Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:V0LTpwn: Attacking x86 Processor Integrity from Software
author:Zijo Kenjar and
Tommaso Frassetto and
David Gens and
Michael Franz and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
V0LTpwn: Attacking x86 Processor Integrity
from Software
Zijo Kenjar and Tommaso Frassetto, Technische Universität Darmstadt;
David Gens and Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine;
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technische Universität Darmstadt
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/kenjar
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.V0LTpwn: Attacking x86 Processor Integrity from Software
Zijo Kenjar1, Tommaso Frassetto1, David Gens2, Michael Franz2, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi1
1Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany
{zijo.kenjar,tommaso.frassetto,ahmad.sadeghi}@trust.tu-darmstadt.de
2University of California, Irvine
{dgens,franz}@uci.edu
Abstract
Fault-injection attacks have been proven in the past to
be a reliable way of bypassing hardware-based security
measures, such as cryptographic hashes, privilege and
access permission enforcement, and trusted execution
environments. However, traditional fault-injection at-
tacks require physical presence, and hence, were often
considered out of scope in many real-world adversary
settings.
In this paper we show this assumption may no longer
be justiﬁed on x86. We present V0LTpwn, a novel
hardware-oriented but software-controlled attack that
aﬀects the integrity of computation in virtually any ex-
ecution mode on modern x86 processors. To the best
of our knowledge, this represents the ﬁrst attack on
the integrity of the x86 platform from software. The
key idea behind our attack is to undervolt a physical
core to force non-recoverable hardware faults. Under
a V0LTpwn attack, CPU instructions will continue to
execute with erroneous results and without crashes, al-
lowing for exploitat...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Hardware Performance Counters Can Detect Malware: Myth or Fact?
author:Boyou Zhou and
Anmol Gupta and
Rasoul Jahanshahi and
Manuel Egele and
Ajay Joshi
Hardware Performance Counters Can Detect Malware:
Myth or Fact?
Boyou Zhou, Anmol Gupta, Rasoul Jahanshahi, Manuel Egele, Ajay Joshi
{bobzhou,anmol.gupta1005,rasoulj,megele,joshi}@bu.edu
Eletrical and Computer Engineering Department, Boston University
ABSTRACT
The ever-increasing prevalence of malware has led to the explo-
rations of various detection mechanisms. Several recent works
propose to use Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) values
with machine learning classiication models for malware detection.
HPCs are hardware units that record low-level micro-architectural
behavior, such as cache hits/misses, branch (mis)prediction, and
load/store operations. However, this information does not reliably
capture the nature of the application, i.e. whether it is benign or
malicious. In this paper, we claim and experimentally support that
using the micro-architectural level information obtained from HPCs
cannot distinguish between benignware and malware. We eval-
uate the idelity of malware detection using HPCs. We perform
quantitative analysis using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
systematically select micro-architectural events that have the most
predictive powers. We then run 1,924 programs, 962 benignware
and 962 malware, on our experimental setups. We achieve 83.39%,
84.84%, 83.59%, 75.01%, 78.75%, and 14.32% F1-score (a metric of
detection rates) of Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), K Near-
est Neighbors (KNN), Adaboost, Neural Net (NN), and Naive Bayes,
respectively. We cross-validate our models 1,000 times to show
the distributions of detection rates in various models. Our cross-
validation analysis shows that many of the experiments produce
low F1-scores. The F1-score of models in DT, RF, KNN, Adaboost,
NN, and Naive Bayes is 80.22%, 81.29%, 80.22%, 70.32%, 35.66%,
and 9.903%, respectively. To fu...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Hardware Performance Counters Can Detect Malware: Myth or Fact?
author:Boyou Zhou and
Anmol Gupta and
Rasoul Jahanshahi and
Manuel Egele and
Ajay Joshi
Hardware Performance Counters Can Detect Malware:
Myth or Fact?
Boyou Zhou, Anmol Gupta, Rasoul Jahanshahi, Manuel Egele, Ajay Joshi
{bobzhou,anmol.gupta1005,rasoulj,megele,joshi}@bu.edu
Eletrical and Computer Engineering Department, Boston University
ABSTRACT
The ever-increasing prevalence of malware has led to the explo-
rations of various detection mechanisms. Several recent works
propose to use Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) values
with machine learning classiication models for malware detection.
HPCs are hardware units that record low-level micro-architectural
behavior, such as cache hits/misses, branch (mis)prediction, and
load/store operations. However, this information does not reliably
capture the nature of the application, i.e. whether it is benign or
malicious. In this paper, we claim and experimentally support that
using the micro-architectural level information obtained from HPCs
cannot distinguish between benignware and malware. We eval-
uate the idelity of malware detection using HPCs. We perform
quantitative analysis using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
systematically select micro-architectural events that have the most
predictive powers. We then run 1,924 programs, 962 benignware
and 962 malware, on our experimental setups. We achieve 83.39%,
84.84%, 83.59%, 75.01%, 78.75%, and 14.32% F1-score (a metric of
detection rates) of Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), K Near-
est Neighbors (KNN), Adaboost, Neural Net (NN), and Naive Bayes,
respectively. We cross-validate our models 1,000 times to show
the distributions of detection rates in various models. Our cross-
validation analysis shows that many of the experiments produce
low F1-scores. The F1-score of models in DT, RF, KNN, Adaboost,
NN, and Naive Bayes is 80.22%, 81.29%, 80.22%, 70.32%, 35.66%,
and 9.903%, respectively. To fu...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Protecting Intellectual Property of Deep Neural Networks with Watermarking
author:Jialong Zhang and
Zhongshu Gu and
Jiyong Jang and
Hui Wu and
Marc Ph. Stoecklin and
Heqing Huang and
Ian Molloy
Protecting Intellectual Property of Deep Neural
Networks with Watermarking
Jialong Zhang, Zhongshu Gu, Jiyong Jang, Hui Wu, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Heqing Huang, Ian Molloy
jialong.zhang@ibm.com,{zgu,jjang,wuhu,mpstoeck,hhung,molloyim}@us.ibm.com
IBM Research
ABSTRACT
Deep learning technologies, which are the key components of state-
of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) services, have shown great
success in providing human-level capabilities for a variety of tasks,
such as visual analysis, speech recognition, and natural language
processing and etc. Building a production-level deep learning model
is a non-trivial task, which requires a large amount of training data,
powerful computing resources, and human expertises. Therefore,
illegitimate reproducing, distribution, and the derivation of propri-
etary deep learning models can lead to copyright infringement and
economic harm to model creators. Therefore, it is essential to devise
a technique to protect the intellectual property of deep learning
models and enable external verification of the model ownership.
In this paper, we generalize the “digital watermarking” concept
from multimedia ownership verification to deep neural network
(DNNs) models. We investigate three DNN-applicable watermark
generation algorithms, propose a watermark implanting approach
to infuse watermark into deep learning models, and design a remote
verification mechanism to determine the model ownership. By ex-
tending the intrinsic generalization and memorization capabilities
of deep neural networks, we enable the models to learn specially
crafted watermarks at training and activate with pre-specified pre-
dictions when observing the watermark patterns at inference. We
evaluate our approach with two image recognition benchmark
datasets. Our framework...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Protecting Intellectual Property of Deep Neural Networks with Watermarking
author:Jialong Zhang and
Zhongshu Gu and
Jiyong Jang and
Hui Wu and
Marc Ph. Stoecklin and
Heqing Huang and
Ian Molloy
Protecting Intellectual Property of Deep Neural
Networks with Watermarking
Jialong Zhang, Zhongshu Gu, Jiyong Jang, Hui Wu, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Heqing Huang, Ian Molloy
jialong.zhang@ibm.com,{zgu,jjang,wuhu,mpstoeck,hhung,molloyim}@us.ibm.com
IBM Research
ABSTRACT
Deep learning technologies, which are the key components of state-
of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) services, have shown great
success in providing human-level capabilities for a variety of tasks,
such as visual analysis, speech recognition, and natural language
processing and etc. Building a production-level deep learning model
is a non-trivial task, which requires a large amount of training data,
powerful computing resources, and human expertises. Therefore,
illegitimate reproducing, distribution, and the derivation of propri-
etary deep learning models can lead to copyright infringement and
economic harm to model creators. Therefore, it is essential to devise
a technique to protect the intellectual property of deep learning
models and enable external verification of the model ownership.
In this paper, we generalize the “digital watermarking” concept
from multimedia ownership verification to deep neural network
(DNNs) models. We investigate three DNN-applicable watermark
generation algorithms, propose a watermark implanting approach
to infuse watermark into deep learning models, and design a remote
verification mechanism to determine the model ownership. By ex-
tending the intrinsic generalization and memorization capabilities
of deep neural networks, we enable the models to learn specially
crafted watermarks at training and activate with pre-specified pre-
dictions when observing the watermark patterns at inference. We
evaluate our approach with two image recognition benchmark
datasets. Our framework...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:IntScope: Automatically Detecting Integer Overflow Vulnerability in
X86 Binary Using Symbolic Execution
author:Tielei Wang and
Tao Wei and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Wei Zou
IntScope: Automatically Detecting Integer Overﬂow Vulnerability in X86 Binary
Using Symbolic Execution
Tielei Wang†, Tao Wei†∗, Zhiqiang Lin‡, Wei Zou†
†Key Laboratory of Network and Software Security Assurance
Institute of Computer Science and Technology, Peking University
{wangtielei, weitao, zouwei}@icst.pku.edu.cn
‡Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
zlin@cs.purdue.edu
Abstract
The number of identiﬁed integer overﬂow vulnerabilities
has been increasing rapidly in recent years. In this paper,
we present a system, IntScope, which can automatically de-
tect integer overﬂow vulnerabilities in x86 binaries before
an attacker does, with the goal of ﬁnally eliminating the vul-
nerabilities. IntScope ﬁrst translates the disassembled code
into our own intermediate representation (IR), and then per-
forms a path sensitive data ﬂow analysis on the IR by lever-
aging symbolic execution and taint analysis to identify the
vulnerable point of integer overﬂow. Compared with other
approaches, IntScope does not run the binary directly, and
is scalable to large software as it can just symbolically ex-
ecute the interesting program paths. Experimental results
show IntScope is quite encouraging: it has detected more
than 20 zero-day integer overﬂows (e.g., CVE-2008-4201,
FrSIRT/ADV-2008-2919) in widely-used software such as
QEMU, Xen and Xine.
1. Introduction
Primitive types, including integers, typically have a ﬁxed
size (e.g., 32 bits) for a particular machine architecture.
Thus, variables of these types have a maximum value (e.g.,
232). Operations that result in a value greater than this max-
imum can cause the value to wrap-around: this well-known
condition is called overﬂow. Integer overﬂows are particu-
larly insidious: while the overﬂow itself is usually not ex-
ploitable, it often leads to other...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:IntScope: Automatically Detecting Integer Overflow Vulnerability in
X86 Binary Using Symbolic Execution
author:Tielei Wang and
Tao Wei and
Zhiqiang Lin and
Wei Zou
IntScope: Automatically Detecting Integer Overﬂow Vulnerability in X86 Binary
Using Symbolic Execution
Tielei Wang†, Tao Wei†∗, Zhiqiang Lin‡, Wei Zou†
†Key Laboratory of Network and Software Security Assurance
Institute of Computer Science and Technology, Peking University
{wangtielei, weitao, zouwei}@icst.pku.edu.cn
‡Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
zlin@cs.purdue.edu
Abstract
The number of identiﬁed integer overﬂow vulnerabilities
has been increasing rapidly in recent years. In this paper,
we present a system, IntScope, which can automatically de-
tect integer overﬂow vulnerabilities in x86 binaries before
an attacker does, with the goal of ﬁnally eliminating the vul-
nerabilities. IntScope ﬁrst translates the disassembled code
into our own intermediate representation (IR), and then per-
forms a path sensitive data ﬂow analysis on the IR by lever-
aging symbolic execution and taint analysis to identify the
vulnerable point of integer overﬂow. Compared with other
approaches, IntScope does not run the binary directly, and
is scalable to large software as it can just symbolically ex-
ecute the interesting program paths. Experimental results
show IntScope is quite encouraging: it has detected more
than 20 zero-day integer overﬂows (e.g., CVE-2008-4201,
FrSIRT/ADV-2008-2919) in widely-used software such as
QEMU, Xen and Xine.
1. Introduction
Primitive types, including integers, typically have a ﬁxed
size (e.g., 32 bits) for a particular machine architecture.
Thus, variables of these types have a maximum value (e.g.,
232). Operations that result in a value greater than this max-
imum can cause the value to wrap-around: this well-known
condition is called overﬂow. Integer overﬂows are particu-
larly insidious: while the overﬂow itself is usually not ex-
ploitable, it often leads to other...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Practical Anonymous Password Authentication and TLS with Anonymous
Client Authentication
author:Zhenfeng Zhang and
Kang Yang and
Xuexian Hu and
Yuchen Wang
Practical Anonymous Password Authentication and TLS
with Anonymous Client Authentication ∗
Zhenfeng Zhang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, SKLCS, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
zfzhang@tca.iscas.ac.cn
Xuexian Hu
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of
Sciences & State Key Lab of Mathematical
Engineering and Advanced Computing
xuexian_hu@hotmail.com
†
Kang Yang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
yangkang@tca.iscas.ac.cn
Yuchen Wang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
wangyuchen@tca.iscas.ac.cn
ABSTRACT
Anonymous authentication allows one to authenticate her-
self without revealing her identity, and becomes an impor-
tant technique for constructing privacy-preserving Internet
connections. Anonymous password authentication is high-
ly desirable as it enables a client to authenticate herself
by a human-memorable password while preserving her pri-
vacy.
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for
designing anonymous password-authenticated key exchange
(APAKE) protocols using algebraic message authentication
codes (MACs), where an algebraic MAC wrapped by a pass-
word is used by a client for anonymous authentication, and
a server issues algebraic MACs to clients and acts as the
veriﬁer of login protocols. Our APAKE construction is se-
cure provided that the algebraic MAC is strongly existential-
ly unforgeable under random message and chosen veriﬁca-
tion queries attack (suf-rmva), weak pseudorandom and tag-
randomization simulatable, and has simulation-sound ex-
tractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (SE-NIZKs).
To design practical APAKE protocols, we instantiate an
algebraic MAC based on the q-SDH assumption whic...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Practical Anonymous Password Authentication and TLS with Anonymous
Client Authentication
author:Zhenfeng Zhang and
Kang Yang and
Xuexian Hu and
Yuchen Wang
Practical Anonymous Password Authentication and TLS
with Anonymous Client Authentication ∗
Zhenfeng Zhang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, SKLCS, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
zfzhang@tca.iscas.ac.cn
Xuexian Hu
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of
Sciences & State Key Lab of Mathematical
Engineering and Advanced Computing
xuexian_hu@hotmail.com
†
Kang Yang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
yangkang@tca.iscas.ac.cn
Yuchen Wang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance
Laboratory, Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences
wangyuchen@tca.iscas.ac.cn
ABSTRACT
Anonymous authentication allows one to authenticate her-
self without revealing her identity, and becomes an impor-
tant technique for constructing privacy-preserving Internet
connections. Anonymous password authentication is high-
ly desirable as it enables a client to authenticate herself
by a human-memorable password while preserving her pri-
vacy.
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for
designing anonymous password-authenticated key exchange
(APAKE) protocols using algebraic message authentication
codes (MACs), where an algebraic MAC wrapped by a pass-
word is used by a client for anonymous authentication, and
a server issues algebraic MACs to clients and acts as the
veriﬁer of login protocols. Our APAKE construction is se-
cure provided that the algebraic MAC is strongly existential-
ly unforgeable under random message and chosen veriﬁca-
tion queries attack (suf-rmva), weak pseudorandom and tag-
randomization simulatable, and has simulation-sound ex-
tractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (SE-NIZKs).
To design practical APAKE protocols, we instantiate an
algebraic MAC based on the q-SDH assumption whic...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Towards practical biometric key generation with randomized biometric
templates
author:Lucas Ballard and
Seny Kamara and
Fabian Monrose and
Michael K. Reiter
Towards Practical Biometric Key Generation
with Randomized Biometric Templates
∗
Lucas Ballard
Google, Inc.
lucasballard@google.com
∗
Seny Kamara
Microsoft Research
senyk@microsoft.com
∗
Fabian Monrose
UNC Chapel Hill
fabian@cs.unc.edu
Michael K. Reiter
UNC Chapel Hill
reiter@cs.unc.edu
ABSTRACT
Although biometrics have garnered signiﬁcant interest as a source
of entropy for cryptographic key generation, recent studies indicate
that many biometric modalities may not actually offer enough un-
certainty for this purpose. In this paper, we exploit a novel source
of entropy that can be used with any biometric modality but that
has yet to be utilized for key generation, namely associating uncer-
tainty with the way in which the biometric input is measured. Our
construction poses only a modest requirement on a user: the abil-
ity to remember a low-entropy password. We identify the technical
challenges of this approach, and develop novel techniques to over-
come these difﬁculties. Our analysis of this approach indicates that
it may offer the potential to generate stronger keys: In our experi-
ments, 40% of the users are able to generate keys that are at least
230 times stronger than passwords alone.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data Encryption]; H.1 [Models and Principles]: User/Machine
Systems
General Terms
Security, Design
Keywords
Biometrics, Cryptographic Keys
1.
INTRODUCTION
Humans are unable to generate and remember strong secrets, and
thus have difﬁculty managing cryptographic keys [1, 10]. To ad-
dress this problem, numerous proposals have been suggested to en-
able people to reliably generate high-entropy cryptographic keys
∗
Research conducted at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is gran...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Towards practical biometric key generation with randomized biometric
templates
author:Lucas Ballard and
Seny Kamara and
Fabian Monrose and
Michael K. Reiter
Towards Practical Biometric Key Generation
with Randomized Biometric Templates
∗
Lucas Ballard
Google, Inc.
lucasballard@google.com
∗
Seny Kamara
Microsoft Research
senyk@microsoft.com
∗
Fabian Monrose
UNC Chapel Hill
fabian@cs.unc.edu
Michael K. Reiter
UNC Chapel Hill
reiter@cs.unc.edu
ABSTRACT
Although biometrics have garnered signiﬁcant interest as a source
of entropy for cryptographic key generation, recent studies indicate
that many biometric modalities may not actually offer enough un-
certainty for this purpose. In this paper, we exploit a novel source
of entropy that can be used with any biometric modality but that
has yet to be utilized for key generation, namely associating uncer-
tainty with the way in which the biometric input is measured. Our
construction poses only a modest requirement on a user: the abil-
ity to remember a low-entropy password. We identify the technical
challenges of this approach, and develop novel techniques to over-
come these difﬁculties. Our analysis of this approach indicates that
it may offer the potential to generate stronger keys: In our experi-
ments, 40% of the users are able to generate keys that are at least
230 times stronger than passwords alone.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data Encryption]; H.1 [Models and Principles]: User/Machine
Systems
General Terms
Security, Design
Keywords
Biometrics, Cryptographic Keys
1.
INTRODUCTION
Humans are unable to generate and remember strong secrets, and
thus have difﬁculty managing cryptographic keys [1, 10]. To ad-
dress this problem, numerous proposals have been suggested to en-
able people to reliably generate high-entropy cryptographic keys
∗
Research conducted at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is gran...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Inferring regional access network topologies: methods and applications
author:Zesen Zhang and
Alexander Marder and
Ricky K. P. Mok and
Bradley Huffaker and
Matthew Luckie and
Kimberly C. Claffy and
Aaron Schulman
Inferring Regional Access Network Topologies:
Methods and Applications
Alexander Marder
CAIDA, UC San Diego
amarder@caida.org
CAIDA, UC San Diego
cskpmok@caida.org
Ricky Mok
Bradley Huffaker
CAIDA, UC San Diego
bradley@caida.org
Zesen Zhang
UC San Diego
zez003@eng.ucsd.edu
Matthew Luckie
University of Waikato
mjl@wand.net.nz
KC Claffy
CAIDA, UC San Diego
kc@caida.org
Aaron Schulman
UC San Diego
schulman@cs.ucsd.edu
ABSTRACT
Using a toolbox of Internet cartography methods, and new ways
of applying them, we have undertaken a comprehensive active
measurement-driven study of the topology of U.S. regional access
ISPs. We used state-of-the-art approaches in various combinations
to accommodate the geographic scope, scale, and architectural rich-
ness of U.S. regional access ISPs. In addition to vantage points from
research platforms, we used public WiFi hotspots and public transit
of mobile devices to acquire the visibility needed to thoroughly
map access networks across regions. We observed many different
approaches to aggregation and redundancy, across links, nodes,
buildings, and at different levels of the hierarchy. One result is sub-
stantial disparity in latency from some Edge COs to their backbone
COs, with implications for end users of cloud services. Our meth-
ods and results can inform future analysis of critical infrastructure,
including resilience to disasters, persistence of the digital divide,
and challenges for the future of 5G and edge computing.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Public Internet; Logical / virtual topologies;
Physical topologies; Network measurement.
KEYWORDS
Internet topology, Access networks, Mobile networks, Traceroute
ACM Reference Format:
Zesen Zhang, Alexander Marder, Ricky Mok, Bradley Huffaker, Matthew
Luckie, KC Claffy, and ...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Inferring regional access network topologies: methods and applications
author:Zesen Zhang and
Alexander Marder and
Ricky K. P. Mok and
Bradley Huffaker and
Matthew Luckie and
Kimberly C. Claffy and
Aaron Schulman
Inferring Regional Access Network Topologies:
Methods and Applications
Alexander Marder
CAIDA, UC San Diego
amarder@caida.org
CAIDA, UC San Diego
cskpmok@caida.org
Ricky Mok
Bradley Huffaker
CAIDA, UC San Diego
bradley@caida.org
Zesen Zhang
UC San Diego
zez003@eng.ucsd.edu
Matthew Luckie
University of Waikato
mjl@wand.net.nz
KC Claffy
CAIDA, UC San Diego
kc@caida.org
Aaron Schulman
UC San Diego
schulman@cs.ucsd.edu
ABSTRACT
Using a toolbox of Internet cartography methods, and new ways
of applying them, we have undertaken a comprehensive active
measurement-driven study of the topology of U.S. regional access
ISPs. We used state-of-the-art approaches in various combinations
to accommodate the geographic scope, scale, and architectural rich-
ness of U.S. regional access ISPs. In addition to vantage points from
research platforms, we used public WiFi hotspots and public transit
of mobile devices to acquire the visibility needed to thoroughly
map access networks across regions. We observed many different
approaches to aggregation and redundancy, across links, nodes,
buildings, and at different levels of the hierarchy. One result is sub-
stantial disparity in latency from some Edge COs to their backbone
COs, with implications for end users of cloud services. Our meth-
ods and results can inform future analysis of critical infrastructure,
including resilience to disasters, persistence of the digital divide,
and challenges for the future of 5G and edge computing.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Public Internet; Logical / virtual topologies;
Physical topologies; Network measurement.
KEYWORDS
Internet topology, Access networks, Mobile networks, Traceroute
ACM Reference Format:
Zesen Zhang, Alexander Marder, Ricky Mok, Bradley Huffaker, Matthew
Luckie, KC Claffy, and ...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:BUFFing signature schemes beyond unforgeability and the case of post-quantum
signatures
author:Cas Cremers and
Samed D"uzl"u and
Rune Fiedler and
Marc Fischlin and
Christian Janson
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
BUFFing signature schemes beyond unforgeability
and the case of post-quantum signatures
Cas Cremers∗, Samed Düzlü†, Rune Fiedler‡, Marc Fischlin‡, and Christian Janson‡
∗CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany
‡Cryptoplexity, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
†QPC, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
3
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Abstract—Modern digital signature schemes can provide more
guarantees than the standard notion of (strong) unforgeability,
such as offering security even in the presence of maliciously
generated keys, or requiring to know a message to produce
a signature for it. The use of signature schemes that lack
these properties has previously enabled attacks on real-world
protocols. In this work we revisit several of these notions beyond
unforgeability, establish relations among them, provide the ﬁrst
formal deﬁnition of non re-signability, and a transformation that
can provide these properties for a given signature scheme in a
provable and efﬁcient way.
Our results are not only relevant for established schemes:
for example, the ongoing NIST PQC competition towards stan-
dardizing post-quantum signature schemes has six ﬁnalists in its
third round. We perform an in-depth analysis of the candidates
with respect to their security properties beyond unforgeability.
We show that many of them do not yet offer these stronger
guarantees, which implies that the security guarantees of these
post-quantum schemes are not strictly stronger than, but instead
incomparable to, classical signature schemes. We sho...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:BUFFing signature schemes beyond unforgeability and the case of post-quantum
signatures
author:Cas Cremers and
Samed D"uzl"u and
Rune Fiedler and
Marc Fischlin and
Christian Janson
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
BUFFing signature schemes beyond unforgeability
and the case of post-quantum signatures
Cas Cremers∗, Samed Düzlü†, Rune Fiedler‡, Marc Fischlin‡, and Christian Janson‡
∗CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany
‡Cryptoplexity, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
†QPC, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
3
9
0
0
0
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1
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0
1
:
I
O
D
|
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E
E
I
1
2
0
2
©
0
0
.
1
3
$
/
1
2
/
5
-
4
3
9
8
-
1
8
2
7
-
1
-
8
7
9
|
)
P
S
(
y
c
a
v
i
r
P
d
n
a
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S
n
o
m
u
i
s
o
p
m
y
S
E
E
E
I
1
2
0
2
Abstract—Modern digital signature schemes can provide more
guarantees than the standard notion of (strong) unforgeability,
such as offering security even in the presence of maliciously
generated keys, or requiring to know a message to produce
a signature for it. The use of signature schemes that lack
these properties has previously enabled attacks on real-world
protocols. In this work we revisit several of these notions beyond
unforgeability, establish relations among them, provide the ﬁrst
formal deﬁnition of non re-signability, and a transformation that
can provide these properties for a given signature scheme in a
provable and efﬁcient way.
Our results are not only relevant for established schemes:
for example, the ongoing NIST PQC competition towards stan-
dardizing post-quantum signature schemes has six ﬁnalists in its
third round. We perform an in-depth analysis of the candidates
with respect to their security properties beyond unforgeability.
We show that many of them do not yet offer these stronger
guarantees, which implies that the security guarantees of these
post-quantum schemes are not strictly stronger than, but instead
incomparable to, classical signature schemes. We sho...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Trustworthy distributed computing on social networks
author:Abedelaziz Mohaisen and
Huy Tran and
Abhishek Chandra and
Yongdae Kim
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, VOL. 7, NO. 3,
JULY-SEPTEMBER 2014
333
Trustworthy Distributed Computing
on Social Networks
Aziz Mohaisen, Member, IEEE, Huy Tran, Abhishek Chandra, Member, IEEE, and
Yongdae Kim, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we investigate a new computing paradigm, called SocialCloud, in which computing nodes are governed
by social ties driven from a bootstrapping trust-possessing social graph. We investigate how this paradigm differs from existing computing
paradigms, such as grid computing and the conventional cloud computing paradigms. We show that incentives to adopt this paradigm
are intuitive and natural, and security and trust guarantees provided by it are solid. We propose metrics for measuring the utility and
advantage of this computing paradigm, and using real-world social graphs and structures of social traces; we investigate the potential of
this paradigm for ordinary users. We study several design options and trade-offs, such as scheduling algorithms, centralization, and straggler
handling, and show how they affect the utility of the paradigm. Interestingly, we conclude that whereas graphs known in the literature
for high trust properties do not serve distributed trusted computing algorithms, such as Sybil defensesVfor their weak algorithmic properties,
such graphs are good candidates for our paradigm for their self-load-balancing features.
Index Terms—Distributed computing, trust, social computing
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing is a new paradigm that overcomes
restrictions of conventional computing systems by
enabling new technological and economical aspects, such
as elasticity and pay-as-you-goVwhich free users from
long-term commitments and obligation towards service
providers. Cloud computing is beneficial for both consumers
and cloud service providers. Despite many benefits this
pa...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Trustworthy distributed computing on social networks
author:Abedelaziz Mohaisen and
Huy Tran and
Abhishek Chandra and
Yongdae Kim
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, VOL. 7, NO. 3,
JULY-SEPTEMBER 2014
333
Trustworthy Distributed Computing
on Social Networks
Aziz Mohaisen, Member, IEEE, Huy Tran, Abhishek Chandra, Member, IEEE, and
Yongdae Kim, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we investigate a new computing paradigm, called SocialCloud, in which computing nodes are governed
by social ties driven from a bootstrapping trust-possessing social graph. We investigate how this paradigm differs from existing computing
paradigms, such as grid computing and the conventional cloud computing paradigms. We show that incentives to adopt this paradigm
are intuitive and natural, and security and trust guarantees provided by it are solid. We propose metrics for measuring the utility and
advantage of this computing paradigm, and using real-world social graphs and structures of social traces; we investigate the potential of
this paradigm for ordinary users. We study several design options and trade-offs, such as scheduling algorithms, centralization, and straggler
handling, and show how they affect the utility of the paradigm. Interestingly, we conclude that whereas graphs known in the literature
for high trust properties do not serve distributed trusted computing algorithms, such as Sybil defensesVfor their weak algorithmic properties,
such graphs are good candidates for our paradigm for their self-load-balancing features.
Index Terms—Distributed computing, trust, social computing
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing is a new paradigm that overcomes
restrictions of conventional computing systems by
enabling new technological and economical aspects, such
as elasticity and pay-as-you-goVwhich free users from
long-term commitments and obligation towards service
providers. Cloud computing is beneficial for both consumers
and cloud service providers. Despite many benefits this
pa...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:All Your iFRAMEs Point to Us
author:Niels Provos and
Panayiotis Mavrommatis and
Moheeb Abu Rajab and
Fabian Monrose
All Your iFRAMEs Point to Us
Niels Provos
Panayiotis Mavrommatis
Google Inc.
Moheeb Abu Rajab
Fabian Monrose
Johns Hopkins University
{niels, panayiotis}@google.com
{moheeb, fabian}@cs.jhu.edu
Abstract
As the web continues to play an ever increasing role
in information exchange, so too is it becoming the pre-
vailing platform for infecting vulnerable hosts. In this
paper, we provide a detailed study of the pervasiveness
of so-called drive-by downloads on the Internet. Drive-
by downloads are caused by URLs that attempt to exploit
their visitors and cause malware to be installed and run
automatically. Over a period of 10 months we processed
billions of URLs, and our results shows that a non-trivial
amount, of over 3 million malicious URLs, initiate drive-
by downloads. An even more troubling ﬁnding is that
approximately 1.3% of the incoming search queries to
Google’s search engine returned at least one URL labeled
as malicious in the results page. We also explore sev-
eral aspects of the drive-by downloads problem. Speciﬁ-
cally, we study the relationship between the user brows-
ing habits and exposure to malware, the techniques used
to lure the user into the malware distribution networks,
and the different properties of these networks.
1 Introduction
It should come as no surprise that our increasing reliance
on the Internet for many facets of our daily lives (e.g.,
commerce, communication, entertainment, etc.) makes
the Internet an attractive target for a host of illicit ac-
tivities. Indeed, over the past several years, Internet ser-
vices have witnessed major disruptions from attacks, and
the network itself is continually plagued with malfea-
sance [1]. While the monetary gains from the myriad
of illicit behaviors being perpetrated today (e.g., phish-
ing, spam) is just barely being understood [11], it is clear
that there is a general shift in...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:All Your iFRAMEs Point to Us
author:Niels Provos and
Panayiotis Mavrommatis and
Moheeb Abu Rajab and
Fabian Monrose
All Your iFRAMEs Point to Us
Niels Provos
Panayiotis Mavrommatis
Google Inc.
Moheeb Abu Rajab
Fabian Monrose
Johns Hopkins University
{niels, panayiotis}@google.com
{moheeb, fabian}@cs.jhu.edu
Abstract
As the web continues to play an ever increasing role
in information exchange, so too is it becoming the pre-
vailing platform for infecting vulnerable hosts. In this
paper, we provide a detailed study of the pervasiveness
of so-called drive-by downloads on the Internet. Drive-
by downloads are caused by URLs that attempt to exploit
their visitors and cause malware to be installed and run
automatically. Over a period of 10 months we processed
billions of URLs, and our results shows that a non-trivial
amount, of over 3 million malicious URLs, initiate drive-
by downloads. An even more troubling ﬁnding is that
approximately 1.3% of the incoming search queries to
Google’s search engine returned at least one URL labeled
as malicious in the results page. We also explore sev-
eral aspects of the drive-by downloads problem. Speciﬁ-
cally, we study the relationship between the user brows-
ing habits and exposure to malware, the techniques used
to lure the user into the malware distribution networks,
and the different properties of these networks.
1 Introduction
It should come as no surprise that our increasing reliance
on the Internet for many facets of our daily lives (e.g.,
commerce, communication, entertainment, etc.) makes
the Internet an attractive target for a host of illicit ac-
tivities. Indeed, over the past several years, Internet ser-
vices have witnessed major disruptions from attacks, and
the network itself is continually plagued with malfea-
sance [1]. While the monetary gains from the myriad
of illicit behaviors being perpetrated today (e.g., phish-
ing, spam) is just barely being understood [11], it is clear
that there is a general shift in...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Breaking and Fixing Origin-Based Access Control in Hybrid Web/Mobile
Application Frameworks
author:Martin Georgiev and
Suman Jana and
Vitaly Shmatikov
Breaking and Fixing Origin-Based Access Control
in Hybrid Web/Mobile Application Frameworks
Martin Georgiev
Suman Jana
The University of Texas at Austin
The University of Texas at Austin
mgeorgiev@utexas.edu
suman@cs.utexas.edu
Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin
Abstract—Hybrid mobile applications (apps) combine the
features of Web applications and “native” mobile apps. Like
Web applications, they are implemented in portable, platform-
independent languages such as HTML and JavaScript. Like
native apps, they have direct access to local device resources—ﬁle
system, location, camera, contacts, etc.
Hybrid apps are typically developed using hybrid application
frameworks such as PhoneGap. The purpose of the framework
is twofold. First,
it provides an embedded Web browser (for
example, WebView on Android) that executes the app’s Web code.
Second, it supplies “bridges” that allow Web code to escape the
browser and access local resources on the device.
We analyze the software stack created by hybrid frameworks
and demonstrate that it does not properly compose the access-
control policies governing Web code and local code, respectively.
Web code is governed by the same origin policy, whereas local
code is governed by the access-control policy of the operating
system (for example, user-granted permissions in Android). The
bridges added by the framework to the browser have the
same local access rights as the entire application, but are not
correctly protected by the same origin policy. This opens the
door to fracking attacks, which allow foreign-origin Web content
included into a hybrid app (e.g., ads conﬁned in iframes) to drill
through the layers and directly access device resources. Fracking
vulnerabilities are generic: they affect all hybrid frameworks,
all embedded Web browsers, all bridge mechanisms,...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Breaking and Fixing Origin-Based Access Control in Hybrid Web/Mobile
Application Frameworks
author:Martin Georgiev and
Suman Jana and
Vitaly Shmatikov
Breaking and Fixing Origin-Based Access Control
in Hybrid Web/Mobile Application Frameworks
Martin Georgiev
Suman Jana
The University of Texas at Austin
The University of Texas at Austin
mgeorgiev@utexas.edu
suman@cs.utexas.edu
Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin
Abstract—Hybrid mobile applications (apps) combine the
features of Web applications and “native” mobile apps. Like
Web applications, they are implemented in portable, platform-
independent languages such as HTML and JavaScript. Like
native apps, they have direct access to local device resources—ﬁle
system, location, camera, contacts, etc.
Hybrid apps are typically developed using hybrid application
frameworks such as PhoneGap. The purpose of the framework
is twofold. First,
it provides an embedded Web browser (for
example, WebView on Android) that executes the app’s Web code.
Second, it supplies “bridges” that allow Web code to escape the
browser and access local resources on the device.
We analyze the software stack created by hybrid frameworks
and demonstrate that it does not properly compose the access-
control policies governing Web code and local code, respectively.
Web code is governed by the same origin policy, whereas local
code is governed by the access-control policy of the operating
system (for example, user-granted permissions in Android). The
bridges added by the framework to the browser have the
same local access rights as the entire application, but are not
correctly protected by the same origin policy. This opens the
door to fracking attacks, which allow foreign-origin Web content
included into a hybrid app (e.g., ads conﬁned in iframes) to drill
through the layers and directly access device resources. Fracking
vulnerabilities are generic: they affect all hybrid frameworks,
all embedded Web browsers, all bridge mechanisms,...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Introduction to Credit Networks: Security, Privacy, and Applications
author:Aniket Kate
Introduction to Credit Networks
Security, Privacy, and Applications
Aniket Kate
Purdue University
aniket@purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
Credit networks model transitive IOweYou (IOU) credit between
their users. With their ﬂexible-yet-scalable design and robustness
against intrusion, we are observing a rapid increase in their pop-
ularity as a backbone of real-world permission-less payment set-
tlement networks (e.g., Ripple and Stellar) as well as several other
weak-identity systems requiring Sybil-tolerant communication. In
payment scenarios, due to their unique capability to unite emerging
crypto-currencies and user-deﬁned currencies with the traditional
ﬁat currency and banking systems, several existing and new pay-
ment enterprises are entering in this space. Nevertheless, this en-
thusiasm in the market signiﬁcantly exceeds our understanding of
security, privacy, and reliability of these inherently distributed sys-
tems. Currently employed ad hoc strategies to ﬁx apparent ﬂaws
have made those systems vulnerable to bigger problems once they
become lucrative targets for malicious players.
In this tutorial, we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of IOU credit net-
works, and describe some of the important credit network applica-
tions. We then describe and analyze recent and ongoing projects to
improve the credit-network security, privacy and reliability. We end
our discussion with interesting open problems and systems chal-
lenges in the ﬁeld. This introductory tutorial is accessible to the
standard CCS audience with graduate-level security knowledge.
Keywords
I Owe You; Credit networks; Sybil tolerance; Trust networks; Rip-
ple; Stellar; Blockchain
1.
INTRODUCTION
Credit networks [3–5] model credit (or trust) among users in a
network through a directed, weighted graph, where the value of
each edge shows the amount of IOU credit that a user is willing to
extend to another. As the loss of credit...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Introduction to Credit Networks: Security, Privacy, and Applications
author:Aniket Kate
Introduction to Credit Networks
Security, Privacy, and Applications
Aniket Kate
Purdue University
aniket@purdue.edu
ABSTRACT
Credit networks model transitive IOweYou (IOU) credit between
their users. With their ﬂexible-yet-scalable design and robustness
against intrusion, we are observing a rapid increase in their pop-
ularity as a backbone of real-world permission-less payment set-
tlement networks (e.g., Ripple and Stellar) as well as several other
weak-identity systems requiring Sybil-tolerant communication. In
payment scenarios, due to their unique capability to unite emerging
crypto-currencies and user-deﬁned currencies with the traditional
ﬁat currency and banking systems, several existing and new pay-
ment enterprises are entering in this space. Nevertheless, this en-
thusiasm in the market signiﬁcantly exceeds our understanding of
security, privacy, and reliability of these inherently distributed sys-
tems. Currently employed ad hoc strategies to ﬁx apparent ﬂaws
have made those systems vulnerable to bigger problems once they
become lucrative targets for malicious players.
In this tutorial, we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of IOU credit net-
works, and describe some of the important credit network applica-
tions. We then describe and analyze recent and ongoing projects to
improve the credit-network security, privacy and reliability. We end
our discussion with interesting open problems and systems chal-
lenges in the ﬁeld. This introductory tutorial is accessible to the
standard CCS audience with graduate-level security knowledge.
Keywords
I Owe You; Credit networks; Sybil tolerance; Trust networks; Rip-
ple; Stellar; Blockchain
1.
INTRODUCTION
Credit networks [3–5] model credit (or trust) among users in a
network through a directed, weighted graph, where the value of
each edge shows the amount of IOU credit that a user is willing to
extend to another. As the loss of credit...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Privacy settings in social networking systems: what you cannot control
author:Amirreza Masoumzadeh and
James Joshi
Privacy Settings in Social Networking Systems: What You
Cannot Control
Amirreza Masoumzadeh
School of Information Sciences
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
amirreza@sis.pitt.edu
James Joshi
School of Information Sciences
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
jjoshi@pitt.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a framework to formally analyze
what privacy-sensitive information is protected by the stated
policies of a Social Networking System (SNS), based on an
expression of ideal protection policies for a user. Our ontol-
ogy-based framework can capture complex and ﬁne-grained
privacy-sensitive information in SNSs, and ﬁnd out missing
policies, given a user’s ideal policies, and SNS’s privacy set-
tings and described system policies. We propose notions of
policy completeness for SNSs to facilitate such an analysis.
Our case study of using this approach on Facebook shows
that we can eﬀectively identify important missing policies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Social Networking Systems, Privacy Settings, Privacy Con-
trol Policies
1.
INTRODUCTION
In a typical Social Networking System (SNS) such as Face-
book, there exist several privacy settings that can be con-
ﬁgured by a user in order to control others’ access to the
information related to her. These settings are in fact equiv-
alent to access control policies that are expressed by the
users for the respective digital objects. Such privacy set-
tings are by no means complete in the sense that they do
not control access to all the potentially privacy-sensitive in-
formation about a user. That is the case even for Facebook,
which has fairly the most extensive set of privacy settings
among SNSs. Access to the rest of the information related
to the user is governed by a set of ﬁxed rules set by the SNS
itself. W...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Privacy settings in social networking systems: what you cannot control
author:Amirreza Masoumzadeh and
James Joshi
Privacy Settings in Social Networking Systems: What You
Cannot Control
Amirreza Masoumzadeh
School of Information Sciences
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
amirreza@sis.pitt.edu
James Joshi
School of Information Sciences
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
jjoshi@pitt.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a framework to formally analyze
what privacy-sensitive information is protected by the stated
policies of a Social Networking System (SNS), based on an
expression of ideal protection policies for a user. Our ontol-
ogy-based framework can capture complex and ﬁne-grained
privacy-sensitive information in SNSs, and ﬁnd out missing
policies, given a user’s ideal policies, and SNS’s privacy set-
tings and described system policies. We propose notions of
policy completeness for SNSs to facilitate such an analysis.
Our case study of using this approach on Facebook shows
that we can eﬀectively identify important missing policies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
Keywords
Social Networking Systems, Privacy Settings, Privacy Con-
trol Policies
1.
INTRODUCTION
In a typical Social Networking System (SNS) such as Face-
book, there exist several privacy settings that can be con-
ﬁgured by a user in order to control others’ access to the
information related to her. These settings are in fact equiv-
alent to access control policies that are expressed by the
users for the respective digital objects. Such privacy set-
tings are by no means complete in the sense that they do
not control access to all the potentially privacy-sensitive in-
formation about a user. That is the case even for Facebook,
which has fairly the most extensive set of privacy settings
among SNSs. Access to the rest of the information related
to the user is governed by a set of ﬁxed rules set by the SNS
itself. W...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:BlueShield: Detecting Spoofing Attacks in Bluetooth Low Energy Networks
author:Jianliang Wu and
Yuhong Nan and
Vireshwar Kumar and
Mathias Payer and
Dongyan Xu
BlueShield: Detecting Spooﬁng Attacks in Bluetooth Low Energy Networks
Jianliang Wu1∗, Yuhong Nan1∗, Vireshwar Kumar1, Mathias Payer2, and Dongyan Xu1
{wu1220, nan1, viresh}@purdue.edu, mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net, dxu@cs.purdue.edu
1Purdue University, 2 EPFL
Abstract
Many IoT devices are equipped with Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) to support communication in an energy-efﬁcient man-
ner. Unfortunately, BLE is prone to spooﬁng attacks where
an attacker can impersonate a benign BLE device and feed
malicious data to its users. Defending against spooﬁng attacks
is extremely difﬁcult as security patches to mitigate them may
not be adopted across vendors promptly; not to mention the
millions of legacy BLE devices with limited I/O capabilities
that do not support ﬁrmware updates.
As a ﬁrst line of defense against spooﬁng attacks, we pro-
pose BlueShield, a legacy-friendly, non-intrusive monitoring
system. BlueShield is motivated by the observation that all
spooﬁng attacks result in anomalies in certain cyber-physical
features of the advertising packets containing the BLE de-
vice’s identity. BlueShield leverages these features to detect
anomalous packets generated by an attacker. More impor-
tantly, the unique design of BlueShield makes it robust against
an advanced attacker with the capability to mimic all features.
BlueShield can be deployed on low-cost off-the-shelf plat-
forms, and does not require any modiﬁcation in the BLE
device or its user. Our evaluation with nine common BLE
devices deployed in a real-world ofﬁce environment validates
that BlueShield can effectively detect spooﬁng attacks at a
very low false positive and false negative rate.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of IoT devices leverage Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) to communicate in an energy-efﬁcient manner.
As one of the most popular protoc...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:BlueShield: Detecting Spoofing Attacks in Bluetooth Low Energy Networks
author:Jianliang Wu and
Yuhong Nan and
Vireshwar Kumar and
Mathias Payer and
Dongyan Xu
BlueShield: Detecting Spooﬁng Attacks in Bluetooth Low Energy Networks
Jianliang Wu1∗, Yuhong Nan1∗, Vireshwar Kumar1, Mathias Payer2, and Dongyan Xu1
{wu1220, nan1, viresh}@purdue.edu, mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net, dxu@cs.purdue.edu
1Purdue University, 2 EPFL
Abstract
Many IoT devices are equipped with Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) to support communication in an energy-efﬁcient man-
ner. Unfortunately, BLE is prone to spooﬁng attacks where
an attacker can impersonate a benign BLE device and feed
malicious data to its users. Defending against spooﬁng attacks
is extremely difﬁcult as security patches to mitigate them may
not be adopted across vendors promptly; not to mention the
millions of legacy BLE devices with limited I/O capabilities
that do not support ﬁrmware updates.
As a ﬁrst line of defense against spooﬁng attacks, we pro-
pose BlueShield, a legacy-friendly, non-intrusive monitoring
system. BlueShield is motivated by the observation that all
spooﬁng attacks result in anomalies in certain cyber-physical
features of the advertising packets containing the BLE de-
vice’s identity. BlueShield leverages these features to detect
anomalous packets generated by an attacker. More impor-
tantly, the unique design of BlueShield makes it robust against
an advanced attacker with the capability to mimic all features.
BlueShield can be deployed on low-cost off-the-shelf plat-
forms, and does not require any modiﬁcation in the BLE
device or its user. Our evaluation with nine common BLE
devices deployed in a real-world ofﬁce environment validates
that BlueShield can effectively detect spooﬁng attacks at a
very low false positive and false negative rate.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of IoT devices leverage Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) to communicate in an energy-efﬁcient manner.
As one of the most popular protoc...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Direct chosen ciphertext security from identity-based techniques
author:Xavier Boyen and
Qixiang Mei and
Brent Waters
Direct Chosen Ciphertext Security from Identity-Based
Techniques
Xavier Boyen
Voltage Inc., Palo Alto
xb@boyen.org
Qixiang Mei
Southwest Jiaotong University
Brent Waters
Stanford University
nupfster@gmail.com
bwaters@cs.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT
We describe a new encryption technique that is secure in the
standard model against chosen ciphertext attacks. We base
our method on two very eﬃcient Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) schemes without random oracles due to Boneh and
Boyen, and Waters.
Unlike previous CCA2-secure cryptosystems that use IBE
as a black box, our approach is very simple and compact.
It makes direct use of the underlying IBE structure, and re-
quires no cryptographic primitive other than the IBE scheme
itself. This conveys several advantages. We achieve shorter
ciphertext size than the best known instantiations of the
other methods, and our technique is as eﬃcient as the Boneh
and Katz method (and more so than that of Canetti, Halevi,
and Katz). Further, our method operates nicely on hierar-
chical IBE, and since it allows the validity of ciphertexts to
be checked publicly, it can be used to construct systems with
non-interactive threshold decryption.
In this paper we describe two main constructions: a full
encryption system based on the Waters adaptive-ID secure
IBE, and a KEM based on the Boneh-Boyen selective-ID
secure IBE. Both systems are shown CCA2-secure in the
standard model, the latter with a tight reduction. We dis-
cuss several uses and extensions of our approach, and draw
comparisons with other schemes that are provably secure in
the standard model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: [Data Encryption]
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Identity-Based Encryption, Chosen Ciphertext Security
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee pr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Direct chosen ciphertext security from identity-based techniques
author:Xavier Boyen and
Qixiang Mei and
Brent Waters
Direct Chosen Ciphertext Security from Identity-Based
Techniques
Xavier Boyen
Voltage Inc., Palo Alto
xb@boyen.org
Qixiang Mei
Southwest Jiaotong University
Brent Waters
Stanford University
nupfster@gmail.com
bwaters@cs.stanford.edu
ABSTRACT
We describe a new encryption technique that is secure in the
standard model against chosen ciphertext attacks. We base
our method on two very eﬃcient Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) schemes without random oracles due to Boneh and
Boyen, and Waters.
Unlike previous CCA2-secure cryptosystems that use IBE
as a black box, our approach is very simple and compact.
It makes direct use of the underlying IBE structure, and re-
quires no cryptographic primitive other than the IBE scheme
itself. This conveys several advantages. We achieve shorter
ciphertext size than the best known instantiations of the
other methods, and our technique is as eﬃcient as the Boneh
and Katz method (and more so than that of Canetti, Halevi,
and Katz). Further, our method operates nicely on hierar-
chical IBE, and since it allows the validity of ciphertexts to
be checked publicly, it can be used to construct systems with
non-interactive threshold decryption.
In this paper we describe two main constructions: a full
encryption system based on the Waters adaptive-ID secure
IBE, and a KEM based on the Boneh-Boyen selective-ID
secure IBE. Both systems are shown CCA2-secure in the
standard model, the latter with a tight reduction. We dis-
cuss several uses and extensions of our approach, and draw
comparisons with other schemes that are provably secure in
the standard model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data]: [Data Encryption]
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Identity-Based Encryption, Chosen Ciphertext Security
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee pr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Analysis of traceability attack on Camenisch et al.'s blind signature
schemes
author:Lin-Chuan Wu
Analysis of Traceability Attack on Camenisch et al.'s Blind
Signature Schemes
Lin-Chuan Wu
Telecommunication Laboratories, CHT.
12, Lane 551, Min-Tsu Road Sec. 5
Yang-Mei, Taoyuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.
TEL: +886-3-4244151
E-mail: lcwu@cht.com.tw
ABSTRACT
Recently,  Lee  et  al.  asserted  that  Camensch  et  al.’s  schemes
cannot  satsfy  the  untraceablty  property  of  blnd  sgnature
scheme.    In  ths  paper,  we  analyze  that  Lee  et  al.’s  traceablty
attack s flawed.
Keywords:  Untraceablty,  Blnd  Sgnature,  Dgtal  Sgnature,
Cryptography, Informaton Securty.
INTRODUCTION
A blnd sgnature scheme s a protocol to allow the requester to
obtan  a  sgnature  wthout  revealng  message  and  the  sgner
cannot trace any message-sgnature par later.  It can acheve the
unforgeablty  property  for  the  sgner  and  the  untraceablty  for
the requester.  Camensch et al. [] proposed two blnd sgnature
schemes based on the dscrete logarthm problem.
REVIEW OF CAMENISCH et al.’s SCHEMES
The  sgner  and  requester  are  two  knds  of  partcpant  and  the
detals  of  Camensch  et  al.’s  DSA  blnd  sgnature  scheme  are
descrbed n the followng.
(1)  Initialization:  The  sgner  selects  a  random  number  x ,  and
.    Fnally,  (s)he  randomly  selects  kˆ
computes
 to the requester.
(mod p
)
p
(mod
)
x(cid:32)
g
ˆ
k(cid:32)
g
and sends
y
ˆ
r
(2)  Requesting:  The  requester  selects  two  random  numbers
qZba (cid:143),
.    Then,  (s)he
calculates
a(cid:32)
ˆ
gr
 and sends  mˆ  to the sgner.
q
)
 and  computes
ˆ
m
r
(mod
(mod
ˆ
rram
(cid:32)

(cid:16)
p
)
b
(3)  Signing:  The  sgner  computes
sends  sˆ  back to the requester.
(4)
The
Verification:
requester
ˆ
s
(cid:32)
ˆ
rx
(cid:14)
ˆˆ
mk
(mod
q
)
 and

(cid:16)
(cid:32)
(cid:14)
ˆˆ
rrs
bm
s
checkng whether
q
(mod
s (cid:32)
g
)
....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Analysis of traceability attack on Camenisch et al.'s blind signature
schemes
author:Lin-Chuan Wu
Analysis of Traceability Attack on Camenisch et al.'s Blind
Signature Schemes
Lin-Chuan Wu
Telecommunication Laboratories, CHT.
12, Lane 551, Min-Tsu Road Sec. 5
Yang-Mei, Taoyuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.
TEL: +886-3-4244151
E-mail: lcwu@cht.com.tw
ABSTRACT
Recently,  Lee  et  al.  asserted  that  Camensch  et  al.’s  schemes
cannot  satsfy  the  untraceablty  property  of  blnd  sgnature
scheme.    In  ths  paper,  we  analyze  that  Lee  et  al.’s  traceablty
attack s flawed.
Keywords:  Untraceablty,  Blnd  Sgnature,  Dgtal  Sgnature,
Cryptography, Informaton Securty.
INTRODUCTION
A blnd sgnature scheme s a protocol to allow the requester to
obtan  a  sgnature  wthout  revealng  message  and  the  sgner
cannot trace any message-sgnature par later.  It can acheve the
unforgeablty  property  for  the  sgner  and  the  untraceablty  for
the requester.  Camensch et al. [] proposed two blnd sgnature
schemes based on the dscrete logarthm problem.
REVIEW OF CAMENISCH et al.’s SCHEMES
The  sgner  and  requester  are  two  knds  of  partcpant  and  the
detals  of  Camensch  et  al.’s  DSA  blnd  sgnature  scheme  are
descrbed n the followng.
(1)  Initialization:  The  sgner  selects  a  random  number  x ,  and
.    Fnally,  (s)he  randomly  selects  kˆ
computes
 to the requester.
(mod p
)
p
(mod
)
x(cid:32)
g
ˆ
k(cid:32)
g
and sends
y
ˆ
r
(2)  Requesting:  The  requester  selects  two  random  numbers
qZba (cid:143),
.    Then,  (s)he
calculates
a(cid:32)
ˆ
gr
 and sends  mˆ  to the sgner.
q
)
 and  computes
ˆ
m
r
(mod
(mod
ˆ
rram
(cid:32)

(cid:16)
p
)
b
(3)  Signing:  The  sgner  computes
sends  sˆ  back to the requester.
(4)
The
Verification:
requester
ˆ
s
(cid:32)
ˆ
rx
(cid:14)
ˆˆ
mk
(mod
q
)
 and

(cid:16)
(cid:32)
(cid:14)
ˆˆ
rrs
bm
s
checkng whether
q
(mod
s (cid:32)
g
)
....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars
author:Lorrie Faith Cranor and
Serge Egelman and
Jason I. Hong and
Yue Zhang
Phinding Phish: Evaluating Anti-Phishing Tools   Yue Zhang, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor, and Jason Hong Carnegie Mellon University zysxqn@andrew.cmu.edu, {egelman, lorrie, jasonh}@cs.cmu.edu    Abstract  There are currently dozens of freely available tools to combat phishing and other web-based scams, many of which are web browser extensions that warn users when they are browsing a suspected phishing site. We developed an automated test bed for testing anti-phishing tools. We used 200 verified phishing URLs from two sources and 516 legitimate URLs to test the effectiveness of 10 popular anti-phishing tools. Only one tool was able to consistently identify more than 90% of phishing URLs correctly; however, it also incorrectly identified 42% of legitimate URLs as phish. The performance of the other tools varied considerably depending on the source of the phishing URLs. Of these remaining tools, only one correctly identified over 60% of phishing URLs from both sources. Performance also changed significantly depending on the freshness of the phishing URLs tested. Thus we demonstrate that the source of phishing URLs and the freshness of the URLs tested can significantly impact the results of anti-phishing tool testing. We also demonstrate that many of the tools we tested were vulnerable to simple exploits. In this paper we describe our anti-phishing tool test bed, summarize our findings, and offer observations about the effectiveness of these tools as well as ways they might be improved.  1. Introduction  Over the past few years we have seen an increase in “semantic attacks” — computer security attacks that exploit human vulnerabilities rather than software vulnerabilities. Phishing is a type of semantic attack in which victims are sent emails that deceive them into providing account numbers, passwords, or other personal information t...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Phinding Phish: An Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Toolbars
author:Lorrie Faith Cranor and
Serge Egelman and
Jason I. Hong and
Yue Zhang
Phinding Phish: Evaluating Anti-Phishing Tools   Yue Zhang, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor, and Jason Hong Carnegie Mellon University zysxqn@andrew.cmu.edu, {egelman, lorrie, jasonh}@cs.cmu.edu    Abstract  There are currently dozens of freely available tools to combat phishing and other web-based scams, many of which are web browser extensions that warn users when they are browsing a suspected phishing site. We developed an automated test bed for testing anti-phishing tools. We used 200 verified phishing URLs from two sources and 516 legitimate URLs to test the effectiveness of 10 popular anti-phishing tools. Only one tool was able to consistently identify more than 90% of phishing URLs correctly; however, it also incorrectly identified 42% of legitimate URLs as phish. The performance of the other tools varied considerably depending on the source of the phishing URLs. Of these remaining tools, only one correctly identified over 60% of phishing URLs from both sources. Performance also changed significantly depending on the freshness of the phishing URLs tested. Thus we demonstrate that the source of phishing URLs and the freshness of the URLs tested can significantly impact the results of anti-phishing tool testing. We also demonstrate that many of the tools we tested were vulnerable to simple exploits. In this paper we describe our anti-phishing tool test bed, summarize our findings, and offer observations about the effectiveness of these tools as well as ways they might be improved.  1. Introduction  Over the past few years we have seen an increase in “semantic attacks” — computer security attacks that exploit human vulnerabilities rather than software vulnerabilities. Phishing is a type of semantic attack in which victims are sent emails that deceive them into providing account numbers, passwords, or other personal information t...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of Mobile and IoT Devices
from (Public) WiFi
author:Lingjing Yu and
Bo Luo and
Jun Ma and
Zhaoyu Zhou and
Qingyun Liu
You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of
Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi
Lingjing Yu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences;
School of Cybersecurity, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Bo Luo,
The University of Kansas; Jun Ma, Tsinghua University; Zhaoyu Zhou and
Qingyun Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/yu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.You Are What You Broadcast:
Identiﬁcation of Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi
Lingjing Yu†‡, Bo Luo§, Jun Ma(cid:93)(cid:92), Zhaoyu Zhou†‡, Qingyun Liu†‡
† National Engineering Lab for Information Security Technologies
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
‡ School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
§ EECS/ITTC, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
(cid:93) Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; (cid:92) Pi2star Technology, Beijing, China
yulingjing@iie.ac.cn, bluo@ku.edu, majun_ee@tsinghua.edu.cn, {zhouzhaoyu,liuqingyun}@iie.ac.cn
Abstract
With the rapid growth of mobile devices and WiFi hotspots,
security risks arise. In practice, it is critical for administrators
of corporate and public wireless networks to identify the type
and/or model of devices connected to the network, in order
to set access/ﬁrewall rules, to check for known vulnerabili-
ties, or to conﬁgure IDS accordingly. Mobile devices are not
obligated to report their detailed identities when they join a
(public) wireless network, while adversaries could easily forge
device at...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of Mobile and IoT Devices
from (Public) WiFi
author:Lingjing Yu and
Bo Luo and
Jun Ma and
Zhaoyu Zhou and
Qingyun Liu
You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of
Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi
Lingjing Yu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences;
School of Cybersecurity, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Bo Luo,
The University of Kansas; Jun Ma, Tsinghua University; Zhaoyu Zhou and
Qingyun Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/yu
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.August 12–14, 2020978-1-939133-17-5Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.You Are What You Broadcast:
Identiﬁcation of Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi
Lingjing Yu†‡, Bo Luo§, Jun Ma(cid:93)(cid:92), Zhaoyu Zhou†‡, Qingyun Liu†‡
† National Engineering Lab for Information Security Technologies
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
‡ School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
§ EECS/ITTC, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
(cid:93) Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; (cid:92) Pi2star Technology, Beijing, China
yulingjing@iie.ac.cn, bluo@ku.edu, majun_ee@tsinghua.edu.cn, {zhouzhaoyu,liuqingyun}@iie.ac.cn
Abstract
With the rapid growth of mobile devices and WiFi hotspots,
security risks arise. In practice, it is critical for administrators
of corporate and public wireless networks to identify the type
and/or model of devices connected to the network, in order
to set access/ﬁrewall rules, to check for known vulnerabili-
ties, or to conﬁgure IDS accordingly. Mobile devices are not
obligated to report their detailed identities when they join a
(public) wireless network, while adversaries could easily forge
device at...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Efficiently Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Data
author:Dario Fiore and
Rosario Gennaro and
Valerio Pastro
Eﬃciently Veriﬁable Computation on Encrypted Data(cid:63)
Dario Fiore1, Rosario Gennaro2, and Valerio Pastro2
1 IMDEA Software Institute
dario.fiore@imdea.org
2 Center for Algorithms and Interactive Scientiﬁc Software, The City College of New York
{rosario,pastro}@cs.ccny.cuny.edu
Abstract. We study the task of veriﬁable delegation of computation on encrypted data. We improve
previous deﬁnitions in order to tolerate adversaries that learn whether or not clients accept the result
of a delegated computation. In this strong model, we construct a scheme for arbitrary computations
and highly eﬃcient schemes for delegation of various classes of functions, such as linear combinations,
high-degree univariate polynomials, and multivariate quadratic polynomials. Notably, the latter class
includes many useful statistics. Using our solution, a client can store a large encrypted dataset on a
server, query statistics over this data, and receive encrypted results that can be eﬃciently veriﬁed and
decrypted.
As a key contribution for the eﬃciency of our schemes, we develop a novel homomorphic hashing
technique that allows us to eﬃciently authenticate computations, at the same cost as if the data
were in the clear, avoiding a 104 overhead which would occur with a naive approach. We support our
theoretical constructions with extensive implementation tests that show the practical feasibility of our
schemes.
(cid:63) An extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of ACM CCS 2014. This is the full version.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Our Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Other Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Efficiently Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Data
author:Dario Fiore and
Rosario Gennaro and
Valerio Pastro
Eﬃciently Veriﬁable Computation on Encrypted Data(cid:63)
Dario Fiore1, Rosario Gennaro2, and Valerio Pastro2
1 IMDEA Software Institute
dario.fiore@imdea.org
2 Center for Algorithms and Interactive Scientiﬁc Software, The City College of New York
{rosario,pastro}@cs.ccny.cuny.edu
Abstract. We study the task of veriﬁable delegation of computation on encrypted data. We improve
previous deﬁnitions in order to tolerate adversaries that learn whether or not clients accept the result
of a delegated computation. In this strong model, we construct a scheme for arbitrary computations
and highly eﬃcient schemes for delegation of various classes of functions, such as linear combinations,
high-degree univariate polynomials, and multivariate quadratic polynomials. Notably, the latter class
includes many useful statistics. Using our solution, a client can store a large encrypted dataset on a
server, query statistics over this data, and receive encrypted results that can be eﬃciently veriﬁed and
decrypted.
As a key contribution for the eﬃciency of our schemes, we develop a novel homomorphic hashing
technique that allows us to eﬃciently authenticate computations, at the same cost as if the data
were in the clear, avoiding a 104 overhead which would occur with a naive approach. We support our
theoretical constructions with extensive implementation tests that show the practical feasibility of our
schemes.
(cid:63) An extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of ACM CCS 2014. This is the full version.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Our Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Other Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Passwords on flexible display devices
author:Sana Maqsood and
Sonia Chiasson and
Audrey Girouard
POSTER: Passwords on Flexible Display Devices
Sana Maqsood, Sonia Chiasson, Audrey Girouard
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
{sana.maqsood, audrey.girouard}@carleton.ca, chiasson@scs.carleton.ca
ABSTRACT
Flexible display devices allow users to interact with the de-
vice by deforming the surface of the display to trigger a com-
mand. When these devices become mainstream, for exam-
ple as smart phones, e-readers, or tablets, they will require
a means of authenticating legitimate users. In this poster,
we present an authentication scheme for ﬂexible display de-
vices, its implementation on a ﬂexible display prototype and
an ongoing user study evaluating the usability and security
of our system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.2 [Interfaces and Representation]: User Interfaces—
Input devices and strategies
Keywords
Usable Security, Flexible Displays, Authentication
1.
INTRODUCTION
Flexible display devices allow users to interact with the
device by deforming the surface of the display to trigger a
command. Application areas for ﬂexible display devices in-
clude gaming, control of media and home appliances, and
smart phones [4]. While these devices are currently not
available to consumers, several prototypes have been devel-
oped to explore their interaction modalities. Lahey et al.
created PaperPhone, a ﬂexible display smart phone [5]. In
their user studies, participants deﬁned bend gestures and
associated them with functionalities. Based on the results
from their user studies, Lahey et al. proposed a classiﬁcation
scheme that categorized bend gestures by location (top cor-
ner, side, or bottom corner) and their polarity (up or down).
Kildal et al. developed the Kinetic device, a deformable mo-
bile phone [4]. They used this device to explore bending
and twisting, and proposed a set of design guidelines for de-
formable devices [4]. When ﬂexible display device...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Passwords on flexible display devices
author:Sana Maqsood and
Sonia Chiasson and
Audrey Girouard
POSTER: Passwords on Flexible Display Devices
Sana Maqsood, Sonia Chiasson, Audrey Girouard
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
{sana.maqsood, audrey.girouard}@carleton.ca, chiasson@scs.carleton.ca
ABSTRACT
Flexible display devices allow users to interact with the de-
vice by deforming the surface of the display to trigger a com-
mand. When these devices become mainstream, for exam-
ple as smart phones, e-readers, or tablets, they will require
a means of authenticating legitimate users. In this poster,
we present an authentication scheme for ﬂexible display de-
vices, its implementation on a ﬂexible display prototype and
an ongoing user study evaluating the usability and security
of our system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.2 [Interfaces and Representation]: User Interfaces—
Input devices and strategies
Keywords
Usable Security, Flexible Displays, Authentication
1.
INTRODUCTION
Flexible display devices allow users to interact with the
device by deforming the surface of the display to trigger a
command. Application areas for ﬂexible display devices in-
clude gaming, control of media and home appliances, and
smart phones [4]. While these devices are currently not
available to consumers, several prototypes have been devel-
oped to explore their interaction modalities. Lahey et al.
created PaperPhone, a ﬂexible display smart phone [5]. In
their user studies, participants deﬁned bend gestures and
associated them with functionalities. Based on the results
from their user studies, Lahey et al. proposed a classiﬁcation
scheme that categorized bend gestures by location (top cor-
ner, side, or bottom corner) and their polarity (up or down).
Kildal et al. developed the Kinetic device, a deformable mo-
bile phone [4]. They used this device to explore bending
and twisting, and proposed a set of design guidelines for de-
formable devices [4]. When ﬂexible display device...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Increased DNS forgery resistance through 0x20-bit encoding: security
via leet queries
author:David Dagon and
Manos Antonakakis and
Paul Vixie and
Tatuya Jinmei and
Wenke Lee
Increased DNS Forgery Resistance
Through 0x20-Bit Encoding
SecURItY viA LeET QueRieS
David Dagon
Georgia Institute of
Technology
Manos Antonakakis
Georgia Institute of
Technology
dagon@cc.gatech.edu
manos@cc.gatech.edu
Paul Vixie
Internet Systems Consortium
Paul_Vixie@isc.org
Tatuya Jinmei
Internet Systems Consortium
Jinmei_Tatuya@isc.org
ABSTRACT
We describe a novel, practical and simple technique to make DNS
queries more resistant to poisoning attacks: mix the upper and
lower case spelling of the domain name in the query. Fortuitously,
almost all DNS authority servers preserve the mixed case encoding
of the query in answer messages. Attackers hoping to poison a DNS
cache must therefore guess the mixed-case encoding of the query,
in addition to all other ﬁelds required in a DNS poisoning attack.
This increases the difﬁculty of the attack. We describe and measure
the additional protections realized by this technique. Our analysis
includes a basic model of DNS poisoning, measurement of the ben-
eﬁts that come from case-sensitive query encoding, implementation
of the system for recursive DNS servers, and large-scale real-world
experimental evaluation. Since the beneﬁts of our technique can be
signiﬁcant, we have simultaneously made this DNS encoding sys-
tem a proposed IETF standard. Our approach is practical enough
that, just weeks after its disclosure, it is being implemented by nu-
merous DNS vendors.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Reliability, availability, and ser-
viceability.
General Terms
Measurement, Security, Standardization.
Keywords
DNS poisoning, DNS-0x20, computer security.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed f...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Increased DNS forgery resistance through 0x20-bit encoding: security
via leet queries
author:David Dagon and
Manos Antonakakis and
Paul Vixie and
Tatuya Jinmei and
Wenke Lee
Increased DNS Forgery Resistance
Through 0x20-Bit Encoding
SecURItY viA LeET QueRieS
David Dagon
Georgia Institute of
Technology
Manos Antonakakis
Georgia Institute of
Technology
dagon@cc.gatech.edu
manos@cc.gatech.edu
Paul Vixie
Internet Systems Consortium
Paul_Vixie@isc.org
Tatuya Jinmei
Internet Systems Consortium
Jinmei_Tatuya@isc.org
ABSTRACT
We describe a novel, practical and simple technique to make DNS
queries more resistant to poisoning attacks: mix the upper and
lower case spelling of the domain name in the query. Fortuitously,
almost all DNS authority servers preserve the mixed case encoding
of the query in answer messages. Attackers hoping to poison a DNS
cache must therefore guess the mixed-case encoding of the query,
in addition to all other ﬁelds required in a DNS poisoning attack.
This increases the difﬁculty of the attack. We describe and measure
the additional protections realized by this technique. Our analysis
includes a basic model of DNS poisoning, measurement of the ben-
eﬁts that come from case-sensitive query encoding, implementation
of the system for recursive DNS servers, and large-scale real-world
experimental evaluation. Since the beneﬁts of our technique can be
signiﬁcant, we have simultaneously made this DNS encoding sys-
tem a proposed IETF standard. Our approach is practical enough
that, just weeks after its disclosure, it is being implemented by nu-
merous DNS vendors.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Reliability, availability, and ser-
viceability.
General Terms
Measurement, Security, Standardization.
Keywords
DNS poisoning, DNS-0x20, computer security.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed f...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:HookFinder: Identifying and Understanding Malware Hooking Behaviors
author:Heng Yin and
Zhenkai Liang and
Dawn Song
HookFinder: Identifying and Understanding Malware Hooking Behaviors
Heng Yin†‡
hyin@ece.cmu.edu
Zhenkai Liang†
Dawn Song§†
zliang@cmu.edu dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu
†Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
‡College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA
§UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Abstract
Installing various hooks into the victim system is an
important attacking strategy employed by malware, in-
cluding spyware, rootkits, stealth backdoors, and others.
In order to defeat existing hook detectors, malware writ-
ers keep exploring new hooking mechanisms. However,
the current malware analysis procedure is painstak-
ing, mostly manual and error-prone.
In this paper,
we propose the ﬁrst systematic approach for automat-
ically identifying hooks and extracting hooking mech-
anisms. We propose a uniﬁed approach, ﬁne-grained
impact analysis, to identify malware hooking behaviors.
Our approach does not rely on any prior knowledge of
hooking mechanisms, and thus can identify novel hook-
ing mechanisms. Moreover, we devise a method using
semantics-aware impact dependency analysis to provide
a succinct and intuitive graph representation to illus-
trate hooking mechanisms. We have developed a proto-
type, HookFinder, and conducted extensive experiments
using representative malware samples from various cat-
egories. We have demonstrated that HookFinder can
correctly identify the hooking behaviors of all samples,
and provide accurate insights about their hooking mech-
anisms.
1 Introduction
The arms race between malware writers and malware
defenders is escalating. In order to evade malware de-
fense techniques, malware writers are always striving to
explore novel attacking techniques. In response, mal-
ware defenders must accurately and responsively under-
stand malware’s attacking vectors to gain an upper hand.
One important malware attacking vecto...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:HookFinder: Identifying and Understanding Malware Hooking Behaviors
author:Heng Yin and
Zhenkai Liang and
Dawn Song
HookFinder: Identifying and Understanding Malware Hooking Behaviors
Heng Yin†‡
hyin@ece.cmu.edu
Zhenkai Liang†
Dawn Song§†
zliang@cmu.edu dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu
†Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
‡College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA
§UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Abstract
Installing various hooks into the victim system is an
important attacking strategy employed by malware, in-
cluding spyware, rootkits, stealth backdoors, and others.
In order to defeat existing hook detectors, malware writ-
ers keep exploring new hooking mechanisms. However,
the current malware analysis procedure is painstak-
ing, mostly manual and error-prone.
In this paper,
we propose the ﬁrst systematic approach for automat-
ically identifying hooks and extracting hooking mech-
anisms. We propose a uniﬁed approach, ﬁne-grained
impact analysis, to identify malware hooking behaviors.
Our approach does not rely on any prior knowledge of
hooking mechanisms, and thus can identify novel hook-
ing mechanisms. Moreover, we devise a method using
semantics-aware impact dependency analysis to provide
a succinct and intuitive graph representation to illus-
trate hooking mechanisms. We have developed a proto-
type, HookFinder, and conducted extensive experiments
using representative malware samples from various cat-
egories. We have demonstrated that HookFinder can
correctly identify the hooking behaviors of all samples,
and provide accurate insights about their hooking mech-
anisms.
1 Introduction
The arms race between malware writers and malware
defenders is escalating. In order to evade malware de-
fense techniques, malware writers are always striving to
explore novel attacking techniques. In response, mal-
ware defenders must accurately and responsively under-
stand malware’s attacking vectors to gain an upper hand.
One important malware attacking vecto...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:ShadowMonitor: An Effective In-VM Monitoring Framework with Hardware-Enforced
Isolation
author:Bin Shi and
Lei Cui and
Bo Li and
Xudong Liu and
Zhiyu Hao and
Haiying Shen
ShadowMonitor: An Eﬀective In-VM
Monitoring Framework with
Hardware-Enforced Isolation
Bin Shi1, Lei Cui2(B), Bo Li1, Xudong Liu1, Zhiyu Hao2, and Haiying Shen3
1 State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment, Beihang University,
{shibin,libo,liuxd}@act.buaa.edu.cn
Beijing, China
{cuilei,haozhiyu}@iie.ac.cn
2 Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
3 Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA
hs6ms@virginia.edu
Abstract. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is one compelling tech-
nique to enhance system security in clouds. It is able to provide strong
isolation between untrusted guests and security tools placed in guests,
thereby enabling dependability of the security tools even if the guest
has been compromised. Due to this beneﬁt, VMI has been widely used
for cloud security such as intrusion detection, security monitoring, and
tampering forensics. However, existing VMI solutions suﬀer signiﬁcant
performance degradation mainly due to the high overhead upon frequent
memory address translations and context-switches. This drawback limits
its usage in many real-world scenarios, especially when ﬁne-grained mon-
itoring is desired. In this paper, we present ShadowMonitor, an eﬀective
VMI framework that enables eﬃcient in-VM monitoring without impos-
ing signiﬁcant overhead. ShadowMonitor decomposes the whole moni-
toring system into two compartments and then assigns each compart-
ment with isolated address space. By placing the monitored components
in the protected compartment, ShadowMonitor guarantees the safety of
both monitoring tools and guests. In addition, ShadowMonitor employs
hardware-enforced instructions to design the gates across two compart-
ments, thereby providing eﬃcient switching between compartm...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:ShadowMonitor: An Effective In-VM Monitoring Framework with Hardware-Enforced
Isolation
author:Bin Shi and
Lei Cui and
Bo Li and
Xudong Liu and
Zhiyu Hao and
Haiying Shen
ShadowMonitor: An Eﬀective In-VM
Monitoring Framework with
Hardware-Enforced Isolation
Bin Shi1, Lei Cui2(B), Bo Li1, Xudong Liu1, Zhiyu Hao2, and Haiying Shen3
1 State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment, Beihang University,
{shibin,libo,liuxd}@act.buaa.edu.cn
Beijing, China
{cuilei,haozhiyu}@iie.ac.cn
2 Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
3 Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA
hs6ms@virginia.edu
Abstract. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is one compelling tech-
nique to enhance system security in clouds. It is able to provide strong
isolation between untrusted guests and security tools placed in guests,
thereby enabling dependability of the security tools even if the guest
has been compromised. Due to this beneﬁt, VMI has been widely used
for cloud security such as intrusion detection, security monitoring, and
tampering forensics. However, existing VMI solutions suﬀer signiﬁcant
performance degradation mainly due to the high overhead upon frequent
memory address translations and context-switches. This drawback limits
its usage in many real-world scenarios, especially when ﬁne-grained mon-
itoring is desired. In this paper, we present ShadowMonitor, an eﬀective
VMI framework that enables eﬃcient in-VM monitoring without impos-
ing signiﬁcant overhead. ShadowMonitor decomposes the whole moni-
toring system into two compartments and then assigns each compart-
ment with isolated address space. By placing the monitored components
in the protected compartment, ShadowMonitor guarantees the safety of
both monitoring tools and guests. In addition, ShadowMonitor employs
hardware-enforced instructions to design the gates across two compart-
ments, thereby providing eﬃcient switching between compartm...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Poster: When Adversary Becomes the Guardian - Towards Side-channel
Security With Adversarial Attacks
author:Stjepan Picek and
Dirmanto Jap and
Shivam Bhasin
Poster: When Adversary Becomes the Guardian –
Towards Side-channel Security With Adversarial Attacks
Delft University of Technology, Delft,
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Stjepan Picek
The Netherlands
s.picek@tudelft.nl
Dirmanto Jap
Singapore
djap@ntu.edu.sg
Shivam Bhasin
Singapore
sbhasin@ntu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Machine learning algorithms fall prey to adversarial examples. As
profiling side-channel attacks are seeing rapid adoption of machine
learning-based approaches that can even defeat commonly used
side-channel countermeasures, we investigate the potential of ad-
versarial example as a defense mechanism. We show that adversarial
examples have the potential to serve as a countermeasure against
machine learning-based side-channel attacks. Further, we exploit
the transferability property to show that a common adversarial
example can act as a countermeasure against a range of machine
learning-based side-channel classifiers.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; • Computing methodologies → Adversarial learn-
ing;
KEYWORDS
Side-channel Analysis; Profiled Attacks; Adversarial Examples; Ma-
chine Learning
ACM Reference Format:
Stjepan Picek, Dirmanto Jap, and Shivam Bhasin. 2019. Poster: When Adver-
sary Becomes the Guardian – Towards Side-channel Security With Adver-
sarial Attacks. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom.
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363284
1 INTRODUCTION
The field of deep learning has advanced rapidly in the past decade,
which is in line with the increase in computer processing power
and the proliferation of data. That progress is not limited to a
few domains but is spreading ever faster thr...


Instruction: 总结这篇安全研究的主要观点

Input:
title:Poster: When Adversary Becomes the Guardian - Towards Side-channel
Security With Adversarial Attacks
author:Stjepan Picek and
Dirmanto Jap and
Shivam Bhasin
Poster: When Adversary Becomes the Guardian –
Towards Side-channel Security With Adversarial Attacks
Delft University of Technology, Delft,
Nanyang Technological University
Nanyang Technological University
Stjepan Picek
The Netherlands
s.picek@tudelft.nl
Dirmanto Jap
Singapore
djap@ntu.edu.sg
Shivam Bhasin
Singapore
sbhasin@ntu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Machine learning algorithms fall prey to adversarial examples. As
profiling side-channel attacks are seeing rapid adoption of machine
learning-based approaches that can even defeat commonly used
side-channel countermeasures, we investigate the potential of ad-
versarial example as a defense mechanism. We show that adversarial
examples have the potential to serve as a countermeasure against
machine learning-based side-channel attacks. Further, we exploit
the transferability property to show that a common adversarial
example can act as a countermeasure against a range of machine
learning-based side-channel classifiers.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; • Computing methodologies → Adversarial learn-
ing;
KEYWORDS
Side-channel Analysis; Profiled Attacks; Adversarial Examples; Ma-
chine Learning
ACM Reference Format:
Stjepan Picek, Dirmanto Jap, and Shivam Bhasin. 2019. Poster: When Adver-
sary Becomes the Guardian – Towards Side-channel Security With Adver-
sarial Attacks. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom.
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363284
1 INTRODUCTION
The field of deep learning has advanced rapidly in the past decade,
which is in line with the increase in computer processing power
and the proliferation of data. That progress is not limited to a
few domains but is spreading ever faster thr...

Output: 这篇论文提供了重要的安全研究见解，对网络安全防护具有指导意义。


Instruction: 请分析这篇安全论文的内容

Output:
安全论文分析：

title:Managing heterogeneous network environments using an extensible policy
framework
author:Lawrence Teo and
Gail-Joon Ahn
Managing Heterogeneous Network Environments Using an
Extensible Policy Framework
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
College of Computing and Informatics
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
College of Computing and Informatics
Gail-Joon Ahn †
gahn@uncc.edu
Lawrence Teo
lcteo@uncc.edu
ABSTRACT
Security policy management is critical to meet organiza-
tional needs and reduce potential risks because almost ev-
ery organization depends on computer networks and the In-
ternet for their daily operations. It is therefore important
to specify and enforce security policies eﬀectively. How-
ever, as organizations grow, so do their networks increas-
ing the diﬃculty of deploying a security policy, especially
across heterogeneous systems. In this paper, we introduce
a policy framework called Chameleos-x which is designed to
enforce security policies consistently across security-aware
systems with network services–primarily operating systems,
ﬁrewalls, and intrusion detection systems. Throughout this
paper, we focus on the design and architecture of Chameleos-
x and demonstrate how our policy framework helps organi-
zations implement security policies in changing, diversity-
rich environments. We also describe our experimentation of
Chameleos-x to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed
approach.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Businesses and organizations depend heavily on computer
networks and information systems for their daily operations.
Due to this ever-increasing reliance on computer systems, it
is critical for organizations to implement a carefully-designed
security policy for their networks and information systems.
When organizations grow, so do their computer networks
and information systems. This growth tends to introduce
diversity and heterogeneity into the network, especially as
new operating systems, network devices, and security tech-
nologie...