single-
day and individual-user behaviors. However, without capturing
long-term signals and group-correlation signals, the models
cannot identify low-signal yet long-lasting threats, and will
wrongly report many normal users as anomalies on busy
days, which, in turn, lead to high false positive rate. In this
paper, we propose ACOBE, anAnomaly detection method
based on COmpound BEhavior, which takes into consideration
long-term patterns and group behaviors. ACOBE leverages
a novel behavior representation and an ensemble of deep
autoencoders and produces an ordered investigation list. Our
evaluation shows that ACOBE outperforms prior work by a
large margin in terms of precision and recall, and our case
study demonstrates that ACOBE is applic...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:OpenNF: enabling innovation in network function control
author:Aaron Gember-Jacobson and
Raajay Viswanathan and
Chaithan Prakash and
Robert Grandl and
Junaid Khalid and
Sourav Das and
Aditya Akella
OpenNF: Enabling Innovation in Network Function Control
Aaron Gember-Jacobson, Raajay Viswanathan, Chaithan Prakash, Robert Grandl,
Junaid Khalid, Sourav Das, and Aditya Akella
University of Wisconsin-Madison
{agember,raajay,cprakash,rgrandl,junaid,souravd,akella}@cs.wisc.edu
http://opennf.cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
Network functions virtualization (NFV) together with software-
deﬁned networking (SDN) has the potential to help operators sat-
isfy tight service level agreements, accurately monitor and manipu-
late network trafﬁc, and minimize operating expenses. However, in
scenarios that require packet processing to be redistributed across
a collection of network function (NF) instances, simultaneously
achieving all three goals requires a framework that provides efﬁ-
cient, coordinated control of both internal NF state and network
forwarding state. To this end, we design a control plane called
OpenNF. We use carefully designed APIs and a clever combina-
tion of events and forwarding updates to address race conditions,
bound overhead, and accommodate a variety of NFs. Our evalua-
tion shows that OpenNF offers efﬁcient state control without com-
promising ﬂexibility, and requires modest additions to NFs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network Archi-
tecture and Design; C.2.3 [Computer Communication Networks]:
Network Operations
Keywords
Network functions, middleboxes, software-deﬁned networking
1.
INTRODUCTION
Network functions (NFs), or middleboxes, are systems that ex-
amine and modify packets and ﬂows in sophisticated ways: e.g.,
intrusion detection systems (IDSs), load balancers, caching prox-
ies, etc. NFs play a critical role in ensuring security, improving
performance, and providing other novel network functionality [37].
...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:OpenNF: enabling innovation in network function control
author:Aaron Gember-Jacobson and
Raajay Viswanathan and
Chaithan Prakash and
Robert Grandl and
Junaid Khalid and
Sourav Das and
Aditya Akella
OpenNF: Enabling Innovation in Network Function Control
Aaron Gember-Jacobson, Raajay Viswanathan, Chaithan Prakash, Robert Grandl,
Junaid Khalid, Sourav Das, and Aditya Akella
University of Wisconsin-Madison
{agember,raajay,cprakash,rgrandl,junaid,souravd,akella}@cs.wisc.edu
http://opennf.cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
Network functions virtualization (NFV) together with software-
deﬁned networking (SDN) has the potential to help operators sat-
isfy tight service level agreements, accurately monitor and manipu-
late network trafﬁc, and minimize operating expenses. However, in
scenarios that require packet processing to be redistributed across
a collection of network function (NF) instances, simultaneously
achieving all three goals requires a framework that provides efﬁ-
cient, coordinated control of both internal NF state and network
forwarding state. To this end, we design a control plane called
OpenNF. We use carefully designed APIs and a clever combina-
tion of events and forwarding updates to address race conditions,
bound overhead, and accommodate a variety of NFs. Our evalua-
tion shows that OpenNF offers efﬁcient state control without com-
promising ﬂexibility, and requires modest additions to NFs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network Archi-
tecture and Design; C.2.3 [Computer Communication Networks]:
Network Operations
Keywords
Network functions, middleboxes, software-deﬁned networking
1.
INTRODUCTION
Network functions (NFs), or middleboxes, are systems that ex-
amine and modify packets and ﬂows in sophisticated ways: e.g.,
intrusion detection systems (IDSs), load balancers, caching prox-
ies, etc. NFs play a critical role in ensuring security, improving
performance, and providing other novel network functionality [37].
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Active Credential Leakage for Observing Web-Based Attack Cycle
author:Mitsuaki Akiyama and
Takeshi Yagi and
Kazufumi Aoki and
Takeo Hariu and
Youki Kadobayashi
TRAFFIC DIRECTION
SYSTEMS AS MALWARE
DISTRIBUTION TOOLS
g
Maxim Goncharov
A 2011 Trend Micro Research Paper
absTRacT
Directing traffic to cash in on referrals is a
common and legitimate method of making
money on the Internet. It should not, therefore,
be surprising for the same to be true in the
illegitimate world of cybercrime. So-called
traffic direction systems (TDSs) have
reached a high level of sophistication.
This research paper will show how such
systems work, how these are utilized by
cybercriminals, and what the security
industry can do about this.
First, we will take a look at how TDSs work by looking at HTTP header redirection.
Then we will look at and compare how TDSs use iframes and Flash-based applications
to distribute malware.
Cybercriminals try to maximize the effectiveness of TDSs in order to profit as much as
possible from their exploits. This paper will also show how time, region, and installed
software influence TDSs by looking at the various tools that are currently available in
the market.
Cybercriminals strongly utilize TDSs to determine traffic type, which will aid them in
directing users to certain malicious sites and in determining what malicious payloads
to execute on particular systems. Some malware may also be the end result of a
particular TDS’s series of redirections, making it a malware infection vector.
What then can we do as part of the security industry?
TDSs present several challenges with regard to malware sample sourcing and
malicious URL detection, as these are capable of detecting the use of security
tools and often initiate avoidance tactics. A naïve approach to looking at TDSs may,
therefore, result in bogus findings and possible damage to the systems of innocent
users. This paper will show how we can protect users by actively...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Active Credential Leakage for Observing Web-Based Attack Cycle
author:Mitsuaki Akiyama and
Takeshi Yagi and
Kazufumi Aoki and
Takeo Hariu and
Youki Kadobayashi
TRAFFIC DIRECTION
SYSTEMS AS MALWARE
DISTRIBUTION TOOLS
g
Maxim Goncharov
A 2011 Trend Micro Research Paper
absTRacT
Directing traffic to cash in on referrals is a
common and legitimate method of making
money on the Internet. It should not, therefore,
be surprising for the same to be true in the
illegitimate world of cybercrime. So-called
traffic direction systems (TDSs) have
reached a high level of sophistication.
This research paper will show how such
systems work, how these are utilized by
cybercriminals, and what the security
industry can do about this.
First, we will take a look at how TDSs work by looking at HTTP header redirection.
Then we will look at and compare how TDSs use iframes and Flash-based applications
to distribute malware.
Cybercriminals try to maximize the effectiveness of TDSs in order to profit as much as
possible from their exploits. This paper will also show how time, region, and installed
software influence TDSs by looking at the various tools that are currently available in
the market.
Cybercriminals strongly utilize TDSs to determine traffic type, which will aid them in
directing users to certain malicious sites and in determining what malicious payloads
to execute on particular systems. Some malware may also be the end result of a
particular TDS’s series of redirections, making it a malware infection vector.
What then can we do as part of the security industry?
TDSs present several challenges with regard to malware sample sourcing and
malicious URL detection, as these are capable of detecting the use of security
tools and often initiate avoidance tactics. A naïve approach to looking at TDSs may,
therefore, result in bogus findings and possible damage to the systems of innocent
users. This paper will show how we can protect users by actively...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Stepwise Construction and Refinement of Dependability Models
author:Cl'audia Betous-Almeida and
Karama Kanoun
Stepwise Construction and Reﬁnement
of Dependability Models
Cl´audia Betous-Almeida and Karama Kanoun
LAAS-CNRS
7, Avenue du Colonel Roche
31077 Toulouse Cedex 4 - France
E-mail: falmeida,kanoung@laas.fr
Abstract
This paper presents a stepwise approach for depend-
ability modeling, based on Generalized Stochastic Petri
Nets (GSPNs). The ﬁrst-step model called functional-level
model, can be built as early as system functional speciﬁca-
tions and then completed by the structural model as soon
as the system architecture is known, even at a very high
level. The latter can be reﬁned according to three differ-
ent aspects: Component decomposition, state and event
ﬁne-tuning and distribution adjustment to take into account
increasing event rates. We deﬁne speciﬁc rules to make
the successive transformations as easy and systematic as
possible. This approach allows the various dependencies
to be taken into account at the right level of abstraction:
Functional dependency, structural dependency and those
induced by non-exponential distributions. A part of the ap-
proach is applied to an instrumentation and control system
(I&C) in power plants.
1. Introduction
Dependability evaluation plays an important role in criti-
cal systems’ deﬁnition, design and development. Modeling
can start as early as system functional speciﬁcations, from
which a high-level model can be derived to help in analyz-
ing dependencies between the various functions. However
the information that can be obtained from dependability
modeling and evaluation becomes more accurate as more
knowledge about the system’s implementation is incorpo-
rated into the models.
The starting point of our work was to help (based on de-
pendability evaluation) a stakeholder of an I&C system in
selecting and reﬁning systems proposed by various contrac-
tors in response to a Call for Tenders. To this end, we ha...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Stepwise Construction and Refinement of Dependability Models
author:Cl'audia Betous-Almeida and
Karama Kanoun
Stepwise Construction and Reﬁnement
of Dependability Models
Cl´audia Betous-Almeida and Karama Kanoun
LAAS-CNRS
7, Avenue du Colonel Roche
31077 Toulouse Cedex 4 - France
E-mail: falmeida,kanoung@laas.fr
Abstract
This paper presents a stepwise approach for depend-
ability modeling, based on Generalized Stochastic Petri
Nets (GSPNs). The ﬁrst-step model called functional-level
model, can be built as early as system functional speciﬁca-
tions and then completed by the structural model as soon
as the system architecture is known, even at a very high
level. The latter can be reﬁned according to three differ-
ent aspects: Component decomposition, state and event
ﬁne-tuning and distribution adjustment to take into account
increasing event rates. We deﬁne speciﬁc rules to make
the successive transformations as easy and systematic as
possible. This approach allows the various dependencies
to be taken into account at the right level of abstraction:
Functional dependency, structural dependency and those
induced by non-exponential distributions. A part of the ap-
proach is applied to an instrumentation and control system
(I&C) in power plants.
1. Introduction
Dependability evaluation plays an important role in criti-
cal systems’ deﬁnition, design and development. Modeling
can start as early as system functional speciﬁcations, from
which a high-level model can be derived to help in analyz-
ing dependencies between the various functions. However
the information that can be obtained from dependability
modeling and evaluation becomes more accurate as more
knowledge about the system’s implementation is incorpo-
rated into the models.
The starting point of our work was to help (based on de-
pendability evaluation) a stakeholder of an I&C system in
selecting and reﬁning systems proposed by various contrac-
tors in response to a Call for Tenders. To this end, we ha...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit
author:Zhaohui Wang and
Angelos Stavrou
Exploiting Smart-Phone USB Connectivity
For Fun And Proﬁt
Zhaohui Wang
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
zwange@gmu.edu
Angelos Stavrou
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
astavrou@gmu.edu
ABSTRACT
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection has become the
de-facto standard for both charging and data transfers for
smart phone devices including Google’s Android and Ap-
ple’s iPhone. To further enhance their functionality, smart
phones are equipped with programmable USB hardware and
open source operating systems that empower them to al-
ter the default behavior of the end-to-end USB communi-
cations. Unfortunately, these new capabilities coupled with
the inherent trust that users place on the USB physical con-
nectivity and the lack of any protection mechanisms render
USB a insecure link, prone to exploitation. To demonstrate
this new avenue of exploitation, we introduce novel attack
strategies that exploit the functional capabilities of the USB
physical link. In addition, we detail how a sophisticated ad-
versary who has under his control one of the connected de-
vices can subvert the other. This includes attacks where a
compromised smart phone poses as a Human Interface De-
vice (HID) and sends keystrokes in order to control the vic-
tim host. Moreover, we explain how to boot a smart phone
device into USB host mode and take over another phone
using a specially crafted cable. Finally, we point out the un-
derlying reasons behind USB exploits and propose potential
defense mechanisms that would limit or even prevent such
USB borne attacks.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in the hardware capabilities of the mo-
bile hand-held devices have fostered the development of open
source operating systems for mobile phones. These new gen-
eration of smart phones such as iPhone and Google Android
phone are powerful...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit
author:Zhaohui Wang and
Angelos Stavrou
Exploiting Smart-Phone USB Connectivity
For Fun And Proﬁt
Zhaohui Wang
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
zwange@gmu.edu
Angelos Stavrou
Department of Computer Science
George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
astavrou@gmu.edu
ABSTRACT
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection has become the
de-facto standard for both charging and data transfers for
smart phone devices including Google’s Android and Ap-
ple’s iPhone. To further enhance their functionality, smart
phones are equipped with programmable USB hardware and
open source operating systems that empower them to al-
ter the default behavior of the end-to-end USB communi-
cations. Unfortunately, these new capabilities coupled with
the inherent trust that users place on the USB physical con-
nectivity and the lack of any protection mechanisms render
USB a insecure link, prone to exploitation. To demonstrate
this new avenue of exploitation, we introduce novel attack
strategies that exploit the functional capabilities of the USB
physical link. In addition, we detail how a sophisticated ad-
versary who has under his control one of the connected de-
vices can subvert the other. This includes attacks where a
compromised smart phone poses as a Human Interface De-
vice (HID) and sends keystrokes in order to control the vic-
tim host. Moreover, we explain how to boot a smart phone
device into USB host mode and take over another phone
using a specially crafted cable. Finally, we point out the un-
derlying reasons behind USB exploits and propose potential
defense mechanisms that would limit or even prevent such
USB borne attacks.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in the hardware capabilities of the mo-
bile hand-held devices have fostered the development of open
source operating systems for mobile phones. These new gen-
eration of smart phones such as iPhone and Google Android
phone are powerful...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites
author:Rob Jansen and
Paul F. Syverson and
Nicholas Hopper
Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites
Rob Jansen
Paul Syverson
U.S. Naval Research Laboratory
{rob.g.jansen, paul.syverson}@nrl.navy.mil
Nicholas Hopper
University of Minnesota
hopper@cs.umn.edu
Abstract
Tor is vulnerable to network congestion and performance
problems due to bulk data transfers. A large fraction of
the available network capacity is consumed by a small
percentage of Tor users, resulting in severe service degra-
dation for the majority. Bulk users continuously drain
relays of excess bandwidth, creating new network bot-
tlenecks and exacerbating the effects of existing ones.
While this problem may currently be attributed to ratio-
nal users utilizing the network, it may also be exploited
by a relatively low-resource adversary using similar tech-
niques to contribute to a network denial of service (DoS)
attack. Degraded service discourages the use of Tor, af-
fecting both Tor’s client diversity and anonymity.
Equipped with mechanisms from communication net-
works, we design and implement three Tor-speciﬁc al-
gorithms that throttle bulk transfers to reduce network
congestion and increase network responsiveness. Unlike
existing techniques, our algorithms adapt to network dy-
namics using only information local to a relay. We exper-
iment with full-network deployments of our algorithms
under a range of light to heavy network loads. We ﬁnd
that throttling results in signiﬁcant improvements to web
client performance while mitigating the negative effects
of bulk transfers. We also analyze how throttling affects
anonymity and compare the security of our algorithms
under adversarial attack. We ﬁnd that throttling reduces
information leakage compared to unthrottled Tor while
improving anonymity against realistic adversaries.
1
Introduction
The Tor [19] anonymity network was developed in an
attempt to improve anonymity on the Internet. Onion
Routing [23,48] serves as...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites
author:Rob Jansen and
Paul F. Syverson and
Nicholas Hopper
Throttling Tor Bandwidth Parasites
Rob Jansen
Paul Syverson
U.S. Naval Research Laboratory
{rob.g.jansen, paul.syverson}@nrl.navy.mil
Nicholas Hopper
University of Minnesota
hopper@cs.umn.edu
Abstract
Tor is vulnerable to network congestion and performance
problems due to bulk data transfers. A large fraction of
the available network capacity is consumed by a small
percentage of Tor users, resulting in severe service degra-
dation for the majority. Bulk users continuously drain
relays of excess bandwidth, creating new network bot-
tlenecks and exacerbating the effects of existing ones.
While this problem may currently be attributed to ratio-
nal users utilizing the network, it may also be exploited
by a relatively low-resource adversary using similar tech-
niques to contribute to a network denial of service (DoS)
attack. Degraded service discourages the use of Tor, af-
fecting both Tor’s client diversity and anonymity.
Equipped with mechanisms from communication net-
works, we design and implement three Tor-speciﬁc al-
gorithms that throttle bulk transfers to reduce network
congestion and increase network responsiveness. Unlike
existing techniques, our algorithms adapt to network dy-
namics using only information local to a relay. We exper-
iment with full-network deployments of our algorithms
under a range of light to heavy network loads. We ﬁnd
that throttling results in signiﬁcant improvements to web
client performance while mitigating the negative effects
of bulk transfers. We also analyze how throttling affects
anonymity and compare the security of our algorithms
under adversarial attack. We ﬁnd that throttling reduces
information leakage compared to unthrottled Tor while
improving anonymity against realistic adversaries.
1
Introduction
The Tor [19] anonymity network was developed in an
attempt to improve anonymity on the Internet. Onion
Routing [23,48] serves as...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:The Request for Better Measurement: A Comparative Evaluation of
Two-Factor Authentication Schemes
author:Ding Wang and
Qianchen Gu and
Haibo Cheng and
Ping Wang
The Request for Better Measurement: A Comparative
Evaluation of Two-Factor Authentication Schemes
Ding Wang†, Qianchen Gu†, Haibo Cheng†, Ping Wang†‡
†School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
‡National Research Center for Software Engineering, Beijing 100871, China
{wangdingg,qcgu,chenghaibo,pwang}@pku.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Despite over two decades of continuous eﬀorts, how to de-
sign a secure and eﬃcient two-factor authentication scheme
remains an open issue. Hundreds of new schemes have wave
upon wave been proposed, yet most of them are shortly
found unable to achieve some important security goals (e.g.,
truly two-factor security) and desirable properties (e.g.,
user anonymity), falling into the unsatisfactory “break-ﬁx-
break-ﬁx” cycle.
In this vicious cycle, protocol designers
often advocate the superiorities of their improved scheme,
but do not illustrate (or unconsciously overlooking) the
aspects on which their scheme performs poorly.
In this paper, we ﬁrst use a series of “improved schemes”
over Xu et al.’s 2009 scheme as case studies to high-
light that, if there are no improved measurements, more
“improved schemes” generally would not mean more ad-
vancements. To ﬁgure out why the measurement of ex-
isting schemes is invariably insuﬃcient, we further in-
vestigate into the state-of-the-art evaluation criteria set
(i.e., Madhusudhan-Mittal’s set). Besides reporting its
ambiguities and redundancies, we propose viable ﬁxes and
reﬁnements. To the best of our knowledge, we for the ﬁrst
time demonstrate that there are at least seven diﬀerent
attacking scenarios that may lead to the failure of a scheme
in achieving truly two-factor security. Finally, we conduct
a large-scale comparative evaluation of 34 representative
two-factor schemes, and our results outline the request for
better measu...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:The Request for Better Measurement: A Comparative Evaluation of
Two-Factor Authentication Schemes
author:Ding Wang and
Qianchen Gu and
Haibo Cheng and
Ping Wang
The Request for Better Measurement: A Comparative
Evaluation of Two-Factor Authentication Schemes
Ding Wang†, Qianchen Gu†, Haibo Cheng†, Ping Wang†‡
†School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
‡National Research Center for Software Engineering, Beijing 100871, China
{wangdingg,qcgu,chenghaibo,pwang}@pku.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Despite over two decades of continuous eﬀorts, how to de-
sign a secure and eﬃcient two-factor authentication scheme
remains an open issue. Hundreds of new schemes have wave
upon wave been proposed, yet most of them are shortly
found unable to achieve some important security goals (e.g.,
truly two-factor security) and desirable properties (e.g.,
user anonymity), falling into the unsatisfactory “break-ﬁx-
break-ﬁx” cycle.
In this vicious cycle, protocol designers
often advocate the superiorities of their improved scheme,
but do not illustrate (or unconsciously overlooking) the
aspects on which their scheme performs poorly.
In this paper, we ﬁrst use a series of “improved schemes”
over Xu et al.’s 2009 scheme as case studies to high-
light that, if there are no improved measurements, more
“improved schemes” generally would not mean more ad-
vancements. To ﬁgure out why the measurement of ex-
isting schemes is invariably insuﬃcient, we further in-
vestigate into the state-of-the-art evaluation criteria set
(i.e., Madhusudhan-Mittal’s set). Besides reporting its
ambiguities and redundancies, we propose viable ﬁxes and
reﬁnements. To the best of our knowledge, we for the ﬁrst
time demonstrate that there are at least seven diﬀerent
attacking scenarios that may lead to the failure of a scheme
in achieving truly two-factor security. Finally, we conduct
a large-scale comparative evaluation of 34 representative
two-factor schemes, and our results outline the request for
better measu...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening in Neural Networks
for Better Security
author:Guanhong Tao and
Yingqi Liu and
Guangyu Shen and
Qiuling Xu and
Shengwei An and
Zhuo Zhang and
Xiangyu Zhang
8
8
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening
in Neural Networks for Better Security
Guanhong Tao, Yingqi Liu, Guangyu Shen, Qiuling Xu, Shengwei An, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang
Email: {taog, liu1751, shen447, xu1230, an93, zhan3299, xyzhang}@cs.purdue.edu
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Abstract—The distance between two classes for a deep learning
classifier can be measured by the level of difficulty in flipping
all (or majority of) samples in a class to the other. The class
distances of many pre-trained models in the wild are very
small and do not align well with humans’ intuition (e.g., classes
turtle and bird have smaller distance than classes cat and
dog), making the models vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which
aim to cause misclassification by stamping a specific pattern to
inputs. We propose a novel model hardening technique called
model orthogonalization which is an add-on training step to
pretrained models,
including clean models, poisoned models,
and adversarially trained models. It can substantially enlarge
class distances with reasonable training cost and without much
accuracy degradation. Our evaluation on 5 datasets with 22
model structures show that our technique can enlarge class
distances by 177.63% on average with less than 1% accuracy loss,
outperforming existing hardening techniques such as adversarial
training, universal adversarial perturbation, and directly using
generated backdoors. It reduces 80% false positives for a state-
of-the-art backdoor scan...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening in Neural Networks
for Better Security
author:Guanhong Tao and
Yingqi Liu and
Guangyu Shen and
Qiuling Xu and
Shengwei An and
Zhuo Zhang and
Xiangyu Zhang
8
8
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Model Orthogonalization: Class Distance Hardening
in Neural Networks for Better Security
Guanhong Tao, Yingqi Liu, Guangyu Shen, Qiuling Xu, Shengwei An, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang
Email: {taog, liu1751, shen447, xu1230, an93, zhan3299, xyzhang}@cs.purdue.edu
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Abstract—The distance between two classes for a deep learning
classifier can be measured by the level of difficulty in flipping
all (or majority of) samples in a class to the other. The class
distances of many pre-trained models in the wild are very
small and do not align well with humans’ intuition (e.g., classes
turtle and bird have smaller distance than classes cat and
dog), making the models vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which
aim to cause misclassification by stamping a specific pattern to
inputs. We propose a novel model hardening technique called
model orthogonalization which is an add-on training step to
pretrained models,
including clean models, poisoned models,
and adversarially trained models. It can substantially enlarge
class distances with reasonable training cost and without much
accuracy degradation. Our evaluation on 5 datasets with 22
model structures show that our technique can enlarge class
distances by 177.63% on average with less than 1% accuracy loss,
outperforming existing hardening techniques such as adversarial
training, universal adversarial perturbation, and directly using
generated backdoors. It reduces 80% false positives for a state-
of-the-art backdoor scan...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An Analysis of Rogue AV Campaigns
author:Marco Cova and
Corrado Leita and
Olivier Thonnard and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Marc Dacier
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
6307
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Alfred Kobsa
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
TU Dortmund University, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbruecken, Germany
Somesh Jha Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich (Eds.)
Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection
13th International Symposium, RAID 2010
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, September 15-17, 2010
Proceedings
1 3
Volume Editors
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
Computer Sciences Department
Madison, WI 53706, USA
E-mail: jha@cs.wisc.edu
Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA
E-mail: {robin, christian}@icir.org
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010933245
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): C.2, K.6.5, D.4.6, E.3, H.4, I.2
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-642-15511-1 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-642-15511-6 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An Analysis of Rogue AV Campaigns
author:Marco Cova and
Corrado Leita and
Olivier Thonnard and
Angelos D. Keromytis and
Marc Dacier
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
6307
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Alfred Kobsa
University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Oscar Nierstrasz
University of Bern, Switzerland
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India
Bernhard Steffen
TU Dortmund University, Germany
Madhu Sudan
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA, USA
Demetri Terzopoulos
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbruecken, Germany
Somesh Jha Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich (Eds.)
Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection
13th International Symposium, RAID 2010
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, September 15-17, 2010
Proceedings
1 3
Volume Editors
Somesh Jha
University of Wisconsin
Computer Sciences Department
Madison, WI 53706, USA
E-mail: jha@cs.wisc.edu
Robin Sommer
Christian Kreibich
International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA
E-mail: {robin, christian}@icir.org
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010933245
CR Subject Classiﬁcation (1998): C.2, K.6.5, D.4.6, E.3, H.4, I.2
LNCS Sublibrary: SL 4 – Security and Cryptology
ISSN
ISBN-10
ISBN-13
0302-9743
3-642-15511-1 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
978-3-642-15511-6 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CloudCmp: comparing public cloud providers
author:Ang Li and
Xiaowei Yang and
Srikanth Kandula and
Ming Zhang
CloudCmp: Comparing Public Cloud Providers
Ang Li
Xiaowei Yang
Duke University
{angl, xwy}@cs.duke.edu
Srikanth Kandula
Ming Zhang
Microsoft Research
{srikanth, mzh}@microsoft.com
ABSTRACT
While many public cloud providers offer pay-as-you-go comput-
ing, their varying approaches to infrastructure, virtualization, and
software services lead to a problem of plenty. To help customers
pick a cloud that ﬁts their needs, we develop CloudCmp, a system-
atic comparator of the performance and cost of cloud providers.
CloudCmp measures the elastic computing, persistent storage, and
networking services offered by a cloud along metrics that directly
reﬂect their impact on the performance of customer applications.
CloudCmp strives to ensure fairness, representativeness, and com-
pliance of these measurements while limiting measurement cost.
Applying CloudCmp to four cloud providers that together account
for most of the cloud customers today, we ﬁnd that their offered ser-
vices vary widely in performance and costs, underscoring the need
for thoughtful provider selection. From case studies on three rep-
resentative cloud applications, we show that CloudCmp can guide
customers in selecting the best-performing provider for their appli-
cations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: General—measurement techniques,
performance attributes; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: Network Operations—network monitoring, public networks;
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—distributed applications, distributed databases
General Terms
Measurement, Design, Performance, Economics.
Keywords
Cloud computing, comparison, performace, cost.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-based cloud computing has gained tremendous momen-
tum in recent years. Cloud customers outsource their computation
and storage to public providers and pay for the...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CloudCmp: comparing public cloud providers
author:Ang Li and
Xiaowei Yang and
Srikanth Kandula and
Ming Zhang
CloudCmp: Comparing Public Cloud Providers
Ang Li
Xiaowei Yang
Duke University
{angl, xwy}@cs.duke.edu
Srikanth Kandula
Ming Zhang
Microsoft Research
{srikanth, mzh}@microsoft.com
ABSTRACT
While many public cloud providers offer pay-as-you-go comput-
ing, their varying approaches to infrastructure, virtualization, and
software services lead to a problem of plenty. To help customers
pick a cloud that ﬁts their needs, we develop CloudCmp, a system-
atic comparator of the performance and cost of cloud providers.
CloudCmp measures the elastic computing, persistent storage, and
networking services offered by a cloud along metrics that directly
reﬂect their impact on the performance of customer applications.
CloudCmp strives to ensure fairness, representativeness, and com-
pliance of these measurements while limiting measurement cost.
Applying CloudCmp to four cloud providers that together account
for most of the cloud customers today, we ﬁnd that their offered ser-
vices vary widely in performance and costs, underscoring the need
for thoughtful provider selection. From case studies on three rep-
resentative cloud applications, we show that CloudCmp can guide
customers in selecting the best-performing provider for their appli-
cations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: General—measurement techniques,
performance attributes; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Net-
works]: Network Operations—network monitoring, public networks;
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—distributed applications, distributed databases
General Terms
Measurement, Design, Performance, Economics.
Keywords
Cloud computing, comparison, performace, cost.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-based cloud computing has gained tremendous momen-
tum in recent years. Cloud customers outsource their computation
and storage to public providers and pay for the...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
author:Jonathan Fuller and
Ranjita Pai Kasturi and
Amit Sikder and
Haichuan Xu and
Berat Arik and
Vivek Verma and
Ehsan Asdar and
Brendan Saltaformaggio
C3PO: Large-Scale Study of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
Jonathan Fuller, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Amit Sikder, Haichuan Xu, Berat Arik
Vivek Verma, Ehsan Asdar, Brendan Saltaformaggio
Georgia Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Current techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or take-
down are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the
botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and
scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware
that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing
privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to
detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots
toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k
malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned
bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with
a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last
15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though
over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the
efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them
prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents
C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident
responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols,
infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C
monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltra-
tion. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weak-
ness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers,
which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and take-
downs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and pr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
author:Jonathan Fuller and
Ranjita Pai Kasturi and
Amit Sikder and
Haichuan Xu and
Berat Arik and
Vivek Verma and
Ehsan Asdar and
Brendan Saltaformaggio
C3PO: Large-Scale Study of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers
via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
Jonathan Fuller, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Amit Sikder, Haichuan Xu, Berat Arik
Vivek Verma, Ehsan Asdar, Brendan Saltaformaggio
Georgia Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
Current techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or take-
down are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the
botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and
scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware
that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing
privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to
detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots
toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k
malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned
bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with
a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last
15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though
over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the
efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them
prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents
C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident
responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols,
infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C
monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltra-
tion. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weak-
ness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers,
which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and take-
downs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and pr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using Write-Only Oblivious RAM
author:Erik-Oliver Blass and
Travis Mayberry and
Guevara Noubir and
Kaan Onarlioglu
Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using
Write-Only Oblivious RAM
Erik-Oliver Blass Travis Mayberry Guevara Noubir Kaan Onarlioglu
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University, Boston MA
Email: {blass|travism|noubir|onarliog}@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
With sensitive data being increasingly stored on mobile devices and
laptops, hard disk encryption is more important than ever. In partic-
ular, being able to plausibly deny that a hard disk contains certain
information is a very useful and interesting research goal. However,
it has been known for some time that existing “hidden volume” so-
lutions, like TrueCrypt, fail in the face of an adversary who is able
to observe the contents of a disk on multiple, separate occasions.
In this work, we explore more robust constructions for hidden vol-
umes and present HIVE, which is resistant to more powerful ad-
versaries with multiple-snapshot capabilities. In pursuit of this, we
propose the ﬁrst security deﬁnitions for hidden volumes, and prove
HIVE secure under these deﬁnitions. At the core of HIVE, we de-
sign a new write-only Oblivious RAM. We show that, when only
hiding writes, it is possible to achieve ORAM with optimal O(1)
communication complexity and only poly-logarithmic user mem-
ory. This is a signiﬁcant improvement over existing work and an
independently interesting result. We go on to show that our write-
only ORAM is specially equipped to provide hidden volume func-
tionality with low overhead and signiﬁcantly increased security. Fi-
nally, we implement HIVE as a Linux kernel block device to show
both its practicality and usefulness on existing platforms.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Disk encryption is an important security technology that is in-
creasingly being used by individuals and businesses alike. All ma-
jor operating systems now support basic encrypted volume...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using Write-Only Oblivious RAM
author:Erik-Oliver Blass and
Travis Mayberry and
Guevara Noubir and
Kaan Onarlioglu
Toward Robust Hidden Volumes Using
Write-Only Oblivious RAM
Erik-Oliver Blass Travis Mayberry Guevara Noubir Kaan Onarlioglu
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University, Boston MA
Email: {blass|travism|noubir|onarliog}@ccs.neu.edu
ABSTRACT
With sensitive data being increasingly stored on mobile devices and
laptops, hard disk encryption is more important than ever. In partic-
ular, being able to plausibly deny that a hard disk contains certain
information is a very useful and interesting research goal. However,
it has been known for some time that existing “hidden volume” so-
lutions, like TrueCrypt, fail in the face of an adversary who is able
to observe the contents of a disk on multiple, separate occasions.
In this work, we explore more robust constructions for hidden vol-
umes and present HIVE, which is resistant to more powerful ad-
versaries with multiple-snapshot capabilities. In pursuit of this, we
propose the ﬁrst security deﬁnitions for hidden volumes, and prove
HIVE secure under these deﬁnitions. At the core of HIVE, we de-
sign a new write-only Oblivious RAM. We show that, when only
hiding writes, it is possible to achieve ORAM with optimal O(1)
communication complexity and only poly-logarithmic user mem-
ory. This is a signiﬁcant improvement over existing work and an
independently interesting result. We go on to show that our write-
only ORAM is specially equipped to provide hidden volume func-
tionality with low overhead and signiﬁcantly increased security. Fi-
nally, we implement HIVE as a Linux kernel block device to show
both its practicality and usefulness on existing platforms.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Disk encryption is an important security technology that is in-
creasingly being used by individuals and businesses alike. All ma-
jor operating systems now support basic encrypted volume...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP
author:Ali Kalakech and
Karama Kanoun and
Yves Crouzet and
Jean Arlat
Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP*
Ali Kalakech, Karama Kanoun, Yves Crouzet and Jean Arlat
LAAS-CNRS, 7, Avenue Colonel Roche 31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France
{kalakech, kanoun, crouzet, arlat}@laas.fr
Abstract
The aim of this paper  is  to  compare the  dependability
of  three  operating  systems  (Windows  NT4,  Windows
2000  and  Windows  XP)  with  respect  to  erroneous
behavior  of  the  application  layer.  The  results  show  a
similar  behavior  of  the  three  OSs  with  respect  to
robustness  and  a  noticeable  difference  in  OS  reaction
and  restart  times.  They  also  show  that  the  application
state  (mainly  the  hang  and  abort  states)  significantly
impacts the restart time for the three OSs
1. Introduction
System  developers  are  increasingly  resorting  to  off-
the-shelf operating systems  (commercial or  open  source),
even  in  critical  application  domains.  However,  any
malfunction  of  the  Operating  System  (OS)  may  have  a
strong impact  on  the  dependability of  the  global  system.
Therefore, it  is  important  to  make information  about  the
OS  dependability  available,  despite
lack  of
information  issued  from  its  development.  The  current
trend is to use dependability benchmarks [1-3].
the
The  aim  of  an  OS  dependability  benchmark  is  to
objectively  characterize  the  OS  behavior  in  presence  of
faults.  A  dependability  benchmark
is  based  on
experimentation on  the OS.  Its  results  are  intended  i) to
characterize  qualitatively  and  quantitatively
the  OS
behavior  in  the  presence  of  faults  and  ii) to  evaluate
performance-related  measures  in  the  presence  of  faults.
These results  can help  in  selecting  the  most  appropriate
OS,  based  on  the  benchmark  measures  evaluated,  in
to
complement
(e.g., performance,
ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP
author:Ali Kalakech and
Karama Kanoun and
Yves Crouzet and
Jean Arlat
Benchmarking The Dependability of Windows NT4, 2000 and XP*
Ali Kalakech, Karama Kanoun, Yves Crouzet and Jean Arlat
LAAS-CNRS, 7, Avenue Colonel Roche 31077 Toulouse Cedex 4, France
{kalakech, kanoun, crouzet, arlat}@laas.fr
Abstract
The aim of this paper  is  to  compare the  dependability
of  three  operating  systems  (Windows  NT4,  Windows
2000  and  Windows  XP)  with  respect  to  erroneous
behavior  of  the  application  layer.  The  results  show  a
similar  behavior  of  the  three  OSs  with  respect  to
robustness  and  a  noticeable  difference  in  OS  reaction
and  restart  times.  They  also  show  that  the  application
state  (mainly  the  hang  and  abort  states)  significantly
impacts the restart time for the three OSs
1. Introduction
System  developers  are  increasingly  resorting  to  off-
the-shelf operating systems  (commercial or  open  source),
even  in  critical  application  domains.  However,  any
malfunction  of  the  Operating  System  (OS)  may  have  a
strong impact  on  the  dependability of  the  global  system.
Therefore, it  is  important  to  make information  about  the
OS  dependability  available,  despite
lack  of
information  issued  from  its  development.  The  current
trend is to use dependability benchmarks [1-3].
the
The  aim  of  an  OS  dependability  benchmark  is  to
objectively  characterize  the  OS  behavior  in  presence  of
faults.  A  dependability  benchmark
is  based  on
experimentation on  the OS.  Its  results  are  intended  i) to
characterize  qualitatively  and  quantitatively
the  OS
behavior  in  the  presence  of  faults  and  ii) to  evaluate
performance-related  measures  in  the  presence  of  faults.
These results  can help  in  selecting  the  most  appropriate
OS,  based  on  the  benchmark  measures  evaluated,  in
to
complement
(e.g., performance,
ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities
in Mobile Applications
author:Shangcheng Shi and
Xianbo Wang and
Wing Cheong Lau
MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for
Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities in Mobile Applications
Shangcheng Shi
Wing Cheong Lau
Xianbo Wang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
ss016@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wx017@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wclau@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
ABSTRACT
Mobile applications today increasingly integrate Single Sign-On
(SSO) into their account management mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the involved multi-party protocol, i.e., OAuth 2.0, was originally
designed to serve websites for authorization purpose. Due to the
complexity of the adapted protocol, a large number of insecure
SSO implementations still exist in the wild. Although the security
testing for real-world SSO deployments has attracted considerable
attention in recent years , existing work either focuses on websites
or relies on the manual discovery of specific and previously-known
vulnerabilities. In the paper, we design and implement MoSSOT
(Mobile SSO Tester), an automated blackbox security testing tool
for Android applications utilizing the SSO services from three main-
stream service providers. The tool detects the vulnerabilities within
the practical SSO implementations by fuzzing related network mes-
sages. We used MoSSOT to examine over 500 first-tier third-party
Android applications from US and Chinese app markets. According
to the test result, around 72% of the tested applications incorrectly
implement SSO and are thus vulnerable. Besides, our test identifies
an unknown vulnerability as well as a new variant, in addition to
four known ones. The vulnerabilities enable the attacker to illegally
log into the mobile applications as the victims or gain access to the
protected resources. MoSSOT has been released as an open-source
project.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and app...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities
in Mobile Applications
author:Shangcheng Shi and
Xianbo Wang and
Wing Cheong Lau
MoSSOT: An Automated Blackbox Tester for
Single Sign-On Vulnerabilities in Mobile Applications
Shangcheng Shi
Wing Cheong Lau
Xianbo Wang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
ss016@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wx017@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
wclau@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
ABSTRACT
Mobile applications today increasingly integrate Single Sign-On
(SSO) into their account management mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the involved multi-party protocol, i.e., OAuth 2.0, was originally
designed to serve websites for authorization purpose. Due to the
complexity of the adapted protocol, a large number of insecure
SSO implementations still exist in the wild. Although the security
testing for real-world SSO deployments has attracted considerable
attention in recent years , existing work either focuses on websites
or relies on the manual discovery of specific and previously-known
vulnerabilities. In the paper, we design and implement MoSSOT
(Mobile SSO Tester), an automated blackbox security testing tool
for Android applications utilizing the SSO services from three main-
stream service providers. The tool detects the vulnerabilities within
the practical SSO implementations by fuzzing related network mes-
sages. We used MoSSOT to examine over 500 first-tier third-party
Android applications from US and Chinese app markets. According
to the test result, around 72% of the tested applications incorrectly
implement SSO and are thus vulnerable. Besides, our test identifies
an unknown vulnerability as well as a new variant, in addition to
four known ones. The vulnerabilities enable the attacker to illegally
log into the mobile applications as the victims or gain access to the
protected resources. MoSSOT has been released as an open-source
project.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and app...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information
Leakage
author:Young-joo Shin and
Hyung Chan Kim and
Dokeun Kwon and
Ji-Hoon Jeong and
Junbeom Hur
Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of
Information Leakage
Youngjoo Shin
Kwangwoon University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
yjshin@kw.ac.kr
Hyung Chan Kim
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kimhc@nsr.re.kr
Dokeun Kwon
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kwondk@nsr.re.kr
Ji Hoon Jeong
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
binoopang@nsr.re.kr
ABSTRACT
Data prefetching is a hardware-based optimization mechanism used
in most of the modern microprocessors. It fetches data to the cache
before it is needed. In this paper, we present a novel microarchitec-
tural attack that exploits the prefetching mechanism. Our attack
targets Instruction pointer (IP)-based stride prefetching in Intel
processors. Stride prefetcher detects memory access patterns with
a regular stride, which are likely to be found in lookup table-based
cryptographic implementations. By monitoring the prefetching
activities near the lookup table, attackers can extract sensitive in-
formation such as secret keys from victim applications. This kind of
leakage from prefetching has never been considered in the design
of constant time algorithm to prevent side-channel attacks. We
show the potential of the proposed attack by applying it against
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm built upon the
latest version of OpenSSL library. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first microarchitectural side-channel attack exploiting
the hardware prefetching of modern microprocessors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
KEYWORDS
Hardware prefetching, microarchitectural side-channel attacks,
OpenSSL, ECDH algorithm
ACM Reference Format:
Youngjoo Shin, Hyung Chan Kim, Dokeun Kwon, Ji Hoon Jeong, and Jun-
beom Hur. 2...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of Information
Leakage
author:Young-joo Shin and
Hyung Chan Kim and
Dokeun Kwon and
Ji-Hoon Jeong and
Junbeom Hur
Unveiling Hardware-based Data Prefetcher, a Hidden Source of
Information Leakage
Youngjoo Shin
Kwangwoon University
Seoul, Republic of Korea
yjshin@kw.ac.kr
Hyung Chan Kim
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kimhc@nsr.re.kr
Dokeun Kwon
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
kwondk@nsr.re.kr
Ji Hoon Jeong
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI
Daejeon, Republic of Korea
binoopang@nsr.re.kr
ABSTRACT
Data prefetching is a hardware-based optimization mechanism used
in most of the modern microprocessors. It fetches data to the cache
before it is needed. In this paper, we present a novel microarchitec-
tural attack that exploits the prefetching mechanism. Our attack
targets Instruction pointer (IP)-based stride prefetching in Intel
processors. Stride prefetcher detects memory access patterns with
a regular stride, which are likely to be found in lookup table-based
cryptographic implementations. By monitoring the prefetching
activities near the lookup table, attackers can extract sensitive in-
formation such as secret keys from victim applications. This kind of
leakage from prefetching has never been considered in the design
of constant time algorithm to prevent side-channel attacks. We
show the potential of the proposed attack by applying it against
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm built upon the
latest version of OpenSSL library. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first microarchitectural side-channel attack exploiting
the hardware prefetching of modern microprocessors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
KEYWORDS
Hardware prefetching, microarchitectural side-channel attacks,
OpenSSL, ECDH algorithm
ACM Reference Format:
Youngjoo Shin, Hyung Chan Kim, Dokeun Kwon, Ji Hoon Jeong, and Jun-
beom Hur. 2...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques Against Telephone
Spam
author:Huahong Tu and
Adam Doup'e and
Ziming Zhao and
Gail-Joon Ahn
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques against Telephone Spam
Huahong Tu, Adam Doupé, Ziming Zhao, and Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University
{tu, doupe, zzhao30, gahn}@asu.edu
Abstract—Telephone spam costs United States consumers
$8.6 billion annually. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission
has received over 22 million complaints of illegal and wanted
calls. Telephone spammers today are leveraging recent techni-
cal advances in the telephony ecosystem to distribute massive
automated spam calls known as robocalls. Given that anti-spam
techniques and approaches are effective in the email domain,
the question we address is: what are the effective defenses
against spam calls?
In this paper, we ﬁrst describe the telephone spam ecosys-
tem, speciﬁcally focusing on the differences between email
and telephone spam. Then, we survey the existing telephone
spam solutions and, by analyzing the failings of the current
techniques, derive evaluation criteria that are critical to an
acceptable solution. We believe that this work will help guide
the development of effective telephone spam defenses, as well
as provide a framework to evaluate future defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The national and global telephony system is a critical
component of our modern infrastructure and economy. In
the United States (US), the mobile telephone subscribership
penetration rate has already surpassed 100% [1]. According
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, each day more than
240 million hours are spent on telephone calls in the United
States, equating to more than 88 trillion hours each year [2].
However, with the pervasiveness of telephone service
subscribership, telephone spam has also become an increas-
ingly prevalent issue in the US. Recent te...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques Against Telephone
Spam
author:Huahong Tu and
Adam Doup'e and
Ziming Zhao and
Gail-Joon Ahn
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Everyone Hates Robocalls: A Survey of Techniques against Telephone Spam
Huahong Tu, Adam Doupé, Ziming Zhao, and Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University
{tu, doupe, zzhao30, gahn}@asu.edu
Abstract—Telephone spam costs United States consumers
$8.6 billion annually. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission
has received over 22 million complaints of illegal and wanted
calls. Telephone spammers today are leveraging recent techni-
cal advances in the telephony ecosystem to distribute massive
automated spam calls known as robocalls. Given that anti-spam
techniques and approaches are effective in the email domain,
the question we address is: what are the effective defenses
against spam calls?
In this paper, we ﬁrst describe the telephone spam ecosys-
tem, speciﬁcally focusing on the differences between email
and telephone spam. Then, we survey the existing telephone
spam solutions and, by analyzing the failings of the current
techniques, derive evaluation criteria that are critical to an
acceptable solution. We believe that this work will help guide
the development of effective telephone spam defenses, as well
as provide a framework to evaluate future defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The national and global telephony system is a critical
component of our modern infrastructure and economy. In
the United States (US), the mobile telephone subscribership
penetration rate has already surpassed 100% [1]. According
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, each day more than
240 million hours are spent on telephone calls in the United
States, equating to more than 88 trillion hours each year [2].
However, with the pervasiveness of telephone service
subscribership, telephone spam has also become an increas-
ingly prevalent issue in the US. Recent te...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Design space and analysis of worm defense strategies
author:David Brumley and
Li-Hao Liu and
Pongsin Poosankam and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Design Space and Analysis of Worm Defense Strategies
David Brumley
Li-Hao Liu Pongsin Poosankam Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
{dbrumley,lhliu,ppoosank,dawnsong}@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
We give the ﬁrst systematic investigation of the design space
of worm defense system strategies. We accomplish this by
providing a taxonomy of defense strategies by abstracting
away implementation-dependent and approach-speciﬁc de-
tails and concentrating on the fundamental properties of
each defense category. Our taxonomy and analysis reveals
the key parameters for each strategy that determine its ef-
fectiveness. We provide a theoretical foundation for under-
standing how these parameters interact, as well as simulation-
based analysis of how these strategies compare as worm
defense systems. Finally, we oﬀer recommendations based
upon our taxonomy and analysis on which worm defense
strategies are most likely to succeed. In particular, we show
that a hybrid approach combining Proactive Protection and
Reactive Antibody Defense is the most promising approach
and can be eﬀective even against the fastest worms such as
hitlist worms. Thus, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate with
theoretic and empirical models which defense strategies will
work against the fastest worms such as hitlist worms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Se-
curity and Protection—Invasive software; I.6.6 [Simulation
and Modeling]: Simulation Output Analysis
General Terms
Security, Measurement
Keywords
worms, worm propagation, worm taxonomy, defense strat-
egy analysis, proactive protection, blacklisting, antibody, lo-
cal containment
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grant...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Design space and analysis of worm defense strategies
author:David Brumley and
Li-Hao Liu and
Pongsin Poosankam and
Dawn Xiaodong Song
Design Space and Analysis of Worm Defense Strategies
David Brumley
Li-Hao Liu Pongsin Poosankam Dawn Song
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
{dbrumley,lhliu,ppoosank,dawnsong}@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
We give the ﬁrst systematic investigation of the design space
of worm defense system strategies. We accomplish this by
providing a taxonomy of defense strategies by abstracting
away implementation-dependent and approach-speciﬁc de-
tails and concentrating on the fundamental properties of
each defense category. Our taxonomy and analysis reveals
the key parameters for each strategy that determine its ef-
fectiveness. We provide a theoretical foundation for under-
standing how these parameters interact, as well as simulation-
based analysis of how these strategies compare as worm
defense systems. Finally, we oﬀer recommendations based
upon our taxonomy and analysis on which worm defense
strategies are most likely to succeed. In particular, we show
that a hybrid approach combining Proactive Protection and
Reactive Antibody Defense is the most promising approach
and can be eﬀective even against the fastest worms such as
hitlist worms. Thus, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate with
theoretic and empirical models which defense strategies will
work against the fastest worms such as hitlist worms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Se-
curity and Protection—Invasive software; I.6.6 [Simulation
and Modeling]: Simulation Output Analysis
General Terms
Security, Measurement
Keywords
worms, worm propagation, worm taxonomy, defense strat-
egy analysis, proactive protection, blacklisting, antibody, lo-
cal containment
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grant...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Learning Unknown Attacks - A Start
author:James E. Just and
James C. Reynolds and
Larry A. Clough and
Melissa Danforth and
Karl N. Levitt and
Ryan Maglich and
Jeff Rowe
Learning Unknown Attacks – A Start
James E. Just1, James C. Reynolds1, Larry A. Clough1, Melissa Danforth2,
Karl N. Levitt2, Ryan Maglich1, and Jeff Rowe2
1 Teknowledge Corporation, 3900 Jermantown Road,  Suite 100
Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
{jjust, reynolds, lclough, rmaglich}@teknowledge.com
2 University of California, 3061 Engineering II, One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616 USA
{danforth, levitt, rowe}@cs.ucdavis.edu
Abstract. Since it is essentially impossible to write large-scale software without
errors,  any  intrusion  tolerant  system  must  be  able  to  tolerate  rapid,  repeated
unknown  attacks  without  exhausting  its  redundancy.  Our  system  provides
continued application services to critical users while under attack with a goal of
less  than  25%  degradation  of  productivity.  Initial  experimental  results  are
promising.  It  is  not  yet  a  general  open  solution.  Specification-based  behavior
sensors (allowable actions, objects, and QoS) detect attacks. The system learns
unknown  attacks  by  relying  on  two  characteristics  of  network-accessible
software  faults:  attacks  that  exploit  them  must  be  repeatable  (at  least  in  a
probabilistic  sense)  and,  if  known,  attacks  can  be  stopped  at  component
boundaries.  Random  rejuvenation  limits  the  scope  of  undetected  errors.  The
current  system  learns  and  blocks  single-stage  unknown  attacks  against  a
protected web server by searching and testing service history logs in a Sandbox
after  a  successful  attack.  We  also  have  an
initial  class-based  attack
generalization technique that stops web-server buffer overflow attacks. We are
working to extend both techniques.
1   Introduction
Designing secure systems to survive cyber-attacks is both hard and complex. Initially
designers built stronge...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Learning Unknown Attacks - A Start
author:James E. Just and
James C. Reynolds and
Larry A. Clough and
Melissa Danforth and
Karl N. Levitt and
Ryan Maglich and
Jeff Rowe
Learning Unknown Attacks – A Start
James E. Just1, James C. Reynolds1, Larry A. Clough1, Melissa Danforth2,
Karl N. Levitt2, Ryan Maglich1, and Jeff Rowe2
1 Teknowledge Corporation, 3900 Jermantown Road,  Suite 100
Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
{jjust, reynolds, lclough, rmaglich}@teknowledge.com
2 University of California, 3061 Engineering II, One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616 USA
{danforth, levitt, rowe}@cs.ucdavis.edu
Abstract. Since it is essentially impossible to write large-scale software without
errors,  any  intrusion  tolerant  system  must  be  able  to  tolerate  rapid,  repeated
unknown  attacks  without  exhausting  its  redundancy.  Our  system  provides
continued application services to critical users while under attack with a goal of
less  than  25%  degradation  of  productivity.  Initial  experimental  results  are
promising.  It  is  not  yet  a  general  open  solution.  Specification-based  behavior
sensors (allowable actions, objects, and QoS) detect attacks. The system learns
unknown  attacks  by  relying  on  two  characteristics  of  network-accessible
software  faults:  attacks  that  exploit  them  must  be  repeatable  (at  least  in  a
probabilistic  sense)  and,  if  known,  attacks  can  be  stopped  at  component
boundaries.  Random  rejuvenation  limits  the  scope  of  undetected  errors.  The
current  system  learns  and  blocks  single-stage  unknown  attacks  against  a
protected web server by searching and testing service history logs in a Sandbox
after  a  successful  attack.  We  also  have  an
initial  class-based  attack
generalization technique that stops web-server buffer overflow attacks. We are
working to extend both techniques.
1   Introduction
Designing secure systems to survive cyber-attacks is both hard and complex. Initially
designers built stronge...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:VulPecker: an automated vulnerability detection system based on code
similarity analysis
author:Zhen Li and
Deqing Zou and
Shouhuai Xu and
Hai Jin and
Hanchao Qi and
Jie Hu
VulPecker: An Automated Vulnerability Detection System
Based on Code Similarity Analysis
Zhen Li†§, Deqing Zou†∗ , Shouhuai Xu‡, Hai Jin†, Hanchao Qi†, Jie Hu†
† Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Big Data Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid
Computing Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
§School of Computer Science and Technology, Hebei University, Baoding, 071002, China
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA
deqingzou@hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Software vulnerabilities are the fundamental cause of many
attacks. Even with rapid vulnerability patching, the prob-
lem is more complicated than it looks. One reason is that
instances of the same vulnerability may exist in multiple
software copies that are diﬃcult to track in real life (e.g.,
diﬀerent versions of libraries and applications). This calls
for tools that can automatically search for vulnerable soft-
ware with respect to a given vulnerability. In this paper, we
move a step forward in this direction by presenting Vulnera-
bility Pecker (VulPecker), a system for automatically detect-
ing whether a piece of software source code contains a given
vulnerability or not. The key insight underlying VulPecker
is to leverage (i) a set of features that we deﬁne to charac-
terize patches, and (ii) code-similarity algorithms that have
been proposed for various purposes, while noting that no
single code-similarity algorithm is eﬀective for all kinds of
vulnerabilities. Experiments show that VulPecker detects 40
vulnerabilities that are not published in the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD). Among these vulnerabilities, 18 are
not known for their existence and have yet to be conﬁrmed
by vendors at t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:VulPecker: an automated vulnerability detection system based on code
similarity analysis
author:Zhen Li and
Deqing Zou and
Shouhuai Xu and
Hai Jin and
Hanchao Qi and
Jie Hu
VulPecker: An Automated Vulnerability Detection System
Based on Code Similarity Analysis
Zhen Li†§, Deqing Zou†∗ , Shouhuai Xu‡, Hai Jin†, Hanchao Qi†, Jie Hu†
† Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Big Data Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid
Computing Lab, School of Computer Science and Technology
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
§School of Computer Science and Technology, Hebei University, Baoding, 071002, China
‡ Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA
deqingzou@hust.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Software vulnerabilities are the fundamental cause of many
attacks. Even with rapid vulnerability patching, the prob-
lem is more complicated than it looks. One reason is that
instances of the same vulnerability may exist in multiple
software copies that are diﬃcult to track in real life (e.g.,
diﬀerent versions of libraries and applications). This calls
for tools that can automatically search for vulnerable soft-
ware with respect to a given vulnerability. In this paper, we
move a step forward in this direction by presenting Vulnera-
bility Pecker (VulPecker), a system for automatically detect-
ing whether a piece of software source code contains a given
vulnerability or not. The key insight underlying VulPecker
is to leverage (i) a set of features that we deﬁne to charac-
terize patches, and (ii) code-similarity algorithms that have
been proposed for various purposes, while noting that no
single code-similarity algorithm is eﬀective for all kinds of
vulnerabilities. Experiments show that VulPecker detects 40
vulnerabilities that are not published in the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD). Among these vulnerabilities, 18 are
not known for their existence and have yet to be conﬁrmed
by vendors at t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
author:Maximilian von Tschirschnitz and
Ludwig Peuckert and
Fabian Franzen and
Jens Grossklags
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
Maximilian von Tschirschnitz, Ludwig Peuckert, Fabian Franzen, and Jens Grossklags
Email: {maximilian.tschirschnitz,ludwig.peuckert}@tum.de, franzen@sec.in.tum.de, jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
Technical University of Munich
3
1
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
Abstract—Bluetooth provides encryption, authentication, and
integrity protection of its connections. These protection mech-
anisms require that Bluetooth devices initially establish trust
on ﬁrst use through a process called pairing. Throughout this
process, multiple alternative pairing methods are supported.
In this paper, we describe a design ﬂaw in the pairing mech-
anism of Bluetooth. This ﬂaw permits two devices to perform
pairing using differing methods. While successfully interacting
with each other, the devices are not aware of the Method
Confusion. We explain how an attacker can cause and abuse
this Method Confusion to mount a Method Confusion Attack. In
contrast to other attacks targeting the pairing method, our attack
applies even in Bluetooth’s highest security mode and cannot be
mitigated in the protocol. Through the Method Confusion Attack,
an adversary can inﬁltrate the secured connection between the
victims and intercept all trafﬁc.
Our attack is successful in practically relevant scenarios. We
implemented it as an end-to-end Proof of Concept for Bluetooth
Low Energy and tested it with off-the-shelf smartphones, a
smartwatch and a banking device. Furthermore, we performed a
user study where none of the 40 participants noticed the ongoing
attack, and 37 (92.5%) of the users completed t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
author:Maximilian von Tschirschnitz and
Ludwig Peuckert and
Fabian Franzen and
Jens Grossklags
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Method Confusion Attack on Bluetooth Pairing
Maximilian von Tschirschnitz, Ludwig Peuckert, Fabian Franzen, and Jens Grossklags
Email: {maximilian.tschirschnitz,ludwig.peuckert}@tum.de, franzen@sec.in.tum.de, jens.grossklags@in.tum.de
Technical University of Munich
3
1
0
0
0
.
1
2
0
2
.
1
0
0
0
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
Abstract—Bluetooth provides encryption, authentication, and
integrity protection of its connections. These protection mech-
anisms require that Bluetooth devices initially establish trust
on ﬁrst use through a process called pairing. Throughout this
process, multiple alternative pairing methods are supported.
In this paper, we describe a design ﬂaw in the pairing mech-
anism of Bluetooth. This ﬂaw permits two devices to perform
pairing using differing methods. While successfully interacting
with each other, the devices are not aware of the Method
Confusion. We explain how an attacker can cause and abuse
this Method Confusion to mount a Method Confusion Attack. In
contrast to other attacks targeting the pairing method, our attack
applies even in Bluetooth’s highest security mode and cannot be
mitigated in the protocol. Through the Method Confusion Attack,
an adversary can inﬁltrate the secured connection between the
victims and intercept all trafﬁc.
Our attack is successful in practically relevant scenarios. We
implemented it as an end-to-end Proof of Concept for Bluetooth
Low Energy and tested it with off-the-shelf smartphones, a
smartwatch and a banking device. Furthermore, we performed a
user study where none of the 40 participants noticed the ongoing
attack, and 37 (92.5%) of the users completed t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn into Adversarial Motion
Sensors
author:Yanzi Zhu and
Zhujun Xiao and
Yuxin Chen and
Zhijing Li and
Max Liu and
Ben Y. Zhao and
Heather Zheng
Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn
into Adversarial Motion Sensors
Yanzi Zhu†, Zhujun Xiao∗, Yuxin Chen∗, Zhijing Li†, Max Liu∗, Ben Y. Zhao∗, Haitao Zheng∗
†University of California, Santa Barbara: {yanzi, zhijing}@cs.ucsb.edu
∗University of Chicago: {zhujunxiao, yxchen, maxliu, ravenben, htzheng}@cs.uchicago.edu
Abstract—Our work demonstrates a new set of silent recon-
naissance attacks, which leverages the presence of commodity
WiFi devices to track users inside private homes and ofﬁces,
without compromising any WiFi network, data packets, or
devices. We show that just by snifﬁng existing WiFi signals, an
adversary can accurately detect and track movements of users
inside a building. This is made possible by our new signal model
that links together human motion near WiFi transmitters and
variance of multipath signal propagation seen by the attacker
sniffer outside of the property. The resulting attacks are cheap,
highly effective, and yet difﬁcult to detect. We implement the
attack using a single commodity smartphone, deploy it in 11 real-
world ofﬁces and residential apartments, and show it is highly
effective. Finally, we evaluate potential defenses, and propose a
practical and effective defense based on AP signal obfuscation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
With near-ubiquitous deployment of WiFi-enabled smart
devices (e.g., security cameras, voice assistants, and smart
appliances), our homes and ofﬁces are ﬁlled with many WiFi
devices1. The ubiquity of these devices and their sheer density
means that they will ﬁll the air around us with radio frequency
(RF) signals, wherever we go.
Unfortunately, the RF signals emitted by these devices pose
a real security and privacy risk to all of us. They are constantly
interacting with (e.g., reﬂecting off) our bodies, carrying infor-
ma...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn into Adversarial Motion
Sensors
author:Yanzi Zhu and
Zhujun Xiao and
Yuxin Chen and
Zhijing Li and
Max Liu and
Ben Y. Zhao and
Heather Zheng
Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn
into Adversarial Motion Sensors
Yanzi Zhu†, Zhujun Xiao∗, Yuxin Chen∗, Zhijing Li†, Max Liu∗, Ben Y. Zhao∗, Haitao Zheng∗
†University of California, Santa Barbara: {yanzi, zhijing}@cs.ucsb.edu
∗University of Chicago: {zhujunxiao, yxchen, maxliu, ravenben, htzheng}@cs.uchicago.edu
Abstract—Our work demonstrates a new set of silent recon-
naissance attacks, which leverages the presence of commodity
WiFi devices to track users inside private homes and ofﬁces,
without compromising any WiFi network, data packets, or
devices. We show that just by snifﬁng existing WiFi signals, an
adversary can accurately detect and track movements of users
inside a building. This is made possible by our new signal model
that links together human motion near WiFi transmitters and
variance of multipath signal propagation seen by the attacker
sniffer outside of the property. The resulting attacks are cheap,
highly effective, and yet difﬁcult to detect. We implement the
attack using a single commodity smartphone, deploy it in 11 real-
world ofﬁces and residential apartments, and show it is highly
effective. Finally, we evaluate potential defenses, and propose a
practical and effective defense based on AP signal obfuscation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
With near-ubiquitous deployment of WiFi-enabled smart
devices (e.g., security cameras, voice assistants, and smart
appliances), our homes and ofﬁces are ﬁlled with many WiFi
devices1. The ubiquity of these devices and their sheer density
means that they will ﬁll the air around us with radio frequency
(RF) signals, wherever we go.
Unfortunately, the RF signals emitted by these devices pose
a real security and privacy risk to all of us. They are constantly
interacting with (e.g., reﬂecting off) our bodies, carrying infor-
ma...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static Use-After-Free
Detection
author:Hua Yan and
Yulei Sui and
Shiping Chen and
Jingling Xue
Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static
Use-After-Free Detection
Hua Yan
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
Data61, CSIRO, Australia
Yulei Sui
CAI and School of Software
University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Shiping Chen
Data61
CSIRO, Australia
Jingling Xue
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
ABSTRACT
Typestate analysis relies on pointer analysis for detecting temporal
memory safety errors, such as use-after-free (UAF). For large pro-
grams, scalable pointer analysis is usually imprecise in analyzing
their hard “corner cases”, such as infeasible paths, recursion cycles,
loops, arrays, and linked lists. Due to a sound over-approximation
of the points-to information, a large number of spurious aliases
will be reported conservatively, causing the corresponding type-
state analysis to report a large number of false alarms. Thus, the
usefulness of typestate analysis for heap-intensive clients, like UAF
detection, becomes rather limited, in practice.
We introduce Tac, a static UAF detector that bridges the gap
between typestate and pointer analyses by machine learning. Tac
learns the correlations between program features and UAF-related
aliases by using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and applies this
knowledge to further disambiguate the UAF-related aliases reported
imprecisely by the pointer analysis so that only the ones validated
by its SVM classifier are further investigated by the typestate anal-
ysis. Despite its unsoundness, Tac represents a practical typestate
analysis approach for UAF detection. We have implemented Tac
in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated it using a set of eight open-source
C/C++ programs. The results show that Tac is effective (in terms of
finding 5 known CVE vulnerabilities, 1 known bug, and 8 ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static Use-After-Free
Detection
author:Hua Yan and
Yulei Sui and
Shiping Chen and
Jingling Xue
Machine-Learning-Guided Typestate Analysis for Static
Use-After-Free Detection
Hua Yan
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
Data61, CSIRO, Australia
Yulei Sui
CAI and School of Software
University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Shiping Chen
Data61
CSIRO, Australia
Jingling Xue
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales, Australia
ABSTRACT
Typestate analysis relies on pointer analysis for detecting temporal
memory safety errors, such as use-after-free (UAF). For large pro-
grams, scalable pointer analysis is usually imprecise in analyzing
their hard “corner cases”, such as infeasible paths, recursion cycles,
loops, arrays, and linked lists. Due to a sound over-approximation
of the points-to information, a large number of spurious aliases
will be reported conservatively, causing the corresponding type-
state analysis to report a large number of false alarms. Thus, the
usefulness of typestate analysis for heap-intensive clients, like UAF
detection, becomes rather limited, in practice.
We introduce Tac, a static UAF detector that bridges the gap
between typestate and pointer analyses by machine learning. Tac
learns the correlations between program features and UAF-related
aliases by using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and applies this
knowledge to further disambiguate the UAF-related aliases reported
imprecisely by the pointer analysis so that only the ones validated
by its SVM classifier are further investigated by the typestate anal-
ysis. Despite its unsoundness, Tac represents a practical typestate
analysis approach for UAF detection. We have implemented Tac
in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated it using a set of eight open-source
C/C++ programs. The results show that Tac is effective (in terms of
finding 5 known CVE vulnerabilities, 1 known bug, and 8 ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SybilInfer: Detecting Sybil Nodes using Social Networks
author:George Danezis and
Prateek Mittal
SybilInfer: Detecting Sybil Nodes using Social Networks
George Danezis
Microsoft Research,
Cambridge, UK.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Prateek Mittal
Illinois, USA.
gdane@microsoft.com
mittal2@uiuc.edu
Abstract
SybilInfer is an algorithm for labelling nodes in a so-
cial network as honest users or Sybils controlled by an
adversary. At the heart of SybilInfer lies a probabilis-
tic model of honest social networks, and an inference
engine that returns potential regions of dishonest nodes.
The Bayesian inference approach to Sybil detection comes
with the advantage label has an assigned probability, indi-
cating its degree of certainty. We prove through analytical
results as well as experiments on simulated and real-world
network topologies that, given standard constraints on the
adversary, SybilInfer is secure, in that it successfully dis-
tinguishes between honest and dishonest nodes and is not
susceptible to manipulation by the adversary. Further-
more, our results show that SybilInfer outperforms state
of the art algorithms, both in being more widely applica-
ble, as well as providing vastly more accurate results.
1
Introduction
The Peer-to-peer paradigm allows cooperating users to
enjoy a service with little or no need for any centralised
infrastructure. While communication [24] and storage [4]
systems employing this design philosophy have been pro-
posed, the lack of any centralised control over identities
opens such systems to Sybil attacks [8]: a few malicious
nodes can simulate the presence of a very large number
of nodes, to take over or disrupt key functions of the
distributed or peer-to-peer system. Any attempt to build
fault-tolerance mechanisms is doomed since adversaries
can control arbitrary fractions of the system nodes. This
Sybil attack is further made practical through the use of
the existing large number of compromised networked ma-
...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point Attacks on Differential
Privacy Systems
author:Jiankai Jin and
Eleanor McMurtry and
Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein and
Olga Ohrimenko
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point
Attacks on Differential Privacy Systems
Jiankai Jin∗, Eleanor McMurtry†‡, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein∗, Olga Ohrimenko∗
∗School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne
†Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich
2
7
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
Abstract—Differential privacy is a de facto privacy framework
that has seen adoption in practice via a number of mature
software platforms. Implementation of differentially private (DP)
mechanisms has to be done carefully to ensure end-to-end
security guarantees. In this paper we study two implementation
ﬂaws in the noise generation commonly used in DP systems. First
we examine the Gaussian mechanism’s susceptibility to a ﬂoating-
point representation attack. The premise of this ﬁrst vulnerability
is similar to the one carried out by Mironov in 2011 against the
Laplace mechanism. Our experiments show the attack’s success
against DP algorithms, including deep learning models trained
using differentially-private stochastic gradient descent.
In the second part of the paper we study discrete counterparts
of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that were previously
proposed to alleviate the shortcomings of ﬂoating-point repre-
sentation of real numbers. We show that such implementations
unfortunately suffer from another side channel: a novel timing
attack. An observer that can measure the time to draw (discrete)
Laplace or Gaussian noise can predict the noise magnitude,
which can then be used to recover sensitive attributes. This
attack invalidates differe...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point Attacks on Differential
Privacy Systems
author:Jiankai Jin and
Eleanor McMurtry and
Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein and
Olga Ohrimenko
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Are We There Yet? Timing and Floating-Point
Attacks on Differential Privacy Systems
Jiankai Jin∗, Eleanor McMurtry†‡, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein∗, Olga Ohrimenko∗
∗School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne
†Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich
2
7
6
3
3
8
9
.
2
2
0
2
.
4
1
2
6
4
P
S
/
9
0
1
1
.
0
1
:
I
O
D
|
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
2
2
/
9
-
6
1
3
1
-
4
5
6
6
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
2
2
0
2
Abstract—Differential privacy is a de facto privacy framework
that has seen adoption in practice via a number of mature
software platforms. Implementation of differentially private (DP)
mechanisms has to be done carefully to ensure end-to-end
security guarantees. In this paper we study two implementation
ﬂaws in the noise generation commonly used in DP systems. First
we examine the Gaussian mechanism’s susceptibility to a ﬂoating-
point representation attack. The premise of this ﬁrst vulnerability
is similar to the one carried out by Mironov in 2011 against the
Laplace mechanism. Our experiments show the attack’s success
against DP algorithms, including deep learning models trained
using differentially-private stochastic gradient descent.
In the second part of the paper we study discrete counterparts
of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that were previously
proposed to alleviate the shortcomings of ﬂoating-point repre-
sentation of real numbers. We show that such implementations
unfortunately suffer from another side channel: a novel timing
attack. An observer that can measure the time to draw (discrete)
Laplace or Gaussian noise can predict the noise magnitude,
which can then be used to recover sensitive attributes. This
attack invalidates differe...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Source flow: handling millions of flows on flow-based nodes
author:Yasunobu Chiba and
Yusuke Shinohara and
Hideyuki Shimonishi
Source Flow: Handling Millions of Flows
on Flow-based Nodes
Yasunobu Chiba, Yusuke Shinohara and Hideyuki Shimonishi
System Platforms Research Laboratories, NEC Corporation
1753 Shimonumabe, Nakahara, Kawasaki, 211-8666, Japan
{y-chiba@bq, y-shinohara@cb, h-shimonishi@cd}.jp.nec.com
ABSTRACT
Flow-based  networks  such  as  OpenFlow-based  networks
have difficulty handling a large  number  of  flows  in  a  node
due to the capacity limitation of search engine devices such
as ternary content-addressable memory (TCAM). One typical
solution  of  this  problem  would  be  to  use  MPLS-like
tunneling, but this approach spoils the advantage of flow-by-
flow  path  selection  for
load-balancing  or  QoS.  We
demonstrate a method named “Source Flow” that allows us to
handle  a  huge  amount  of  flows  without  changing  the
granularity  of  flows.  By  using  our  method,  expensive  and
power  consuming  search  engine  devices  can  be  removed
from  the  core  nodes,  and  the  network  can  grow  pretty
scalable.  In  our  demo,  we  construct  a  small  network  that
consists  of  small  number  of  OpenFlow  switches,  a  single
OpenFlow controller, and end-hosts. The hosts generate more
than  one  million  flows  simultaneously  and  the  flows  are
controlled on a per-flow-basis. All active flows are monitored
and  visualized  on  a  user  interface  and  the  user  interface
allows  audiences  to  confirm  if  our  method  is  feasible  and
deployable.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design C.2.6 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Internetworking
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Performance
1.  INTRODUCTION
Flow-based networks allow us to control traffic on a per-flow
basis.  In  flow-based  networks,  a  network ...