Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Predicting Users' Motivations behind Location Check-Ins and Utility
Implications of Privacy Protection Mechanisms
author:Igor Bilogrevic and
K'evin Huguenin and
Stefan Mihaila and
Reza Shokri and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
Predicting Users’ Motivations behind Location
Check-Ins and Utility Implications of Privacy
Protection Mechanisms
Igor Bilogrevic*
K´evin Huguenin*
Stefan Mihaila
Google
Switzerland
LAAS-CNRS
France
EPFL
Switzerland
Reza Shokri†
University of Texas, Austin
USA
Jean-Pierre Hubaux
EPFL
Switzerland
ibilogrevic@google.com
huguenin@laas.fr
stefan.mihaila@epﬂ.ch
shokri@cs.utexas.edu
jean-pierre.hubaux@epﬂ.ch
Abstract—Location check-ins contain both geographical and
semantic information about the visited venues, in the form of
tags (e.g., “restaurant”). Such data might reveal some personal
information about users beyond what they actually want to
disclose, hence their privacy is threatened. In this paper, we study
users’ motivations behind location check-ins, and we quantify the
effect of a privacy-preserving technique (i.e., generalization) on
the perceived utility of check-ins. By means of a targeted user-
study on Foursquare (N = 77), we show that the motivation behind
Foursquare check-ins is a mediator of the loss of utility caused
by generalization. Using these ﬁndings, we propose a machine-
learning method for determining the motivation behind each
check-in, and we design a motivation-based predictive model for
utility. Our results show that the model accurately predicts the
loss of utility caused by semantic and geographical generalization;
this model enables the design of utility-aware, privacy-enhancing
mechanisms in location-based social networks.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and
Foursquare, allow their users to share location information with
each other. Such a feature is quite popular, as 30% of users
attach locations to their posts [36]. The reason for sharing
locations include the desire to connect with...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
author:Indranil Gupta and
Robbert van Renesse and
Kenneth P. Birman
Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
Indranil Gupta, Robbert van Renesse, Kenneth P. Birman
Dept. of Computer Science
Cornel1 University
Ithaca NY USA  14853
{gupta,rvr,ken}@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
This paper discusses fault-tolemnt, scalable solutions to
the problem  of  accurately and scalably calculating  global
aggregate functions  in  large process groups  communicat-
ing over unreliable networks. These groups could represent
sensors  or processes  comniunicating  over a  network  that
is either fixed (eg., the Internet) or dynamic (eg., niultihop
ad-hoc). Group members are prone to failures.  The ability
to evaluate global aggregate properties (eg., the average of
sensor temperature  readings) is important for higher-level
coordination activities in such large groups.  We first define
the  setting  and problem,  laying  down nietrics  to evaluate
direrent algorithms for the same.  We discuss why the usual
approaches  to solve  this problem are unviable and unscal-
able over an unreliable network prone to message delivery
failures and  crash jiiilures.  We then propose a  technique
to impose an abstract hierarchy on such  large groups, de-
scribittg how this hierarchy can be made to mirror the net-
work  topology.  We discuss several alternatives to use this
technique to solve the global aggregate function evaluation
problem.  FinulIy, we present a protocol based on gossiping
that uses this hierarchical technique. We present mathemat-
ical analysis and performance results to validate the robust-
ness, efJiciency and accuracy of the Hierarchical Gossiping
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Smart sensors networks, multihop ad-hoc networks and
process  groups  over  the  Internet  are  examples  of  large
groups of  processes  that  inherently  need  to communicate
and coordinate to ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
author:Indranil Gupta and
Robbert van Renesse and
Kenneth P. Birman
Scalable Fault-Tolerant Aggregation in Large Process Groups
Indranil Gupta, Robbert van Renesse, Kenneth P. Birman
Dept. of Computer Science
Cornel1 University
Ithaca NY USA  14853
{gupta,rvr,ken}@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
This paper discusses fault-tolemnt, scalable solutions to
the problem  of  accurately and scalably calculating  global
aggregate functions  in  large process groups  communicat-
ing over unreliable networks. These groups could represent
sensors  or processes  comniunicating  over a  network  that
is either fixed (eg., the Internet) or dynamic (eg., niultihop
ad-hoc). Group members are prone to failures.  The ability
to evaluate global aggregate properties (eg., the average of
sensor temperature  readings) is important for higher-level
coordination activities in such large groups.  We first define
the  setting  and problem,  laying  down nietrics  to evaluate
direrent algorithms for the same.  We discuss why the usual
approaches  to solve  this problem are unviable and unscal-
able over an unreliable network prone to message delivery
failures and  crash jiiilures.  We then propose a  technique
to impose an abstract hierarchy on such  large groups, de-
scribittg how this hierarchy can be made to mirror the net-
work  topology.  We discuss several alternatives to use this
technique to solve the global aggregate function evaluation
problem.  FinulIy, we present a protocol based on gossiping
that uses this hierarchical technique. We present mathemat-
ical analysis and performance results to validate the robust-
ness, efJiciency and accuracy of the Hierarchical Gossiping
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Smart sensors networks, multihop ad-hoc networks and
process  groups  over  the  Internet  are  examples  of  large
groups of  processes  that  inherently  need  to communicate
and coordinate to ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A general model of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback
author:Liming Lu and
Mun Choon Chan and
Ee-Chien Chang
A General Model of Probabilistic Packet Marking
for IP Traceback
Liming Lu
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Mun Choon Chan
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Ee-Chien Chang
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
luliming@comp.nus.edu.sg
chanmc@comp.nus.edu.sg
changec@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we model Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identiﬁcation prob-
lem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker
is associated with a distribution on tags, which are short
binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows its as-
sociated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP
header. Since there are a large number of (for example, over
4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples from
a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to
identify individual distribution contributing to the mixture.
Guided by this model, we propose Random Packet Marking
(RPM), a scheme that uses a simple but eﬀective approach.
RPM does not require sophisticated structure/relationship
among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction
similar to AMS [16]. Simulations show improved scalabil-
ity and traceback accuracy over prior works. For example,
in a large network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers in-
duce 63% of false positives in terms of edges identiﬁcation
using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to
2%. The eﬀectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior
knowledge of neighboring nodes, a simple and properly de-
signed marking scheme suﬃces in identifying large number
of markers with high accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: performance attributes
General...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A general model of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback
author:Liming Lu and
Mun Choon Chan and
Ee-Chien Chang
A General Model of Probabilistic Packet Marking
for IP Traceback
Liming Lu
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Mun Choon Chan
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Ee-Chien Chang
Computing
National University of
Singapore
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
Computer Science, School of
luliming@comp.nus.edu.sg
chanmc@comp.nus.edu.sg
changec@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we model Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identiﬁcation prob-
lem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker
is associated with a distribution on tags, which are short
binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows its as-
sociated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP
header. Since there are a large number of (for example, over
4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples from
a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to
identify individual distribution contributing to the mixture.
Guided by this model, we propose Random Packet Marking
(RPM), a scheme that uses a simple but eﬀective approach.
RPM does not require sophisticated structure/relationship
among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction
similar to AMS [16]. Simulations show improved scalabil-
ity and traceback accuracy over prior works. For example,
in a large network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers in-
duce 63% of false positives in terms of edges identiﬁcation
using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to
2%. The eﬀectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior
knowledge of neighboring nodes, a simple and properly de-
signed marking scheme suﬃces in identifying large number
of markers with high accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—security and protection; C.4 [Performance of Sys-
tems]: performance attributes
General...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing Heterogeneous Distributed
Enclave Applications
author:Gianluca Scopelliti and
Sepideh Pouyanrad and
Job Noorman and
Fritz Alder and
Frank Piessens and
Jan Tobias M"uhlberg
POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing
Heterogeneous Distributed Enclave Applications
Job Noorman
Sepideh Pouyanrad
Gianluca Scopelliti
gianluca.scopelliti@ericsson.com
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
sepideh.pouyanrad@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Leuven, Belgium
Frank Piessens
frank.piessens@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
job.noorman@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
jantobias.muehlberg@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
ABSTRACT
We present an integrated open-source framework to develop, de-
ploy, and use event-driven distributed enclaved applications across
heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Our frame-
work strives for strong application authenticity and integrity guar-
antees, and optionally confidentiality and availability, while mini-
mizing the run-time Trusted Computing Base (TCB). For software
developers, our framework provides a high level of abstraction over
the platform-specific TEE layer that provides isolation, attestation
and secure communication amongst distributed application compo-
nents, allowing developers to focus of application logic. We provide
a notion of event-driven programming to develop distributed en-
clave applications in Rust and C for heterogeneous TEEs, including
Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone and the open-source Sancus. This het-
erogeneity makes our framework uniquely suitable for a broad
range of use cases which combine cloud processing, mobile and
edge devices, and lightweight sensing and actuation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Trusted computing; Distributed
systems security; • Computer systems organiza...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing Heterogeneous Distributed
Enclave Applications
author:Gianluca Scopelliti and
Sepideh Pouyanrad and
Job Noorman and
Fritz Alder and
Frank Piessens and
Jan Tobias M"uhlberg
POSTER: An Open-Source Framework for Developing
Heterogeneous Distributed Enclave Applications
Job Noorman
Sepideh Pouyanrad
Gianluca Scopelliti
gianluca.scopelliti@ericsson.com
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
sepideh.pouyanrad@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Fritz Alder
fritz.alder@acm.org
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Leuven, Belgium
Frank Piessens
frank.piessens@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
job.noorman@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
jantobias.muehlberg@kuleuven.be
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
ABSTRACT
We present an integrated open-source framework to develop, de-
ploy, and use event-driven distributed enclaved applications across
heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Our frame-
work strives for strong application authenticity and integrity guar-
antees, and optionally confidentiality and availability, while mini-
mizing the run-time Trusted Computing Base (TCB). For software
developers, our framework provides a high level of abstraction over
the platform-specific TEE layer that provides isolation, attestation
and secure communication amongst distributed application compo-
nents, allowing developers to focus of application logic. We provide
a notion of event-driven programming to develop distributed en-
clave applications in Rust and C for heterogeneous TEEs, including
Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone and the open-source Sancus. This het-
erogeneity makes our framework uniquely suitable for a broad
range of use cases which combine cloud processing, mobile and
edge devices, and lightweight sensing and actuation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Trusted computing; Distributed
systems security; • Computer systems organiza...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy
author:Radu-Ioan Paise and
Serge Vaudenay
Mutual Authentication in RFID
Security and Privacy
Radu-Ioan Paise
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
radu-ioan.paise@epﬂ.ch
Serge Vaudenay
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
serge.vaudenay@epﬂ.ch
ABSTRACT
In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate them-
selves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied se-
curity and privacy models for these protocols. We extend
this model to protocols which oﬀer reader authentication
to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that se-
cure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags
have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Un-
der this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich
a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication
RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseu-
dorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based
on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy
based on public-key cryptography.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
Keywords
identiﬁcation protocol, privacy, RFID
1. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
RFID refers to wireless protocols which make it possible
to identify mobile tags to readers in a given system. Typ-
ically, the reader together with the system is considered as
a single powerful and secure participant, but tags are tiny
inexpensive devices which are not secure, prone to corrup-
tion, and with little computational capabilities. RFID tags
become pervasive, thus lead us to privacy threats. For this,
the study for security and privacy of RFID protocols (while
preserving eﬃciency) has become a hot research topic.
RFID schemes are characterized by a three-fold quality.
Correctness ensures that legitimate tags interacting with the
reader are correctly identiﬁed or authenticated. Security
says that an a...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Mutual authentication in RFID: security and privacy
author:Radu-Ioan Paise and
Serge Vaudenay
Mutual Authentication in RFID
Security and Privacy
Radu-Ioan Paise
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
radu-ioan.paise@epﬂ.ch
Serge Vaudenay
EPFL
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
serge.vaudenay@epﬂ.ch
ABSTRACT
In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate them-
selves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied se-
curity and privacy models for these protocols. We extend
this model to protocols which oﬀer reader authentication
to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that se-
cure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags
have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Un-
der this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich
a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication
RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseu-
dorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based
on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy
based on public-key cryptography.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
Keywords
identiﬁcation protocol, privacy, RFID
1. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
RFID refers to wireless protocols which make it possible
to identify mobile tags to readers in a given system. Typ-
ically, the reader together with the system is considered as
a single powerful and secure participant, but tags are tiny
inexpensive devices which are not secure, prone to corrup-
tion, and with little computational capabilities. RFID tags
become pervasive, thus lead us to privacy threats. For this,
the study for security and privacy of RFID protocols (while
preserving eﬃciency) has become a hot research topic.
RFID schemes are characterized by a three-fold quality.
Correctness ensures that legitimate tags interacting with the
reader are correctly identiﬁed or authenticated. Security
says that an a...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multiple Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates
author:Xinyu Li and
Jing Xu and
Zhenfeng Zhang and
Dengguo Feng and
Honggang Hu
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiple Handshakes Security
of TLS 1.3 Candidates
Xinyu Li∗†, Jing Xu∗, Zhenfeng Zhang∗, Dengguo Feng∗, Honggang Hu†
∗Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, SKLCS,
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
†CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
Email: {lixinyu, xujing, zfzhang, feng}@tca.iscas.ac.cn, hghu2005@ustc.edu.cn
Abstract—The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is by
far the most widely deployed protocol for securing communica-
tions and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently
developing TLS 1.3 as the next-generation TLS protocol. The
TLS standard features multiple modes of handshake protocols
and supports many combinational running of successive TLS
handshakes over multiple connections. Although each handshake
mode is now well-understood in isolation, their composition in
TLS 1.2 remains problematic, and yet it is critical to obtain
practical security guarantees for TLS.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst formal treatment of multiple
handshakes protocols of TLS 1.3 candidates. First, we introduce
a multi-level&stage security model, an adaptation of the Bellare-
Rogaway authenticated key exchange model, covering all kinds
of compositional interactions between different TLS handshake
modes and providing reasonably strong security guarantees. Next,
we prove that candidate handshakes of TLS 1.3 draft meet
our strong notion of multiple handshakes security. Our results
conﬁrm the soundness of TLS 1.3 security protection design.
Such a multi-level&stage approach is convenient for analyzing
the compositional design of the candidates with different session
modes, as they establish dependencies of multiple...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multiple Handshakes Security of TLS 1.3 Candidates
author:Xinyu Li and
Jing Xu and
Zhenfeng Zhang and
Dengguo Feng and
Honggang Hu
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiple Handshakes Security
of TLS 1.3 Candidates
Xinyu Li∗†, Jing Xu∗, Zhenfeng Zhang∗, Dengguo Feng∗, Honggang Hu†
∗Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, SKLCS,
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
†CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
Email: {lixinyu, xujing, zfzhang, feng}@tca.iscas.ac.cn, hghu2005@ustc.edu.cn
Abstract—The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is by
far the most widely deployed protocol for securing communica-
tions and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently
developing TLS 1.3 as the next-generation TLS protocol. The
TLS standard features multiple modes of handshake protocols
and supports many combinational running of successive TLS
handshakes over multiple connections. Although each handshake
mode is now well-understood in isolation, their composition in
TLS 1.2 remains problematic, and yet it is critical to obtain
practical security guarantees for TLS.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst formal treatment of multiple
handshakes protocols of TLS 1.3 candidates. First, we introduce
a multi-level&stage security model, an adaptation of the Bellare-
Rogaway authenticated key exchange model, covering all kinds
of compositional interactions between different TLS handshake
modes and providing reasonably strong security guarantees. Next,
we prove that candidate handshakes of TLS 1.3 draft meet
our strong notion of multiple handshakes security. Our results
conﬁrm the soundness of TLS 1.3 security protection design.
Such a multi-level&stage approach is convenient for analyzing
the compositional design of the candidates with different session
modes, as they establish dependencies of multiple...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps? The Effect of Requirements and
Developer Practices on App Security
author:Charles Weir and
Ben Hermann and
Sascha Fahl
From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
The Effect of Requirements and Developer
Practices on App Security
Charles Weir, Lancaster University; Ben Hermann, Paderborn University;
Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/weir
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
 The Effect of Requirements and Developer Practices
 on App Security
Ben Hermann, Paderborn University     Sascha Fahl,  Leibniz University Hannover
Charles Weir, Lancaster University
 Abstract
Increasingly mobile device users are being hurt by security or
privacy issues with the apps they use. App developers can
help prevent this; inexpensive security assurance techniques
to  do  so  are  now  well  established,  but  do  developers  use
them? And if they do so, is that reflected in more secure apps?
From a survey of 335 successful app developers, we conclude
that less than a quarter of such professionals have access to
security  experts;  that  less  than  a  third  use  assurance  tech-
niques regularly; and that few have made more than cosmetic
changes as a result of the European GDPR legislation. Reas-
suringly, we found that app developers tend to use more as-
surance techniques and make more frequent security updates
when (1) they see more need for security, and (2) there is se-
curity expert or champion involvement.
In a second phase we downloaded the apps corresponding to
each  completed  survey  and  analyzed  them for  SSL  issues,
cryptographic API misuse and privacy leaks, finding only one
fifth defect-free as far as our tools could detect. We found ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps? The Effect of Requirements and
Developer Practices on App Security
author:Charles Weir and
Ben Hermann and
Sascha Fahl
From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
The Effect of Requirements and Developer
Practices on App Security
Charles Weir, Lancaster University; Ben Hermann, Paderborn University;
Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/weir
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.From Needs to Actions to Secure Apps?
 The Effect of Requirements and Developer Practices
 on App Security
Ben Hermann, Paderborn University     Sascha Fahl,  Leibniz University Hannover
Charles Weir, Lancaster University
 Abstract
Increasingly mobile device users are being hurt by security or
privacy issues with the apps they use. App developers can
help prevent this; inexpensive security assurance techniques
to  do  so  are  now  well  established,  but  do  developers  use
them? And if they do so, is that reflected in more secure apps?
From a survey of 335 successful app developers, we conclude
that less than a quarter of such professionals have access to
security  experts;  that  less  than  a  third  use  assurance  tech-
niques regularly; and that few have made more than cosmetic
changes as a result of the European GDPR legislation. Reas-
suringly, we found that app developers tend to use more as-
surance techniques and make more frequent security updates
when (1) they see more need for security, and (2) there is se-
curity expert or champion involvement.
In a second phase we downloaded the apps corresponding to
each  completed  survey  and  analyzed  them for  SSL  issues,
cryptographic API misuse and privacy leaks, finding only one
fifth defect-free as far as our tools could detect. We found ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
author:Seth Hardy and
Masashi Crete-Nishihata and
Katharine Kleemola and
Adam Senft and
Byron Sonne and
Greg Wiseman and
Phillipa Gill and
Ronald J. Deibert
Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing
and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne,
and Greg Wiseman, The Citizen Lab; Phillipa Gill, Stony Brook University;
Ronald J. Deibert, The Citizen Lab
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/hardy
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium.August 20–22, 2014 • San Diego, CAISBN 978-1-931971-15-7Open access to the Proceedings of  the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXTargeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying
Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy§ Masashi Crete-Nishihata§ Katharine Kleemola§ Adam Senft§
Byron Sonne§ Greg Wiseman§ Phillipa Gill† Ronald J. Deibert§
§ The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada
† Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, USA
Abstract
Targeted attacks on civil society and non-governmental
organizations have gone underreported despite the fact
that these organizations have been shown to be frequent
targets of these attacks. In this paper, we shed light on
targeted malware attacks faced by these organizations by
studying malicious e-mails received by 10 civil society
organizations (the majority of which are from groups re-
lated to China and Tibet issues) over a period of 4 years.
Our study highlights important properties of malware
threats faced by these organizations with implications on
how these organizations defend themselves and how we
quantify these threats. We ﬁnd that the technical sophis-
tication of malware we observe is fairly low, with more
effort placed on socially engineering the e-mail...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
author:Seth Hardy and
Masashi Crete-Nishihata and
Katharine Kleemola and
Adam Senft and
Byron Sonne and
Greg Wiseman and
Phillipa Gill and
Ronald J. Deibert
Targeted Threat Index: Characterizing
and Quantifying Politically-Motivated
Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Katharine Kleemola, Adam Senft, Byron Sonne,
and Greg Wiseman, The Citizen Lab; Phillipa Gill, Stony Brook University;
Ronald J. Deibert, The Citizen Lab
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/hardy
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium.August 20–22, 2014 • San Diego, CAISBN 978-1-931971-15-7Open access to the Proceedings of  the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXTargeted Threat Index: Characterizing and Quantifying
Politically-Motivated Targeted Malware
Seth Hardy§ Masashi Crete-Nishihata§ Katharine Kleemola§ Adam Senft§
Byron Sonne§ Greg Wiseman§ Phillipa Gill† Ronald J. Deibert§
§ The Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada
† Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, USA
Abstract
Targeted attacks on civil society and non-governmental
organizations have gone underreported despite the fact
that these organizations have been shown to be frequent
targets of these attacks. In this paper, we shed light on
targeted malware attacks faced by these organizations by
studying malicious e-mails received by 10 civil society
organizations (the majority of which are from groups re-
lated to China and Tibet issues) over a period of 4 years.
Our study highlights important properties of malware
threats faced by these organizations with implications on
how these organizations defend themselves and how we
quantify these threats. We ﬁnd that the technical sophis-
tication of malware we observe is fairly low, with more
effort placed on socially engineering the e-mail...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Securing Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
author:Igor Smolyar and
Muli Ben-Yehuda and
Dan Tsafrir
Securing Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
Igor Smolyar, Muli Ben-Yehuda, and Dan Tsafrir, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/smolyar
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 12–14, 2015 • Washington, D.C.ISBN 978-1-939133-11-3Open access to the Proceedings of  the 24th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXSecuring Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
Igor Smolyar
Muli Ben-Yehuda
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
{igors,muli,dan}@cs.technion.ac.il
Dan Tsafrir
Abstract
I/O virtualization (SRIOV)
Single root
is a hard-
ware/software interface that allows devices to “self virtu-
alize” and thereby remove the host from the critical I/O
path. SRIOV thus brings near bare-metal performance to
untrusted guest virtual machines (VMs) in public clouds,
enterprise data centers, and high-performance comput-
ing setups. We identify a design ﬂaw in current Ethernet
SRIOV NIC deployments that enables untrusted VMs to
completely control the throughput and latency of other,
unrelated VMs. The attack exploits Ethernet ”pause”
frames, which enable network ﬂow control functional-
ity. We experimentally launch the attack across sev-
eral NIC models and ﬁnd that it is effective and highly
accurate, with substantial consequences if left unmiti-
gated:
(1) to be safe, NIC vendors will have to mod-
ify their NICs so as to ﬁlter pause frames originating
from SRIOV instances; (2) in the meantime, administra-
tors will have to either trust their VMs, or conﬁgure their
switches to ignore pause frames, thus relinquishing ﬂow
control, which might severely degrade networking per-
formance. We present the Virtualization-Aware Network
Flow Controller (VANFC), a software-based SRIOV NIC
prototype that overcomes the attack. VANFC ﬁlters pause
frames...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Securing Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
author:Igor Smolyar and
Muli Ben-Yehuda and
Dan Tsafrir
Securing Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
Igor Smolyar, Muli Ben-Yehuda, and Dan Tsafrir, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/smolyar
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 12–14, 2015 • Washington, D.C.ISBN 978-1-939133-11-3Open access to the Proceedings of  the 24th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXSecuring Self-Virtualizing Ethernet Devices
Igor Smolyar
Muli Ben-Yehuda
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
{igors,muli,dan}@cs.technion.ac.il
Dan Tsafrir
Abstract
I/O virtualization (SRIOV)
Single root
is a hard-
ware/software interface that allows devices to “self virtu-
alize” and thereby remove the host from the critical I/O
path. SRIOV thus brings near bare-metal performance to
untrusted guest virtual machines (VMs) in public clouds,
enterprise data centers, and high-performance comput-
ing setups. We identify a design ﬂaw in current Ethernet
SRIOV NIC deployments that enables untrusted VMs to
completely control the throughput and latency of other,
unrelated VMs. The attack exploits Ethernet ”pause”
frames, which enable network ﬂow control functional-
ity. We experimentally launch the attack across sev-
eral NIC models and ﬁnd that it is effective and highly
accurate, with substantial consequences if left unmiti-
gated:
(1) to be safe, NIC vendors will have to mod-
ify their NICs so as to ﬁlter pause frames originating
from SRIOV instances; (2) in the meantime, administra-
tors will have to either trust their VMs, or conﬁgure their
switches to ignore pause frames, thus relinquishing ﬂow
control, which might severely degrade networking per-
formance. We present the Virtualization-Aware Network
Flow Controller (VANFC), a software-based SRIOV NIC
prototype that overcomes the attack. VANFC ﬁlters pause
frames...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Proximity Breeds Danger: Emerging Threats in Metro-area Wireless Networks
author:Periklis Akritidis and
Wee-Yung Chin and
Vinh The Lam and
Stelios Sidiroglou and
Kostas G. Anagnostakis
Proximity Breeds Danger:
Emerging Threats in Metro-area Wireless Networks
P. Akritidis
∗
, W.Y. Chin
•
, V.T. Lam
†
, S. Sidiroglou
‡
, K.G. Anagnostakis
•
• Systems and Security Department
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), Singapore
{kostas,wychin}@s3g.i2r.a-star.edu.sg
‡ Computer Science Department
Columbia University, USA
stelios@cs.columbia.edu
? Computer Laboratory
Cambridge University, UK
Periklis.Akritidis@cl.cam.ac.uk
† Dept. of Comp. Science and Engineering
University of California San Diego, USA
vtlam@cs.ucsd.edu
Abstract
1 Introduction
The growing popularity of wireless networks and mo-
bile devices is starting to attract unwanted attention
especially as potential targets for malicious activities
reach critical mass.
In this study, we try to quantify
the threat from large-scale distributed attacks on wireless
networks, and, more speciﬁcally, wiﬁ networks in densely
populated metropolitan areas. We focus on three likely
attack scenarios: “wildﬁre” worms that can spread con-
tagiously over and across wireless LANs, coordinated
citywide phishing campaigns based on wireless spooﬁng,
and rogue systems for compromising location privacy in
a coordinated fashion. The ﬁrst attack illustrates how
dense wiﬁ deployment may provide opportunities for at-
tackers who want to quickly compromise large numbers
of machines. The last two attacks illustrate how botnets
can amplify wiﬁ vulnerabilities, and how botnet power is
ampliﬁed by wireless connectivity.
To quantify these threats, we rely on real-world data
extracted from wiﬁ maps of large metropolitan areas in
the States and Singapore. Our results suggest that a care-
fully crafted wireless worm can infect up to 80% of all
wiﬁ connected hosts in some metropolitan areas within
20 minutes, and that an attacker can launch phishing...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Proximity Breeds Danger: Emerging Threats in Metro-area Wireless Networks
author:Periklis Akritidis and
Wee-Yung Chin and
Vinh The Lam and
Stelios Sidiroglou and
Kostas G. Anagnostakis
Proximity Breeds Danger:
Emerging Threats in Metro-area Wireless Networks
P. Akritidis
∗
, W.Y. Chin
•
, V.T. Lam
†
, S. Sidiroglou
‡
, K.G. Anagnostakis
•
• Systems and Security Department
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), Singapore
{kostas,wychin}@s3g.i2r.a-star.edu.sg
‡ Computer Science Department
Columbia University, USA
stelios@cs.columbia.edu
? Computer Laboratory
Cambridge University, UK
Periklis.Akritidis@cl.cam.ac.uk
† Dept. of Comp. Science and Engineering
University of California San Diego, USA
vtlam@cs.ucsd.edu
Abstract
1 Introduction
The growing popularity of wireless networks and mo-
bile devices is starting to attract unwanted attention
especially as potential targets for malicious activities
reach critical mass.
In this study, we try to quantify
the threat from large-scale distributed attacks on wireless
networks, and, more speciﬁcally, wiﬁ networks in densely
populated metropolitan areas. We focus on three likely
attack scenarios: “wildﬁre” worms that can spread con-
tagiously over and across wireless LANs, coordinated
citywide phishing campaigns based on wireless spooﬁng,
and rogue systems for compromising location privacy in
a coordinated fashion. The ﬁrst attack illustrates how
dense wiﬁ deployment may provide opportunities for at-
tackers who want to quickly compromise large numbers
of machines. The last two attacks illustrate how botnets
can amplify wiﬁ vulnerabilities, and how botnet power is
ampliﬁed by wireless connectivity.
To quantify these threats, we rely on real-world data
extracted from wiﬁ maps of large metropolitan areas in
the States and Singapore. Our results suggest that a care-
fully crafted wireless worm can infect up to 80% of all
wiﬁ connected hosts in some metropolitan areas within
20 minutes, and that an attacker can launch phishing...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Can they hear me now?: a case for a client-assisted approach to monitoring
wide-area wireless networks
author:Sayandeep Sen and
Jongwon Yoon and
Joshua Hare and
Justin Ormont and
Suman Banerjee
Can They Hear Me Now?: A Case for a Client-assisted
Approach to Monitoring Wide-area Wireless Networks
Sayandeep Sen∗, Jongwon Yoon∗, Joshua Hare∗, Justin Ormont, Suman Banerjee
University of Wisconsin-Madison
{sdsen, yoonj, hare, ormont, suman}@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
We present WiScape, a framework for measuring and under-
standing the behavior of wide-area wireless networks, e.g.,
city-wide or nation-wide cellular data networks using active
participation from clients. The goal of WiScape is to provide
a coarse-grained view of a wide-area wireless landscape that
allows operators and users to understand broad performance
characteristics of the network. In this approach a central-
ized controller instructs clients to collect measurement sam-
ples over time and space in an opportunistic manner. To
limit the overheads of this measurement framework, WiS-
cape partitions the world into zones, contiguous areas with
relatively similar user experiences, and partitions time into
zone-speciﬁc epochs over which network statistics are rela-
tively stable. For each epoch in each zone, WiScape takes
a minimalistic view — it attempts to collect a small num-
ber of measurement samples to adequately characterize the
client experience in that zone and epoch, thereby limiting
the bandwidth and energy overheads at client devices. For
this eﬀort, we have collected ground truth measurements
for up to three diﬀerent commercial cellular wireless net-
works across (i) an area of more than 155 square kilometer
in and around Madison, WI, in the USA, (ii) a road stretch
of more than 240 kilometers between Madison and Chicago,
and (iii) locations in New Brunswick and Princeton, New
Jersey, USA, for a period of more than 1 year. We jus-
tify various design choices of WiScape through this data,
demonst...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Can they hear me now?: a case for a client-assisted approach to monitoring
wide-area wireless networks
author:Sayandeep Sen and
Jongwon Yoon and
Joshua Hare and
Justin Ormont and
Suman Banerjee
Can They Hear Me Now?: A Case for a Client-assisted
Approach to Monitoring Wide-area Wireless Networks
Sayandeep Sen∗, Jongwon Yoon∗, Joshua Hare∗, Justin Ormont, Suman Banerjee
University of Wisconsin-Madison
{sdsen, yoonj, hare, ormont, suman}@cs.wisc.edu
ABSTRACT
We present WiScape, a framework for measuring and under-
standing the behavior of wide-area wireless networks, e.g.,
city-wide or nation-wide cellular data networks using active
participation from clients. The goal of WiScape is to provide
a coarse-grained view of a wide-area wireless landscape that
allows operators and users to understand broad performance
characteristics of the network. In this approach a central-
ized controller instructs clients to collect measurement sam-
ples over time and space in an opportunistic manner. To
limit the overheads of this measurement framework, WiS-
cape partitions the world into zones, contiguous areas with
relatively similar user experiences, and partitions time into
zone-speciﬁc epochs over which network statistics are rela-
tively stable. For each epoch in each zone, WiScape takes
a minimalistic view — it attempts to collect a small num-
ber of measurement samples to adequately characterize the
client experience in that zone and epoch, thereby limiting
the bandwidth and energy overheads at client devices. For
this eﬀort, we have collected ground truth measurements
for up to three diﬀerent commercial cellular wireless net-
works across (i) an area of more than 155 square kilometer
in and around Madison, WI, in the USA, (ii) a road stretch
of more than 240 kilometers between Madison and Chicago,
and (iii) locations in New Brunswick and Princeton, New
Jersey, USA, for a period of more than 1 year. We jus-
tify various design choices of WiScape through this data,
demonst...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A First Look at the Misuse and Abuse of the IPv4 Transfer Market
author:Vasileios Giotsas and
Ioana Livadariu and
Petros Gigis
A First Look at the Misuse and Abuse
of the IPv4 Transfer Market
Vasileios Giotsas1(B), Ioana Livadariu2, and Petros Gigis3,4
1 Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
v.giotsas@lancaster.ac.uk
2 Simula Metropolitan, Oslo, Norway
3 University College London, London, UK
4 Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas (FORTH-ICS), Patras, Greece
Abstract. The depletion of the unallocated IPv4 addresses and the slow
pace of IPv6 deployment have given rise to the IPv4 transfer market,
the trading of allocated IPv4 preﬁxes between organizations. Despite
the policies established by RIRs to regulate the IPv4 transfer market,
IPv4 transfers pose an opportunity for malicious networks, such as spam-
mers and bulletproof ASes, to bypass reputational penalties by obtaining
“clean” IPv4 address space or by oﬄoading blacklisted addresses. Addi-
tionally, IP transfers create a window of uncertainty about the legitimate
ownership of preﬁxes, which leads to inconsistencies in WHOIS records
and routing advertisements. In this paper we provide the ﬁrst detailed
study of how transferred IPv4 preﬁxes are misused in the wild, by syn-
thesizing an array of longitudinal IP blacklists, honeypot data, and AS
reputation lists. Our ﬁndings yield evidence that transferred IPv4 address
blocks are used by malicious networks to address botnets and fraudulent
sites in much higher rates compared to non-transferred addresses, while
the timing of the attacks indicate eﬀorts to evade ﬁltering mechanisms.
Keywords: IPv4 transfers · Routing · BGP · Blacklists
1 Introduction
The depletion of the unallocated IPv4 addresses combined with the slow tran-
sition to IPv6 has led to the emergence of a secondary market for ownership
transfers of IPv4 addresses. However, the IPv4 market has been poorly reg-
ulated due to the lack of widely adopted IP preﬁx ownership authentication
mechan...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A First Look at the Misuse and Abuse of the IPv4 Transfer Market
author:Vasileios Giotsas and
Ioana Livadariu and
Petros Gigis
A First Look at the Misuse and Abuse
of the IPv4 Transfer Market
Vasileios Giotsas1(B), Ioana Livadariu2, and Petros Gigis3,4
1 Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
v.giotsas@lancaster.ac.uk
2 Simula Metropolitan, Oslo, Norway
3 University College London, London, UK
4 Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas (FORTH-ICS), Patras, Greece
Abstract. The depletion of the unallocated IPv4 addresses and the slow
pace of IPv6 deployment have given rise to the IPv4 transfer market,
the trading of allocated IPv4 preﬁxes between organizations. Despite
the policies established by RIRs to regulate the IPv4 transfer market,
IPv4 transfers pose an opportunity for malicious networks, such as spam-
mers and bulletproof ASes, to bypass reputational penalties by obtaining
“clean” IPv4 address space or by oﬄoading blacklisted addresses. Addi-
tionally, IP transfers create a window of uncertainty about the legitimate
ownership of preﬁxes, which leads to inconsistencies in WHOIS records
and routing advertisements. In this paper we provide the ﬁrst detailed
study of how transferred IPv4 preﬁxes are misused in the wild, by syn-
thesizing an array of longitudinal IP blacklists, honeypot data, and AS
reputation lists. Our ﬁndings yield evidence that transferred IPv4 address
blocks are used by malicious networks to address botnets and fraudulent
sites in much higher rates compared to non-transferred addresses, while
the timing of the attacks indicate eﬀorts to evade ﬁltering mechanisms.
Keywords: IPv4 transfers · Routing · BGP · Blacklists
1 Introduction
The depletion of the unallocated IPv4 addresses combined with the slow tran-
sition to IPv6 has led to the emergence of a secondary market for ownership
transfers of IPv4 addresses. However, the IPv4 market has been poorly reg-
ulated due to the lack of widely adopted IP preﬁx ownership authentication
mechan...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An energy efficient circuit level technique to protect register file
from MBUs and SETs in embedded processors
author:Mahdi Fazeli and
Alireza Namazi and
Seyed Ghassem Miremadi
978-1-4244-4421-2/09/$25.00 c(cid:13)2009 IEEE
195
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tsinghua University. Downloaded on March 20,2021 at 09:56:57 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
 An Energy Efficient Circuit Level Technique to protect Register File from MBUs and SETs in Embedded Processors  M. Fazeli, A. Namazi, S.G. Miremadi Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran {m_fazeli, namazi}@ce.sharif.edu, miremadi@sharif.edu    Abstract  This paper presents a circuit level soft error-tolerant-technique, called RRC (Robust Register Caching), for the register file of embedded processors. The basic idea behind the RRC is to effectively cache the most vulnerable registers in a small highly robust register cache built by circuit level SEU and SET protected memory cells. To decide which cache entry should be replaced, the average number of read operations during a register ACE time is used as a criterion to judge. In fact, the victim cache entry is one which has the maximum read count. To minimize the power overhead of the RRC, the clock gating technique is efficiently exploited for the main register file resulting in significantly low power consumption. The RRC is able to protect the register file not only against Single Bit Upsets (SBUs) but also against Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs). The RRC is experimentally evaluated using the LEON processor. The experimental results show that, if the cache size is selected properly, the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) of the register file becomes about 1% while it imposes low power, area and performance overheads to the processor.   1. Introduction High energy particle strikes have severely challenged the reliability of today’s embedded processors [19][20]. Until re...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Measurement methods for fast and accurate blackhole identification
with binary tomography
author:'Italo Cunha and
Renata Teixeira and
Nick Feamster and
Christophe Diot
Measurement Methods for Fast and Accurate Blackhole
Identiﬁcation with Binary Tomography
Ítalo Cunha
Thomson / UPMC Paris
Universitas
Renata Teixeira
CNRS / UPMC Paris
Universitas
Nick Feamster
Georgia Tech
Christophe Diot
Thomson
feamster@cc.gatech.edu
christophe.diot@thomson.net
italo.cunha@thomson.net
renata.teixeira@lip6.fr
ABSTRACT
Binary tomography—the process of identifying faulty net-
work links through coordinated end-to-end probes—is a
promising method for detecting failures that the network
does not automatically mask (e.g., network “blackholes”).
Because tomography is sensitive to the quality of the input,
however, na¨ıve end-to-end measurements can introduce in-
accuracies. This paper develops two methods for generating
inputs to binary tomography algorithms that improve their
inference speed and accuracy. Failure conﬁrmation is a per-
path probing technique to distinguish packet losses caused
by congestion from persistent link or node failures. Aggrega-
tion strategies combine path measurements from unsynchro-
nized monitors into a set of consistent observations. When
used in conjunction with existing binary tomography algo-
rithms, our methods identify all failures that are longer than
two measurement cycles, while inducing relatively few false
alarms. In two wide-area networks, our techniques decrease
the number of alarms by as much as two orders of magni-
tude. Compared to the state of the art in binary tomogra-
phy, our techniques increase the identiﬁcation rate and avoid
hundreds of false alarms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer
Communication Networks—Network Monitoring
General Terms
Design, Experimentation, Measurement
Keywords
Network Tomography, Troubleshooting, Diagnosis
1.
INTRODUCTION
Binary tomography refers to the ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Measurement methods for fast and accurate blackhole identification
with binary tomography
author:'Italo Cunha and
Renata Teixeira and
Nick Feamster and
Christophe Diot
Measurement Methods for Fast and Accurate Blackhole
Identiﬁcation with Binary Tomography
Ítalo Cunha
Thomson / UPMC Paris
Universitas
Renata Teixeira
CNRS / UPMC Paris
Universitas
Nick Feamster
Georgia Tech
Christophe Diot
Thomson
feamster@cc.gatech.edu
christophe.diot@thomson.net
italo.cunha@thomson.net
renata.teixeira@lip6.fr
ABSTRACT
Binary tomography—the process of identifying faulty net-
work links through coordinated end-to-end probes—is a
promising method for detecting failures that the network
does not automatically mask (e.g., network “blackholes”).
Because tomography is sensitive to the quality of the input,
however, na¨ıve end-to-end measurements can introduce in-
accuracies. This paper develops two methods for generating
inputs to binary tomography algorithms that improve their
inference speed and accuracy. Failure conﬁrmation is a per-
path probing technique to distinguish packet losses caused
by congestion from persistent link or node failures. Aggrega-
tion strategies combine path measurements from unsynchro-
nized monitors into a set of consistent observations. When
used in conjunction with existing binary tomography algo-
rithms, our methods identify all failures that are longer than
two measurement cycles, while inducing relatively few false
alarms. In two wide-area networks, our techniques decrease
the number of alarms by as much as two orders of magni-
tude. Compared to the state of the art in binary tomogra-
phy, our techniques increase the identiﬁcation rate and avoid
hundreds of false alarms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer
Communication Networks—Network Monitoring
General Terms
Design, Experimentation, Measurement
Keywords
Network Tomography, Troubleshooting, Diagnosis
1.
INTRODUCTION
Binary tomography refers to the ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Paranoid Android: versatile protection for smartphones
author:Georgios Portokalidis and
Philip Homburg and
Kostas Anagnostakis and
Herbert Bos
Paranoid Android: Versatile Protection For Smartphones
Georgios Portokalidis∗
Network Security Lab
Dept. of Computer Science
Columbia University, NY, USA
porto@cs.columbia.edu
Philip Homburg
Dept. of Computer Science
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Vrije Universiteit
philip@cs.vu.nl
Kostas Anagnostakis
Niometris R&D
Singapore
kostas@niometrics.com
Herbert Bos
Dept. of Computer Science
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
herbertb@cs.vu.nl
ABSTRACT
Smartphone usage has been continuously increasing in re-
cent years. Moreover, smartphones are often used for privacy-
sensitive tasks, becoming highly valuable targets for attack-
ers. They are also quite diﬀerent from PCs, so that PC-
oriented solutions are not always applicable, or do not oﬀer
comprehensive security. We propose an alternative solution,
where security checks are applied on remote security servers
that host exact replicas of the phones in virtual environ-
ments. The servers are not subject to the same constraints,
allowing us to apply multiple detection techniques simulta-
neously. We implemented a prototype of this security model
for Android phones, and show that it is both practical and
scalable: we generate no more than 2KiB/s and 64B/s of
trace data for high-loads and idle operation respectively, and
are able to support more than a hundred replicas running
on a single server.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [General]: Protection mechanisms
General Terms
Design, Security, Reliability
Keywords
Decoupled security; Smartphones; Android
1.
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have come to resemble general-purpose com-
puters:
in addition to traditional telephony stacks, calen-
∗This work was done while the author was in Vrije Univer-
siteit Amsterdam.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grante...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Paranoid Android: versatile protection for smartphones
author:Georgios Portokalidis and
Philip Homburg and
Kostas Anagnostakis and
Herbert Bos
Paranoid Android: Versatile Protection For Smartphones
Georgios Portokalidis∗
Network Security Lab
Dept. of Computer Science
Columbia University, NY, USA
porto@cs.columbia.edu
Philip Homburg
Dept. of Computer Science
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Vrije Universiteit
philip@cs.vu.nl
Kostas Anagnostakis
Niometris R&D
Singapore
kostas@niometrics.com
Herbert Bos
Dept. of Computer Science
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
herbertb@cs.vu.nl
ABSTRACT
Smartphone usage has been continuously increasing in re-
cent years. Moreover, smartphones are often used for privacy-
sensitive tasks, becoming highly valuable targets for attack-
ers. They are also quite diﬀerent from PCs, so that PC-
oriented solutions are not always applicable, or do not oﬀer
comprehensive security. We propose an alternative solution,
where security checks are applied on remote security servers
that host exact replicas of the phones in virtual environ-
ments. The servers are not subject to the same constraints,
allowing us to apply multiple detection techniques simulta-
neously. We implemented a prototype of this security model
for Android phones, and show that it is both practical and
scalable: we generate no more than 2KiB/s and 64B/s of
trace data for high-loads and idle operation respectively, and
are able to support more than a hundred replicas running
on a single server.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [General]: Protection mechanisms
General Terms
Design, Security, Reliability
Keywords
Decoupled security; Smartphones; Android
1.
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have come to resemble general-purpose com-
puters:
in addition to traditional telephony stacks, calen-
∗This work was done while the author was in Vrije Univer-
siteit Amsterdam.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is grante...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SAINTDroid: Scalable, Automated Incompatibility Detection for Android
author:Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva and
Clay Stevens and
Niloofar Mansoor and
Witawas Srisa-an and
Tingting Yu and
Hamid Bagheri
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses,
Dissertations, and Student Research
Computer Science and Engineering, Department of
4-2019
GAINDroid: General Automated Incompatibility
Notifier for Android Applications
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bvrsilva1@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons
Vieira Resende e Silva, Bruno, "GAINDroid: General Automated Incompatibility Notifier for Android Applications" (2019).
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 167.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss/167
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
GAINDROID: GENERAL AUTOMATED INCOMPATIBILITY NOTIFIER FOR
ANDROID APPLICATIONS
by
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva
A THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulﬁlment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science
Major: Computer Science
Under the Supervision of Hamid Bagheri
Lincoln, Nebraska
April, 2019
GAINDROID: GENERAL AUTOMATED INCOMPATIBILITY NOTIFIER FOR
ANDROID APPLICATIONS
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2019
Adviser: Hamid Bagheri
With the ever-increasing popularity of mobile devices over the last decade,
mobile apps and the frameworks upon...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:SAINTDroid: Scalable, Automated Incompatibility Detection for Android
author:Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva and
Clay Stevens and
Niloofar Mansoor and
Witawas Srisa-an and
Tingting Yu and
Hamid Bagheri
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses,
Dissertations, and Student Research
Computer Science and Engineering, Department of
4-2019
GAINDroid: General Automated Incompatibility
Notifier for Android Applications
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bvrsilva1@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons
Vieira Resende e Silva, Bruno, "GAINDroid: General Automated Incompatibility Notifier for Android Applications" (2019).
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 167.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss/167
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
GAINDROID: GENERAL AUTOMATED INCOMPATIBILITY NOTIFIER FOR
ANDROID APPLICATIONS
by
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva
A THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulﬁlment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science
Major: Computer Science
Under the Supervision of Hamid Bagheri
Lincoln, Nebraska
April, 2019
GAINDROID: GENERAL AUTOMATED INCOMPATIBILITY NOTIFIER FOR
ANDROID APPLICATIONS
Bruno Vieira Resende e Silva, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2019
Adviser: Hamid Bagheri
With the ever-increasing popularity of mobile devices over the last decade,
mobile apps and the frameworks upon...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain
Registration Privacy under the GDPR
author:Chaoyi Lu and
Baojun Liu and
Yiming Zhang and
Zhou Li and
Fenglu Zhang and
Haixin Duan and
Ying Liu and
Joann Qiongna Chen and
Jinjin Liang and
Zaifeng Zhang and
Shuang Hao and
Min Yang
From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale
Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy
under the GDPR
Chaoyi Lu∗†, Baojun Liu∗†¶(cid:66), Yiming Zhang∗†, Zhou Li§, Fenglu Zhang∗, Haixin Duan∗¶(cid:66),
Ying Liu∗, Joann Qiongna Chen§, Jinjin Liang, Zaifeng Zhang, Shuang Hao∗∗ and Min Yang††
∗Tsinghua University, †Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology,
∗∗University of Texas at Dallas, shao@utdallas.edu, ††Fudan University, m yang@fudan.edu.cn
¶Qi An Xin Group, 360 Netlab, {liangjinjin, zhangzaifeng}@360.cn,
{lcy17, zhangyim17, zﬂ20}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, {lbj, duanhx}@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, liuying@cernet.edu.cn
§University of California, Irvine, {zhou.li, joann.chen}@uci.edu,
Abstract—When a domain is registered, information about the
registrants  and  other  related  personnel  is  recorded  by  WHOIS
databases  owned  by  registrars  or  registries  (called  WHOIS
providers  jointly),  which  are  open  to  public  inquiries.  However,
due  to  the  enforcement  of  the  European  Union’s  General  Data
Protection  Regulation  (GDPR),  certain  WHOIS  data  (i.e.,  the
records about EEA, or the European Economic Area, registrants)
needs  to  be  redacted  before  being  released  to  the  public.  Anec-
dotally,  it  was  reported  that  actions  have  been  taken  by  some
WHOIS  providers.  Yet,  so  far  there  is  no  systematic  study  to
quantify the changes made by the WHOIS providers in response
to  the  GDPR,  their  strategies  for  data  redaction  and  impact  on
other  applications  relying  on  WHOIS  data.
In  this  study,  we  report  the  ﬁrst  large-scale  measurement
study to answer these questions, in hope...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain
Registration Privacy under the GDPR
author:Chaoyi Lu and
Baojun Liu and
Yiming Zhang and
Zhou Li and
Fenglu Zhang and
Haixin Duan and
Ying Liu and
Joann Qiongna Chen and
Jinjin Liang and
Zaifeng Zhang and
Shuang Hao and
Min Yang
From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale
Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy
under the GDPR
Chaoyi Lu∗†, Baojun Liu∗†¶(cid:66), Yiming Zhang∗†, Zhou Li§, Fenglu Zhang∗, Haixin Duan∗¶(cid:66),
Ying Liu∗, Joann Qiongna Chen§, Jinjin Liang, Zaifeng Zhang, Shuang Hao∗∗ and Min Yang††
∗Tsinghua University, †Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology,
∗∗University of Texas at Dallas, shao@utdallas.edu, ††Fudan University, m yang@fudan.edu.cn
¶Qi An Xin Group, 360 Netlab, {liangjinjin, zhangzaifeng}@360.cn,
{lcy17, zhangyim17, zﬂ20}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, {lbj, duanhx}@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, liuying@cernet.edu.cn
§University of California, Irvine, {zhou.li, joann.chen}@uci.edu,
Abstract—When a domain is registered, information about the
registrants  and  other  related  personnel  is  recorded  by  WHOIS
databases  owned  by  registrars  or  registries  (called  WHOIS
providers  jointly),  which  are  open  to  public  inquiries.  However,
due  to  the  enforcement  of  the  European  Union’s  General  Data
Protection  Regulation  (GDPR),  certain  WHOIS  data  (i.e.,  the
records about EEA, or the European Economic Area, registrants)
needs  to  be  redacted  before  being  released  to  the  public.  Anec-
dotally,  it  was  reported  that  actions  have  been  taken  by  some
WHOIS  providers.  Yet,  so  far  there  is  no  systematic  study  to
quantify the changes made by the WHOIS providers in response
to  the  GDPR,  their  strategies  for  data  redaction  and  impact  on
other  applications  relying  on  WHOIS  data.
In  this  study,  we  report  the  ﬁrst  large-scale  measurement
study to answer these questions, in hope...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go?
author:Jason Hiser and
Anh Nguyen-Tuong and
Michele Co and
Matthew Hall and
Jack W. Davidson
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ILR: Where’d My Gadgets Go?
Jason Hiser, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Michele Co, Matthew Hall, Jack W. Davidson
University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
Charlottesville, VA
{hiser,an7s,mc2zk,mh,jwd}@virginia.edu
Abstract—Through randomization of the memory space and
the conﬁnement of code to non-data pages, computer security
researchers have made a wide range of attacks against program
binaries more difﬁcult. However, attacks have evolved to exploit
weaknesses in these defenses.
To thwart these attacks, we introduce a novel technique
called Instruction Location Randomization (ILR). Conceptu-
ally, ILR randomizes the location of every instruction in a
program, thwarting an attacker’s ability to re-use program
functionality (e.g., arc-injection attacks and return-oriented
programming attacks).
ILR operates on arbitrary executable programs, requires
no compiler support, and requires no user interaction. Thus,
it can be automatically applied post-deployment, allowing easy
and frequent re-randomization.
Our preliminary prototype, working on 32-bit x86 Linux
ELF binaries, provides a high degree of entropy. Individual
instructions are randomly placed within a 31-bit address
space. Thus, attacks that rely on a priori knowledge of the
location of code or derandomization are not feasible. We
demonstrated ILR’s defensive capabilities by defeating attacks
against programs with vulnerabilities, including Adobe’s PDF
viewer, acroread, which had an in-the-wild vulnerability.
Additionally, using an industry-standard CPU performance
benchmark suite, we compared the run time of prototype
ILR-protected executables to that of native executables. The
average run-time overhead of ILR was 13% with more than
half the programs having effectively no overhead (15 out of 29),
indicating that ILR is a realistic and cost-ef...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go?
author:Jason Hiser and
Anh Nguyen-Tuong and
Michele Co and
Matthew Hall and
Jack W. Davidson
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ILR: Where’d My Gadgets Go?
Jason Hiser, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Michele Co, Matthew Hall, Jack W. Davidson
University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
Charlottesville, VA
{hiser,an7s,mc2zk,mh,jwd}@virginia.edu
Abstract—Through randomization of the memory space and
the conﬁnement of code to non-data pages, computer security
researchers have made a wide range of attacks against program
binaries more difﬁcult. However, attacks have evolved to exploit
weaknesses in these defenses.
To thwart these attacks, we introduce a novel technique
called Instruction Location Randomization (ILR). Conceptu-
ally, ILR randomizes the location of every instruction in a
program, thwarting an attacker’s ability to re-use program
functionality (e.g., arc-injection attacks and return-oriented
programming attacks).
ILR operates on arbitrary executable programs, requires
no compiler support, and requires no user interaction. Thus,
it can be automatically applied post-deployment, allowing easy
and frequent re-randomization.
Our preliminary prototype, working on 32-bit x86 Linux
ELF binaries, provides a high degree of entropy. Individual
instructions are randomly placed within a 31-bit address
space. Thus, attacks that rely on a priori knowledge of the
location of code or derandomization are not feasible. We
demonstrated ILR’s defensive capabilities by defeating attacks
against programs with vulnerabilities, including Adobe’s PDF
viewer, acroread, which had an in-the-wild vulnerability.
Additionally, using an industry-standard CPU performance
benchmark suite, we compared the run time of prototype
ILR-protected executables to that of native executables. The
average run-time overhead of ILR was 13% with more than
half the programs having effectively no overhead (15 out of 29),
indicating that ILR is a realistic and cost-ef...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
author:Mathy Vanhoef
Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through
Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
Mathy Vanhoef, New York University Abu Dhabi
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/vanhoef
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through
Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
Mathy Vanhoef
New York University Abu Dhabi
mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu
Abstract
In this paper, we present three design ﬂaws in the 802.11
standard that underpins Wi-Fi. One design ﬂaw is in the frame
aggregation functionality, and another two are in the frame
fragmentation functionality. These design ﬂaws enable an
adversary to forge encrypted frames in various ways, which in
turn enables exﬁltration of sensitive data. We also discovered
common implementation ﬂaws related to aggregation and
fragmentation, which further worsen the impact of our attacks.
Our results affect all protected Wi-Fi networks, ranging from
WEP all the way to WPA3, meaning the discovered ﬂaws
have been part of Wi-Fi since its release in 1997. In our
experiments, all devices were vulnerable to one or more of our
attacks, conﬁrming that all Wi-Fi devices are likely affected.
Finally, we present a tool to test whether devices are affected
by any of the vulnerabilities, and we discuss countermeasures
to prevent our attacks.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, major improvements have been made to
the security of Wi-Fi. Most notably this includes the discov-
ery and prevention of key reinstallation in WPA2 [18, 57, 58],
and the standardization of WPA3 which, among other things,
prevents ofﬂine dictionary attacks [60]. Additionally, extra
defenses have been standardized, such as operating channel
validation and beacon protec...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
author:Mathy Vanhoef
Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through
Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
Mathy Vanhoef, New York University Abu Dhabi
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/vanhoef
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium.August 11–13, 2021978-1-939133-24-3Open access to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through
Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation
Mathy Vanhoef
New York University Abu Dhabi
mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu
Abstract
In this paper, we present three design ﬂaws in the 802.11
standard that underpins Wi-Fi. One design ﬂaw is in the frame
aggregation functionality, and another two are in the frame
fragmentation functionality. These design ﬂaws enable an
adversary to forge encrypted frames in various ways, which in
turn enables exﬁltration of sensitive data. We also discovered
common implementation ﬂaws related to aggregation and
fragmentation, which further worsen the impact of our attacks.
Our results affect all protected Wi-Fi networks, ranging from
WEP all the way to WPA3, meaning the discovered ﬂaws
have been part of Wi-Fi since its release in 1997. In our
experiments, all devices were vulnerable to one or more of our
attacks, conﬁrming that all Wi-Fi devices are likely affected.
Finally, we present a tool to test whether devices are affected
by any of the vulnerabilities, and we discuss countermeasures
to prevent our attacks.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, major improvements have been made to
the security of Wi-Fi. Most notably this includes the discov-
ery and prevention of key reinstallation in WPA2 [18, 57, 58],
and the standardization of WPA3 which, among other things,
prevents ofﬂine dictionary attacks [60]. Additionally, extra
defenses have been standardized, such as operating channel
validation and beacon protec...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Improving secure server performance by re-balancing SSL/TLS handshakes
author:Claude Castelluccia and
Einar Mykletun and
Gene Tsudik
Improving Secure Server Performance by Re-balancing SSL/TLS Handshakes
Improving Secure Server Performance by Re-balancing SSL/TLS Handshakes
Claude Castelluccia
Zirst - 655 avenue de l’Europe
38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
INRIA
France
Einar Mykletun, Gene Tsudik
Computer Science
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92697-3425
USA
Claude.Castelluccia@inria.fr
{mykletun,gts}@ics.uci.edu
ABSTRACT
Much of today’s distributed computing takes place in a client
/server model. Despite advances in fault tolerance – in par-
ticular, replication and load distribution – server overload
remains to be a major problem. In the Web context, one
of the main overload factors is the direct consequence of ex-
pensive Public Key operations performed by servers as part
of each SSL handshake. Since most SSL-enabled servers
use RSA, the burden of performing many costly decryption
operations can be very detrimental to server performance.
This paper examines a promising technique for re-balancing
RSA-based client/server handshakes. This technique facil-
itates more favorable load distribution by requiring clients
to perform more work (as part of encryption) and servers to
perform commensurately less work, thus resulting in better
SSL throughput. Proposed techniques are based on careful
adaptation of variants of Server-Aided RSA originally
constructed by Matsumoto, et al.
[1]. Experimental re-
sults demonstrate that suggested methods (termed Client-
Aided RSA) can speed up processing of RSA private key
operations by a factor of between 11 to 19, depending on the
RSA key size. This represents a considerable improvement.
Furthermore, proposed techniques can be a useful compan-
ion tool for SSL Client Puzzles in defense against DoS and
DDoS attacks.
Keywords: Load-balancing, Server-Aided RSA, Denial-of-
Service, Server-Aided Secure Computation, Client Puzzl...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Improving secure server performance by re-balancing SSL/TLS handshakes
author:Claude Castelluccia and
Einar Mykletun and
Gene Tsudik
Improving Secure Server Performance by Re-balancing SSL/TLS Handshakes
Improving Secure Server Performance by Re-balancing SSL/TLS Handshakes
Claude Castelluccia
Zirst - 655 avenue de l’Europe
38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
INRIA
France
Einar Mykletun, Gene Tsudik
Computer Science
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92697-3425
USA
Claude.Castelluccia@inria.fr
{mykletun,gts}@ics.uci.edu
ABSTRACT
Much of today’s distributed computing takes place in a client
/server model. Despite advances in fault tolerance – in par-
ticular, replication and load distribution – server overload
remains to be a major problem. In the Web context, one
of the main overload factors is the direct consequence of ex-
pensive Public Key operations performed by servers as part
of each SSL handshake. Since most SSL-enabled servers
use RSA, the burden of performing many costly decryption
operations can be very detrimental to server performance.
This paper examines a promising technique for re-balancing
RSA-based client/server handshakes. This technique facil-
itates more favorable load distribution by requiring clients
to perform more work (as part of encryption) and servers to
perform commensurately less work, thus resulting in better
SSL throughput. Proposed techniques are based on careful
adaptation of variants of Server-Aided RSA originally
constructed by Matsumoto, et al.
[1]. Experimental re-
sults demonstrate that suggested methods (termed Client-
Aided RSA) can speed up processing of RSA private key
operations by a factor of between 11 to 19, depending on the
RSA key size. This represents a considerable improvement.
Furthermore, proposed techniques can be a useful compan-
ion tool for SSL Client Puzzles in defense against DoS and
DDoS attacks.
Keywords: Load-balancing, Server-Aided RSA, Denial-of-
Service, Server-Aided Secure Computation, Client Puzzl...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection: Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive
Streams by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay
author:David L. Donoho and
Ana Georgina Flesia and
Umesh Shankar and
Vern Paxson and
Jason Coit and
Stuart Staniford
Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection:
Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive Streams
by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay
David L. Donoho1, Ana Georgina Flesia1, Umesh Shankar2, Vern Paxson3,
Jason Coit4, and Stuart Staniford4
1 Department of Statistics, Stanford University
Sequoia Hall, 390 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-4065 USA
{donoho,flesia}@stanford.edu
2 Department of Computer Science, University of California at Berkeley
567 Soda Hall, Berkeley, CA 94704
ushankar@cs.berkeley.edu
3 International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center St. suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704-1198
vern@icir.org
4 Silicon Defense
203 F Street, suit E, Davis, CA95616, USA
{stuart,jasonc}@silicondefense.com
Abstract. Computer attackers frequently relay their attacks through a
compromised host at an innocent site, thereby obscuring the true origin
of the attack. There is a growing literature on ways to detect that an
interactive connection into a site and another outbound from the site
give evidence of such a “stepping stone.” This has been done based on
monitoring the access link connecting the site to the Internet (Eg. [7,11,
8]). The earliest work was based on connection content comparisons but
more recent work has relied on timing information in order to compare
encrypted connections.
Past work on this problem has not yet attempted to cope with the
ways in which intruders might attempt to modify their traﬃc to defeat
stepping stone detection. In this paper we give the ﬁrst consideration
to constraining such intruder evasion. We present some unexpected
results that show there are theoretical limits on the ability of attackers
to disguise their traﬃc in this way for suﬃciently long connections.
We consider evasions that consist of local jitteri...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection: Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive
Streams by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay
author:David L. Donoho and
Ana Georgina Flesia and
Umesh Shankar and
Vern Paxson and
Jason Coit and
Stuart Staniford
Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection:
Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive Streams
by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay
David L. Donoho1, Ana Georgina Flesia1, Umesh Shankar2, Vern Paxson3,
Jason Coit4, and Stuart Staniford4
1 Department of Statistics, Stanford University
Sequoia Hall, 390 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-4065 USA
{donoho,flesia}@stanford.edu
2 Department of Computer Science, University of California at Berkeley
567 Soda Hall, Berkeley, CA 94704
ushankar@cs.berkeley.edu
3 International Computer Science Institute
1947 Center St. suite 600, Berkeley, CA 94704-1198
vern@icir.org
4 Silicon Defense
203 F Street, suit E, Davis, CA95616, USA
{stuart,jasonc}@silicondefense.com
Abstract. Computer attackers frequently relay their attacks through a
compromised host at an innocent site, thereby obscuring the true origin
of the attack. There is a growing literature on ways to detect that an
interactive connection into a site and another outbound from the site
give evidence of such a “stepping stone.” This has been done based on
monitoring the access link connecting the site to the Internet (Eg. [7,11,
8]). The earliest work was based on connection content comparisons but
more recent work has relied on timing information in order to compare
encrypted connections.
Past work on this problem has not yet attempted to cope with the
ways in which intruders might attempt to modify their traﬃc to defeat
stepping stone detection. In this paper we give the ﬁrst consideration
to constraining such intruder evasion. We present some unexpected
results that show there are theoretical limits on the ability of attackers
to disguise their traﬃc in this way for suﬃciently long connections.
We consider evasions that consist of local jitteri...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Compromising Security of Economic Dispatch in Power System Operations
author:Devendra Shelar and
Pengfei Sun and
Saurabh Amin and
Saman A. Zonouz
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Compromising Security of Economic Dispatch
in Power System Operations
Devendra Shelar:, Pengfei Sun˚, Saurabh Amin: and Saman Zonouz˚
Civil and Environmental Engineering, ˚Electrical and Computer Engineering
:Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ˚Rutgers University
{shelard, amins}@mit.edu, {pengfei.sun, saman.zonouz}@rutgers.edu
Abstract—Power grid operations rely on the trustworthy op-
eration of critical control center functionalities, including the so-
called Economic Dispatch (ED) problem. The ED problem is a
large-scale optimization problem that is periodically solved by the
system operator to ensure the balance of supply and load while
maintaining reliability constraints. In this paper, we propose a
semantics-based attack generation and implementation approach
to study the security of the ED problem.1 Firstly, we generate
optimal attack vectors to transmission line ratings to induce
maximum congestion in the critical lines, resulting in the violation
of capacity limits. We formulate a bilevel optimization problem in
which the attacker chooses manipulations of line capacity ratings
to maximinimize the percentage line capacity violations under
linear power ﬂows. We reformulate the bilevel problem as a mixed
integer linear program that can be solved efﬁciently. Secondly,
we describe how the optimal attack vectors can be implemented
in commercial energy management systems (EMSs). The attack
explores the dynamic memory space of the EMS, and replaces
the true line capacity ratings stored in data regions with the
optimal attack vectors. In contrast to the well-known false data
injection attacks to control systems that require compromising
distributed sensors, our approach directly implements attacks to
the control center server. ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Compromising Security of Economic Dispatch in Power System Operations
author:Devendra Shelar and
Pengfei Sun and
Saurabh Amin and
Saman A. Zonouz
2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Compromising Security of Economic Dispatch
in Power System Operations
Devendra Shelar:, Pengfei Sun˚, Saurabh Amin: and Saman Zonouz˚
Civil and Environmental Engineering, ˚Electrical and Computer Engineering
:Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ˚Rutgers University
{shelard, amins}@mit.edu, {pengfei.sun, saman.zonouz}@rutgers.edu
Abstract—Power grid operations rely on the trustworthy op-
eration of critical control center functionalities, including the so-
called Economic Dispatch (ED) problem. The ED problem is a
large-scale optimization problem that is periodically solved by the
system operator to ensure the balance of supply and load while
maintaining reliability constraints. In this paper, we propose a
semantics-based attack generation and implementation approach
to study the security of the ED problem.1 Firstly, we generate
optimal attack vectors to transmission line ratings to induce
maximum congestion in the critical lines, resulting in the violation
of capacity limits. We formulate a bilevel optimization problem in
which the attacker chooses manipulations of line capacity ratings
to maximinimize the percentage line capacity violations under
linear power ﬂows. We reformulate the bilevel problem as a mixed
integer linear program that can be solved efﬁciently. Secondly,
we describe how the optimal attack vectors can be implemented
in commercial energy management systems (EMSs). The attack
explores the dynamic memory space of the EMS, and replaces
the true line capacity ratings stored in data regions with the
optimal attack vectors. In contrast to the well-known false data
injection attacks to control systems that require compromising
distributed sensors, our approach directly implements attacks to
the control center server. ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations via Symbolic Reasoning
author:Ronghai Yang and
Wing Cheong Lau and
Jiongyi Chen and
Kehuan Zhang
Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations
via Symbolic Reasoning
Ronghai Yang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sangfor Technologies Inc.;
 Wing Cheong Lau, Jiongyi Chen, and Kehuan Zhang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yang
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations via Symbolic Reasoning
Ronghai Yang1,2, Wing Cheong Lau1, Jiongyi Chen1, and Kehuan Zhang1
1The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
2Sangfor Technologies Inc.
Abstract
Encouraged by the rapid adoption of Single Sign-On
(SSO) technology in web services, mainstream identity
providers, such as Facebook and Google, have devel-
oped Software Development Kits (SDKs) to facilitate
the implementation of SSO for 3rd-party application de-
velopers. These SDKs have become a critical foun-
dation for web services. Despite its importance, little
effort has been devoted to a systematic testing on the
implementations of SSO SDKs, especially in the pub-
lic domain.
In this paper, we design and implement
S3KVetter (Single-Sign-on SdK Vetter), an automated,
efﬁcient testing tool, to check the logical correctness and
identify vulnerabilities of SSO SDKs. To demonstrate
the efﬁcacy of S3KVetter, we apply it to test ten popular
SSO SDKs which enjoy millions of downloads by ap-
plication developers. Among these carefully engineered
SDKs, S3KVetter has surprisingly discovered 7 classes
of logic ﬂaws, 4 of which were previously unknown.
These vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences,
ranging from the snifﬁng of user activities to the hijack-
ing of user accounts.
1
Introductio...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations via Symbolic Reasoning
author:Ronghai Yang and
Wing Cheong Lau and
Jiongyi Chen and
Kehuan Zhang
Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations
via Symbolic Reasoning
Ronghai Yang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sangfor Technologies Inc.;
 Wing Cheong Lau, Jiongyi Chen, and Kehuan Zhang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yang
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium.
August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
978-1-939133-04-5
Open access to the Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations via Symbolic Reasoning
Ronghai Yang1,2, Wing Cheong Lau1, Jiongyi Chen1, and Kehuan Zhang1
1The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
2Sangfor Technologies Inc.
Abstract
Encouraged by the rapid adoption of Single Sign-On
(SSO) technology in web services, mainstream identity
providers, such as Facebook and Google, have devel-
oped Software Development Kits (SDKs) to facilitate
the implementation of SSO for 3rd-party application de-
velopers. These SDKs have become a critical foun-
dation for web services. Despite its importance, little
effort has been devoted to a systematic testing on the
implementations of SSO SDKs, especially in the pub-
lic domain.
In this paper, we design and implement
S3KVetter (Single-Sign-on SdK Vetter), an automated,
efﬁcient testing tool, to check the logical correctness and
identify vulnerabilities of SSO SDKs. To demonstrate
the efﬁcacy of S3KVetter, we apply it to test ten popular
SSO SDKs which enjoy millions of downloads by ap-
plication developers. Among these carefully engineered
SDKs, S3KVetter has surprisingly discovered 7 classes
of logic ﬂaws, 4 of which were previously unknown.
These vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences,
ranging from the snifﬁng of user activities to the hijack-
ing of user accounts.
1
Introductio...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
author:Yixin Sun and
Anne Edmundson and
Laurent Vanbever and
Oscar Li and
Jennifer Rexford and
Mung Chiang and
Prateek Mittal
RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
Yixin Sun and Anne Edmundson, Princeton University; Laurent Vanbever, ETH Zürich;
Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Mung Chiang, and Prateek Mittal, Princeton University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/sun
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 12–14, 2015 • Washington, D.C.ISBN 978-1-939133-11-3Open access to the Proceedings of  the 24th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXRAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
Yixin Sun
Princeton University
Anne Edmundson
Princeton University
Laurent Vanbever
ETH Zurich
Oscar Li
Princeton University
Jennifer Rexford
Princeton University
Mung Chiang
Princeton University
Prateek Mittal
Princeton University
Abstract
The Tor network is a widely used system for anony-
mous communication. However, Tor is known to be
vulnerable to attackers who can observe trafﬁc at both
ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show
that prior attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. We
present a suite of new attacks, called Raptor, that can
be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes) to com-
promise user anonymity. First, AS-level adversaries can
exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet routing to in-
crease the chance of observing at least one direction of
user trafﬁc at both ends of the communication. Second,
AS-level adversaries can exploit natural churn in Inter-
net routing to lie on the BGP paths for more users over
time. Third, strategic adversaries can manipulate Inter-
net routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using
speciﬁc Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform
trafﬁc analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of Rap-
tor attacks by analyzing historical BGP data and Tracer-
oute data as well as perfor...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
author:Yixin Sun and
Anne Edmundson and
Laurent Vanbever and
Oscar Li and
Jennifer Rexford and
Mung Chiang and
Prateek Mittal
RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
Yixin Sun and Anne Edmundson, Princeton University; Laurent Vanbever, ETH Zürich;
Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Mung Chiang, and Prateek Mittal, Princeton University
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/sun
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security SymposiumAugust 12–14, 2015 • Washington, D.C.ISBN 978-1-939133-11-3Open access to the Proceedings of  the 24th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIXRAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
Yixin Sun
Princeton University
Anne Edmundson
Princeton University
Laurent Vanbever
ETH Zurich
Oscar Li
Princeton University
Jennifer Rexford
Princeton University
Mung Chiang
Princeton University
Prateek Mittal
Princeton University
Abstract
The Tor network is a widely used system for anony-
mous communication. However, Tor is known to be
vulnerable to attackers who can observe trafﬁc at both
ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show
that prior attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. We
present a suite of new attacks, called Raptor, that can
be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes) to com-
promise user anonymity. First, AS-level adversaries can
exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet routing to in-
crease the chance of observing at least one direction of
user trafﬁc at both ends of the communication. Second,
AS-level adversaries can exploit natural churn in Inter-
net routing to lie on the BGP paths for more users over
time. Third, strategic adversaries can manipulate Inter-
net routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using
speciﬁc Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform
trafﬁc analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of Rap-
tor attacks by analyzing historical BGP data and Tracer-
oute data as well as perfor...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:TEA: Enabling State-Intensive Network Functions on Programmable
Switches
author:Daehyeok Kim and
Zaoxing Liu and
Yibo Zhu and
Changhoon Kim and
Jeongkeun Lee and
Vyas Sekar and
Srinivasan Seshan
TEA: Enabling State-Intensive Network Functions on
Programmable Switches
Yibo Zhu
Zaoxing Liu
ByteDance Inc.
Carnegie Mellon University
and Boston University
Daehyeok Kim
Carnegie Mellon University
and Microsoft Research
Changhoon Kim
Intel, Barefoot Switch
Division
Jeongkeun Lee
Intel, Barefoot Switch
Division
Vyas Sekar
Carnegie Mellon University
Srinivasan Seshan
Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
Programmable switches have been touted as an attractive alterna-
tive for deploying network functions (NFs) such as network address
translators (NATs), load balancers, and firewalls. However, their
limited memory capacity has been a major stumbling block that has
stymied their adoption for supporting state-intensive NFs such as
cloud-scale NATs and load balancers that maintain millions of flow-
table entries. In this paper, we explore a new approach that leverages
DRAM on servers available in typical NFV clusters. Our new system
architecture, called TEA (Table Extension Architecture), provides a
virtual table abstraction that allows NFs on programmable switches
to look up large virtual tables built on external DRAM. Our ap-
proach enables switch ASICs to access external DRAM purely in
the data plane without involving CPUs on servers. We address
key design and implementation challenges in realizing this idea.
We demonstrate its feasibility and practicality with our implemen-
tation on a Tofino-based programmable switch. Our evaluation
shows that NFs built with TEA can look up table entries on exter-
nal DRAM with low and predictable latency (1.8–2.2 µs) and the
lookup throughput can be linearly scaled with additional servers
(138 million lookups per seconds with 8 servers).
CCS Concepts
• Networks → Programmable networks; In-network process-
ing; • Hardware → Emerging tech...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:TEA: Enabling State-Intensive Network Functions on Programmable
Switches
author:Daehyeok Kim and
Zaoxing Liu and
Yibo Zhu and
Changhoon Kim and
Jeongkeun Lee and
Vyas Sekar and
Srinivasan Seshan
TEA: Enabling State-Intensive Network Functions on
Programmable Switches
Yibo Zhu
Zaoxing Liu
ByteDance Inc.
Carnegie Mellon University
and Boston University
Daehyeok Kim
Carnegie Mellon University
and Microsoft Research
Changhoon Kim
Intel, Barefoot Switch
Division
Jeongkeun Lee
Intel, Barefoot Switch
Division
Vyas Sekar
Carnegie Mellon University
Srinivasan Seshan
Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
Programmable switches have been touted as an attractive alterna-
tive for deploying network functions (NFs) such as network address
translators (NATs), load balancers, and firewalls. However, their
limited memory capacity has been a major stumbling block that has
stymied their adoption for supporting state-intensive NFs such as
cloud-scale NATs and load balancers that maintain millions of flow-
table entries. In this paper, we explore a new approach that leverages
DRAM on servers available in typical NFV clusters. Our new system
architecture, called TEA (Table Extension Architecture), provides a
virtual table abstraction that allows NFs on programmable switches
to look up large virtual tables built on external DRAM. Our ap-
proach enables switch ASICs to access external DRAM purely in
the data plane without involving CPUs on servers. We address
key design and implementation challenges in realizing this idea.
We demonstrate its feasibility and practicality with our implemen-
tation on a Tofino-based programmable switch. Our evaluation
shows that NFs built with TEA can look up table entries on exter-
nal DRAM with low and predictable latency (1.8–2.2 µs) and the
lookup throughput can be linearly scaled with additional servers
(138 million lookups per seconds with 8 servers).
CCS Concepts
• Networks → Programmable networks; In-network process-
ing; • Hardware → Emerging tech...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。