Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Hummingbird: Privacy at the Time of Twitter
author:Emiliano De Cristofaro and
Claudio Soriente and
Gene Tsudik and
Andrew Williams
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hummingbird: Privacy at the time of Twitter
Emiliano De Cristofaro∗
PARC
edc@parc.com
Claudio Soriente†
ETH Zurich
Gene Tsudik
UC Irvine
Andrew Williams‡
UC Irvine
claudio.soriente@inf.ethz.ch
gene.tsudik@uci.edu
andrewmw@uci.edu
Abstract—In the last several years, micro-blogging Online
Social Networks (OSNs), such as Twitter, have taken the world
by storm, now boasting over 100 million subscribers. As an
unparalleled stage for an enormous audience, they offer fast
and reliable centralized diffusion of pithy tweets to great mul-
titudes of information-hungry and always-connected followers.
At the same time, this information gathering and dissemination
paradigm prompts some important privacy concerns about
relationships between tweeters, followers and interests of the
latter. In this paper, we assess privacy in today’s Twitter-like
OSNs and describe an architecture and a trial implementation
of a privacy-preserving service called Hummingbird. It is
essentially a variant of Twitter that protects tweet contents,
hashtags and follower interests from the (potentially) prying
eyes of the centralized server. We argue that, although in-
herently limited by Twitter’s mission of scalable information-
sharing, this degree of privacy is valuable. We demonstrate, via
a working prototype, that Hummingbird’s additional costs are
tolerably low. We also sketch out some viable enhancements
that might offer better privacy in the long term.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) offer multitudes of peo-
ple a means to communicate, share interests, and update
others about their current activities. Social networking ser-
vices are progressively replacing more “traditional” one-
to-one communication systems, such as email and instant
messaging. Alas, as their proliferation increases, so do
privacy concer...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:An Experience Developing an IDS Stimulator for the Black-Box Testing
of Network Intrusion Detection Systems
author:Darren Mutz and
Giovanni Vigna and
Richard A. Kemmerer
An Experience Developing an IDS Stimulator for the Black-Box Testing of
Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Darren Mutz
Giovanni Vigna
Richard Kemmerer
Reliable Software Group
Department of Computer Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
 dhm,vigna,kemm @cs.ucsb.edu
Abstract
Signature-based intrusion detection systems use a set of
attack descriptions to analyze event streams, looking for
evidence of malicious behavior.
If the signatures are ex-
pressed in a well-deﬁned language, it is possible to ana-
lyze the attack signatures and automatically generate events
or series of events that conform to the attack descriptions.
This approach has been used in tools whose goal is to force
intrusion detection systems to generate a large number of
detection alerts. The resulting “alert storm” is used to de-
sensitize intrusion detection system administrators and hide
attacks in the event stream. We apply a similar technique to
perform testing of intrusion detection systems. Signatures
from one intrusion detection system are used as input to
an event stream generator that produces randomized syn-
thetic events that match the input signatures. The resulting
event stream is then fed to a number of different intrusion
detection systems and the results are analyzed. This pa-
per presents the general testing approach and describes the
ﬁrst prototype of a tool, called Mucus, that automatically
generates network trafﬁc using the signatures of the Snort
network-based intrusion detection system. The paper de-
scribes preliminary cross-testing experiments with both an
open-source and a commercial tool and reports the results.
An evasion attack that was discovered as a result of analyz-
ing the test results is also presented.
Keywords: Evasion Attacks, Intrusion Detection, Software
Testing, Trafﬁc Generat...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:An Experience Developing an IDS Stimulator for the Black-Box Testing
of Network Intrusion Detection Systems
author:Darren Mutz and
Giovanni Vigna and
Richard A. Kemmerer
An Experience Developing an IDS Stimulator for the Black-Box Testing of
Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Darren Mutz
Giovanni Vigna
Richard Kemmerer
Reliable Software Group
Department of Computer Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
 dhm,vigna,kemm @cs.ucsb.edu
Abstract
Signature-based intrusion detection systems use a set of
attack descriptions to analyze event streams, looking for
evidence of malicious behavior.
If the signatures are ex-
pressed in a well-deﬁned language, it is possible to ana-
lyze the attack signatures and automatically generate events
or series of events that conform to the attack descriptions.
This approach has been used in tools whose goal is to force
intrusion detection systems to generate a large number of
detection alerts. The resulting “alert storm” is used to de-
sensitize intrusion detection system administrators and hide
attacks in the event stream. We apply a similar technique to
perform testing of intrusion detection systems. Signatures
from one intrusion detection system are used as input to
an event stream generator that produces randomized syn-
thetic events that match the input signatures. The resulting
event stream is then fed to a number of different intrusion
detection systems and the results are analyzed. This pa-
per presents the general testing approach and describes the
ﬁrst prototype of a tool, called Mucus, that automatically
generates network trafﬁc using the signatures of the Snort
network-based intrusion detection system. The paper de-
scribes preliminary cross-testing experiments with both an
open-source and a commercial tool and reports the results.
An evasion attack that was discovered as a result of analyz-
ing the test results is also presented.
Keywords: Evasion Attacks, Intrusion Detection, Software
Testing, Trafﬁc Generat...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Direct static enforcement of high-level security policies
author:Qihua Wang and
Ninghui Li
Direct Static Enforcement of High-Level Security Policies
Qihua Wang
wangq@cs.purdue.edu
Ninghui Li
ninghui@cs.purdue.edu
Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security
and Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
ABSTRACT
A high-level security policy states an overall safety requirement for
a sensitive task. One example of a high-level security policy is a
separation of duty policy, which requires a sensitive task to be per-
formed by a team of at least k users. Recently, Li and Wang [6]
proposed an algebra for specifying a wide range of high-level se-
curity policies with both qualiﬁcation and quantity requirements on
users who perform a task. In this paper, we study the problem of di-
rect static enforcement of high-level security policies expressed in
this algebra. We formally deﬁne the notion of a static safety policy,
which requires that every set of users together having all permis-
sions needed to complete a sensitive task must contain a subset that
satisﬁes the corresponding security requirement expressed as a term
in the algebra. The static safety checking problem asks whether an
access control state satisﬁes a given high-level policy. We study
several computational problems related to the static safety check-
ing problem, and design and evaluate an algorithm for solving the
problem.
1.
INTRODUCTION
A high-level security policy states an overall safety requirement
for a sensitive task. One well-known high-level security policy is
Separation of Duty (SoD). In its simplest form, an SoD policy states
that a sensitive task should be performed by two different users act-
ing in cooperation. More generally, an SoD policy requires the co-
operation of at least k (k ≥ 2) different users to complete the task.
SoD is a high-level policy because it does not place restrictions on
which users are allowed to perform which individual steps in ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Direct static enforcement of high-level security policies
author:Qihua Wang and
Ninghui Li
Direct Static Enforcement of High-Level Security Policies
Qihua Wang
wangq@cs.purdue.edu
Ninghui Li
ninghui@cs.purdue.edu
Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security
and Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
ABSTRACT
A high-level security policy states an overall safety requirement for
a sensitive task. One example of a high-level security policy is a
separation of duty policy, which requires a sensitive task to be per-
formed by a team of at least k users. Recently, Li and Wang [6]
proposed an algebra for specifying a wide range of high-level se-
curity policies with both qualiﬁcation and quantity requirements on
users who perform a task. In this paper, we study the problem of di-
rect static enforcement of high-level security policies expressed in
this algebra. We formally deﬁne the notion of a static safety policy,
which requires that every set of users together having all permis-
sions needed to complete a sensitive task must contain a subset that
satisﬁes the corresponding security requirement expressed as a term
in the algebra. The static safety checking problem asks whether an
access control state satisﬁes a given high-level policy. We study
several computational problems related to the static safety check-
ing problem, and design and evaluate an algorithm for solving the
problem.
1.
INTRODUCTION
A high-level security policy states an overall safety requirement
for a sensitive task. One well-known high-level security policy is
Separation of Duty (SoD). In its simplest form, an SoD policy states
that a sensitive task should be performed by two different users act-
ing in cooperation. More generally, an SoD policy requires the co-
operation of at least k (k ≥ 2) different users to complete the task.
SoD is a high-level policy because it does not place restrictions on
which users are allowed to perform which individual steps in ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CrossLine: Breaking "Security-by-Crash" based Memory Isolation in
AMD SEV
author:Mengyuan Li and
Yinqian Zhang and
Zhiqiang Lin
CrossLine: Breaking “Security-by-Crash” based Memory
Isolation in AMD SEV
Mengyuan Li
The Ohio State University
li.7533@osu.edu
Yinqian Zhang✉
Southern University of Science &
Technology
yinqianz@acm.org
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
ABSTRACT
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an emerging secu-
rity feature of modern AMD processors that allows virtual machines
to run with encrypted memory and perform confidential comput-
ing even with an untrusted hypervisor. This paper first demystifies
SEV’s improper use of address space identifier (ASID) for control-
ling accesses of a VM to encrypted memory pages, cache lines,
and TLB entries. We then present the CrossLine attacks1, a novel
class of attacks against SEV that allow the adversary to launch an
attacker VM and change its ASID to that of the victim VM to imper-
sonate the victim. We present two variants of CrossLine attacks:
CrossLine V1 decrypts victim’s page tables or any memory blocks
conforming to the format of a page table entry; CrossLine V2 con-
structs encryption and decryption oracles by executing instructions
of the victim VM. We discuss the applicability of CrossLine attacks
on AMD’s SEV, SEV-ES, and SEV-SNP processors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Hardware security implementa-
tion; Hardware attacks and countermeasures; Trusted com-
puting.
KEYWORDS
Trusted execution environments; Secure Encrypted Virtualization;
Memory encryption; Cloud security
ACM Reference Format:
Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin. 2021. CrossLine: Breaking
“Security-by-Crash” based Memory Isolation in AMD SEV. In Proceedings of
the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS ’21), November 15–19, 2021, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 14 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485253
1 I...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CrossLine: Breaking "Security-by-Crash" based Memory Isolation in
AMD SEV
author:Mengyuan Li and
Yinqian Zhang and
Zhiqiang Lin
CrossLine: Breaking “Security-by-Crash” based Memory
Isolation in AMD SEV
Mengyuan Li
The Ohio State University
li.7533@osu.edu
Yinqian Zhang✉
Southern University of Science &
Technology
yinqianz@acm.org
Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
zlin@cse.ohio-state.edu
ABSTRACT
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an emerging secu-
rity feature of modern AMD processors that allows virtual machines
to run with encrypted memory and perform confidential comput-
ing even with an untrusted hypervisor. This paper first demystifies
SEV’s improper use of address space identifier (ASID) for control-
ling accesses of a VM to encrypted memory pages, cache lines,
and TLB entries. We then present the CrossLine attacks1, a novel
class of attacks against SEV that allow the adversary to launch an
attacker VM and change its ASID to that of the victim VM to imper-
sonate the victim. We present two variants of CrossLine attacks:
CrossLine V1 decrypts victim’s page tables or any memory blocks
conforming to the format of a page table entry; CrossLine V2 con-
structs encryption and decryption oracles by executing instructions
of the victim VM. We discuss the applicability of CrossLine attacks
on AMD’s SEV, SEV-ES, and SEV-SNP processors.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Hardware security implementa-
tion; Hardware attacks and countermeasures; Trusted com-
puting.
KEYWORDS
Trusted execution environments; Secure Encrypted Virtualization;
Memory encryption; Cloud security
ACM Reference Format:
Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, and Zhiqiang Lin. 2021. CrossLine: Breaking
“Security-by-Crash” based Memory Isolation in AMD SEV. In Proceedings of
the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS ’21), November 15–19, 2021, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 14 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485253
1 I...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Graph-theoretic analysis of structured peer-to-peer systems: routing
distances and fault resilience
author:Dmitri Loguinov and
Anuj Kumar and
Vivek Rai and
Sai Ganesh
Graph-Theoretic Analysis of Structured Peer-to-Peer
Systems: Routing Distances and Fault Resilience
Dmitri Loguinov, Anuj Kumar, Vivek Rai, Sai Ganesh
Department of Computer Science
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843
dmitri,anujk,vivekr,ssai@cs.tamu.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper examines graph-theoretic properties of existing
peer-to-peer architectures and proposes a new infrastructure
based on optimal-diameter de Bruijn graphs. Since gener-
alized de Bruijn graphs possess very short average routing
distances and high resilience to node failure, they are well
suited for structured peer-to-peer networks. Using the ex-
ample of Chord, CAN, and de Bruijn, we ﬁrst study routing
performance, graph expansion, and clustering properties of
each graph. We then examine bisection width, path over-
lap, and several other properties that aﬀect routing and re-
silience of peer-to-peer networks. Having conﬁrmed that de
Bruijn graphs oﬀer the best diameter and highest connec-
tivity among the existing peer-to-peer structures, we oﬀer
a very simple incremental building process that preserves
optimal properties of de Bruijn graphs under uniform user
joins/departures. We call the combined peer-to-peer archi-
tecture ODRI – Optimal Diameter Routing Infrastructure.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Communication Networks]: Network Protocols
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Theory
Keywords
Peer-to-peer, Modeling, Graph Theory, DHT, de Bruijn
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, peer-to-peer networks have rapidly
evolved and have become an important part of the exist-
ing Internet culture. All current peer-to-peer proposals are
built using application-layer overlays, each with a set of
graph-theoretic properties that determine its routing eﬃ-
ciency and resilience to node failure. Graphs in peer-t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Graph-theoretic analysis of structured peer-to-peer systems: routing
distances and fault resilience
author:Dmitri Loguinov and
Anuj Kumar and
Vivek Rai and
Sai Ganesh
Graph-Theoretic Analysis of Structured Peer-to-Peer
Systems: Routing Distances and Fault Resilience
Dmitri Loguinov, Anuj Kumar, Vivek Rai, Sai Ganesh
Department of Computer Science
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843
dmitri,anujk,vivekr,ssai@cs.tamu.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper examines graph-theoretic properties of existing
peer-to-peer architectures and proposes a new infrastructure
based on optimal-diameter de Bruijn graphs. Since gener-
alized de Bruijn graphs possess very short average routing
distances and high resilience to node failure, they are well
suited for structured peer-to-peer networks. Using the ex-
ample of Chord, CAN, and de Bruijn, we ﬁrst study routing
performance, graph expansion, and clustering properties of
each graph. We then examine bisection width, path over-
lap, and several other properties that aﬀect routing and re-
silience of peer-to-peer networks. Having conﬁrmed that de
Bruijn graphs oﬀer the best diameter and highest connec-
tivity among the existing peer-to-peer structures, we oﬀer
a very simple incremental building process that preserves
optimal properties of de Bruijn graphs under uniform user
joins/departures. We call the combined peer-to-peer archi-
tecture ODRI – Optimal Diameter Routing Infrastructure.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Communication Networks]: Network Protocols
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Theory
Keywords
Peer-to-peer, Modeling, Graph Theory, DHT, de Bruijn
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, peer-to-peer networks have rapidly
evolved and have become an important part of the exist-
ing Internet culture. All current peer-to-peer proposals are
built using application-layer overlays, each with a set of
graph-theoretic properties that determine its routing eﬃ-
ciency and resilience to node failure. Graphs in peer-t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:No attack necessary: the surprising dynamics of SSL trust relationships
author:B. Amann and
Robin Sommer and
Matthias Vallentin and
Seth Hall
The Surprising Dynamics of SSL Trust Relationships
No Attack Necessary:
Bernhard Amann1, Robin Sommer1,3, Matthias Vallentin2, Seth Hall1
1International Computer Science Institute
2UC Berkeley
3Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
ABSTRACT
Much of the Internet’s end-to-end security relies on the
SSL/TLS protocol along with its underlying X.509 certiﬁcate
infrastructure. However, the system remains quite brittle due
to its liberal delegation of signing authority: a single com-
promised certiﬁcation authority undermines trust globally.
Several recent high-proﬁle incidents have demonstrated this
shortcoming convincingly. Over time, the security commu-
nity has proposed a number of counter measures to increase
the security of the certiﬁcate ecosystem; many of these eﬀorts
monitor for what they consider tell-tale signs of man-in-the-
middle attacks. In this work we set out to understand to
which degree benign changes to the certiﬁcate ecosystem
share structural properties with attacks, based on a large-
scale data set of more than 17 billion SSL sessions. We ﬁnd
that common intuition falls short in assessing the malicious-
ness of an unknown certiﬁcate, since their typical artifacts
routinely occur in benign contexts as well. We also discuss
what impact our observations have on proposals aiming to
improve the security of the SSL ecosystem.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As a key building block of today’s Internet security, the
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL1) protocol provides secure end-to-
end channels and authentication through its underlying X.509
certiﬁcate infrastructure. In a nutshell, certiﬁcate authori-
ties (CAs) sign server certiﬁcates, which clients then verify
against a list of trusted root CA certiﬁcates shipping with
their operating system or client software. In most cases, root
CAs do not sign server certiﬁcates directly, but in...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:No attack necessary: the surprising dynamics of SSL trust relationships
author:B. Amann and
Robin Sommer and
Matthias Vallentin and
Seth Hall
The Surprising Dynamics of SSL Trust Relationships
No Attack Necessary:
Bernhard Amann1, Robin Sommer1,3, Matthias Vallentin2, Seth Hall1
1International Computer Science Institute
2UC Berkeley
3Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
ABSTRACT
Much of the Internet’s end-to-end security relies on the
SSL/TLS protocol along with its underlying X.509 certiﬁcate
infrastructure. However, the system remains quite brittle due
to its liberal delegation of signing authority: a single com-
promised certiﬁcation authority undermines trust globally.
Several recent high-proﬁle incidents have demonstrated this
shortcoming convincingly. Over time, the security commu-
nity has proposed a number of counter measures to increase
the security of the certiﬁcate ecosystem; many of these eﬀorts
monitor for what they consider tell-tale signs of man-in-the-
middle attacks. In this work we set out to understand to
which degree benign changes to the certiﬁcate ecosystem
share structural properties with attacks, based on a large-
scale data set of more than 17 billion SSL sessions. We ﬁnd
that common intuition falls short in assessing the malicious-
ness of an unknown certiﬁcate, since their typical artifacts
routinely occur in benign contexts as well. We also discuss
what impact our observations have on proposals aiming to
improve the security of the SSL ecosystem.
1.
INTRODUCTION
As a key building block of today’s Internet security, the
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL1) protocol provides secure end-to-
end channels and authentication through its underlying X.509
certiﬁcate infrastructure. In a nutshell, certiﬁcate authori-
ties (CAs) sign server certiﬁcates, which clients then verify
against a list of trusted root CA certiﬁcates shipping with
their operating system or client software. In most cases, root
CAs do not sign server certiﬁcates directly, but in...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:FANS: Fuzzing Android Native System Services via Automated Interface
Analysis
author:Baozheng Liu and
Chao Zhang and
Guang Gong and
Yishun Zeng and
Haifeng Ruan and
Jianwei Zhuge
FANS: Fuzzing Android Native System Services
via Automated Interface Analysis
Baozheng Liu1,2∗, Chao Zhang1,2, Guang Gong3,
Yishun Zeng1,2, Haifeng Ruan4, Jianwei Zhuge1,2
1Institute of Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University chaoz@tsinghua.edu.cn
2Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology zhugejw@tsinghua.edu.cn
3Alpha Lab, 360 Internet Security Center 4Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University
Abstract
1
Introduction
Android native system services provide essential supports and
fundamental functionalities for user apps. Finding vulnerabil-
ities in them is crucial for Android security. Fuzzing is one of
the most popular vulnerability discovery solutions, yet faces
several challenges when applied to Android native system
services. First, such services are invoked via a special inter-
process communication (IPC) mechanism, namely binder,
via service-speciﬁc interfaces. Thus, the fuzzer has to recog-
nize all interfaces and generate interface-speciﬁc test cases
automatically. Second, effective test cases should satisfy the
interface model of each interface. Third, the test cases should
also satisfy the semantic requirements, including variable
dependencies and interface dependencies.
In this paper, we propose an automated generation-based
fuzzing solution FANS to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in Android na-
tive system services. It ﬁrst collects all interfaces in target
services and uncovers deep nested multi-level interfaces to
test. Then, it automatically extracts interface models, includ-
ing feasible transaction code, variable names and types in the
transaction data, from the abstract syntax tree (AST) of target
interfaces. Further, it infers variable dependencies in transac-
tions via the variable name and type knowledge...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:FANS: Fuzzing Android Native System Services via Automated Interface
Analysis
author:Baozheng Liu and
Chao Zhang and
Guang Gong and
Yishun Zeng and
Haifeng Ruan and
Jianwei Zhuge
FANS: Fuzzing Android Native System Services
via Automated Interface Analysis
Baozheng Liu1,2∗, Chao Zhang1,2, Guang Gong3,
Yishun Zeng1,2, Haifeng Ruan4, Jianwei Zhuge1,2
1Institute of Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University chaoz@tsinghua.edu.cn
2Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology zhugejw@tsinghua.edu.cn
3Alpha Lab, 360 Internet Security Center 4Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University
Abstract
1
Introduction
Android native system services provide essential supports and
fundamental functionalities for user apps. Finding vulnerabil-
ities in them is crucial for Android security. Fuzzing is one of
the most popular vulnerability discovery solutions, yet faces
several challenges when applied to Android native system
services. First, such services are invoked via a special inter-
process communication (IPC) mechanism, namely binder,
via service-speciﬁc interfaces. Thus, the fuzzer has to recog-
nize all interfaces and generate interface-speciﬁc test cases
automatically. Second, effective test cases should satisfy the
interface model of each interface. Third, the test cases should
also satisfy the semantic requirements, including variable
dependencies and interface dependencies.
In this paper, we propose an automated generation-based
fuzzing solution FANS to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in Android na-
tive system services. It ﬁrst collects all interfaces in target
services and uncovers deep nested multi-level interfaces to
test. Then, it automatically extracts interface models, includ-
ing feasible transaction code, variable names and types in the
transaction data, from the abstract syntax tree (AST) of target
interfaces. Further, it infers variable dependencies in transac-
tions via the variable name and type knowledge...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Superset Disassembly: Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without Heuristics
author:Erick Bauman and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Kevin W. Hamlen
Superset Disassembly:
Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without Heuristics
Erick Bauman
University of Texas at Dallas
erick.bauman@utdallas.edu
Zhiqiang Lin
University of Texas at Dallas
zhiqiang.lin@utdallas.edu
Kevin W. Hamlen
University of Texas at Dallas
hamlen@utdallas.edu
Abstract—Static binary rewriting is a core technology for
many systems and security applications, including proﬁling, opti-
mization, and software fault isolation. While many static binary
rewriters have been developed over the past few decades, most
make various assumptions about the binary, such as requiring
correct disassembly, cooperation from compilers, or access to de-
bugging symbols or relocation entries. This paper presents MUL-
TIVERSE, a new binary rewriter that is able to rewrite Intel CISC
binaries without these assumptions. Two fundamental techniques
are developed to achieve this: (1) a superset disassembly that com-
pletely disassembles the binary code into a superset of instructions
in which all legal instructions fall, and (2) an instruction rewriter
that is able to relocate all instructions to any other location by
mediating all indirect control ﬂow transfers and redirecting them
to the correct new addresses. A prototype implementation of MUL-
TIVERSE and evaluation on SPECint 2006 benchmarks shows that
MULTIVERSE is able to rewrite all of the testing binaries with a rea-
sonable runtime overhead for the new rewritten binaries. Simple
static instrumentation using MULTIVERSE and its comparison with
dynamic instrumentation shows that the approach achieves better
average performance. Finally, the security applications of MUL-
TIVERSE are exhibited by using it to implement a shadow stack.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In many systems and security applications, there is a
need to statically transform COTS binaries. Software fault
isolation (SFI) [41], includ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Superset Disassembly: Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without Heuristics
author:Erick Bauman and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Kevin W. Hamlen
Superset Disassembly:
Statically Rewriting x86 Binaries Without Heuristics
Erick Bauman
University of Texas at Dallas
erick.bauman@utdallas.edu
Zhiqiang Lin
University of Texas at Dallas
zhiqiang.lin@utdallas.edu
Kevin W. Hamlen
University of Texas at Dallas
hamlen@utdallas.edu
Abstract—Static binary rewriting is a core technology for
many systems and security applications, including proﬁling, opti-
mization, and software fault isolation. While many static binary
rewriters have been developed over the past few decades, most
make various assumptions about the binary, such as requiring
correct disassembly, cooperation from compilers, or access to de-
bugging symbols or relocation entries. This paper presents MUL-
TIVERSE, a new binary rewriter that is able to rewrite Intel CISC
binaries without these assumptions. Two fundamental techniques
are developed to achieve this: (1) a superset disassembly that com-
pletely disassembles the binary code into a superset of instructions
in which all legal instructions fall, and (2) an instruction rewriter
that is able to relocate all instructions to any other location by
mediating all indirect control ﬂow transfers and redirecting them
to the correct new addresses. A prototype implementation of MUL-
TIVERSE and evaluation on SPECint 2006 benchmarks shows that
MULTIVERSE is able to rewrite all of the testing binaries with a rea-
sonable runtime overhead for the new rewritten binaries. Simple
static instrumentation using MULTIVERSE and its comparison with
dynamic instrumentation shows that the approach achieves better
average performance. Finally, the security applications of MUL-
TIVERSE are exhibited by using it to implement a shadow stack.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In many systems and security applications, there is a
need to statically transform COTS binaries. Software fault
isolation (SFI) [41], includ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag
author:Karsten Nohl and
David Evans and
Starbug and
Henryk Pl"otz
Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag
Karsten Nohl and David Evans
University of Virginia
Department of Computer Science
{nohl,evans}@cs.virginia.edu
Starbug and Henryk Pl¨otz
Chaos Computer Club
Berlin
starbug@ccc.de, henryk@ploetzli.ch
Abstract
The security of embedded devices often relies on the secrecy of proprietary cryptographic algorithms. These
algorithms and their weaknesses are frequently disclosed through reverse-engineering software, but it is
commonly thought to be too expensive to reconstruct designs from a hardware implementation alone. This
paper challenges that belief by presenting an approach to reverse-engineering a cipher from a silicon imple-
mentation. Using this mostly automated approach, we reveal a cipher from an RFID tag that is not known
to have a software or micro-code implementation. We reconstruct the cipher from the widely used Mifare
Classic RFID tag by using a combination of image analysis of circuits and protocol analysis. Our analysis re-
veals that the security of the tag is even below the level that its 48-bit key length suggests due to a number of
design ﬂaws. Weak random numbers and a weakness in the authentication protocol allow for pre-computed
rainbow tables to be used to ﬁnd any key in a matter of seconds. Our approach of deducing functional-
ity from circuit images is mostly automated, hence it is also feasible for large chips. The assumption that
algorithms can be kept secret should therefore to be avoided for any type of silicon chip.
Il faut qu’il n’exige pas le secret, et qu’il puisse sans inconv´enient tomber entre les mains de l’ennemi.
([A cipher] must not depend on secrecy, and it must not matter if it falls into enemy hands.)
August Kerckhoffs, La Cryptographie Militaire, January 1883 [13]
1
Introduction
It has long been recognized that security-through-obscur-
ity does not work. However...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag
author:Karsten Nohl and
David Evans and
Starbug and
Henryk Pl"otz
Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag
Karsten Nohl and David Evans
University of Virginia
Department of Computer Science
{nohl,evans}@cs.virginia.edu
Starbug and Henryk Pl¨otz
Chaos Computer Club
Berlin
starbug@ccc.de, henryk@ploetzli.ch
Abstract
The security of embedded devices often relies on the secrecy of proprietary cryptographic algorithms. These
algorithms and their weaknesses are frequently disclosed through reverse-engineering software, but it is
commonly thought to be too expensive to reconstruct designs from a hardware implementation alone. This
paper challenges that belief by presenting an approach to reverse-engineering a cipher from a silicon imple-
mentation. Using this mostly automated approach, we reveal a cipher from an RFID tag that is not known
to have a software or micro-code implementation. We reconstruct the cipher from the widely used Mifare
Classic RFID tag by using a combination of image analysis of circuits and protocol analysis. Our analysis re-
veals that the security of the tag is even below the level that its 48-bit key length suggests due to a number of
design ﬂaws. Weak random numbers and a weakness in the authentication protocol allow for pre-computed
rainbow tables to be used to ﬁnd any key in a matter of seconds. Our approach of deducing functional-
ity from circuit images is mostly automated, hence it is also feasible for large chips. The assumption that
algorithms can be kept secret should therefore to be avoided for any type of silicon chip.
Il faut qu’il n’exige pas le secret, et qu’il puisse sans inconv´enient tomber entre les mains de l’ennemi.
([A cipher] must not depend on secrecy, and it must not matter if it falls into enemy hands.)
August Kerckhoffs, La Cryptographie Militaire, January 1883 [13]
1
Introduction
It has long been recognized that security-through-obscur-
ity does not work. However...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:CFI CaRE: Hardware-Supported Call and Return Enforcement for Commercial
Microcontrollers
author:Thomas Nyman and
Jan-Erik Ekberg and
Lucas Davi and
N. Asokan
CFI CaRE: Hardware-Supported Call
and Return Enforcement for Commercial
Microcontrollers
Thomas Nyman1,2(B), Jan-Erik Ekberg2, Lucas Davi3, and N. Asokan1
1 Aalto University, Espoo, Finland
thomas.nyman@aalto.fi, n.asokan@acm.org
2 Trustonic, Helsinki, Finland
{thomas.nyman,jee}@trustonic.com
3 University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
lucas.davi@wiwinf.uni-due.de
Abstract. With the increasing scale of deployment of Internet of Things
(IoT), concerns about IoT security have become more urgent. In par-
ticular, memory corruption attacks play a predominant role as they
allow remote compromise of IoT devices. Control-ﬂow integrity (CFI)
is a promising and generic defense technique against these attacks. How-
ever, given the nature of IoT deployments, existing protection mecha-
nisms for traditional computing environments (including CFI) need to
be adapted to the IoT setting. In this paper, we describe the challenges
of enabling CFI on microcontroller (MCU) based IoT devices. We then
present CaRE, the ﬁrst interrupt-aware CFI scheme for low-end MCUs.
CaRE uses a novel way of protecting the CFI metadata by leveraging
TrustZone-M security extensions introduced in the ARMv8-M architec-
ture. Its binary instrumentation approach preserves the memory layout
of the target MCU software, allowing pre-built bare-metal binary code to
be protected by CaRE. We describe our implementation on a Cortex-M
Prototyping System and demonstrate that CaRE is secure while impos-
ing acceptable performance and memory impact.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are becoming pervasive across many applica-
tion areas ranging from industrial applications (manufacturing), transport, and
smart cities to consumer products. Internet of Things (IoT) refers to systems
incorporating such devices with (typically always-on) communic...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:CFI CaRE: Hardware-Supported Call and Return Enforcement for Commercial
Microcontrollers
author:Thomas Nyman and
Jan-Erik Ekberg and
Lucas Davi and
N. Asokan
CFI CaRE: Hardware-Supported Call
and Return Enforcement for Commercial
Microcontrollers
Thomas Nyman1,2(B), Jan-Erik Ekberg2, Lucas Davi3, and N. Asokan1
1 Aalto University, Espoo, Finland
thomas.nyman@aalto.fi, n.asokan@acm.org
2 Trustonic, Helsinki, Finland
{thomas.nyman,jee}@trustonic.com
3 University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
lucas.davi@wiwinf.uni-due.de
Abstract. With the increasing scale of deployment of Internet of Things
(IoT), concerns about IoT security have become more urgent. In par-
ticular, memory corruption attacks play a predominant role as they
allow remote compromise of IoT devices. Control-ﬂow integrity (CFI)
is a promising and generic defense technique against these attacks. How-
ever, given the nature of IoT deployments, existing protection mecha-
nisms for traditional computing environments (including CFI) need to
be adapted to the IoT setting. In this paper, we describe the challenges
of enabling CFI on microcontroller (MCU) based IoT devices. We then
present CaRE, the ﬁrst interrupt-aware CFI scheme for low-end MCUs.
CaRE uses a novel way of protecting the CFI metadata by leveraging
TrustZone-M security extensions introduced in the ARMv8-M architec-
ture. Its binary instrumentation approach preserves the memory layout
of the target MCU software, allowing pre-built bare-metal binary code to
be protected by CaRE. We describe our implementation on a Cortex-M
Prototyping System and demonstrate that CaRE is secure while impos-
ing acceptable performance and memory impact.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are becoming pervasive across many applica-
tion areas ranging from industrial applications (manufacturing), transport, and
smart cities to consumer products. Internet of Things (IoT) refers to systems
incorporating such devices with (typically always-on) communic...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Cryptographic primitives for building secure and privacy respecting
protocols
author:Jan Camenisch
Cryptographic Primitives for Building Secure and Privacy
Respecting Protocols
Keynote – 2010 ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Innovation Award
Jan Camenisch
IBM Research – Zurich
jca@zurich.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
Using the Internet and other electronic media for our daily
tasks has become common. Thereby a lot of sensitive infor-
mation is exchanged, processed, and stored at many diﬀer-
ent places. Once released, controlling the dispersal of this
information is virtually impossible. Worse, the press reports
daily on incidents where sensitive information has been lost,
stolen, or misused - often involving large and reputable orga-
nizations. Privacy-enhancing technologies can help to min-
imize the amount of information that needs to be revealed
in transactions, on the one hand, and to limit the disper-
sal, on the other hand. Many of these technologies build on
common cryptographic primitives that allow for data to be
authenticated and encrypted in such a way that it is possi-
ble to eﬃciently prove possession and/or properties of data
revealing the data or side-information about it. Proving
such statements is of course possible for any signature and
encryption scheme. However, if the result is to be practi-
cal, special cryptographic primitives and proof protocols are
needed.
In this talk we will ﬁrst consider a few example scenarios
and motivate the need for such cryptograph building block
before we then present and discuss these. We start with
eﬃcient discrete logarithms based proof protocols often re-
ferred to as generalized Schnorr proofs. They allow one to
prove knowledge of diﬀerent discrete logarithms (exponents)
and relations among them. Now, to be able to prove posses-
sion of a (valid) signature and a message with generalized
Schnorr proofs, it is necessary that the signature and the
message signed are exponents and that no hash-function is
used in the signature veri...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Cryptographic primitives for building secure and privacy respecting
protocols
author:Jan Camenisch
Cryptographic Primitives for Building Secure and Privacy
Respecting Protocols
Keynote – 2010 ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Innovation Award
Jan Camenisch
IBM Research – Zurich
jca@zurich.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
Using the Internet and other electronic media for our daily
tasks has become common. Thereby a lot of sensitive infor-
mation is exchanged, processed, and stored at many diﬀer-
ent places. Once released, controlling the dispersal of this
information is virtually impossible. Worse, the press reports
daily on incidents where sensitive information has been lost,
stolen, or misused - often involving large and reputable orga-
nizations. Privacy-enhancing technologies can help to min-
imize the amount of information that needs to be revealed
in transactions, on the one hand, and to limit the disper-
sal, on the other hand. Many of these technologies build on
common cryptographic primitives that allow for data to be
authenticated and encrypted in such a way that it is possi-
ble to eﬃciently prove possession and/or properties of data
revealing the data or side-information about it. Proving
such statements is of course possible for any signature and
encryption scheme. However, if the result is to be practi-
cal, special cryptographic primitives and proof protocols are
needed.
In this talk we will ﬁrst consider a few example scenarios
and motivate the need for such cryptograph building block
before we then present and discuss these. We start with
eﬃcient discrete logarithms based proof protocols often re-
ferred to as generalized Schnorr proofs. They allow one to
prove knowledge of diﬀerent discrete logarithms (exponents)
and relations among them. Now, to be able to prove posses-
sion of a (valid) signature and a message with generalized
Schnorr proofs, it is necessary that the signature and the
message signed are exponents and that no hash-function is
used in the signature veri...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Twin signatures: an alternative to the hash-and-sign paradigm
author:David Naccache and
David Pointcheval and
Jacques Stern
Twin Signatures: an Alternative
to the Hash-and-Sign Paradigm
David Naccache
Gemplus Card International
34, rue Guynemer
92447 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
david.naccache@gemplus.com
David Pointcheval
Jacques Stern
´Ecole Normale Sup´erieure
45, rue d’Ulm
75230 Paris cedex 05, France
{david.pointcheval,jacques.stern}@ens.fr
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a simple alternative to the hash-and-
sign paradigm, from the security point of view but for sign-
ing short messages, called twinning. A twin signature is
obtained by signing twice a short message by a signature
scheme. Analysis of the concept in diﬀerent settings yields
the following results:
• We prove that no generic algorithm can eﬃciently forge
a twin DSA signature. Although generic algorithms
oﬀer a less stringent form of security than computa-
tional reductions in the standard model, such success-
ful proofs still produce positive evidence in favor of the
correctness of the new paradigm.
• We prove in standard model an equivalence between
the hardness of producing existential forgeries (even
under adaptively chosen message attacks) of a twin
version of a signature scheme proposed by Gennaro,
Halevi and Rabin and the Flexible RSA Problem.
We consequently regard twinning as an interesting alter-
native to hash functions for eradicating existential forgery
in signature schemes.
Keywords
Digital Signatures, Provable Security, Discrete Logarithm,
Generic Model, Flexible RSA Problem, Standard Model.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The well-known hash and sign paradigm has two distinct
goals:
increasing performance by reducing the size of the
signed message and improving security by preventing exis-
tential forgeries. As a corollary, hashing remains mandatory
even for short messages.
From the conceptual standpoint, the use of hash functions
comes at the cost of extra assumptions such as the conjec-
ture ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Twin signatures: an alternative to the hash-and-sign paradigm
author:David Naccache and
David Pointcheval and
Jacques Stern
Twin Signatures: an Alternative
to the Hash-and-Sign Paradigm
David Naccache
Gemplus Card International
34, rue Guynemer
92447 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
david.naccache@gemplus.com
David Pointcheval
Jacques Stern
´Ecole Normale Sup´erieure
45, rue d’Ulm
75230 Paris cedex 05, France
{david.pointcheval,jacques.stern}@ens.fr
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a simple alternative to the hash-and-
sign paradigm, from the security point of view but for sign-
ing short messages, called twinning. A twin signature is
obtained by signing twice a short message by a signature
scheme. Analysis of the concept in diﬀerent settings yields
the following results:
• We prove that no generic algorithm can eﬃciently forge
a twin DSA signature. Although generic algorithms
oﬀer a less stringent form of security than computa-
tional reductions in the standard model, such success-
ful proofs still produce positive evidence in favor of the
correctness of the new paradigm.
• We prove in standard model an equivalence between
the hardness of producing existential forgeries (even
under adaptively chosen message attacks) of a twin
version of a signature scheme proposed by Gennaro,
Halevi and Rabin and the Flexible RSA Problem.
We consequently regard twinning as an interesting alter-
native to hash functions for eradicating existential forgery
in signature schemes.
Keywords
Digital Signatures, Provable Security, Discrete Logarithm,
Generic Model, Flexible RSA Problem, Standard Model.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The well-known hash and sign paradigm has two distinct
goals:
increasing performance by reducing the size of the
signed message and improving security by preventing exis-
tential forgeries. As a corollary, hashing remains mandatory
even for short messages.
From the conceptual standpoint, the use of hash functions
comes at the cost of extra assumptions such as the conjec-
ture ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:PacketShader: a GPU-accelerated software router
author:Sangjin Han and
Keon Jang and
KyoungSoo Park and
Sue B. Moon
PacketShader: A GPU-Accelerated Software Router
Sangjin Han†
Keon Jang†
KyoungSoo Park‡
Sue Moon†
†Department of Computer Science, KAIST, Korea
{sangjin, keonjang}@an.kaist.ac.kr, sbmoon@kaist.edu
‡Department of Electrical Engineering, KAIST, Korea
kyoungsoo@ee.kaist.ac.kr
ABSTRACT
We present PacketShader, a high-performance software router frame-
work for general packet processing with Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU) acceleration. PacketShader exploits the massively-parallel
processing power of GPU to address the CPU bottleneck in current
software routers. Combined with our high-performance packet I/O
engine, PacketShader outperforms existing software routers by more
than a factor of four, forwarding 64B IPv4 packets at 39 Gbps on
a single commodity PC. We have implemented IPv4 and IPv6 for-
warding, OpenFlow switching, and IPsec tunneling to demonstrate
the ﬂexibility and performance advantage of PacketShader. The eval-
uation results show that GPU brings signiﬁcantly higher throughput
over the CPU-only implementation, conﬁrming the effectiveness of
GPU for computation and memory-intensive operations in packet
processing.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network communica-
tions; C.2.6 [Internetworking]: Routers
General Terms
Design, experimentation, performance
Keywords
Software router, CUDA, GPU
1.
INTRODUCTION
PC-based software routers provide a cost-effective packet process-
ing platform with easy extensibility and programmability. Familiar
programming environments on general-purpose operating systems
allow ﬂexible composition of router applications that meet today’s
complex trafﬁc engineering demand. Adding to that, modern inno-
vation in commodity hardware continues to drive down the cost per
performance, realizing off-the-shelf programmable routers.
While programmability and low cost are the two ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:PacketShader: a GPU-accelerated software router
author:Sangjin Han and
Keon Jang and
KyoungSoo Park and
Sue B. Moon
PacketShader: A GPU-Accelerated Software Router
Sangjin Han†
Keon Jang†
KyoungSoo Park‡
Sue Moon†
†Department of Computer Science, KAIST, Korea
{sangjin, keonjang}@an.kaist.ac.kr, sbmoon@kaist.edu
‡Department of Electrical Engineering, KAIST, Korea
kyoungsoo@ee.kaist.ac.kr
ABSTRACT
We present PacketShader, a high-performance software router frame-
work for general packet processing with Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU) acceleration. PacketShader exploits the massively-parallel
processing power of GPU to address the CPU bottleneck in current
software routers. Combined with our high-performance packet I/O
engine, PacketShader outperforms existing software routers by more
than a factor of four, forwarding 64B IPv4 packets at 39 Gbps on
a single commodity PC. We have implemented IPv4 and IPv6 for-
warding, OpenFlow switching, and IPsec tunneling to demonstrate
the ﬂexibility and performance advantage of PacketShader. The eval-
uation results show that GPU brings signiﬁcantly higher throughput
over the CPU-only implementation, conﬁrming the effectiveness of
GPU for computation and memory-intensive operations in packet
processing.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Network communica-
tions; C.2.6 [Internetworking]: Routers
General Terms
Design, experimentation, performance
Keywords
Software router, CUDA, GPU
1.
INTRODUCTION
PC-based software routers provide a cost-effective packet process-
ing platform with easy extensibility and programmability. Familiar
programming environments on general-purpose operating systems
allow ﬂexible composition of router applications that meet today’s
complex trafﬁc engineering demand. Adding to that, modern inno-
vation in commodity hardware continues to drive down the cost per
performance, realizing off-the-shelf programmable routers.
While programmability and low cost are the two ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of Security and Privacy Advice
on the Web
author:Elissa M. Redmiles and
Noel Warford and
Amritha Jayanti and
Aravind Koneru and
Sean Kross and
Miraida Morales and
Rock Stevens and
Michelle L. Mazurek
A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of
Security and Privacy Advice on the Web
Elissa M. Redmiles, Noel Warford, Amritha Jayanti, and Aravind Koneru,
University of Maryland; Sean Kross, University of California, San Diego;
Miraida Morales, Rutgers University; Rock Stevens and Michelle L. Mazurek,
University of Maryland
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/redmiles
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation
of Security and Privacy Advice on the Web
Elissa M. Redmiles1, Noel Warford1, Amritha Jayanti1, Aravind Koneru1,
Sean Kross2, Miraida Morales3, Rock Stevens1, Michelle L. Mazurek1
1University of Maryland
2University of California San Diego
3Rutgers University
Abstract
End users learn defensive security behaviors from a variety of
channels, including a plethora of security advice given in on-
line articles. A great deal of eﬀort is devoted to getting users to
follow this advice. Surprisingly then, little is known about the
quality of this advice: Is it comprehensible? Is it actionable?
Is it eﬀective? To answer these questions, we ﬁrst conduct a
large-scale, user-driven measurement study to identify 374
unique recommended behaviors contained within 1,264 doc-
uments of online security and privacy advice. Second, we
develop and validate measurement approaches for evaluating
the quality – comprehensibility, perceived actionability, and
perceived eﬃcacy – of security advice. Third, we deploy these
measurement approaches to evaluate the 374 unique pieces
of security advice in a user-study with 1,586 users an...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of Security and Privacy Advice
on the Web
author:Elissa M. Redmiles and
Noel Warford and
Amritha Jayanti and
Aravind Koneru and
Sean Kross and
Miraida Morales and
Rock Stevens and
Michelle L. Mazurek
A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of
Security and Privacy Advice on the Web
Elissa M. Redmiles, Noel Warford, Amritha Jayanti, and Aravind Koneru,
University of Maryland; Sean Kross, University of California, San Diego;
Miraida Morales, Rutgers University; Rock Stevens and Michelle L. Mazurek,
University of Maryland
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/redmiles
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation
of Security and Privacy Advice on the Web
Elissa M. Redmiles1, Noel Warford1, Amritha Jayanti1, Aravind Koneru1,
Sean Kross2, Miraida Morales3, Rock Stevens1, Michelle L. Mazurek1
1University of Maryland
2University of California San Diego
3Rutgers University
Abstract
End users learn defensive security behaviors from a variety of
channels, including a plethora of security advice given in on-
line articles. A great deal of eﬀort is devoted to getting users to
follow this advice. Surprisingly then, little is known about the
quality of this advice: Is it comprehensible? Is it actionable?
Is it eﬀective? To answer these questions, we ﬁrst conduct a
large-scale, user-driven measurement study to identify 374
unique recommended behaviors contained within 1,264 doc-
uments of online security and privacy advice. Second, we
develop and validate measurement approaches for evaluating
the quality – comprehensibility, perceived actionability, and
perceived eﬃcacy – of security advice. Third, we deploy these
measurement approaches to evaluate the 374 unique pieces
of security advice in a user-study with 1,586 users an...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Perspectives on network calculus: no free lunch, but still good value
author:Florin Ciucu and
Jens B. Schmitt
Perspectives on Network Calculus –
No Free Lunch, but Still Good Value
Florin Ciucu
T-Labs / TU Berlin
Jens Schmitt
University of Kaiserslautern
ABSTRACT
ACM Sigcomm 2006 published a paper [26] which was per-
ceived to unify the deterministic and stochastic branches
of the network calculus (abbreviated throughout as DNC
and SNC) [39]. Unfortunately, this seemingly fundamental
uniﬁcation—which has raised the hope of a straightforward
transfer of all results from DNC to SNC—is invalid. To
substantiate this claim, we demonstrate that for the class of
stationary and ergodic processes, which is prevalent in traﬃc
modelling, the probabilistic arrival model from [26] is quasi-
deterministic,
i.e., the underlying probabilities are either
zero or one. Thus, the probabilistic framework from [26] is
unable to account for statistical multiplexing gain, which is
in fact the raison d’ˆetre of packet-switched networks. Other
previous formulations of SNC can capture statistical multi-
plexing gain, yet require additional assumptions [12, 22] or
are more involved [14, 9, 28], and do not allow for a straight-
forward transfer of results from DNC. So, in essence, there
is no free lunch in this endeavor.
Our intention in this paper is to go beyond presenting a
negative result by providing a comprehensive perspective on
network calculus. To that end, we attempt to illustrate the
fundamental concepts and features of network calculus in a
systematic way, and also to rigorously clarify some key facts
as well as misconceptions. We touch in particular on the re-
lationship between linear systems, classical queueing theory,
and network calculus, and on the lingering issue of tight-
ness of network calculus bounds. We give a rigorous result
illustrating that the statistical multiplexing gain scales as
Ω(√N ), as long as some small violations of system perfor-
mance constraints ar...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Perspectives on network calculus: no free lunch, but still good value
author:Florin Ciucu and
Jens B. Schmitt
Perspectives on Network Calculus –
No Free Lunch, but Still Good Value
Florin Ciucu
T-Labs / TU Berlin
Jens Schmitt
University of Kaiserslautern
ABSTRACT
ACM Sigcomm 2006 published a paper [26] which was per-
ceived to unify the deterministic and stochastic branches
of the network calculus (abbreviated throughout as DNC
and SNC) [39]. Unfortunately, this seemingly fundamental
uniﬁcation—which has raised the hope of a straightforward
transfer of all results from DNC to SNC—is invalid. To
substantiate this claim, we demonstrate that for the class of
stationary and ergodic processes, which is prevalent in traﬃc
modelling, the probabilistic arrival model from [26] is quasi-
deterministic,
i.e., the underlying probabilities are either
zero or one. Thus, the probabilistic framework from [26] is
unable to account for statistical multiplexing gain, which is
in fact the raison d’ˆetre of packet-switched networks. Other
previous formulations of SNC can capture statistical multi-
plexing gain, yet require additional assumptions [12, 22] or
are more involved [14, 9, 28], and do not allow for a straight-
forward transfer of results from DNC. So, in essence, there
is no free lunch in this endeavor.
Our intention in this paper is to go beyond presenting a
negative result by providing a comprehensive perspective on
network calculus. To that end, we attempt to illustrate the
fundamental concepts and features of network calculus in a
systematic way, and also to rigorously clarify some key facts
as well as misconceptions. We touch in particular on the re-
lationship between linear systems, classical queueing theory,
and network calculus, and on the lingering issue of tight-
ness of network calculus bounds. We give a rigorous result
illustrating that the statistical multiplexing gain scales as
Ω(√N ), as long as some small violations of system perfor-
mance constraints ar...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:HexType: Efficient Detection of Type Confusion Errors for C++
author:Yuseok Jeon and
Priyam Biswas and
Scott A. Carr and
Byoungyoung Lee and
Mathias Payer
764
valve  made  of  closely  knitted  teflon  stiffened  with
polyurethane.  The  prosthesis  is  fashioned  in  the
operating-theatre from a standard crimped woven teflon
tube; it is sutured to the base of the aortic cusps and to
the aortic wall once the diseased valve has been excised.
The advantage of this type of prosthesis is that it can be
adapted to the type of cusp deformity found, the artificial
cusps replacing the shrivelled cusps of valves which have
been freely  regurgitant.  7 patients  with stenosis  and
regurgitation  have  undergone  this  operation,  and  in
each the absence of an aortic  diastolic  murmur post-
operatively  indicated  relief  of incompetence  by  the
prosthesis.  3 patients died in the first twenty-four hours
from causes other than failure of the valve.  KAY et al.12
use two types of artificial valve for the relief of aortic-
valvular  disease.  In  patients  with  regurgitation  in
whom part of the valvular tissue is  preserved, plastic
prostheses consisting of three leaflets  of the same size
and shape are fashioned in the theatre to the individual
requirements and then sutured in position.  When the
patient’s valve has to be completely excised (as often in
severe  calcific  stenosis),  the  three  leaflets  have  to  be
deeper and are then buttressed with teflon felt.  This
procedure  has  been  used  in  28  patients  with  aortic
regurgitation and in 8 with calcific stenosis; 4 in the first
group died, and 3 in the second. Careful follow-up has
shown  effective  function  of  the  prosthetic  valves.
HARKEN et a1.13 have employed a caged ball-valve in the
treatment of 6 patients with aortic-valve disease.  4 died,
but in the other 2 the valve was functioning satisfactorily
several months after the operation.
Although these reports  are promising, much clearly
remains ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:HexType: Efficient Detection of Type Confusion Errors for C++
author:Yuseok Jeon and
Priyam Biswas and
Scott A. Carr and
Byoungyoung Lee and
Mathias Payer
764
valve  made  of  closely  knitted  teflon  stiffened  with
polyurethane.  The  prosthesis  is  fashioned  in  the
operating-theatre from a standard crimped woven teflon
tube; it is sutured to the base of the aortic cusps and to
the aortic wall once the diseased valve has been excised.
The advantage of this type of prosthesis is that it can be
adapted to the type of cusp deformity found, the artificial
cusps replacing the shrivelled cusps of valves which have
been freely  regurgitant.  7 patients  with stenosis  and
regurgitation  have  undergone  this  operation,  and  in
each the absence of an aortic  diastolic  murmur post-
operatively  indicated  relief  of incompetence  by  the
prosthesis.  3 patients died in the first twenty-four hours
from causes other than failure of the valve.  KAY et al.12
use two types of artificial valve for the relief of aortic-
valvular  disease.  In  patients  with  regurgitation  in
whom part of the valvular tissue is  preserved, plastic
prostheses consisting of three leaflets  of the same size
and shape are fashioned in the theatre to the individual
requirements and then sutured in position.  When the
patient’s valve has to be completely excised (as often in
severe  calcific  stenosis),  the  three  leaflets  have  to  be
deeper and are then buttressed with teflon felt.  This
procedure  has  been  used  in  28  patients  with  aortic
regurgitation and in 8 with calcific stenosis; 4 in the first
group died, and 3 in the second. Careful follow-up has
shown  effective  function  of  the  prosthetic  valves.
HARKEN et a1.13 have employed a caged ball-valve in the
treatment of 6 patients with aortic-valve disease.  4 died,
but in the other 2 the valve was functioning satisfactorily
several months after the operation.
Although these reports  are promising, much clearly
remains ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless Setting
author:Dominic Deuber and
Bernardo Magri and
Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless Setting
∗
†
, Bernardo Magri
∗
and Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan
Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-N¨urnberg, Germany
E-mail: {deuber, thyagarajan}@cs.fau.de
Dominic Deuber
∗
†
Aarhus University, Denmark
E-mail: magri@cs.au.dk
Abstract—Bitcoin is an immutable permissionless blockchain
system that has been extensively used as a public bulletin
board by many different applications that heavily relies on its
immutability. However, Bitcoin’s immutability is not without its
fair share of demerits. Interpol exposed the existence of harmful
and potentially illegal documents, images and links in the Bitcoin
blockchain, and since then there have been several qualitative
and quantitative analysis on the types of data currently residing
in the Bitcoin blockchain. Although there is a lot of attention
on blockchains, surprisingly the previous solutions proposed for
data redaction in the permissionless setting are far from feasible,
and require additional trust assumptions. Hence, the problem of
harmful data still poses a huge challenge for law enforcement
agencies like Interpol (Tziakouris, IEEE S&P’18).
We propose the ﬁrst efﬁcient redactable blockchain for the
permissionless setting that
is easily integrable into Bitcoin,
and that does not rely on heavy cryptographic tools or trust
assumptions. Our protocol uses a consensus-based voting and
is parameterised by a policy that dictates the requirements and
constraints for the redactions; if a redaction gathers...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless Setting
author:Dominic Deuber and
Bernardo Magri and
Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan
(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:26)(cid:1)(cid:42)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:90)(cid:78)(cid:81)(cid:80)(cid:84)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:78)(cid:1)(cid:80)(cid:79)(cid:1)(cid:52)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:90)(cid:1)(cid:66)(cid:79)(cid:69)(cid:1)(cid:49)(cid:83)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:66)(cid:68)(cid:90)
Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless Setting
∗
†
, Bernardo Magri
∗
and Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan
Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-N¨urnberg, Germany
E-mail: {deuber, thyagarajan}@cs.fau.de
Dominic Deuber
∗
†
Aarhus University, Denmark
E-mail: magri@cs.au.dk
Abstract—Bitcoin is an immutable permissionless blockchain
system that has been extensively used as a public bulletin
board by many different applications that heavily relies on its
immutability. However, Bitcoin’s immutability is not without its
fair share of demerits. Interpol exposed the existence of harmful
and potentially illegal documents, images and links in the Bitcoin
blockchain, and since then there have been several qualitative
and quantitative analysis on the types of data currently residing
in the Bitcoin blockchain. Although there is a lot of attention
on blockchains, surprisingly the previous solutions proposed for
data redaction in the permissionless setting are far from feasible,
and require additional trust assumptions. Hence, the problem of
harmful data still poses a huge challenge for law enforcement
agencies like Interpol (Tziakouris, IEEE S&P’18).
We propose the ﬁrst efﬁcient redactable blockchain for the
permissionless setting that
is easily integrable into Bitcoin,
and that does not rely on heavy cryptographic tools or trust
assumptions. Our protocol uses a consensus-based voting and
is parameterised by a policy that dictates the requirements and
constraints for the redactions; if a redaction gathers...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Secure In-Band Wireless Pairing
author:Shyamnath Gollakota and
Nabeel Ahmed and
Nickolai Zeldovich and
Dina Katabi
Secure In-Band Wireless Pairing
Shyamnath Gollakota, Nabeel Ahmed, Nickolai Zeldovich, and Dina Katabi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the ﬁrst wireless pairing protocol
that works in-band, with no pre-shared keys, and protects
against MITM attacks. The main innovation is a new key
exchange message constructed in a manner that ensures
an adversary can neither hide the fact that a message was
transmitted, nor alter its payload without being detected.
Thus, any attempt by an adversary to interfere with the
key exchange translates into the pairing devices detect-
ing either invalid pairing messages or an unacceptable
increase in the number of such messages. We analytically
prove that our design is secure against MITM attacks,
and show that our protocol is practical by implementing a
prototype using off-the-shelf 802.11 cards. An evaluation
of our protocol on two busy wireless networks (MIT’s
campus network and a reproduction of the SIGCOMM
2010 network using traces) shows that it can effectively
implement key exchange in a real-world environment.
1
INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in the security of home WiFi networks are
driven by two phenomena: ordinary users often strug-
gle with the security setup of their home networks [14],
and, as a result, some of them end up skipping security
activation [19, 26]. Simultaneously, there is a prolifera-
tion of WiFi gadgets and sensors that do not support an
interface for entering a key. These include WiFi sound
systems, medical sensors, USB keys, light and tempera-
ture sensors, motion detectors and surveillance sensors,
home appliances, and game consoles. Even new models
of these devices are unlikely to support a keypad because
of limitations on their form factor, style, cost, or func-
tionality. Responding to these two requirements—easing
security setup for home users, and securi...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Secure In-Band Wireless Pairing
author:Shyamnath Gollakota and
Nabeel Ahmed and
Nickolai Zeldovich and
Dina Katabi
Secure In-Band Wireless Pairing
Shyamnath Gollakota, Nabeel Ahmed, Nickolai Zeldovich, and Dina Katabi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the ﬁrst wireless pairing protocol
that works in-band, with no pre-shared keys, and protects
against MITM attacks. The main innovation is a new key
exchange message constructed in a manner that ensures
an adversary can neither hide the fact that a message was
transmitted, nor alter its payload without being detected.
Thus, any attempt by an adversary to interfere with the
key exchange translates into the pairing devices detect-
ing either invalid pairing messages or an unacceptable
increase in the number of such messages. We analytically
prove that our design is secure against MITM attacks,
and show that our protocol is practical by implementing a
prototype using off-the-shelf 802.11 cards. An evaluation
of our protocol on two busy wireless networks (MIT’s
campus network and a reproduction of the SIGCOMM
2010 network using traces) shows that it can effectively
implement key exchange in a real-world environment.
1
INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in the security of home WiFi networks are
driven by two phenomena: ordinary users often strug-
gle with the security setup of their home networks [14],
and, as a result, some of them end up skipping security
activation [19, 26]. Simultaneously, there is a prolifera-
tion of WiFi gadgets and sensors that do not support an
interface for entering a key. These include WiFi sound
systems, medical sensors, USB keys, light and tempera-
ture sensors, motion detectors and surveillance sensors,
home appliances, and game consoles. Even new models
of these devices are unlikely to support a keypad because
of limitations on their form factor, style, cost, or func-
tionality. Responding to these two requirements—easing
security setup for home users, and securi...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analysing the Performance of Security Solutions to Reduce Vulnerability
Exposure Window
author:Yolanta Beres and
Jonathan Griffin and
Simon Shiu and
Max Heitman and
David Markle and
Peter Ventura
2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Analysing the Performance of Security Solutions to Reduce Vulnerability
Yolanta Beres, Jonathan Griffin, Simon Shiu
Max Heitman, David Markle, Peter Ventura
yolanta.beres, jonathan.griffin, simon.shiu
max.heitman, david.markle, peter.ventura
Exposure Window
CITI
@citi.com
HP Labs
@hp.com
Abstract
In this paper we present a novel approach of using
mathematical  models  and  stochastic  simulations  to
guide  and  inform  security  investment  and  policy
change  decisions.
investigate
vulnerability  management  policies,  and  explore  how
effective  standard  patch  management  and  emergency
escalation  based  policies  are,  and  how  they  can  be
combined with earlier, pre-patch mitigation measures
to reduce the potential exposure window.
In  particular,  we
The  paper  describes  the  model  we  constructed  to
represent typical vulnerability  management  processes
in  large  organizations,  which captures  the  external
threat environment and the internal security processes
and decision  points.  We  also  present  the  results  from
the  experimental  simulations,  and  show  how  changes
in security solutions and policies, such as speeding up
patch  deployment  and  investing  in  early  mitigation
measures, affect the overall exposure window in terms
of the time it takes to reduce the potential risk.
We believe that this type of mathematical modelling
and  simulation-based  approach  provides  a  novel  and
useful  way  of  considering
investment
decisions, which is quite distinct from traditional risk
analysis.
1. Introduction
security
security  operations
typical
organization  has  a  number  of  security  co...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analysing the Performance of Security Solutions to Reduce Vulnerability
Exposure Window
author:Yolanta Beres and
Jonathan Griffin and
Simon Shiu and
Max Heitman and
David Markle and
Peter Ventura
2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Analysing the Performance of Security Solutions to Reduce Vulnerability
Yolanta Beres, Jonathan Griffin, Simon Shiu
Max Heitman, David Markle, Peter Ventura
yolanta.beres, jonathan.griffin, simon.shiu
max.heitman, david.markle, peter.ventura
Exposure Window
CITI
@citi.com
HP Labs
@hp.com
Abstract
In this paper we present a novel approach of using
mathematical  models  and  stochastic  simulations  to
guide  and  inform  security  investment  and  policy
change  decisions.
investigate
vulnerability  management  policies,  and  explore  how
effective  standard  patch  management  and  emergency
escalation  based  policies  are,  and  how  they  can  be
combined with earlier, pre-patch mitigation measures
to reduce the potential exposure window.
In  particular,  we
The  paper  describes  the  model  we  constructed  to
represent typical vulnerability  management  processes
in  large  organizations,  which captures  the  external
threat environment and the internal security processes
and decision  points.  We  also  present  the  results  from
the  experimental  simulations,  and  show  how  changes
in security solutions and policies, such as speeding up
patch  deployment  and  investing  in  early  mitigation
measures, affect the overall exposure window in terms
of the time it takes to reduce the potential risk.
We believe that this type of mathematical modelling
and  simulation-based  approach  provides  a  novel  and
useful  way  of  considering
investment
decisions, which is quite distinct from traditional risk
analysis.
1. Introduction
security
security  operations
typical
organization  has  a  number  of  security  co...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Unleashing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning
author:Dario Pasquini and
Giuseppe Ateniese and
Massimo Bernaschi
Unleashing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning
Dario Pasquini
Sapienza University of Rome
Institute of Applied Computing, CNR
Rome, Italy
Rome, Italy
pasquini@di.uniroma1.it
Giuseppe Ateniese
George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia, USA
ateniese@gmu.edu
Massimo Bernaschi
Institute of Applied Computing, CNR
Rome, Italy
massimo.bernaschi@cnr.it
ABSTRACT
We investigate the security of split learning—a novel collaborative
machine learning framework that enables peak performance by
requiring minimal resource consumption. In the present paper, we
expose vulnerabilities of the protocol and demonstrate its inherent
insecurity by introducing general attack strategies targeting the
reconstruction of clients’ private training sets. More prominently,
we show that a malicious server can actively hijack the learning
process of the distributed model and bring it into an insecure state
that enables inference attacks on clients’ data. We implement differ-
ent adaptations of the attack and test them on various datasets as
well as within realistic threat scenarios. We demonstrate that our
attack can overcome recently proposed defensive techniques aimed
at enhancing the security of the split learning protocol. Finally, we
also illustrate the protocol’s insecurity against malicious clients by
extending previously devised attacks for Federated Learning.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and application security;
Privacy-preserving protocols; Distributed systems security.
KEYWORDS
Collaborative learning; ML Security; Deep Learning
ACM Reference Format:
Dario Pasquini, Giuseppe Ateniese, and Massimo Bernaschi. 2021. Unleash-
ing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning. In Proceedings of the 2021
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
’21), November 15–19, 2021, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea. ACM, Ne...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Unleashing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning
author:Dario Pasquini and
Giuseppe Ateniese and
Massimo Bernaschi
Unleashing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning
Dario Pasquini
Sapienza University of Rome
Institute of Applied Computing, CNR
Rome, Italy
Rome, Italy
pasquini@di.uniroma1.it
Giuseppe Ateniese
George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia, USA
ateniese@gmu.edu
Massimo Bernaschi
Institute of Applied Computing, CNR
Rome, Italy
massimo.bernaschi@cnr.it
ABSTRACT
We investigate the security of split learning—a novel collaborative
machine learning framework that enables peak performance by
requiring minimal resource consumption. In the present paper, we
expose vulnerabilities of the protocol and demonstrate its inherent
insecurity by introducing general attack strategies targeting the
reconstruction of clients’ private training sets. More prominently,
we show that a malicious server can actively hijack the learning
process of the distributed model and bring it into an insecure state
that enables inference attacks on clients’ data. We implement differ-
ent adaptations of the attack and test them on various datasets as
well as within realistic threat scenarios. We demonstrate that our
attack can overcome recently proposed defensive techniques aimed
at enhancing the security of the split learning protocol. Finally, we
also illustrate the protocol’s insecurity against malicious clients by
extending previously devised attacks for Federated Learning.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and application security;
Privacy-preserving protocols; Distributed systems security.
KEYWORDS
Collaborative learning; ML Security; Deep Learning
ACM Reference Format:
Dario Pasquini, Giuseppe Ateniese, and Massimo Bernaschi. 2021. Unleash-
ing the Tiger: Inference Attacks on Split Learning. In Proceedings of the 2021
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
’21), November 15–19, 2021, Virtual Event, Republic of Korea. ACM, Ne...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Poster: Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting Gradient-Attacks
that Preserve Functionality
author:Raphael Labaca Castro and
Battista Biggio and
Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Poster: Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting
Gradient-Attacks that Preserve Functionality
Raphael Labaca-Castro
Research Institute CODE
Bundeswehr University Munich
Munich, Germany
raphael.labaca@unibw.de
Battista Biggio
Dept. of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering
University of Cagliari
Cagliari, Italy
battista.biggio@unica.it
Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Research Institute CODE
Bundeswehr University Munich
Munich, Germany
gabi.dreo@unibw.de
ABSTRACT
Machine learning has proved to be a promising technology to deter-
mine whether a piece of software is malicious or benign. However,
the accuracy of this approach comes sometimes at the expense of its
robustness and probing these systems against adversarial examples
is not always a priority. In this work, we present a gradient-based
approach that can carefully generate valid executable malicious
files that are classified as benign by state-of-the-art detectors. Initial
results demonstrate that our approach is able to automatically find
optimal adversarial examples in a more efficient way, which can
provide a good support for building more robust models in the
future.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Malware and its mitigation; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; • Computing methodologies → Neu-
ral networks.
ACM Reference Format:
Raphael Labaca-Castro, Battista Biggio, and Gabi Dreo Rodosek. 2019. Poster:
Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting Gradient-Attacks that Preserve
Functionality. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom.
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363257
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks have been widely implemented for malware
classification [4, 7, 10]. Yet, problems still persist when they are
confronted to advers...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Poster: Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting Gradient-Attacks
that Preserve Functionality
author:Raphael Labaca Castro and
Battista Biggio and
Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Poster: Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting
Gradient-Attacks that Preserve Functionality
Raphael Labaca-Castro
Research Institute CODE
Bundeswehr University Munich
Munich, Germany
raphael.labaca@unibw.de
Battista Biggio
Dept. of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering
University of Cagliari
Cagliari, Italy
battista.biggio@unica.it
Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Research Institute CODE
Bundeswehr University Munich
Munich, Germany
gabi.dreo@unibw.de
ABSTRACT
Machine learning has proved to be a promising technology to deter-
mine whether a piece of software is malicious or benign. However,
the accuracy of this approach comes sometimes at the expense of its
robustness and probing these systems against adversarial examples
is not always a priority. In this work, we present a gradient-based
approach that can carefully generate valid executable malicious
files that are classified as benign by state-of-the-art detectors. Initial
results demonstrate that our approach is able to automatically find
optimal adversarial examples in a more efficient way, which can
provide a good support for building more robust models in the
future.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Malware and its mitigation; Soft-
ware reverse engineering; • Computing methodologies → Neu-
ral networks.
ACM Reference Format:
Raphael Labaca-Castro, Battista Biggio, and Gabi Dreo Rodosek. 2019. Poster:
Attacking Malware Classifiers by Crafting Gradient-Attacks that Preserve
Functionality. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom.
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363257
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks have been widely implemented for malware
classification [4, 7, 10]. Yet, problems still persist when they are
confronted to advers...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Connected Colors: Unveiling the Structure of Criminal Networks
author:Yacin Nadji and
Manos Antonakakis and
Roberto Perdisci and
Wenke Lee
Connected Colors:
Unveiling the Structure of Criminal Networks
Yacin Nadji1, Manos Antonakakis2, Roberto Perdisci3, and Wenke Lee1
1 College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
{yacin.nadji, wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
2 Damballa, Inc.
manos@damballa.com
3 Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
Abstract. In this paper we study the structure of criminal networks,
groups of related malicious infrastructures that work in concert to pro-
vide hosting for criminal activities. We develop a method to construct a
graph of relationships between malicious hosts and identify the under-
lying criminal networks, using historic assignments in the DNS. We also
develop methods to analyze these networks to identify general structural
trends and devise strategies for eﬀective remediation through takedowns.
We then apply these graph construction and analysis algorithms to study
the general threat landscape, as well as four cases of sophisticated crimi-
nal networks. Our results indicate that in many cases, criminal networks
can be taken down by de-registering as few as ﬁve domain names, re-
moving critical communication links. In cases of sophisticated criminal
networks, we show that our analysis techniques can identify hosts that
are critical to the network’s functionality and estimate the impact of
performing network takedowns in remediating the threats. In one case,
disabling 20% of a criminal network’s hosts would reduce the overall
volume of successful DNS lookups to the criminal network by as much
as 70%. This measure can be interpreted as an estimate of the decrease
in the number of potential victims reaching the criminal network that
would be caused by such a takedown strategy.
1
Introduction
Many of today’s cyber-security threats make use of globally reachable network
hosts that support cyber-cri...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Connected Colors: Unveiling the Structure of Criminal Networks
author:Yacin Nadji and
Manos Antonakakis and
Roberto Perdisci and
Wenke Lee
Connected Colors:
Unveiling the Structure of Criminal Networks
Yacin Nadji1, Manos Antonakakis2, Roberto Perdisci3, and Wenke Lee1
1 College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology
{yacin.nadji, wenke}@cc.gatech.edu
2 Damballa, Inc.
manos@damballa.com
3 Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia
perdisci@cs.uga.edu
Abstract. In this paper we study the structure of criminal networks,
groups of related malicious infrastructures that work in concert to pro-
vide hosting for criminal activities. We develop a method to construct a
graph of relationships between malicious hosts and identify the under-
lying criminal networks, using historic assignments in the DNS. We also
develop methods to analyze these networks to identify general structural
trends and devise strategies for eﬀective remediation through takedowns.
We then apply these graph construction and analysis algorithms to study
the general threat landscape, as well as four cases of sophisticated crimi-
nal networks. Our results indicate that in many cases, criminal networks
can be taken down by de-registering as few as ﬁve domain names, re-
moving critical communication links. In cases of sophisticated criminal
networks, we show that our analysis techniques can identify hosts that
are critical to the network’s functionality and estimate the impact of
performing network takedowns in remediating the threats. In one case,
disabling 20% of a criminal network’s hosts would reduce the overall
volume of successful DNS lookups to the criminal network by as much
as 70%. This measure can be interpreted as an estimate of the decrease
in the number of potential victims reaching the criminal network that
would be caused by such a takedown strategy.
1
Introduction
Many of today’s cyber-security threats make use of globally reachable network
hosts that support cyber-cri...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:POSTER: Attacks to Federated Learning: Responsive Web User Interface
to Recover Training Data from User Gradients
author:Hans Albert Lianto and
Yang Zhao and
Jun Zhao
POSTER: Attacks to Federated Learning: Responsive Web User
Interface to Recover Training Data from User Gradients
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Jun Zhao
Singapore
junzhao@ntu.edu.sg
Hans Albert Lianto∗
Singapore
HANS0032@e.ntu.edu.sg
Yang Zhao∗†
Singapore
S180049@e.ntu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Local differential privacy (LDP) is an emerging privacy standard to
protect individual user data. One scenario where LDP can be applied
is federated learning, where each user sends his/her user gradients
to an aggregator who uses these gradients to perform stochastic
gradient descent. In a case where the aggregator is untrusted and
LDP is not applied to each user gradient, the aggregator can recover
sensitive user data from these gradients. In this paper, we present an
interactive web demo showcasing the power of LDP by visualizing
federated learning with LDP. Moreover, the live demo shows how
LDP can prevent untrusted aggregators from recovering sensitive
training data. A measure called the exp-hamming recovery is also
created to show the extent of how much data the aggregator can
recover.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Distributed systems security; • Com-
puting methodologies → Supervised learning by classification;
Supervised learning by regression.
KEYWORDS
Local differential privacy, Machine learning, Federated learning,
Linear regression, Stochastic gradient decent.
ACM Reference Format:
Hans Albert Lianto, Yang Zhao, and Jun Zhao. 2020. POSTER: Attacks to
Federated Learning: Responsive Web User Interface to Recover Training
Data from User Gradients. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020,
Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/1...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:POSTER: Attacks to Federated Learning: Responsive Web User Interface
to Recover Training Data from User Gradients
author:Hans Albert Lianto and
Yang Zhao and
Jun Zhao
POSTER: Attacks to Federated Learning: Responsive Web User
Interface to Recover Training Data from User Gradients
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Jun Zhao
Singapore
junzhao@ntu.edu.sg
Hans Albert Lianto∗
Singapore
HANS0032@e.ntu.edu.sg
Yang Zhao∗†
Singapore
S180049@e.ntu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Local differential privacy (LDP) is an emerging privacy standard to
protect individual user data. One scenario where LDP can be applied
is federated learning, where each user sends his/her user gradients
to an aggregator who uses these gradients to perform stochastic
gradient descent. In a case where the aggregator is untrusted and
LDP is not applied to each user gradient, the aggregator can recover
sensitive user data from these gradients. In this paper, we present an
interactive web demo showcasing the power of LDP by visualizing
federated learning with LDP. Moreover, the live demo shows how
LDP can prevent untrusted aggregators from recovering sensitive
training data. A measure called the exp-hamming recovery is also
created to show the extent of how much data the aggregator can
recover.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Distributed systems security; • Com-
puting methodologies → Supervised learning by classification;
Supervised learning by regression.
KEYWORDS
Local differential privacy, Machine learning, Federated learning,
Linear regression, Stochastic gradient decent.
ACM Reference Format:
Hans Albert Lianto, Yang Zhao, and Jun Zhao. 2020. POSTER: Attacks to
Federated Learning: Responsive Web User Interface to Recover Training
Data from User Gradients. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020,
Taipei, Taiwan. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/1...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Using Throughput-Centric Byzantine Broadcast to Tolerate Malicious
Majority in Blockchains
author:Ruomu Hou and
Haifeng Yu and
Prateek Saxena
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2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Using Throughput-Centric Byzantine Broadcast
to Tolerate Malicious Majority in Blockchains
Ruomu Hou
Haifeng Yu
Prateek Saxena
National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore
houruomu@comp.nus.edu.sg
haifeng@comp.nus.edu.sg
prateeks@comp.nus.edu.sg
Abstract—Fault tolerance of a blockchain is often character-
ized by the fraction f of “adversarial power” that it can tolerate
in the system. Despite the fast progress in blockchain designs in
recent years, existing blockchain systems can still only tolerate f
below 0.5. Can practically usable blockchains tolerate a malicious
majority, i.e., f above 0.5?
This work presents a positive answer to this question. We ﬁrst
note that the well-known impossibility of byzantine consensus
for f above 0.5 does not carry over to blockchains. To tolerate
f above 0.5, we use byzantine broadcast, instead of byzantine
consensus, as the core of the blockchain. A major obstacle in
doing so, however, is that the resulting blockchain may have
extremely low throughput. To overcome this central technical
challenge, we propose a novel byzantine broadcast protocol
OVERLAYBB, that can tolerate f above 0.5 while achieving
good throughput. Using OVERLAYBB as the core, we present
the design, implementation, and evaluation of a novel Proof-of-
Stake blockchain called BCUBE. BCUBE can tolerate a malicious
majority, while achieving practically usable transaction through-
put and conﬁrmation latency in our experiments with 10000
nodes and under f = 0.7. To our knowledge, BCUBE is the ﬁrst
bloc...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Using Throughput-Centric Byzantine Broadcast to Tolerate Malicious
Majority in Blockchains
author:Ruomu Hou and
Haifeng Yu and
Prateek Saxena
7
1
6
3
3
8
9
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2
2
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2
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2
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Using Throughput-Centric Byzantine Broadcast
to Tolerate Malicious Majority in Blockchains
Ruomu Hou
Haifeng Yu
Prateek Saxena
National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore
National University of Singapore
houruomu@comp.nus.edu.sg
haifeng@comp.nus.edu.sg
prateeks@comp.nus.edu.sg
Abstract—Fault tolerance of a blockchain is often character-
ized by the fraction f of “adversarial power” that it can tolerate
in the system. Despite the fast progress in blockchain designs in
recent years, existing blockchain systems can still only tolerate f
below 0.5. Can practically usable blockchains tolerate a malicious
majority, i.e., f above 0.5?
This work presents a positive answer to this question. We ﬁrst
note that the well-known impossibility of byzantine consensus
for f above 0.5 does not carry over to blockchains. To tolerate
f above 0.5, we use byzantine broadcast, instead of byzantine
consensus, as the core of the blockchain. A major obstacle in
doing so, however, is that the resulting blockchain may have
extremely low throughput. To overcome this central technical
challenge, we propose a novel byzantine broadcast protocol
OVERLAYBB, that can tolerate f above 0.5 while achieving
good throughput. Using OVERLAYBB as the core, we present
the design, implementation, and evaluation of a novel Proof-of-
Stake blockchain called BCUBE. BCUBE can tolerate a malicious
majority, while achieving practically usable transaction through-
put and conﬁrmation latency in our experiments with 10000
nodes and under f = 0.7. To our knowledge, BCUBE is the ﬁrst
bloc...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship Circumvention in Empiricism
author:Michael Carl Tschantz and
Sadia Afroz and
anonymous and
Vern Paxson
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SoK: Towards Grounding Censorship
Circumvention in Empiricism
Michael Carl Tschantz∗, Sadia Afroz∗, Anonymous‡, and Vern Paxson∗†
∗International Computer Science Institute
†University of California, Berkeley
Abstract—Eﬀective evaluations of approaches to circumventing
government Internet censorship require incorporating perspec-
tives of how censors operate in practice. We undertake an
extensive examination of real censors by surveying prior mea-
surement studies and analyzing ﬁeld reports and bug tickets from
practitioners. We assess both deployed circumvention approaches
and research proposals to consider the criteria employed in their
evaluations and compare these to the observed behaviors of real
censors, identifying areas where evaluations could more faithfully
and eﬀectively incorporate the practices of modern censors. These
observations lead to an agenda realigning research with the
predominant problems of today.
I. Introduction
Censorship circumvention research seeks to develop ap-
proaches for facilitating access to banned Internet resources, a
domain with a fundamentally adversarial nature arising from
the ongoing interactions between circumventors and censors.
Both parties ﬁnd themselves locked in an arms race where each
side must manage tradeoﬀs between eﬃcacy and expenditure.
These tradeoﬀs continually evolve in subtle ways as new
technologies change the costs of various approaches.
Given this complexity, undertaking sound evaluation of
potential circumvention approaches proves both crucial and
diﬃcult. Sound evaluation is crucial since, due to limited
resources, the developers of circumvention approaches cannot
implement and deploy every prospective approach; they need
criteria for selecting the most promising. It is diﬃcult,...